Conflict

Conflict Resolution & Peace Studies
An Introductory Handbook
Editor
Jayadeva Uyangoda
Center for Policy Research and Analysis (CEPRA)

University of Colombo
in association with Eriedrich Ebert Stiftung Colombo office
December 2000
FES PUBLICATION 43
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK
Editor Cover Design
: Jayadeva Uyangoda : Dietmar Kneitschel
Copyright FES, 2000
The views and ideas expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of FES.
ISBN 95-7-032-X
Publisher: F
E STIFRJNG
4, Adams Avenue, Colombo 4 Sri Lanka
Table of Contents
Contributors Foreword 1. Introduction 2. Defining Negotiation Dietmar Kneitschel Jayadeva Uyangoda Jayadeva Uyangoda N. Selvakkumaran Jayadeva Uyangoda Jayadeva Uyangoda Laksiri Fernando S. I. Keethaponcalan
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vi - viii 1 3
3. Negotiation in Conflicts 4. Mediation and Conflict Resolution 5. Peace Studies 6. Understanding the Ethnic Conflict and Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka: A Conflict Resolution Perspective 7. Negotiations for Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Sri Lankas Past Experiences 8. Learning from Bangladeshs Practical Approach 9. Lessons from Northern Ireland Peace Agreements 10. The Philippines: Key to Success in Peace Making 11. Constitution-Making in a Plural Society: Conflict Prevention Resolution 12. The South African Constitution of 1996: Lessons for Sri Lanka Appendix A I. Bibliogruphy, A 2. Internet addresses
22 33 44 78
Jayadeva Uyangoda
96
Jehan Perera
119
Jehan Perera
132
Jehan Perera N. Selmkkumran
140 147
Rohan Edrisinha
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174 184
Contributors
Rohan Edrisinha is a Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Colombo and founder Co-Director, Center for Policy Research and Analysis. Laksiri Fernando is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the Dept. of History and Political Science, University of Colombo. S. I. Keethaponcalan is a Lecturer at the Dept. of History and Political Science, University of Colombo. He is presently a doctoral student in Peace Studies at Noa South Eastern University, Florida, USA. Jehan Perera is the Media Director of the National Peace Council, Colombo and a member of the Presidential Task Force on Ethnic Affairs and National Integration. N. Selvakkumaran is the Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Colombo and until recently Co-Director, Center for Policy Research and Analysis. Jayadeva Uyangoda is a Senior Lecturer at the Dept. of Political Science, University of Colombo and founder Co-Director, Center for Policy Research and Analysis.
FOREWORD Conflicts exist at all levels of society. They reflect differences in interests, values, aims, needs and perceptions. Therefore, conflicts are unavoidable in a pluralistic democratic society, and they can even be considered necessary elements of social change and progress. So conflicts as such are not bad, but are legitimate expressions of differing points of view and contending positions. What really matters is how people deal with conflicts: they can violently confront each other in a zero-sum contest, expressing maximast goals and intransigent demands, without the readiness to compromise or they can act in a flexible manner, by dialogue, negotiation and compromise, thus converting the win-lose -option of the violent alternative of conflict resolution into a mutually beneficial win-win- perspective. So conflicts can be fought out in a destructive manner - by the use of force, with arms and violence, or they can be handled constructively in a peaceful way, by non-violent procedures and the use of soft power When conflicts have degenerated into deadly confrontation and even armed struggle, the great challenge is to transform them again into non-violent disputes by rebuilding broken relationships between the antagonists and promoting dialogue and willingness for negotiated solutions between the conflicting parties.
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Such solutions must be more than mere short- term oriented stopgap measures. To be sustainable, to be effective in the long-term, they have to be solidly based on the principles and practice of genuine democracy, fairness, equality, dignity and justice. By its very nature, a democratic system of government, based on norms of tolerance, co-operation and consensus, and with meaningful institutions of power sharing and safeguards for minority rights, is the best guarantee for the establishment of fair and harmonious social structures, and thus peace. The present publication offers an introduction to the basic concepts of peace, war and violence and of conflict management, -resolution and -transformation. It further describes methods and procedures for regulating conflicts peacefully, particularly through negotiation and mediation. In addition, the book analyzes the protracted ethno-political conflict in Sri Lanka and portrays the key features of the constitutional reforms that could establish a basis for a just and sustainable political solution of this conflict. The book further documents how conflicts are managed in other countries and which lessons could be drawn from these foreign experiences for constructive conflict transformation and resolution in Sri Lanka. Though the authors of the book are eminent social and political scientists, the book is not an indigestible academic textbook, and it is not addressed towards scholars only. It is addressed particularly towards practitioners, with or without an academic background, who want to practically contribute to the process of a peaceful regulation of the ethno- political conflict by active participation in civil society organizations and initiatives that form the peace constituency of Sri Lanka.
To make this so called Track Two-Diplomacy effective, possessing good will to work for peace is certainly a vital and indispensable pre-requisite, but it might not be sufficient of its own. With only theoretical and techniques and participation in efficiency. an emotional commitment towards peace, but without practical knowledge about the different approaches, strategies for conflict resolution and peace-building, peace initiatives may lack power of persuasion and
Deeply convinced that a truly democratic and just society can only be established and consolidated through constructive non-violent solution of conflicts, FES hopes this publication will motivate and encourage its readers to contribute building sustainable peace. May it help to develop a new CULTURE OF PEACE AND NONVIOLENCE in Sri Lanka.
Dietmar Kneitschel Resident Representative Friedrich-Ebert-Stif
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Introduction
This Handbook is prepared with the intention of introducing readers to the basic ideas of conflict resolution and peace. In many countries, conflict resolution and peace have now become a branch of studies in social sciences and law. Many universities offer undergraduate and post-graduate programs of study as well as research in this area. Similarly, in many countries, activist social groups offer non-formal learning and training programs in conflict resolution and peace building. These are indeed responses to the growing recognition throughout the world that promoting cultures of non-violence and peace is of paramount importance in achieving human progress in a universe of conflicts. In a way, Sri Lanka, through its multiplicity of conflicts, provides very useful insights into understanding conflicts, conflict resolution and peace. It is perhaps a tragedy of Sri Lanka that with three decades of violent conflicts, a strong culture of peace has not yet come to change the course of conflicts. It may be cynical to believe that conflicts cannot be terminated and they have their natural life-cycles and life- spans. Creating conditions for peace is one useful way to intervene in bringing bloody and destructive conflicts to an end. A peace culture can be best sustained through a community of peace advocates and peace practitioners. Although there is a vast body of experience and knowledge in the sphere of conflict resolution and peace-building, that knowledge is still not accessible to the Sri Lankan public. It is in order to fill this lacuna
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STlJDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK
that the Center for Policy Research and Analysis (CEPRA) of University of Colombo began planning educational programs in this field. The present handbook is a part of this pedagogical exercise. CEPRA acknowledges with thanks the encouragement and support given to this initiative by the Colombo office of the FriedrichEbert-Stiftung. Ms. Rohini Peiris of FES and Ms. Shyamika Jayasundara of CEPRA deserve special thanks for their assistance in producing this volume. Jayadeva Uyangoda December 2000.
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Defining Negotiation
Jayadeva Uyangoda and N.Selvakkumaran
Introduction
We negotiate throughout our lives, exchanging commitments and promises. Any time two people need to reach an agreement, they have to negotiate if the terms are not yet clear. Negotiation is also what business is all about-arrangements for buying, selling or exchanging goods and services. It is what human relationships are also about. In everyday life, the objective of a negotiation is generally not to come out on top but to reach a balanced agreement that seems fair to both parties. That is also an agreement the parties will stick to. In conflict resolution processes, negotiation among parties is an accepted practice. With experience in complex conflict negotiation exercises, the practice of negotiation has become a specialized art. In dispute resolution also, negotiations always play a key role. For example, in industrial disputes, labor unions and employers usually have developed traditions of negotiation. Often, labor union leaders, who may not have formal educational qualifications, are skillful negotiators who successfully bargain with lawyers and business leaders. As we will learn in Chapter 3, negotiation is also an everyday skill which all of us already possess with varying degrees of expertise. In negotiations in armed conflicts or inter-state conflicts, many factors can affect the outcome. In this chapter, we will focus on the understanding of the concept of negotiation. Let us begin by the definition of the term. (Doucest, 1996)
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Negotiation can be defined by contrasting it with arbitration. In industrial disputes, arbitration is a widespread practice in Sri Lanka. Negotiations are talks between conflicting parties who discuss ideas, information and options in order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Initially at least, negotiations may not be faceto-face. The important point here is that parties directly communicate, or talk, to each other, attempting to work out an outcome. Arbitration is when conflicting parties present their cases to a third party, who makes a judgement of the cases, which includes a decision on the rights and wrongs of the cases presented and how the conflict should be settled. Arbitration may be binding (the parties agree in advance to accept the third partys judgement) or non-binding (where they agree only to consider it, sometimes as an aid to negotiation). The third party is a person or organization whose authority the conflicting parties recognize. For example, the Commissioner of Labor is the arbitrator in disputes between trade unions and employers. This arbitrating role of the third party is different from third-party facilitation, as explained later. The difference between negotiation and arbitration may be illustrated as follows:
Arbitrator
Facilitator
A Party A Party B Arbitration
A Party A - Party B Negotiation 4
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STlJDlES AN INTRODlJCTORY
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As the above illustration indicates, the essential difference is that in arbitration the parties main or only communication is with the thirdparty arbitrator, on whose authority they rely. In contrast, negotiation involves the conjlict-parties discussing matters between themselves, in a bi-polar relationship. Even if facilitators are present, communications are essentially between the conflict-parties. Negotiation Types A typology of negotiations can be presented according to strategic objectives of the exercise of negotiation. They are:
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Problem Solving Negotiation: This involves efforts to find an alternative that is acceptable to both sides. Here, negotiation has . the character of being a joint enterprise. In joint problem solving, the parties exchange accurate information about their underlying interests, and work jointly to identify possible alternatives. This is an excellent way to find mutually acceptable solutions, but not always practical because one party may not be ready for it when the other party is. Contending: Negotiations of this type involve an effort to force one partys will on the other party. In this, one party may try to persuade the other to accept alternatives that favor ones own interests. This is also called positional bargaining. Efforts are made to dominate the other party by means of pressure tactics. In this type, negotiation can be a rigid and inflexible exercise, parties unwilling to make concessions. Yielding: This involves the reduction in ones basic aspirations or goals. Yielding is a straightforward operation. Therefore, a negotiator who chooses this strategy is not faced with inflexible or rigid situations. Yielding is good and advantageous to end negotiations quickly, particularly when issues involved are not very
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important. Lighter yielding often makes problem solving more effective. However, there is a danger in yielding too far. This point is obvious when one party yields and the other does not. Yielding can also be seen as a weakness. Therefore, the ideal is for parties to yield to a point that is compatible with the potential for joint problem solving.
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Inaction: In this type, a party might do as little as possible in negotiations. Parties sometimes opt for this strategy deliberately. Inaction wastes time and even sometimes temporarily suspends the negotiation. This, of course, tends to delay agreement and can even contribute to breakdown in the negotiation if it leads the other party to become discouraged and break off. Withdrawal: This involves withdrawing from the negotiation
exercise. Negotiations can generally be long processes. They may go on for a very long time, stopping and starting, whereas arbitration is usually a time-limited process. There can also be a link between negotiation and arbitration in the sense that arbitration can enter into a long-drawn negotiation exercise. Within negotiations, there may be a specific period of arbitration, where parties pause in their negotiating with each other in order to call in a third party to arbitrate. In such cases, non-binding arbitration can usefully add an outside perspective to negotiating processes. Such arbitration is useful when negotiations reach a deadlock. Where parties decide that negotiations have failed, turning to binding arbitration is often a last-hope attempt to resolve the conflict.
FACTORS FAVORING NEGOTIATION
Certain things increase the chances of negotiations being successful. In other words, negotiations succeed when there are favorable conditions. It is important to ask whether these conditions are present
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or not present in conflict resolution attempts. Similarly, if the favorable conditions are not present, the question is how can they be brought about in the stages and processes of negotiation? Experience shows that the chances of success in negotiation are increased when the following favorable conditions are present: Conflicting parties realize they are unlikely to get what they want through unilateral action. Early in conflicts, parties tend to believe they can get what they want through force or the threat of it. This belief ignores the competing interests and needs of the other parties. The conflict is ripe for negotiation. Appropriate timing of negotiation processes is crucial. The author I. William Zartman used the term ripe to describe appropriate timing (Zartman, 1989). A conflict is ripe for negotiation when the parties realize that the alternatives to a negotiated agreement involve unacceptable costs (economically, politically, loss of life etc). But if the parties are unable or unwilling to foresee the costs of conflict or optimistic that these will fall on other parties rather than on themselves, there will be little or no motivation necessary for successful negotiation. Preparatory conciliation processes can help the parties become more realistic about the negotiation outcome. Often, negotiations are only considered when the conflict has escalated to the point where costs are already high. Preparation for negotiations may include third parties helping the conflicting parties to foresee the likely costs of continuing conflict Parties opt to seize on change. Negotiations are also possible when propitious changes have taken place. Therefore, the presence of changes that are favorable is an
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important precondition. This suggests changes in attitudes among parties. Changes in attitude toward negotiation usually come about through a comparative evaluation ofpresent and future possibilities. The moment ispropitious, orfavorable, for negotiation when both sidesperceive that they may be better off with an agreement than without one. The representatives of each party have enough authority to speak for the whole party and commit it to a course of action. This may be something which me negotiation process has to create and maintain. Often, parties to conflicts are not homogeneous. Each party may contain factions and rival leaders, and representatives may be vary of appearing weak. The authority of representatives can be strengthened or weakened by support from outside groups, or even by pressure brought on by rival factions within the party. In armed conflicts, sometimes representatives to negotiation may come from the political wing of the movement, whereas the armed, or guerilla, wing may not be very enthusiastic about negotiations. In such situations, there is the likelihood of the position of the representative to negotiation being undermined. This requires that parties should prepare themselves for negotiation and its outcome. Preparations may involve finding consensus within the party and authorizing acceptable representatives to conduct negotiations. Other parties (in the region or globally) support, encourage and press for negotiations. Due to pressure from others, parties may come to the negotiation table. Care must be taken with the role of other parties. The greatest influence can be exerted by regional and international parties accepted as neutral in the issue over which there is conflict. Links of religion, ethnic origin, economics and trade between an external party and one of the conflict-parties can make encouragement to negotiate sound to
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the other conflicting parties like a taking of sides, and have the counterproductive effect of escalating the conflict. But pressure from friendly states can provide conflicting parties with a face-saving way of moving away from violent conflict towards negotiation.
WHEN TO NEGOTIATE?
As we have already noted, timing is extremely important for negotiations to succeed. But, when is negotiation an appropriate way ofhandling a conflict? The characteristics that lead parties to define issues as negotiable can be described in a number of ways. Situations appropriate for negotiations have two characteristics: the parties agree that they need a solution, and that their decision on a solution must be unanimous. In the first, parties may feel that we cant go on like this any longer. In the second, the parties might say: We are in this mess together, whether we like it or not. Then the two parties might feel : We have to find a solution together. This is what makes negotiations different from other decision-making processes. Now we can come to the following conclusion: negotiation is appropriate when decisions must be unanimous. Negotiations involve above all the discovery of new alternatives rather than choices between existing, fixed and given options. Thus, negotiation is appropriate when new solutions have to be invented to replace unacceptable old ones or new ones have to be created when new problems arise. The same can be restated as follows: negotiation is appropriate when there is a change in the structure of affairs and a new order must be created or problems managed in its absence.
LOCATION AND LEVELS OF NEGOTIATION
Location: The place of meeting can have important symbolic significance which may vary between the conflicting parties. The conflict may be replayed around the issue of meeting location. To reach prior
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agreement on the place of meeting, a third party may have tousemany of the skills in relation to the main meeting between the contlict-parties. How conflict-parties respond to the need to agree on details of where (and when and how) to meet, can provide third parties with much useful information about their negotiating styles, the role of factions or rivals within each party, and the role of each partys domestic audience. lnformation gathered and relationships formed between contlict parties and third parties at this preparatory stage often strongly influence the main negotiations later Open or closed locations may be more appropriate. Conducting meetings at closed locations, excluding observers, reporters etc., and possibly even not informing them that the meeting is taking place, tends to allow more honest and flexible negotiations between the parties. Choice of a closed location may include an agreement between parties not to report and comment publicly on the meeting until a later, agrced time. Open locations, with outsiders present and public reporting of the meetings progress, tend to encourage the conflict-parties to adopt postures designed for public consumption, particularly their homeaudience. The public, therefore, becomes a sort of declared party to thenegotiations, influencing their course but largely beyond the influence of third-party facilitators. Levels of communication between parties should also be considered carefully. Negotiations (and mediation) may be conducted between the top level of each party, but it is important that there are communications between many of the levels of each party. For negotiators, multi level communication provides move information on how the other party views the conflic-issues, adding depth and probably more flexibility, to the official position declared by the partys ofiicial negotiators. For third parties involved as advisors, facilitators ofnegotiations, or mediators, maintaining communication with many different levels within a conflict-party can provide much useful information, particularly in the preparation stages and ifobstacles occur which stalemate the negotiations.
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With fact-finding missions, shuttle-diplomacy, goodwill visits, unofficial consultation etc., conciliation processes can help bring conflicting parties to the point where they are ready to consider the possibility of negotiation, and where some factors conducive to successful negotiation have developed.
GROUND RULES
Ground rules are similar in negotiations, facilitation, mediation and other meetings. These are the basic rules of conduct, which all parties agree to as essentials for these meetings. Ground rules have the immediate practical value of allowing the meetings to happen; and they also have a broaderpsychological value. Acceptance of, and then experiencing, these ground rules reveals what is needed for constructive communication and mutuality in relationships. When the parties are in conflict, of course, such ground rules are not applicable at all. Efforts must be made to find ground rules which all participants can agree to. Ground rules can include the following elements: Allowing all the parties to participate fully, including to state their views and suggestions Listening to each speaker without interruption or disrespect Freedom to suggest ideas without commitment to them and without ridicule Confidentiality and non-attribution outside the meeting Mutually constructing agenda and timetable to satisfy all parties Commitment to reach an agreement Acceptance of the role of the facilitator (or mediator etc.) Freedom to ask for time out (a pause in the main negotiations for any party to meet in private with or without the facilitator) Punctuality
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STAGES OF NEGOTIATION The five main stages of negotiation are the following: 0 Preparing for negotiations 0 Opening negotiations o Developing strategies
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Making decisions/solving problems Making it work
These stages in the negotiating process can be illustrated as below, as if climbing a mountain and then coming down the other side.
Solve problems - Make decisions
(Implementation etc. post-agreement)
Preparing for Negotiations Conflict-analysis methods provide tools for starting to understand the conflict prior to getting involved in negotiations. It is important for potential negotiators and facilitators to prepare themselves in several stages, repeatedly tine-tuning their understanding of the conflictsituation. These stages of preparation include:
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Analyzing the conflict: Identifying the parties, the problems and issues, deciding in principle whether to get involved; Analyzing in more detail: What are other issues, other parties, the relationships between them, the history of these, the context and alternatives to negotiation, and outcome-possibilities? Checking the decision to get involved: If decide to get involved, decide when? how? with what/who? Making initial contacts: Explore possible forums for discussion and consider possible convenors; Designing the process: Deciding the appropriate style of negotiation; and Reaching agreement on the negotiation process: Agreeing on ground rules and issues to be discussed, considering details needed to create an appropriate climate for negotiation (agreement on process is important to reach agreement on substance). Identifying all the parties involved in the conflict, including parties involved or with an interest in the conflict in a secondary or indirect way, is particularly important. These secondary or indirect parties to the conflict may influence the main parties, and may distort or sabotage the negotiating process or its outcome. It is often not helpful to give every party a seat at the negotiating table, yet leaving them out of the process entirely may encourage them to exert unhelpful influence. Including secondary/indirect parties productively in the process may involve third parties in consulting them before and during negotiations between the main conflict-parties. Even in non-facilitated negotiations, third parties may play this useful background role.
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This initial stage is negotiation about negotiation, or getting the parties to the table. This may also be described as @e-negotiation talks or talks about talks. Important matters which will help to decide if negotiations are possible and worthwhile include: which issues are to be negotiated, who will participate, which outsiders, negotiating principles, the agenda, duration and location. Reaching agreement on a negotiating process often involves increasing the conflicting parties level of communication, trust and confidence, and developing a shared understanding of the problem to be negotiated. The practical matters discussed (for example, where negotiations might take place) are important for psychological, as well as practical, reasons. However speculative, such discussions are communication between the parties (even if indirectly, through other people), and they are constructive. The process of offering a suggestion, considering a counter-suggestion, responding to it and eventually reaching some agreement (about relatively unimportant things) enlarges the possibility for constructive communication about the real conflict-issues. Energy going down this path is energy not going down the path of violence. Sometimes, the subjects discussed might seem trivial (the size of the table, which side to sit, who will enter the room first), especially in the context of great suffering currently being caused by the conflict. The parties discussion of even such apparently unimportant matters may well be full of the sense of injustice, passion, intransigence, hate etc which characterizes the conflict itself This can be useful as a preparation for negotiations, because it provides practice-runs for the parties in experiencing these upsurges of emotion which create non-negotiable positions, and then being able to go on to reach more reasonable agreements. Until the very last moment, parties may hold back from committing to negotiations. Often, all the time that the practicalities and possibilities of negotiations are being discussed, the likelihood that they will happen is increasing. Pre-negotiation should be treated as seriously, and with as much time and care, as the main negotiations they lead to.
