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Hume and the Nature of Taste Author(s): James R.

Shelley Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter, 1998), pp. 29-38 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/431945 . Accessed: 16/05/2012 12:29
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JAMES R. SHELLEY

Hume and the Natureof Taste

What, accordingto Hume, accountsfor the normative force of the standardof taste?1That standard, Hume declares in his essay "Of the Standard of Taste,"2is "the joint verdict" of "true judges" (p. 241), a truejudge being a critic who possesses delicatetaste and strongsense, who has practiced and formed comparisons, and who lacks prejudice (pp. 234-242).3 What, then, makes the joint verdict of such critics the standard? Suppose that my verdict of a particular workdiverges from a verdictjointly renderedby critics possessing the above five characteristics. Why,as Hume says, must I regardmyself as "the bad critic,"and "conclude,upon the whole, that the fault lies in [me]" (p. 236)? How can their taste possibly be binding on mine? That Hume'sessay fails to addresssuch questions-that it simply contains no account of whatmakes the standardthe standard-is ajoint verdictof recentpapersby TedCohenand Theodore Gracyk.To his conclusion thatHume'stheory of taste is "themost appealing,and most defensible, theory of taste I know or can imagine," Cohen, in his perceptive"PartialEnchantments of the QuixoteStory in Hume'sEssay on Taste," appendsthe following reservation:
The theory does, however, leave one insidious question. I will raise it and then leave it. The proto-question is this: In what sense is the response of a true judge correct?4

Taste," also expresses admiration for Hume's essay, referringto it as a "mature masterpiece."5 But Gracyk goes on to contend that the essay contains no argumentfor the superiorityof the taste of true judges over other tastes, despite Hume's assertion, near the essay's end, that his "presentpurpose" is to "have proved, that the taste of all individualsis not upon equal footing,
and that some men in general ... will be ac-

knowledged by universal sentiment to have a preferenceabove others"(p. 242). Hume'sargument for such a conclusion, Gracykmaintains, can be located only in earlier essays.6 I disagree, on this point, with Cohen and Gracyk. The aim of this paper is to present a reading of Hume's essay which locates an account of the normative force of Hume's standard of taste precisely where Hume claims to have placed it. Let me begin with an attempt to clarify the meaningof a seriesof difficult sentences,largely ignoredby exegetes of Hume's essay:
(a) Some particularforms or qualities, from the original structureof the internalfabric, are calculatedto please, and othersto displease;and if they fail of their effect in any particularinstance, it is from some apparentdefect or imperfectionin the organ. (p. 233) (b) Though some objects, by the structure of the mind, be naturallycalculatedto give pleasure,it is not to be expected, that in every individual the pleasure will be equally felt. (p. 234) (c) Thus, though the principles of taste be universal, and nearly,if not entirelythe same in all men; yet few are qualified to give judgmenton any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty.(p. 241)

That is indeed the "proto-question," it is inand deed insidious, assumingthatHume, in fact, has left it unaddressed:to have done so is to have failed to explain what makes the standardthe standard,and it is hardto imagine a greaterdeficiency in Hume's theory of taste. Gracyk, in his useful "Rethinking Hume's Standard of

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism56:1 Winter 1998

30 of (d) The generalprinciples taste are uniformin Wheremen vary in theirjudgments, humannature: in somedefector perversion the faculties maycommonlybe remarked. 243) (p. A couple of preliminary points, which I hope will not be controversial,are in order.First, in interpretingthe above sentences we shouldkeep in mind that they frame the section of the essay in which Hume details the five characteristics of truejudges (pp. 234-241) and claims that their "jointverdict"is "the true standardof taste and beauty"(p. 241): sentences (a) and (b) appearin paragraphswhich introduce this section; sentences (c) and (d) appear in paragraphsat or near its close. This means that Hume's references, in sentences (a) and (d), to the "defects," of "imperfections,"and "perversions" the "faculties" or "organ"refer specifically to the five ways, described in that section, in which one may fail to be a true judge. It also means that when Hume claims, in (c), that "few are qualified to give judgment on any work of art, or establish their own sentiment as the standardof beauty,"the "few" he is referringto are those who qualify, by possession of the five characteristics, as truejudges. The second preliminary point is that the "principlesof taste," which Hume claims to be "universal"or "uniform in human nature"in sentences (c) and (d), just are principlesroughly statingthat, as Humeputs it in sentences (a) and (b), certain "forms or qualities ... are [naturally] calculated to please, and others to displease." That this is so becomes clear once sentence (b) is given some context: are Manyandfrequent thedefectsin the internal oror the gans,whichprevent weaken influence those of
general principles, on which depends our sentiment

