ASEAN Political Security Community and the Case of the South China Sea: A RulesBased Community of Shared Values

and Norms as a Solvency?

Abstract This work is going to focus on the South China Sea aspect of the ASEAN Political Security Community. This writing will basically argue on how norms in general would not be enough to solve the problem, being seen from the realist point of view and from the current development of the facts. It will then argue further on how, the norms specifically promoted by Southeast Asia, the DOC, would not and has not helped a lot since its birth at 2002. Having assessed that, and other relevant facts and argumentation, this writing would then in the end provide a recommendation on what Indonesia should do regarding the case, taking into account the possible relevant development in the future.

ASEAN Political Security Community and the Case of the South China Sea: A RulesBased Community of Shared Values and Norms as a Solvency? 1

To achieve the target of creating an ASEAN Community by 2015 is one of the dreams envisaged in the ASEAN Vision 2020. One of the pillars of ASEAN Community 2015 is the ASEAN Political-Security Community, which blueprint lays out the tangible targets in which when it is achieved we could proudly refer ourselves as having succeed in the steps of creating a security community. These tangible targets are clustered into three notion that are referred to as the three characteristics that envisages the ASEAN Political-Security Community, they are that ASEAN shall be: (1) A Rules-based Community of shared values and norms; (2) A Cohesive, Peaceful, Stable and Resilient Region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security; and (3) A Dynamic and Outward-looking Region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world. One of the matters that are referred to in the blueprint is matter regarding South China Sea. These matters upon South China Sea were generally stated under the first characteristic of how ASEAN being a rules-based community of shared values and norms. As a matter of fact, South China Sea was specifically referred in one general section under the first characteristic (section A.2) and was elaborated more in the derivative section of A.2.3. This publication is going to talk about the South-China Sea aspect of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. Departing from explanation on how South China Sea being very important for surrounding states thus can be, and has been, a trigger for interstate conflicts, this paper will then develop its argumentation on how a legally binding norm is needed for a proper dispute settlement. In explaining, she will also considers the realism perspective upon seeing international norms, and relate it particularly to the case of South China Sea. Lastly, this writing is going to provide recommendation on how ASEAN, particularly Indonesia, should act regarding the matter of South China Sea, an important matter that unfortunately wasnt much concerned by the ASEAN Political Security Community, despite its evident urgency, having only one section referring to it.

This publication is the work of Dian Aditya Ning Lestari (Diku), a third year student from International Relation Department, Universitas Indonesia. A soon to be prominent IR Scholar. This publication is for her dreams.

South China Sea: The Strategic Waters According to the International Hydrographical Bureau, South China Sea is defined as the body of water stretching from south-westerly to north easterly direction, bordered in the South by 3 South Latitude between Sumatra and Kalimantan (Karimata Straits) and in North by the Strait of Taiwan from the northern tip of Taiwan to the Fukien coast of China. It covers about 4 million sq. kilometers of waters. 2 The seabed of South China Sea is rich in natural resources. In Indo-Malay region alone there are more than 2500 fish species, making South China Sea a very potential target of exploitation for fishery industry. The seabed of South China Sea, too, is expected to be a source of extensive hydrocarbon and fossil oil. The exploitation conducted by Malaysia and Indonesia in their own continental shelves, as well as by the Philippines in the Reed Banks, give credence to such expectation3. On the political colors, the states surrounding the South China Sea are markedly different: from the Communist northern coastlines of the PRC, Vietnam, and Cambodia -- with all its internal or intra-mural conflicts and rivalries, to the non-communist southern and eastern coastlines of Thailand, Malaysia Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and Taiwan4. These countries are coping with the raising energy demand, in which in 2020, it is estimated that the demand for energy in South East Asia will rise to 74 mm TOE 5. Though the rise is but only 1,2% of the total energy demand worldwide 6, we are not to forget the massive need of the rapidly growing industry of China. The South China Sea is largely surrounded by independent and ideologically different countries.7 When all these countries are in dire need of energy, it does not need a complicated way of thinking to conclude that the potential for conflict is high. Especially, when there was already a long history of conflicts between surrounding states. These surrounding countries are namely Vietnam and China, on the energy-rich Islands of Paracel; Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and China on the Islands of Spratly. The conflict was one of those that involves military capability as its means, having the South Sea Fleet (SSF) been used by China to capture the
2

