The Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Czechoslovakian Crisis in 1938: New Material from the Soviet

Archives Author(s): Zara Steiner Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp. 751-779 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3020920 . Accessed: 15/06/2011 04:10
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TheHistorical 42, Journal, 3 (I 999), pp. 75 I-779 C I999 Cambridge University Press

Printed in the United Kingdom

THE SOVIET COMMISSARIAT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CRISIS IN 1938: NEW MATERIAL FROM THE SOVIET ARCHIVES*
ZARA STEINER
New Hall, Cambridge

in ABSTRACT. Thisarticle based documents thearchives theSoviet is on of Commissariat Foreign of Affairs,many whichhavenotbeen of previously published. This extramaterial allowsoneto seethe The development Sovietpolicyat closerhandthough of thereis still muchthat remains obscure. between the the correspondence Litvinov, Commissarfor Foreign Affairs,andStalin,despite absence is as their and of thelatter's answers, particularly valuable itfurther illuminates working relationship in reveals someof thedifferences between them.The exchanges between Litvinov Moscowand the cautioned Sovietpolpred, Alexandrovsky, Pragueshow clearlythat the latterwas repeatedly in the leaders thinkthattheycould on theunilateral to assistance the againstencouraging Czech rely of to USSR. Theyreveal,too,thedegree whichLitvinov Potemkin, deputy and a commissar, that felt the Fierlinger, Czechminister Moscow,was misrepresenting Soviet in the positionin this respect. Additional evidence hereconfirms cited earlier viewsthattheSoviet leadership notprepared act was to the independently Franceor outside League Nationsevenwhentheopportunities assisting of of for out were endsona cautionary pointing thelimitations Czechoslovakia available.Thearticle note, of as the foreignministry archives a guideto theinnerdynamics Sovietdiplomacy. of

I
There are few studies of the Czechoslovakian crisis of I938 that do not admit that any accurate account of the role of the Soviet Union must remain 'a matter of mystery and controversy'.' Because the Soviet diplomatic and military archives have until recently been opened only on a very restricted and selected basis and still present problems of access and availability, the number of books using primary Soviet sources is still quite restricted. A few scholars have made extensive use of the valuable published Soviet sources or have
* I wish to thank Igor Lebedev, former head of the historic-diplomatic department (archives) of the foreign ministry of the Russian Federation for assistancein the documentary researchfor this article as well as Professor 0. A. Rzheshevsky of the Institute of Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences. Prof. Dr Serban Papacostea, Dirctor of the Insitutul de Isotrie 'Nicolae Iorga' kindly arranged for a search to be made into the archives of the Romanian foreign ministry. I am indebted to the Leverhulme Foundation for financial support which covered research 1 Telford Taylor, Munich,thepriceof peace(London, I979), p. 430. expenses. 75I

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explored previously unavailable non-Soviet archives, particularly those found in Prague, that have thrown considerable light on the course of Soviet policy.2 The following article is based primarily on the Soviet archives currentlyheld in the Russian foreign ministry and on searches done for the author in the Romanian foreign ministry archives. The presidential archive in Moscow was not yet open so that, though I have cited Litvinov's letters to Stalin, I do not have the Politburo's or Stalin's answers, if they were transmitted in a written form. The very fact that the commissar asks the same questions in two or three letters written to Stalin, always addressed in connection with Molotov and other Politburo members, within a ten day period is suggestive in itself. For the most part, my focus, apart from the Litvinov correspondence with the Politburo, is on the exchanges between Litvinov and his deputy commissar, Potemkin, with the Soviet polpred Prague, as well as on their interviews with in the Czech minister in Moscow, Zdenek Fierlinger, who in April I945 became prime minister in a still partly occupied Czechoslovakia. The picture that emerges from the Soviet foreign ministry archives helps to improve our understanding of Soviet conduct during the Munich crisiswhile casting only a partial light on the sources of policy and the means by which it was implemented.' The USSR was not at Munich because no one wanted her there. Her exclusion confirmed Stalin's belief that the Soviet Union must play its own game among hostile capitalist powers without joining either camp but preparing for the inevitable war which would come sooner rather than later. What Stalin thought during the crisis presents a more difficult problem. The story has been told from a number of different vantage points, from London and Paris, and, more recently, from Prague. It has been firmly established that neither the Chamberlain nor the Daladier governments had any confidence in the Soviet Union and believed that though she had the military strength to defend her territory, she was not strong enough to attack any major European
2 Of special importance for this article areJ. Haslam, TheSovietUnion andthestrugglefor collective in security Europe,1933-1939 (Basingstoke and London, I984); J. Haslam, The SovietUnionand the threat from the East, I933-I94I (Basingstoke and London, I992); Sylvio Pons, Stalin e la guerra inevitabile (Turin, I 995) ; J. Hochman, TheSovietUnionandthe failure of collective security, 1934-1938 (Ithaca, NY, I984); Igor Lukes, Czechoslovakia between StalinandHitler: thediplomacy Edvard of Benes' in the ig30s (New York and Oxford, I996); Ivan Pfaff, Die Sowjetunion die verteidigung und der Tschechoslowakei, 1934-1938 (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna, I 996); G. Roberts, TheSoviet Union and theoriginsof theSecond WorldWar (Basingstoke and London, I 995). There are, of course, a large number of books using the British and French archives that are highly relevant to this theme as well as a number of recent articles, including those by M. J. Carley on Anglo-Franco-Soviet relations that cast light on Soviet policy during the Munich crisis. A detailed study of Soviet-Romanian policy is long overdue though it appears that many of the relevant Romanian archives are no longer in Bucharest. 3 See the important articles by Sabine Dullin, 'La Narkomindel dans la politique exterieure de l'URSS (annees I930) ', LesCahiers l'IHTP, 55 (I996), pp. 29-4I; de 'Le r6le de Maxime Litvinov pp. 76-80; 'Les diplomates sovietiques des dans les annees trente', Communisme, 42/4 (1995), 9I annees I930 et leur evaluation de la puissance de 1'URSS', Relationsinternationales, (I997) PP- 339-55-

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power. Their judgement had been reinforced by the purges of the Soviet military forces that only ended during the summer months of I 938. Repeatedly during I938, Chamberlain, in particular, but others in London and Paris as well, pointed out that war over Czechoslovakia would benefit only the Soviet Union. What this meant varied according to the speaker and the particular circumstances of the moment. At no time during the Czech crisis was either Chamberlain or Daladier willing to admit the Soviet Union into their circle or seriously to consider her possible contribution to an anti-German front. This was due in part to the Terror and the denigration of Soviet military power but also to the widespread distrust of the USSR and the extreme distaste for its system and ideology in the governing elites of both countries. In France, this dislike and fear was accentuated by the importance of the French communist party and the impact on domestic politics of any contact with the USSR. Whatever the tensions between Britain and France, the two countries shared assumptions about the structures of government, the nature of economic life and even about the workings of the international system that tied them together; there could be no such linkage between either state and Moscow. While Chamberlain discounted the ideological factor in his search for an agreement with Hitler, though he found Nazism a repugnant creed, the spectre of Bolshevism triumphant and moving across Europe was one that he could never stomach. The Soviet view of the western states, both in ideological and practical terms, was equally hostile and suspicious. In the winter of I 937-8, Litvinov, hitherto identified with the policies of collective security in Moscow, was very much on the defensive. Not only had the atmosphere in which the Narkomindel (People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs) operated been poisoned by the Terror, but the failure of his policies during the previous months gave weight to the views of those who, like the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov, and Zhdanov, the chairman of the foreign affairs commission of the Supreme Soviet, questioned the wisdom of agreements with the Western powers against Germany. Increasingly, Stalin appeared to prefera retreat into isolation. Safety lay in building up the power of the Soviet state. This meant not only the build-up of the Soviet army and air force but the elimination of any possible threat to the political unity of the USSR, even if this resulted in an assault on the very heart of the state and the replacement of the current leadership with one entirely loyal and subservient to Stalin. Litvinov was well aware that his policies were under threat. As early as January I938, he wrote to Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Yezhov, warning against the abandonment of the League of Nations and article I6 on which both the Franco-Soviet and Soviet-Czechoslovakpacts rested. 'if we take a new position and show indifference', he warned, 'this would deliver a shattering blow to all organizationsfor peace '.' Sensitive to the strength of the opposition to his views,
4 AVP RF (foreign policy archive of the Russian Federation, Moscow), fond 05, opis I 8, papka I37, delo, i, vol. I, list I I8, 4 Jan. I938. Later citations shortened to f., op., p., d., 1. I am deeply

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he invariably insisted that whatever action he proposed would not result in any new Soviet obligations. In Moscow, as in London and Paris, the Anschluss was anticipated well before it happened. The Soviet charge d'affaires in Berlin, Astakhov, had warned, many months before, that it could be expected in December I 93 7 orJanuary I 938. As in the west, there were no preparationsfor any response. The Anschluss actually occurred on the eve of the sentencing of Bukharin, Krestinsky, and the other unfortunates accused of being 'War Provocateurs', in the latest, and what proved to be the last, of Stalin's 'show trials'. It was not until I4 March that the Moscow papers began to comment on the events in Austria with Britain depicted as the chief villain of these events and the German action blamed on Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Hitler. It is clear from Litvinov's letter to Stalin on the I4th that he was unhappy about the Soviet failure to make its views known:
To be silent and to remain totally passive with regard to this event is incompatible with our policy of peace and our position in the League of Nations. I consider it extremely desirable for us to make our position clear in a statement addressed to the other states... I do not expect any official replies to our statement, especially from England, who does not want to tie her hands with any practical statements. Thus our statement will not lay any obligations on us, but will nevertheless achieve its aims.5