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism are "naturally calculated"to producefeelings of pleasure or displeasure, while in the second clause he claims, essentially,thatonly those few who are free of the five "defects"or "imperfections," describedby Hume in the section on true judges, feel the pleasure or displeasure which thosequalitiesarenaturally calculated produce. to As I have already mentioned, the expanding literatureon Hume's essay largely ignores these sentences.An exceptionis RichardShusterman's provocativepaper"Of the Scandal of Taste:Natureas Social Privilegein the AestheticTheories of Hume and Kant,"which takes a particular inof terpretation them as its basis. Shusterman reasons that since certain qualities of objects are "naturally calculated" give pleasureor displeato sure, and only true judges feel that pleasure or displeasure,it follows that only true judges feel what is natural. Fromthis Shusterman concludes that the taste of true judges is, for Hume, more natural thanthe taste of all others,and thatit is in virtue of its unique naturalness that the taste of true judges is the standardof taste.7 This, according to Shusterman,allows Hume to argue "the enlightenment'scase that if only we could see things naturally(free from disease and cultural prejudice)we would all see them aright," and places him in position to put forward the taste of "a healthy innocentor hommesauvage" as the standard.8 instead,accordingto ShusBut terman,Hume does what can be explained only by his deep and unacknowledged purposeof enshrining the tastes of his own socio-economic class as the standard: describesthe truejudge, he by means of each of the five characteristics, as "someone who is thoroughlyeducated, socially trained,and culturallyconditioned."9 This leads Shusterman concludethat to despitehis recognition tasteinvolves that muchmore thannatural never facesupto thefactthat gifts,Hume this completely undermines appealto a natural his standard tastethrough common of the natural constitution mankind, of through "general ... principles uniformin human nature.?10 Thus, while Shusterman, unlike Cohen and Gracyk,does locate in Hume'sessay an account of the normativity of the standard, it is an account hopelessly divided against itself: on the one hand, Hume asserts that the taste of true judges is the standard because of its unique

of beauty deformity. or Though someobjects, the by of structure the mind,be naturally calculated give to it pleasure, is not to be expected,thatin everyindividualthe pleasure be equallyfelt. (p. 234, emwill phasisadded) What this means is that Hume is making essentially the same point in each of the above sentences (which should give us some indicationof the importanceHume attaches to that point). In the opening clause Humeclaims, essentially,that certain qualities, "by the structureof the mind,"

Shelley Hume and the Natureof Taste on claim to naturalness; the other,Hume defines truejudges in such a way that not merely one or two, but ratherall five of the requisitecharacteristics are unnaturalthrough some sort of social contamination. I am not interestedin contesting the latter of these two points,bothbecauseShusterman makes a strongcase that the five characteristicsare soin cially infected and therefore"unnatural" this sense, and because Hume himself appearsto be entirely aware of this fact. He claims, for example, that in order to rid oneself of prejudice, one must abandonone's "natural position" (p. 239). And Hume clearly understandspractice and comparisonto be formsof education,the role of the former being to overcome "natural" deficiencies in delicacy of taste (p. 237), the role of the latter being to give one's mind a particular kind of sophisticationlacking in "themind of a peasant or Indian" (p. 238). There remain, therefore,two possible ways of opposing Shusterman:one may argueeither (a) thatHume uses in the word "natural" more than one sense in the essay, and the sense in which he claims that the taste of true judges is naturaldoes not oppose the sense in which he claims that their taste is or unnatural, (b) thatHume neverclaims thatthe taste of true judges is particularlynatural.The first option has a certain plausibility,given the and slippery natureof the word "natural," given that Hume does employ it equivocally in the essay, as I hope to make clear. But it is the second option I wish to pursue,since I believe it can be shown that Hume does not hold the taste of truejudges to be particularly in natural any sense. We have already noted Shusterman'sreason for attributing claim to Hume.He maintains, this citing portionsof all fourof the sentencesquoted at the beginning of this essay, thatgiven thatcertain qualities are "naturallycalculated"to produce certain feelings, and given that those feelings are producedonly in truejudges, it follows that only truejudges feel what is natural.As obvious as such an attribution may seem, a careful readingof the opening clauses of those sentences shouldmake us uneasy.Humeclaims, in (b), that "someobjects, by the structureof the mind,"are "naturallycalculated to give pleasure,"and his referenceto "themind"certainly makes it sound as if he is talking,not aboutsome very small subset of humanminds, but about the human mind in general. Hume appearsto be saying, in other