Hasjim Djalal, Indonesia and The Law of The Sea, (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), p. 365. 3 Ibid, p. 366. 4 Ibid, p. 367. 5 Phinyada Atchatavivan, ASEAN Energy Cooperation: An Opportunity for Regional Sustainable Energy Development, page 6, downloaded from http://www.pon.org/downloads/ien15.8.Atchatavivan.pdf 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid, p. 366

Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974, and to occupy a number of islands in the Spratlys Archipelago in 1988.8 It is then not exaggerating to say that the political set-up and the history of conflict the South China Sea, followed by the rising demand of energy, and could lead to another conflict.

Norms Evolving Around the Dispute The surrounding countries, though, are not effortless, when it comes to assuring the peace and stability in the region. Most of these efforts resulted in various international agreements circa 1990 2000s. Among others, is the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in 1992, the adoption in 2002 of the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). This DOC was one of the important referent to ASEAN and its will to shape and share norms, particularly regarding creating a stable and peaceful region without any conflicts between states amongst the region9 or adjacent to the region. It was stated under the A.2 section of the blueprint which can be seen as follows:
A.2. Shaping and Sharing of Norms 16. ASEAN promotes regional norms of good conduct and solidarity, in accordance with the key principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter. In this context, ASEAN also continues to uphold the Treaty of Amity and Co operation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the SEANWFZ Treaty and other key agreements, as well as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea.10

However, after signing the DOC, the parties have not ceased activities that complicate the situation.11 Several claims were still made and some complains are still given by a party over the others perceived violation. For example, in 2011 the Aquino administration has laid a protest on at least six incidents, including Reed Bank incident, involving alleged Chinese intrusion into waters within the Philippines 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone. 12

8 9

Sourced from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/south-sea.htm In which, is an important aim of creating a security community, and an end phase of being one. Further explanation, read Amitav Acharya, A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia, Journal of Strategic Studies, diakses dari http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402399508437610, p.176 10 ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, June 2009, p. 6 11 Tran Truong Thuy, Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Security and Cooperation, CSIC Southeast Asia Program Research Paper, June 30 2011, accessed from csis.org/files/publication/110629_Thuy_South_China_Sea.pdf, p. 1 12 Ibid, p. 21

Seeing the example, it was clear that actions that supposedly are violating the 2002 DOC are still being conducted by several parties, in this case, the strong China. According to the CSIS Southeast Asian Research Paper released on June 30th 2011, there was report of the Philippine military in the same month that a Chinese surveillance vessel and navy ships were seen unloading building materials and erecting posts in the vicinity of Iroquois Reef and Amy Douglas Bank an uninhabited undersea hill claimed by the Philippines about 230 kilometers from south-western Palawan province. 13 If report of Philippine military is correct, it is clear that China seriously violates the DOC 2002, in article 5 of which states that The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.14

The Realist Version of the World and the South China Sea The action in which China has done in this past few years confirmed true the realists version of the world: that never shall institution work things out between states. Realism encompasses five propositions. First, states are the major actors in world affairs. 15 Second, the international environment severely penalizes states if they fail to protect their vital interests or if they pursue objectives beyond their means; hence, states are "sensitive to costs" and behave as unitary- rational agents.16 Third, international anarchy is the principal force shaping the motives and actions of states.17 Fourth, states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the face of

13

Citated by Tran Truong Thuy (2011), from Philippines accuses China of serious violations in South China Sea http://globalnation.inquirer.net/3205/philippines-accuses-china-of-%E2%80%98serious-violations%E2%80%99-inspratlys 14 Citated by Tran Truong Thuy (2011), from http://www.asean.org/13163.htm 15 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.10 citated by Grieco in Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 485-507, published by: The MIT Press, accessed from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787 25/10/2010 07:34 16 Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 331., citated by Grieco, in Ibid. 17 Waltz, Man, State, and War, pp. 224-38; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 79-128; Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 27, 54-87, 129; Aron, Peace and War, pp. 6-10., citated by Grieco in Ibid.