Litvinov hoped to mobilize the anti-appeasersin Britain and France, to put the responsibility for further action on Britain, and to answer insinuations about the weakness of the Soviet Union. In an effort to move Stalin out of his immobility, Litvinov used the Polish-Lithuanian clash to secure his consent to the issue of a statement. A Polish soldier had been killed by a Lithuanian policeman and the Poles reacted by demanding that Lithuania reopen diplomatic relations with Poland that had been broken off in I 920 over Vilna. Litvinov insisted at Warsaw that Poland seek a peaceful settlement of the dispute but refused to intervene, not wanting to sour relations with Warsaw at a time of such tension with Germany. The Lithuanians were forced to exchange missions with the Poles, and the USSR, supposedly their patron, was made to look weak and ineffective. As a riposte, Litvinov secured Stalin's permissionfor a declaration, made in an interview with foreign journalists, condemning the Anschluss declaring that the Soviet Union was ready 'to enter immediately and into discussionswith other powers in the League of Nations and outside it on practical measures dictated by circumstances. Tomorrow may already be too late.'6 This was as much as could be wrung from Stalin.

indebted to Dr V. Dimitrov of the London School of Economics who secured and translated these documents for me. He has no responsibility,of course, for the use I have made of them. Documents from printed Soviet sources were also translated for me unless found in other language sources. 5 Ibid., f. 05, Op. i8, p. I37, d.i, vol. I, 1. I i8, Litvinov to Stalin, and others as above, I4 Mar.
I 938.
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I977)

Dokumenty Vneshnei PolitikiSSSR (Documents on the foreign policy of the USSR) (Moscow, (DVP), vol. xxi, doc. 82.

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Litvinov had long seen the problems of Austria and Czechoslovakia as one with only the question of priority in time left open. He feared, as he wrote to Alexandrovsky, the Soviet representative in Prague, that Benes, like Schuschnigg, would go down 'the path of gradual concessions, and will end up falling in the same pit'. He warned the ambassador that his declaration 'is, perhaps, our last call for co-operation in Europe; after that we shall probably take a position of little interest in the future developments in Europe. The Anschlussalready gives Hitler hegemony in Europe.'7 The same line was taken with Ivan Maisky, the Soviet polpredin London, whose reports re-enforced the Politburo view that Chamberlain was not only intent on coming to an agreement with Hitler but also would try to make Germany strong enough to turn on the Soviet Union. As became clear, Chamberlain and Stalin held mirror images of each other, each believing that the other wanted war with the intention of leaving their respective countries as the arbiter of Europe. Maisky was encouraged in his views by his many conversations with Winston Churchill, held during I 938. Despite Churchill's puzzlement and concern over what was happening inside the Soviet Union, he still believed, as he repeatedly assured the Soviet representative, that the only way to stop Hitler was through a united front that would include the USSR. It was possible, Maisky and Litvinov agreed, that a shift in the British political scene could drive the appeasers from power and that the Conservative dissidents would take office. It was during I 938 that Churchill became, in the official Soviet mind, the symbol of resistance to Chamberlain's policies. In April, Litvinov took up Maisky's suggestion that Churchill be allowed to observe the Red Army manoeuvres in order to convince him that the rumours about its destruction in the purges were untrue. The visit did not materialize but Litvinov's tentative support is significant. Maisky's reports of Churchill's opinions naturally fed Soviet mistrust of the existing government. There was equally little confidence in the ' reactionary leaders of the English Labour movement, the Citrines, the Bevins, the Daltons, and their assistants', who were trying to hinder ' the creation of an English front against Fascism and war'.8 Curiously, these were the very men who wanted such a 'front'. In the end, in part out of frustration, the Soviets reverted to their revolutionary roots and looked to the British workers to overcome the 'sabotage' of their leaders and exercise their own influence over British foreign policy in the interests of peace. The Russians were not entirely passive in the post-Anschluss period as attention focused on Czechoslovakia. Quite apart from the activities of the Czechoslovak communist party, there was also action on the state level with visits between Czech and Soviet military men in March, Soviet purchases of armaments, particularly artillery, and, late in April, the sale of forty bombers to Czechoslovakia which the Soviets delivered by flying over Romania. An effort was made, too, to improve relations with Bucharest mainly out of fear
7 AVP RF, f. 05, p. I49, d. i66, 11. 4-7, 26 Mar. I938. 8 Quoted in Haslam, SovietUnionand thestruggle in security Europe, p. for collective
I 72.

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that King Carol's government might strike a bargain with Germany but also with the intention of concluding military and air agreements. At the beginning of April, Alexandrovsky was sent from Prague to Bucharest. The Soviet representative to Romania had been recalled and arrested; his charge d'affaires, Butenko, frightened that he, too, would suffer a similar fate, disappeared, and Alexandrovsky was supposed to discover his whereabouts. The envoy took the opportunity to see the foreign minister, Comnene (PetrescuComnen) who was distinctly cool to any talk of friendship. None the less, the door was left open, and in Moscow the Romanian representativesuggested that Litvinov and Comnene might meet for talks during the May session of the League in Geneva. Litvinov was delighted and even sought permission from Stalin to speak about Bessarabia, always the sticking point in any negotiations for a mutual assistance pact between the two countries. It seems unlikely, judging from what is known, that permission was granted. Progress was difficult and not just because of Bessarabia.The Romanian government was as frightened of Bolshevism as it was of German economic and political subjugation. Comnene was purposely vague in his talks with Litvinov, and the visit of the Romanians to Warsaw at the end of May and delays about concluding a formal agreement allowing planes to overfly Romanian territory, which had been happening without an agreement for some two years, soured relations at the Moscow end. According to a telegram sent to Bucharest at the end of May by the Romanian minister in Prague, Crutzescu, the latter warned the Czech foreign minister, Kamil Krofta, that though he
did not believe that it was the intention of the Romanian government to declare publicly that it would never permit in any circumstances that Russian troops cross its territory... this does not mean, and you know it of course as well as I, that the agreement of the Romanian government for an eventual movement of Russian troops across its territory is already assured, and that consequently your convictions in that regard are founded on illusions ... the not very friendly attitude of the Soviet government towards Romania, the fear of communist influence, and the general feeling of public opinion, make me personally consider such an agreement one of the most doubtful.9

Krofta admitted that 'not even we wish - at least in official circles - the effective support of the Russian army', but that the Czechs did not want this known as the possibility of Soviet assistance might moderate the ambitions of the Reich. The Alexandrovsky visit to Bucharest was followed by his meeting in Moscow with Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Litvinov, and Kaganovich on I4 April when the question of Czechoslovakia was fully discussed. Litvinov, who had on a number of occasions pressed Stalin to allow him to make some gesture towards the League of Nations, appears to have won a partial victory. It was decided that the USSR would take measures to guarantee Czechoslovakia's security along with the co-operation of the French. Marshal Voroshilov was,
Io-I6,

9 Romanian foreign ministry archives, Bucharest, fond 7 i/dosare speciale, volum 308, pp. telegram no. I424, 30 May I938.

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according to a report made by Fierlinger, the strongly pro-Soviet Czech minister in Moscow, particularly enthusiastic. On 26 April, Mikhail Kalinin, the titular head of the Soviet state, in a public address, stated that the USSR might aid Czechoslovakia even if France abstained, and on 8 May, he assured a visiting Czech delegation that Moscow would honour its obligations to Czechoslovakia and France 'to the last letter'.'0 These were highly welcome words in Prague where Benes was facing not only Henlein's eight point programmebut also constant pressurefrom Basil Newton, the British minister, to reach a settlement with the Sudeten Germans. Admittedly, the French had reaffirmedtheir intention to fulfil their obligations but even the overly optimistic president was aware of the influence London could exert on Paris. When Georges Bonnet, the French foreign minister, and Litvinov met at the council meeting in Geneva on 9 May, the former, according to his own account, asked Litvinov what the Soviet Union would do, given its lack of common border with Czechoslovakia, to assist her, and whether the USSR would force a passage across either Poland or Romania. Litvinov answered the latter question in the negative and insisted it was up to the French, who had treaties with Prague and Bucharest, to clear the way for the Russians. The talk with Bonnet convinced Litvinov that the French had little interest in Soviet co-operation. And while Litvinov took the occasion of Halifax's presence in Geneva to lecture him on Britain's mistaken view of German policy, he was powerless to influence London's policies.
II

The May crisis appears to have taken the foreign ministry by surprise;none of their diplomatic representatives had any foreknowledge of the weekend's events. At this time, there is no proof of Soviet covert involvement in the scare or any evidence that a Soviet agent spread the false information about the massing of German troops." The Soviet leadership responded in a somewhat hesitant fashion and was caught off balance by the strong Anglo-French response. The Czech documents show that Fierlinger could not reach any member of the Soviet leadership in these critical days and that when he and General Husaik,Benes's special emissary, were finally received by Voroshilov and Litvinov on 25 May, they 'found them evasive and their answersvague'.12 Litvinov's instructions to Alexandrovsky confirm the impression of Soviet passivity. The Soviet representative in Prague, who was only told of the mobilization by Krofta (who did not believe Germany 'capable of conducting a serious war'), on the morning of 2I May, was totally surprisedby the news of the crisis. He wrote to Litvinov that Krofta appeared concerned about the Soviet reaction to the Czech mobilization and though he was not asked
Lukes, Czechoslovakia between HitlerandStalin,p. I 43. 11 Lukes concludes his argument to the contrary by writing, 'At the moment, such speculation is no more than an audacious theory unverifiable by available documents'. Ibid., p. I57. 12 Reference in Hochman, The SovietUnionandthe failure of collective security, I 52. p.
10