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As the process of helping the parties prepare for negotiation goes on, facilitators are also becoming more prepared - getting to know the parties better, and understanding the subtleties of the issues. And continuously, negotiators and facilitators should be revising their analysis of the conflict. A shared understanding of the problem or issue may result from the above processes. Parties in conflict often have very different understandings of the situation. Before negotiations can start, all parties must recognize that there is a conflict, what the issues in conflict are including knowing even if not accepting the other partys descriptions of the conflict-issues. Most of all, they must understand and accept that it is these issues which are the subject of negotiation. Through forms of contlict-analysis, negotiators and facilitators can help to create a broad understanding of the conflict, which is shared by all the parties. During this preparation stage, the parameters of negotiation may be decided - what is and what is not to be negotiated over. Discussing and deciding this may take each party a long time. Privately, as well as with each party, facilitators can map the various issues, to find a core of negotiable issues. When there is a core of agreement between the conflicting parties about what can be negotiated, the start of negotiations may be close. Even at this early stage, progress has been made - a complex conflict has been processed into a series of definable issues, by the conflicting parties with the help of negotiators. This is already a considerable achievement. Before negotiations start, it may be worthwhile for negotiators to reflect on the core of agreed negotiable issues with each party, making explicit the shared perceptions, interests, values and needs which are behind this agreed basis for negotiation. Pre-Negotiation Behavior Our discussion above suggests that beginning negotiation in a conflict is usually a long process. It can even cover years of effort and
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODIJCTORY HANDBOOK
preparation, between the time when one party decides that the problem is appropriate for negotiation and the time when it convinces the other party. These attempts generally require a great deal of time, first in implementing, then in communicating to the other party, and then still more time for the trial and error process of thinking up new alternatives and communicating them in turn. There can also bepre-negotiation tactics employed by the parties. Pre-negotiation tactics are efforts made by parties to change the course of negotiation in favor of their individual interests. Opening Negotiations
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To set the tone (how negotiations start is very important) and tactics To share thoughts on how the situation looks from the different perspectives To agree on problem(s) to be solved, before seeking agreement on solutions
Negotiators and facilitators of negotiations both have to establish at the outset the previously agreed style and tone of the negotiations. Broadly, are they to be a contest of strength in bargaining for which one party wins (though perhaps only in the short-term), or are they intended to bring about mutual gains, in which all parties are reasonably satisfied with an outcome which may endure in the long-term? Different tactics will be used for each - and the tactics used are a good indication of how each party is approaching the negotiations, in reality as apposed to what they say they are doing.
Contest-negotiating, the hard styleofnegotiatingnoted earlier, is
characterized by these tactics:

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Starting with a surprise demand or precondition Insisting on setting out your partys position first, and monopolizing the time available Asking high -making high demands and forcing concessions out of the other party Undermining the other partys positions and/or its representatives, and its unity Stonewalling -refusing to change any detail, insisting everything is linked, delaying, referring back to higher authorities or the people Coercing-issuing ultimatums or threats or faits accomplis
If pursued for long, these tactics can undermine the good faith and trust which has brought the conflicting parties to the negotiating table. When deadlocks occur there is a temptation to resort to these hard tactics. But when there are deadlocks it is usually better to take extra time to ease the pressure and find some shared form of conflict analysis or problem-solving to discover what the deadlock is about. Mutual-gain negotiating, in contrast, can be identified by these tactics:
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Starting with non-threatening, constructive suggestions - about the negotiating process rather than the substantive issue Starting by making sure both parties understand how the other sees the situation, and engage together in some analysis of the conflict (even if this has been done before) Starting with a goodwill concession - something which one party can afford to give
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Identifying the needs underlying each partys position, and seeking solutions which accommodate these adequately enough for all parties Being explicit where one issue is being traded off against another, or where a compromise is needed Separating off the most difficult issues for shared working groups to study and report back Suggesting new possibilities and asking how they suit the other partys as well as ones own party Avoiding locking parties into agreements prematurely Being thorough at the end instead of rushing, and agreeing ways of implementing and monitoring agreements, with mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance Reframing the language in an overall problem-sharing and problemsolving spirit Developing Strategies Some of the tactics for mutual-gain negotiating, noted above, come into the later stages of the negotiation process. During this middle phase, negotiators are engaged in developing and refining their strategies, and putting them into practice, by:
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Conflict-mapping: analyzing the people and groups, processes and problems involved Thinking through aims, needs, interests and potential solutions Getting from problems to causes to underlying needs; separating people from problems, interests from positions
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Considering what bargaining power they have, and how to use it; what strengths and weaknesses Exploring all the alternatives to negotiation Understanding the other party and using fair standards to support ideas; granting legitimacy to the ideas of others
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A positive contribution is made to negotiations by focusing on what is wanted rather than what is not wanted. It is worth reflecting on what the alternatives to negotiating are, and deciding if they are better - so that one engages in negotiation because that is the best course available at the time. Facilitators can help parties by costing out, in a realistic way, the various alternatives (violent conflict ofvarious forms, withdrawal from the conflict, arbitration etc.) Making Decisions and Solving Problems Be inventive about options - sometimes increase the options available. Create criteria to evaluate negotiations which focus on the needs to be met. Emphasize common ground. Make decisions preliminary and provisional, fine-tune the details. Decide if enough has been agreed; need everything be agreed? Expanding the range of options being negotiated about means there is more to be divided up between the parties, and something for everyone. If the options are few in number, negotiations may be badly influenced by the fear of not getting enough and a win/lose situation develops. Feeling free to consider the wide range of possibilities on each issue can encourage a sense of productive shared effort. Parties are
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more likely to feel free in this way if a final commitment is not asked for until enough elements of a comprehensive package have been sketched in, then reconsidered and revised as necessary. If agreement has proved impossible on one or two issues, it may be best to make the limited agreement which is possible at the time and remit the unresolved issues to another forum at a later date. The negotiations may have been attempting too much, and the experience of the limited agreement achieved may make the other issues resolvable later. Making it Work This final stage of negotiation and facilitated negotiation involves putting the pieces together to make peace: Preliminary decisions are combined to make a complete package; additional negotiations may be needed for unresolved issues. Be concrete, specific and clear; who does what, when, where. Work out monitoring and implementing procedures, or programme later negotiations. Formalize the agreement and get the necessary approvals or ratification. Schedule review-meetings; the agreement may need additions or adjustment. Consider how to jointly sell the agreement regionally, internationally and at home. Consider guarantors or friends of the peace process to sell it, and ensure compliance. A shared sense of pride and achievement accompanies successful negotiations, which facilitators, observers and outside parties should affirm. This achievement should be marked in some celebratory way which is appropriate to the culture and the nature of the conflict resolved.
NOTE
In preparing this chapter, the following textbooks were extensively used: Breslin J. William and Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (1993), Negotiation Theory and practice, Cambridge, Massachusetts: the Program for Negotiation at Harvard Law school Cornelius, Helena and Faire, Shoshana, (1994), Everyone Can Win, How to Resolve Conflict, Siman & Schuster Australia Doucest, Ian (Ed.), (1996), Resource Pack for Conflict Transformation, International Alert, London Zartrnan, William I. and Berman, Maureen R., ( 1982), The Practical Negotiator, New Haven and London: Yale University Press Zartman,William I. (1989), Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford
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Negotiation in Conflicts
Jayadeva Uyangoda Introduction In the field of conflict resolution, the idea of negotiation has gained currency against a number of successful instances where conflicts have been settled or terminated through talks or discussions among parties involved. Recent examples are Northern Ireland, South Africa, IsraelPalestine and Bangladesh. In all these instances, parties to the conflict came to the negotiation table for peace talks. Through talks, they have arrived at agreements to settle the conflict and implement an agreement which they had worked out together. We generally describe these instances as ones of conflict settlement or termination by means of negotiations. But not all conflicts are terminated through negotiations. Nor are all conflict negotiations likely to end in a peace settlement Even when an agreement is worked out, there is no guarantee that it will invariably bring a conflict to an end. Sri Lanka is a clear case in point in this regard. Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) held talks twice, in 1989 and 1995, without producing any peace agreement. In 1987, there was an agreement between Sri Lankan and Indian governments to solve Sri Lankas conflict, but the conflict did not end. However, both successful and failed negotiations offer us important lessons about negotiation and conflict resolution. Negotiations have succeeded under circumstances favorable to conflict termination. When parties to the conflict are ready for a settlement and there are political conditions to facilitate the option of peace, and when
the conflict itself is ripe for settlement, the negotiation option is more likely to succeed. But when even one party to the conflict is not ready for a settlement and when the conflict has still more energy to go on, negotiations are not possible; nor is there space for negotiations to succeed. Indeed, conflict negotiation is an extremely complex exercise. Merely because some conflicts are brought to an end by means of negotiations, it does not mean that all conflicts await negotiations. Similarly, merely because negotiations have failed to bring peace in one conflict, it does not mean that even that particular conflict defies negotiations. Therefore, in this module, we will discuss some of the complexities involved in conflict negotiation. Negotiation as an Everyday Skill At a preliminary level, negotiation is an everyday activity in which we ourselves are involved as a part of our regular life. Indeed, we are often successful negotiators. Imagine a situation where a fish-vendor comes to your doorstep on Sunday morning. You want to buy a kilo of fish, but the vendor tells you that the price is Rs. 250. You are not happy with that price and you begin to bargain. You offer a lower price, knowing very well that the vendor is likely to come down on the price and he was keen to sell off his merchandize. The fish-vendor also knows that you need fish for your Sunday meal and you are most likely to buy fish. After several bargaining offers, you and the vendor agree to do the transaction at Rs. 225 a kilo. You may buy the fish with the satisfaction that you got the price reduced through successful bargaining. And of course, the vendor goes off with the satisfaction that he made a profitable deal, although his profit margin was a little less than what he initially aimed at. When we analyze this situation, using theoretical tools of negotiation, we can identify how clever we indeed are at negotiation.
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You and the fish-vendor entered into a negotiation exercise in the form of a business transaction. The two parties had two objectives to satisfy theirrespective interests. When you refused to accept the price quoted by the vendor, you initiated a bargaining exercise. You made a hard bargaining offer, when you offered to buy a kilo of fish for Rs. 200 or else not to buy any fish at all. The vendor countered your initial bargaining offer by making a counter offer at Rs. 240 a kilo. You still went on bargaining by refusing to buy fish at that price. In the process, both you and the vendor retreated from your positions by working out a mutually acceptable price. In other words, the two of you moved awayfrompositional bargaining and accepted a compromise. Rs. 225 is the compromise agreement reached through this process of negotiation. If both you and the vendor stuck to positional bargaining, a compromise may not have been worked out and there would not have been a transaction at all. Similarly, in this example, there was a negotiation process, a willingness to bargain, and a will to compromise. And the compromise brought out a mutually satisfying outcome. Bargaining and compromise are elements of our everyday life of negotiations. Without us knowing it, we are negotiation practitioners at home, in the office, in the business field and in our relations with others. But, negotiation in conflicts is slightly more difficult than negotiating in a non-conflictual situation like buying fish. Bargaining in a political conflict involves not just two individuals, but thousands or millions of people. There, the stakes placed at the negotiation table are very high. The stakes usually involved in such conflicts revolve around state power. Parties may not always be ready to compromise, even when they negotiate. Even when a compromise is possible, the parties to the conflict may not trust each others intentions. Then, there may be doubts about the outcome of the compromise settlement. Even when the outcome is clear, there can be apprehensions about the implementation of the settlement agreement. The conclusion we can arrive at is the following:
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Conflict termination through negotiation will have to take into consideration the complexities inherent in all stages of theprocess. Defining Negotiation According to some theorists, the concept negotiation denotes something specific in conflict situations. It does not refer to the resolution of a conflict. Rather, it suggests the settlement or termination of a conflict. The idea here is that negotiation is a means to settle or terminate a conflict, rather than resolving conflict. Here, we need to recognize the conceptual differences between conflict resolution and conflict settlement. Conflict resolution requires a change ofbeliefs and values among parties, in order to address the causes that produced the conflict. Here, the conflict is resolved through resolving causes that led to the contlict so that the same conflict may not arise again. Conflict settlement does not anticipate such a fundamental change among parties. It seeks only a change of their behavior. Then the focus of negotiation is not attitude change per se, but an agreement to change behavior in ways that make settlement possible (Rubin, 1993:3). In this definition, negotiation is a means to an end. The end is the settlement of the conflict. Let us take the example of an internal armed conflict, like in Sri Lanka. When the armed conflict is on, the parties to the conflict operate within a specific pattern of behavior. When they come to the negotiation table, they may have not changed their behavior. But, when they negotiate to settle or terminate the armed conflict, they will be changing, or more precisely, agreeing to change, their conflict behavior so that settlement is produced through that change. Of course, conflict settlement can lead to the resolution of the conflict. But negotiations are primarily aimed at changing the behavior of the parties involved. Negotiation is also a communicative action. It involves talking, talking in order to go beyond a conflict. In a conflict, parties may not communicate with each other at all. Or, they may actually be
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communicating which results in conflict escalation. But negotiation is a different kind of talking. It presupposes, at the minimum level, the willingness of parties to explore into the possibility of resolving disagreements. It is in this sense that Rubinstein defines negotiation in the following way: Negotiation is a set of communicative processes through which individuals or groups try to resolve disagreements that exist among them (Rubinstein, 1992: 116). The definition of the concept negotiation has gone through a transformation in recent years, due to many experiences in conflict negotiation. A traditional definition is found in the International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (1968). Negotiation is a form of interaction through which [parties] . . . try to arrange . . . a new combination of some of their common and conflicting interests. In more contemporary definitions, negotiation is viewed as more than a form of interaction among parties. Rather, it is a process. William Zartman, one of the leading theorists in the field of conflict resolution, defines negotiation as a process of combining conflicting positions into a common position, under a decision rule of unanimity, a phenomenon in which the outcome is determined by the process (Zartman,1993:147). Why Negotiations are Difficult In this discussion, we are focusing on negotiations in internal armed conflicts. Internal armed conflicts are the most difficult conflicts to terminate or settle. It has generally been the case that when an internal conflict is of the character of a revolutionary insurrection or having as its goal ethnic self-determination, such a conflict is more likely to protract. That is why some of those who have studied conflicts make the point that when the conflict is over identity - ethnic or religious - the room for compromise solutions becomes more constrained.
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Maximalism of Insurgents: Revolutionary or identity-based armed conflicts often have a tendency to generate maximalist goals. When an insurgent movement has set a maximalist goal - for example, the capturing of state power, or establishing a separate state - there is usually reluctance on the part of that movement to revise its goal and to accept something less than the original, final objective. Such conflicts are also propelled by idealistic motivations. A slogan like Motherland or death, we shall win! often characterizes the commitment of the insurgent movement to make sacrifices, to withstand enormous human losses and to continue the struggle for years. In such an idealistic framework, compromise, or even talking to the enemy to find a compromise, may be seen as incorrect, immoral and being harmful to the final goal. Inflexibility of the State: Similarly, the states that are involved in internal contlicts can also be inflexible with regard to a settlement. States often view insurgent challenges as law-and-order problems that should be resolved by the use of military force. Once a state begins to use military force in an internal conflict, it is usually difficult for that state to seek a solution outside a unilateral military victory. Any deviation from the military option by the state may be seen as a sign of weakness, an acceptance of the legality of the enemy, and even a step towards endangering national security. In such circumstances, negotiations may be seen as (i) giving legitimacy to the enemys claims, and (ii) the admission of the enemys strength vis- a-vis the weakness of the state. Therefore, states often tend to be intransigent and uncompromising, until such time that the conflict itself compels the state to seek a negotiated option. Fear of a Settlement: Strangely enough, parties to internal conflicts may sometimes feel afraid of a negotiated settlement. The fear element is usually associated with rebels who are involved in a conflict with the state. The fear of a settlement can be of different dimensions. Annihilation of the movement, as a result of a compromise with the enemy, is often
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felt by rebels as a possible consequence of a settlement. They might seenegotiation as a trap and settlement as capitulation. There can also be the fear that a negotiated compromise with the enemy might result in splitting the movement. There is always the possibility that in an insurgent movement, there are hardliners who reject the idea of a compromise and any deviation from the original maximalist objectives. Uncertainty of the Negotiation Outcome: The present state of Sri Lankas ethnic conflict demonstrates how the parties to the conflict are skeptical about negotiations. The LTTE walked out from the negotiation table twice, on the argument that negotiation was not bringing about a useful outcome, or an outcome favorable to them. The government is reluctant to resume negotiations, because of the view that negotiations might not produce any positive result. There is also the view, shared by both the government and the LTTE, that negotiation might be manipulated by one party as an exercise in buying time or obtaining some breathing space. Parties may not even place much trust on each others commitments. There is also the doubt about how genuine negotiations are. That is why sometimes one party to a conflict might lay down preconditions for negotiations that are patently unacceptable to the other. Why Should One Negotiate with the Enemy? One of the most commonplace objections to negotiations in a situation of conflict is that talking to the enemy is a futile exercise. Particularly in identity-based conflicts, even the very idea of negotiations with the enemy is considered by hardliners as a sign ofweakness, a great risk and even a prelude to capitulation. Some people have a mental block about talking to the enemy. We should destroy the enemy. Why should our people talk to them? is the question they often ask. A fascinating reply to this kind of objections to negotiation is provided by Simha Flapan, an Israeli intellectual. Flapan is a journalist
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in Israel who advocated negotiations between Israeli government and the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) even in the seventies and eighties when in Israel any suggestion of peace with PLO was treated as sheer treachery. Flapan not only advocated a negotiated settlement between the two sides, but also maintained links with the PLO and communicated to the Israel public that the enemy should be treated as a potential ally in peace. He wrote in 1982: There is a fundamental difference between strategy of peace and strategy of war. Unlike war, peace cannot be planned in secrecy; it requires an appeal to the people, both its own and the adversary s. It requires the recognition of the enemy as a potential ally. It requires dialogue." (Flapan, March 1982) Why Negotiation is Necessary The conclusion we must draw from the above is that negotiations are difficult. But it should not mean that negotiations are not necessary or are irrelevant to a conflict resolution process. In the contemporary world, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a conflict is resolved by the total capitulation of one party through purely military means used by the other side. Even if a conflict may protract itself for decades, like in Northern Ireland or Palestine, there may come a time when the parties realize that a settlement is more realistic than the conflict which is likely to protract. That is why negotiation is considereda rational choice. It is rational to end the conflict than allowing it to protract, because a compromise serves ones interests better. The experience of successful negotiated settlement of conflicts tells us many things about why negotiation is necessary, rational and useful. Irrelevance of Maximalist Goals: We noted above that parties to a conflict often begin their campaigns with maximalist goals. It may well happen in the course of a conflict that the parties begin to realize the
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irrationality of sticking to original, maximalist objectives. When the world situation changes, the goals set up during the previous world situation may not be realistic anymore. The Palestinians accepted this reality when they went to serious negotiations with the enemy, the Israeli state. This realization of the need to change the original goal was dramatically stated by one of the PLO leaders: The past year has seen tumultuous and unforeseen change in the world order as it has stood since the end of World War II. A new and as yet unpredictable global balance is in the making, with consequences that will be felt everywhere, including in the Middle East. Turbulent as these times are, the Palestinian people and their representative, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), see new prospects for peace in the Middle East. As the tide of change in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, South Africa and elsewhere has swept away obsolete notions and structures, the Palestinian people are very much a part of this historical process.. . In this context, the PLO regards its own current political program offering a two-state solution to the century-old conflict over the land of Palestine.. .as being entirely consonant with the spirit of the times. The PLO decision to recognize Israel . . . is rooted in pragmatism, openness, and the readiness to dissolve the long-standing presuppositions, attitudes and antagonisms of the past. (Khalaf, 1990) The Need to Search for Alternatives: It so happens in conflicts that parties sometimes reach a situation in which original goals and strategies need to be revised. For example, a party to a conflict may realize that its military strategy is no longer viable or even useful, because the continuing war would not serve any purpose. It may only further hurt them in material, human and political terms. Then there is the possibility
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that either one party or both parties would want to seek alternative strategies and solutions. It is often the case that alternatives have to be worked out together. Negotiations are a useful devise in such circumstances for parties to find mutually acceptable alternatives.