common interests.18 Finally, international institutions affect the prospects for cooperation only marginally. 19 The prepositions that the author would like to highlight here is the last, reason being that it serves as a theoretical explanation on how norms formed by international institution is never totally effective to settle dispute, nor to eliminate possible disputes tendency to zero. Shall norms can, never will China perform such act that can be considered as violating the COC. Explaining more on the reason why, we are to look at the fourth and third preposition of the realist. The anarchic nature of the international system shapes motives and action of countries like China to pursue whats best for them. Surely whats best for a state in such an anarchic condition where their security is not in assurance is to pursue capabilities and power. South China Sea, as explained by the author above, consists of energy beyond a state like Chinas dream. It is estimated that the oil reserves could reach 2330 billion tons, accounting for onethird of Chinas aggregate oil and gas resources,20 and large amount of energy that shall contributes significantly to the power of the state as it fuels the economic and military capabilities of the state. Linked indeed, to the fourth preposition on how states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, and are predisposed towards conflict and competition though there might be some chances of common interest that shall be dismissed. On the reason why state would dismiss common interest, Grieco lays out the concept of relative gain. The notion is that state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that partners are achieving, or are likely to achieve, relatively greater gains.21 Chinas action indeed signify how it sharply limits its commitment to a cooperative arrangement targeted norms such as DOC, but in this case it is not particularly true that other states having relatively greater gains. Objectively speaking non of
18 19

Aron, Peace and War, p. 5; Gilpin, "Political Realism," p. 30, citated by Grieco in Ibid. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 115-16; see also Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 512; and Stanley Hoffmann, "International Organization and the International System," in Leland M. Goodrich and David A. Kay, eds., International Organization: Politics and Process (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 50, citated by Grieco in Ibid. 20 Lee Lai To & Chen Shaofeng, China and Joint Development in the South China Sea: An Energy security Perspective, In Security and International Politics in the SCS, ed. Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers, 2009, 160, citated by Tran in Tran Truong Thuy, Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Security and Cooperation, CSIC Southeast Asia Program Research Paper, June 30 2011, accessed from csis.org/files/publication/110629_Thuy_South_China_Sea.pdf 21 Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 485-507, published by: The MIT Press, accessed from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787 25/10/2010 07:34 , p. 499

the other signatories of the DOC are stronger in China, both in economic or military fields. None of the other signatories, too, have relatively greater gains. As a stronger state it is China who has the ability to act accordingly to its interest while other states can only try to use DOC as a mean to not let China to. Can Rules-Based Community of Shared Values and Norms Save the Day? No. That is the answer proposed by the author. Reason being that the rules that are to be the basis of the dispute settlement are not enough: not strong enough, not binding enough, and have not the ability to make its so-called signatories commit. Other than that it was because of the community of the shared values and norms do not exist. True that is, to say that ASEAN is going that way. Too, by having APT (ASEAN+3) consisting Japan, Korea, and China in this certain wing, ASEAN is trying to enlarge what to be perceived as a community, further northeast. The ARF was too its instrument of being a leader in tackling matters in Asia-Pacific. Yet to be blatantly speaking never did such comprehensive-approach of security regime success in creating any norms that could be strong enough to be a basis for an effective dispute settlement, as such approach was focusing mainly on exchanging information to eliminate suspicion a.k.a. security dilemma as a cause of war from the inside (of the region). 22 On ASEANs effort in creating and forming this South China Sea-referent norm, the same characteristic of the above-explained DOC norms being not strong enough to make a state commit and being intentionally made to not make states surrender part of their authority can be tracked again in the derivative of the previous section.

The derivative section was:

A.2.3. Ensure full implementation of the DOC for peace and stability in the South China Sea Actions: Continue ASEANs current practice of close consultation among Member States to achieve full implementation of the DOC; Explore and undertake cooperative activities identified in the DOC and eventually explore other co-operative measures on the basis of close consultation among the member countries, while respecting sovereignty and integrity of each other;

22

Read more on comprehensive security in S.D Muni, Comprehensive Security: South Asian Case, IDS Singapore January 2002, and Eunsook Chung: Cooperative Security Regimes.

