Evaluating Nature Aesthetically

Author(s): Stan Godlovitch

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 56, No. 2, Environmental Aesthetics
(Spring, 1998), pp. 113-125
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/432250
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 STAN GODLOVITCH
EvaluatingNatureAesthetically
New places are always worth a visit, especially
new terrain.So I needed no persuadingto spend
a few hours wandering about Uvas Canyon
CountyPark,which lies to the south and west of
San Jose. My friends,whose idea this was, knew
full well that, for me, there simply is no contest
between a day in the woods-any woods-and
any temptationthe city-any city-can hold in
store. So off we went. Before we arrived,they
filled in a few details about the place and their
acquaintancewith it. The walk chosen for the
afternoon was a short circuit which passed by
three waterfalls. As if to calm what might have
been overheated and dashed expectation, my
friends explained that these were rather little
waterfalls, quite short on height and splash,
maybe even waterfalls in polite circles alone,
but very attractivenonetheless. Well, they were
little waterfalls,and yet very attractivenonethe-
less, as was the entire setting, and the afternoon
a success altogether.
But I have since been bemused aboutwhy my
friendsnearly apologizedfor the little waterfalls
and aboutwhat it means to do that sort of thing.
This paper is largely about appreciating and
valuing the naturalenvironment,and the stan-
dardsand rankingsthatcome into play when we
appreciateand value nature.Even thoughappre-
ciation and differentialevaluation are unavoid-
ably and properly inseparablewhen applied to
the culturalsphere, it is disquieting to consider
them inseparablewhen appliedto the naturaldo-
main. In culturalmatters, the ties that bind ap-
preciationand evaluationare the provinceof the
critic and connoisseur. Only those with the
worst taste would judge all works of art equally
exquisite. But transportthat discriminationover
to the naturalsphere and the critic and connois-
seur startto play God. This would be harmlessly
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism56:2 Spring 1998
presumptuouswere it not for our typically hand-
ing over the preservationand protection of na-
ture to nature "critics"much as the protection
and preservationof culturalheritage are left in
the able hands of our culturalexperts. These na-
ture critics belong to a varied circle including
conservation biologists, restoration ecologists,
parksand wildlife managers,not to mentionnat-
ural resourcemanagersand environmentalpol-
icy planners.Though I try to indicate how and
why this transferof discriminationfrom art to
naturemight be resisted, I am also aware that it
cannot be, and, more tellingly, must not be re-
sisted. For if it is resistedtoo religiously,the aes-
thetic dimension will simply be canceled out as
an effective factorin natureconservationpolicy,
leaving the field considerably more under the
sway of seductively operationaland measurable
resourcevalues.
Centralto my accountis the contrastbetween
what reasonablygoes on in the culturalsphere,
and what might or should go on in the natural
sphere.In a nutshell,regardingthe latter,we are
left with a choice between two awkward alter-
natives;viz., (1) that aspects of the naturalenvi-
ronmentare to be evaluatively weighted and so
differentially treated, or (2) that all aspects of
the environmentare to be deemed of equal ap-
preciative value and cannot thus be differen-
tially treated,at least on aesthetic grounds.The
formerrelatesto differentialtreatmentbased on,
say, scenic beauty,ecological centrality,and rep-
resentativeness, or species richness, with poor
scorers falling through the conservation net.
The latter view, an expression of positive aes-
thetics,1 effectively eliminates the relevance of
appreciativevalue in natureconservationpolicy
by failing to provide any pertinent aesthetic or
other nonfunctionaland noneconomic differen-
114
tiae on which to grounddifferentialtreatmentof
the environment.Otherwiseput, if natureappre-
ciation is not supposed or obliged to choose fa-
vorites, then it cannot be true that all apprecia-
tion involves evaluation; i.e., judging, grading,
and ranking.But if that is so, then appreciation
which involves no evaluation cannot play any
role in setting conservation priorities. If aes-
thetic appreciationdoes have a role to play in
prioritysetting, however, then it must resort to
art-aesthetic-like evaluative imperatives, and
thus forsake the spirit of valuing every natural
thing as it is as the basis of natureappreciation.
Appreciation is a normative venture and in-
volves some kind of pro-attitude.To character-
ize natureappreciationas distinctively nonjudg-
mental involves the denial that to appreciate
some thing is necessarily to evaluateit. But one
may, presumably,value a thing without evaluat-
ing it. One program for a distinctive positive
naturalaesthetic, then, is to affirm the claim "To
appreciateis to value," while denying the claim
"Tovalue is to evaluate."
Below, I examine efforts to defuse or elimi-
nate differential aesthetic judgment so as to
allow greaterevaluativeprominenceto ordinary
things, culturaland natural.All such efforts un-
fortunatelymisfire. Because my concernis prin-
cipally with the relation between appreciation,
evaluation,and valuing, I do not have space here
to explore otherimportantfeaturesof natureap-
preciation such as its psychological dimension,
its special content, and its guiding focus, some
aspects of which I have consideredelsewhere.2
I close with a sketch about the role aesthetics
might have left to play in natureconservationin
light of the need to establish conservationprior-
ities. In brief, however shaky on abstract
grounds, there are powerful pragmaticreasons
for those interested in saving nature to accept
and work on a metric for naturalaesthetics if
only to ensure future opportunitiesfor the aes-
thetic appreciationof nature.Otherwise,we will
be left only with those things in naturesparedon
grounds having altogethertoo little to do with
nature'saesthetic value.
I. APPRECIATING THE LITTLE THINGS
That my friends appropriatelypreparedme for
my encounter with the small falls was nothing
out of the ordinary.We all do that sort of thing
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
all the time, most certainly when it involves in-
troductions to what people comfortably call
"local culture." Conscientious hosts prepare
their guests for the modesty in store when mod-
est fare thereis. Folks from the big sophisticated
city need to be pre-adjustedfor the pioneer mu-
seum or the local blues band. Visits to the small
town art gallery and struggling Indian restau-
rant are often swaddled in local humilityjust to
make sure that no one gets the scale wrong. For
disappointmentis swift and certain if one other-
wise comes ready to savorand appreciatein full
as one wouldthe sights, sounds, and tastes of the
best there is anywhere. After all, the ordinary
and commonplacearejust what they are-plain
and common-and in essence just inferior to
the extraordinaryand exceptional. With such a
contrast, can anyone seriously argue that each
merits and satisfies the same degree of appreci-
ation as the other?
Perhapsthis rhetoricalquestion misfires, for
the ordinarydoes not lack its defenders.Broad-
minded protestsmay springforth aboutthe pro-
priety of appreciating the little things of life.
Further,one may insist thatappreciationis prop-
erly at home in its propersetting. But, however
high-minded and charitable these outlooks, it
seems blinkered to suggest that the breadthof
one's experience can be ignored or, worse, sup-
pressed, when new experiencemanifestly deliv-
ers less of something or other which past expe-
rience offered in full.
For to what does one consent when putting
oneself in a frame of mind which ensures that
one appreciates the little things of life? One
scarcely needs convincing that the little things
may well have their own charms or attractions.
