American Military University SPST613 Communication Satellites

Argument for the Non-proliferation of Space Warfare

BY Carl Lee Tolbert Student ID # 4172687

6 April 2012

CONTENTS

Introduction3 Space Warfare Defined..3 Inevitability Thesis.................4 Active Players.5 Inevitability Thesis Rejected.................7 Preventive Measures..8 Conclusion......9 Notes..........11 Works Cited......13

Introduction The proliferation of weapons in space has been a subject of discussion since the days of Wernher von Braun, who used the subject to gain military funding.1 The discussion still exists today, with very specific arguments for and against it. This paper is an argument against the proliferation of space-based weapons in either offensive or defensive forms. The argument for proliferation is primarily supported by a concept called the inevitability thesis, which overlooks the ramifications of several aspects of proliferation, including basic economics and the dependence of states on space infrastructure. Furthermore, the inevitability thesis does not address the asymmetrical proliferation of nuclear weapons by China and Russia. Space Warfare Defined Space warfare can be broken down into three complementary categories. The first category involves assets located in space in the form of offensive space-to-ground or space-to-space weapons. The second category involves earth-to-space weapons. The third category is the most debated, including established or future assets that are militarized, such as military communications satellites. This paper uses the first two categories to define space warfare. Pundits argue that ocean crossing missiles that enter space during delivery demonstrate that space-based weapons already exist.2 This idea is akin to stating the jet liners used in the 9/11 terrorist attacks were weaponized based on how they were used by terrorists. Pundits also argue that military satellites have residual and/or dedicated weaponization capabilities.3 This alternative argument can be dismissed as the insurance policy or deterrent for the current lack of escalation in space in the form of categories one or two.4
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The definition of space warfare also ignores the concepts of jamming or hacking space infrastructures. Jamming of communication devices has occurred since World War Two and is currently part of the arsenals of all modern militaries.5 Hacking is also ignored in the definition of space warfare because the primary targets are computers and control systems and space-based assets may or may not be affected. However, the Pentagon has recently determined that hacking causing damage, death, and destruction will be interpreted as an act of war.6 Inevitability Thesis The inevitability thesis is the belief that space will inevitably become weaponized, regardless of nations attempting to prevent the proliferation.7 One basis for this thesis is that human nature will guide nations in empire building, as can be seen from the weaponization of land, sea, and air and humans primal instincts for warfare.8 Another reason the inevitability thesis is pervasive is the belief that space is a natural extension of the existing air warfare infrastructure currently existing in modern war-faring nations.9 Others state that adding space warfare assets allows nations to gain an upper hand in warfare superiority.10 Last is the economics of space, with billions of dollars of communications satellites (owned primarily by civilians) that require protection by nations defending their precious and expensive cargo.11 The inevitability thesis is defined by all these elements or a combination of them when used by advocates of proliferation. These arguments seem valid on the surface, but have inherent weaknesses when viewed through the lens of economics and repercussions, which are described later in the paper.
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Active Players The current players (nations) involved in the debate over space-based warfare are the US, Russia, and China. North Korea and Iran will not be discussed because of their current lack of offensive and defensive space-based capabilities; however, their advancing technology could soon make them active players. The players will be described with a current view of inevitability, plans and actions, and nuclear arsenal. United States of America US Air Force Spokesmen Col. John E. Hytan summarizes the view of the US by stating that conflict in space is inevitable because no frontier or territory occupied by humans has ever been free of conflict.12 The 2006 National Space Policy (NSP) increased the worldwide perception that the US was indeed striving to develop space-based weapon platforms as an extension of the Bush Doctrine of preemptive military action; however, the current NSP has toned down the language to the wellused right of defending national security.13 To date, the seeming adoption of the inevitability thesis by the US has not precipitated the movement of strategic, institutional, and economic assets in the direction of proliferation of any magnitude.14 There has been no real movement in that direction. Prior to the end of Cold War, the US conducted 33 antisatellite weapon (ASAT) tests in the development of the technology.15 At the end of the Cold War, Washington and Moscow agreed to constrain space warfare, following the guidelines set out by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (abandoned by the Bush Administration in 2002).16, 17

