TERRORISM’S ENDGAME

Tactical Nuclear Games: Counters & Politics

Lyle Brecht
15 May 2004

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 1

 TERRORISM’S ENDGAME
Tactical Nuclear Games: Counters & Politics

Lyle Brecht
15 May 2004

Tactical Nuclear Games

What is desperately needed today is a new counter-terrorism strategy, a counter-terror strategy
that does not make the U.S. itself look like the terrorists it is fighting in its “war on terrorism.”1
Such a rethinking of counter-terror strategy is especially necessary before the U.S. or its allies is
hit with a terrorist attack using CBRN weapons of mass destruction that kills or injures 30,000 or
300,000 people, rather than 3,000 people as in the 9/11 attacks.

The following discussion portrays the present “global war against terrorism” the U.S. is engaged
in as an analyzable game competitively “played” by two opposing sides. 2 What this discussion

1 For example, in a January 25, 2002 memo from Alberto R. Gonzoles to President George W. Bush enti-
tled: “Application of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war to the conflict with al Qaeda and the
Taliban,” the White House attorney is concerned that Bush administration officials could be prosecuted
for ‘war crimes’ as a result of the measures to combat terror adopted by the administration in response to
the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda.

2 The benefits of re-thinking the “war on terrorism” is not to arrive at a final solution or descriptive analy-
sis, but to alter perspectives so that creative, potentially productive alternatives to conventional wisdom
may be explored and included in a multifaceted counter-threat strategy. Here the exercise is to model ter-
rorism as a game that is being played in real-time by two opposing sides. This exercise potentially uncov-
ers salient aspects of the “fitness landscape” or underlying structure that is required for any counter-threat
system to adequately address different threat scenarios. This approach also highlights relative levels of
funding required for the various components in an interlinked network of components (the “counter-threat
system”) to produce specific results. In no way does the dispassionate manner in which terrorism dis-
cussed here suggest that the author does not view terrorism as a horrific and morally reprehensible tactic
to achieve political aims.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 2

argues for is a holistic approach to “war on terrorism” strategy based on the inclusion of all
means at the disposal of the state; not only counter-intelligence and military might, but also dip-
lomatic, economic, political, moral, and justice-seeking measures appropriate for the type of po-
litical conflict that engenders terrorism as a tactic to achieve political objectives.3

Instead of thinking about this as a “war against terrorism,” this can be more accurately thought of
as a “proxy war” fought by privatized groups of individual actors (e.g. al Qaeda is presently a
prime example of such a group) who use terrorism as a technique to achieve political objectives
that have the intention of producing structural changes in power-sharing relationships that are
international in scope.4

It is a “proxy war” in that al Qaeda, for example, is fighting as an agent on behalf of its “spon-
sors” rather than for its own power or territorial objectives.5 This proxy war, from the perspec-

3 For example, well-funded hard-power components such as counter-intelligence and military power pro-
duce less value for dollar expended if other soft-power components such as diplomatic, economic, politi-
cal, moral and justice-seeking measures are not also optimally employed as part of an overall counter-
threat systems approach. See Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Publi-
cAffairs, 2004).

4 Terrorism as used here is systemized violence against a predominantly civilian population that may take
the form of lethal force, symbolic violence, economic disruption, and other forms that impinge or impede
on the normal human freedoms that are reasonable, normative, and expected by such civilian population.
Thus, terrorism has been a common a tactic of war used, for example, by the Germans against the Jewish
populations of Poland, Germany, etc. during WWII; by the U.S. in its fire-bombing of Tokyo, etc. (e.g.
100,000 civilians were killed in one night’s air raids) against Japan in WWII; the U.S. “pacification” pro-
gram in Vietnam; Pol Pot’s “ruralization” project in Cambodia that systematically killed millions of Cam-
bodians; as a tactic of the U.S.-supported mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan war; Sadam’s use of WMD
against the Kurds in northern Iraq in the 1980’s; etc. “International” describes the fact that the combatants
are not fighting a domestic civil war within their respective domestic nation states, but internationally,
across state boundaries. “Privatized” describes the fact that the terrorists are privately funded and are not
controlled by the policies or directives of any particular nation state.