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whether Moscow approved or not, Alexandrovsky felt it necessary to reassure him. His action earned a rebuke from Litvinov as well as a cautionary warning about Alexandrovsky's future exchanges with the Czechs. I fully understand the Czech government when it does not wish to raise the question of our help before France does. Anyway, we could not give her any reply if we do not know in advance whether and how France would help because our help is determined by French help. We consider, however, that a French approach would also not produce satisfactory results and the questions have to be discussed by representatives of the French, Czechoslovak, and Soviet general staffs.We are not going to be too forthcoming in offering such talks and you must not raise this question ... With such a raging pressure being put upon Czechoslovakia by England and France, you should of course reinforce the spirit-of the Czechs and their resistance to that pressure. You should not forget, however, that we are not at all interested in the forcible solution of the problem of the Sudeten Germans and we should offer no objections at all to such measures, which, while preserving Czechoslovakia'sfull political independence, would be able to diffuse the tension and prevent the danger of a military confrontation... You should not object to Anglo-French suggestions concerning some extension of the rights of the Sudeten Germans, the sending of observers and so on.'3 If Litvinov would have liked to combat the spirit of passivity and isolationism in Moscow, as his speech to a pre-election meeting in Leningrad on 23 June suggested, he could not move far without Stalin's support. Litvinov never underestimated the unwillingness of his domestic critics to defend a peace settlement in which the Soviet Union had taken no part. Litvinov's speech in Leningrad illustrated the degree to which he was running with both the hares and the hounds. We are used to distinguishing between war-time and peace-time, and we do not realise that as far as there will be a capitalistic system, the idea of a long-lasting peace will be impossible. What is usually called the time of peace should be better considered as a more or less long intermission between two wars, in other words a cease-fire. Now, it is possible to say in whole truth, that the world war from 1914 to I9I8 did not end with Versailles, St. Germain and the other treaties which were signed at that time and that these twenty years should be considered as a cease-fire. It is also possible to say that the cannonades in Spain and China sound like the echo of the last world war.'4 While dissociating the Soviet Union from 'imperialist interests', Litvinov, nevertheless, told his listeners that the Soviet Union 'could not completely stand aside from these events'. Germany was pursuing a policy based on 'unlimited aggression' and was openly conducting a 'furiously anti-Soviet policy, suspiciously raising memories of the time when the Teutonic Order dominated the Baltic region; it has wild dreams about conquering the Ukraine and even the Urals'. Litvinov warned that 'no state, however strong and distant it may be', could be guaranteed against aggression. There was, he told his listeners, no guarantee that war would bring a better and fairer arrangement
13 14

AVP RF, Litvinov to Alexandrovsky, i i June, f. 05, op. i8, p. I 49, d. i 66, 11. I 6-I 7. Izvestiya, 24 June I 938.

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after its ending; Brest-Litovsk was not better than the peace of Versailles. The speech closed on a negative note, with a reference to his proposal of I 7 March calling for an international conference. His appeal for 'urgent collective measures to save humanity from war' was not heeded 'but [sic] the Soviet Government considers itself free from all responsibilities for the future development of events' . Zhdanov's speeches in Leningrad in May and June took up the theme of preparing the proletarians of all countries for a victory against capitalism and stressed the need to inculcate the 'still insufficient and yet growing democracy' with the anti-fascist and anti-capitalist spirit. This appeal to class solidarity was the alternative to calls for a common front against German aggression. ThroughoutJuly and August, the Soviets appeared to adopt a 'wait and see' policy. This could have been a tactical ploy on Stalin's part; it may be that he was actually prepared to co-operate with other powers as long as they took the initiative. It is also possible that he had decided that he was not going to take part in any war regardless of whether the USSR had allies or not. In any case, the question was purely hypothetical; in I 938 no great power was prepared to make a prior commitment to the Soviet Union. There was no sign whatsoever that Stalin was prepared to act independently or would sanction a repetition of the Comintern performance in Spain. Litvinov, on 3 I July, suggested to Stalin that Alexandrovsky be warned not to intervene officially in the relations between the Czechoslovak government and the Sudeten Germans. 'With our intervention, which would encourage Benes to be unyielding,' Litvinov wrote to Stalin, ' we would take upon ourselves obligations going beyond the pact.'"6 There was also a warning to Alexandrovsky not to read too much into the commissar's 23 June speech. Of course, we are extremely interested in the preservation of Czechoslovakia's independence, in the hindrance of the Hitlerite drive to the south-east, but without the Western powers it is doubtful whether we would be able to do anything serious, and those powers do not consider it necessary to seek our assistance, ignore us and decide everything concerning the German-Czechoslovak conflict among themselves. We are not aware of Czechoslovakia herself ever pointing out to her Western 'friends' the necessity of bringing in the Soviet Union. In such circumstances, for us to criticize officially and publicly the actions of England and France would result in accusations of us trying to sabotage their 'peaceful action', and encouraging Czechoslovakia's unyielding attitude which would not be of any help to Czechoslovakia herself. Nevertheless, while following these instructions, Alexandrovsky was not to put 'too much emphasis on our lack of interest in European affairs'. The Soviet representative was ordered to correct the wrong answer he had given General Krejci, the Czech chief of the general staf, when he said that the Czech-Soviet pact would cover Polish action against Czechoslovakia, though he should be reminded that nothing in the non-aggression treaty with Poland prevented
15 16

p. Quoted in Haslam, SovietUnionand thestruggle collective for security, I 75. AVP RF, Litvinov to Stalin and Molotov, 3I July, f. 05, Op. i8, p. I37, d.

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Soviet action."7Litvinov was walking a fine line between avoiding commitment and keeping open the possibility of some future involvement. If Litvinov was restive, Polish pressure on Czechoslovakia provided an opportunity for action. Writing to Stalin on 29 May, Litvinov suggested an approach to France with regard to a tougher Soviet line towards Poland.
Poland does not hide her intentions to use Germany's advance on Czechoslovakia, in order to take parts of Czechoslovak territory... We can hinder Poland's intervention with a suitable warning, but we would like to know in advance whether in such a case France would considerherselfan ally of Poland in the sense of the Franco-Polishalliance treaty. Such an approach, which would have to be leaked to the press, would be intended really to give Poland a fright, force France to clarify her attitude towards Poland, and really help Czechoslovakia, at least diplomatically. At present all foreign papers write that England and partly France saved Europe from war with their actions. It is necessary for our voice to be heard as well. I await instructions.18

Yakov Surits, the Soviet representativein Paris, was told on 5 June to make an and inquiry. Bonnet referredthe question to hisjurisconsulte in a delayed reply answered that Moscow was under no obligation to assist Czechoslovakia against Poland unless France was already doing so. If so, they would both be fighting on the same side. When Coulondre, the French ambassador in Moscow, relayed this answer to Litvinov, the latter suggested that the Soviet Union might intervene even if the French did nothing. Such was the mistrust on both sides that Coulondre wondered whether Russia would consider attacking Poland unless acting in concert with Germany. A German attack on Czechoslovakiaand a German-Soviet attack on Poland, he noted, would leave France friendlessin Eastern Europe. It is highly probable that Soviet agents reported Hitler's decision to move against Czechoslovakia and his i October deadline. On 26June, it was decided to reform the Kiev and Byelorussian commands into a special military command with the measures to be completed by i September. Did the Soviets take any steps to encourage Czech resistance by promises of future support? The foreign ministry evidence shows what a cautious policy Litvinov followed. Whether the Czech ministerin Moscow was overenthusiastic,naive, or, as later critics claim, a ' spineless opportunist' and ' more Bolshevik than the Bolsheviks', his reports gave a misleading impression of the situation in Moscow. It is true that General Husak, one of Benes' emissariesto the USSR, spent almost the whole month of May in Moscow and found Voroshilov prepared to go ' to the end' in the support of Czechoslovakia."9 Moreover, on 29 June, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on technical co-operation, 'mostly in the area of military hardware' and the two Czech negotiators were given a three hour reception by Stalin and Molotov on the previous day. Whether these signals were sufficientto warrant Benes'sbelief
17 18

Ibid., Litvinov to Alexandrovsky, i i Aug., f. OI, op. i8, p. I49, d. i, 1. 66. Ibid., Litvinov to Stalin and Molotov, 29 May, f. 05, op. i8, p. I37, d. I, vol. I, "9 Lukes, Czechoslovakia between StalinandHitler, p. I 92.

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that he could count on Soviet assistance, as he told the highly sceptical Mastny in July, is open to question, particularly as Litvinov never spoke to this point and warned Alexandrovsky against giving any such assurances. Public statements by Soviet diplomats linked Soviet action with France's fulfilment of her obligations to Czechoslovakia, a linkage which, as the reader will remember, was demanded by the Czechs in I935. III There were reasons for Soviet caution. In July, when European attention was centred on Czechoslovakia, the USSR was involved in a clash with Japanese troops on the heights above Lake Khasan on the border with Japanese occupied Manchuria.20 The Japanese military were probing the Soviet defences, though it appears from a Soviet investigation instituted by Marshal Blyukher that it was the Soviet troops who provoked the armed conflict. Moscow, supplied with excellent intelligence from Victor Sorge among others, knew that the Japanese would not allow the incident to escalate into a war. Stalin felt that he could take an exceptionally tough line and prodded the unwilling Blyukher to wipe out the Japanese troops after an attempt at a diplomatic solution failed. Heavy fighting followed but, as Sorge had anticipated, the Japanese withdrew and on i o August, a cease-fire was arranged. Stalin's willingness to take the risk of an escalating war was based on the intelligence thatJapan would not fight while she was so tied down in China. At the military council convened later to investigate the events at Khasan, Blyukherwas blamed for the inadequacies of the Far Eastern army and accused of harbouring 'enemies of the people'. He was dismissed and ultimately tortured to death in November I 938. His disgrace and fate further undermined the morale of the Far Eastern army, already severely shaken by NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) activities. Despite the Soviet victory, the disclosure of the weaknesses of the army during the investigation convinced Stalin that he could not contemplate further show-downs in the Far East. The immediate effect of the victory, however, was to revive confidence in Moscow. The Russians took a stronger public line over Czechoslovakia in August, lecturing the British on their policy towards Prague and attacking the Runciman mission. On 22 August, Litvinov told the German ambassador in Berlin that, if attacked, the Czechs would fight, the French would mobilize and Britain would have to march to defend its French ally. 'The Soviet Union had promisedCzechoslovakiaher support'; Litvinov told Schulenburg,the German ambassador in Moscow, 'she would keep her word and do her best'.21 While the Soviets might present a stronger front to the outside world, they were still frozen out of the main diplomatic drama. Stalin left as usual for the
20 21

from theEast, I933-4I, pp. I I 3-20. For details, see Haslam, TheSovietUnionandthethreat Documents German on Foreign Policy(London, I955) (DGFP), series D, vol. ii, no. 396, 26 Aug.