In this lesson, you have learned the following : Both successful and failed negotiations offer us important lessons about negotiation and conflict resolution. Conflict resolution through negotiation is a complex exercise; it is a process. Negotiation is also an everyday exercise. We often practice negotiation successfully. Lessons we can learn from everyday negotiations are useful to understand the dynamics of complex conflict negotiation. In political/ identity conflicts, conflict termination through negotiation requires the recognition that there can be many complexities through all its stages. Conflict resolution and conflict settlement are different concepts. Negotiation is a communication process. Conflict negotiation can be difficult due to many reasons such as (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Parties find it difficult to change their maximalist objectives. Parties are inflexible. There is a fear of settlement. Uncertainty of the negotiation outcome.
Negotiation is a rational choice.

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References/Readings Doucest, Ian, (Ed)( 1996), Resource pack for Conjlict Transformation , London:Intemational Alert Flapan, Simha, New Outlook, March 1982 Khalaf, Salah (Aby Iyad),( 199O),Lowering the Sword reprinted in Ian S.Kustick, Arab-Israeli Relations: A collection of Contending Perspectives and Recent Research , New York and London:Guarlan Publishers Rubin, Jeffrey Z.,( 1993), Some Wise and Mistaken Assumptions About Conjlict and Negotiation in J.William Breslin and Jeffrey Z.Rubin, Negotiation Theory and Practice , Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School Rubinstein, Robert A., (1992),Culture and Negotiation in Elizabeth Wamock Fernea and Mary Evelyn Hocking (Eds.), The Struggle for Peace , Austin : University of Texas Press Zartman,William I.,( 1989), Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and ln terven tion in Africa , New York and Oxford University Press Zartman, William I.,( 1993),Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation Process in Breslin and Rubin, ibid
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4
Mediation and Conflict Resolution
Jayadeva Uyangoda Introduction When a conflict protracts itself with no possibility of resolution, like the one in Sri Lanka, there can emerge an argument for a mediated settlement. The basic assumption of this argument is that direct parties to the conflict are incapable of solving the conflict on their own. Therefore, as the argument further goes, a third-party involvement is necessary to bring about a settlement. There is also a body of international experience to support the claim that seemingly intractable conflicts can be terminated through third-party mediation. Experience in conflict mediation also tells us that there is another side to the story. All attempts at mediation may not succeed. Similarly, the path of mediation can be a very difficult one. Mediation cannot happen merely because there is a conflict and that conflict needs to be resolved. It is a process with complexities and challenges. In this chapter, we will discuss mediation, trying to identify some of the major complexities in the process and exercise of conflict mediation. Mediation Defineded Mediation can be defined as an act of outside intervention to assist adversaries to resolve a shared conflict. It works to create a peace process to engage adversaries in a constructive political dialogue, or to transform an established dialogue process into a conflict resolution and peace-making one. (Rabie : 132)
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In this definition, there are a number of elements involved in an act of mediation. i. ii. iii. iv. Mediation is an act of an outsider (Neutrality). Mediator assists adversaries to resolve a conflict (Facilitation). Mediation is a component of a conflict resolution and peace process (Ripe Conditions). Through mediation, parties engage in a constructive dialogue (Compromise).
Mediator as an Outsider
Mediator in a conflict is by definition an outsider. The term thirdparty mediation is derived from this inherent characteristic of the act of mediation. This notion of outsider has a host of meanings. It does not simply mean that the mediator comes from abroad, or from other country. First, it means that the mediator is an outsider to the conflict and should not be a party involved in the conflict. Nor should the mediator be seen as aligned with or supportive of one particular party to the conflict. We may call this requisite ofmediation as the neutrality principle. Whenever one party to the conflict perceives the mediator as non-neutral, or supportive of the adversary, successful mediation cannot take place, because the mediators role in the expected settlement too would be in doubt. Mediators neutrality is important to create an atmosphere and psychology of confidence and trust in the negotiation process among the parties to the conflict. One of the crucial barriers to a settlement in a conflict through negotiations is the possibility of one party perceiving the negotiation exercise as likely to result in an outcome unfavorable to its own interests. In such a situation, if that particular party perceives the mediator as partial or biased towards the adversary, mediation may not be possible. Neutrality, then, is important for the mediator to create confidence among conflicting parties not only on the exercise of mediation, but also the outcome of negotiations.
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Mediators Role Sometimes, people tend to think that a mediator can bring conflicting parties to the negotiation table and impose a settlement on them. As Sri Lankas own experience demonstrates, this belief is quite far fi-om the realities of conflict negotiation. Perhaps, in a neighborhood dispute, a powerful or respected third party can do so and the disputants may accept the solution offered by the third party even though they are not quite satisfied with the outcome. But in macro political conflicts, such compromises can be hardly made or can work, because in them, unlike in neighborhood conflicts, the stakes are very high. In highstake political conflicts, often involving issues of state power, imposing a settlement by an outsider is quite different fi-om a referee separating two boxers locked in a fight. The parties themselves should ultimately make the compromise within a mutually acceptable framework. But then, what is the role of the mediator? Let us imagine a situation where the two parties, while they have been engaged in a war, want to settle their conflict. However much they are keen on arriving at a settlement, they dont trust each other to work it out. In this situation, no party is willing to take the first step towards negotiations, because any relaxation of the military campaign by that side may be seen by the other as a moment of the adversarys weakness. Here, a third-party can play a constructive role by facilitating communication between the two sides. In this situation, the mediator is the medium through which the two sides begin to communicate. In many armed conflicts, communication between parties is one of the most challenging areas of interaction. They may communicate through military means, like one party giving signals to the other through an extremely guarded and ambiguous language. A good example is the LTTE leaders speech on 26 November, 1998 in which he called for a mediated settlement. But that call was presented in such a way that there was also a message continuing the armed struggle to achieve the movements ultimate political goal. Some analysts
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interpreted this speech as a call for mediation while others disagreed. What we can see in that speech of the LTTEs leader is a deliberate ambiguity in communication. In the absence of direct communication between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, there was no mechanism for the government to respond to the other sides mediation suggestion in any positive terms. As expected, the government responded cautiously and negatively. In such an atmosphere of ambiguity and caution, the mediator can facilitate communication between the parties so that their actual intentions can be explored. Mediation can also mean a slightly greater role for the third party. Suppose that the two parties want to come to the negotiation table. Even though the parties agree to begin face-to-face talks, they may still mistrust each others intentions, objectives, goals, strategies and tactics. There can also be a lot of disagreement over the timetable for talks, the agenda, the venue, the level of representation and the timeframe within which talks should be concluded. Still more complex disagreements may arise on issues of cease-fire and the behavior of the two sides during the negotiations. It is always the case that during negotiations, each party may try to seek advantage over the other through bargaining. This is exactly where a mediator has a role to play. The mediator can consult the two sides, ascertain their respective concerns and then assist the two sides to avoid disagreements in the preparation to negotiations. When disagreements arise, the mediator can propose solutions or alternatives. Further, the mediator can assist the parties in working out the settlement agreement, if negotiations progress towards a compromise. Formulating a settlement to terminate an armed conflict is not an easy task. The settlement has to be mutually acceptable to the parties. They should feel satisfied and comfortable with the outcome. They should be willing to make sacrifices and they should also be ready to accept and implement the settlement. Parties may also seek mutual guarantees. Here, the mediators role is to facilitate the working out of the settlement by being a referee, a neutral thinker and a constructive planner:
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Mediation and Ripe Conditions Can a mediator just walk into a conflict, organize a negotiation process and make the parties agree on a settlement? The plain answer to this question is No, although people sometimes might think that the answer ought to be Yes. Such an arbitrary act of mediation can be a disaster, especially for the mediator. If a conflict involves a sovereign state, uninvited mediation by an outsider would be immediately seen as an interference with the countrys internal affairs and an affront to its sovereignty. If the conflict is between the state and a rebel movement, uninvited mediation would be perceived by the rebels as a part of a conspiracy against them by the state. Here, the lesson to be drawn is simple: Mediation in a conflict would require the consent by both parties to the conflict. Indeed, mediation works better when there is bi-partisan willingness to negotiate. This leads us to ask another important question about mediation: What is the best time for mediation in a conflict? Or, under what circumstances would parties to a conflict accept mediation? Here, the most important thing is that both parties should accept the utility of mediation. If only one party calls for mediation, the other party is most likely to reject mediation, or even not respond to the call. Similarly, if a potential mediator calls upon the parties to accept mediation, the parties may ignore it altogether. The point, then, is that there should be conditionsfavorablefor mediation. In conflict theory, the notion of conflict ripeness refers to the existence of conditions conducive to conflict resolution. The notion of conflict ripeness was developed by William Zartman in his writings of the early eighties. According to Zartman, a conflict or a crisis, is ripe for resolution when the following three conditions are present:
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(i).
There exists a situation of deadlock and deadline.
(ii). Unilateral solutions are blocked and joint solutions are conceivable. (iii). The party that previously had upper hand in the conflict has lost the advantage and the weaker party has gained in strength. In Zartmans concept of ripeness, each side to the conflict perceives that it is unable to win the conflict by itself. In other words, parties feel that there is a deadlock and the deadlock may go on indefinitely, each party still having the capacity to hurt the other. At the same time, each party perceives a moment when things will get worse unless an advantage is secured through other means. It is a deadlock that hurts. Zartman describes such a situation as a mutually hurting stalemate. It is useful to quote Zartman to get his precise words: The point when conflict is ripe for resolution is associated with two different sorts of intensity-alled hereplateaus and theprecipice - which produce different sorts of pressure - called respectively deadlocks and deadlines. A plateau and its deadlock begin when one side is unable to achieve its aims, to resolve the problem, or to win the conflict by itself, and they are completed when the other side arrives at a similar perception. Each party must begin to feel uncomfortable in the costly dead-end into which it has gotten itself. A plateau must be perceived by both not as a momentary resting ground, but as a hurting stalemate, a flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future providing no later possibilities for decisive escalation or for graceful escape. (Zartman, 1989:267-268) The recognition of this ripe moment is crucial for successful conflict mediation. In the ripe moment, the parties may find themselves locked in a stalemate which brings to them only an unavoidable catastrophe. Or else, they no longer see the viability ofunilateral solutions. They are ready to seek joint solutions. The important thing is that even when
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parties realize this situation, they may not act towards a compromise on their own. But a mediator can step in once the moment has come. And then, the parties and mediator can turn to the more creative, meticulous, trial-and-error job of finding an acceptable way out of the conflict. (Zartman, 1989: p. 273) Mediation and Compromise Making We noted above that a compromise solution to a conflict involves the seeking of joint solutions by parties and that mediator can play a constructive role in such circumstances. In other words, the role of the mediator is to make compromise-making possible for parties that are still locked in the conflict. Enabling parties to make compromises requires from the mediator a series of activities. Rabie, in his book Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity identifies six such activities for the mediator: (i). Initiate dialogue among adversaries and induce cooperation between competing groups. (ii). Facilitate analysis of causes of conflict and prepare for negotiations to end them. (iii), Sustain and foster direct or indirect negotiations through improved or added channels of communication. (iv). Bridge gaps between adversaries through the establishment of direct human contacts and help antagonists discover common goals that require joint actions. (v). Enhance the chances of success in resolving conflict through the introduction of fresh ideas and new creative proposals. (vi). Simply provide a forum for declaring the acceptance of compromise settlements that could not otherwise be declared.
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Mediation as a Process The above discussion tells us another important aspect of mediation. Mediation as a means of conflict resolution is not a oneshot activity A mediator cannot just come into a conflict situation, try his hands at a settlement and then fly back. In real life, conflict resolution does not happen in such fairytale manner. Mediation is a long, arduous and often a frustrating exercise. Mediation can suffer setbacks and even total failure. In the process of mediation, negotiation between parties can break down and the conflict may even escalate. Mediator will have to be prepared for complex and unforeseen eventualities. Mediation efforts in the Northern Ireland, or in the Palestine-Israel conflicts are good examples. In both instances, the US played the role of the mediator. Mediation there involved alongdrawn exercise of preparatory work for negotiations to begin. In the course of negotiations, there were times when parties withdrew from negotiations. There were threats of unilateral action, putting in jeopardy the whole mediation exercise. But the mediator did not give up. Of course, the US had the advantage of being a powerful and influential mediator. Nevertheless, the point here is that the mediator should have perseverance to stay in the course amidst setbacks, until a settlement is reached. Itisinrecognizingthecomplexityofmediationasapoliticalexercise and the seriousness of the role of the mediator that scholars have called mediation a process. It is a process with distinct and interrelated stages. Some of the tasks involved in a mediation process are: (i) (ii) (iii) Exploring the possibilities for mediation and negotiation Preliminary communication with conflicting parties Understanding the issues involved and exploring possible common
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(iv) Taking concrete action to bring parties to the table, assisting parties to overcome their fears and apprehensions (v) Use of persuasion and threat wherever necessary
(vi) Envisioning of an acceptable framework of settlement and strategizing the path to settlement (vii) Monitoring the negotiation process, ensuring the parties agree and sign the settlement document (viii) Ensuring the implementation of the settlement (ix) Acting as the guarantor of the settlement Mediation and Intervention There is sometimes confusion about the terms mediation and intervention. In Sri Lanka, those who oppose a negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict interpret mediation as foreign intervention. Sometimes, government officials also tend to dismiss mediation by saying, We dont want foreign intervention in our internal affairs. These objections to mediation have two interesting elements. Firstly, mediation is identified as an activity of a foreign actor. Secondly, mediation is perceived as something undesirable. These are usual objections to mediation in a conflict. They, to some extent, indicate that in a conflict, there is no universal unanimity on mediation and that mediation is not welcome under all circumstances of a conflict. Mediation, in a way, is a form of intervention in a restricted sense of the term. The mediator indeed intervenes in a conflict, in order to bring it to an end through a settlement acceptable to the parties involved. This is intervention in a political sense. Mediation is not intervention in the military sense of the term. Military intervention is also a third party activity, often aimed at changing the course of a conflict. American
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intervention in Somalia and NATO intervention in Yugoslavia are examples. These are not mediation efforts, but politico-military actions in order to impose a settlement, as defined by the forces that intervene. Intervention, meanwhile, refers to the use of force to change the course of a conflict, either on behalf of one party or to force both parties to bring the conflict to an end. Intervention often involves military force. Mediation and Facilitation In Sri Lankas political debate on conflict resolution, the term facilitation is preferred by some to mediation. For example, the Sri Lankan government is of the view that they do not need third party mediation, but welcome third party facilitation. In fact, the Norwegian initiative launched in February 2000 is described by the government as facilitation, whereas the term mediation is also used to characterize it Is there a real distinction between mediation and facilitation? At least from the perspective of the Sri Lankan government, there seems to be a clear distinction. They understand facilitation as the help of a third party to facilitate communication between the government and the LTES. Once the communication is established and conditions for direct negotiations between the two sides are created, the role of the facilitator is over. When talks begin, there is probably no direct role for the facilitator, whereas in mediation there can be a direct role for the mediator.
In this lesson, you have learned some key concepts involved in mediation for conflict resolution.
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Mediation is an outside intervention in a conflict. It seeks to assist adversaries to resolve a shared conflict through constructive political dialogue. Mediators role can range from facilitating communication between parties to enable them to find a settlement and assisting them in the implementation of the settlement. Mediation requires the consent of the parties to the conflict for negotiation. Mediation works better with such consent and consensus. Mediation also works better when conditions are ripe for conflict resolution. Mediation is not an one-act play. It is a long and complex process. Mediation, intervention and facilitation are distinct concepts, as well as acts in conflict resolution.
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Readings / References Rabie, Mohamed, Conjlict Resolution and Ethnicity Zartman,William 1.,(1989), Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa,Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford
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5
Peace Studies
Laksiri Fernando
Even in peacetime the world has an awful lot of problems. Only in peacetime can we get on with solving them. Thinking about peace is the first step towards achieving it. Bill Oddie
1. What is Peace? Peace is normally defined and studied in relation to war and violence. There is merit in that, because peace is an urgent and pressing need when there is war or violence. But there are other long-term needs associated with peace. Development is one. Justice is another. Harmony with the environment is yet another. Therefore, people today tend to study peace in its broadest and long-term meaning. This holistic approach to peace is often called an ecopolitical approach. Ecopolitics is a term to describe a cluster of economic, political, ecological and ethical issues. A more traditional view argued that peace is the absence of war. But this is not completely correct. War may be absent. But violence may continue. There is a difference between war and violence. War is a large-scale conflict. Violence may be a state of small-scale conflict, yet inimical to peace. Electoral violence, for example, is not war. But it is a major threat to peace. War may end with a peace agreement. But
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peace thus remain and scale series understand
achieved can be temporary. The reasons for war might continue. War might erupt again or transform into smallof violence. Therefore, a broader definition is necessary to peace.
The traditional argument can be enlarged to define peace as the absence of war and violence. It makes better sense, but does not fully cover our complete concern for peace. The definition still transpires a negative meaning, the absence of war and violence. This is like what is called negative healthiness, the mere absence of sickness. But healthiness should be a positive one. Not only the absence of sickness, but also the physical fitness and good muscle tone. Peace should be like that, a positive one. Peace should end not only war, the symptom, but also injustice, the underlying causes. This does not mean that wars are waged against injustice. Onthecontrary, warsareusuallywagedtoperpetuateinjustice or for injustice. Hitler waged war against other nations to dominate them on the basis of race. The elimination of racism is therefore necessary to avoid wars of the type of Hitler. Peace should not only end war through agreement, but also bring harmony between warring nations. Otherwise, peace will not be a lasting one. Johan Galtung made the important distinction between what we normally call violence, physical violence, and structural violence. Structural violence might not harm the victims directly. But the people are harmed, victimized and violated through institutional means and structures. Poverty, malnutrition and hunger are some results of structural violence. If peace is the absence of violence, it should mean the absence ofviolence including structural violence as well. Peace means not only the absence of war and violence but also the absence of causes of war and violence. The study of peace not only encompasses the issue of justice but also the issue of ecology We may understand this connection between peace and ecology better by discussing different approaches to peace or peace studies.
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2. Approaches to Peace There are six main approaches to peace or peace studies. These approaches are, more or less, similar to prevailing approaches in other subjects. They are: (i) Conservative, (ii) Pragmatic, (iii) Social Justice, (iv) Personal Transformation, (v) World Order, and (vi) Ecological. Conservative Approach. This is mainly an authoritarian approach to peace, most often advocated by the established states and super powers. This is an approach of buildingpeace through strength and authority This approach believes in crisis management. It is skeptical about total peace. A limited peace is its ideal. It is a kind of a police approach to peace. According to this approach, peace is equated with order; and a little bit of violence may be necessary to maintain order. In respect of international order, proponents of this approach do not advocate complete disarmament. They say we must learn to live with nuclear weapons. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, during the Cold War period, based their policies on peace on this approach. The advocates of this approach hardly believe that ordinary people could make a difference in building peace. This is a big brother approach to world peace. Pragmatic Approach. This approach assumes neutrality in ideology and attempts to build peace through pragmatic and practical means. It does not care much about philosophy, values or politicalideals. The best possible degree of peace is its ideal. The termination of war is one of its main objectives. In this approach, there is no much concern about structural violence in society. The approach is based on international diplomacy. It strongly assumes that peace ultimately derives from effective negotiation and bargaining. These negotiations should be based on international law and treaties. In achieving peace, the mediation by neutral parties could play a major role. Under this approach, there is an attempt to strengthen international standards and mechanisms for peace. Nuclear disarmament is a major objective of peace. The United Nations usually
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bases its policies on pragmatism. There are merits and weaknesses in this approach. Social Justice Approach. This is an advocacy for positive peace. This approach analyzes long-term reasons for the breach of peace in society. The main advocates of this approach are the followers of Johan Galtung. A Norwegian by nationality, Galtung was the founding father of the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO). The main focus of this approach is on structural violence and its elimination. Social injustices such as poverty, hunger racism, chauvinism and economic exploitation are the results of structural violence. To build peace in the long run these issues should be addressed positively. This approach is for a new social order that could foster equality, justice and social harmony. The latter are attributes of what they mean by positive peace. Personal Transformation Approach. Preamble to the UNESCO Constitution states; Since wars begin in the minds, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed. The personal transformation approach has much to do with this proposition. The roots of it, however, can be traced to many religious philosophies. This approach is concerned with the ultimategoal of resolving contradictions within and between individuals. There is a psychological aspect to this approach. Advocacy of non-violence is a major method of this approach as advocated by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. This approach finds something wrong with the contemporary socialisation processes. There is much emphasis on peace education as a means to peace. Educationists and social psychologists are the main advocates of this approach. World Order Approach. This is popular among academics, particularly in the international relations field. Nevertheless, it is an interdisciplinary approach of the global system and its problems of peace in a holistic fashion. It approaches theproblems of peace not in isolation but in relation to development, justice and human
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~~NFLICT~SOLUT~~NANDPE;ACE~T~IESAN~TROOUCT~RYHANDB~~K
rights. The approach is systematic in character. It is normative in the sense that it values peace as a higher goal and attempts to achieve it through advocating necessary policies. It is value-oriented, non-elitist and rejects neutrality. It is by far the most comprehensive and coherent approach to peace. Extensive research and investigation support this approach. Ecological Approach. This is an approach developed particularly by Professor Fred Knehnan. A natural scientist (Physicist) by training, he was the founding Director of the Vancouver Peace Council in Canada. He has tried to synthesize positive aspects of all earlier approaches, mainly the last three and develop a new approach. It is very close to the last approach, the world order model. The approach seeks to establish linkages between three sets of problems. They are: (i) Peace/War (ii) Development/Environment (iii) Human Rights/Justice. The approach argues that all these sets of issues are related and interlinked. The objective of the approach is towards creating a sustainable future in which peace will also be sustainable. A considerable attention in this approach is paid for problem solving. It also emphasises the importance of peace movements. Peace studies and peace education are also considered to be of paramount importance in the peace movements. Similarities and Differences. There are several similarities and differences between the above six approaches. The first two approaches, the conservative and the pragmatic, are very close in nature. Both are elitist. They consider war and violence to be outcomes of power struggles. Therefore, the attempt is either to crush the new power seekers or to bring agreement between them. While the conservative approach pursues the first, the pragmatic approach pursues the second. American policy towards Iraq is a good example for the conservative approach. Neutral countries and the UN, in contrast, pursue a more pragmatic approach to bring peace to various issues. Pragmatic approach has various merits in the short term in bringing peace to various issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 48
There are general similarities between the other four approaches. They are non-elitist in nature. They all consider peoples participation as important in building peace in the world. For all of them, peace is a valued normative goal. But they differ largely in emphasizing different approaches in achieving peace. The social justice and the personal transformation are two complimentary approaches. Both are particularly related to eliminating civil war or political violence due to ethnic and social disharmony. They have equal application in resolving domestic violence as well. The main vision of the social justice approach is equity or distributive justice. The personal transformation approach tries to capture the hearts and minds of human beings in building peace. There are major similarities between the world order and the ecological approaches. Both are applicable to civil wars, as well as regional/international wars. Particularly, the latter has a specific application in analyzing and resolving political violence in country contexts as well. These are well-developed academic models in studying and analyzing issues of war, violence and peace. Both are holistic in nature and take into account almost all the relevant variables for analysis. The ecological approach is more advanced. According to Knelman: Peace is not simply the absence of war or the mediation of conflict but rather a dynamic balance between mutually reinforcing elements of emotional, economic, political, cultural, natural, ethical and technological variables. Here, peace is equated to harmony. This is philosophical. Emotional disharmony in a person creates tension. So does injustice. It is the mother of personal frustration, depression, anger or aggression. Harmony means free-from-harm and free-from-injustice. Social or political disharmony and injustice create violence and war. This has been the situation throughout history.