5This is a real war, at least from the perspective of the U.S., in that the U.S is engaged in the maximum
use of “force to compel our enemy to do our will.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 3

tive of the “enemies of the U.S.” has two primary political objectives: (1) to provoke a non-
proportional violent response by the U.S. government that leads to escalation of violence, and (2)
to achieve disproportionate economic costs for the U.S. that over time will negatively impact the
U.S. economic hegemony in the world.6

Using the analogy of war, al Qaeda’s attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. immediate response to those
attacks constitute one battle in this “proxy war.” Viewed from this perspective, al Qaeda decid-
edly won this battle, not because of the death and destruction in New York and Washington, DC
on 9/11, but because al Qaeda achieved its two primary political objectives: (1) to provoke a non-
proportional violent response by the U.S. government that leads to escalation of violence, and (2)
to achieve disproportionate economic costs on the U.S. The U.S. immediately attacked Afghani-
stan where ~10,000 civilians were killed in that war. Then the Iraqi war was justified on the basis
of the “war on terrorism” which killed another ~10,000 civilians so far. Economically, the U.S.
response to the attacks on 9/11 that may have cost ~$2 million to plan and carry out was for the
U.S. to spend ~$200 billion on two wars and counter-terrorism measures since 9/11/2001.

The misconception of such disproportional retaliation by the U.S. is that such massive use of
force will effectively destroy the fighting forces of the enemy; to “put [them] in such a condition
that they can no longer carry on the fight.”7 However, this approach to this “proxy war” is
doomed because the “sponsor” for whom the enemy (al Qaeda in this specific “battle”) is best
imagined as groups of individuals who believe in the ideals of human freedom and democratic

6 This assumption redefines terrorism as a “political socio-economic act” rather than a tactic to create a
climate of fear and anxiety. Using this definition enables one to model terrorism as a “project” and to
think about counter-projects from a capital budgeting, investment analysis perspective (e.g. what pro-
grams achieve the greatest return (reduction in terrorist “economic acts”) for invested capital?).

7 von Clausewitz, 90.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 4

self-determination ideas espoused by the U.S. 8 That is, at the core of the “war against terrorism,”
the two opposing sides are the “theory” of the U.S. regarding human freedom, human develop-
ment and self-determination vs. the praxis of the U.S regarding human freedom, human devel-
opment, and self-determination. The role of the agents engaged in terrorism acting as proxies is
primarily to call attention to the world community that what the U.S. espouses as its democratic
values and how it lives these values are irreparably and immeasurably disjunctive.

To cast the “war against terrorism” in theological terms of “good versus evil” only tends to rein-
force the world community’s understanding of the U.S. as a fundamentally evil, imperial force.
That is because the fundamental charge of the international privatized terrorist against the U.S. is
hypocrisy – “a gap between appearance and reality, between saying and doing, caused by a mis-
placed hierarchy of values and excessive emphasis on external matters [“material things”] to the
neglect of the interior.”9 For, rather than a force for human freedom and democratic self-
determination, the U.S. is perceived as a nation that says one thing, “terrorism as a tactic of war”
is evil, but practices something entirely different, “is willing to engage in terrorism itself for its
own self-serving purposes.”

Categories, Types and Forms of Terrorism: Terrorism is commonly believed to be a tactic

to create a climate of fear and anxiety. Fear and anxiety may result from terrorism, but this is of-

8It is not accurate to portray “us” as “those who love freedom” and the enemy as “those who hate free-
dom.” The reality is that if “our” freedom despoils or constrains “their” vision of freedom, from the
“other’s” perspective we are oppressors, not lovers of freedom. If we are discussing the Middle East, for
example, terrorism has been used as a technique against oppressive governments (oppressive as measured
by currently accepted international U.N. norms, for example) who could be classified as socialistic,
authoritarian, or totalitarian – many of which at one time or another have received military aid from the
U.S. (e.g. Sadam Hussein’s government in Iraq was a large recipient of U.S. military aid in Iraq in the
1980’s even as he used WMD on his Kurdish population in northern Iraq).