Carry out on a regular basis the overview of the process of implementation of the DOC, thus ensuring timely and proper conducts of the Parties in the South China Sea in accordance with the DOC; and Work towards the adoption of a regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).23

Declaration of Conduct of Parties that is often referred as the norms surrounding countries should use to settle disputes in the South China Sea. Yet to be blatantly speaking, the DOC is basically a mere political document,24 in which, according to the statement of an Indonesian Foreign Ministry Advisor in 2011, is aimed to direct the activities of parties in South China Sea to lean to cooperation rather than conflicts. 25 Stated in the third perambulatory clause of the code of conduct, that the signatories are: COGNIZANT of the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China for the enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity in the region,26 which represent the overall sense of what the document is basically about. It is stated by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry Officer that the declaration is binding27, in the sense that the states are to commit themselves as to the rules. But to talk in a more realistic way, in which realist does not believe anyhow, any international document could not be used as a mean of solving anything unless it is legally binding. That is why one of the targets of the DOC is that it could in as near as possible future be transformed into a legally binding Code of Conduct.28 Other signatories could then refer it as a basis to stop Chinas harassment of their territory of exclusive economic zone, but then again it is questionable whether China would ever sign the legally binding treaties, to see it from the realism perspective. Shall there ever be a legally binding code of conduct, it is questionable whether or not the content will consist any that would hamper a stronger state from its will. Taking a look at the example of the current DOC, none of the clauses tackle the very root of the conflict that actually needs to be well-defined: the problem of borders. When it
23 24

ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, June 2009, p. 7 Which means that it is hardly binding. Referred too by Tan, in in Tran Truong Thuy, Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Security and Cooperation, CSIC Southeast Asia Program Research Paper, June 30 2011, accessed from csis.org/files/publication/110629_Thuy_South_China_Sea.pdf, page 3. 25 Citated from the statement of Derry Arman, an Indonesian Foreign Ministry Officer, in Workshop Kajian dan Penulisan Ilmiah ASEAN Indonesian Foreign Policy Review, Depok, 28th of September 2011, AJB FISIP, Universitas Indonesia. 26 The Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in South China Sea, Pnom Penh, Kingdom of Cambodia, 2002, downloaded from http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm 27 Derry Arman, an Indonesian Foreign Ministry Officer, in Workshop Kajian dan Penulisan Ilmiah ASEAN Indonesian Foreign Policy Review, Depok, 28th of September 2011, AJB FISIP, Universitas Indonesia. 28 As shown by the states intention as reported in http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/11/10/insight-thesouth-china-sea-and-asean-china-relations.html. This was also the target of the APSC regarding the South China Sea DOC.

comes to matters regarding dispute, all that the DOC has is its elaboration of the fifth article, which stated that:
... Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and confidence between and among them, including: a. holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between their defense and military officials; b. ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in distress; c. notifying, on a voluntary basis, other Parties concerned of any impending joint/combined military exercise; and d. exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information.29

To be talking in the realist point of view again, fact that strong states such as China would join in for cooperation with other state is that, it is because the cooperation allows them to not perform commitment. The author then sees that the nowadays trend of international agreements in which strong states such as China are willing to enter, is when it does not require them to surrender, not even a tiny bit, of its authority. To highlight from the above sentences, wording such as on a voluntary basis would be enough to show how the DOC binds nothing, and, the author worries, would not even be a strong basis for any effective legally binding COC. The author worries even more then, that never shall Southeast Asian states have any document that it could refer to claim their rights in the South China Sea.