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CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
AND
PEACE
STUDIES
AN
INTRODUCTORY
HANDBOOK
3. The War Problem There are two types of war: (i). internal or civil war, which occurs within countries and, (ii). international war, which occurs between countries. Elimination or termination of war is a major challenge to the peace problem. Before analyzing this problem we need to understand it. To understand it properly, we need a proper definition about war. We dont call feuds, riots or small-scale violence war although they are related to the peace problem. War is a major and a specific peace problem. Ronald J. Glossop in his Conznting War ( 1987), has offered a good definition about war, which says; War is large scale violent conflict between organized groups that are or that aim to establish governments. War is large-scale violent conflict. The parties to the conflict are either governments (e.g. in World War II) or organized groups that aim to establish government (e.g. civil war in Rwanda). Or one party can be a government while the other party aims to establish a government. The latter is the case in Israel-PLO conflict or Sri LankaLTTE conflict. Types of War. There are various types of war. There can be war between nations with equal power or unequal power A powerful nation might wage war to conquer a poor or a weak nation. This is called imperialist or colonial war. The reason for the war is obviously unjustified. There is no dispute here where both parties are equally responsible. Therefore, there is no question of mitigation. Peace in this case should be based on a complete withdrawal of armies and perhaps with compensation and war reparation. On the other hand, when a colonized nation is trying to liberate itself from an imperialist master it is called a war of national liberation. This is popularly considered a just war, a justified one. There have been a series of national liberation wars in Asia and Africa after the end of the World War II. However, Mahatma Gandhi insisted that war of national liberation should be non-violent.
There are other types. A secessionist war is one in which some regions try to secede from the nation (e.g. Bangladesh against Pakistan or Eritrea against Ethiopia). Territorial civil war is another in which each of the opposing groups is seeking control of the whole nation (e.g. Rwanda or Angola). A revolutionary war is yet another, in which an organized group (e.g. JVP) seeks to overthrow the existing government and establish itself as the decision-maker for the whole nation. It should be noted, however, that a particular war might exemplify more than one type that we have identified. For example, there can be a war between an established government and a secessionist group within a country where the secessionist group receives assistance from another country. In this case, the war is both a civil as well as an international one. This was the situation in Bangladesh in 1971. Effects of War. War is a major problem for peace. Even a limited or negative peace is better than war In a negative peace situation (in the absence of war) there may or may not be injustice. But in a war situation there is definitely injustice. In a war, people are killed and maimed. Their property is destroyed. This is simply because they are on the other side or sometimes simply because they just appear to be there. Bombs, missiles and machine guns do not always hit the targets. They most often hit other things. Even soldiers have little or no choice about participating in the war. They are conscripted or forced into war by power seekers. Most of them are innocent victims. War always motivates people to be suspicious and spiteful of people on the other side. Only peace makes it possible for people to be more humane and sympathetic towards people in the other groups. This is common to civil wars as well as to international ones.
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4. A Peace Problem? It is also possible for negative peace to be a bad thing. A society can be a peaceful one, at least superficially, in which a ruthless dictator rules with an iron fist. Freedom or rights will not prevail under the circumstances. The decisions of the dictator will be arbitrary, ruthless and oppressive. There can be resentment and opposition underneath. But no one would dare even to raise a voice against the dictator because of the fear of reprisal. Therefore, it is quite possible to think of a socalled peace situation where there is so much injustice. Even war would be better, if it means a chance of getting rid of the dictator. Even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (of the United Nations) argued in its Preamble that if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human right should be protected by the rule of law. Here, rebellion was considered a recourse against tyranny and oppression although as a last resort. Just War. The above is a basis for a just war theory. This theory argues that under certain circumstances injustice is intolerably gross that even violence and war seem to be justified. It is on a similar basis that Marxists advocated revolutionary violence to overthrow what they called capitalist dictatorship. But the benefits of peace and horrors of war are such that it does not make sense to start a war over every injustice. As Glossop explained: An important part of the just war theory is the notion that the means must be proportional to the ends which can be expected. If a little violence, not too destructive, can get rid of a great deal ofinjustice, then such violence may be justified. But if, like modem war, it is likely to create more evil than it will remove, then violence is not justified. In view of the destructiveness of modem war, just war theorists are tending towards the idea that the large-scale violence of war is virtually never justified.
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5. Is Violence Inherent? Is violence inherent in human beings? Is it part of our natural biology? Some people say yes, not so openly but by implication and discretely. There are always lingering doubts about peace. One objective of peace studies is to dispel them. This is the question that we are trying to investigate in this section. Our answer is an emphatic no. But we need to substantiate it scientifically. In 1989, under the auspices of UNESCO, a group of well renowned scientists from different parts of the world met in Seville, a village in Spain. They thoroughly investigated the question and came up with a statement called The Seville Statement on Eolence. The statement was subtitled by the phrase Preparing the Ground for the Construction of Peace. These scientists, in their Introduction to the statement, declared: Some people say that violence and war cannot be ended because they are part of our natural biology. We say that is not true. People used to say that slavery and domination by race and sex were part of our biology. Some people even claimed they could provethesethings scientificahy. We now know they were wrong. Slavery has been ended and now the world is working to end domination by race and sex. That was a powerful declaration for peace, against violence and war. The statement contained five propositions. These propositions are worth summarizing for careful study. First Proposition. It is not scientific to say that war cannot be ended because animals make war and people are like animals. First, it is not true that animals make war. Although fighting occurs widely among some animal species, only a few cases of destructive fighting between organized groups have ever been reported. The inter-colony conflicts of ants, wolves or monkeys do not involve the use of destructive tools and institutionalization of conflict, which are common to human warfare.
CONFLlCT
RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK
Second, it is not true that people are just like animals. (It might be an insult to animals!) Unlike animals, people have human culture. Second Proposition. It is not scientific to say that war cannot be ended because it is part of our nature and genetic formation. Arguments about human nature cannot prove anything definitive. Because our human culture gives us the ability to change and shape our nature from one generation to another. It is not only the nature which determines human personality but its interaction with nature. The conditions of nature involve both ecological and social environments. Darwins theory is not about the survival of the strongest but the survival of the fittest. People that make war in certain circumstances may live in peace with h iig neighboursunder other circumstances. T eVkn s (in Denmark) were warriors at one time. Their descendants are the most peaceful people at present. Third Proposition. It is not scientific to say that aggression and violence are necessary for the humans to survive better. Violence is not in our evolutionary legacy. This view underestimates the importance of cooperation in human survival. Cooperation shown by human societies in food gathering, hunting and food production are most remarkable behavioral qualities of human beings. The traditional aththam (giving hand to others) system in Sri Lankan village life is one good example. Community practices in village life are almost universal in every society at the grass-roots level. Cooperation has been especially important to the survival of human species. Fourth Proposition. It is not scientific to say that humans have a violent brain. While we do have neural apparatus to act violently, it is not automatic. How we act is shaped by how we have been conditioned and socialized. It has been proved by scientific investigation that human phenomena such as crime and war are not an inevitable result of any neural cruelty. The scientists that gathered in Seville concluded that there is nothing in our neurophysiology that compels us to react violently.
Fifth Proposition. It is not scientific to say that war is caused by instinct or any single motivation. The behavior of soldiers in modem warfare has little to do with their perceived aggressiveness. Modern warfare uses a number of personal characteristics for training of soldiers. It exaggerates characteristics associated with violence, both in the training of soldiers and generating support for war among the general population. This is despicable. These systematically generated violent characteristics are not the causes but the consequences of war. The statement also had a conclusion. It stated that biology does not condemn humanity to war. Just as war begins in the minds of men, peace also begins in our minds. The same species that invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us. 6. A Historical Outlook A historical outlook might be necessary to understand how war and peace developed in human society. These developments are linked to the origins of the state and its evolution as a national state in modern times. It is also within the conflicts between national states and its international system that many of the devices and mechanisms for peace have been invented. Origins of War and Peace. The origins of war and peace are related to the origins of the state. It is difficult to know with precision when the state originated. Nomadic groups of people must have had some informal structures to make decisions for theirrespective societies. But the state in the sense of a permanent structure to control large communities by a small group of rulers, probably arose with permanent settlements, agrarian and urban. This must have happened over six thousand years ago. The known states were in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley.
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The original states made war against each other for wealth and power like in the present day warfare. They also made peace, although not permanent. The first known peace treaty was inscribed in clay around 300 B.C. War between small states became terminated when a powerful sovereign created an empire encompassing all small states. What they followed was, in a sense, the conservative approach for peace (See our discussion on different approaches). Peace was established under firm and ruthless authority. However, when the leader who created that empire died, a new cycle of warfare again erupted. Or there was warfare between empires. Three of the powerful empires in the Middle East were Hittite, Egyptian and Assyrian. Around 1400 B.C., these three empires entered into a non-aggression pact. About a century later, the Hittites and Egyptians formed an alliance against the expanding Assyrian Empire. What is important in this ancient history is that it is very much similar to war and peace in the present day world. A parallel violent development to war was class struggle. This was clearly visible during the Roman Empire. Since the third century B.C., the Roman Empire spread into vast areas, internally suppressing class stmggle and externally conquering other countries. It was the period of Pax Romana. Slaves and slave trade were extensively used in building this empire. Similar developments occurred in Asia. China and India were two major centres for state and empire building in Asia Burma Thailand and Cambodia were three other minor centres. The formation and development of Asian states and empires also involved war and internal violence, though with intermittent peace. National State. The development of a national state system from the beginning of the modem era (1 6th century A.D.) is generally considered to be favorable to peace in the world. This consideration might not be completely correct. However, it is assumed that a national 56
state system, compared to previous empires could contain internal violence and external aggression. It is true that after the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 this objective was fairly achieved in Western Europe. After that period, national boundaries were established for Spain, France, England, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Austria, Hungary and Russia. The areas presently make up Germany and Italy consisted of many smaller states. Before that, extreme violence and war marked the period between 1350 and 1650. Peasants and townspeople fought feudal nobles, kings fought Emperor and the Pope, Protestants fought Catholics and one nationality fought another The fighting came to a climax in the Thirty Years War(1618-48). National state is a stable state with a defined territory, a stable population and a sovereign government. It is not like the unstable ancient state systems of empires and precarious kingdoms. This is why an international system with well-defined national states is considered to be more conducive to peace and stability. Colonialism. But the above assumption was not completely correct. After the emergence of national states, war between Western countries became escalated in conquering and demarcating the territories of Americas, Asia and Africa. The main victims were the people of these colonized continents. Now the game was war and peace. After each war, there was a peace treaty. It was as if they were following the pragmatic approach to peace (See our previous discussion on different approaches). The purpose of these treaties was not to bring peace to the inhabitants, but to demarcate and redemarcate the colonial territories between them. For example, after the Seven Years War (1757-63) between France and Britain, the Treaty of Paris was signed. It gave British control over North America and the East Coast of India.
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War in Europe also did not end just because of the Treaty of Westphalia. There was continuous war after the French Revolution. But the West invented another mechanism, international conferencing, to resolve conflict. In a limited sense, international conferencing can be considered as a way to peace. The Congress of Vienna ( I 8 14- 15) was such a conference. It redrew the map of Europe. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Western powers were competing for territory. Marxists analyzed war as a natural outcome of what they called imperialism. The big powers negotiated their conflicts with each other while using military force to subdue small powers and non-industrialized societies. World War I. Power competition escalated in the early twentieth century as the race for colonies and military superiority became more intense. Italy and Germany were very aggressive as late comers to the competition. The competing European nations formed different alliances. Competition for influence was intense in the Balkan region (This is the area where ethnic conflicts and civil war are intense even today). The assassination of an Austrian prince by a Serbian insurgent sparked the world war. Even before the incident, the belligerent nations had their war plans already made. The Treaty of Versailles (19 19) provided a settlement after the war Germany was punished. It lost all overseas possessions and had to pay reparations to the victors. It has been argued whether the punitive settlement was conducive to peace in the long run. New states were created (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia). Some nations became independent. The League of Nations. The Treaty of Versailles also provided for the formation of the League of Nations. It was a new invention. An invention of a permanent international organization to promote and protect peace. The US President Woodrow Wilson was the main architect of the League. But he failed to persuade the US Senate to ratify the treaty. As a consequence, the US could not become a member of the League.
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One argument of the world order approach (that we have outlined earlier) has been to emphasize the importance of a permanent international organization to preserve peace. The League achieved the said objective. But the international organization should be strong, and strong enough to prevent new military build up. But the League could not achieve the second objective. The League was weak. It was not effective in preventing military build up of many countries, particular1 y Germany, Japan and Italy. Therefore, it could not preserve peace in the long run. In 193 1, Japan captured Manchuria from China. In 193536, Italy conquered Ethiopia. However, the League was helpless. , i
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World War II. The German invasion of Poland in September 1939 was considered to be the beginning of World War II. However, Japan had invaded China in 1937. The rise of Fascism in Germany, Japan, Italy and Spain was the background to the war. Fascism was a particular authoritarian ideology based on the superiority of particular races. This kind of ideology was proved to be extremely inimical to peace everywhere. It created both internal and external aggression. In Germany, the minority community of Jews was almost exterminated. Germany took over Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands and France, and attacked Britain and Russia. The rise of Fascism occurred within a background of world economic crisis and depression. The situation vindicated the argument (of the social justice approach) that war and peace are related to deeprooted social, economic, political and ecological conditions. However, after the war had erupted into such worldwide proportions, only force could stop its further escalation. This is a tragedy in war and peace. After a strong assault by combined forces, Germany surrendered in May 1945. But Japan surrendered in August of the same year after the Americans had dropped-newly developed atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is arguable whether the atomic bomb was necessary or not. The consequences of the bomb was devastating for the ordinary Japanese people for decades to come.
Cold War. The Allied nations formed the United Nations to preserve the peace achieved at the end of World War II. However, within three years after the end of the war, the Cold War broke out between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Quarrels developed over the terms of peace. Berlin was a major flashpoint. The Western powers formed a new military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Communist countries formed the Warsaw Pact in retaliation. There were revolutions, war and violence in China, Korea and Vietnam. Korea became divided. Eventually, Vietnam also became divided. The country could unite itself only after 1975. Another feature of the post-war period was the gaining of independence by many former colonies. Most of them achieved independence only after military struggles. Algeria and Indonesia were two major examples. America gave independence to the Philippines in 1946 and Britain to India, Pakistan, Burma and Sri Lanka in I94748. There were widespread violence between Hindus and Muslims before and after independence of India and Pakistan. The decolonization process was generally considered to be favorable to world peace. Otherwise, more struggles and war would have been the result. The decolonization of most of the African countries came late - in the 1960s. The process of decolonization strengthened the UN membership, allowing a more equitable world order. The newlyindependent countries, forming themselves under the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), also played a balancing role in world affairs. The Cold War was a discrete war. Most of the pawns were the former colonies. For the Arab-Israeli conflict, there were reasons (the Palestinian question) other than the super-power rivalries. But the super-power rivalries reinforced them. There were wars in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982. This situation also created continuous conflicts in Lebanon among various religious factions. There were internal conflicts in many African countries (Rwanda, Zaire, Zambia, Algeria, Sudan, Nigeria, Uganda, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Chad, Angola,
Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Morocco), directly and indirectly fueled by external powers. Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) was another stage for the Cold War drama. Struggles were not restricted to the newly independent countries. Especially after the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the superpower rivahies became intensified through various factions and regimes in Latin America. As we could see from our historical overview, war between citystates has evolved through national states to super power rivalries. Growing military power has been the key ingredient in this development. Although the Cold War is now over, the growing military power of different nations still constitutes the major element in peace problem. 7. Need for Disarmament The need for disarmament is a need for peace. This has been proved through history. War is old as civilization. But wars fought today are completely different to wars fought four or five thousand years ago. The most obvious is the difference in the weapons used. Until the fourteenth century, there were only minor changes in the manner in which the wars were fought. The chiefweapons were bows and arrows, swords, shields, catapults and spears. Major changes occurred when gunpowder was introduced. As a result, cannons replaced catapults, while guns and bullets replaced bows and arrows. New Changes. After the Industrial Revolution, new and more destructive weapons becameinvented by new technology. The development of weaponry first included the invention of landmines, torpedoes, grenades, machine guns, and tanks, submarines and bombs that can be dropped from airplanes. Then came the mass destructive weaponry such as nuclear and thermonuclear (hydrogen) bombs. They were accompanied by the invention of chemical and biological weaponry. War and war preparations have come to involve more and more people in many ways.