I 938.

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Caucusus for his long summer break in late August; there was no press comment on foreign affairs between I and 20 September and Litvinov was very careful in his responses to questions about Soviet policy. Under intense pressure, Benes and Krofta, at the end of August, decided to sound out the Russians. Fierlinger was to inquire about talks between the two countries' general staffs. Senior officers, including the head of Czech artillery, General Netek, had already arrived in Moscow on 25 August, and General Jaroslav Fajfr, the head of the Czech air force, came some days later. Before he left for the USSR, Fajfr saw Alexandrovsky and asked: 'Do the heads of the aviation of the Red Army and the corresponding ruling bodies in matters of national defence agree to receive him for discussions on the specification of the forms of practical co-operation of the military aviations of our countries?'22 Litvinov put the question to Stalin and Molotov on 27 August and waited for instructions. In the interval, Litvinov wrote to Alexandrovsky, making it clear that the Soviet Union would not help Prague unless France did so also. As you can see from the record of my talk with Fierlinger of today's date [26 August], ... no answer from France has been received. I do not know whether this is because Fierlinger is badly informed, or they have been telling you of the French promises in order to ease Fajfr's negotiations with us. Even if one is to believe the information about France's promise to help with aviation, I do not see anything good in that. I would be inclined to think in that case that, instead of a mobilization for an advance on Germany, France has decided to limit herself to help with aviation. Czechoslovakia cannot conduct a war with aviation only, even if she receives such help from us. If France intends to go to war with Germany herself,then it is doubtful whether she would be able to give Czechoslovakia any air power, of which she herself has little. I do not know what answer would be given to General Fajfr, if he comes. In any case, I continue to think that, if we are to speak about any serious help to Czechoslovakia, it would be difficult to go without serious negotiations with France.23 The correspondence between Alexandrovsky and Litvinov indicates that the former was sympathetic to the Czech need for encouragement and was bewildered by the current Moscow line. The representative wanted a clearer signal given so that 'faith and reliance on the USSR would not lead to unexpected happenings and miscalculations'. Alexandrovsky detailed what should be done: In such circumstances it is simply necessary to inform, without excessive noise, but determinedly and consistently, the broad popular masses about what the Soviet Union does, and in what way, to preserve not only the peace in Europe but also the independence of the Czechoslovak Republic... For example, our 'Tass' people did not supply anything at all from Moscow on your speech at the electoral meeting in Leningrad ... 'Tass' also did not give anything about the meeting of Comrade Kalinin with foreign delegates on the occasion of I May... In the events around the partial mobilization of 2 I May, the responsesfrom Moscow were excessively late... Finally, our
2 23

AVP RV, f. 05, Op. i8, p. I37, d. i, vol. 2, Ibid., f. 05, op. i8, p. I49, d. i66, 11.30-I.

1. I27.

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attitude towards the latest stage-the Runciman mission-has already been expressed in articles in Izvestia and Pravda. Up to now, however, 'Tass' has not sent anything to Prague. The first information about these articles appeared in the reports of the correspondents of 'Rude Pravo' and 'Rote Fahne', once again distorted by the censorship... 'Tass' should increase rather than decrease its information, even if we have little to say to Czechoslovakia and are forced to be reserved,in the sense of political statements which can commit us in some way or other. Even if in the given situation it is better for us to keep silent, there remains a large area in which 'Tass' can and should increase its work in Czechoslovakia.24 One of the first public signs of Soviet intentions came on 2 September when Jean Payart, the French charge d'affaires in Moscow, officially asked Litvinov what assistance the USSR could give Czechoslovakia, given the difficulties involving Romania and Poland. Litvinov immediately asked Stalin for instructions as he had 'absolutely no idea as to what tactics I should follow'. He wanted to know whether the earlier recommendations for an international conference and the establishment of contacts between the general staffs of the three countries were 'still in force, or should we add anything to them?'25 We do not have, at this point, Stalin's answer, but Litvinov's conversation with Payart suggests that the previous tactics were 'still in force'. Litvinov insisted that it was France which was under obligation to assist Czechoslovakia irrespective of Soviet help and that Soviet assistance was conditional on that of France. If France came to Czechoslovakia's assistance, the Soviet Union would fulfil all its obligations, 'utilizing every means at our disposal'. With regard to Polish and Romanian hostility, Litvinov suggested that the League Council be mobilized immediately so that it could act as soon as aggression began. Even a majority vote would have a 'beneficial psychological effect' on Romania. He reminded Payart that Romania's foreign minister had suggested that his country would close its eyes to Soviet overflights. This point was confirmed when in a conversation with Bonnet on i I September, Comn'ene made it clear that given the weaknesses of the Romanian air defences, Soviet overflights would go unopposed but no authorization would be given for Soviet troops to cross Romanian territory. Though there were rumours of a Soviet-Romanian agreement on land forces, Comnene repeatedly denied them. 'Inform all legations', he telegraphed from Geneva to Bucharest, 'that news reports concerning the accord, or even conversations concerning the crossing of Soviet troops through Romania, are absolutely false.'26 According, however, to the study by Ivan Pfaff published in I996, the subject was discussed, in secret, between Litvinov and Comn'ene at Crassier, near Geneva, on the night of I4 September. An oral agreement was reached that in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia or after a date was announced for such an attack, the
24 25

Ibid., Alexandrovsky to Litvinov, 30 July, f. 05, op. i8, p. I49, d. i68, 11. I40-2. Ibid., Litvinov to Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov, i Sept., f. os, op. i8, p. I37, d. i, vol.

2,

1. I38.
26

Romanian foreign ministry archives, fond 7 I /dosare speciale C-7-B, volum 308, telegram no.

7, I I Sept. I938.

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Romanians would permit I 00,000 Soviet troops to pass through a land bridge in Bukovina and allow a massive overflight of Soviet planes with troops and weapons to reach Czechoslovakia. This agreement was reached in response to reportsof the movement of Henlein's supportersinto the frontier areas of north and west Bohemia on the night of I3/I4 September, which was seen as the signal for a German attack on the Czech state.27According to Pfaff's account, which is throughout highly critical of Soviet policy, between I4 and 23 September, the Romanians worked out the details of these arrangements. On 24 September, the day after the Czech mobilization was announced, a Romanian note, detailing the terms for the passage of Soviet troops and planes through and over Romania, was sent to Litvinov in Geneva and Potemkin in Moscow. The Romanians estimated that between 250,000 and 350,000 men could be sent to Czechoslovakia by those routes. Pfaff claims, too, that the Romanians no longer demanded a Soviet guarantee of Romania's borders as a condition but only a guarantee that the Red Army would not interfere with Romania's domestic affairs. The Romanian offer was repeated on 26 and 27 September but was never explored by the Soviet government.28At this point, no further reference to this offer or to any follow-up has been found in the Soviet or Romanian foreign ministry archives.29 In his conversation with Jean Payart on 2 September, Litvinov returned to his idea of a conference of powers, notably France, England, and the USSR, to be followed by a solemn and categorical declaration. Payart reported that Litvinov felt that this would stop Hitler, who based his calculations on the double hypothesis that 'France will move, but only if England moves, and England will not move.'30 What Payart did not report to Paris was Litvinov's suggestion of' a meeting of the representativesof the Soviet, French and Czech armies'.3"It may well be that Litvinov feared he had gone too far, for he instructed his diplomats to relay the contents of his conversations only informally. He was worried, too, that what he had said would be misrepresented. Believing that Payart had intended to elicit a negative or evasive response and that the French wanted to shift responsibility to Russian shoulders, he sent Surits in Paris a copy of the record of the conversation. Indeed, Litvinov's responsewas described in Paris as 'evasive' and the rumour spread that the Soviet Union could not be counted on to give assistance to Czechoslovakia. On 3 September, Surits reported that he had learned from a 'solid source' that each time the question of contact with the Soviet Union was
27 Pfaff, Die Sowjetunion p. unddie verteidigung Tschecheslovakei, 392. References are to Czech der sources. 28 Ibid., p. 397. The text of this note based on a Romanian source is printed in Hochman, The Soviet Unionand thefailure of collective security, Though its i934-i938, appendix C, pp. I94-20I. authenticity has been questioned because of the many French spelling errorsin the text, Pfaffin his book supplies a good deal of supporting evidence though nothing explicitly from the Romanian 29 Searches were made on my behalf in both archives in I997. archives. 30 Documents Diplomatiques Francais (DDF), 2e serie, vol. x, no. 534. 31 Quoted in Haslam, The SovietUnionand thestrugglefor collective security, i933-39, p. i8o.