9 This was the charge against the scribes and Pharisees by Jesus as recounted in Matt. 23:13-21. See Dan-
iel J. Harrington, S.J., (Sacra Pagina, Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1991), 326. This recollection of
hypocrisy is also attested to in the Nevi’im (the “Prophets) of Jewish scripture which preserved the
prophets’ words as “not only significant for the circumstances in which they were originally pronounced
but potentially relevant for later ones as well…[in their] crucial role in critiquing and trying to change
society.” See Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler, editors, The Jewish Study Bible: Jewish Publication
Society Tanakh Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 457-8.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 5

ten neither the primary reason, nor result hoped for by the modern international terrorist. The dif-
ficulty is that terrorism is often discussed as a monolithic conceptual entity. But terrorism is ac-
tually pluralistic and polyvalent; it is not one thing. Also, depending on which category, type and
form of terrorism someone is concerned with, dramatically different counter-terrorism ap-
proaches make sense.

There are two major categories of terrorism: domestic and international:

• Palestinian-Israeli conflict involves domestic terrorism (use of lethal force against civil-
ian populations by both sides in the conflict).

• Soviet war in Afghanistan involved international terrorism (use of lethal force against ci-
vilian population of Afghanistan by both Soviet troops and mujahideen funded by U.S.
and Saudis).

• U.S. war against Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan involved international terrorism
(use of lethal force, whether intentional or unintentional, against Afghan civilian popula-
tion by U.S. troops fighting al Qaeda, a known international terrorist organization).

Within domestic terrorism there are two types: psycho-pathological and socio-political:

• Psycho-pathological: e.g. Columbine High School shootings perpetrated by a socio- or

psychopathically disturbed individual for purely individualistic, bizarre reasons. An ap-
propriate counter-strategy is proactive and interventionist law enforcement.
• Socio-political: This type of terrorism usually takes place within pre-modern or modern
nation states as a technique of the powerful against the powerless or the powerless against
the powerful, incumbent government. An example of state-sponsored domestic terrorism
is the repression of the Kurds under the former Sadam Hussein regime in Iraq prior to the
U.S. liberation of Iraq. Domestic terrorism of disaffected groups against the incumbent
government usually results when a disaffected, indigenous group of individuals believe
they have no legitimate means for negotiating power-sharing relationships in the nation
state. Good examples where this type of terrorism is evident are the Israel-Palestine con-
flict, the conflict in Chechnya between Chechnya rebels and Russian troops and presently
in Iraq against the Coalition occupying force.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 6

 • The typical counter-strategy for political-nationalist terrorism is use of military force. Yet,
the only solution that has ultimately worked historically is negotiated power-sharing ar-
rangements. These are power-sharing relationships that address legitimate and substan-
tive claims of the center political constituency. Diplomacy, not military counters, is most
likely to produce satisfactory results. The vast majority of the world’s terrorism is this
type of terrorism. For example, successful transitions from political-nationalist terrorism
to peace after negotiated power-sharing has recently occurred in South Africa, the Ivory
Coast, Sierra Leone, etc.

Within international terrorism there are two predominant forms: publicly financed terrorism and
privately financed terrorism. International terrorism is almost always socio-political terrorism:
terrorism that is attempting to bring about a set of specific political objectives of a “transna-
tional” nature:

• By publicly-financed actors: e.g. U.S. soldiers involved in Abu Ghraib jail abuses
of civilian detainees reported by International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) as “systematic;”10 C.I.A. operatives involved in interrogations of al Qaeda
detainees that contravene Third and Fourth Geneva Convention Act protocols for
treatment of prisoners. Typically, only internationally constituted 3rd party inter-
veners (e.g. UN “peacekeeping force,” International Red Cross, World Court, etc.)
are an effective counter-measure for this form of terrorism.

• By privately financed actors (“privatized”): e.g. al Qaeda 9/11 terrorist attacks on

the World Trade Center in New York City and on the Pentagon in Washington,
DC; some of the attacks on Coalition forces in Iraq; and some recent attacks in
Saudi Arabia. As Richard Clarke points out in his op-ed “The Wrong Debate on
Terrorism (NY Times, April 25, 2004),” this is a “battle of ideas” whose most ef-
fective long-term counter is neither military violence nor diplomacy but “finding

10International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Report of the ICRC on the Treatment by Coalition
Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest,
Internment and Interrogation,” February 2004.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 7

 ideological and religious counterweights” to motivating figures and thought pat-
terns that legitimize this type of terrorism.