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CONFLICT RESOLlJTION
War has become an industry. There was a distinction between military personnel and civilians earlier But this distinction has increasingly disappeared. All are at stake and involved in a modem day war. During a war, the countries involved commit a great deal of human and financial resources to the fight. Even during peacetime, the top priority of many nations is on national security. Consequences of War. The consequences of war, as a result of advanced weaponry, are a major challenge to peace. Quincy Wright who studied data from 1480 to 1940 in his A Study of Wr says: a It is clear that during the modem period there has been a trend toward an increase in the absolute and relative size of armies whether one considers the peace time army, the number mobilized for war, the number of combatants engaged in battle, or the number of military and civil populations devoting themselves to war work. The proportion of the population engaged in the armies has tended to become larger, and the number of the battles has tended increase. As a result, the proportion of the population dying as a direct consequence of battle has tended to increase. It is estimated that the number of battle deaths of military personnel alone was 9,000,OOO in World War I and 15,000,OOO in World War II. Total deaths from warfare have been two to three times greater in the 20th century than during the 19th century. During the Six-Day War between Israel and Arab countries in 1967 there were about 19,600 battle-related deaths, which was about 3,266 per day. Costs of War. The worldwide expenditure for military purposes is now about three billion a day. Although the Cold War is over, the arms race is still on. As one superpower is gone, the other tries to maintain a world hegemony; and new ones are emerging to replace the gone one. Nuclear race is extremely intense between the middle powers
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(e.g. India-Pakistan) than between the big ones. Arms expenditure is escalating in countries engulfed with civil wars. Guerrilla armies are amassing arms and war technology in so far unknown proportions. The governments facing such threats are diverting money to the military from civilian purposes. The welfare and development of the people suffer. It is not correct to say that the danger of a Third World War is over. If something goes wrong, the human costs will be devastating. There are over 50,000 nuclear warheads in the world today. Each is bigger than the bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Not only the blast and heat of each bomb, but the radiation, which the bombs unleash, can be devastating to the whole ofhumanity. Not only the countries at war, but also the whole world will suffer. The argument that the countries will not use nuclear weapons even if there is another world war is not correct. It is not consistent with the logic of war. The aim of war is to win. In a war, if either side is facing defeat, it will use nuclear weapons. If the winning side anticipates the losing side to use nuclear weapons, they would want to use them before. If the losing side anticipates that the winning side would feel it that way, then they would prefer to use them before the winning side. The end of the logic would be that both sides will be forced to use nuclear weapons as soon as the war begins. If there was any rationality on the part ofbelligerents not to use nuclear weapons in a war, it would not allow a war to develop in the first place. The only way to prevent a nuclear holocaust is to prevent any war between any nuclear power, small or big. But we cannot ignore the possibility that a nuclear war might trigger by accident. Charles Osgood reported the incident in October 1960 that the US was about to attack the Soviet Union, mistaking early warning signals about a Soviet attack on the US! The debacle was prevented because the officer in charge knew that the Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev was in New York at that 63
time and it was unlikely that the Soviets were to launch an attack at such a time. After the above incident, a (Teletype) hotline was established between Moscow and Washington to prevent that kind of an accident. However, now the Soviet Union is dissolved into various republics, there are more nuclear powers in the region than before. There are also other nuclear powers, which have emerged during the last decade or so. The latest additions to this list are India and Pakistan. Progress in Disarmament. The picture is not completely gloomy. There has been some progress in the worlds disarmament efforts. However, the efforts started only after all major powers, the big five (US, Soviet Union, Britain, France and China), joined the nuclear club. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968 and came into operation in 1970. A major objective of this treaty was to prevent other countries becoming nuclear powers. This has not been to the satisfaction of emerging powers although a large majority of countries have signed this treaty now. The treaty also did not do anything to prevent the stockpiling of strategic weapons, including nuclear arms by the big powers. It was to address this issue that Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were initiated. After series of talks, the SALT I treaty was concluded between the two super powers in 1972. This was the first successful effort to constrain the nuclear arms race. However, this was an interim agreement for five years. After some dragging of feet, the SALT II was concluded in 1979. However, its implementation was impaired because of superpower controversy. Apart from the new right wing administration in the US under Ronald Reagan, the atmosphere for arms control was also spoiled by the Soviet invasion of Afghanstan. The situation eased only after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. There has been much progress in the area of strategic arms control since then. The two super powers signed an agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) in 1987. It managed to
remove about one-fifth of the existing nuclear weapons in the world and paved the way for more and more arms control and removal. The new way of looking at the problem was the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). There have been several rounds of talk and the achievements are considerable. The latest addition to the disarmament effort is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although this has made some progress, some countries, including India and Pakistan, have refused to sign this treaty. 8. Role of the UN The role of the UN in ensuring world peace is a decisive one. Peace was the main objective of forming the UN in 1945. However, the powers and mechanisms it has under its disposal to ensure world peace are limited. Compounding this limitation, the organization is also engulfed with serious power rivalries. During the Cold War (1948-90) these rivalries were paramount. Although the atmosphere has now changed due to the supposed end of the Cold War, power rivalries still continue and obstruct peace. It might be necessary to outline the basic structure and development of this organization before evaluating its role in ensuring world peace. This will be done, however, with a view on peace. Membership. The UN started in 1945 with a membership of 48 countries. The limited membership was mainly a reflection of colonialism. Many countries of the world, especially in the continents of Africa and Asia, were under colonial masters. The United Nations rightly considered this situation to be a threat to world peace. Therefore, decolonisation was one of its principal policies to promote world peace. Gradually, over a hundred countries have become independent under the promotion of the UN. These countries eventually acquired membership of this august body. By 1990, there were 165 member countries in the UN. 65
Another threat for peace was considered to be the Russian (or communist) hegemony in Eastern Europe and Soviet Asia. This was a major reason for the Cold War. This situation became diffused after the fall of the Soviet Union in 199 1. As a result, over 15 new nations have emerged. At present, the UN membership amounts to 190. It is believed that when the world community consists of its organic components (i.e. independent nations), there is a better balance in world politics. This is one argument of the world order approach. However, the short-term result of these developments has been continuous unrest, violence and civil war in Eastern Europe. Structure. The UN is not a world government. It is an international association of nation states for the protection and promotion of peace, among other things. It has six main bodies: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice (ICI) and the Secretariat. All these are not dealing with peace. The main body of the UN is its General Assembly. All member countries sit in this assembly. One country has one vote. However, it is not the most powerful body in the organization. It has an important role to play in the promotion of peace in the long run. This role has so far been performed in developing policies and recommending guidelines for the member countries. It has also initiated many actions under the Secretariat towards the promotion of disarmament and arms control. The use of child soldiers in armed conflict, the menace of land mines and the prevention of international terrorism are three major areas that the General Assembly has undertaken for its policy development in recent times. Various committees and commissions of the General Assembly also have played a major role in developing international treaties with a view to prevent war and to promote peace. One of its important functions is to approve the budget of the organization for various activities, including peace and disarmament.
A major weakness of the General Assembly is that its decisions have no binding power over the member countries. It conducts its affairs through statements and resolutions. The statements are largely rhetoric. The resolutions are only recommendations. It is also helpless in preventing war or aggression in the short run. The General Assembly meets only once a year. It has no executive arm of its own other than the Secretariat. The Security Council mainly controls the Secretariat. The member countries or the General Assembly has only an indirect infIuence. Security Council. The Security Council consists of 15 member nations. Five major countries (Russia, UK, France, China and US) are Permanent Members. Ten other nations are elected every two years by the General Assembly. The Security Council is a permanent body ready to be convened at any hour of the day or night to handle threats to international peace and security. Its resolutions are binding on all member nations although there are instances that these decisions are not respected. The Security Council is a controversial body. It is not a democratic body elected by the General Assembly. The permanent members have veto power quite contrary to accepted democratic principles. The Council is politically polarized. This polarization was a major reason for the Cold War before 1990. It is argued that because of political self-interests of major/super powers in the Security Council, the world peace is hampered than preserved by its decisions. Some members sometimes prevent the Security Council from taking important decisions on peace because of the use of veto power. Whatever the weaknesses, however, the Security Council has been the only effective mechanism in preventing a Third World War so far. Dispute Settlement? The role of the Security Council so far has been not in line with the principles of dispute settlement or conflict resolution. There have been two major instances where the Security Council took firm action regarding war.
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First was in 1950, during the Korean civil war. America took this initiative during a boycott of the Council by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the decision was not vetoed. However, the decision was partisan and led to the division of Korea into two, North and South. Without settling the dispute, the division of the country exacerbated the conflict with a massive human cost and security risks for the decades to come. The second was in 1990, against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Thanks to the end of the Cold War, there was a general agreement between major powers on the issue. However, the decision was not only to impose sanctions against Iraq but also to force its withdrawal from Kuwait by military means. This was a decision initiated by the US with complete support of Britain. The decision was implemented even going well beyond the terms of the Security Council decisions. There is no question that Iraq went against the accepted international norms of national sovereignty by invading Kuwait. By its military action, Iraq fbrther threatened the regional peace in no uncertain terms. There was the possibility of war spreading into neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia. However, it is a controversial question whether the actions so far taken against Iraq by the Security Council were proportionate and in line with the norms of international peace. Sanctions have hit hard on the ordinary people of Iraq. The whole process of weapons inspection has been engulfed with dispute and controversy. The US has taken unilateral decisions to wage military action quite contrary to the expected results of peace. The Iraqi issue has raised questions about the reliability of the Security Council mechanism to ensure peace and prevent war. During the period between 1950 and 1990, the Council has not been able to take any worthwhile decision on international disputes because of the Cold War controversies. Now the Cold War is over, it is not clear whether the Council is going in the right direction. It has been argued, therefore, that the UN and especially the Security Council has to be reformed if it is to meet the challenges of war and peace in the 2 1stst
Century.
ICJ. The International Court of Justice is an important body constituted under the Charter of the UN. It is a specialized body of legal luminaries to decide upon international disputes. It has a major potential for preventing disputes escalating into conflicts and war if the services of this body are utilized and the decisions adhered to. However, very few nations take their international disputes before this court. Some others refuse to appear before it even if their cases are being referred to this court. Also, there is no world police to enforce the decisions of this court ofjustice. Peace Keeping. This has been a very useful function of the UN. It is the deployment of a peacekeeping force (soldiers) with the assistance of police and civilian personnel in order to prevent conflicts or to bring them under a reasonable control. These peacekeeping soldiers are popularly called Blue Helmets. Since 1945, the UN has been involved in over thirty-five peace keeping operations until now. A total of over 600,000 military, police and civilian personnel have been deployed in these operations. Nearly 1,000 of them, unfortunately, have died in the service of their cause. Peacekeeping forces are normally deployed with the consent of the respective governments. The nature of peacekeeping operations has evolved considerably over years. For example, the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in early 1990s vastly differed from the mandate of the peacekeeping operation deployed when India and Pakistan fought over the issue of Kashmir in early 1950s. The recent peace keeping operations have been more forceful and forthright with a strong backing of the Security Council. Moreover, in the case of Cambodia, for example, the UN peacekeepers were deployed after a peace agreement between the respective parties. Therefore, the mandate was stronger and involved the decommissioning of the existing armies of various factions to the conflict as well. Cambodia was one of the most successful peace keeping operations of the UN. 69
A major weakness of UN peacekeeping operations is that the deployments completely depend on the soldiers supplied by various member governments of the UN. The UN has no standing army of its own. The units supplied by different countries differ largely in training, experience and cultural background. They do not have any training in peace keeping as such. Therefore, the behavior of these soldiers is very much similar to ordinary soldiers in a conflict situation. As a result, they invariably tend to fue1 the conflicts than appeasing them. This has been a major criticism about the UN peacekeeping operations. Although there are general commanders to various peacekeeping operations, the army units from different countries generally operate under their own commands. Therefore, most of the operations do not have proper coordination required for the respective tasks. This has been a major reason to propose that the UN should have its own peacekeeping army with proper training and coordination. Another weakness has been financial. The costs of peacekeeping operations have tremendously increased with the expansion of deployments. One years bill is something like $1 billion. However, the contributions for these operations do not match the actual costs. There has always been a considerable debt owed by the UN to the troop-contributing countries. However, the UNs peacekeeping operations have been commendable. In 1988, the UN peacekeeping forces won the Nobel Peace Prize for demanding and hazardous services in the cause of peace. Other Activities. Another important area that the UN has been involved in is peace making. Peace making means initiatives to bring hostile or conflicting parties to agreement and peace settlements. This is also what we mean by conflict resolution. Since the Manila Declaration on Peaceful Settlement in 1982, the UN, and more particularly the Secretary General and his Office, have been involved in direct peace making activities. As a third party in conflict resolution, UN has demonstrated more credibility than any other source.
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The UN in 1988/89 successfully negotiated the Soviet Unions withdrawal from Afghanistan. It took a major role in the formulation and the execution of the Paris Agreements on Cambodia. The UN facilitated the independence in Namibia and the transfer of power in South Africa. The UN has been successful in negotiating settlements in Guatemala, El Salvador and several other conflict-tom Latin American countries. The UN has been making arrangements to get involved in a big way in what it has called Preventive Diplomacy as well. It means the action to prevent disputes from arising between parties and to prevent existing disputes from escalating into major conflicts. The measures for fact finding have taken a major role in this endeavor since preventive steps must be based on timely and accurate facts. Recently, the UN also has been developing valuable networks of early warning systems concerning risks of nuclear accidents, natural disasters, environmental threats and mass movements of populations. These incidents without control can impinge on peace directly in many areas. Another area that the UN has been assisting its member countries is peace building. Measures for peace building involves assistance to refugees, displaced persons, the construction and reconstruction of infrastructure facilities and peace education in conflict zones both before and after peace settlements. The idea of post-conflict peace building is to prevent conflicts recurring due to lack of confidence or for material difficulties. Difficulties/Weaknesses. There are enormous difficulties in the path of peace by the UN. Some are financial. The entire UN system has an annual budget only of about $7 billion. This is less than a weeks expenditure worldwide on the arms race. It is also less than the budget of New York City Council. Yet it is only a small fraction of that total UN budget which is spent on disarmament and peace activities.
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The UN system has a comparatively small staff. To address the issues of nearly 6 billion people in the world, the whole UN system with its specialized agencies has only about 50,000 staff members. This is not even one staff member for every 100,000 human beings. It is often said that the UN spends a lot of money on paper work. This is highly exaggerated. Its use of paper for one year is less than what is used for one Sunday edition of The New York Times. A major weakness of the UN in terms of peace building seems to be its lack of mandate and incapacity to involve itself in peace settlements in internal conflicts. This incapacity emerges out of the Charter itselfbecause it prohibits, in Article 2 (7), the UN to get involved in disputes without agreement of the disputant governments or the parties to a conflict. Only exception is when the Security Council considers that such a conflict would pose a serious threat to world peace and security. This is entirely a political judgement and not a humanitarian one. What it means is that the UN can ignore some conflicts and intervene in some others. Most of the political conflicts since World War II have been internal than international. These conflicts have been mostly due to ethnic, religious or similar social rivalries. Others are of rebellious or revolutionary nature based on ideology or political perspective. The Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University in Sweden annually reports on these conflicts. It has been continuously reported that internal armed conflicts are on the increase after the end of the Cold War and they are being dragged on with considerable human costs. There are about 150 conflicts of this nature in the world at present. These conflicts involve more than one third of the member countries of the UN, yet the organization has not been in a position to resolve or at least intervene in them due to internal weaknesses or restrictions.
In our discussions on peace studies in this chapter we have not touched upon internal conflicts and conflict resolution due to the fact that these themes are being discussed in other chapters. Students of peace studies, however, need to keep in mind that these subjects are closely interconnected and the chapters on peace studies and conflict resolution are complimentary to each other. 9. Conclusion What is the best way to conclude our discussion on peace studies? Perhaps by invoking some new thinking on the subject as a summary. The best person to draw some inspiration from, perhaps, is Edward De Bono. He is the author of Lateral Thinking and Conflicts: A Better Way to Resolve Them. He invented the term lateral thinking to explain a new type of creative thinking. Now he has applied this thinking to better understand and resolve conflicts. This is not to say that all what he says is valid and true. But there is a lot to learn from his thinking. Traditionally, people consider the absence of war as their approach to peace. But according to De Bono, the absence of peace is our problem. We need to discuss the problem of peace from the point of view of peace and not from the point of view of war. There is something wrong in our traditional way of thinking! What is wrong is that we think in arguments. Peace is not an argument. Peace cannot be achieved through argument. Peace is a social design, a creative one at that. Argument is the most venerated in the Western thinking tradition. We tend to approach peace and contlict resolution through this tradition. When we have disputes we either try to fight/litigate or negotiate/bargain. This has been the history of war and peace. This is what we have found through our historical exploration in this chapter as well as in our discussions on the UN activities. But disputes are due to different
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interests or opinions. We never try to harmonize these interests and opinions. We may succeed in avoiding confhct or war in the short run through argument thinking i.e. negotiation and bargain. But we never achieve peace in the long run. De Bono tried to draw some clues from the Asian tradition. Referring to Japan he said: It would be extremely bad manners to tell a person that he was wrong or his idea incorrect. It might even have been criminal to suggest that something ought to be changed. [Instead, they say] that is wonderful and perfect and cannot be improved, now lets explore. This is the secret to design a way out for peace. Peace is an exploration for social harmony. The approach of De Bono, while unique in its own way, strengthens the positive elements of social justice and ecological approaches that we have discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Summary In this chapter, you have learned the following: On Peace
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Peace is not just the absence of war. Peace also means the absence of causes and conditions for war and violence. If peace is absence of violence it should also mean the absence of hidden, structural violence.
On Approaches to Peace
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There are six approaches to peace and peace studies: 1. Conservative Approach: An authoritarian approach, often advocated by the states and super powers.
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2. Pragmatic Approach: This looks at peace from a practical point of view, focusing more on negotiations, diplomacy and practical objectives than on ideals or philosophies. 3. Social Justice Approach: The main focus is on structural violence and its elimination. 4. Personal Transformation Approach: This approach believes in the ultimate goal of resolving contradictions within and between individuals. 5. World Order Approach: This approach peace in relation to development, justice and human rights. 6. Ecological Approach: The focus is on building a sustainable future for peace also to be sustainable. On War
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There are two types of war: internal or civil wars and international wars.
0 War is a large-scale violent conflict.

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War is a problem for peace. A limited peace is better than war.
On Violence
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It is wrong to assume that violence is inherent in human beings. There is nothing natural in violence.