Of course they do, and it is the height of snob-
bery and impoverishmentof spirit to suggest
otherwise. At this level of experience,to appre-
ciate something is to see some good in it and to
take pleasurein thatgood, and, to the extentthat
the little things in life have some good in them,
one is all the richerin experience who does not
let that slip by. Still, these attractionsare often
experiencedeither as lesser attractionsthan the
familiarbenchmarks,or as slightly sad compen-
sation for failing to display more importantfea-
tures that reach the height of attractiveness.
Being in a mood to appreciatethe little things
seems to requirethat one set one's sights lower
and simply make do with the availablebenefits,
Godlovitch EvaluatingNatureAesthetically
however disappointingin the contrast.To adapt
thus is sensible and even rewarding, since any
appreciativebenefit is betterthannone, and cer-
tainly better than out-and-out disappointment,
derogation,and dismissal. Such appreciativere-
ceptiveness is thus bound to be worthwhile,
however otherwise overwhelmed when con-
trasted with the big things in life. But, no one
would willingly choose the experienceof the lit-
tle things over that of the big things, nor will-
fully seek out the commonplace when the ex-
ceptional is to hand. At best, one makes do
appreciatively when the big things in life are
somewhereelse.
The terms "little" and "big"are meant to re-
flect typical cultural comparative practices.
Bookstores often express this differencecatego-
rially in offeringfor sale Fiction in one shelf and
Literaturein another. Music and drama audi-
ences get used to distinguishing between local
and internationalacts, and between major and
minor recording labels. Whereas the paintings
of Rembrandtregularly go on world tour, the
beloved local artists of the past stay pinned in
perpetuo to the walls of the struggling county
gallery. So it is with wineries, breweries, and
potteries. And so too it is with baseball, rugby,
golf, cars, computers,high schools, restaurants,
jewelry, clothing, rugs, corkscrews, running
shoes, and just about anything else that is made
or done and is exposed to the cold light of edu-
cated taste and worldly judgments of differen-
tial quality.Withoutdoubt, critics and aficiona-
dos have had their heavy hand in doing this for
us and to us. But to lay the blame exclusively on
them is unfair,for all they do is specialize where
we dabble in a practice that comes by instinct
with exposure to artifice itself, to the things of
humanhands and minds. What is this practice?
None otherthanbeing moved to rankthings and
the experienceof them on the strengthof the dif-
ferences experience reveals. Rare is that person
who is able to appreciateall things with equal
intensity; so rare indeed as to be suspected ei-
ther of a prodigious monotony of mind or,
worse, a seamless monotonyof experience.The
fact is we perceive differences amongst things
of a kind and have preferenceswhetherwe like
it or not, and these perceptionsand preferences
are informed by and change with experience.
115
II. BEST IN ITS LEAGUE, ONE OF A KIND:
APPRECIATION FIT FOR ITS PROPER SETTING
The second reminder-that appreciation is
properly at home in its proper setting, that ap-
preciation must fit its subject-is designed to
soften the uncompromisingjudgmental mode
which ensures that the little things remain little
when matched against the big ones. Even if
ordinary things are inferior to and so deserve
less appreciationthan extraordinarythings, we
should refuse to observe strictureson apprecia-
tion fanatically.Otherwise,ourdisappointments
would mount and ruin our very capacity to ap-
preciate. If we always appeal to the remorseless
standard of greatness, experience will become
increasingly disappointing because experience
is most often of the ordinary.As experience in-
creases, experience of the ordinary increases,
and thus the odds of experiencing the excep-
tional decreases. Many exceptional things have
only one chance to be exceptional. Repeat them
often and they become ordinary.Further,expec-
tations of the exceptional become increasingly
disappointedas increasingly less is available in
experience to strike one as exceptional. This
makes jadedness not an aberrationbut a normal
development, and also explains why children
find the world so much more amazing than do
adults.
To what does the claim that appreciationis
properly at home in its proper setting commit
us? Here are some examples: it is unfitting and
irresponsible to match one's experience of a
child's drawingagainst one done by Durer;it is
remiss to rank the prize winners at the annual
amateurvintners competition against the great
vintages of old Bordeaux chateaux; it is out of
place to judge with the same ear the struggles of
the Red Deer Civic Orchestraand the effortless
perfection of the Berlin Philharmonic;it is ab-
surd to compare the performanceof the high-
school baseball team in the same terms as the
New York Yankees. There are veritable leagues
of practice. Notwithstanding some seepage
across leagues and some promotions into and
demotions out of leagues, we can determine
roughlywhere the boundarieslie. These leagues
are markednot only by predictablepreoccupa-
tion and output;more importantly,they define
appropriateboundariesof consumerexpectation
and so the appropriatelevels and atmosphereof
116
appreciationto be activated.Being disappointed
by the Red Deer Civic Orchestrajust because it
sounds "smalltown"against the Berlin Philhar-
monic is irrational.The Red Deer Civic Orches-
tra is small town and sounds exactly as one
would expect a small town orchestrato sound.
The Red Deer Civic Orchestrais not meantto be
heard in league with any great European or-
chestra. It has no such purposeor ambition.
To adjustone's expectations to the context of
practice does not require that one abandon all
reasonableexpectation and approachthe world
with a boundlesslyreceptivespirit.Some nights,
the Red Deer group outshines itself. On others,
it falls behind the karaoke event at the King
Eddy Bar down on the Main. The Red Deer en-
semble puts to shame the Swift CurrentPhilhar-
monia but lags behindthe Moose JawOrchestra.
So, one's discriminatingexpectations and stan-
dardsare preserved,howevercarefullybounded.
The payoff is that, for any league of practice,
one's highest appreciative experience fittingly
matchesthe intensity of that of any other league
of practice. The appreciationdue the very best
of little league performanceis no less than that
due the very best of the big leagues. The thrillin
the hockey finals victory of the Drumheller
Rockets over their old foes, the Hanna Maver-
icks, and the appreciation of their hard-won
fight, matches in intensity whateverjoyous ap-
proval is otherwise expressed over the success
of the National Hockey League EdmontonOil-
ers. Since the height of appreciativeexperience
is a response to the very best, since experience
and appreciationfunction fittingly only relative
to classes of practice, and since in each such
league there are going to be participantswhich
are best in their class, the height of appreciative
experience is available within any such league.
If leagues of practicemust not be rankedagainst
one another-ranking being internal to a league
of practice-but are instead equal to one an-
other qua classes in which membersare ranked
for performance,then nothing differentiatesthe
height of appreciativeexperience appropriateto
each league qua that appreciation'sbeing the
highest fitting responseto the best of the league.
The identical force of appreciativeresponserel-
ative to each league is thus fully appropriate.A
great local orchestrais as great in its own local
orchestraleague as a great internationalensem-
ble is in its own internationalleague.
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
Leagues come in two kinds, hierarchicaland
categorial. Sports provides instances of both.
Hierarchical leagues not only demarcateareas
of practice but allow interleagueranking.They
are, thus, higher-order leagues, or leagues of
leagues. So, when talking of major and minor
leagues, one may assertthe relativeinferiorityof
one whole league against another.With hierar-
chical leagues, one ranks both intraleagueand
interleagueperformance.Thus, one may judge
an achievement as an outstanding minor but
humdrummajor league accomplishment.This
is allowable and fitting because of the featureof
mobility in the hierarchical league category.