31 in words,thatthe humanmind is structured such a way that certain objects naturallygive it pleasure. He appearsto make the same point in the opening clause of (a), in which he picturesquely refers to the mind as the "internalfabric,"and certain asserts thatgiven its "originalstructure," "particularforms or qualities ... are calculated to please, and others to displease." The same point is made, perhapsyet more clearly, in sentences (c) and (d), in which Hume respectively claims thatthe principlesof taste are "universal" and "uniformin humannature." But there is good reason, it seems, to resist this interpretation of the opening clauses of sentences (a) though (d), since all it appearsto accomplish is to rendereach sentence self-contradictory.For how can Hume possibly be asserting, in the same sentence, that the human mind is structuredin such a way that certain qualities of objects naturally(i.e., universally) cause it pleasure and that those same objects cause pleasurein only some humanminds? How can he possibly be asserting, in the same sentence, that the "principlesof taste [are] universal"and that"few are qualifiedto give judgment on any work or art, or establish their own sentiment as the standardof beauty?"It is one thing to maintain, as Shustermandoes, that Hume's essay is divided against itself, but quite another to maintain that a numberof its individual sentences explicitly are. I propose that we can resolve these apparent contradictionsby becoming as clear as possible aboutjust whatexactly Hume'suniversalprinciples of taste state. Shustermanputs forwardthe following view: (1) Certain objects just "are naturallyfitted to excite agreeable sentiments" of beauty in sound humanbeings.1I1 But, as we havejust noted, the last few words of this formulationdo not appearto squarewith the text, at least not with the opening clauses of sentences (a) through(d). I suggest, therefore,that we tentativelydelete the word "sound": (2) Certain objects just are "naturallyfitted to excite agreeable sentiments"of beauty in human beings. It also seems clear that we can expand on this formulationin two ways. First, as sentence (a) makes clear, "certain objects" do not merely

32 produce pleasurable sentiments of beauty, but also displeasurablesentimentsof whatHume labels "deformity"(p. 235). Thus, we can reformulate (2) as follows: (3) Certain objects naturally excite agreeable sentiments of beauty, or disagreeable sentiments of deformity,in humanbeings. Second, and more importantly,we should note that Hume's view is not merely that certain objects naturallyproduce sentiments of beauty or deformity in human beings, although sentence (b), taken in isolation, may seem to suggest this. Sentence (a) reflects Hume's more precise (and typical) way of putting the matter: it is not so much the object, but the "particularforms or qualities" in it which naturally produce the agreeable sentimentsof beauty.Thus: (4) Certain forms or qualities of objects naturally excite agreeablesentimentsof beauty,or disagreeable sentiments of deformity, in human beings. The difference between (3) and (4) is small but crucial. If the principlesof taste state merely thatcertain objectsnaturally(universally)excite agreeable sentiments of beauty,or disagreeable sentiments of deformity,in human beings, then sentences (b) through (d) truly are self-contradictory. If two people perceive the same object, and its perceptioncauses pleasurein one but not the other,then it cannotbe thatthe perceptionof the object naturally (universally) causes pleasure in the humanmind. However,if two people perceive the same object, and its perception causes pleasure in one but not in the other,then it can still be the case thatthe perceptionof certain qualities in the object naturally (universally) causes pleasurein the humanmind, since it may be that the one person has perceived the relevantqualities in the object and thatthe other has not. And this, I claim, is precisely the point that Hume is getting at in sentences (a) through (d): the principles of taste are universal-the humanmind is so structured that the perception of certain qualities in objects naturallygives it pleasure or displeasure-but only those who properly perceive all the relevant qualities are qualified to "establish their own sentiment as the standardof beauty"(p. 243). Perhaps Hume's clearest expression of this point appears in his telling and subsequentin-