References/Readings David Adams, The Seville Statement on Violence: Preparing the Groundfor the Construction of Peace, UNESCO, Paris, 199 1
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Sydney Bailey, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Ideas and Proposals for Research, UN Institute for Training and Research, New York, 1970 Sydney Bailey, How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflicts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, t 1983 Frank Barnaby (Ed.), Building a More Democratic United Nations, i Frank Cass, London, 199 1 Edward De Bono, Conflicts: A Better Way to Resolve Them, Penguin, London, 199 1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, United Nations, New York, 1992 D. W. Bowett (Ed.), The Search for Peace, Routledge, London, 1972 Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, World Peace Through World Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960 Brian Crozier, A Theory of Conflict, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1974 Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, Saul H. Mendlovitz (Eds.), Towards a Just World Order, Westview Press, Boulder, 1982 Mary L. Foster and Robert A. Rubinstein, Peace and War: Cross Cultural Perspectives, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1986 Ed Garcia, War and Peace Making, Claretian Publications, Quezon, 1994. Ronald J. Glossop, Confrronting War, McFarland, Jefferson, N. C., 1987
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Sydney Bailey, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Ideas and Proposals for Research, UN Institute for Training and Research, New York, 1970 Sydney Bailey, How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conjlicts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983 Frank Bamaby (Ed.), Building a More Democratic United Nations, Frank Cass, London, 199 1 Edward De Bono, Conflicts: A Better Way to Resolve Them, Penguin, London, 199 1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, United Nations, New York, 1992 D. W. Bowett (Ed.), The Search for Peace, Routledge, London, 1972 Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, World Peace Through World Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960 Brian Crozier, A Theory of Conflict, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1974 Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, Saul H. Mendlovitz (Eds.), Towards a Just World Order, Westview Press, Boulder, 1982 Mary L. Foster and Robert A. Rubinstein, Peace and War: Cross Cultural Perspectives, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1986 Ed Garcia, War and Peace Making, Claretian Publications, Quezon, 1994. Ronald J. Glossop, Confronting War, McFarland, Jefferson, N. C., 1987
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Max Habicht, The Abolition of War, Club Humaniste, Paris, 1986 Shirley Hazzard, Defeat of an Ideal: A Study of the Self-Destruction of the United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1973 Signe Howell and Roy Willis, Societies at Peace, Routledge, London, 1989 Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament, Pan Publishers, London, 1982 John Kettle and Stephanie Dowrick (Eds.), After the GulfWar: For Peace in the Middle East, Pluto Press, Sydney, 199 1 Dennis Pirages, Managing Political Conflict, Praeger, New York, 1976 Robert F. Randle, The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace Settlement, The Free Press, New York, 1973 Emery Reves, The Anatomy of Peace, Penguin, London, 1945 Keith Suter, A New International Order: Proposals for Making a Better World, World Federalists, 198 1 Keith Suter, Alternative to War: Conflict Resolution and the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, Womens International League, Sydney, 1986 Brian, Urquhart, Conflict Resolution in 1988: the Role of United Nations, in SIPRI Year Book 1989, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989
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Understanding the Ethnic Conflict and Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka: A Conflict Resolution Perspective
S. I. Keethaponcalan Introduction The conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tarnils in Sri Lanka has not only caused immense destruction to the social, economic and political institutions, but it has also claimed approximately 60,000 lives. In that sense the conflict has become the major influencing factor of the modem history of the island nation. Although some analysts trace the historical origins of the conflict to the pre-colonial period, the mid20th century witnessed the beginnings of a direct confrontation between these two communities. Then in the 198Os, the conflict that had remained a peaceful, political one, transformed itself into a violent conflict and war. As the destructive nature of the conflict gradually escalated, a number of efforts were made to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. However, the peace-making efforts failed to produce any fruitful and lasting outcomes. In this chapter, we will attempt to understand some dimensions of the conflict, the peace efforts and main reasons for the failure of those peace processes. Nature of the Conflict Sri Lankas present conflict is generally described as an ethnic conflict. What it means is that (i) there are demands or political goals of ethnic communities at the core of the conflict, and (ii) ethnic
communities are involved in the conflict. The word ethnic is the most contemporary expression to refer to communities who have distinct cultural, linguistic or religious identities. Therefore, an ethnic conflict can also be described as an identity conflict, arising from group identity-based grievances, demands and aspirations. Sri Lankas ethnic conflict has entered the phase of an armed conflict between the state and militant political representatives of the Tamil community. In this sense, the conflict is also an internal armed conflict. This internal armed conflict has now reached its eighteenth year, a fairly long conflict in terms of its life span. In that sense, it can also be called aprotracted conflict. Parties to the Conflict In understanding a conflict, it is important to identify the parties involved in the conflict. Identifying parties involved also helps us to get a better understanding of the nature of the conflict. In intra-state conthcts that involve ethnic identity groups, the state and political movements, identifying parties is not an easy task. The main reason is that although there are direct and indirect parties to a conflict, sometimes this distinction gets blurred. This is particularly so in Sri Lankas conflict. What we can do is to try to identify parties to the conflict at different levels. If we define Sri Lankas conflict as an ethnic conflict, then we can see the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils as main ethnic communities in the conflict. According to the 198 1 Census, the majority Sinhalese community in the country comprise 74% of the total population. The Sri Lankan Tamils, the largest minority community of Sri Lanka concentrate mostly in the Northern and Eastern provinces and comprise nearly 13% of the total population. In a simple sense, these two communities are the main parties to the conflict. However, a complication begins when we realize that all members of these ethnic
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communities are not probably parties to the conflict. Many of the Sinhalese and Tamil people may not have wanted the conflict at all. Therefore, when we say that Sinhalese and Tamil communities are parties to the present ethnic conflict, we do so in a general, descriptive sense. Then there is another ethnic community in Sri Lanka that can also be considered a party to the present ethnic conflict. They are Sri Lankan Muslims who comprise about 7% of the countrys population. They are a party to the conflict in a different sense. Muslim community, particularly those living in the Northern and Eastern provinces, have been severely affected by the armed conflict. Many Muslim families have been displaced from the conflict region. In working out a solution to Sri Lankas ethnic problem, their interests and demands, particularly on the question of power-sharing in the Eastern province, cannot be ignored. Indeed, they will have to be a party to the solution. In the on-going war, there are two main parties directly involved. The first is the Sri Lankan state and the other is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. They are the most direct parties in the conflict in the sense that they are the regular participants in the war. With regard to the role of the state, we can even say that the state has been a party to the conflict even before it took the character of an armed conflict. In the pre-war period of the conflict, the parties were the state and the political representatives of the Tamil community. Difficulties in exactly identifying the parties to the conflict would not end there. Each ethnic community may have different political actors with different degrees of involvement with the conflict and with different perceptions and solutions. For example, in Sinhalesesociety, its two main political parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party - Peoples Alliance and the United National Party have, because of their being ruling parties, direct roles in the conflict. There are other political parties in Sinhalese society who have not held governmental power, but been indirect parties by their advocacy of specific positions about ethnic relations and the
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conflict itself For example, a group that advocates the military option in resolving the conflict and is opposed to a negotiated settlement becomes a party to the conflict, although not in a direct sense. In Tamil society too, a similar picture prevails. Presently, the LTTE is the most prominent and active Tamil party to the conflict and it wants to be the sole representative of the Tamil people. Although various Tamil political groups have disputed this claim, the movement is undoubtedly the strongest among all Tamil political actors. The LTTE is waging a war against the Sri Lankan military forces in the Northern and Eastern part of the island and has the capacity to determine the political trend of the country and disrupt any peace initiative. Therefore, it could be regarded as a major player of the conflict. Then there are other Tamil political parties who have been directly involved in the conflict in the past, but now play a role secondary to the LTTE. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the traditional parliamentary party of the Tamil community, represents an approach quite different from the LTTE. While the LTTE implements a military strategy, the TULF prefers a negotiated political settlement. Then, there are former Tamil militant organizations like Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP), and Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) that have been parties to the armed conflict in the past and have now adopted political strategies. In sum, we can say that there is a multiplicity ofparties to Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. Some are direct while some others are indirect. Goals The modern conflict between the Sinhala and the Tamil communities began with the Tarnils demand for regional autonomy to the Northern
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and Eastern provinces. The Tamils, under the leadership of S.J:V. Chelvanayakam, transformed this vague idea of regional autonomy into a demand for a federal state, immediately after the independence in 1948. The early 1980s show the escalation of violence and the emergence of the Tamil militant movements including the LTTE, and the cry became separate state very soon. The LTTE is still fighting for the separate state of Tamil Eelam. Therefore, in a sense, the attainment of a separate state could be described as the major goal of the Tamils in this conflict. In reality, however, not all of the Tamil factions, especially those who joined the mainstream politics subscribe to the idea of separate state. They are prepared to settle for something less than a separate state; for example, a federal state or a separate regional council for the Tamils in the Northern and Eastern provinces. In other words, there are factions within the Tamil community that are willing to compromise for a constitutional arrangement that guarantees regional autonomy to the Tamils. The Sinhalese nationalist forces perceive this Tamil goal, be it a separate state or regional autonomy, as a direct threat to their aspirations and goal, which is the territorial integrity of the country. With the exception of a small minority, the Sinhalese community sees the territorial integrity and the unitary status of the country as interdependent. The Sri Lankan military forces have been fighting a bitter war with the LTTE to preserve the territorial integrity and the unitary nature of the island nation. Sources of Conflict Any meaningful effort at resolution ofprotracted conflicts, like in Sri Lanka 's present conflict, should aim at creating sustainablepeace as its fundamental objective. Sometimes, people tend to think that quick fixes can bring conflicts to end, but rarely have they brought lasting peace. A sustainable peace endeavor must 82
be able, among other things, to understand and address the causes of the conflict, which are usually deep rooted and may have remained ignored for quite a long time. For the purpose of easy understanding, the causes of conflict between the Tarnil and Sinhalese communities in Sri Lanka could be categorized under two headings: (i) root causes, and (ii) immediate causes. Root Causes: Three factors appear to be prominent in Sri Lankas conflict. They are: (a) historical, (b) psychological, and (c) economic factors. The political and military conflict are manifestations of these root causes. With regard to historical roots, there are contending claims made by the Sinhalese and T ml on the question of the land and the territory. a is Both communities claim that their ancestors arrived in the Island first, from the Indian subcontinent some thousands of years ago and therefore they have exclusive right to the land. In this, Sinhalese and Tamil claims differ with regard to the area of territory for which their exclusive historical right of habitation is supposed to exist. While the Sinhalese subscribe to the notions of Sinhaladeepa (Land of the Sinhalese) and dammadeepa (Land of the Buddhist Doctrine), the Tamils claim that the Northern and Eastern provinces of the island are their thayagam (traditional homeland). This competing claim for land is reinforced with some powerful historical memories, associated with the past of the two communities The Sinhalese historical memories ofmilitary invasions by the Southern Indian kings, especially after the emergence of Tamil Kingdoms in India during 5th century AD, have been quite powerful in sustaining the perception that the Tamils have been a constant source of threat to the political independence of the Sinhalese nation and the existence of Buddhism in the island. It has created a sense ofinsecurity in the Sinhalese psyche which is sometimes described as minority
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complex of an ethnic majority. Although Sinhalese are the majority within Sri Lanka, regionally they are a minority compared with the Tamils, whose population is nearly 55 million in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Meanwhile, Sri Lankan Tamils make the claim that they were the first historical settlers in the island and they have had an independent state in northern Sri Lanka, throughout history. They also believe that Sri Lankas Northern and Eastern provinces are their traditional homeland and on that belief they claim territorial autonomy within these two provinces. In addition to these historical and psychological reasons, there were economic factors that intensified the confrontation and tension between the two communities. The Sinhalese perception that the Tamils have been a privileged minority, and even the Tamil perception of discrimination was largely due to economic factors. During the British colonial rule, due to American missionary activities in the heartland of Jaffna, English school education expanded. As a result, there emerged a new English- educated class among the Tamils of Jaffna particularly in clerical, legal, accounting, medical and technological professions. This group of professionals dominated the limited opportunities for public sector employment even in the south, to such an extent that the average Sinhalese educated felt left out in the competition for employment. The Sinhalese, indeed, felt that the colonial rule discriminated against them, while granting economic privileges to the Tarnil minority. When the political power was transferred from the British Empire to the local political leaders in 1948, the Sinhalese political leaders were naturally in a position to compensate themselves for the past (perceived or real) grievances. Public policy in post-independence in Sri Lanka, under Sinhalese dominated governments, were fashioned to redress these grievances of economic victimization under colonialism. Paradoxically, this in turn led to new grievances of discrimination among the Tamils. They perceive the post-independence political order as one which not only imposed disabilities on their economic advancement - Official Language law is one such policy measure-but also neglected 84
Northern and Eastern provinces from the mainstream of economic development. Immediate Causes: The immediate causes of Tamil ethnic resurgence are found in the politics of Sinhala-Tamil ethnic relations in the post-independence period. They have been progressively developing until a sentiment for a separate and independent Tamil state took roots in Tamil politics in the late seventies and early eighties. Many commentators on Sri Lankas ethnic conflict have said that the ethnic violence of July-August 1983 was the most crucial turning point in turning Tamil nationalist politics into the irreversible path of separatism. Political causes of Tamil separatism have a history of their own throughout Sri Lankas post-independence years. The Tamils point out that the governmental policy and actions immediately after independence were aimed at reducing the Tamil community into a position of second class citizens. They became critical of such legislation as the Citizenship Act of 1948, the franchise law of 1949, the Sinhala Only Act of 1956 and the policy of standardization in higher education in the 1970s. Meanwhile, the Tamils became particularly suspicious of the state-sponsored peasant colonization programs in the Eastern province and alleged that the Sinhalese governments were attempting to extend Sinhala domination into Tamil-majority provinces by settling Sinhalese in those areas. Similarly, the Tamils resisted the policy of standardization of university entrance, introduced in the 1970s claiming that this policy was designed to prevent large sections of the Tamil youth from receiving higher education and obtaining government employment. Although these claims have been disputed by some Sinhalese scholars, the net effect of the above-mentioned state policies was the development of a psychology ofvictimization among the Sri Lankan Tamils and their loss of faith in the Sinhalese-led governments.
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Against this sense of victimization was the Tamil political sentiment that some measure of political self-rule would enable the Tamils to safeguard their rights and interests. From the early 1950s the Tamil political leadership began to demand a federal system for Sri Lanka, on the argument that the Tamils constituted a distinct nation, similar to the Sinhalese. It is on the basis of this federalist demand that the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 and SenanayakeChelvanayakam Agreement of 1965 were signed. Both agreements envisaged administrative autonomy to Tamil-majority provinces, but they were not implemented due to the opposition from Sinhalese political parties and the Buddhist leaders. Then, in 1972, when Sri Lanka was being made a Republic and a new constitution was drafted, the main Tamil political party, the Federal Party, proposed a federal constitution for Sri Lanka. But, the government totally rejected the Tamil proposal and enacted a unitary constitution with centralization of political and administrative structures. In the 1972 constitutional reforms, the Senate was abolished while the special constitutional safeguards for minority protection were removed. Thus the Tamil fear of their community being further reduced to a politically powerless minority in a majority dominated polity. It is in this context that the Tamil demand for selfdetermination and a separate state evolved. The question ofpolitical insecurity in a majority-dominated unitary state is another immediate cause which Tarnils point out as an immediate reason for the present conflict. The formation of this collective feeling of insecurity goes back to 1958 riots. These riots occurred against the backdrop of Sinhalese-Tamil tension following the official language legislation of 1956. Then, inter-communal tension developed again in 1977, 1978 and 1979, particularly in Sinhalese majority areas where Tamils also have been living. In these instances of tension, life and property of the Tamils were threatened, yet the state did not take actions
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to prevent the escalation of tension. The culmination of this process occurred in July 1983 when, following the killing of 13 soldiers by Tamil militants in Jaffna, large scale ethnic riots broke out. The 1983 riots proved to be a turning point in Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic problem. It gave legitimacy to the argument being made by small Tamil militant groups that a war of national liberation was the only option available for Sri Lankan Tamils to secure their national rights. Strategies/Tactics In understanding an ethnic conflict, it is useful to examine how strategies of the ethnic minority have evolved over the years of conflict formation. Politics of ethnic conflicts is usually formed over a comparatively long period of time. The evolution of minority strategies is also linked to the politics of ethnic relations. In the history of SinhaleseTamil ethnic conflict, strategies adopted by Tamil political leadership have gone through a number of stages. These stages, through which the minority political goals evolved, are briefly described below. i. United Action for Sinhalese-Tamil Rights: This was the strategy advocated by Tamil leaders in the early part this century, when Sri Lankas national movement under colonialism was beginning to take shape. When the Ceylon National Congress was formed in 19 19, Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam advocated that all communities should unite to struggle for the rights of all Sri Lankans. However, this idea did not survive long when the Congress split in 192 1 along communal lines. Weighted and Balanced Representation for Minorities: From the late 1920s onwards, Tamil political leaders agitated for balanced representation in the colonial legislature between the majority Sinhalese and all minority communities. The famous fifty-fifty demand of G. G. Ponnambalam was made in this context.
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The argument behind the idea of balanced representation was that the legislature would not be dominated by the majority community. iii. Regional Autonomy within a Federalist Constitution: The formulation of this strategic goal was made after independence, in early 1950s. The formation of the Federal Party in 195 1 was meant to carry this demand in the political sphere. Cooperation with Sinhalese Majority Governments and Negotiations: From independence to the 1970s the main strategic course of action adopted by the Tamil political leadership was to work within the parliamentary system of government. Cooperation with governments was a result of this strategy. When the first independence government was formed in 1947, the Tamil Congress was a part of the ruling UNP coalition and in fact the cabinet of ministers had two Tamil representatives. But after the franchise legislation was passed in 1949 they left the Government. Then, when the 1956 Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) government under Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike came into power, the Federal Party negotiated with the Prime Minister to grant regional administrative autonomy to Northern and Eastern provinces. Known as Bandaranaike- Chelvanayakam Pact, this agreement was not however implemented due to Sinhalese nationalist opposition. Then, in 1965, the Federal Party joined the United National Party Government coalition, led by Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake. The Federal Party leadership once again succeeded in negotiating an agreement with the government to set up a system of Regional Councils in the Tamilmajority provinces. The Minister of local government in the 1945 coalition was in fact a Federal Party representative. But this time around too, the strategy of cooperation failed to achieve Tamil political demands and the Federal Party quite the government in1969. 88
iv.
v. Mass Agitation: Another strategy adopted by the Tamil political parties was mass agitation. The first time they launched a mass agitation was in 1957 and 1958, in the context of the implementation of the official language legislation. The Tamil leaders described their action as Gandhian sathyagraha. Again in 1960 they launched a series of sathyagraha protests in Colombo and Jaffna demanding language rights of the Tamils. The mass action strategy came to a high point in the 1970s. When the United Front Government of 1970 refused to consider the federalist constitutional proposal, the Tamil political leadership organized a series of mass protests in the Northern and Eastern provinces. These protests began in July 1972 when the new constitution came into effect. When the government reacted angrily to these protests, Tamil nationalist sentiments also gathered greater momentum. It is in that context that a new united front for Tamil political independence, Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), was formed in 1976. The TULF shifted the strategy of Tamil political struggle from cooperation-negotiation to mass mobilization for national self-determination. They contested the 1977 parliamentary elections, seeking a mandate from the Tamil people in North-East provinces to form a separate and independent Tamil state. When the TULF won the majority of parliamentary seats in these two provinces, that election result was then interpreted as a mandate for working towards an Eelam, an independent Tamil state. vi. Armed Struggle: The Tamil nationalist strategy of armed struggle originated in the late seventies with the radicalization of youth politics in Jaffna. Radical youth politics assumed greater intensity when the TULF leaders, after the 1977 election, could not transform their concept of national self-determination into a concrete political outcome. A number of small guerilla organizations emerged, with armed struggle as their strategic
course of action. Then, after 1983 riots and with the expulsion of the TULF from parliament, for not taking the oath of allegiance to the unitary state, the militant groups took control of Tamil politics. Since 1983 onwards, the ethnic conflict has been characterized by the armed struggle which has now developed into a full scale internal war between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE. vii. Negotiations: While the ethnic war has been going on, there have also been attempts to end the conflict through negotiations. Attempts at negotiations go as far back as 1984, but no successful results have yet been achieved. In the next section of this chapter, we will briefly discuss the history of negotiations. Negotiations with the Help of Third Party Sri Lankas ethnic comflict provides an extremely useful case study in conflict negotiations. The fact that negotiations have not resulted in the termination of the conflict does not mean at all that the student of conflict resolution should disregard Sri Lankas experience in negotiations. The initial impulses for a negotiated settlement in Sri Lankas conflict came from India. India, Sri Lankas immediate neighbor, became extremely interested in the conflict in Sri Lanka for its own reasons. After several rounds ofnegotiations between the Sri Lankan government representatives and the Tamil political parties and militant movements under the auspices of the Indian government, an agreement called the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed in 1987. India had to employ her military forces in the island in order to guarantee the implementation of the agreement. However with the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF), the agreement became a dead letter and the provincial councils, created by the Indo-Lanka Accord, were disfunctional.
The Indian role in Sri Lanka as a third party failed to produce a resolution owing to several factors. First of all, according to experts in the regional politics, Indias decision to intervene was influenced by its need for (1) regional dominance, (2) national security, and (3) the Indian central governments dependency on the government of Tamil Nadu for political support. Therefore, it was evident that the decision for intervention did not arise from the needs of the parties, as it should be in the case of an ideal and successful intervention. Meanwhile, India was known for its support of the Tamil militancy called the Tamil Terrorism by the Sri Lankan government. Therefore, India was seen essentially as a Tamil ally by the Sinhalese and not as a neutral third party. Many conflict resolution scholars do not agree that the thirdparty neutrality is a crucial factor in intervention. In fact, scholars like John Paul Lederach advocate an inside partial model of intervention in the conflicts in traditional societies. Whatever the debate, in order to be successful, especially when the third party is from outside, the particular intervenor should possess some elements of neutrality. India totally lacked this aspect as it took different sides during the course of its activities in Sri Lanka. When the Sri Lankan government was forced to negotiate, it did not have a choice but to go ahead with the Indian plans, because of fear of punishment by the big neighbor. In other words, in order to be effective the potential third party must have the consensus and invitation is not from all, at least from the major parties to the conflict. In that sense the Indian intervention had seeds of failure from its inception. Negotiations without Third Party First, in 1990 the so-called Hilton Talks were held in Colombo between President Premadasas government and the LTTE. Then in 1994, immediately after the electoral victory of the newly formed Peoples Alliance coalition, headed by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, the government engaged in rounds of negotiations with the LTTE in
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Jaffha. One notable aspect of both these processes was the absence of a third-party involvement. It could be argued that the parties involved in a highly violent conflict, unless the condition is a "hurting stalemate, could not easily get to the negotiation table without the help of a thirdparty However, both in 1990 and 1994 the parties agreed to negotiate for various other reasons. This strategy of negotiating for side effect was one fundamental reason for the failure of those peace processes. Once the purpose was achieved the parties duly withdrew from the peace proceedings. For example, in 1990 the primary objective of the consensus between the parties was to get the Indian Army out of the island. Achieving peace through negotiation was not the driving force behind the process. The negotiations broke down immediately after the withdrawal of the IPKF. In early 2000, there were initiatives to involve the Norwegian government as a mediator in Sri Lankas conflict. The government of Sri Lanka, however, did not like the term mediation to describe the Norway involvement. The government prefmed the role of a facilitator. While the government was careful about the role of Norway, the LTTE wanted third-party mediation. This debate in a way indicated two different approaches to the role of a third party. Present Trend Since the unilateral withdrawal of the LITE from the negotiations in 1994, the war continues on a high pace, claiming hundreds of lives from both sides, combatants as well as civilians. Disappointed by the attitude of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government has been waging a "War for peace. We may note here that the notion of war for peace is only a myth, as war can hardly bring sustainable peace anywhere in the world. Sri Lanka is no exception. When a conflict is terminated by military means, one party loses and the other wins. We can call this outcome as a zero-sum situation. However, conflict resolution scholars agree that real peace could be achieved only through a win-win
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agreement between theparties. And it should also be noted that the experience of the long war in Sri Lanka suggests that bothmajor actors lack the power to impose a total defeat on the other. In other words, a military stalemate can continue for quite some time. At the same time it also looks like both parties are entrapped in their war cries. Therefore, they are unable to initiate any peace endeavors or at least tosend signals in that direction. Alternatives The political history of Sri Lanka proves that the leadership in both sides of the ethnic spectrum has failed to handle the issue with a vision and proper understanding of the long-term consequences of the conflict. One particular reason for this state of affairs is the tolerance shown by the general public of this country towards the war and its outcomes. Research that was carried out in Sri Lanka to determine the perceptions of the Sri Lankan people pertaining to the war and peace, proves that the majority of them want peace. It is also worth mentioning here that in 1994, the Peoples Alliance Coalition won a landslide electoral victory on the peace platform. However, when the parties returned to warpath for one reason or the other, the people have remained silent and passive. One of the striking features of the conflict in Sri Lanka is the absence of pressure on the leadership to take action to negotiate and seek peaceful solution through compromise, although the people themselves hope for peace. Some of us may argue that this behavior of silent majority has been determined by their nationalistic mentality or the unwillingness to compromise their fundamental positions. However, if the people believe in peace and are ready to compromise their positions, this is the time to thinkabout alternatives. After all, peace can only be achieved by a win-win solution and a win-win solution is possible only when the parties compromise theirpositions. It is possible for the conflicting parties to attain their
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interests even after compromising their positions. It is, for example, possible for the Tamils to safeguard and protect their long-term survival, culture and territorial needs and for the Sinhalese to preserve the territorial integrity of the land and protection of Sinhala-Buddhist race even after they agree, say, to a federal form of government. The fundamental obstacle to finding a compromised solution is mutual mistrust and fear. In eliminating mistrust and fear a civil society can do much more than the state which, more often than not, fails to take into consideration the human relationship aspect of the conflict. In building peace or taking other necessary steps towards peace, leadership does not necessarily have to emerge from political institutions of the country. Civil society can also provide a formidable contribution to peace initiatives. John Paul Lederach (1997) identifies three major categories of leadership base in a conflict setting. They are: top level, middle range and the grass roots. Top level refers to the political leadership, whichincludeskeypolitical and military leaders. The middlerange leadership involves people like ethnic and religious leaders, academics, intellectuals and humanitarian leaders like NGO figures. Grass roots represent the masses and grassroots leadership including local leaders, leaders of indigenous NGOs, community developers, local health officials and refugee camp leaders. Louise Diamond and John McDonald (1996) identify nine peace tracks. They are; (1) Government (peace making through diplomacy), (2) Non-governmental and professional (peace making through professional conflict resolution), (3) Business (peace making through commerce) (4) Private citizen (peace making through personal involvement), (5) Research, training and education (peace making through learning), (6) Activism (peace making through advocacy), (7) Religion (peace making through faith and action), (8) Funding (peace making through providing resources), and (9) Communication and media (peace making through information). The point here is that there are several tracks and levels in a civil society that can be made use of in order to encourage peace. In Sri Lanka, although there are peace activities undertaken by different
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN 1NTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK
sectors of society, they are not forceful enough to pressure the parties to try and achieve a negotiated settlement. Therefore, in an effort to make peace in Sri Lanka it is essential to strengthen the civil society and exploit the resources available in different levels and tracks in the society. Summary In this chapter, you have learned the following lessons;
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There are many ways to describe Sri Lankas present conflict. Some useful concepts are: ethnic conflict, identity conflict, internal armed conflict and protracted conflict. Parties to a conflict can be both direct and indirect. Parties to Sri Lankas ethnic conflict are many, and multiple. Any meaningful attempt at resolving conflicts should create sustainable peace. Quick F ixes cannot bring about lasting peace. In conflicts, there are root causes and immediate causes. Root causes have historical, psychological and economic dimensions. Immediate causes are found in the politics of ethnic relations. Peace can only be achieved through a win-win solution. A win-win solution is possible only when parties compromise and seek joint solutions. Conflict resolution involves many tracks. Marshalling of civil society resources is crucial for conflict resolution and peace building.