Practitioners within hierarchical leagues may
be moved up or down a league depending on
performance. Sometimes whole teams may be
moved up or down. Note, mobility is grounded
in practice skills and abilities which are in prin-
ciple commonly accessible across leagues.
Interleagueevaluation is not available when
dealing with categorial leagues. No categorial
league may fittingly be cross-compared with
any other in part because of the absence of in-
terleague mobility and the presence of hard
league boundaries. Consider leagues within
boxing established on the basis of weight
classes. It is unacceptableto judge that an out-
standing welter-weightfighter would be a dead
loss in a heavy-weight bout. In some team
sports, the distinction between big and peewee
leagues cuts a categorialboundaryon the basis
of age. So it is with sex-based leagues, leagues
for the physically handicapped, or species-
based leagues such as involve horse racing or
rose growing.
Any categorial league may be judged as if it
were a member of a hierarchicalleague simply
by declaring the categorialdifferentiae such as
age, weight, or sex to be as incidental as eye
color is in baseball. By parity,a range of differ-
entiae judged to be irrelevantfrom a hierarchi-
cal league perspectivemay be declaredcategor-
ial league criteria,thus insulatinga league from
broaderinterleagueevaluation.Categorialcrite-
ria are often presumed to affect performance
(e.g., age, sex, weight, species), butthis is not al-
ways so. Categorialleague membershipmay de-
pend upon nationality,say, or religion or marital
status.
Context-sensitiveappreciationdepends upon
recognizing or declaringcertain leagues as cat-
Godlovitch EvaluatingNatureAesthetically
egorial and not hierarchical. The evaluation
arising in the appreciation of league practice
must thereby be strictly intraleagueevaluation.
Appreciation being properly league-specific,
the highest appreciation fittingly goes to the
best in its league.
In context-sensitive appreciation, the little
things of life, the ordinaryand the local, are de-
clared members of categorial leagues. Ranking
and thus appreciation become strictly in-
traleagueaffairs. Thus, an excellent local wine
is not also a mediocre instance of the league of
world-classvintages.The context-sensitiveview
has some appeal.Like the principleof semantic
charitywhich encouragesone to make the most
sense possible of whateveris said, this view of
appreciativevalue tries to maximize the oppor-
tunities for the richest forms of appreciationby
maximizing the opportunities for experiencing
the best there is. At the same time, it does not
undulycheapen appreciationand evaluationbe-
cause it maintains relevant intraleaguenorma-
tive differentiae which reflect standards of
league-based practice. Furthermore,it does not
impose upon those who would otherwise face
increasing disappointmentin experience the ul-
timately self-defeating retreat into reclusive
connoisseurship.Appreciationremainingpegged
to the best of the league, no one need fear re-
lentless and growing failure of expectation. In-
deed, this approach constantly opens new av-
enues for appreciationas the world unfolds in
experience. The greaterone's search for experi-
ence, the greaterthe prospectsfor encountering
and recognizing new leagues, even whole new
practices. With that come fresh outlets for ap-
preciation, notably new opportunities to en-
counterand take pleasurein the value of an ever-
expanding range of things experience passes
one's way. For of what more can appreciation
consist than that of the experience of taking
pleasurein things whose value is made manifest
in experience?
We began with the awkwardnessthat comes
with preparingto face the drabnessand disap-
pointment of the local fare. The categorial
league account shows this to have been mis-
guided. Far from having to endure the limited-
ness of the local, one can often be assuredthat
what is open for appreciationwill bringentirely
new appreciativeprospects-so long as one gets
the league right. The prime payoff is the expo-
117
sureto new leagues, even wholly new skilled en-
terprises. Hence the attraction in tasting local
food, hearinglocal music, viewing local art, ex-
ploring the local church-the complete ethnic
rush, the geographer'sSense of Place. These are
all league openers,experienceswhich beckon us
to open new appreciativelogbooks. Otherwise,
how confined our self-imposed enclave of ap-
preciative experienceseems in the contrast.For
just how many times, really, must one listen to
Beethoven's late quartets, attend yet another
performance of Hamlet, drink yet another
matchlessvintage of ChateauLafite, see yet an-
othertouringdisplayof the Flemish masters,be-
fore it all goes merely to ritual?Then, too, there
are NiagaraFalls, Lake Louise, Bryce Canyon,
the General Sherman tree, Mount Everest, the
Serengeti, Franz Josef Glacier ... but more on
these later.
III. PROBLEMS WITH CONTEXT-SENSITIVE
APPRECIATION
However appealingly postmodern,not much of
this works. Three principalworriesemerge. (a)
The first is the demarcationproblem. What in-
dividuatesa league? Context-basedappreciation
relies on the recognition of relatively discrete
leagues. But whatdemarcatesa league?Leagues
must be identifiable independently of our ac-
knowledgmentof the best a league has to offer;
however,leagues are not even remotelybounded
as stubbornlyas typical naturalkinds. They do
not come ready-madefor any observerto iden-
tify. What guides us in getting the right focus?
Why, say, might we think it inappropriateto
judge the Red Deer Civic Orchestraon the same
termsas we would the Berlin Philharmonic?Or-
chestras constitute a bona fide league, surely.
Perhaps we seek league-shrinking categorial
qualifiersto enhance appreciativefairness. Per-
haps we choose to confine ourselves to leagues
like AmateurOrchestra,or Small TownOrches-
tra, or UnderfundedOrchestra,all these invok-
ing categorialdelimiters. Still, we are not war-
ranted in choosing a qualifier just to give us
groundsfor appreciatingthe Red Deer Civic Or-
chestraas the best of its class. Even if this were
not blatantly question-begging,it clearly spells
the end of credibility for the notion of league,
for nothing stops us from specifying just that
delimiter which guarantees that our favorite
118
small thing in life is also the very best of its
class. This happenswhen statusrides on favored
statistics. This township is the biggest producer
of sugar beets in southwestern Alberta, while
that southwesternAlbertacommunityboasts the
record for triticale wheat. This coffeeshop
serves the finest cinnamon buns in the "world"
(i.e., the world of accessible prairie coffee-
shops), while that one takes the cake on saska-
toonberrypie. Anything whatevercan be made
to set some record or other. Of course, it cuts
many ways. The record winner in one league
can just as easily come last in another league.
This predictably comes with evaluative gerry-
manderingwhich would not be possible but for
our insistence that we work within boundaries,
that we set our sights no furtherthan the desig-
nated league. League solipsism soon makes an
appearance. For no one can dictate the mini-
mum membershipin a league. Discounting the
null league, leagues may ultimatelybe delimited
as singleton leagues, thus giving conclusive
proof to the view that anything whatsoevercan
be the very best of its kind since everything
whatsoevercan be one of a kind, and is so due
the most exclusive and equal appreciative re-
gard. (b) A second problem involves an embar-
rassmentof appreciativeriches. How muchmust
we appreciate? If, by extending hierarchical
leagues unduly,the snob appreciatesfar too lit-
tle (since so much winds up near the bottom),
the countervailing maximization of categorial
leagues leads to appreciationrunriot.3Does one
aim to divide practices into as many categorial
leagues as will maximize appreciationby creat-
ing a plethoraof practices which maximize the
numberof exceptional instances? If so, there is
too much to appreciate.We create for ourselves
the best of all possible worlds. Efforts to retain
appreciativestandardsgive way. Evaluationbe-
comes trivial. (c) Preying upon the excesses of
(a) and (b), we get the problem of appreciative
reliability.Any item can be made the best in its
own categorial league. Any item can be made
the worst in some other categorial league. If
thereare no objectively privilegedleagues, there
is nothing outside the very will to appreciateit-
self which ultimatelydetermineswhethersome-
thing will be positively appreciated.This makes
appreciation a kind of choice, an attitude one
willfully adopts,ratherthan a fitting responseto
certain admirableand rankablequalities.