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism terpretationof the parableof Sancho'skinsmen, which Hume adapts from Don Quixote. Hume has Sancho recountthe story as follows: Two of my kinsmenwere once calledto give their of whichwas supposed be exto opinion a hogshead, cellent,beingold andof a goodvintage. of them One tastesit;considers andaftermature it; reflection pronounces wineto be good,wereit notfor a small the tasteof leather, whichhe perceived it. The other, in afterusingthesameprecautions, alsohisverdict gives in favour thewine;butwiththereserve a tasteof of of iron,whichhe couldeasily distinguish. cannot You howmuchtheywerebothridiculed their imagine for But in judgment. wholaughed theend?Onemptying the hogshead, therewas foundat the bottom,an old key witha leathern thongtiedto it. (pp. 234-235) Hume then begins his interpretation the paraof ble as follows: The greatresemblance betweenmentaland bodily tastewilleasilyteachus to apply story. this it Though be certain,that beautyand deformity, more than sweetandbitter, not qualities objects,butbeare in long entirelyto sentiment,internalor external; it mustbe allowed, there certain that are qualities obin jects,whicharefittedby nature produce to thoseparticular feelings.(p. 235) I take Hume to be proposing here that the parable somehow suggests that "it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in objects, which are fitted by natureto produce [the] particular feelings" of "beauty and deformity," that, in otherwords,the principlesof taste are universal. How does the parable suggest this? It is suggested, I take it, by the fact thatthe discovery of the key and thong silences the ridicule of the townspeople. For what reason have the townspeople, who originally suppose the wine to be excellent, to be silenced, except for their own recognitionthat had they perceivedthe tastes of iron and leather(which it is now clear are present in the wine) they would have concurredin the kinsmen'sdisapproval reservation? put or To the same point more technically, two principles of taste figure in the parable:one statingthatthe perception of iron in wine naturallycauses displeasurein the humanmind, and anotherstating the same thing with regardto the perceptionof leather. The fact that the discovery of the key

Shelley Hume and the Natureof Taste and thong silences the ridiculeof the townspeople reveals the naturalness or universality of these principles, since were it not true that the tastes of iron and leather in wine naturally caused feelings of "deformity"in the human mind (and not true thatthe townspeoplerealized this), the discovery of the key and thong would impute nothing aboutthe meritof the wine. 12 What separatesthe taste of the kinsmen from that of the townspeople, then, has nothing to do with its relative naturalness.Each person'staste is equally natural: each feels the appropriate pleasure or displeasure in accordance with the qualities in the wine perceived by each. What separates the taste of the kinsmen is their perceptual acuity,their ability to detect qualities of the wine which are undetectable by the rest. Hume clarifies this point as he continues his interpretationof the story: in It mustbe allowed, therearecertainqualities that to those objects,whicharefittedby nature produce particular feelings. Now as these qualitiesmay be foundin small degree,or may be mixed and confounded eachother, oftenhappens, thetaste with it that is not affectedwith suchminutequalities, is not or ableto distinguish the particular all amidst flavours, thedisorder, whichtheyarepresented. 235) in (p. We may put Hume's general point another way. According to Hume, there are, as it were, two separablestages involvedin everyjudgment of taste: a perceptual stage, in which we perceive qualities in objects, and an affective stage, in which we feel the sentiments of pleasure or displeasure that arise from our perceptions of qualities. Now, when Hume says that "the general principlesof taste are uniformin humannature"(p. 243), or that"thereare certainqualities in objects, which are fitted by natureto produce [the] feelings" of "beauty and deformity" (p. 235), he is claiming, in effect, that there are no failures at the affective stage. In otherwords, Hume's claim is that althoughpeople do fail to perceive aesthetically relevant qualities in objects, once a quality is perceived an inappropriate sentiment never arises. Thus, while everyone's taste is not equal, given the dependenceof taste on the perceptualfaculty, everyone's taste is equally natural,in the sense that no one ever feels an inappropriatesentiment based on the qualities perceived.

33 If thereare no failuresat the affective stage, it follows thatnone of the "defects," "perversions," and "imperfections"of which Hume speaks in sentences (a) through(d) are "defects,""perversions," or "imperfections" that occur at this stage. And I believe a careful readingof Hume's discussion of the five characteristicsof a true judge confirmsthis. Thatfailuresto possess delicacy of taste and to have practiced constitute "imperfections"or "defects" of perception is perhapsobvious: delicacy of taste is defined as the ability to "perceive every ingredient in the composition"and "to allow nothing to escape" (p. 235), while practice is defined mainly as a means to the acquisition of delicacy of taste (without practice, the mind "cannot perceive the several excellencies of the performance" [p. 237]). That the failureto possess good sense disconstitutes,accordingto Hume,a perceptual order may come as a surprise,given that good sense may seem to be a rationalas opposed to a perceptualcapacity.But Hume is working with a broadnotion of perceptionhere:the critic who lacks good sense fails to "perceive""themutual relationand correspondenceof parts"in a work of art, fails to "perceivethe consistence and uniformity of the whole" (p. 240), and, in general, fails to "discernthe beauties of design and reasoning" (p. 241). Failures to possess either of the remainingtwo characteristics-comparison and lack of prejudice-represent imperfections of a differentorder,since both the critic who has not made comparisons "between the several species and degrees of excellence"and the critic who is prejudicedmay well perceive all the relevant qualities of an object. The critic who has not made comparisons,however,fails to discern the proper comparative rank of the pleasures and displeasures arising from the properties perceived, and hence fails to discern the proper comparative rank of the works themselves (p. 238), while the prejudicedcritic allows pleasures and displeasures caused by extraneous factorsto enterinto considerationas if they were qualities of the object itself (p. 239). Hume, then, does not regardthe taste of true in judges as particularly"natural," any sense of the word.'3 In one sense, as Shustermanrightly points out, Hume sees the taste of truejudges as particularly unnatural. Hume, we might say, holds an Augustinian view of our perceptual abilities: the perceptualfaculty is naturally"dis-

