G.R. No.

189776

December 15, 2010

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO vs. FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration" filed by respondents on April 28, 2000, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner. Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it "may be considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation. HELD: The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs. The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation. The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz: Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.

G.R. No. 187056

September 20, 2010

JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO vs. ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA

This case pertains to a gift, otherwise denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in reality is a donation inter vivos made effective upon its execution by the donors and acceptance thereof by the donees, and immediately transmitting ownership of the donated property to the latter, thus precluding a subsequent assignment thereof by one of the donors. On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled "DonationMortis Causa" in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses 126-square meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila in equal shares. The deed of donation reads: It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse. It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano Gonzales will continue to occupy the portions now occupied by them. It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any other distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or intestate and where ever situated. It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right, ownership, possession and administration of this property herein donated and accepted and this Disposition and Donation shall be operative and effective upon the death of the DONORS. Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document. Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few months later or on December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972. In 1998 Jarabini filed a "petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Sp. Proc. 98-90589. Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father Leopoldos assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her. ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses donation to Asuncion, Emiliano, and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos. HELD: That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics: 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; 2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and 3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos. The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived. Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donors lifetime.

Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peaflorida, in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed. Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donees acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated. Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non habet.

G.R. No. 131953

June 5, 2002

MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S. CABATINGAN vs. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN and HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half () portion of the former's house and lot. Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, and (c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan real properties. These deeds of donation contain similar provisions, to wit: "That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed 3 automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect; x x x" (Emphasis Ours) On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died. Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation executed on January 14, 1995. Respondents allege, inter alia, that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. Petitioners in their Amended Answer, deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments. Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death. In addition, petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners die ahead of Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos. HELD: Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit. In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive."In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in their Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation. That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" does not qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason. We apply the above rulings to the present case. The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be transferred to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would have not expressed such proviso in the subject deeds. Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and as such, said deeds must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code. The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor and the donee, the documents were not executed in the manner provided for under the above-quoted provisions of law. Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error in declaring the subject deeds of donation null and void.

G.R. No. 106755

February 1, 2002

APOLINARIA AUSTRIA-MAGAT v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FLORENTINO LUMUBOS, et. al. Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five (5) children, namely, Rosario Austria, Consolacion Austria, herein petitioner Apolinaria AustriaMagat, Leonardo, and one of herein respondents, Florentino Lumubos. Leonardo died in a Japanese concentration camp at Tarlac during World War II. In 1953, Basilisa bought a parcel of residential land together with the improvement thereon covered and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4036 (T-3268). On December 17, 1975, Basilisa executed a document designated as Kasulatan sa Kaloobpala (Donation). The said document which was notarized by Atty. Carlos Viniegra, reads as follows: KASULATANG SA KALOOBPALA (DONATION) TALASTASIN NG LAHAT AT SINUMAN: Na ako, si BASELISA COMERCIANTE, may sapat na gulang, Filipina, balo, at naninirahan sa blg. 809 L. Javier Bagong Pook, San Antonio, Lungsod ng Kabite, Filipinas, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang itoy NAGSASALAYSAY Na alang-alang sa mabuting paglilingkod at pagtingin na iniukol sa akin ng apat kong mga tunay na anak na sila: X x x x

Kusang loob na ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi na mababawi sa naulit ng apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagamagmana (sic), ang aking isang lupang residential o tirahan sampu ng aking bahay nahan ng nakatirik doon na nasa Bagong Pook din, San Antonio, Lungsod ng Kabite, at nakikilala bilang Lote no. 7, xxx Na ang Kaloob palang ito ay magkakabisa lamang simula sa araw na akoy pumanaw sa mundo, at sa ilalim ng kondision na:

Magbubuhat o babawasin sa halaga ng nasabing lupa at bahay ang anumang magugul o gastos sa aking libing at nicho at ang anumang matitira ay hahatiin ng APAT na parte, parepareho isang parte sa bawat anak kong nasasabi sa itaas nito upang maliwanang (sic) at walang makakalamang sinoman sa kanila; At kaming apat na anak na nakalagda o nakadiit sa kasulatang ito ay TINATANGGAP NAMIN ang kaloob-palang ito ng aming magulang na si Basilisa Comerciante, at tuloy pinasasalamatan namin siya ng taos sa (sic) puso dahil sa kagandahan look (sic) niyang ito sa amin. SA KATUNAYAN, ay nilagdaan o diniitan namin ito sa Nobeleta, Kabite, ngayong ika-17 ng Disyembre taong 1975. (sgd.) Basilisa and her said children likewise executed another notarized document denominated as Kasulatan which is attached to the deed of donation. On February 6, 1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject house and lot in favor of herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). As the result of the registration of that sale, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT for brevity) No. RT-4036 in the name of the donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-10434 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite City in favor of petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat on February 8, 1979. On September 21, 1983, herein respondents Teodora Carampot, Domingo Comia, and Ernesto Apolo (representing their deceased mother Consolacion Austria), Ricardo, Mamerto and Segunda, all surnamed Sumpelo (representing their deceased mother Rosario Austria) and Florentino Lumubos filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 4426 against the petitioner for annulment of TCT No. T-10434 and other relevant documents, and for reconveyance and damages. HELD: CA: The decisive proof that the deed is a donation inter vivos is in the provision that : Ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi mababawi sa naulit na apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, ang aking lupang residential o tirahan sampu ng aking bahay nakatirik doon xxx. (emphasis supplied) This is a clear expression of the irrevocability of the conveyance. The irrevocability of the donation is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos. By the words hindi mababawi, the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the house and lot in question. The right to dispose of a property is a right essential to full ownership. Hence, ownership of the house and lot was already with the donees even during the donors lifetime. xxx xxx xxx xxx In the attached document to the deed of donation, the donor and her children stipulated that: Gayon din ang nasabing titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang may buhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante. The stipulation is a reiteration of the irrevocability of the dispossession on the part of the donor. On the other hand, the prohibition to encumber, alienate or sell the property during the lifetime of the donor is a recognition of the ownership over the house and lot in issue of the donees for only in the concept of an owner can one encumber or dispose a property. SC: The provisions in the subject deed of donation that are crucial for the determination of the class to which the donation belongs are, as follows: xxx xxx xxx xxx(I)binibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi mababawi sa naulit na apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, ang aking lupang residential o tirahan sampu ng aking bahay nakatirik doon na nasa Bagong Pook din, San Antonio, Lungsod ng Kabite xxx xxx xxx

Na ang Kaloob palang ito ay magkakabisa lamang simula sa araw na akoy pumanaw sa mundo, xxx. xxx xxx xxx Na ang titulo numero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ng Lungsod ng Kabite, bahay sa loteng tirahan ng Bagong Pook na nababanggit sa nasabing kasulatan, ay mananatili sa poder o possesion ng Ina, na si Basilisa Comerciante habang siya ay nabubuhay at Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante xxx. It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the characteristics of a donation mortis causa, to wit: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. Significant to the resolution of this issue is the irrevocable character of the donation in the case at bar. In Cuevas v. Cuevas, we ruled that when the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the property donated (thus making the donation irrevocable), he in effect is making a donation inter vivos. He parts away with his naked title but maintains beneficial ownership while he lives. It remains to be a donation inter vivos despite an express provision that the donor continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the donated property while he is alive. In the Bonsato case, we held that: (W)hat is most significant [in determining the type of donation] is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be irrevocable, a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art.737; New Civil Code, Art. 828). Construing together the provisions of the deed of donation, we find and so hold that in the case at bar the donation is inter vivos. The express irrevocability of the same (hindi na mababawi) is the distinctive standard that identifies that document as a donation inter vivos. The other provisions therein which seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not go against the irrevocable character of the subject donation. According to the petitioner, the provisions which state that the same will only take effect upon the death of the donor and that there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber, dispose, or sell the same, are proofs that the donation is mortis causa. We disagree. The said provisions should be harmonized with its express irrevocability. In Bonsato where the donation per the deed of donation would also take effect upon the death of the donor with reservation for the donor to enjoy the fruits of the land, the Court held that the said statements only mean that after the donors death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. In Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the prohibition to alienate does not necessarily defeat the inter vivos character of the donation. It even highlights the fact that what remains with the donor is the right of usufruct and not anymore the naked title of ownership over the property donated. In the case at bar, the provision in the deed of donation that the donated property will remain in the possession of the donor just goes to show that the donor has given up his naked title of ownership thereto and has maintained only the right to use (jus utendi) and possess (jus possidendi) the subject donated property. Thus, we arrive at no other conclusion in that the petitioners cited provisions are only necessary assurances that during the donors lifetime, the latter would still enjoy the right of possession over the property; but, his naked title of ownership has been passed on to the donees; and that upon the donors death, the donees would get all the rights of ownership over the same including the right to use and possess the same. Furthermore, it also appeared that the provision in the deed of donation regarding the prohibition to alienate the subject property is couched in general terms such that even the donor is deemed included in the said prohibition (Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante). Both the donor and the donees were prohibited from alienating and encumbering the property during the lifetime of the donor. If the donor intended to maintain full ownership over the said property until her death, she could have expressly stated therein a reservation of her right to dispose of the same. The prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property during her lifetime is proof that naked ownership over the property has been transferred to the donees. It also supports the irrevocable nature of the donation considering that the donor has already