A More Well-Developed Norms: Can UNCLOS be the Answer? It is dangerous of course, if Southeast Asian states have nothing to refer to legally defend itself from China. To have the argument on how they should actually develop military capabilities30 (to counter China) aside, ASEAN states could use some internationallyacknowledged clause to be more safe, and by more safe here the author means having a
29

The Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in South China Sea, Pnom Penh, Kingdom of Cambodia, 2002, downloaded from http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm 30 An argument in which derived from the realists balance of power theory that distribution of power is what matters in keeping the stability of international system. By stability here we refer to a condition in which there are no conflicts between states, which, to the proponents of balance of power theory, would happen if (1) two strongest states have respectively the same military and economic capability, or (2) each of the states in the region have respectively similar military and economic capability. The one is the preposition of bipolar stability and the latter is the of multipolar stability. For further explanation read Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1993), p. 31, John John J. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Chapter 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 71-88, can also be accessed from http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199298334/dunne_chap04.pdf, and on the explaination of multipolar stabilty read Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (1979).

justified reason to keep China away from their waters and secure their rights for energy. Of course, then, the justified basis should be consisted of clauses that could be directly referred to when solving disputes regarding borders. One of those that the Southeast Asian countries can use is the well-known United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS 31). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas has been used by UN member states as a basis of settling disputes, for it has been ratified by most of the worldwide states that are bordered by the sea. Even so there are still obstacles to the implementation of this law to settle the ASEAN China South China Sea dispute, for as a great power China is still being dismissive to the UNCLOS (as they keep harassing other countries, for example the Philippines, exclusive economic zone) 32. The U-Shaped line they claimed, is, as the matter of fact, being treated by them as an own territory being under its national integrity. 33 In 2009 the United Nations rejected their claims, 34 reason being that their arguments, one of them was that the historical document of Nan Zhou Yi Wu Zhi (Records of Strange Things in the South) from the era of The Three Kingdoms (220-265 A.D) once referred the Islands of Spratly and Paracel was a set of a magnetic stones which appearance can be seen in the south,35 (thus they justify how China has a right to the Islands as the Chinese found them first 36), was considered unacceptable. The rejection of the UN does not mark an end of the dispute. As explained before from then until 2011, aggressions towards the maritime borders of adjacent ASEAN states are still being conducted by China. Can UNCLOS then save the day? The answer is, can, only if the states are willing to take the steps of having a tribunal dispute settlement as their means of ending the conflict. Yet the trend is that such tribunal dispute settlement mechanism is not that
31

Consisted of UNCLOS I, II, and III, UNCLOS is the current most comprehensive international norms regarding borders, definition, and dispute settlement of any that is related to the sea. Matters regarding territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, international waters, and sea lines of communication is regulated in the UNCLOS. 32 This thought was also presented by the author in Astari Damia Ghassani, Aswin Syarief Prasetyo, Dian Aditya Ning Lestari, M. Iman Usman, LIMITASI UNCLOS DALAM PENYELESAIAN SENGKETA KEPULAUAN SPRATLYS DAN PARACELS DI LAUT CINA SELATAN, presented as a final paper to the Dinamika Normatif dalam Hubungan Internasional Class, Departement of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Indonesia, 2010. 33 See appendix 1. 34 Hasjim Djalal, Indonesia and The Law of The Sea, (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), p. 370. 35 Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Island, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International: 1996), p. 59 36 In which, (history) can be of a consideration in deciding in international law. More details read the ICJ publication on the case of Sipadan and Ligitan http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/102/7714.pdf

popular in ASEAN as they prefer to settle things in a bilateral, government to government manner 37. Therefore it is hard even for UNCLOS to be a settlement when the states do not want it to be. Supporting much the first preposition of the realist, that state is, and indeed, the most important actor, or maybe even, seeing how the argument has developed, the only important actors, when it comes to international norms.