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
These problems are degenerativeratherthan
fatal. Adopting a Lakatosian4model, the best
approach is one which promises the greatest
number of (a) actual appreciativeexperiences,
(b) new opportunitiesfor appreciation,and (c)
the most rewarding appreciative experiences
(the greatestexposure to the most of the best of
things). One tries to maximize appreciative
rangeoverthe largestnumberof practicesand to
maximize intra-enterprise exposure over the
greatest number of leagues within a practice.
Approaches to appreciation which maximize
receptivity toward practices and leagues are
maximally Lakatos-progressive.The differen-
tial yield of appreciativeexperience forms the
basis for choosing an appreciativestance. This
might make it more rationalto expose oneself to
a broadrange of top "minor"league experiences
than a narrowerrange of "major"league experi-
ences. But such a strategyshows strainsince the
choice of maximization favors the recognition
of ever-increasing numbers of practices and
leagues within each. Taken to its extreme, the
strategy degeneratesinto one where no experi-
ence fails to yield top-of-the-league satisfaction
since each experienceis one-of-a-kind and thus
uniquely best in its league.
Though a species of extreme aestheticism,
opting to appreciateevery experienced item as
the best that experience can afford (in its own
class), it is not self-defeating. Still, the degener-
ation results from the merely self-perpetuating
activity of acknowledgingever-new opportuni-
ties for more experiences of the top-of-the-
league. Efforts to maximize appreciative ex-
perience drive the recognition of increasing
numbers of leagues which make possible the
maximization of appreciative experience and
opportunitiesfor furtherappreciation.But this
has a stronglyinflationaryeffect. The more you
aim to experiencethe most of the best, the more
you partitionexperienceinto the most practices
and leagues possible. But thereis no upperlimit
on partition,so experienceis partitionedin such
a way as to make every instance an experience
of the best. Thus you abandonall ordinalrank-
ing. Everything is the best by default. But this
final leveling has the effect of making every-
thing ordinary.The best and the ordinarycoin-
cide, and consequentlythe goal of full appreci-
ation, which depends upon ordinal ranking,
degenerates. To recognize a categorial league
Godlovitch EvaluatingNatureAesthetically
for each thing reducesthe value in experienceby
forcing upon one an imperativeto maximize ap-
preciation opportunities and thus ensure that
nothing is excluded from being the best of its
kind.
IV. NONJUDGMENTAL APPRECIATION:
APPRECIATING THINGS JUST AS THEY ARE
Appreciationof culturalthings, like preference,
calls forth differences in evaluation. We un-
avoidably have our preferences and we are in-
veterate graders. On this grading rest our dif-
ferential and differentiating judgments. The
grading process is scalar. The scale runs from
the positive end past a zero indifference point
and down througha negative end. The appara-
tus of hierarchicalleagues is one frameworkin
which this grading operates.To argue that each
thing is the best of its kind-whether watercolor
or waterfall-is a dead end, however noble.
To save little waterfalls from otherwise well-
deserved dismissal, we may need to establish a
domain of nonjudgmentalor nonevaluativeap-
preciation that is not simple indifference, and
that justifies us in appreciatingeverything on
equal terms without committing ourselves to
saying that everything is equally extraordinary.
Whereas art appreciationmust be judgmental,
nature appreciationmust not be, so the theme
runs. Unfortunately, this effort fails, but is
worth a brief review.
If appreciationis principally a form of posi-
tive judgment,we seem committed to making
comparisons, and with comparisons we allow
for the possibility of differentialjudgment. We
may discoverthat,in comparison,the objects we
judge are evaluatively indistinguishable. All
may be judged equally and indistinguishably
good. However, ignoring the extreme unlikeli-
ness of this outcome, any such result will be
contingentand so unstable.At any stage we may
weight things differentially either because we
discovernew and relevantdifferencesin our ex-
perience or simply because we shift the evalua-
tive weightings we already have with the result
that rankingemerges. Our penchantfor league-
making may just be too powerful to resist. So,
the first injunctionis: Do not judge.
The second injunction is: Do not assimilate
naturalthings to art. A powerful reason against
treatingthe things of natureas if they were like
119
artworksis precisely thatwe do not want to have
to rank the things of nature as we cannot but
rank objects of art-as indeed it is our obliga-
tion to do.5
Nonjudgmentalappreciationmust be positive
without invoking any sort of appreciativescale.
For, otherwise, one might just as well adopt a
universal deprecationsince there may be noth-
ing to choose between them. We need a form of
nonjudgmentalappreciationoutsideleagues and
ranking.Otherwise, we will grade the things of
natureas we rightlydo the things of culture.The
characterizationof such a positive aesthetic as
the view that "the natural world is essentially
aesthetically good" or that "natureis beautiful
and has no negative aesthetic qualities"6does
not distinguish between weak and strong vari-
ants. Strongpositive aesthetics is the view that
the things of the naturalworld are equal or iden-
tical or incommensurable in their aesthetic
goodness. The Weak view merely says that
everything in nature has positive aesthetic
worth on balance. A weaker view still is that
everything in nature has some aesthetic good.
This last view is compatible with some, even
most, items being on balance aesthetically neu-
tral or even bad. As such, this weakest view is
not a literal variantof positive aesthetics in that
it denies the essential aesthetic goodness of all
things natural-where "essential"means both
ineliminably and on-balance good. The Strong
view resemblesthe extreme of context-sensitive
appreciation and shares its vulnerability.The
Weakview, as presented,is compatiblewith dif-
ferential ranking since it does not exclude un-
equal aesthetic value and thus allows for "de-
grees of beauty."7In adopting the Strong view,
one endorses a third injunction: Declare some
noncomparativegood to reside in all natural
things.