International privatized terrorism as Infomercial: asking the question, “What is the

information content of this form of terrorism?” International privatized terrorism is like
an advertising campaign directed at the “civilized world.” Like advertising, its job is to reach the
masses and to gain a “share of mind” on the part of the consumer. From this perspective, interna-
tional privatized terrorism as advertising has been immensely successful; probably the most ef-
fective advertising campaign ever conceived at reaching a global audience and establishing
“share of mind.”

The purpose of international privatized terrorism as advertising is to produce massive, over-

responsive counter-violence on the part of the government and communities violated by the ter-
rorist event. When this violence/counter-violence cycle occurs, this achieves a share of mind at
the lowest cost per viewer, similar to “viral marketing.” International privatized terrorism as ad-
vertising has produced stunning results, not only is its message top of mind, but it has produced a
massive counter-violence/violence spiral that keeps its message top-of-mind week-to-week.

The message, or information content, of terrorism as advertising directed at the “civilized world”
is twofold: (1) “your narrative, how you define reality, is incomplete in that it does not ade-
quately take us into account,” and (2) “you are not as strong and powerful and invincible as you
believe that you are.” These are primarily “religious” as opposed to secular messages.

International privatized terrorism as a technique of personae miserae (the power-

less) in modernity to post-modernity shift: Counter-terrorism strategy typically makes the
mistake of approaching international privatized terrorism like a point-source pollution problem:
“If only we can rid ourselves of the few terrorists who are doing this activity, then we will be
safe.” Yet, the reality is that international privatized terrorism is like the result of non-point-

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 8

source pollution in that it has general, tacit approval of the am harets,11 who make up the vast
majority of the world’s population. The am harets are the implicit “us” in the information content
of terrorism: “your narrative is incomplete in that it does not take us into account” and “you are
not as strong and powerful and invincible [relative to us] as you believe that you are.”

Even though terrorism is carried out by only a relatively “fringe” few on behalf of the am harets,
the underlying message is believed to be “on-target” by the vast majority of the world’s popula-
tion (even as terrorism itself as a technique of political warfare is widely denounced by the ma-
jority of the world’s population). As long as the message is on-target and international privatized
terrorism is viewed as an effective, least-costly means to convey this information to the elite of
the world, there will be an effectively infinite supply of new terrorists to replace those that are
killed or dispersed.

The shift from modernity to post-modernity is primarily a shift in the inclusiveness of human
freedom, defined as self-determination of human development. In modern times, those with dis-
proportionate access to the world’s resources served as colonial powers that exploited less-
powerful indigenous populations for the primary benefit of the colonial power. 12 Post-modernity
is built on the premise that colonialism, in whatever hegemonic form, is not sustainable over
time and is ultimately destructive of both the hegemonic power and the exploited, less-powerful

11 Am harets is a Hebrew word meaning “people of the earth.” In the first century C.E. it was applied de-
risively to refer to individuals as “country bumpkins,” those perceived as “less civilized” whose speech
was less refined and who were not up-to-date on the latest ideas from the centers of culture in that day and
age. In today’s post-modern era, the am harets comprise about five billion of a total 6.3 billion human
population and are found in differing degrees in all nations, including “developed” countries.

12 For example, in the U.S. drive to “liberate” oppressed peoples so that they may experience human free-
dom, it is vitally important that this is achieved in a manner that does not remind an indigenous popula-
tion of “colonialism” or lead to conditions that in any way, shape, or form smack of colonial hegemony.
For a view of colonialism as international privatized terrorism’s roots see Mahmood Mamdani, Good
Muslim, Bad Muslim : America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (Pantheon Books, 2004).

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 9

indigenous population.13 Thus, underneath the political rhetoric, false religiosity, and unre-
strained violence of international privatized terrorism is a moral quest for self-determination and
enhanced human freedom for the personae miserae (the powerless).

International privatized terrorism is not due to a disjunctive religiosity between Is-

lam and Christianity (or Judaism) or even a “fundamentalism” of religious belief:
The fundamental morality and underpinnings of human justice are concurrent across Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam:

• Sacred scripture “tells us the kinds of people we are to become if we are to hear its mes-
sage faithfully.”

• Sacred scripture “is both a historical document and a canonical and sacred text for a be-
lieving community.

• Sacred scripture contains information that is “useful to guide behavior today.”