The Future of South China Sea Dispute and the Possibility of Conflict: The Need for Indonesias Leadership It is to be known that the South China Sea is of the most strategic waterways in the world. For Japan, South China Sea and its most important approaches, namely the straits of Malacca and Singapore are extremely important for its economy and strategic lifelines since more than 80% of its oil imports are transported through the waterways. At the same time, the waterways are also very important to Japan for shipping in its trade with South-East Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe38. United States, too, has always been interested in the area because it offers the shortest route from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and because it is essential for the movement of the United States fleets, either for its own global strategy or for the purpose of defending its allies in the region39 Indonesia is the biggest country in Southeast Asia that is most-likely to be a great power. The 2007 report of the Goldman Sachs elaborated in the Global Economic Paper shows the projection of how that in 2050, Indonesia will be the next world's largest economies along with Brazil, Russia, India, and China.404142 Soon, like China now, Indonesia would be able to transform the economic capability into a military one, a precondition of being the great power o
37

Happens many times in ASEAN, having bilateral diploacy as an aswer. Yet it never actually solve any problem significantly, as the negotiations mainly results in normative statements that cant be considered tangible nor binding. The Indonesia-Malaysia tense of immigrant workers and the Indonesia-Singapore issue of smoke, shall be an example. 38 Hasjim Djalal, Indonesia and The Law of The Sea, (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995) p. 368. 39 Ibid, pp. 368-369. 40 Dominic Wilson, Raluca Dragusanu, The Expanding Middle: The Exploding World Middle Class and Falling Global Inequality, Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No:107, p. 4, accessed from GS Global Economic Website, Economic Research from Goldman 360, at https://360.gs.com, 19 December 2010, 16:45. 41 To be more detailed it was actually Indonesia and the other Next Eleven (or N-11)Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, and VietnamIn making the projection, the bank chose considered their promising outlooks for investment and future growth with macroeconomic stability, political maturity, openness of trade and the quality of education as criteria. Below chart will show the comparison 42 See appendix 2

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the region (to talk in the realism language). As a great power Indonesia will be one able to determine the rule f the game, in which one of the game is matters regarding the sovereignty over South China Sea. Though it is not now that Indonesia could become the great power we referred to, Indonesia should start its leadership from now on. Having the theme of ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations 43 shows enough of Indonesias willingness to initiate and be the leader in many of the ASEANs effort in engaging with the global community worldwide, and contributes in creating a solution to many of the worlds contemporary problem. The Bali Concord III that was just signed at November 17 2011 in the 19 th ASEAN Summit in Bali, would also be significant to Indonesias leadership as this Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community within the Global Community of Nations (Bali Concord II) would become a blueprint and a common foundation for the ten member countries for ASEAN to increase the regional grouping's contribution to the solution of various global issues.
44

The Author hopes that South China Sea

would also be one of the focuses of this cause, as the urgency is dire and the current norms are unable to solve anything. For now, Indonesia can breathe freely as the existence of a global village of energy companies drilling in South China Sea such as Exxon Mobil (U.S), BP (U.K), PGS (Norway), Chevron (US), Pogo (US), ONGC (India), Indemisu (Japan), Pearl Energy (UK), Knoc (South Korea) and Gazprom (Russia) would hamper China for doing anything aggressive. 45 Though there was report on how China was being quite threatening to the activities of this MNCs, the existence of these global interest would make U.S.A and its allies defend the South China Sea at all cost. ASEAN, as a region that is perceived by the author as an ally to all, should be led by Indonesia, in efforts of settling the South China Sea dispute now and eliminating the possibilities of conflict forever.

(***)

43 44

http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/News.aspx?IDP=4159&l=id http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v5/newsworld.php?id=627675 45 Tran in Tran Truong Thuy, Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Security and Cooperation, CSIC Southeast Asia Program Research Paper, June 30 2011, accessed from csis.org/files/publication/110629_Thuy_South_China_Sea.pdf, p.9.

11

Appendix 1. Map of Chinas claimant of South China Sea being under its sovereignty46. The map shows Chinas U-Shaped line that included the Islands of Spratlys and Paracels as the part of its most southern province.

46

Hasjim Djalal, Indonesia and The Law of The Sea, (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), p. 370.

12

2. The projection of Goldman Sachs Investment Bank on the world GDP in 2050. 47

47

Dominic Wilson, Raluca Dragusanu, The Expanding Middle: The Exploding World Middle Class and Falling Global Inequality, Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No:107, p. 4, accessed from GS Global Economic Website, Economic Research from Goldman 360, at https://360.gs.com, 19 December 2010, 16:45.

13