34 and eased"or "perverted," it is only by the grace of educationthatthe truejudge managesto transcend "his naturalposition." In another sense, Hume sees the taste of true judges as neither more nor less naturalthan that of anyone else: the principles which govern affection "areuniform in human nature";in other words, the human mind is so structured thatthe perceptionof certain qualities in objects gives it pleasure, while the perception of others gives it displeasure. These conclusions lead to the following question: why has Humearrangedthings in precisely this way? Given the two stages involvedin judgments of taste, why maintain that erroneous judgments result principallyfrom failure at the perceptualstage but neverfrom failure at the affailfective stage?Why maintainthatperceptual ure is virtually inevitable while affective failure is impossible? I believe we can best approach these questions by imagining an alteredversionof the parableof Sancho's kinsmen. In Hume's telling of the story, we recall, the townspeople apparentlyall agree that the tastes of iron and leathermar the taste of wine, but all fail to detect those tastes in the hogshead. In other words, they agree that there exist principles of taste linking the tastes of iron and leatherin wine to sentimentsof displeasurein the humanmind, but theirperceptual faculties fail to detect those tastes. Let us reimagine the story such thatthe perceptualfaculties do not fail, while the principles of taste do. Suppose,for example,thatupon hearingthe verdicts of Sancho'skinsmen,one townsmanmakes it known that he also detects the tastes iron and leather and believes that these tastes enhance the flavor of the wine. (This may explain why the key and thong found their way into the hogsheadin the first place.) In such a case, what grounds might the kinsmen possibly give to prove the superiorityof their taste over his? Obviously they cannotclaim perceptualsuperiority because they have detected nothing undetected by him. What,then, might they say to attemptto prove that his perceptionsof iron and leatherin wine ought to have produceddispleasureas opposed to pleasure? What can be said in such a case, except de gustibus non est disputandum? This positions us to begin to answerthe questions posed in the opening paragraphof this essay. According to Hume, human beings natu-

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism rally (i.e., universally)regardcertaindifferences in perceptualability normatively.Hume emphasizes this importantpoint as follows: to It is acknowledged be theperfectionof everysense its withexactness mostminute or faculty, perceive to to objects, to allownothing escapeits noticeand and observation. smaller objectsare,whichbeThe the to comesensible theeye, thefiner is thatorgan.... In like manner, quickandacuteperception beauty a of and deformity mustbe theperfection of ourmental taste....In this decision the sentimentsof all mankind
are agreed. Wherever can ascertain a delicacy of you taste, it is sure to meet with approbation.(pp. 236237, emphasis added)

If you perceive all the same qualities in an object that I do, but in additionperceive qualities I do not, you and I do not merely perceive the object differently:you perceive it better than I do. And it is this, ultimately, which is the (chief) source of the normativityof Hume's standard. Where differences in affective response result from differences in perceptualability, the former inheritthe normativityinherentin the latter. If you and I have differingaffective responsesto a work of art, and those differencesresult from your superior perceptual acuity, our responses are not merely different: you have responded betterthanI have.Thus Humedoes addresswhat Cohen refers to as the "proto-question": where there exist universalprinciples of taste linking the perceptionof the qualities of an object to the occurrenceof sentimentsof pleasureor displeasure in the humanmind, where, in other words, we all, given the structureof our minds, would respond uniformly to an object if only we correctly perceived it, the response of a true judge is the correct response because the true judge alone correctly perceives the object. But what of those cases where, as in my altered version of the Quixoteparable,there exist no such universalprinciplesof taste-where, in otherwords,we wouldnot all responduniformly to the object, even if we did all properlyperceive the totality of the object's relevant qualities? Hume acknowledges, near the essay's end, the existence of such cases:
A young man, whose passions are warm, will be more sensibly touched with amorous and tender images, than a man of more advancedyears, who takesplea-