What form, then, might a positive nonjudg-
mental appreciationassume? Suppose it is pri-
marilya form of positive affective response and
receptivity.8But psychologizing the notion by
understanding it in terms of being always
struck, pleased, awed, amazed, fascinated, or
impressed by everything filling our experience
will not help. If we are selectively struck,we are
back to ranking, however inadvertently.Quasi-
judgmental comparisons resurface in the dis-
tinction between those things that strike us,
those that fail to attract our notice, and those
120
that repel us. Psychologically, it is difficult to
imagine whatit would be like to be so struckand
with equal force by absolutelyeverything in ex-
perience. It just does not happen. Certainly,
those to whom it fails to happenare scarcely de-
ficient. The world is orderedin ongoing experi-
ence into foregroundand background.We can-
not take in all the details for simple survival's
sake, let alone rejoice in them all.9
We are no better off by appealing to the most
selfless of other-regardingresponses of maxi-
mal empathywith or care for others.'10However
true it is that we do not judge comparatively
those to whom we are fully dedicatedin love, af-
fection, and concern, the fact is that we are not
so dedicatedto all beings, nor could we be. The
power to love all things equally, uncondition-
ally, and equally strongly is reservedfor divini-
ties. For the rest of us, our love will be local and
highly circumscribed.But if I cannot love all
things equally and unconditionally,I give no-
tice, in my selective dispensation of affection,
that not all things are equally important and
valuable to me. Where affection is concerned,
the very psychological and biological limits of
our powers of attachmentbetoken rankingsand
priorities.I can try to be boundlessly loving and
caring,benignly indiscriminatein my affection,
but in this I am sureto fail. Lapses and gaps will
hauntme at each turn.ShouldI blame myself for
such lapses and gaps as if I were sinfully defi-
cient? I think not. If deficiency this is, it is both
universaland helpless. Should I think those less
deficient than me in this extension of affection
somehow to be emulated? Perhaps so, for it is
likely true that those with a greatercapacity for
love and affection, eitherin intensity or breadth,
live happier and richer lives than those with
weaker capacity. But none of this implies that
the proper end of this exercise in affective ex-
pansion is or ought to be fully universal any
more than the proper end of emulating those
who can play fast scale passages on the guitar is
to play either infinitely fast or even faster than
anyone else. All this aside, if I should neverthe-
less emulate those with greatercapacities than I
possess, this presupposesthe proprietyof com-
parativejudgment, and it is that we have been
trying all along to shed.
If appreciation figures at all in concern for
others, it cannot but be implicitly judgmental
and comparative.One lesson here is that to ap-
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
preciate nonjudgmentallyis to take and accept
things exactly as they are and for what they are.
Just as our full affection for others is not calcu-
latedly proportionalto the degrees of presence
of certain qualities, so perhapsour appreciation
of naturalthings should not be pegged to any
specific comparisonsat all. But what more does
this come to than our appreciatingeach thing
precisely as being in an exclusive league all of
its own, each thing becoming by default top of
its own categorial league, no two leagues being
subject to higher-levelrankings?Howevereval-
uatively degenerate, this approach is scarcely
nonevaluative and nonjudgmentaldespite ap-
pearing nonjudgmental in that it defeats the
point of comparisonand ranking.11
Could appreciating each thing exactly for
what it is invoke the significance of uniqueness?
By affirming the special goodness we attach to
uniqueness we can insulate one appreciation
from another.By declaringthe absolutenessand
ubiquity of uniqueness and by claiming that to
appreciateany thing is to appreciateits unique-
ness, we ensurethat no thing can have any more
or any less appreciative value than any other
thing since each thing is utterly and equally
unique.
Are we wise to emphasize the uniquenessof
all things? Besides the fact that uniqueness
alone is not good grounds for being favorably
disposed toward something, and that natural
things are no more unique than any thumbtack,
there is something ineliminably trivial about
uniqueness. Just as any thing differs from any
other thing in an indefinite numberof respects,
so any two things are alike in an indefinitely
large number of respects.'2 Every thing is in-
deed unique; but so is it equally common. If
sameness runs as riot as difference, it is difficult
to reserve a special place for anything.
Nor will it do to conceive uniquenessin eco-
logical terms. There is great uncertaintyabout
just how valuablethings are ecologically, and no
ecologist claims that everything in natureis of
equal, inestimable, irreplaceable, and funda-
mental ecological significance. One prominent
view has it that ecosystems have their "little
players and big players."'3Does this sound un-
comfortably like talk about major and minor
leagues or major and minor officials? One
might indict ecologists on a charge of ideologi-
cal hierarchism,but such on its own can come
Godlovitch EvaluatingNatureAesthetically
only from a presumptuousstance of "less ideo-
logical than thou."'4I would guess that they are
trying merely to be fair to the availablefacts and
would happily shift with the evidence as it ar-
rives. Whatevertheir faults, ecologists cannotbe
accused of concealing or downplayingthe great
gaps and uncertaintiesin their science.
V. ACCEPTING COMPARATIVE AESTHETIC
VALUES OF NATURE
The results so far have been discouraging. No
account of appreciationof natureconvincingly
does away with the differentialevaluativejudg-
ment and grading so familiar and fitting in our
appreciationof culturalthings. But if natureap-
preciation is at bottomjust like cultureappreci-
ation, we have to accept the consequences. Just
as there are rotten violinists, so there must be
pathetic creeks; just as there is pulp fiction, so
there must be junk species; just as there are for-
gettable meals, so theremust be inconsequential
forests. Despite substantialcriticism of the aes-
theticist "areaof outstandingnaturalbeauty"ap-
proach,15those attractedto such principlesmay
have been on the righttrackall along, at least as
far as differentialrankinggoes. David Ehrenfeld
asks rhetorically:"Manycritics would say that
El Greco was a greater painter than Norman
Rockwell, but is the Serengeti savanna artisti-
cally [i.e., aesthetically] more valuablethan the
New Jersey Pine Barrens?"16But the answer
may be reasonablysimple if one gets the hierar-
chical league right.Nothing paradoxicalstumps
the mind about the thought that this savannaor
that waterfall is not quite as magnificent as that
one.
No one questions whethersome things in na-
ture have aesthetic value. There remain, how-
ever, two tough questions about the natureand
significance of this value. The first is: How
much aesthetic value do naturalthings have, or,
more weakly, where does one thing stand aes-
thetically in comparisonwith another?The sec-
ond is: Where does (or should) naturalaesthetic
value rank amongst other and often competing
values attributedto nature?The questions are
linked in the context of nature conservation.
Those for whom nature has aesthetic value
would care to protect or conserve this source of
value.17What role can aesthetic value play in
real-world conservation decisions? Here are
121
sketches of a few themes and pragmaticoppor-
tunities which arise from these questions.
VI. A METRIC FOR NATURAL AESTHETIC
VALUE?
Why shouldwe care whetherlittle waterfallsget
a low aesthetic score? Why not think of little
waterfalls as you would the many scarcely no-
ticeable species and habitatswhich form partof
our experience of nature'swhite noise, outdoor
wallpaper,fresh air Muzak?Against these pos-
sibilities, scientists, planners, and politicians
are determining how to choose what gets into
the new ark. Much will be left out. Why? There
is great interest in the "assessmentand evalua-
tion of species and communities [because] it
would be impracticalto protectand conserve all
species and all communities with an equal
amountof supportand endeavour.There is sim-
ply not enough money and scientific expertise
to do this."'l8This is our world.
In determiningconservationpriorities,exten-
sive consideration of the values of nature has
been undertaken.19Generally,these values are
divided into resource and nonresource cate-
gories. This reflects not only economic and
noneconomicvalue, but often expresses the dif-
ference between easily quantifiableand not so
easily quantifiable (or unquantifiable)values.
So, for example, so-called recreationalvalue of
a site may be classified as a resource value be-
cause one can calculate how much money will
be spent to use and maintainit by recreationists,
and also as a nonresourcevalue of a purely aes-
thetic naturefor which no simple monetarycon-
version is available (ignoring willingness-to-
pay transformations).The overallvalue of a site
is determinedby taking into account a range of
resourceand nonresourcevalues including eco-
nomic, recreational,ecological, aesthetic, scien-
tific, religious, and other dimensions of value.