• “Human love and justice is modeled for us in [sacred] scripture” (e.g. “the golden rule:
do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”).14

Given these starting assumptions, the following predicates for human justice are equally true for
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam:

13There are a whole range of socio-political and political-economic reasons for this paradigm shift from
modernity to post-modernity. However, a practical reason is that historical colonialism, in whatever form,
has always led to conflict and in an era of proliferated WMD, the cost of such asymmetrical conflict with
WMD is potentially unsustainable to even the wealthiest and most powerful countries. For a discussion of
modernity and post-modernity as it applies to statecraft see Robert Cooper, Order and Chaos in the
Twenty-First Century (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004).

14
John R. Donahue, S.J., “The Bishop and the Proclaimation of Biblical Justice’” in David A. Stosur, ed.,
Unfailing Patience and Sound Teaching: Reflections on Episcopal Ministry in Honor of Rembert G.
Weakland, O.S.B. (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2003), 246-248.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 10

 1. Human history and human institutions and political arrangements are not “‘secular” in the
sense of being outside God’s plan for humanity.” Thus, morality and human justice (see
above tenets) “should inform a person’s public life in community.”

2. “Made in the image and likeness of God, all people have a human dignity and fundamen-
tal rights that are independent of their gender, age, nationality, ethnic origin, religion, or
economic status.”

3. “The fullness of human life is found in community with others.”

4. Moses/Christ/Mohammed’s “message imposes a prophetic mandate to speak for those

who have no one to speak for them [the powerless: the “poor”, the “widow,” the “or-
phan,” and the “stranger in the land”], to be a defender of the defenseless.”

5. To “misuse [] the world’s resources or [appropriate] them by a minority of the world’s

population betrays the gift of creation” and distorts our community with others (see #3
above).

6. “On earth, we belong to one human family and as such have mutual obligations to pro-
vide the development of all people’s across the world.”15

International privatized terrorism’s link to and appeal to religion as a rationale is a

false religiosity: International privatized terrorism as a condoned technique to redress social or
political grievances of the personae miserae (the powerless) is outside the mainstream religions

15 Donahue, 240-2.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 11

and even the mainstream fundamental movements.16 Wrapping terrorism in a rationale of religi-
osity (Islamism, of even “jihadist” movements, etc.) obscures the reality that international privat-
ized terrorism is primarily like an advertising campaign of a widespread political movement for
liberation and human freedom of self-determination. This does not obviate potential retrogressive
political movement in the opposite direction of human freedom and self determination (e.g. Tali-
ban in Afghanistan; Iran’s Mullah Government after deposition of the Shaw, etc.) However, these
interim, repressive political structures are not the goal of the am harets or personae miserae or
supported by any mainstream religion: Islam, Christianity, or Judaism (although sometimes na-
tionalist movements can co-opt regional churches; e.g. regional Catholic and Protestant Christian
churches were co-opted and basic Christian moral theology subverted in Germany pre-WWII).

Over-reliance on counter-violence to fight international privatized terrorism serves

as confirmation of the personae miserae’s (the powerless) worst fears: Especially dis-
concerting is how often the spoken words, “kill the terrorists” presently occurs in public dis-
course at the highest levels of society; an almost mirror response to the terrorists’ verbiage of
“kill Americans;” clearly, war talk. If this situation was only one aspect of a constellation of pub-
licly knowable responses that addressed and countered the underlying messages (information
content) of terrorism it would not be so corrosive or enlisting of new terrorists to the “cause.”
However, if the U.S. response to the terrorist threat is multifaceted, inclusive of non-violent
countering means, at present this is not readily publicly knowable. Some myths regarding terror-
ism include:
1. Terrorists are beyond rehabilitation. Saudi Intelligence routinely “rehabilitates” Saudi
terrorists without coercion or torture according to Geneva Convention guidelines using

16 The argument here is that as soon as an adherent steps outside the boundaries of normative community
behavior, the individual is acting on their own individualistic beliefs that may be framed for them in a
religious context (quoting “scripture,” using traditional “religious” vocabulary to rationalize their actions,
etc.), but have almost nothing to do with the base religion – which is defined by the community, not the
individual. Historically, sometimes the broader religious community is wrong (as in Germany during
WWII where the mainline Christian denominations were complicit in the persecution of the Jews by the
Nazis), but in almost all cases, the splinter community advocates traditional normative behavior not vio-
lent means to achieve relief from oppression (e.g. Dietrich Bonhoffer’s splinter “Confessing Christian
Church” that pledged solidarity with the Jews during the Nazi oppression and attempted to enlist the Al-
lies to help). A counter-argument to this thesis is Charles Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil (San
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2002).

