Aniag vs Comelec Facts In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution

n No. 2323, Gun Ban, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the Gun Ban, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioners house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint outside Batasan Complex When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. o He argues that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. o that the resolution did away with the requirement of final conviction before the commission of certain offenses o that instead, it created a presumption of guilt as a candidate may be disqualified from office which is contrary to the requisite quantum of proof for one to be disqualified from running or holding public office under the Omnibus Election Code o Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections. Arguments o Petitioner protesting manner PNP conducted the search : Without warrant and without informing driver of his right. o He was not impleaded as party respondent in the preliminary investigation and not included in the charge sheet then making him a respondent in the criminal information - violate due process o Driver not a security personnel or bodyguard o Return guns In compliance to gunban

Issue: WON the warrantless search (checkpoint) is valid

Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for the criminal information without being impleaded as party respondent in the preliminary investigation Held A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. The firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint and it was not also announced to the media to forewarn the citizens Manner Comelec proceeded against Congressman Aniag runs counter with due process Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not subjected to preliminary investigation He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. - violation of his right to due process. Comelec cannot contend that Aniag was given opportunity to be heard when he was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver because this does not satisfy the requirement of due process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense o Must observe both substantive and procedural rights o petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate the latter's explanation. o Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party respondent in the case, so that his written explanation on the incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. o he was not apprised that he was himself a respondent when he appeared before the City Prosecutor. Petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration with COMELEC cannot be considered as a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary investigation for himself but an insistence on his right. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside. ADMU vs Capulong As a result of the initiation rites of the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School, Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital and Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him.

Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt in which they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered. the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza and directed the dropping of their names from its roll of students

Issue: whether a school is within its rights in expelling students from its academic community pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards whether or not the penalty imposed by the school administration is proper under the circumstances. Was there denial of due process against the respondent students. Held: The court granted the petition and reversed the order of respondent judge ordering readmission of respondent students. (Ang Tibay case) Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus: o the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them o that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: o they shall be informed of the evidence against them o they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;

o the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. The twin elements of notice and hearing are present. The requisite assistance of counsel was also met. Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements that they were denied procedural due process. It may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.

ISAE vs Quisumbing International School, Inc. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. It employs its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities. The School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying them as foreign-hires and local-hires. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. Petitioner then filed a strike and the failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. DOLE issued an order in favor of the school and subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Issue : Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause.

Held: The Constitution directs the State to promote equality of employment opportunities for all. Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay. Although the court recognizes the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates In this case, the court finds that the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. Thus, the practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and unconstitutional