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raised, particularly with regard to the military staffs, the fear was expressed that this would meet with British objections. Payart's demarche was the result of pressurefrom one group of ministers. 'I fully allow that, having made this demarche under pressure', Suritswrote, 'Bonnet may have secretly counted on our giving a negative reply or, in any case, a reply bolstering his conclusions against contact.'32Coulondre, the French ambassador to the USSR, who was in Paris at the time, rightly suspected that Litvinov's assurances had been misconstruedand hurried back to Moscow to ascertain the true state of affairs. On 5 September, Maisky learned that ambassador Corbin in London had not been told of the Payart-Litvinov conversation. He had the impression that the French wanted to 'hush up the conversation' and thereby 'reduce its immediate political impact to a minimum'33 Bonnet was equally furtive in repoi ting on his meeting with Litvinov at Geneva on i i September. When pressed by the French foreign minister on the question of assistance to Czechoslovakia, Litvinov gave the same answers as he had given Payart. Whereas Bonnet emphasized, in his account of the exchange, Litvinov's demand for proceeding via the League, Litvinov barely mentions this aspect in his own report. The French foreign minister was convinced that the Soviets would find an escape clause allowing them to abstain when France was already committed. It was the British, as Bonnet told Litvinov, who turned down the latter's suggestion of a three power meeting. At the same time, the French foreign minister, already in a state of panic over Czechoslovakia and worried by Chamberlain'sseemingly toughened line, never sought the Britishdemarche at Berlin which he told Litvinov had been refusedby London. Bonnet's furtive behaviour only reinforced the Soviet unwillingness to move ahead on its own. Bonnet encouraged the impression that the Soviet Union was not fully committed to Czechoslovakia. Even Fierlinger felt that Moscow had let the Czechs down. He saw Potemkin, the deputy commissar, at the foreign ministry on 3 September and told him that Litvinov's answerhad been 'too theoretical'. He wanted the Soviet Union to play a more active role and insisted on the need for Czech participation in any conference regarding the Sudetenland. In order to dispel the Czech impressionof Soviet disloyalty, Potemkin showed Fierlinger a copy of Litvinov's despatch from Geneva and assured him that if France assisted Czechoslovakia, the USSR would 'render support to the last by every means at its disposal . Potemkin complained that the French were 'continuing to play the fool, pretending that they did not understand our reply, and reducing it merely to an offer to act through the League of Nations or coming out with a declaration in the name of the USSR, England and France'.35The British accepted the French version of events and, at least according to the Soviet charge d'affaires in Berlin, believed that the Soviet position was 'even less decisive' than that of France. More important and, perhaps the real reason for Fierlinger's disappointment, was the poor reception Fajfr received in
32

Ibid., p. i8i.

33

Ibid.

34

Ibid., p. I83-

35

DVP, vol. xxi, doc.

350.

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Moscow. On 4 September, the Czech minister saw Litvinov and complained of the futility of the air chief's conversations with the Soviet authorities and the cold reception given to General Netek by Shaposhnikov, the head of the Soviet general staff. Fierlinger warned Litvinov that 'if Fajfr flies off tomorrow without having achieved any directions in the field of aviation, at least comparable to those which had been promised by France, then this would create the impression in Czechoslovakia that with our answer to the French government, we wish to hide behind the League of Nations'.36 As nothing transpired during the last day of Fajfr's visit, Fierlinger's distress deepened. There was an angry exchange with Potemkin on 9 September. Fierlinger complained 'in an unofficial capacity' of the chilly reception accorded the military specialists and the way in which the Czechoslovak artillery officers who had come to the USSR through Romania with guns and shells had been treated by the Russians. He warned again of the impressionthis would make in Prague. Potemkin expressed surprise that Fierlinger should present these complaints at such a late stage but claimed that the answer given to the French, which had been immediately communicated to Prague, 'is totally sufficient to destroy the slander about the USSR's position on the Czechoslovakquestion'.37 Potemkin noted that France had not fully informed either Prague or London of the Soviet answer and that hostile circles were trying to sabotage collective help to Czechoslovakia and putting the blame on Russia. As he left, Fierlinger once again tried to convince the highly sceptical Potemkin that the French government was promising to help. Chamberlain's decision to go to Berchtesgaden on I 5 September confirmed the view of those in Moscow who believed not only that the Western powers were intent on excluding the USSR from their deliberations but were prepared to seek an agreement with Germany over Czechoslovakia that would leave the Soviet Union isolated. Even Litvinov warned the French indirectly that the Soviet Union would reverseits policies and abandon the principlesof collective security and the League of Nations. Stalin, who returned from the Caucasus in mid-September, was not quite ready to cast the USSR adrift. He agreed that Benes should be given positive answers to the questions raised with Alexandrovsky on i 9 September. According to the Soviet documents, Benes asked whether the USSR would give immediate and real help according to the mutual assistance pact if France remained loyal and also helped. Again according to the Soviet documents, Benes also said he would launch an appeal under articles i 6 and I 7 of the Covenant and wanted an immediate reply as to whether the USSR would assist in its capacity as a member of the League of Nations on the basis of these articles. Speed was essentialas general mobilization might have to be declared by the evening of the 20th. Potemkin, in charge while Litvinov was in Geneva, answered both questions in the affirmative. On 2 I September, Litvinov spoke in Geneva defending Articles X and XVI of the
36 2,1.

148.

AVP, RF, Litvinov to Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov, 4 Sept., f. 05, op. i 8, p. I 37, d. i, vol. 3 Ibid., Potemkin's diary, 8 Sept., f. OI38, op. I9, p. I23, d. i, 11. 62-3.

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Covenant and reiterating the USSR's commitment to Czechoslovakia and France. At the same time, he made no mention of any threat to the Soviet Union. There has been a considerable argument about the wording of Benes's second question and the timing of the Soviet reply. As recorded in Benes's memoirs, the president asked: 'What will the attitude of the Soviet Union be if France refuses to fulfil her obligations?' and not the query Potemkin answered.38 Some historianshave argued that Alexandrovskyhad changed the question to one that makes no sense given the urgency of the situation or, more possibly in my view, that Potemkin may have altered its composition either at the time or later to fit the Soviet answer.39The question of timing is also in dispute. Hochman and Lukes claim that the Soviet replies were given to the Czechs only on 2 I September, after the Czech decision had been taken to yield to British and French pressure and that Alexandrovsky purposely delayed delivering the affirmative Soviet answers. There is, however, a telegram from Alexandrovsky on 2 I September saying that he had informed Benes by telephone of the Soviet reply and its communication to the French at 7 p.m. on the 20th, when the Czech council of ministers was still debating their reply to the Anglo-French proposals.40 There is no record of this message in the Czech presidential archives. Both these questions are important for assessing the Soviet policies towards Prague. Neither the early decision to reject the Western powers' recommendation, however, nor the later and more significant one that evening to accept the Anglo-French ultimatum had much to do with the Soviet replies. Given Benes's reliance on the Western powers, his continuing distrust of the USSR and the CPC (Czech Communist party) and the recent disappointments over bilateral military co-operation with the Soviet Union, it is hard to believe that an offer of unilateral Soviet support, even if it had been made, would have changed the outcome of the Czech deliberations. Did the Soviet Union want to encourage the Czechs without sharing in the responsibilityfor their decision? Moscow wanted Benes to resist but would not go further than France in supporting this resistanceand, more to the point, did not want to be blamed for the Czech capitulation. According to a Czech document, Alexandrovsky told the head of the chancery of the Czech foreign ministry that 'the question the president put before him was clearly formulated and yesterday he delivered a clear answer from Moscow to both of these questions. The president had not asked him anything else.'41Alexandrovsky,
between StalinandHitler,p. 223. Quoted in Lukes, Czechoslovakia My discussion of this point should be compared with the arguments and evidence produced failure from the Czech archives in ibid., pp. 223-5, as well as in Hochman, TheSovietUnionandthe der und of collective security, i934-i938, pp. I 6I-2; Pfaff, Die sowjetunion dieverteidigung Tschecheslovakei, PP- 370-540 Documenty Sgovora,i937-i939 (Moscow, I979), no. i6o. See the po Istorii Myunkhenskogo between HitlerandStalin,p. 229. argument in Lukes, Czechoslovakia 41 Dokumenty Istorii Myunkhenskogo Sgovora, no. i 6o. See citation from Czech documents in po Lukes, Czechoslovakia between HitlerandStalin,p. 229.
39 38

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and later Litvinov, were certainly indignant at the attempt made to lay the blame for the Czech surrender on the Soviet Union. The former categorically denied, in Prague, the statement carried in the special edition of the Czech newspaper, Vecher,that the Czechs had also been betrayed by 'a people of the Slavonic race' and it seems probable that his outrage was genuine. He had tried previously to get more from Moscow than Litvinov offered. On I7 September, well before his meeting with Benes, Alexandrovsky raised the question of the USSR's assistance if England and France deserted Czechoslovakia. He strongly urged on Potemkin ('I would like to emphasize, with the utmost insistence') a positive answer and in good time so as not to 'disappoint the proletariat and the working people'. He warned of a 'loss of morale and increase of defeatist attitudes' if no statement was made that could allay Czech fears.42 The minister was under no illusions as to the limited nature of what the Soviets would offer Benes. It is revealing that already on the 22nd, Potemkin had reminded Alexandrovsky of this and criticized the use of the embassy as a centre of Czech protest. In response to what clearly was a very sharp telegram, Alexandrovsky wrote, 'Of course, I have accepted your suggestions, as information and as guidance. That was all the more easy for me as I have always been guided by the main point of your instructions and of Comrade Litvinov's speeches in Geneva, namely that our help to Czechoslovakia depends on France's help.' The representative claimed his words to the crowd demonstrating in front of the embassy were intended to give a soothing effect and in no way represented an interference with the internal affairs of the country. 'The delegations which came to the Polpredstvo [equivalent to embassy] did not come with slogans calling for the overthrow of their own government', Alexandrovsky wrote, 'but with manifestations of friendship and sympathy towards the USSR. "' Both Alexandrovsky and Potemkin blamed Fierlinger for misrepresenting the Soviet view. On 23 September, Potemkin called the Czech minister to the ministry: I informed Fierlinger that his telegram reporting our meeting yesterday had created, according to Alexandrovsky'sreports, the impression that I had allegedly expressedmy support for the possibility of our giving help to Czechoslovakia even without the involvement of France and for the giving of help immediately, bypassing certain formal procedures set out in the pact of the League of Nations and the corresponding articles of the Soviet-Czech mutual assistance treaty. I told Fierlinger I could not understand how he could have shown the content of our conversation in such a light.44 Showing great confusion and discomfort, at least according to Potemkin, for Fierlinger had passed similar information to ambassador Coulondre, the Czech minister lamely claimed that his despatch must have been incorrectly transmitted. Potemkin was very sharp with Fierlinger insisting that he had 'no grounds whatsoever for attributing such an intention to us, as we ourselves had
42 43 44