In 1978, the Carter administration attempted to ban the use of ASAT technology, but did not garner the support necessary to complete the treaty.18 At one point during the height of the Cold War, the US had almost 32,000 nuclear warheads stockpiled. With treaties and drawdowns, the amount today is closer to 10,000.19 Russia Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov dismisses the idea of inevitability by categorically rejecting any militarization of space for Russia or any nation.20 The key understanding is that postCold War Russia has a vested interest in non-military commercial launch infrastructure, including the international space station, as well as in multilateral cooperation with other nations, including the US, for space ventures.21 In 2002, economic opportunities led Russia to approach the UN to seek a moratorium on any space-based weapons.22 During the Cold War, like the US, the Soviet Union also tested a great deal of ASAT weapon platformsa total of 20, versus the 33 performed by the US.23 Also like the US, Russia has constrained themselves to abide by treaties and has curtailed ASAT testing. Unlike the US, Russias nuclear arsenal has reduced to roughly 8000 nuclear warheads, with limited capability of new production.24 Even with a military budget only 5% less than that of the US, Russia would have a difficult time moving back in the direction of nuclear warhead manufacturing. Coupled with the anti-space proliferation sentiment, further reservations are based on fear of the US military moving into space is obsessed by Russian generals and politicians that Russia would not be able to do anything about it.25

China China, unlike Russia, takes its planning as seriously as the US does. The idea is if the US believes that the inevitability thesis is valid, then so does China.26 In 2002, Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Zonghuai declared that China would not remain indifferent to space weaponization by any nation.27 China made headlines and shocked the world on January 11th, 2007, when it fired a missile at an obsolete Chinese weather satellite and destroyed it.28 It flexed its ASAT technology to the world and denied that the test was indeed an ASAT test. For many nations, the denial of the testing was more troubling than the actual test.29 The motivation behind the test is still unknown; the outcome, however, may hurt the economic viability of commercial space rather than leading other nations to view China as an equal player in space weaponization.30 Many feel that the US missed an opportunity to offer a treaty to Russia and China that would ban ASAT technology, instead choosing to non-committedly retain the right to deploy ASATs itself.31 At roughly 400, China has a significantly lower stockpile of nuclear warheads.32 Chinas approach to readiness is also vastly different from the fact that the warheads are not installed into the delivery device.33 It is, however, continuing to develop different methods, including a solid fuel rocket design that does not need to be fueled, like its American and Russian counterparts.34 Inevitability Thesis Rejected

The basic problem with anything being defined as inevitable is that such a definition ignores any attempt to prevent that event from occurring.35 If this belief is pervasive in citizens and elected representatives, then the belief becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 36 The two other problems are less esoteric. The first is the current economics of space and the second is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The US owns approximately 400 of the 900 current satellites in orbit around the earth, at a price tag of $123 billion dollars; the US military has 83 of these satellites.37 Space is an economic power house beneficial to all countries. Outside of a rogue nation, the three big players would not want to upset the balance of power based on the economic turmoil it would cause. This is expressly presented by Russia and its current economic climate. The proliferation of nuclear weapons has dwindled considerably since the end of the Cold War. All three active players agree that any move into space by one player would provoke a change in the nuclear capabilities of the other two. The idea of nuclear proliferation in response to space weaponization can be dismissed by some based on Russias stance on warhead manufacturing and Chinas weak readiness and its small number of warheads active in its arsenal; however, how many nuclear strikes constitute a threat to humanity? Preventive Measures Obviously, diplomacy and multilateral cooperation are the primary keys for de-escalation. The argument can be made that diplomacy takes a great deal of time and effort, and the UN Security Council often vetoes any sanctions pertaining to member states that break or bend the rules. The US can change its designs to make its satellites less susceptible to attacks and possible damage without falling into the space warfare category.
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There are several strategies that can be instituted to make satellites more defensive. Making satellites smaller (as the current trend is already heading) will not only reduce cost, but will make satellite detection systems less likely to locate and target specific satellites.38 Deception plays a critical part in modern warfare, and intelligence agencies need to assume that some systems have different critical values and provide misinformation to competing agencies. An advisory targeting a satellite it perceives as high value when it is not would be the outcome of such misinformation.39 Lastly, utilizing redundancy for critical systems is paramount. Meaning, if there are several redundancies, then the nation can survive satellite damage on another of the same system design.40 It is important to note that the compromise of a satellite involves not only the satellite located in space. The satellite is part of a system with uplinks, downlinks, and a command and control system located on the ground.41 These parts of the overall system must also be protected because attacks may not come in the form of an ASAT that directly targets the satellite in question. Conclusion It is perfectly acceptable for nations to have the stance that if their nation or assets are attacked, they will defend themselves. This is epitomized by the current NSP, which is published for the world to see. The key takeaway from this paper is the idea of managing perception. If any government wants to promote the inevitability thesis as the basis of an argument, then the economic and potential nuclear proliferation potential must also be addressed. The more that the economic force generated by the peaceful use of space and the repercussions of nuclear proliferation are promoted, the more the national and international perception changes, repudiating the so-called inevitability.