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 12

 religious deprogramming techniques that replace a radical, violent Islamism with a mod-
erate Islamism.

2. One should never negotiate with terrorists. Turkey effectively diffused internal terrorism
by the Kurdish P.K.K (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) by negotiating with Ocalan, the
P.K.K. leader, and making good on its promises if Ocalan stopped terrorism against the
Turkish government. In contrast, Russia refused to negotiate and is still contending with
Muslim Chechens in southern Russia seeking independence.

3. The best means to fight terrorism is through military pre-emption. According to the
C.I.A., the U.S. war in Afghanistan, at best, scattered al Qaeda operatives making them
harder to find and strengthened al Qaeda’s regional leadership structure in over 60 coun-
tries.

4. All terrorists are evil and deserve death. I agree that violence is usually evil. However,
one must remember that during the War of Independence, the British called the American
colonists “terrorists” because they shot at British soldiers from behind trees, which was
considered “cowardly.”

5. Terrorism against the U.S. is predominantly due to fundamental Islamists or jihadists

from the countries of the Middle East. Probably the gravest form of domestic terrorism
today is the 70,000 rapes annually perpetrated on young women attending colleges in the
U.S by male U.S. citizens.17 The Oklahoma City bombing, the most devastating act of
political terrorism in the U.S. prior to 9/11 was perpetrated by a white Caucasian male
U.S. citizen, who was also a decorated Viet Nam War veteran.

Redefining the problem of international privatized terrorism requires that we first stop viewing
the objective as to “fight” terrorism. Especially harmful is the concept of a “war on terrorism.”
This framework for policy and action only leads from violence to counter-violence and then
more violence in retaliation, etc.(e.g. the ever-escalating and pervasive cycle in violence between
the two sides in the Israeli–Palestinian terror war).

17
Task Force of the National Advisory Council on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, “A Call to Action:
Changing the Culture of Drinking at U.S. Colleges,” April 2002.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 13

International privatized terrorism is best viewed as a form of political “pollution.” Something has
gone very wrong in the political process to engender a response of terrorism to make a political
statement. This form of political pollution occurs in pre-modern, modern and post-modern socie-
ties of vastly differing per capita wealth and under all forms of political governance: democracy,
totalitarianism, and authoritarian regimes. The only fruitful approach to international privatized
terrorism is to “define solutions in terms of underlying drivers and forces.” The history of “fight-
ing” terrorism, with few exceptions, by attempting to eliminate or even slow the destructive
forces of terrorism, have largely failed in the past (e.g. “Battle for Algiers”) and will fail in the
current U.S. “war on terrorism.” The failure stems in part from focusing too much on symptoms
(terrorism) while neglecting the underlying causes of this pollution of the political process (why
terrorism is being used?, what is behind these horrific acts of human self-sacrifice?: to claim all
terrorists are “evil” and “deranged” is neither a theologically nor politically useful explanation).

If one bothers to ask basic questions regarding political realities that engender terrorism as pollu-
tion of the political process, a number of universal drivers emerge, which are constellated in
unique ways depending on which terrorist political group one is examining. Such universal driv-
ers for terrorism include socio-political drivers revolving around issues of: (1) population pres-
sures and demographics, (2) affluence differentials, (3) technology access, (4) relative poverty,
(5) market failures such as ``perverse pricing” of externalities, (6) policy and political failures of
inclusiveness and power-sharing arrangements, (7) the scale and rate of economic growth, (9)
cultural and religious values, and (10) the local impacts of globalization. Fix the politics, prose-
cute the terrorists, and avoid the violence/counter-violence spiral is how to solve the problem of
international terrorism. Counter-violence without addressing the underlying drivers will only
lead to more terrorism – on a grander scale than what the U.S. has yet experienced.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 14