AVP RV, Alexandrovsky to Potemkin, I7 Sept., f. 0I38, Op. I9, p. I28, d. 6, 11.I27-8. Ibid., Alexandrovsky to Potemkin, 29 Sept., f. OI38, op. I9, p. I28, d. 6,11. I5I-2. Ibid., Potemkin's diary, 23 Sept., f. OI38, op. I9, p. I23, d. i, 11.72-3.

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not formulated our attitude on this question, which had been put to us by Benes'. Potemkin's rebuke suggests that the Soviet authorities were not prepared to go beyond what they had already told the Czech president, who apparently did ask this key question, and that Stalin preferrednot to give any instructions on this point. In late September, surveying Benes's attitude throughout the crisis, Alexandrovsky wrote to Potemkin:
Since our talk on I 9 September, when he wanted to know urgently what would be the USSR's attitude towards giving help in different situations, depending on France's nonfulfilment of her treaty obligations, I have always felt that Benes both wants and does not want Soviet help as a means of defending Czechoslovakia's interests... I have no doubt that this dry pedantic man, an old hand in diplomacy in trying to achieve what was best for Czechoslovakia, placed his entire hopes from the very beginning, and continues to place them even now, on the support of England and France, and perceives the USSR's help as a suicidal means of defending Czechoslovakia against Hitler.45

This seems an accurate judgement made by a diplomat sympathetic to the Czech cause, if not to Benes, personally. The Soviet leaders, as far as can be ascertained from these papers, never considered taking independent action to assist Czechoslovakia, nor did they anticipate that the French would come to their ally's assistance should the Germansinvade. Litvinov repeatedly checked Alexandrovskywhen he thought the minister was encouraging the Czechs too much. At the same time, it is highly probable that Stalin never ruled on what the Soviet Union would do if either France kept to its treaty or if the Germans attacked Czechoslovakia and France and Britain stood aside. It was not at all out of character for Stalin to avoid taking such decisions unless forced by circumstances to do so. The answers to Benes's questions may still have been in the form reported by Alexandrovsky and stated by Litvinov in Geneva on 2I September. It is not without significance that, on the day after receiving the news of Chamberlain's trip to Godesberg, Litvinov tried to get Stalin to take a tougher line in order to impress Hitler. The following message was sent to Moscow on 23 September.
Being of the opinion that a European war, in which we will be involved, is not in our interest and that it is necessary to do anything to prevent it, I wonder whether it is convenient for us to declare even a partial mobilization and promote a press campaign in order to force Hitler and Beck to believe in the possibility of a great war which will include us ... It is possible that France agrees to declare a partial mobilization as well. It is necessary to act at once.46

Litvinov still thought that Hitler would retreat if faced with the possibility of joint Soviet-French-English action against him. There is no evidence that his recommendations were adopted.
Ibid., Alexandrovsky to Potemkin, 29 Sept., f. OI38, op. I9, p. I28, d. 6,11. 15I-2. D VP,vol. xxi, doc. 369. Also quoted in a slightly different translation in Haslam, SovietUnion andthestruggle collective for security, I 87. p.
4 46

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If Stalin was unwilling to sanction independent moves to assist Czechoslovakia, he was willing to take a tougher line with the Poles. On 22 September, Krofta called Moscow's attention to the Polish frontier preparations and asked for Soviet diplomatic action in Warsaw. At about four in the morning of 23 September - an unusually late hour for even Stalin to hold meetings at the Kremlin - Potemkin called in the Polish charge d'affaires to hand him a note warning the Poles that the Soviet Union would denounce the non-aggression pact if Poland attacked Czechoslovakia. The Poles rightly suspected that the Czechs were behind the Soviet intervention. Warsaw rejected the Soviet warning, and relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia deteriorated. There was also military action, though the dating suggests the decision was taken independently of Litvinov's recommendations to Stalin. Between 2I and 24 September a partial mobilization took place involving forces from the Kiev and Byelorussian special military districts and several other internal districts. These measures including the
alerting and raising to full strength of fortified regions along the border and in the depths and the full mobilization of one tank corps; thirty rifle and ten cavalry divisions; seven tank and motorized rifle and twelve aviation brigades; seven fortifiedregions, and two corps, one division, two brigades, sixteen regiments, and numerous separate air defence battalions. By the end of the month, additional mobilization measures were implemented in other military districts. In all, sixty rifle and sixteen cavalry divisions, three tank corps, thirty-three separate tank brigades and seventeen aviation brigades were mobilized for a total of 330,000 men.47

The French were first told of the mobilization on 25 September, the day after they had declared their own partial mobilization. On 28 September, Voroshilov reported to the Politburo and Council of People's Commissarson the air squadrons that could be sent to Czechoslovakia on 30 September, the eve of Hitler's threatened invasion date.48 The September mobilization prompted the Soviet general staff to improve and reconsider its proceduresin the weeks that followed and to develop a new strategic deployment plan in November. The new Shaposhnikovplan envisioned a two front war, in the west against Germany, Italy, Poland, and possibly Romania, Finland, and the Baltic states; and in the east against Japan, with the European threat given priority. It is important to notice, in view of the Soviet negotiations with the British and French in I939, that the planners were unsure whether the major attack would come north or south of the Pripiat Marshes which divided the theatre in two. Alternative plans were developed to meet either case. In both, it was noted that Finnish forces and those of the Baltic states could assist the Germans with an attack on Leningrad. The military preparations in September I 938 were a demonstration of Soviet resolve but provide little evidence of any intention actually to assist
47 Figures and quotation from David Glantz, Themilitary strategy theSovietUnion(London and of Portland, OR, i99i), pp. 69-70; see also Haslam, SovietUnionandthestruggle collective for security, 48 Quoted in Haslam, SovietUnionandthestruggle p. I89. for collective security, I 9 I-2. pp.

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Czechoslovakia until sure of what the Western powers would do. At most, these preparations might have acted as a deterrent to Poland. Displaying his own doubts about Benes's intentions, Litvinov, when later reviewing the Czech crisis in October, questioned the reasons for the surrender to Poland. Even if capitulation to Hitler had been unavoidable, the Czechoslovak army was, it seemed, strong enough to resist Poland. Even if we did not consider it necessary to act against Poland, after we had made our warning to her she nevertheless had to keep an eye on the East and leave considerable forces on the Soviet-Polish frontier. It cannot be ruled out that we might have made some regrouping of forces in the frontier region with the same purpose ... I doubt that Hitler would have attacked Prague in support of Poland's demands, as Fierlinger supposes This would have made the position of Daladier and Chamberlain, whom Hitler must now support, more difficult.49 Quite apart from this Soviet-oriented interpretation of Czech interests, the letter to Alexandrovsky is interesting because it suggests that Litvinov felt that part of the blame for the Czech capitulation rested with Benes. Litvinov turned to Alexandrovsky, whose name disappeared from the diplomatic list in I939, for further elucidation. The Munich agreement cancelled out the Soviet threat to Poland. On I October, a Polish ultimatum was dispatched to Prague demanding the cession of part of Teschen within twenty-four hours and the remainder in ten days. The beleaguered Czechs capitulated within a few hours. The Soviets already anticipated a similar fate for Poland itself. Deputy Commissar Potemkin, more isolationist in sympathy than Litvinov, warned Coulondre more than once that 'Poland is preparing its fourth partition.'50 On the diplomatic front, between Godesberg and Munich, the Soviets continued to avoid any commitments to Prague. On 24 September, acting on Halifax's instructions, De la Warr, the lord privy seal and one of Chamberlain's scorned 'boys brigade' (i.e. the younger men in the cabinet who disputed his policies) and 'Rab' Butler, both present in Geneva for the League session, came to Litvinov to seek information about the Soviet position should the talks with Hitler break down and Britain and France take counter measures. Litvinov tried, with little success, to find out something more about the Chamberlain talks. For his part, he refused to answer any questions about Soviet military preparations. Claiming ignorance, as he had been absent from Moscow for two weeks, he suggested a conference of great powers, in London or Paris but not in Geneva, as the last would not impress Hitler. Pressed by De la Warr as to whether the Russians would wait for prior movement by France or a decision by the League before sending their forces into action, Litvinov replied 'that one scarcely moves and mobilizes forces faster than one can take a decision at Geneva, but that we would anyway not act before France, particularly after what has happened in the last days'. 5 Litvinov was only restating the earlier Soviet position. From Moscow, on the same day, in reply
4 AVP RV, Litvinov to Alexandrovsky, I I Oct., f. 05, op. i8, p. 149, d. i66, 11.33-5. 50 DDF, 2e serie, vol. xii, no. I 7. 5 Quoted in Haslam, SovietUnionandthestruggle collective for security, I88. p.