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Negotiations for Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Sri Lankas Past Experiences
Jayadeva Uyangoda Introduction From the early days of Sri Lankas ethnic armed conflict, there have been attempts at ending the conflict through negotiations. But, all these negotiation efforts have failed to terminate the conflict, or at least deescalate the war. Nonetheless, they provide a wealth of insights on which a future process of successful negotiations could be built. It is wrong to assume that an internal armed conflict can be brought to an end through one or few negotiation attempts. Once a conflict has started, its termination may become exceedingly difficult due to a variety of factors. Conflict resolution can be as complex a phenomenon as the conflict itself. Similarly, when negotiations fail once, twice or perhaps many times, it does not mean that the negotiation option is totally invalidated, although some may argue to that effect. From a common sense perspective, it is through failures that success ultimately materializes itself What is important in this regard is to examine failures as objectively as possible and draw necessary lessons. In this chapter, we will make an attempt to look back at Sri Lankas past experiences of negotiations in order to draw some useful lessons. Our discussion will examine four negotiation attempts (i) the Thimpu Talks of 1985, (ii) Indo-Lanka Agreement of 1986, (iii) Government of Sri Lanka and LTTE talks of 198911990, and (iv) Government-LTTE talks of 1994/l 995.
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Thimpu Talks The first attempt at bringing together representatives of the Sri Lankan government and Tamil militant groups was mediated by the Indian government in July 1985. By this time, the ethnic war was two years old. Tamil militant groups were relatively small guerilla organizations operating mainly in the Northern province. The talks were held in Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan. Thimpu was selected because of the perception that the two sides should meet at a neutral venue. Indian government acted as the broker of the Thimpu meeting. The Indian government also facilitated a cease-fire agreement between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil militant groups as a prelude to negotiations. In order to present a common Tamil voice at negotiations, the T ml militant groups formed a common front called Elam National a i Liberation Front (ENLF). Although the TULF, the main Tamil parliamentary party, also represented the Tamil side, the militant groups had an upper hand in the talks. Dr. H. W. Jayewardene, President J. R. Jayewardenes brother, led the Sri Lankan delegation. During the talks that went on through two rounds, the Tamil side had insisted that the Sri Lankan govermnent should put forward its own proposals for a settlement so that they could consider whether these proposals were acceptable. The government delegation presented a set of political proposals and draft legislation for their implementation. These were basically the proposals that the government had already presented before the All-Party Conference (APC) held in Colombo the previous year. Incidentally, they were the same proposals which the Tamil parties had rejected at the APC. The essence of these proposals was to set up a system of District Development Councils (DDCs) in each district of Sri Lanka, with the provision of two or more DDCs to amalgamate. The Tamil delegation at Thimpu talks rejected these proposals as inadequate and presented their own framework for a settlement of the ethnic problem.
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Now known as Thimpu principles these counter-proposals of Tamil parties contained the following four elements: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Recognition of Tamils in Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality Recognition of a Tamil homeland and its territorial sovereignty Right of self-determination of Tami1 people Right of citizenship and other democratic rights of Tamil people
The government delegation rejected the first three demands of the Tamil side as totally unacceptable. Their position was that the government could consider only the citizenship demand. The government side also reiterated that any agreement reached at Thimpu talks could be implemented only if the militant groups surrendered all their arms and dismantled their training camps located in Sri Lanka and abroad. When the round two of Thimpu talks began a few days later, the negotiations had reached a point of collapse. Both sides accused each other of intentional violation of the cease-fire agreement and the Tamil delegation walked out from the negotiation table. However, the failed Thimpu talks provide some important lessons concerning ethnic conflict resolution and negotiations. The first lesson, which we may draw from retrospective insights, is that the situation prevailing at that time was too early for a negotiated settlement. In other words, there were no favorableprerequisites for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. It is true that both sides publicly claimed that they were for a negotiated settlement. But, that was only a rhetorical commitment. Behind the rhetoric ofnegotiations and the reality of failure was indeed one important dynamic in conflict formation and conflict resolution: the Sri Lankan armed conflict had not reached a stage of settlement that can be worked out through negotiations at all. In other words, both sides had maintained their faith in the efficacy of the military strategy. It was too early for the Sri Lankan government to
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come to a compromise with Tamil militants, because the government still believed that the guerilla war could be defeated by military means. It was too early for the Tamil militant groups, too, to abandon the armed struggle in favor of a negotiated settlement, because they had just begun what they perceived as a liberation war Indeed, the Thimpu talks began within just two years of a liberation struggle for a separate ethnic state and the romanticism of a long-drawn, heroic war was still afresh in the thinking of T&-nil militants. In the initial phase of a war of liberation, militant guerilla groups usually have little or no inclination to make a compromise with the enemy. Their idealism was such that any settlement with the state had to be on their own victorious terms. The point then is that the conflict had not reached a stage where the parties would pursue negotiations with seriousness of intent of its outcome. The second important lesson emanates from the fact that the negotiation positions adopted by the two sides were far too apart from one another. A negotiated settlement means, in simple terms, the emergence of a compromise of contending positions, jointly pursued by the parties to the conflict. lt is a middle ground. But for a middle ground to emerge, the competing positions of negotiating parties should be such that the meeting point should not be one that demands the parties to make fundamental revisions of their original positions. But, at Thimpu talks, there was no such possibility of flexibility of negotiation positions. On the contrary, they were hard and rigid bargainingpositions, in the sense that they represented a spirit of take it or leave it. Conflict resolution is hardly materialized when competing negotiation positions are designed to be rigid and inflexible. The third lesson is linked to the second. That concerns the intent of parties to come to the negotiation table. In conflict negotiation, it is not always the case that parties agree to negotiations to seek a settlement. They may have other intentions or agendas. Indeed, the
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govemment of Sri Lanka and the Tamil militant groups came to Thimpu, largely because of the pressure brought upon them by the Indian government. It is clear that neither party had any appreciable measure of faith in a positive outcome of the negotiation exercise. Evidence points to an observation which is important for students of conflict resolution. The overriding objective of the two sides at Thimpu talkss was not conflict settlement, but canvassing for their respective positions that left little or no room for a compromise. There is a fourth lesson to be drawn from Thimpu talks. It centers on the question of terms of a settlement. The experience of Thimpu tells us that the two sides attempted to impose a settlement on one another on terms preferred and defined by either side. What it meant in practical terms is that, while the Sri Lankan government delegation presented its settlement formula in terms of district-based decentralization of power, the Tamil side argued for the right of selfdetermination of the nationality of Sri Lankan Tamils in a territorial homeland. These were not negotiable terms, but mutually exclusive positions which each side attempted to impose on the other. Indo-Lanka Accord On 27 July, 1987, Sri Lankas President J. R. Jayewardene and Indias Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed an inter-state agreement to end Sri Lankas ethnic conflict and bring about a political settlement. The agreement envisaged all parties to the conflict, Sinhalese and Tamil, to accept the framework of settlement as proposed in the Accord. The main points of the Accord were for the Sri Lankan government to create a system of devolution of power through a constitutional amendment. Once the provincial councils were created, elections were to be held to elect representatives for these new bodies of devolution. Devolution was meant to grant a measure ofpolitical and administrative autonomy to the periphery with the province as the unit of devolution. This was a significant improvement from the position earlier held by
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the Sri Lankan government in its proposal for a district-based system of administrative decentralization. There was also a provision for an eventual merger of Northern and Eastern provinces through a referendum. The Accord also expected all Tamil parties to the conflict to accept the settlement, since the new system of province-based devolution was viewed as a suitable mechanism to meet the Tamil demand for autonomy. The Accord particularly envisaged that the militant Tamil groups, who were waging a guerilla war for an independent state, would accept the settlenient, surrender their arms and join the mainstream of politics. On Indias part, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi committed the Indian state to be the guarantor of the implementation of the Accord. However, the events that followed the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord belied the optimistic expectations of the Sri Lankan and Indian leaders and the well-wishers of the Accord. When the Accord was being signed in Colombo, there was violent resistance mounted by Sinhalese nationalist forces against what was termed as Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. The resistance, led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) subsequently developed itself into an armed rebellion against the state, which went on for almost three years, bringing the govemmentunderaseriouspoliticalcrisis. Theconstitutional amendment to create provincial councils was passed in October 1987. Yet, when the elections for new councils were held, there was unprecedented violence against holding elections. More importantly, in the immediate aftermath of the Indo-Lanka joint initiative, the conflict in the North-East entered a new phase of complexity, which went totally against the expectations of the Accord. The new complexity centered on the non-cooperation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the main Tar-nil guerilla organization, to accept and join in the process of implementing the Accord. While the other guerilla organizations directly or tacitly accepted the accord and
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decided to join the mainstream of politics, the LTTE did not. Except a symbolic surrender of few weapons, it did not disarm itself. When the LTTE refused to cooperate with the implementation of the Accord, President Jayewardene, in accordance with the provisions of the Accord, asked the Indian government to take steps to disarm the LITE. Then, in October 1987, the Indian government began to send its army to Sri Lanka with the intention of disarming the LTTE. The LTTE began to resist the Indian Army, or the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF), and soon the confrontation between the two sides developed into a major war. After two years of fighting the LTTE, with about 85,000 of its troops, the Indian army withdrew its forces from Sri Lanka in 1990 with mission unaccomplished. The experience of the Indo-Lanka Accord and its aftermath provides some important lessons for conflict resolution. Let us identify and briefly discuss the main lessons. The Role of the Third Party In the literature of conflict resolution and peacemaking, there is an extensive body of ideas about the role of the third party In this literature, the neutrality of the third party is often emphasized. The notion of neutrality means that the mediator should not be seen as favoring one party over the other, because the mediators role should be acceptable to both parties. In Sri Lankas experience of Indias role in the proposed settlement of July 1987, it was not clear whether India mediated or intervened in bringing about a settlement framework. In a pure case of mediation, the third party may bring the conflicting parties together, facilitate negotiations between them, help them to work out a settlement on mutual acceptance and ultimately assist the parties to implement the settlement. In this process, the mediator may use political, diplomatic and perhaps military coercion, but in a manner that will not jeopardize the avowed principle of neutrality.
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It is on the question of neutrality that Indias role in 1987 can be first examined. The Sinhalese people did not believe that India was a neutral outsider in Sri Lankas conflict. They believed that the Indian government and its state government in Tamil Nadu had supported and directly assisted the Tamil militant movement. As a result, there was overwhelming Sinhalese suspicion about Indias intentions in Sri Lankas problem. Then in July 1987, when the Indian government tried to broker a peace settlement, the Sinhalese nationalist forces thought that India had a hidden political agenda. The issue became more complicated when the Indian government sent the IPKF to disarm the LTTE. This military intervention meant that India used its direct military power to implement the settlement. Then a full-scale war broke out between the IPKF and the LTTE, running into about two years. In this process, India became a direct party to the conflict. This process indicates how Indias role in Sri Lankas conflict gradually changed from mediation to military intervention and then to be a party to the conflict. Role of Multiple Parties in the Conflict Acontlictisusuallyresolvedbytheactiveengagementofthedirect parties to the conflict. By agreeing to resolve the armed conflict, the parties are supposed to seek non-military options and work out political measures to address the causes of the conflict. But, the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 and its implementation process raises many questions about the role of various indirect parties to the conflict in the exercise of settlement. These questions can be clustered around two issues: (I) What was the role of direct parties in working out the settlement agreement? (II) What was the role of indirect parties in making the settlement agreement unworkable? On the question of the role of direct parties in formulating the framework of settlement, the Indian and Sri Lankan governments did the negotiations between them while keeping Tamil militant groups away
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from the negotiation process. It appears that the Tamil groups were consulted by the Indian officials, yet there was no direct communication between them and the Sri Lankan government. In fact, the representatives and leaders of the two governments decided the entire framework of settlement. In this sense, only one directparty to the conflict, the Sri Lankan government, played a direct role in the proposed settlement. Even that role was limited to negotiations with the Indian government, an interested third party. This, fi-om a conflict resolution perspective, was a major weakness in the 1987 effort at conflict settlement in Sri Lanka. When one side of the conflict is excluded fi-om the negotiations, that side has no political responsibility to abide by the settlement. As the position taken by the LTTE clearly demonstrated, such a peace effort can be interpreted as an attempt to impose a solution by force. It is obvious that the Indian government overestimated its own possible role in bringing a settlement in Sri Lanka A settlement effort can also be undermined by the actions of indirect parties to the conflict, as it was the case in Sri Lanka in 1987 and after. The Sinhalese nationalist opposition led by the radical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), opposed the Indo-Lanka Accord so violently that the implementation of the agreement itselfbecame a major political challenge for the government. Indeed, the JVP derived much public support for its anti-state rebellion primarily by appealing to antiIndian nationalist sentiments of the Sinhalese community. The JVP described Indias military intervention in the North-East as a prelude to a larger project of colonizing Sri Lanka. The JVP-led resistance also became the rallying point for a variety of Sinhalese nationalist forces including the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the nationalist Buddhist Sangha and the Sinhala nationalist intelligentsia. Utilizing the new nationalist/patriotic political space opened up by the Indo-Lanka Accord, these forces seized control of the political debate thereby delegitimizing to a considerable extent the very concept of a political solution to the ethnic question. The lesson to be learned from that experience is that there are both direct and indirectparties to the Sri Lankan conflict and their actions can shape the entire fate of the settlement.
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This leads us to identify a much more fundamental lesson to be drawn in conflict resolution. In an ethnic conflict, which has deeply divided ethnic communities, a settlement can regenerate deeply held fears of the majority ethnic group when that settlement intends to recognize the legitimacy ofminority ethnic demands. In other words, a settlement in the nature of compromise with a minority ethnic group, is likely to regenerate fears and anxieties among sections of the majority community whose majoritarian world view is shaped by a deep-seated feeling ofpolitical insecurity. Indeed, this is not unique to Sri Lanka In plural societies where there is competition and tension between the ethnic majority and minorities, the fear of the minorities gaining supremacy is a deeply felt anxiety among nationalists of the majority community. In such a context, there is the ever-present possibility of extremist groups within the majority community mobilizing those fears in a campaign of militant resistance to compromise. They see compromise with the ethnic enemy as a betrayal, an act of treachery that has to be resisted violently and as a matter of patriotic duty. For a negotiated settlement to succeed, it is important to recognize the crucial need to politically manage the post-agreement process in such a way that extremist political groups, which are intrinsically opposed to peacemaking through compromise, are not allowed to occupy the political centre stage. Political Consensus The point we just made above warrants some reflection, so that we can learn another lesson from the 1987 experience. In a society where an internal ethnic conflict has taken a violent and military form, the polity can become an intensely fragmented entity. Various political groups can have different and competing understandings of the conflict and conflicting approaches as to what the solution should be. When one party works out a solution, say by the government, there is always the possibility of other forces in society radically opposing the
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governments decision. Such a development can have unforeseen and complex consequences, as evidenced in Sri Lanka in 1987-89. It can politically isolate the government, thereby making the government incapable of properly implementing the settlement. It can also deny legitimacy to the settlement itself Without public support, no ethnic conflict settlement can be realistically implemented. And finally, there can be fears among sections of society about the settlement itself Public fear of the consequences of conflict settlement is a major barrier to any conflict resolution process. The lesson to be learned then is that in a deeply divided society, ethnic conflict resolution requires consensus among political actors as well as between the government and thepeople. Bringing about such a broad consensus requires political education of the masses of the people, redefining the terms of the political debate and providing intellectual and political leadership to society in a direction of ethnic reconciliation UNP-LTTE Talks in 1989/1990 Two years after the failure of Indo-Lanka Accord to bring Sri Lankas conflict to an end, another round of talks was held in 198990 between the UNP government, headed by President Premadasa, and the LTTE leadership. The initiative for this round of talks was taken by Mr. Premadasa, within a few months of his being elected to the office of the President. In April 1989, he made an open call on the JVP and the LTTE to come to talks with the government. While the JVP, which was engaged in a rebellion to capture state power, rejected Mr. Premadasas offer, the LTTE, while fighting the IPKF, responded positively. The talks were held in Colombo. From the governments side the President himself, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and senior government officials took part in the talks. The LTTE side was represented by its political representatives and headed by Anton Balasingham. During the talks, which went on for about a year, there was an understanding between the two sides to retrain from hostilities, although they did not sign a formal cease-fire agreement.