Shelley Hume and the Natureof Taste


sure in wise, philosophical reflections concerningthe conductof life and moderationof the passions. ... One personis morepleased with the sublime;anotherwith the tender;a third with raillery.One has a strongsensibility to blemishes, and is extremely studiousof correctness:Anotherhas a more livelyfeeling of beauties, and pardonstwenty absurditiesand defects for one elevated or pathetic stroke. The ear of one man is entirely turned towards conciseness and energy; that man is delighted with a copious, rich, and harmonious expression. Simplicity is affected by one; ornament by another.(p. 244, emphasis added)

35 weakness"of Hume. Budd locates the "principal Hume's aesthetic theory in the alleged fact that it provides no means of determining whether differencesin affective responsedo in fact result from differencesin perceptualability,and therefore no means of determiningwhetherthe normativityinherentin the lattersuccessfully transfers to the former.15If the perceptionof all the aestheticallyrelevantqualitiesof any given work guaranteeda uniform affective response to that work, Budd concedes, the verdictof a truejudge would be the standard, presumablybecause it would then be the verdict we would all give of that work if we only perceived all of its aesthetically relevantqualities. But because the perception of all the aestheticallyrelevantpropertiesof any given workneed not guaranteea uniformaffective response to it, Budd argues, the mere fact that true judges perceived all the aesthetically relevantpropertiesof a given work implies nothing "aboutthe status of their verdicts that the [work] is good."16He therefore concludes that, while the verdict of a true judge does provide a standardof perception, it falls short of providinga standardof taste.17This reading of Hume, however, assigns no role to Hume's requirementof a joint verdict,and assigns only an ancillary role to the principles of taste.18Thus, while Budd rightly sees that not all verdicts of true judges will be joint (given that possession of delicacy of taste, togetherwith the other four ensuresno uniformityof affective characteristics, response),he fails to see thatthose verdictswhich are uniformwill be the standard,given thatthey are verdictsnot merely of our perceptualsuperiors, but of our perceptuallysuperiorselves. But while Budd'sobjectionmisses its mark,it may seem to point up a parallelobjection. If the principalweakness of Hume's theory is not that the possession of the five characteristicsfails to guaranteethat joint verdicts will always occur, perhapsit is ratherthat neitherthe possession of the five characteristicsnor anything else guarantees that joint verdicts will ever occur. The purpose of the unanimity of the verdict, as we have remarked,is to rule out the possibility that a verdict relies on anything particular in the judges, therebyensuringthat it is the verdictwe would all give. This means that the verdict cannot be considered "joint"unless the participating quorumof judges is maximally diverse, including, presumably,judges of every possible

Hume here concedes thatnot every aesthetically relevant quality is linked by a universal principle of taste to particularsentiments of pleasure or displeasure in the human mind. There exist no such principles, for example, corresponding to the qualities of amorousness,tenderness,sublimity, raillery, conciseness, energy, etc. Hume attributesour divergentresponses to such qualities both to "the differenthumoursof particular men" and to "the particularmannersand opinions of our age or country"(p. 243), and grants that in such cases there simply is "no room to give one [taste] the preferenceabove the other," and that "we seek in vain for a standard, by which we can reconcile the contrarysentiments" (p. 244). It is for this reason, I contend, that Hume has to maintainthatwe arriveat "thetrue standardof taste and beauty"only when a "joint verdict" of true judges is rendered (p. 234). Given that true judges perceive all the aesthetically relevantpropertiesof a work, their failure to arrive at a joint verdict with respect to it implies a divergentresponse to one or more of its properties, which in turn implies that no standardexists for thatwork.14 But when truejudges of every possible humor,nationality,and historical era respond uniformly to all the properties of a particularwork, their verdict must be acknowledgedas the standardbecause it is the verdict each of us would give, if, among other things, we had better perceptualabilities. The joint verdicts of true judges are binding on our divergent verdicts, in other words, because the former express nothing but our own tastes: they are, in essence, nothing but the verdicts of our perceptuallybetter selves. It is this crucial point that Malcolm Budd, in his new book Values of Art: Pictures, Poetry and Music, appears to overlook in his criticism of