Using game theory to develop a holistic counter-terrorism strategy: terrorist open-
ings with tactical nuclear devices:18 More terrorism – on a grander scale that what the U.S.
has yet experienced is inevitable because under the present counter-terrorism strategy of the
U.S., the international privatized terrorists are encouraged to use CBRN weapons as an opening
to the next level of warfare. From a game perspective, this is a rational course of action. 19 The
use of tactical nuclear devices (or other CBRN weapons) on U.S. soil by terrorists is high be-
cause: 1) the use of CBRN weapons produces a winning endgame for the terrorists; 2) CBRN
weapons are relatively inexpensive and offer the greatest destructive value per dollar cost; 3)
there is a large and growing supply of both CBRN weapons and international terrorists to carry
out such attacks, and 4) the U.S. continues to position itself as the most attractive target for inter-
national privatized terrorism.20

A range of scenarios can be modeled whereby the terrorist side’s attack comprises the detonation
of one or more CBRN weapons in one location, in multiple locations, over a relatively short time
period or over a period of weeks, months or years. The type of attack can also be modeled to in-
clude a biological, chemical, or radiological component along with or in lieu of the tactical nu-

18The purpose of this section of the discussion is to explore game simulations where the terrorist side
opens with an attack using tactical nuclear weapons (and/or comparable CBRN weapons). To those unfa-
miliar with such simulations, the prospect of thinking of a terrorist attack as a game of moves and
counter-moves must seem somewhat bizarre and horrible. However, the purpose is to model potential un-
folding scenarios to determine the robustness of plans and capabilities of the underlying support systems
necessary to carry out these plans. In the contest against international privatized terrorism, one of the most
important uses for such a model is to determine: (1) if our counter terrorism strategy is sound; (2) if we
are allocating adequate capital to our counter-terrorism systems; and (3) if we are funding each compo-
nent of this system in an optimal fashion.

19 Various assumptions concerning the exact attack scenario and probabilities related to the ability of a
terrorist group to obtain tactical nuclear devices (or other CBRN weaponry) and carry out complex logis-
tical planning and execution steps leading to a CBRN attack can be assessed and argued.

20Each of these four propositions or explanations are themselves controversial and demand considered
debate. However, for the purposes of this discussion, we will assume that they are true or nearly true and
see where the game scenario leads us. Then, once we have followed through with one complete game
scenario, we can modify these assertions to see how that would impact our counter-terror moves to such
an attack.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 15

clear component.21 Remember, the international privatized terrorists’ strategy is to develop at-
tacks that undermine underlying systems that support economic well-being or destroy confidence
in these support systems and their ability to protect and nurture the national economy and to
force a disproportionate violent response from the U.S. government to such an attack.22

For example:
• For less than $2 million, the attacks on 9/11 produced about $90 billion in property dam-
age and lost income (experiential data) and created a one-time, short-term (less than 2
years) structural $200 billion dollar cash outflow (as measured by the U.S. war response
to these attacks).

• For less than $50 million, one could model a series of CBRN attacks timed over a short
period that could produce a long-term 2%-3% reduction of each year’s annual GDP or
~$600 billion cash impact over a period of 2-5 years.

• For less than $500 million, one could model a series of CBRN attacks timed over a
longer period that could produce a long-term 10% reduction of each year’s annual GDP
or $2,000 billion cash impact over a period of 3-7 years.

21 The model itself is based on an assumption that the game we are presently playing with terrorists today
is one of wealth destruction and escalation of a violence/counter-violence cycle. The objective of the
game from the terrorist’s perspective is to destroy as much of America’s wealth as possible for a given
dollar of cost and to encourage the U.S. to respond with disproportionate violence.

22From this perspective, the international privatized terrorists attempt to damage our productive capacity
and our will to carry on economic activity in the face of adversity. These terrorists function as modern
anti-entrepreneurs leveraging capital to destroy rather than to create wealth. With this perspective of ter-
rorism as primarily a dis-economic activity, monetary measures can be used as a proxy to discern results
of various counter-terrorism strategies. While many scenarios can be envisioned where the terrorists bun-
gle such an attack, from a game strategy perspective, we believe that one must assume that the best game
move will be chosen by the opponent – that is, the terrorists will make the best use of a tactical nuclear
device (or other CBRN weapon), and not a sub-optimal use.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 16