NOTES

10

Columba Peoples, "Assuming the Inevitable? Overcoming the Inevitability of Outer Space Weaponization and Conflict." Contemporary Security Policy 29, no. 3 (2008): 502520, International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed September 13, 2011).
2

Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-Hyman, Space Weapons and Proliferation, Nonproliferation Review 12, no. 2 (2005): 323341, Routledge, EBSCOhost (accessed April 5, 2011), 325.
3

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 326.

Siobhan Gorman and Julie Barnes, "Cyber Combat: Act of War," Wall Street Journal, May 20, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304563104576355623135782718.html (accessed April 7, 2012).
7

Columba Peoples, 504. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 505. Ibid., 506. Ibid., 507.

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1 15

Michael Krepon, Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive toward Antisatellite Weapons, Foreign Affairs (2001), Council on Foreign Affairs, EBSCOhost (accessed April 5, 2011), 2.
1 16

Ibid. Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-Hyman, 239. Michael Krepon, 2. Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-Hyman, 328. Columba Peoples, 511. Ibid. Ibid. Michael Krepon, 2. Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-Hyman, 328. Columba Peoples, 511. Ibid., 507. Ibid., 508.

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2 28

Peter A. Buxbaum, Arms Race in Space, Defense Technology International 2, no. 1 (2008):1, EBSCOhost (accessed April 5, 2011).
2 29

Ibid. Columba Peoples, 509. Ibid., 510. Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-Hyman, 330. Ibid. Ibid. Columba Peoples, 514. Ibid.

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3 37

Scott A. Weston, "Examining Space Warfare," Air & Space Power Journal 23, no. 1 (2009): 7382, International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed September 13, 2011).
3 38

M. V. Smith, "Spacepower and Warfare," JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, no. 60 (2011): 4245, International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed September 13, 2011).
3 39

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

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WORKS CITED
Buxbaum, Peter A. Arms Race in Space. Defense Technology International 2, no. 1. (2008). EBSCOhost (accessed April 5, 2011). Gorman, Siobhan and Julie Barnes. "Cyber Combat: Act of War." Wall Street Journal, May 20, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304563104576355623135782718.html (accessed April 7, 2012). Krepon, Michael Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive toward Antisatellite Weapons. Foreign Affairs (2001), Council on Foreign Affairs. EBSCOhost (accessed April 5, 2011).

Krepon, Michael and Michael Katz-Hyman. Space Weapons and Proliferation. Nonproliferation Review 12, (2005): 323341. Routledge. EBSCOhost (accessed April 5, 2011). Peoples, Columba. "Assuming the Inevitable? Overcoming the Inevitability of Outer Space Weaponization and Conflict." Contemporary Security Policy 29, no. 3 (2008): 502520. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center. EBSCOhost (accessed September 13, 2011).

no. 2

Smith, M. V. "Spacepower and Warfare." JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, no. 60 (2011): 4245. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center. EBSCOhost (accessed September 13, 2011). Weston, Scott A. "Examining Space Warfare." Air & Space Power Journal 23, no. 1 (2009): 7382. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center. EBSCOhost (accessed September 13, 2011).