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to his account of this conversation, came the response that it was highly doubtful whether Britain and France would agree to ajoint conference with the USSR as they had hitherto ignored the Soviet Union. Evidently, according to information that reached Prague from London, Chamberlain was appalled at De la Warr's approach to Litvinov and 'warned of the great danger that would arise from the presence of Russian forces in central Europe, since it would strengthen Bolshevism throughout the world'.52 It is presumably to this that Lord Home was referring in I988 when he revealed that, 'according to Chamberlain, the Soviet Union had to be inhibited from intervening on behalf of Czechoslovakia on the ground that a successful intervention would leave Eastern Europe exposed to "'Russian penetration"'." During this critical period, Alexandrovsky was one of the very few foreign diplomats who saw Benes continually. Neither the British nor the French ministers could or would approach him informally. Though after the war, Benes told Gottwold that he disliked the Soviet minister, he seems to have treated Alexandrovsky to a series of long monologues which the Soviet representative subsequently summarized for Litvinov's benefit. At the least, unlike Fierlinger who exaggerated the possibilities of Soviet assistance, Alexandrovsky appears to have said as little as possible when Benes indulged in flights of verbal fancy over what the Soviet Union might do. In his diary account of these days prepared in late October, Alexandrovsky records Benes's optimism even before Hitler's Godesberg demands were rejected by Britain and France. Once Czech mobilization began and war anticipated, Benes went into higher gear, asking many 'practical questions' about the forms of Soviet assistance to Czechoslovakia, including how many thousands of airborne troops would be deployed. 'I confess', Alexandrovsky wrote, 'to having a heavy feeling because I could tell Benes nothing, especially regarding his " practical questions "'.5 After Hitler's Sportpalast speech on the 26th, through which the exhausted president had slept, 'Benes was not only in an eager but even in a happy mood. Our meeting was short but his whole tone was simply militant', Alexandrovsky recalled. Benes claimed that Roosevelt's appeal was the result of his, Benes's, work and that now 'it was absolutely clear to everyone that a world coalition to defend peace against the aggressor's attempt to provoke war had really appeared'. By the next day, in what was to be their last meeting, the Czech president's mood had changed completely. Benes was speaking 'quite seriously about the inevitable war', and his tone regarding Soviet assistance was 'quite different'. The Soviet minister believed that Benes had deceived him about the contents of Chamberlain's personal letter, describing it as expressing England's willingness to help with armed forces. Aleksandrovsky writes that Benes wanted Soviet help despite the absence of
52 Ibid., p. I88; for British documents on conversations in Geneva, see Documents British on Foreign Policy(DBFP), 3rd series, vol. XI, nos. I043, I07I. WorldWar(Oxford and Malden, MA, 53 Reference in AndrewJ. Crozier, Thecauses theSecond of p- I44. between StalinandHitler,p. 240. 5 Quotation in Lukes, Czechoslovakia I997),

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assistance from France and England, 'he undoubtedly tried to lie to us not with the aim of Czechoslovakia's capitulation', the Soviet representative explained, 'but with the aim of involving us in a war against Western Europe so that Czechoslovakia's fate would be decided not by some kind of decrees issued at Munich, but by a great European war'. Alexandrovsky admitted that this 'train of thought' was contradicted by Benes's 'cowardly and half-hearted behaviour in questions of internal policy'. Attributing this to the president's fear of the 'activity of the popular masses', he speculated that Benes's 'requests for answers on the question of help were a manoeuvre for laying the blame for Czechoslovakia's capitulation and ruin on the USSR as well'. Even a good Bolshevik like Alexandrovsky admitted that the question was so complicated that 'I would not like to assert anything definite.'55 There is little evidence, judging from the commissariat documentation, of any secret negotiations between the Soviet Union and Germany but signs of some willingness on each side to consider better relations during these difficult months. Talks between the two countries had been broken off in March I938 after the Germans refused to accept the Soviet demands on trade credits. The Soviets still had no ambassador in Berlin; Litvinov, who had doubts about the suitability of Astakhov, the charge d'affaires, was anxious that an appointment should be made for fear that Count Werner von der Schulemburg, the German ambassador, who was not a party member and 'is not sympathetic to the party's foreign policy' would be transferred from Moscow.56 It was already clear in April I 938 that Malenkov, a bureaucrat in charge of personnel in the party secretariat, might make the next appointment and, indeed, the new appointee, Alexei Merekalov, was a deputy commissar of foreign trade. It was, of course, through trade negotiations that the previous unsuccessful Soviet initiatives for an agreement had been launched. Merekalov was a weak appointment; he spoke no German, and seems to have found it difficult to find his bearings. Astakhov continued to send political reports to Moscow months after Merekalov's appointment. While in charge of the embassy, he reported on the diminution of the anti-Soviet campaign in the German press but warned Litvinov that this was 'no indication of a better attitude towards us' but rather a lull which could be replaced at any moment by a new raging campaign.57 Merekalov's appointment was made in April. On I I July, Astakhov wrote an account of the new representative's introduction to Weizsacker, the state secretary at the German foreign ministry and to Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister. Weizsacker raised the question of proposals for an increase in trade. Though Merekalov replied that the initiative with regard to any new credit offer had to be taken by the Germans, he made it perfectly clear that Moscow would welcome new recommendations. Queried on who would
5 56

AVP RV, Alexandrovsky to Litvinov, 20 Oct., f. OI38, op. I9, p. I28, d. 6,11. I6I-75. Ibid., Litvinov to Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Ezhov, 4 Apr. f 05, Op. i 8, Ibid., Astakov to Litvinov,
I3

p- 37, d. I, vol. I, 1. 222.

57

May, f. 05, Op. i8, p.

I42,

d. 56.

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handle the negotiations, Merekalov replied that the technical questions would be handled by the Soviet trade mission in Berlin though the embassy would be involved in the more general questions of economic relations between the two countries. Curiously, as if trying to feel out the state secretary's position, Merekalov asked whether the German foreign ministry knew about the credit talks handled by the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg. Weizsacker disclaimed any personal knowledge though he assumed that the foreign ministry officials would have the information. Ribbentrop's questions were purely perfunctory. The ambassador was also received by the Fuihrer but the conversation with a 'refreshed and relaxed' Hitler consisted entirely of pleasantries. There were rumours in the foreign press of a German demarche in Moscow intended to persuade the Russians not to intervene in the Czechoslovakian conflict. Between Schulenburg's return from his summer vacation on 2 I August and Litvinov's departure for Geneva on 4 September, the two men met twice. Litvinov was at pains to deny the press rumours. He wrote to Stalin that the German ambassador had come on his own initiative before leaving for the Nuremberg party congress and in connection with this 'he gasped and moaned about the coming war'. In answer to Schulenburg's questions about the mood in Prague and Paris, Litvinov replied that if an attack was made, the Czechoslovakian people would resist desperately and France would come to Czechoslovakia's aid. Schulenburg did not put 'any requests or questions'." On 27 August, Litvinov told Schulenburg about the incorrect information in the foreign press concerning their previous meeting. Both the German and Soviet sources suggest that there were no negotiations during the Munich crisis. Official contact was renewed in December when the Germans, in view of Litvinov's marginalization after Munich, thought it worthwhile to offer the Soviets the possibility of renewed talks.59 The Soviets accepted, only to be unpleasantly surprised when the Germans, alarmed by rumours circulating in the French press, decided to cancel the trip of the delegation to Moscow led by Dr Karl Schnurre, a senior official at the foreign ministry's economic policy department.

IV
Munich could only be viewed in Moscow as a disaster for the Soviet Union. Germany had been strengthened and was in a position to take the rest of Czechoslovakia and threaten Poland. Both Britain and France showed every sign of facilitating Hitler's expansionist policies. Soviet isolation had been exposed in the most humiliating manner. While the passivity and isolation of the USSR was partly the result of conscious choice, it was evident that neither Britain nor France considered the Soviet Union a desirable or militarily useful ally. Nor did the German general staff feel it necessary even to discuss the
58

Ibid., Litvinov to Stalin and Molotov, 29 Aug. f 05, Op. i8, p. I37, d. 1, vol. 9 DGFP, series D, vol. iv, doc. 482, memorandum by Hilger, 23 Dec. I938.

2,1.

I35.