Conservationpriorityattaches to sites with the
highest overall value.
Much effort in conservationbiology goes to-
ward establishing criteriato allow quantifiably
justifiable choice of sites to conserve. Repeata-
bility is essential. Once a scale of value and a
method of measurement are established, then
any two parties weighing the value of an area
should come to the same conclusion. If they do
not, that can be blamed on an errorin measure-
122
ment, thus reducing differences to procedural
and not normativematters.Naturally,big ques-
tions concern the choice of criteria,the quanti-
tative weightings, the formulae, the accuracyof
measurement,and so on, but these are not taken
to be intractable.20
Anyone wanting nonresource values to be
countedinto the total is advisedto producesome
sort of comparativemeasureto parallelwhatthe
resource sphere provides. Otherwise, the ten-
dency will be for resource criteriato predomi-
nate. Relying on an economic correlate to aes-
thetic value in the recreationalsphere may not
be sufficient if aesthetic value is to achieve full
prominence. The actual economic benefit may
not be very great; it may vary as tastes change
or as substitutes become available; and it is
often swayed by a preference for so-called
iconic landscapesand species, e.g., areasof out-
standing naturalbeauty or habitatfor large and
beloved endangered species. Refusal to ac-
knowledge the possibility of a scale2' may be to
run away from the practicalimplications of not
having one. Decisions will be made favoring
some sites over others simply because there is
not enough supportto save them all. Better that
some determinable input be available in the
nonresourceaesthetic sphereratherthan none.
If there are no palpable aesthetic criteriafor
nature conservation, the aesthetic dimension
will not have much influence on systematiccon-
servation choices.22 Further,unless defensible
aesthetic rankingsare available,aesthetic crite-
ria will fail to interestconservationpolicy mak-
ers. So, if aesthetic value has any seriousrole in
natureconservationdecisions by policy makers,
it must be conceived in scalar terms with deter-
minable degrees.23Further,to avoid the charge
that such judgments are subjectively variable,
aesthetic value must be presented as intersub-
jectively measurable.Aesthetic value must thus
be representable on a public metric24 ordinal or
cardinal.Only if naturalaesthetic value is mea-
surable will it stand a chance of influencing
conservation priorities.25Otherwise it will be
swept aside as just anothervague externalityor
subjective attachment. In accepting any such
metric, one must abandonany but the most mar-
ginal positive aesthetics, viz., the view thatthere
is some aesthetic good in any naturalthing.26
That alone tips no balance one way or another.
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
VII. THE VALUE OF AESTHETIC VALUE
Suppose aesthetic value makes it onto the con-
servationagenda. What weight does it have? Of
what value is aesthetic value? What difference
can aesthetic value make? Counted into the
reckoningare families of values, e.g., economic
(utilitarian,monetary,resource) value, ecologi-
cal value, scientific value, ludic values of play
and curiosity,moralvalue, religious and cultural
value, heritagevalue, aesthetic value, existence
value, even the ecocentrist's morally intrinsic
value. If each family is taken to be immeasur-
ably categorical or intrinsic or incommensu-
rable,conflicts and intractableincompatibilities
will arise.However,if each is takento contribute
but one dimensionof an overallvalue, no appar-
ent conflict arises. But this calls for a further
second-order value; viz., that which differen-
tially ranksthese families of value by assigning
weights to them.
If, say, a thing's aesthetic value is the value
someone places in the aesthetic experienceof it,
and its economic value is the value someone
places in its exchange potential, a second-order
rankingvalue would take these values as its ob-
jects, e.g., the value placed (by someone) in hav-
ing (first-order)things of value respected (by
others), or, the value respected (placed or ac-
knowledged) in the value placed upon first-
order things. Generally,the second-ordervalue
is thatvalue acknowledged(respected,counted)
in the value placed (by others) upon things or
whateveris valuableto some thing. A thing may
thus be valuedby or valuableto some nonhuman
and even some nonsentientbeing. This involves
something other than maximizing preference
satisfaction because to place a priority upon
preference satisfaction presupposes that some-
thing is valuableonly if it satisfies some prefer-
ence. Not all valuablethings are such necessar-
ily because of some preference-satisfyingstate.
To determine such a second-order value is
precisely to determine not why but how much
aesthetic value shouldaffect the conservationof
a site. Once that is established, one must deter-
mine how much aestheticvalue a site has. There
is no reason why rankingthe value of aesthetic
value needs to be a fixed weighting. But if this
too is variable,yet anotherprincipleis required
to rank the degrees of value ranking for any
given case. Why go throughwith this? Because,
Godlovitch EvaluatingNatureAesthetically
however low on the meta-scale which assigns
differentialvalues to primaryvalues (including
economic, recreational,and ecological values),
as a measurablefactor,high aesthetic value may
sometimes tip the balance in certain decisions,
especially when all other values are equal.
Throughout, a voice keeps saying "This is
utter madness!" Besides resting on injudicably
differing intuitions about which values get the
largest say, some argue that once one buys into
this method of decision-making,one is increas-
ingly less able to extricate oneself from it. As
Ehrenfeldwisely counsels:
Theneedto conservea particularcommunityor spe-
cies mustbejudgedindependently of theneedto con-
serveanythingelse.Limitedresourcesmayforceus to
makechoicesagainstourwills, butrankingsystems
encourageandrationalizethe makingof choices....
[T]he more formaland generalized[rankingsys-
tems] become,the more damagethey are likely to
cause.27
For this is no stopgap measure awaiting a solu-
tion that will ultimately make measurementre-
dundant.It becomes a standingmodus operandi
precisely because there is no better substitute
decision procedure,and throwsthe entirematter
forever into the hands of those who have no
stake in the worth of intrinsic or inestimable
value. The modus operandi becomes, if not
overtly economic, then certainly neo-economic.
Worse than playing God, the environmental
planner plays Accountant. Worse still, the ac-
count books have columns for all of it-Money,
Knowledge, Beauty-and the sums flow with-
out faltering.
In response, Ehrenfeldmakes a plea for what
he calls "the Noah Principle,"named after the
greatest conservationplanner ever. But he con-
cedes that, as with the Big Flood, only a cata-
strophe will have any substantive effect upon
our present orientation.In the meanwhile, aes-
theticians of naturehad best get out the rulers
and scopes, had best scrape down to the hard
physical bedrock of naturalappeal. And more,
they had best seek out any powerful and impor-
tant people left who think that even little water-
falls have some lasting charm.28
123
STAN GODLOVITCH
Departmentof Humanand Leisure Sciences
Lincoln University
P.O.Box 84
Canterbury
New Zealand
INTERNET: GODLOVIS@LINCOLN.AC.NZ
1. For a detailed sympatheticexposition of positive aes-
thetics, see Alien Carlson,"Natureand Positive Aesthetics,"
EnvironmentalEthics 6 (1984): 5-34. Also, see Eugene
Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics (Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989). Notwithstandinghis
conception of natureas both "an assortmentof resourcesto
be managed and consumed"but also "as an object of aes-
thetic appreciationand moral respect,"Mark Sagoff, in his
aesthetics and morality of "loving care" for nature,accepts
that"we cannotavoid interventionsinto nature.Even wilder-
ness areas must be managed;we 'play God in Yellowstone'
as well as everywhereelse." See Mark Sagoff, "HasNature
a Good of its Own?"in EcosystemHealth:New Goalsfor En-
vironmentalManagement,eds. R. Constanza, B. G. Norton,
and B. D. Haskell (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1992),
pp. 57-71.