Many scenarios can be elaborated and alternate assumptions put forth that alter this conclusion to
the terrorist threat somewhat – but always at an unsustainable cost (the diversion of such a large
portion of GDP to counter-terrorism activities as to be unsustainable over any length of time).
That is, instead of the game ending in a terrorist-winning move, we can envision a series of
counter-moves that defer for a time a capitulation to the terrorists’ demands at an unsustainable
economic cost. To continue to play an unwinable game is pure folly or badly managed hubris.
From a strategic perspective there are two fundamental questions that need a definitive answer:
1) Is the present game truly unwinable if CBRN weapons are used by our opponent, and 2) If we
are in fact playing an unwinable game, how can we alter the game itself in our favor?

The results of the analysis so far suggest that indeed, once our opponent plays CBRN weapon in
the game, the terrorist always wins under the U.S. present counter-terrorism strategy, as there are
not winning conventional countermoves readily available. 23
Presently, our approach to counter-terrorism, while multi-faceted, relies heavily on threat as-
sessment (primarily through intelligence gathering), forward deployment of military and para-
military forces, and law enforcement. Planned activities include pre-emptive attacks; a true
homeland security strategic capability that includes hardening of domestic infrastructure; and a
more coordinated perimeter policing, among other defensive measures. However, this strategy
and its attendant budget are precisely what the models suggest that the terrorist opposition can
and will contravene and ultimately win against through the use of CBRN weapons.24

23 If one believes that there are strategies and vetted counter moves (tactics) that enable the U.S. to con-
tinue with its present counter-terrorism policies and strategies after such an attack, these need to be input
into the models and exposed to debate as to their soundness. Absent such new ideas and analysis, clearly a
discussion of the game itself and what changes might be made to its underlying structure rises to upper-
most importance.

24While the counter-terror models are sensitive to budget (how much we have to spend to accomplish a
certain level of threat preparedness), they are also sensitive to speed – how fast can we close off a specific
threat opportunity, and more importantly – how fast can responsible organizations learn to counter new
threats that the terrorists think up. Thus, pouring more and more dollars into solving the problem will not
necessarily produce more security if the result is a bigger and slower bureaucracy.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 17

Continuing to invest in conventional moves of counter-violence will not produce a
winning endgame against international privatized terrorists: The more traditional
counter-terrorism measures, primarily hard power that relies upon coercion and violence for ef-
fectiveness because they are well-understood and can be implemented with existing intelligence,
military and federal law enforcement infrastructure are what are receiving the lion’s share of total
budget allocated toward countering the terrorist threat. Yet, our model predicts that this approach
alone is doomed to fail over time (see above discussion). Part of the reason the present approach
to counter terror will fail is that we are approaching the problem as a point solution: identify
known terrorists, discover their plans, interdict their materiel, deter their attack, find them, and
prosecute them. All of these activities are fairly narrowly constituted, linearly dependent, and
focused on results, assuming that we have: 1) the capability for discovering plans and specific
individuals associated with those plans, and 2) the capability to interdict the attackers and their
CBRN materiel before they are able to carry out an attack.

Unfortunately, there is little data to support the supposition that such a set of assumptions is valid
or a greater degree of success can be achieved than for example, discovering the plans of organ-
ized crime syndicates and interdicting drug shipments into this country. With enough diligence
and organization, over time one can expect to be successful at learning the plans of and interdict-
ing some percentage of drug shipments into the U.S. However, when one considers the conse-
quences of an attack using CBRN weapons, the percentage of leakage matters a lot. One means
to measure the probability of a CBRN weapon entering the U.S. is to assess the relative probabil-
ity of a specific drug shipment entering. That is, when we are able to close our boarders to all
illegal drug shipments, one may also assume that it is equally improbable for a CBRN weapon to
enter.

To win against international privatized terrorism we must change their will to play
this game! [soft power discussion, in detail, along with hard power components that are multi-
lateral and meet 3rd and 4th Geneva Convention rules and guidelines]

[need to secularize legitimacy of international privatized terrorists political objectives by height-

ened use of Christian, Jewish, and Muslim mainline religions, not only to condemn terrorism as a
war technique to achieve political objectives but to let mainline churches legitimately carry a
voice for necessary power-sharing relationship changes in order to blunt voice of terrorists.]

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games 18