36 temperament, age, gender, race, culture, and, possibly, social class.19 What guarantee do we have that such a group will agree on anything? What guaranteedo we have, in otherwords, that any single verdict will be expressive of each of our individualtastes? But it would be a mistake to construe the above as an objection to Hume's theory, rather than as an acknowledgedelement of it.20 Hume is fully aware that nothing guaranteeseven the occasional agreementof truejudges: and Ineachcreature, is a sound a defective there state; to andthe former alonecan be supposed affordus a of truestandard tasteandsentiment. in the sound If, stateof theorgan, there anentireora considerable be of uniformity sentiment amongmen,we maythence derive ideaof theperfect the beauty. 234, empha(p. sis added) Hume thus acknowledgesthat his identification of the standardof taste with the joint verdict of true judges does not, by itself, provide any evidence for the existence of the standard:it merely tells us what the standardis if there is one. That "thejoint verdictof [truejudges] is the true standardof taste and beauty"is an a priori proposition, expressing what Hume famously calls a "relationof ideas."'21 That "in the sound state of the organ, there [is] an entire or considerable uniformityof sentimentamong men"is, by contrast,an empiricalproposition,expressingan alleged "matterof fact."22As such, it can be established with probability only, by means of argument"foundedentirely on experience."23 Hume produces two versions of what is essentially the same argumentfor this empirical proposition,one coming just priorto the discussion of the five characteristics(p. 233), the other coming just after (pp. 242-243). Hume maintains, in both, that as particularworks persist in our collective attention through time our perception of them improves. In the first version, Hume attributesthis improvementto the tendency of certain kinds of prejudiceto dissipate with the passage of time: A realgenius,the longerhis worksendure, the and morewidetheyarespread, moresincere theadthe is mirationwhich he meets with. Envy and jealousy havetoo muchplacein a narrow circle;andevenfamiliar acquaintance hisperson diminish with may the

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applausedue to his performances:But when these obstructions are removed, the beauties, which are naturally fitted to excite agreeable sentiments, immediately display their energy; and while the world endures,they maintain their authorityover the minds of men. (p. 233) In the second version, Hume attributes the collective sharpening of our perception simply to the tendency of the superior perceptions of good critics to spread, over time, to the less critically talented. In other words, Hume asserts that delicacy of taste, with respect to particular works, is contagious: The ascendantwhich [men of delicate taste] acquire, gives a prevalence to that lively approbation,with which they receive any productions of genius, and renders it generally predominant.Many men, when left to themselves, have but a faint and dubious perception of beauty, who are yet capable of relishing any fine stroke, which is pointed out to them. Every convert to the admirationof the real poet or oratoris the cause of some new conversion. (p. 243) As our perception of particular works thus collectively sharpens and converges over time, asserts Hume (in both versions), our sentiments regarding certain of those works also come into alignment. For while, as Hume concedes at the essay's outset, a "great variety of taste ... prevails in the world" (p. 226), and this "variety of taste" is in fact "greater in reality than in appearance" (p. 227), there also exists a conspicuous uniformity of taste in particular cases: The same HOMER, who pleased at ATHENS and ROME two thousand years ago, is still admired at PARISand at LONDON. All the changes of climate, government, religion, and language, have not been able to obscure his glory. (p. 233) ARISTOTLE, and PLATO, and EPICURUS, and DESCARTES,may successively yield to each other: But TERENCE and VIRGILmaintain an universal, undisputed empire over the minds of men. The abstract philosophy of CICEROhas lost its credit: The vehemence of his oratoryis still the object of our admiration.(pp. 242-243) That our sentiments regarding the works of such authors thus align, as our perceptions of those

Shelley Hume and the Natureof Taste works do, attests, Hume concludes, to the fact "that,amidst all the varietyand capriceof taste, there are certain general principles of approbation and blame"(p. 233). Homer,havingpleased in Athens and Rome, would not continue to do so in Paris and London without the existence of principlesof taste, linking the perceptionsof the propertiesof his works with sentimentsof pleasure in the human mind. Without such principles, our sentiments regarding Homer's works would not converge, no matter how sharpened and attunedour perceptionsbecame. Such, I conclude, is Hume's account of the normativity,and existence, of the standard of taste. That a verdict issues from truejudges ensures that it is reflective of correct perception. That such a verdict is joint ensures that it is expressive of sentiments common to all. That a joint verdict of true judges is at once reflective of correctperceptionand expressiveof common sentiments makes it the standard: any divergence from it can result only from perceptual failing. That our collective sentiments have been observedto align, on occasion, as our collective perceptionsdo, establishes the probability that truejudges will, on occasion, agree.24
JAMES R. SHELLEY