2. See Stan Godlovitch, "AestheticProtectionism,"Jour-
nal of AppliedPhilosophy6 (1989); "Ice Breakers,"Journal
of Applied Philosophy 11 (1994); and "Carlsonon Appreci-
ation," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55
(1997). Also, "Positive Aesthetics and ConservationPriori-
ties" (unpublished).
3. See Godlovitch, "Boors and Bumpkins, Snobs and
Snoots," The Journal of Aesthetic Education 24 (1990):
65-74.
4. See Imre Lakatos,"Falsificationand the Methodology
of Scientific Research Programmes"in Criticism and the
Growth of Knowledge,eds. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1970).
5. Among those who tend to associate value in
naturewith value in art are RobertElliot, "FakingNature,"
Inquiry 25 (1982); Elliott Sober, "PhilosophicalProblems
for Environmentalism,"in The Preservationof Species, ed.
B. Norton (Princeton University Press, 1986); Lilly-Mar-
lene Russow, "Do Species Matter?"EnvironmentalEthics 3
(1981); and Donald Crawford, "ComparingNatural and
Artistic Beauty,"in Landscape,NaturalBeautyand the Arts,
eds. Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (New York:Cambridge
University Press, 1993). Among those resisting this assimi-
lation are Allen Carlson, "Appreciationand the NaturalEn-
vironment,"The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism37
(1979) and "Nature,Aesthetic Judgmentand Objectivity,"
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 40 (1981); J.
Baird Callicott, "The Land Aesthetic" in Companionto a
Sand County Almanac (University of Wisconsin Press,
1987); and Stan Godlovitch, "Ice Breakers."Among those
who suspect uneasily thatnaturemay acquireaesthetic value
only because aesthetic value is placed in art are David
Ehrenfeld,TheArroganceof Humanism(New York:Oxford
University Press, 1981) (especially "The Conservation
124
Dilemma,"pp. 204-207) and lan F. Spellerberg,Evaluation
and Assessment for Conservation (London: Chapman &
Hall, 1992). One view that assimilates artworksto Kantian
persons would requireus by parityto think each such work
to be of inestimable value, a strikingly peculiar view. See
Alan Tormey,"AestheticRights,"The Journalof Aesthetics
and Art Criticism32 (1973): 163-170.
6. The first from Carlson, "Natureand Positive Aesthet-
ics," p. 28; the second from Hargrove,p. 177.
7. Hargrove,p. 179. Hargrove adds that "more beautiful
objects ought to be given priorityfor preservationover less
beautifulones." Hargrovedoes not develop the notion of de-
grees of beauty and appearsto introduce it merely in order
to avoid the potent charge that equal aesthetic merit in all
things leaves aesthetics out of conservationprioritysetting.
The view he expresses about prioritymust be taken with a
heavy dose of ceteris paribus. An aesthetically indifferent
wetland may be ecologically vital. Of course, if being eco-
logically crucial is itself takento be an aesthetic quality,then
Hargrove'sview becomes trivially self-fulfilling. But once
one absorbs purely ecological characteristicsinto the aes-
thetic sphere, one might just as well pull in economic, reli-
gious, cultural, recreational, scientific, and other features
into the aesthetic fold with predictablyincreasingemptiness
of the aesthetic dimension following suit.
8. Noel Carrollhas elaboratedsuch a view in "On Being
Movedby Nature:Between Religion and NaturalHistory,"in
Landscape,NaturalBeautyand the Arts,eds. S. Kemal and I.
Gaskell, pp. 244-266. See also Godlovitch,"Carlsonon Ap-
preciation."Allen Carlsonrejectsaffect-centeredapproaches
in "Nature,Aesthetic Appreciation, and Knowledge," The
Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism53 (1995): 393-399,
and also in "AppreciatingGodlovitch,"The Journalof Aes-
theticsand Art Criticism55 (1997): 55-57.
9. See Jorge Luis Borges's precautionarytale "Funesthe
Memorious."
10. Mark Sagoff ("Has Nature a Good of its Own?")de-
velops an aesthetics of loving care for nature.See also his
"Zuckerman'sDilemma: A Plea for EnvironmentalEthics,"
Hastings Center Report 21 (1991): 32-40. For a critiqueof
Sagoff's affect-laden approach, see Stan Godlovitch, "Ice
Breakers."However true it may be that "all you need is
love," someone is bound to ask: "How much?"
11. Such a view is latent in the advocacy of "ex-
istence value" in David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Hu-
manism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp.
207-211; Beginning Again (New York:Oxford University
Press, 1993), pp. 114-123; and "WhyPut a Valueon Biodi-
versity,"in Biodiversity(Washington, DC: National Acad-
emy Press, 1988).
12. See Nelson Goodman, "Seven Strictureson Similar-
ity," in Problems and Projects (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1975), pp. 437-446.
13. Rejecting the extremes of species interdependence
and the randomnessof species diversity,E. 0. Wilson states:
"Whether a particular species occurs in a given suitable
habitatis largely due to chance, but for most organisms the
chance is strongly affected by the identity of the species al-
ready present. In such loosely organizedcommunities there
are little players and big players." The Diversity of Life
(HarvardUniversity Press, 1993), p. 164. Similarly, Kunin
and Lawton, in considering the effects on ecosystem func-
tions of biological diversity,challenge on observationaland
The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
experimentalgroundsthe hypothesis that all species make a
contributionto ecosystem processes. "Ingeneral,we suspect
that species-loss will generally produce either no, or idio-
syncratic, changes in ecosystem function." See William E.
Kunin and JohnLawton,"Does BiodiversityMatter?Evalu-
ating the Case for ConservingSpecies" in Biodiversity:A Bi-
ology of NumbersandDifference,ed. Kevin Gaston(Oxford:
Blackwell Science, 1996), p. 297. More of a wait-and-see
line on functional redundancy(also called "functionalsimi-
larity")is urged in Scott Collins and Tracy Benning, "Spa-
tial and TemporalPatternsin FunctionalDiversity,"in Gas-
ton, ed., Biodiversity:A Biology of Numbersand Difference,
pp. 253-280.
14. The interplay between ecological theory and socio-
political ideology is intriguinglytraced in Donald Worster,
Nature'sEconomy,2nd ed. (New York:CambridgeUniver-
sity Press, 1994).
15. See Alien Carlson, "Appreciationand the NaturalEn-
vironment,"and J. Baird Callicott, "The Land Aesthetic."
Currentsite conservationcriteriatend towardecological and
not human-centeredaesthetic criteria;e.g., representative-
ness, species richness, endemism, rarity,vulnerability,and
the like. A comprehensive survey is to be found in Ian F.
Spellerberg,Evaluationand Assessmentfor Conservation.
16. David Ehrenfeld,TheArroganceof Humanism,p. 206.
17. See Godlovitch, "AestheticProtectionism."
18. Ian F. Spellerberg, Evaluation and Assessmentfor
Conservation,p. xiii.