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possibility of Soviet intervention, apart from the possibility of a few planes being sent to Prague. There were rumours in Berlin in early September that Soviet Russia would 'tumble down'. The Soviet efforts to minimize the effects of the military purges had failed to convince either 'friends' or foes. Litvinov's position, already shaky, was furtherweakened. The Czech crisishighlights how little the foreign minister knew about Stalin's intentions as well as his unwillingness to move too far without Stalin's permission. It was a tactic that he often used to take a step forward and then to check with Stalin after he had acted. This procedure was used during the Munich crisis. Those who, like Molotov and Zhdanov, opposed Litvinov's orientation towards the Western powers or harboured hopes for the elusive rapprochementwith Germany could press their case, after the Munich conference, with far greater confidence. In its immediate aftermath, Stalin kept a low profile. On I 9 September I 938, Pravda published Chapter I2 of the Brief courseon the historyof Vkp (All Union Communist Party), a book reputedly written by Stalin. In this chapter, the author writes:
in actual fact, the second imperialistwar had already broken out... It is directed against Britain's, France's and the United States's capitalistic interests, for its aim is to divide the world and the spheres of influence in a way favourable to the aggressive countries and disadvantageous for the so-called democratic countries. The main characteristicof the second imperialist war is that it is led and developed by aggressive powers, while other powers, the 'democratic' ones, against which it is fundamentally directed, pretend that the war is not their business.60

In an unpublished speech, during a discussion of the Brief course,Stalin emphasized the danger of the international situation and the need for a realistic foreign policy of which the most important aim was to prevent the union of the capitalist states against the Soviet Union. Stalin was to return to the same themes in the much-quoted 'chestnuts' speech of Io March I 939. Speaking of the imperialist war inherent in the capitalist world, he argued that the Soviet Union had to be free in her foreign policy, siding neither with the aggressorsor non-aggressors. The war of the 'four strongest European imperialist states', Molotov's phrase used in a speech in October I938, should not involve the Soviet Union. As was not uncommon when blocked on the international stage, the Soviets reverted to marshalling the revolutionary potential of the working classes. However dim the prospectsof success, the day after the Munich agreement, the French, British, German, and Czech communist parties issued a joint declaration condemning the agreement reached by the capitalist great powers and calling on the forcesof peace to end the 'policy of capitulating to fascism 61 It may well be, as Klement Gottwald told Benes in September I 945, that 'the Soviet leaders had severely criticized him for his failure to carry out a
60 61

inevitabile, 224. p. Quoted in Silvio Pons, Staline la guerra p. security Europe, I98. in for Quoted in Haslam, SovietUnionandthestruggle collective

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communist coup d'etat in Prague during the September I938 crisis'.62 There was, however, not much 'revolutionary potential' in the crowds demonstrating in Prague on the night of 2 I-2 September against the acceptance of the AngloFrench ultimatum. Benes brought the upheavals to an end within a few hours; the resignation of Hodza and his replacement by General Syrovy, who had served in the Masaryk legions in Russia, was enough to send the workers back to their factories and to disperse the crowds. There was even less chance of revolutionary action, if that was what Gottwald and the CPC leaders had planned, when a crowd assembled before the Castle to protest against the acceptance of the Munich Diktat. The Czech police were ready and the protestors pushed back and scattered. Nor was the PCF (French communist party) having any success in France where in October, Paul Reynaud was made finance minister; price controls were lifted and the forty hour working week virtually abolished. The CGT (Conf6deration generale du travail) declared a general strike on 30 November; it was a semi-failure which the government's extreme measures and fierce campaign of repression turned into a total defeat for the workers. With the assistance of the public authorities, the employers had won their 'Battle of the Marne' (Simone Weil's expression). The PCF lost votes after Munich for opposing the settlement and the party had an uphill battle to try to win them back. From Berlin in early September, the Soviet representative described the defeatist mood in Germany of 'the lower classes and the intelligentsia' and the swing in the opposite direction with the welcome news of Chamberlain's visit. On 27 September, Astakhov reported that 'Hitler had not managed to create enthusiasm in the masses ... Of course no great hopes could be placed on that in the near future, but it should be noted nevertheless.'63 As to the British working classes, Maisky noted that Chamberlain was the hero of the hour and the voices of dissent few. In Spain, the Munich agreements delivered Franco from the agonizing fear that a war could lead to an alliance between France and the Republic. Franco's cabinet remained in permanent session while the carve-up of Czechoslovakia took place. The decisive Nationalist counter-offensive in the Battle of the Ebro began at the end of October. Once again, Franco preferred to annihilate the Republican armies rather than to opt for a more ambitious strategy that would have ended the war far more quickly. After repeated delays, the final offensive against Catalonia was launched and the Republic, as the Soviet leaders had anticipated, entered its final death throes. If the Comintern leaders believed that a war in I938 would unleash 'the second wave of proletarian revolutions', they were more removed from the realities of practical politics than seems possible or probable. The Soviet leadership anticipated a war between the capitalist powers. In I 938, however, such a war would have only magnified the dangers the Soviets faced. It was more prudent to 'wait and see'. It is against this background that Stalin's speech to the i8th party congress on Io March I 939 should be read.
62 63

Reference in Lukes, Czechoslovakia between StalinandHitler, p. 23 1. AVP RV, Astakhov to Potemkin, 27 Sept., f. o82, Op. 2I, p. 89, d. 4, 1. 234.

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The dictator had no doubt about the dangers of the present situation and the need for the Soviet Union to follow the most realistic policy possible. The USSR had to be free in her foreign policy, neither with the aggressors nor with the non-aggressors. In the war between the imperialist powers, the USSR had to 'observe caution and not let our country be drawn into conflicts by warmongers urging others to take the chestnuts out of the fire '.64 Though the whole speech was unfriendly towards the West, it did not indicate that Stalin had decided to strike a deal with Germany. The Soviet Union was in a weak and exposed position in the post-Munich period and Stalin, for the moment, had few cards in hand. Paradoxically, it may have been the British guarantees to Poland that rescued Stalin from this situation. As the French ambassador, Robert Coulondre, wrote in his retrospective memoirs: The Reich could not attack Russia by land without using Polish or Romanian territory, that is to say, since I 3 April, without bringing into play the guarantee of the Western powers and consequently triggeringwar with them. Stalin had obtained, indirectly and without having to commit himself, the shield in the West which he had been seeking for ten years... he could safely watch developments and carry on a double game in a way dear to the Russians. One should not tempt saints; still less those who are not saints.65 The legacy of Munich was not without importance in the outcome of that game. V These foreign ministry archives, many of which, to my knowledge, have not been previously used, provide strong support for those who have argued that the Soviet leadership was not prepared to take any unilateral action to assist Czechoslovakia against Nazi Germany. Nothing found here suggests that Benes would have fared better had he put his trust in the USSR rather than in France and Britain. Neither, however, do these papers provide any evidence that the Soviet government was encouraging the Czechs to stand up to the Germans in the hope of a Czech-German war, into which France might also be drawn and from which the Soviet Union could remain aloof so as to emerge as the arbiter of Europe. Letters from Litvinov suggest the contrary. Even in the absence of Stalin's replies, the Litvinov-Stalin correspondence is a first-rate source, adding to what is already known about the relations between the two men and the possible sources of their policy differences. The number of letters sent and the repetition of the same or similar questions indicate that Litvinov did not know what Stalin intended and was not privy to Stalin's thoughts. The letters confirm the impression that, though Litvinov might have had considerable freedom in his daily conduct of ministry business, he was wary of taking independent action and repeatedly asked either for instructions or approval of actions already taken in their absence.
64 65

Pravda,ii Mar. I 9399 de R. Coulondre, De Stalinea Hitler: souvenirs deuxambassades, 1936-1939

(Paris, I 950),

P.

263.

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While the immediate and limited focus of Litvinov's letters to Stalin make them less valuable than one might wish, they do cast some additional light on the internal Soviet debate about whether the USSR should continue to cooperate with the Western powers or retreat into a position of isolation. Litvinov made no secret of his dissatisfaction with the passivity in current policy and prodded Stalin to take a more interventionist line. Many of his suggestions, however, were of a public relations kind, accompanied by assurances that they would not lead to an increase in Soviet obligations. Undoubtedly aware of the prevailing winds in the Kremlin, Litvinov was necessarily cautious but he was, himself, highly suspicious of the Western leaders and made much of their willingness, not only to come to terms with Hitler, but also to exclude the Soviet Union from their deliberations. These letters do not provide much insight into what Litvinov thought was practically, as distinct from politically, possible. The diplomatic correspondence confirms earlier impressions, based on memoir and printed sources, that experienced professionals like Maisky in London and Surits in Paris wrote freely to Litvinov, who paid close attention to their reports while not always accepting their advice. As might have been expected, Alexandrovsky in Prague was kept on a short lead. In no uncertain terms, he was warned not to encourage the Czechs in their hopes that the Soviet Union would offer assistance independently of France and was, in fact, reprimanded when it was thought he had gone too far in the opposite direction. Throughout the crisis, the diplomatic exchanges suggest that Alexandrovsky favoured a more public pro-Czech position than his masters were willing to countenance. Both Litvinov and Potemkin were highly critical of the Czech minister in Moscow; they accused Fierlinger of misrepresenting the Soviet position and of dangerously exaggerating what Moscow would do on behalf of Czechoslovakia. In this instance, the Soviet archives confirm the judgement of recent writers on Czech foreign policy. Some words of caution are necessary. The way the Soviet foreign ministry archives are classified and distributed make it difficult to know whether one has seen all the relevant papers. On the positive side, where checks have been made, published versions, apart from a few omissions, have accurately reproduced the original sources. These papers, of course, tell only one part of the Munich story and the availability of other Soviet archives is still far from complete. One would need to consult, in the first instance, the presidential and Politburo archives to uncover the well-springs of Soviet policy. Even then, as is so often the case with Hitler or Roosevelt, where papers are voluminous and accessible, we may not know what Stalin thought or how he arrived at his decisions. The decision-making apparatus during the Munich crisis remains obscure. The foreign ministry was only one player in the foreign affairs arena and Litvinov had already suffered a loss of influence in the quarters that mattered. He and his officials had already fallen under the shadow of the Terror. Key posts were left unfilled as their previous occupants were recalled, dismissed and/or arrested. There is ample proof that Litvinov and Molotov

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were old rivals and intensely disliked each other and that it was Molotov who
was, by far, the closer to Stalin. It is well known, too, that Stalin had multiple sources of information and used a variety of agents and institutions to carry out his policies. Access to the records of the Comintern, the NKVD, and the army and air force, to name the most obvious, might help to further clarify the still grey areas of Soviet policy during the crisis. Despite these reservations, the additional material found in the foreign ministry archives gives the reader a more immediate sense of Soviet policy during these weeks and, in particular, provides a glimpse of the cross-winds in Moscow that were so important in the months that followed.