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Gracykmaintains both that Hume's essay contains no such argumentand that its "lengthydiscussion of the five characteristics of good critics"is "a tangent"(pp. 175-176). Gracyk is driven to both drastic moves, in my opinion, by his conflation of the view that the tastes of true judges are superior (preferable) with the view that the personal possession of such tastes is desirable. Gracykis right to conclude that "Of the Standardof Taste" contains no argumentfor this latterview, and he performsthe valuabletask of piecing togetheran argumentfor it in the earlieressays "Ofthe Delicacy of Taste and Passion"and "OfRefinementin the Arts" (pp. 178-179). 7. Richard Shusterman,"Of the Scandal of Taste: Social Privilege as Naturein the Aesthetic Theories of Hume and Kant," The Philosophical Forum 20 (1989): 211-212, 216-218. 8. Ibid., p. 217. 9. Ibid., p. 217. 10. Ibid., p. 218. 11. Ibid., p. 21 1. 12. I am indebtedto Cohen for the insight that the townspeople must alreadyrecognize the principlesof taste for the discovery of the key and thong to have the particularforce that it does. Cohen and I disagree, however, regardingexactly what these recognized principles state. See Cohen, pp. 145-156. 13. Shustermanis not alone in committing this error. I make what amountsto the same errorin an earlier essay, in which I claim that Hume's naturallaws of taste apply only to truejudges. See my "Hume'sDouble Standardof Taste," TheJournalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism52 (1994): 441. Cohen also appears to make the same error when he concedes, in a footnote registering his general disagreement with Shusterman,that Hume regardsthe taste of truejudges "as natural,in some sense" (p. 155, n. 4). 14. I am indebted here again to Cohen, this time for the brilliantinsight that the jointness of the truejudges' verdict serves to sort out "blameless"from "blameable" differences in taste (Cohen, pp. 153-155). Cohen and I differ, however, regarding the importance of this role of the joint verdict. Cohen downplays it, claiming that the sorting out of such differencesis not Hume's"mainreason"for requiringa joint verdict, and in fact was "probablynot explicitly in Hume's mind"butrathersomething his theory "prescientlyprovides for" (p. 154). But if Hume does in fact have an account of the normativity of the standardof taste, and that account hinges on the inclusion of such a mechanism (falling prey, otherwise, to Budd's objection, consideredbelow), then we do an injustice to Hume by treatingits inclusion as anything less than a conscious provision. 15. Malcolm Budd, Values of Art: Painting,Poetry and Music (London: Penguin Books, 1996), pp. 19-24. 16. Ibid., pp. 22-24. 17. Ibid., p. 23. 18. Ibid., p. 179, n. 31. 19. The notion of a working-classtruejudge may be oxymoronic, since, as Shustermanpoints out, members of the working class lack "access to the right objects and the time and education necessary to make taste ever more refined" (p. 218), and since, presumably,providing members of the working class with the necessary access, time, and education would simply rendertheir taste unrepresentative the of workingclass.

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1. This paperis the winnerof the 1997 JohnFisherMemorial Prize Award. The paper was read at the 54th annual meeting of The American Society for Aesthetics in Montreal, Canada, in October 1996. (Ed.) 2. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis:LibertyClassics, 1985), pp. 226-248. Unless otherwise specified, the above is the source of all Hume quotations in this paper,which will be cited in the text. 3. I provide a fuller account of each of these five characteristics below. 4. TedCohen, "PartialEnchantments the QuixoteStory of in Hume's Essay on Taste,"in Institutionsof Art:Reconsiderations of George Dickie's Philosophy, ed. RobertJ. Yanal (Pennsylvania State UniversityPress, 1994), p. 155. 5. Theodore A. Gracyk,"RethinkingHume's Standardof Taste," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (1994): 169. 6. Ibid., pp. 169, 177. It is no coincidence, I believe, that

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20. Here again I am indebted to Cohen. See Cohen, p. 155, n. 4. 21. David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. SelbyBigge, rev. by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 25. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., p. 164. 24. I thank Philip Alperson and anonymousmembers of

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism


the John Fisher Memorial Prize Committee for valuable comments on this paper.I also thank all who offered comments on an earlier version, delivered at the 1996 national meeting of The AmericanSociety for Aesthetics, especially Roger Shiner, Thomas Leddy, George Dickie, Roger Seamon, Peter Kivy, and Ted Cohen. Finally, I thank Roman Bonzon, who carefully read each version of this paper and offered severalparticularlyvaluable suggestions. I take full responsibilityfor any faults it contains.

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