19. See Ian Spellerbergand David Ehrenfeld. Also, Ian
Spellerberg,Biological Evaluationfor Conservation(Lon-
don: Edward Arnold, 1981); William E. Kunin and John
Lawton,"Does BiodiversityMatter?Evaluatingthe Case for
Conserving Species," and R. I. Vane-Wright,"Identifying
Prioritiesfor the Conservationof Biodiversity: Systematic
BiologicalCriteriawithin a Socio-PoliticalFramework,"both
in Gaston, ed., Biodiversity:A Biology of Numbersand Dif-
ference. A fine general introductionto methods and prob-
lems in conservationis to be found in Ian F. Spellerberg,ed.,
ConservationBiology (London: Longman, 1996). More de-
tailed studies include Ecological Knowledge and Environ-
mentalProblem-Solving:Conceptsand Case Studies(Wash-
ington, DC: NationalAcademyPress, 1986); R. J.Berry,ed.,
EnvironmentalDilemmas: Ethics and Decisions (London:
Chapman& Hall, 1993); K. S. Shrader-Frechetteand E. D.
McCoy,Methodin Ecology:Strategiesfor Conservation(New
York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993). Philosophers,too,
have contributedvoluminouslyto the discussion. See, for ex-
ample, Bryan G. Norton, Why Preserve Natural Variety?
(PrincetonUniversityPress, 1987); MarkSagoff, The Econ-
omy of the Earth (New York:CambridgeUniversity Press,
1988); Andrew Brennan, ThinkingAbout Nature (London:
Routledge,1988);EugeneHargrove,Foundationsof Environ-
mental Ethics; Holmes Rolston, Conserving Natural Value
(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1994); The Monist
Issue on the IntrinsicValueof Nature75 (1992); and others.
20. See, for example, Spellerberg'scareful analysis and
critique of D. R. Helliwell's numericalranking system for
woodlands (in D. R. Helliwell, "Prioritiesand Valuesin Na-
ture Conservation,"Journalof EnvironmentalManagement
1 [1973]: 85-127) in Ian F. Spellerberg,Evaluationand As-
sessmentfor Conservation,pp. 70-75.
21. David Ehrenfeld has consistently urged against the
adoption of such scales. See note 11 above.
Godlovitch EvaluatingNatureAesthetically
22. The need for such practicalcriteriahas been furthered
in the name of "appliedenvironmentalaesthetics."See Yrjo?
Sep?anmaa,"AppliedAesthetics," in Art and Beyond: Fin-
nish Approaches to Aesthetics, eds. Ossi Naukkarinenand
Olli Immonen(InternationalInstituteof AppliedAesthetics,
1995), pp. 226-248. Also Yrjo? Sepanmaa, The Beauty of
Environment:A General Model/forEnvironmentalAesthet-
ics (Denton, TX: EnvironmentalEthics Books, 1993). There
areotherways of exertinginfluencefor aestheticpreferencein
the form of applyinggrass-rootssocial and politicalpressure.
When these fail or are subverted,however,there is little op-
portunityfor appeal.
23. Philip Kitcherjustifies what he admits is an idealiza-
tion of scientific cognizers (i.e., scientists) as follows: "Sci-
entists can be idealized as Bayesian decision makers.... The
precision of Bayesianism may be artificial, but when we
need precision we have nothing that is preferableto tolerat-
ing artificiality."Philip Kitcher,TheAdvancementof Science
(New York:Oxford UniversityPress, 1993), p. 294. By par-
ity, where we need precision in aesthetic evaluation(a prag-
matic case for which can be made) we are, by methodologi-
cal elimination, obliged to tolerate the artificiality of the
view thatnaturalaesthetic featuresare precisely rankable.
24. For an interesting discussion of the possibility of an
art metric, see Bruce Vermazen,"ComparingEvaluationsof
Worksof Art," The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism
34 (1975): 7-14. See also Godlovitch, "AestheticJudgment
and Hindsight,"The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism
46 (1987): 75-83.
25. The use of quantitativeor "parametric"(versus"holis-
tic") assessment of naturalaesthetic featuresis nothing new
to landscapearchitectureand planning.For example, see the
helpful overview of methods, scoring techniques, and prob-
lems in J. G. Fabos and A. McGregor,Assessment of Vi-
sual/Aesthetic Landscape Qualities (University of Mel-
bourneCentrefor EnvironmentalStudies, 1979). This is not
to say that any such metric is convincing. Allen Carlson,
"On the Possibility of Quantifying Scenic Beauty,"Land-
scape Planning 4 (1977): 131-172, persuasively challenges
efforts to establish quantitativelymeasurableaestheticcrite-
ria for natureon the basis of formal or publicly preferred
properties. (See also Allen Carlson, "On the Possibility of
Quantifying Scenic Beauty-A Response to Ribe," Land-
125
scape Planning 11 [1984]: 49-65.) That some techniques
misfire, however,does not entail that all must. Further,the
claim that objectivity can be securedwithout quantification
is not pertinentin cases where, withoutquantification,aes-
thetic judgments will simply not be factored into conserva-
tion decisions. The case presentedabove is based on the ex-
pectation that some metric approachcan be established, and
the pragmaticnecessity that something be in place to repre-
sent the aesthetic dimension in conservationplanning. Fur-
ther, aesthetic considerationsmust be seen to complement
and not merely to duplicate or absorb ecological criteria.
That the two dimensionsare distinct is certainly assumed in
various discussions of value undertakenby ecologists. See
Ehrenfeld,Spellerberg,Kunin and Lawton, and others.
26. There is something contentless and unhelpful in ap-
peals to the beauty of nature simpliciter in discussions of
conservation. Such a flaw is present in Roger Paden, "Two
Types of Preservation Policies," in The Environmental
Ethics and Policy Book, eds. D. VanDeVeerand C. Pierce
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth,1994), pp. 523-529. My appeal
to the mysterious in nature (Stan Godlovitch, "Ice Break-
ers")is equallycontentless and unhelpful.The same goes for
appeals to affection, closeness, reverence, love, care, awe,
engagement, respect, nurture,and the like, all of which in
fact apply variablyin the world and not categorically.These
are all multi-valuedand not Yes/No binary dimensions and
so invite representationin a scalar scheme of measurement.
The same holds for integrity, complexity, health, stability,
biodiversity, and other ecological desiderata. To create a
basis for reasonedchoice about ecosystems, ecologists and
others consistently call for making these notions opera-
tional, i.e., determinableby public measurement. See, for
example, the interestingdiscussion of biodiversityas a "con-
cept," as a "measurableentity" and as a "social/political
construct"in Kevin Gaston,"Whatis Biodiversity?"in Gas-
ton, ed., Biodiversity:A Biology of Numbersand Difference,
pp. 1-9. Also, KristinShrader-Frechette,"PracticalEcology
and Foundationsfor EnvironmentalEthics,"The Journalof
Philosophy92 (1995): 621-635.
27. Ehrenfeld,The Arroganceof Humanism,p. 204.
28. My thanks to Arnold Berleant and Allen Carlson for
their many helpful editorial comments. And, of course, to
Tom and Karenfor anothergreat day in the woods.