divested herself of the right to dispose of the donated property. On the other hand, the prohibition on the donees only meant that they may not mortgage or dispose the donated property while the donor enjoys and possesses the property during her lifetime. However, it is clear that the donees were already the owners of the subject property due to the irrevocable character of the donation. The petitioner argues that the subsequent and contemporaneous acts of the donor would show that her intention was to maintain control over her properties while she was still living. We disagree. Respondent Domingo Comia testified that sometime in 1977 or prior to the sale of the subject house and lot, his grandmother, the donor in the case at bar, delivered the title of the said property to him; and that the act of the donor was a manifestation that she was acknowledging the ownership of the donees over the property donated. Moreover, Atty. Viniegra testified that when the donor sold the lot to the petitioner herein, she was not doing so in accordance with the agreement and intent of the parties in the deed of donation; that she was disregarding the provision in the deed of donation prohibiting the alienation of the subject property; and that she knew that the prohibition covers her as well as the donees. Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter vivos is the acceptance clause therein of the donees. We have ruled that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. On the other hand, donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors lifetime. We now rule on whether the donor validly revoked the donation when one of her daughters and donees, Consolacion Austria, violated the prohibition to encumber the property. When Consolacion Austria mortgaged the subject property to a certain Baby Santos, the donor, Basilisa Comerciante, asked one of the respondents herein, Domingo Comia, to redeem the property, which the latter did. After the petitioner in turn redeemed the property from respondent Domingo, the donor, Basilisa, sold the property to the petitioner who is one of the donees. The act of selling the subject property to the petitioner herein cannot be considered as a valid act of revocation of the deed of donation for the reason that a formal case to revoke the donation must be filed pursuant to Article 764 of the Civil Codewhich speaks of anaction that has a prescriptive period of four (4) years from non-compliance with the condition stated in the deed of donation. The rule that there can be automatic revocation without benefit of a court action does not apply to the case at bar for the reason that the subject deed of donation is devoid of any provision providing for automatic revocation in event of non-compliance with the any of the conditions set forth therein. Thus, a court action is necessary to be filed within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the condition violated. As regards the ground of estoppel, the donor, Basilisa, cannot invoke the violation of the provision on the prohibition to encumber the subject property as a basis to revoke the donation thereof inasmuch as she acknowledged the validity of the mortgage executed by the donee, Consolacion Austria, when the said donor asked respondent Domingo Comia to redeem the same. Thereafter, the donor, Basilisa likewise asked respondent Florentino Lumubos and the petitioner herein to redeem the same.[20 Those acts implied that the donees have the right of control and naked title of ownership over the property considering that the donor, Basilisa condoned and acknowledged the validity of the mortgage executed by one of the donees, Consolacion Austria.

G.R. No. L-6600

July 30, 1954

HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL. The case was initiated on June 27, 1945, by respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint (for annulment and damages) charged that on the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052, situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000. ISSUE: What is the juridical nature of the donations in question. HELD: xxx The majority of the special divisions of five of the Court of Appeals that took cognizance of this case relied primarily on the last paragraph, stressing the passage: Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion . . .

while the minority opinion lay emphasis on the second paragraph, wherein the donor states that he makes "perfect, irrevocable, and consummated donation" of the properties to the respective donees, petitioners herein. Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid donations, or else legacies void for failure to observe the formalities of wills (testaments). Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at present that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition, and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thus suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept. ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions. xxx We have insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to emphasize that the term "donations mortis causa" as commonly employed is merely a convenient name to designate those dispositions of property that are void when made in the form of donations. Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidalvs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633); (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R. L-4326, November 18, 1952); (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce ("de los productos mientras viva el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo"), a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation. It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective" (que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion"). However, said expression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees. In the cases held by this Court to be transfers mortis causa and declared invalid for not having been executed with the formalities of testaments, the circumstances clearly indicated the transferor's intention to defer the passing of title until after his death. Thus, in Cario vs. Abaya, 70 Phil., 182, not only were the properties not to be given until thirty days after the death of the last of the donors, but the deed also referred to the donees as "those who had been mentioned to inherit from us", the verb "to inherit" clearly implying the acquisition of property only from and after the death of the alleged donors. In Bautista vs. Sabiniano, 49 Off. Gaz., 549; 92 Phil., 244, the alleged donor expressly reserved the right to dispose of the properties conveyed at any time before his death, and limited the donation "to whatever property or properties left undisposed by me during my lifetime", thus clearly retaining their ownership until his death. While in David vs. Sison, 42 Off. Gaz. (Dec, 1946) 3155, the donor not only reserved for herself all the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important, specially provided that "without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way", thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of ownership, the power to dispose of the properties. No similar restrictions are found in the deeds of donation involved in this appeal. That the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the services rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds Exhibits 1 and 2 constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have identical motivation. Nevertheless, the existence of such consideration corroborates the express irrevocability of the transfers and the absence of any reservation by the donor of title to, or control over, the properties donated, and reinforces the conclusion that the act was inter vivos. Hence, it was error for the Court of Appeals to declare that Exhibits 1 and 2 were invalid because the formalities of testaments were not observed. Being donations inter vivos, the solemnities required for them were those prescribed by Article 633 of the Civil Code of 1889 (reproduced in Art. 749 of the new Code, and it is undisputed that these were duly complied with. As the

properties involved were conjugal, the Court of First Instance correctly decided that the donations could not affect the half interest inherited by the respondents Josefa Utea, et al. from the predeceased wife of the donor.

G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990 RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, in his capacity as Special Administrator vs. HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and URSULA D. PASCUAL G.R. No. L-45394 July 23, 1990 PEDRO DALUSONG vs HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, JUDGE, BRANCH VII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, and URSULA D. PASCUAL G.R. Nos. 73241-42 July 23, 1990 OFELIA D. PARUNGAO and ROSARIO DUNCIL vs.THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (Third Civil Cases Division), BENJAMIN P. REYES and OSCAR REYES. The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from the same facts and involve similar issues. Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18,1972. He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes- Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P. Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Manna Reyes Manalastas; (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half- blood Pedro Dalusong. On December 3, 1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings in the then Court of First Instance for the administration of his estate. On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2, 1966 executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the estate of Dr. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M) and therefore should be excluded from the inventory. On August 1, 1976; the trial court issued an order excluding from the inventory of the estate the properties donated to Ursula. The records show that on May 15, 1969, Emilio Pascual executed a deed of donation of real property inter vivos over the abovementioned lot in Manila in favor of Ofelia D. Parungao, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 a minor with her mother, Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift and donation for and in her behalf. When Parungao reached the age of majority or on December 20, 1976, she tried to have the donation registered. However, she found out that the certificate of title was missing from where it was supposed to be kept, prompting her to file a petition for reconstitution of title with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The petition was granted in October 1977. Parungao registered the deed of donation with the Register of Deeds of Manila who cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17854 and issued in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao. She then filed a motion for exclusion in Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M. In the meantime, on September 23, 1976, Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes. On May 2, 1978, Benjamin Reyes, private respondent in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092, Register of Deeds of Manila and/or reconveyance of deed of title against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil, with the then Court of First Instance of Manila. In their answer with compulsory counterclaim Parungao and Duncil, denied Reyes' assertion of ownership over the Tondo property. On November 6, 1978, Ofelia Parungao filed a complaint for recovery of possession over the Tondo property against Benjamin Reyes and his nephew Oscar Reyes with the Court of First Instance of Manila. In her complaint, Parungao also alleged that as early as 1973, the defendants occupied two (2) doors of the apartment situated at the Tondo property by mere tolerance of the previous owner, Dr. Emilio Pascual, and later by her until April 8, 1978 when she formally demanded that the defendants vacate the premises. Parungao prayed that the defendants be evicted from the premises. HELD:

The petitioners assert that the 1966 donation was null and void since it was not executed with the formalities of a will. Therefore, the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45262 insist that the donated properties should revert to the estate of Emilio Pascual while the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 insist that the donation of real property inter vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao be given effect. The subject deed of donation titled "DONATION MORTIS CAUSA" duly notarized by a certain Cornelio M. Sigua states: That Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, Filipino, single, of age and resident of Apalit, Pampanga, hereinafter called the DONOR and Ursula D. Pascual, Filipino, single, also of age, resident of and with postal address at Apalit, Pampanga, hereinafter called the DONEE, have agreed, as they do hereby agree, to the following, to wit: That the said DONOR, Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, for and in consideration of the love and affection which he has and bears unto the said DONEE, as also for the personal services rendered by the said DONEE to the said DONOR, does hereby by these presents voluntarily GIVE, GRANT, and DONATE MORTIS CAUSA unto the said DONEE URSULA D. PASCUAL, her heirs and assigns, all of my rights, title and interest, in and to the following parcels of land with all the improvements thereon, situated in the Municipality of Apalit, Pampanga, and more particularly described and Identified as follows: xxx xxx xxx (Enumerated herein are 41 parcels of land) Also included in this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA are all personal properties of the DONOR in the form of cash money or bank deposits and insurance in his favor, and his real properties situated in other towns of Pampanga, such as San Simon, and in the province of Rizal, San Francisco del Monte and in the City of Manila. That the said donor has reserved for himself sufficient property to maintain him for life; and that the said DONEE does hereby ACCEPT and RECEIVE this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA and further does express his appreciation and gratefulness for the generosity of said DONOR; (Rollo of G.R. No. L-45262, pp. 12-16) xxx xxx xxx Considering the provisions of the DONATION MORTIS CAUSA the appellate court ruled that the deed of donation was actually a donation inter vivos although denominated as DONATION MORTIS CAUSA. It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on the provisions stated in such deed. This Court explained inConcepcion v. Concepcion (91 Phil. 823 [1952]) ...But, it is a rule consistently followed by the courts that it is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained therein, and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. Here, the donation is entitled and called donacion onerosa mortis causa. From the body, however, we find that the donation was of a nature remunerative rather than onerous. It was for past services rendered, services which may not be considered as a debt to be paid by the donee but services rendered to her freely and in goodwill. The donation instead of being onerous or for a valuable consideration, as in payment of a legal obligation, was more of remuneratory or compensatory nature, besides being partly motivated by affection. We should not give too much importance or significance to or be guided by the use of the phrase 'mortis causa in a donation and thereby to conclude that the donation is not one of inter vivos. In the case of De Guzman et al. v. Ibea et al. (67 Phil. 633), this Court through Mr. Chief Justice Avancena said that if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. In the case of Laureta v. Mata, et al. (44 Phil. 668), the court held that the donation involved was inter vivos. There, the donor Severa Magno y Laureta gave the properties involved as ... a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my affection toward him and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate 'mortis causa to said youth all the properties described as follows: xxx xxx xxx I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take possession of the properties donated before the death of the donor, and in the event of her death the said donee shall be under obligation to cause a mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my sold, and also to defray the expenses of my burial and funerals.'

It will be observed that the present case and that of Laureta above cited are similar in that in both cases the donation was being made as a reward for services rendered and being rendered, and as a token of affection for the donee; the phrase 'mortis causa was used; the donee to take possession of the property donated only after the death of the donor; the donee was under obligation to defray the expenses incident to the celebration of the anniversary of the donor's death, including church fees. The donation in both cases were duly accepted. In said case of Laureta this Court held that the donation was in praesenti and not a gift in futuro. In the later case of Bonsato et al. v. Court of appeals, et al. (95 Phil. 481 [1954]) this Court, distinguished the characteristics of a donation inter vivos and "mortis causa" in this wise: Did the late Domingo Bonsato, make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (fun or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal v. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman v. Ibea 67 Phil., 633); (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista v. Sabiniano, G.R. No. L- 4326, November 18, 1952); (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. These principles were repeated in the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (27 SCRA 1076 [1969]), to wit: Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition made. 'Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon the execution of the donation? If this is so, as reflected from the provisions contained in the donation, then it is inter vivos; otherwise, it is merely mortis causa, or made to take effect after death.' (Howard v. Padilla and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-7064 and L7098, April 22, 1955. Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the execution of the deed of donation.