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The talks suddenly broke down in June 1990. The LTTE appeared to have unilaterally walked off negotiations with no public explanation. The breakdown of talks and the resumption ofhostilities were a violent event. It was reported that the LTTE suddenly surrounded a police station in Amparai, took nearly 200 policemen prisoners and some of them were executed. Although the government made an attempt to resume talks by sending the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Jaffna to meet the LTTE leadership, the latter refused to engage in any further talks on the argument that the government had not been sincere in its approach to negotiations. On government-LTTE talks of 1989/l 990, there is very little information available. There are no records available to find out what the two parties discussed in these talks. The content of discussions was not reported in the press either. The main lessons to be drawn from 1989/l 990 talks concern the objectives of participants. The available information suggests that the two parties did not have a commitment to resolution of the ethnic conflict as such. Instead, the two sides appeared to have had their own and distinct strategic objectives to be achieved in an exercise of talks. For the Colombo government under President Premadasa, forcing India to withdraw the IPKF from Sri Lanka was an immediate issue in its political agenda. During this time, the government was also fighting the JVP insurgency in the south, with all its armed forces and the police and the state machinery involved in a massive counter-insurgency operation. Neutralizing one military front was obviously an objective in real politics. In achieving that objective, the government perhaps sought a strategic political alliance with the LTTE. From the LTTEs own perspective, the removal of Indian military forces from the Northern and Eastern provinces was an immediate politico-military objective. They then found an ally in President Premadasa in whose agenda too the Indian military presence in Sri Lanka was a factor of priority. When their respective strategic objectives coincided, they began to talk and
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refrained from hostility. But when the Indian government withdrew the IPKF from Sri Lanka by March 1990, the need for further continuation of that strategic alliance was perhaps not there. In this sense, it is difficult to characterize the 1989/l 990 talks as negotiation for conflict resolution as such. Then, the overall lesson to be learned from UNP-LTTE talks in 198911990 is that negotiation for conflict resolution requires a vision and commitment to resolving the conflict. When short-term strategic or tactical objectives are allowed to take precedence, no tangible outcome can emerge through talks. Yet, it is also important to recognize that in protracted conflicts, the occurrence of such negotiations for short-term gains cannot be totally ruled out. Indeed, parties might meet at the negotiation table in order to secure specific objectives that can be military or political. In such situations, when one party realizes that talks have served its objectives, or even talks cannot serve its goals, that party will have no moral or political barriers to withdraw from talks unilaterally and even giving no reasons for its action. Subjection ofnegotiations to tactical objectives ofparties does not serve the objectives of conflict resolution. Such action can result in de-legitimizing the very concept of a negotiated settlement. Similarly, the party that suffered from the others unilateral termination of talks is most likely to develop a deep mistrust of the outcome of future talks. It can also strengthen the arguments against a negotiated settlement. And its most pernicious effect would be the possibility of public cynicism concerning negotiations as well as a non-military settlement. The 1989/l 990 talks also provide a lesson concerning the absence of a facilitator or mediator in the negotiation process. The context in which President Premadasa made the offer for talks in 1989 was characterized by a deep crisis suddenly developed in the aftermath of Indias mediation and involvement in Sri Lankas ethnic conflict. Indias third-party role had not only failed, but also had brought the conflict to
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a new stage of intensity. In that context, the suspicion of the role of a third party in conflict negotiation had gained ground in Sri Lanka. The assumption developed at that time and publicly articulated by President Premadasa was that Sri Lankas conflict was a purely internal matter that required no outside involvement. However, what appears to be clear from the 1989/l 990 experience is that when parties meet at talks without a mediator, there is always the risk of the talks being unilaterally terminated by oneparty with no possibility of their return to the negotiation table. This experience was indeed to be repeated subsequently too, during 1994/l 995 peace talks.
PA-LTTE Negotiations of 1994/1995
The negotiations between the Peoples Alliance government and the LTTE in 1994/l 995 provide a host of important lessons in negotiation for conflict resolution, When this round of negotiations began, there was a great deal of expectation and optimism about peace returning to the country. This is the first time that the people in Sri Lanka and the international community took government-LTTE negotiations seriously in the hope that at last the parties to negotiations would manage to find and work out a lasting solution to the ethnic question. In 1994/l 995, there were four rounds of talks between government and LTTE representatives. The talks were held in jaffna The last round of talks was held on April 9- 10,1995. A few days after the last round ended, the LTTE unilaterally terminated the negotiation process by resuming military hostilities on 19 April, 1995. The main lessons to be learned from this experience of negotiations concern why the exercise of peace making failed. Preconditions for Compromise A conflict settlement means that the parties to the conflict are ready for a compromise. Willingness to compromise by both sides is
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an essential precondition for a successful negotiated settlement. A compromise in a conflict involves the willingness of the major parties to seekamiddleground from where they can seek a mutually acceptable framework of settlement. It requires from both parties to the conflict to abandon their maximum goals. Then, the question we can ask is whether in 1994/l 995 the PA government and the LITE had reached such a stage of middle ground and compromise. The PA government declared that it was willing to pursue a political settlement through enhanced devolution, but it was not clear whether the LTTE was ready to accept devolution as an acceptable framework of settlement. When the two sides went into negotiations, they have declared publicly that they were committed to a settlement, but what remained undeclared was the framework within which they could find a common ground. Finding a common ground between two parties that have been engaged in an internal armed conflict for years is usually not an easy exercise. However, this difficulty may be possible to overcome by parties if the following preconditions are also present: (i) Parties to the conflict realize that the war is no longer useful, necessary or helpful to achieve their respective political objectives. There is also the realization that the ultimate goal that the parties had set for themselves at the beginning of the conflict is no longer viable and a new goal, short of the initial goal, needs to be worked out. The new goal can be achieved through negotiation and compromise.
(ii)
(iii)
In the conflict resolution theory, the presence of this set of preconditions in a conflict is described as constituting a moment of conflict ripeness. It means that the conflict has reached the stage of
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certainmaturityinthesensethatitisripeforresolution.WilliamZartman says that a conflict is ripe when (i) there exists a situation of deadlock and deadline, and (ii) the parties realize that unilateral solutions are blocked and joint solutions become conceivable (Zartman, 1985). When we apply this concept to the situation in Sri Lankas conflict in 1994/1995, it is difficult for us to see that the conflict had reached a dangerous stalemate which could push both parties simultaneously to finding a solution through the difficult path ofnegotiations. Nevertheless, there existed some important preconditions for negotiations. Most important among them was the public clamor for a negotiated settlement. In Sri Lankan society, among all ethnic groups, there had developed a sentiment in favor of a negotiated settlement. There were also many civil society groups that had actively campaigned for ending the conflict through negotiations. The political change in 1994 to a great extent gave expression to this change in the public mood. The new leadership that came into power in 1994 -Peoples Alliance led by President Chandrika Kumaratunga - also enjoyed a uniquely favorable status for finding a settlement to the conflict, precisely because this leadership had not identified itself with the conduct of the war. Rather, it had identified itself with the section of the political opinion in the country that opposed the war and stood for an early political settlement. Consequently, the political leadership of the government enjoyed a considerable measure of confidence among the Tamil people too. But 1994/95 negotiation experience tells us that public support for a settlement and the political leaderships commitment to finding a settlement by themselves are not sufficient conditions for successful conflict resolution. Undoubtedly, they are important conditions in the sense that they enabled the negotiation process to begin. They were indeed enabling preconditions. But, when actual negotiations started and new and complex challenges came on the way, the negotiation process entered into a period of crisis, ultimately
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resulting in the collapse of the entire negotiation exercise. We can draw another lesson from this experience: the favoruble preconditions to begin negotiations may not be sufficient enough to bring about a settlement. There is a long way to go from negotiations to a negotiated settlement. Negotiations are a Process When negotiations between the government and the LTTE began in 1994 soon after the PA government came into power, there were many expectations in Sri Lanka and abroad that the negotiations would succeed and the success would come soon. There were also skeptics who repeatedly argued that the negotiations were doomed to fail, because a negotiated settlement was not possible or feasible with the LTTE. But, when we look back now at the experience of negotiations from a somewhat detached point of view, with the benefit of retrospective insights, we are more likely to see how complex the entire negotiation exercise was. As we noted above, the negotiations began with a great deal of optimism. The two sides, the government and the LTTE, also initially demonstrated a positive, optimistic and resultoriented approach to negotiations. There were encouraging letters exchanged by President Kumaratunga and Mr. Prabhakaran expressing their commitment to, and willingness of pursuing, an early settlement to the conflict. In the first week of January 1995, the two parties signed a cease-fire agreement. By this time, the government had announced a number of initiatives that can be described in the language of conflict resolution as confidencebuilding measures. These included the lifting of the ban on many consumer items to Jaffna, a plan of rehabilitation and reconstruction, provision of electricity, the facilitation of civilian travel from Jaffna to the rest of the country and the supply of food and medicine to the civilian population in the north. But, in February 1995, there emerged some signs of the negotiation process beginning to face a crisis. It first manifested itself when the LTTE and the government
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developed a disagreement over the monitoring of the cease-fire agreements implementation. In the agreement, there was a provision for international monitoring of the working of the cease-fire agreement. While the government had invited a team of foreign monitors, the L T E did not allow the monitors to enter into areas under their control. Ultimately, the monitoring exercise failed. It is still not clear why this happened and what contributed to the LTTEs thinking. But we can draw a general lesson from this experience: once negotiations begin, there can be unforeseen circumstances that have to be treated with care, patience and prudence. If these unanticipated issues are not handled prudently by both sides, the negotiation exercise itself may suffer. There were many other similar instances that brought the negotiation exercise under pressure and stress. For example, the lifting on the ban of consumer commodities to Jaffna was hailed by the government as an indication of its own commitment to the normalization of civilian life in the north. But the LTTE repeatedly argued that although the government made public statements to that effect, the commitments were not properly implemented. The LTTE even went to the extent of saying that the government was not sincere. An intense debate between the government and the LTTE ensued. While the government, reiterating its commitment to an early end to the ethnic conflict, demanded that the LTTE should engage the government in negotiating the political and constitutional framework for ethnic conflict resolution, the LTTE took up the position that what was immediately important was the addressing of the consequences of thirteen years of war and not the root causes of the ethnic conflict. These were indeed two different approaches to the negotiation exercise. It is an approach that can be described as root causes of the conflict vs. consequences of the conflict. The two sides indeed could not solve this issue. What is the lesson we must draw from this and similar experiences of the 1994/95 failed peace negotiations? A basic lesson is that conflict
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negotiation is not a on-off affair. Rather, it is a complex exercise with unforeseen challenges and difficulties. Parties to negotiations should consider negotiation as a longprocess that has to be rescued and sustained at every turn of complex events. Negotiation Collapse and Fall Back Strategies To treat negotiation for conflict resolution as a process, it is important thatparties have strategies to deal with crisis situations, like the crisis which Sri Lanka experienced in April 1995. The LTTE, accusing the government of dragging on negotiations disregarding its demands for normalization of civilian life, issued an ultimatum to the government in April and then within a week of that ultimatum resumed hostilities. Ever since, the two sides have been engaged in an intense war with no effort being made to resume negotiations. The lesson to be learnt from this is that apeaceprocess needs serious strategizing. Strategizingpeace is as important as strategizing war. Like in war, in negotiations too, there are inevitable setbacks while there may be occasional successes. It does not mean that the peace process should be abandoned. Northern Ireland negotiation process points to a lesson in contrast. There, the cease-fire agreement was broken a number of times, yet the US mediator and the parties continued with the negotiation process, exploring new options and resuming the exercise of talking. In Sri Lanka, there was no mediator to bring the parties back to the negotiation table after the resumption ofhostilities. Neither did the parties appear to have any sustainable fall back plans to reactivate negotiations. The result was that the parties went back to an exclusively military strategy. Cease-Fire and its Lessons Another important lesson to be learnt from the breakdown of 1994/95 negotiations concerns the question whether a cease-fire
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agreement is really necessary in negotiating peace in an armed conflict. In conflict resolution, a main argument in favor of cease-fire agreement is that a mutually-agreed no war situation would help humanize the conflict, strengthening the peace process. A cease-fire may also enable civilians to return to a normal life, after years of being caught up in the war. It can also create conditions for the parties to trust each other, enabling them to negotiate in an atmosphere not colored by hostility. In this sense, a cease-fire agreement can be viewed as an important confidence-building measure for conflict resolution. But, Sri Lankas experience demonstrated that although those favorable conditions were present at the beginning of the cease-fire agreement between the government and the LTTE, it also generated complex challenges to both sides, challenges that had a negative impact on the entire peace process. One lesson to be learned in the Sri Lankan experience is that a cease-fire agreement can bring a lot ofpressure on the negotiation process itself. There can be many reasons for this possibility. There is always the likelihood of the terms of the agreement being violated, intentionally or unintentionaIly. Combatants on the ground may, for purely local reasons, exchange fire at each other Parties who have signed the agreement also might violate the terms on tactical grounds, in order to bring pressure on the other side. There can also be groups among the negotiating parties that are opposed to negotiations and therefore, might try to undermine the talks by internationally breaking the rules ofbehavior as specified under the agreement. These are contingencies that can make the cease-fire situation unstable. Indeed, such a situation can be further complicated by the fact that although the two sides have signed a pact to cease hostilities temporarily, they are deeply suspicious of each others strategies, motives and goals. Because of calculations based on mistrust, there is the likelihood of one party going back to war on the assessment that negotiations are useless. Yet another crucial issue on cease-fire during negotiations emerged in the government-LTTE peace talks in 1994/95. It concerns the
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suspicion developed by both parties that each side utilized the ceasefire period to rearm and regroup themselves. The LTTE began to accuse the government, even within a month of the cease-fire agreement, that the government, behind the veil of cease-fire, began to rearm the armed forces, recruit new troops and then prepare for a major offensive in Jaffna. The government also suspected that the LTTE was busy in recruiting new guerillas, training them and acquiring new weapons. In fact, some critics of the peace-talks accused the government of falling into the LTTE trap of ceasefire. Their point was that the case-fire gave the LTTE, which had been militarily weakened, much needed breathing space to regroup and re-arm itself. This points to an important lesson: a cease-fire agreement, initially perceived as a confidence-building measure between two conflicting parties, may run the risk of leading itself to greater mutual suspicion and new possibilities of hostility. The challenge then is, how to handle such unforeseen contingencies that may arise as direct consequence of the cease-fire agreement in such a way that the negotiation process is not disrupted? There are two possible answers to this question. Firstly, a third-party mediation can be of great help, as demonstrated in many peace negotiations in other countries. The mediators role is to help the two sides to overcome those challenges and prevent them from walking out of the negotiation table. The second response is that, perhaps, a cease-fire agreement as a precondition for talks between the two warring parties is not necessary. In this argument, what may be important is not the cessation of hostilities, but a sustainable negotiation process that can eventually lead to a workable cease-fire agreement as a positive measure of conjlict deescalation. When two parties to an armed conflict begin talks, it is perhaps not necessary for them to establish mutual trust at the beginning of talks. Even if they want such mutual trust to be established at the very beginning, a cease-fire agreement is perhaps not the best mechanism for that, because once the agreement breaks down, there is every possibility for the negotiation process to
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collapse. There can be other, less strenuous confidence-building measures like a mutually agreed commitment to a framework for negotiations, an agenda for negotiations and perhaps a time frame. In this process of pre-negotiation talks, once an exploration into issues are jointly made by the two sides, the cease-fire option can also be explored into. Then, a cease-fire arrangement can be worked out under conditions favorable to its sustainability. S m u a ma y r y
l
For conflict negotiations to succeed, there should exist favorable preconditions for a negotiated settlement. A negotiated settlement in a conflict would mean the emergence of a compromise among contending positions. It is a middle ground which should be jointly pursued by the parties to the conflict. Negotiations often succeed when there are preconditions for peace. When short-term objectives, political or military, of parties enter the negotiation agenda, conflict resolution through negotiation becomes difficult. In political conflicts, there are direct and indirect parties. For conflict settlement, the role of indirect parties also needs to be considered. Negotiation can be a long and complex process with setbacks. For a negotiation process to succeed, there need to be efforts to sustain the process. A peace process needs serious strategizing. Strategizing negotiation and peace is as important as strategizing war.
Readings/References Dixit, J. N.,( 1998), Assignment Colombo, Vijitha Yapa:Colombo 117
Rotberg, Robert I, (1999), Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, Civil War and Reconciliation, Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC Rupesinghe, Kumar, (Ed.),( 1998), Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka, Efforts, Failures and Lessons, International Alert; London Uyangoda, Jayadeva, Breakdown of Peace Talks, in Pravada, May/ June, 1995 Loganathan, K.,( 1996), Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities, Past Attempts at Resolving Ethnic Conflict, Center for Policy Research and Analysis, University of Colombo, Colombo Manikkalingam, Ram,( 1996), Prudently Negotiating a Moral Peace, Social Scientists Association: Colombo Zartman,William,( 1985), Ripe for Resolution, Conflict and Intervention in Apica, Oxford University Press, New York
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Learning from Bangladeshs Practical Approach

Jehan Perera When it is thought about from Sri Lankas distance, Bangladesh is usually an object of humanitarian concern. This densely populated country of 120 million is often projected as the basket case of South Asia and Mother Natures step-child, plagued with floods and cyclones. But to at least some of the members of the Sri Lankan delegation who were in Bangladesh to study the peace process in the country, their visit may have evoked memories of Sri Lankas own economic boom years in the late 1970s when Colombos skyline changed with a startling rapidity. Dhaka today may be polluted and chaotic, but there is a dynamism that Sri Lanka lost a decade and a half ago, in its terrible ethnic war. If not for far-sighted political leadership on both sides of the divide, Bangladesh too may have got bogged down endlessly in its own ethnic war. In 1976, even before the Sri Lankan conflict got under way, a guerilla movement calling itself the Shanti Bahini, and based in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the eastern extremity of the country bordering India, took up arms against the state. It is easy to wax eloquent about the rights of others in other countries, while violating the rights of people at home. For many years, Bangladesh was caught up in this dilemma. A small community of people in Bangladesh wished to obtain autonomy and a protected status for themselves. The initial response of the state was to try and suppress them by force of arms. Especially in the immediate aftermath of the successful liberation war of 197 1, and independence, there was a strong
and fierce pride in Bengali nationalism. There was a sense that Bangladesh must have a centralized state and be one people and one country. But the realities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts called this notion of Bengali nationalism into question. The example of Bangladesh shows that whatever may be the proportions of the majority and minority populations, when the minority rises in protest, no amount of physical coercion can suppress them. They have to be dealt with politically. In Bangladesh, the right to autonomy has not become an issue of separation, but rather of ensuring equal rights to a smaller national community. Interestingly, due to the pragmatic nature of Bangladeshs leaders, they did not become bogged down in endless conceptual debates on the rights of nations, homelands and self-determination, but arrived at a solution by which these values could be protected.
Anti-National
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is located at the eastern extremity of Bangladesh and borders India. It constitutes about 10 percent of the territory of the country and has a population of little over 1 million, which is less than 1 percent of the population. It is populated by a non-Bengali people. They are called tribals. But they prefer to be known as hill people or Jumma people. The largest of the groups is the Chakmas who are largely Buddhist by religion. Across the border in India are a similar people in the states of Mizoram, Tripura etc. During the partitioning of India, the middle classes of the hill people preferred to join India as it was ethnically diverse and secular. But the British rulers gave the CHT to Pakistan. Hill leaders who protested were harassed and fled to India. From then on India became the destination of refugee hill people, including the leaders of the militancy. They also became seen by the Bengali population as pro-India and anti-national.
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The Liberation War of 197 1 in which Bangladesh was formed, saw certain key leaders of the hill people supporting Pakistan rather than the Bengali liberation movement. For a second time, at a key junction, the leadership of the hill people went against the sentiment of the people by whose side they lived. During and in the immediate aftermath of the war, many atrocities were perpetrated on the hill people in the name of getting rid of pro-Pakistan collaborators. In June 1972, shortly after the liberation of Bangladesh, activists among the hill people formed the Purbatyo Chattagram Jana Sumhati Sumiti (PCJSS). The armed wing of the PCJSS was called the Shanti Bahini. For a short time the leadership of the hill people worked together with the government of Bangladesh. But with the assassination of the Father of the Nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in August 1975, they went underground and declared armed struggle to secure a political solution to their problems. The new leaders of Bangladesh were not happy with the position taken by the hill people during the Liberation War. They were also not prepared to respect the different identity of the hill people or give the region a special status. In addition, the government sent in about 400,000 Bengalis to settle down in the CHT, both to ease the pressure on the land in other parts of Bangladesh and to dilute the dominance of the hill people in the CHT. The population balance shifted dramatically. In the census of 195 1, Bengalis were only 9 percent of the population; in the census of 199 1 they were 49 percent of the population. Someoftheinitialdemandsofthehillpeoplewerea)compensation for the approximately 100,000 people who were displaced by the construction of a giant hydro-electric dam; b) expulsion of the new Bengali settlers; c) reservation of 3 seats in the parliament; d) declaration of an exclusive region for the hill people; and, e) a regional council with autonomy.
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There are many parallels to be seen with Sri Lanka in the subsequent events that unfolded in Bangladesh. For instance, in 1980, President (General) Ziaur Rahman termed the problem to be an economic one. He called for unconditional surrender of the miscreants. In 1987, President (General) Mohamed Ershad said We may continue the fight but peace will not come. He spoke of the need for a political solution. At peace talks held in December 1987, the government agreed to 26 points put forward by the Shanti Bahini, but refused to accept the following: a) to take back the Bengali settlers; b) to withdraw the army; c) to merge the three districts of the CHT to set up a single regional council with autonomy; and d) to exclude from the peace talks those whom it termed national betrayers (ie. those hill groups who opposed the Shanti Bahini). Like the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the Shanti Bahini saw themselves as the sole representatives of the hill people; the government of Bangladesh attempted to sideline the Shanti Bahini by negotiating with the other hill groups. Thus, in February 1989, the government of President Ershad signed an agreement with prominent leaders of the CHT who were not from the Shanti Bahini. The government established three district councils with limited autonomy. This was rejected by the Shanti Bahini but accepted by the other hill groups. Elections were held to these district councils. Polls observers were not permitted and the elections were rigged. The Shanti Bahini rejected the establishment of the three district councils and called for their dissolution. They demanded the formation of a merged regional council with a guarantee clause in the constitution. The armed conflict continued. Soon it became clear that there could be no peace in the CHT without the Shanti Bahini coming into the peace process.
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New Phase The peace process entered a new phase with the formation of a non-military-based democratic government under Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. In 1992, the BNP government of Khaleda Zia formed a multi-party Committee for CHT formed with members of all mainstream political parties in parliament, including the opposition Awami League. The Shanti Bahini also declared a cease-fire. The Shanti Bahini leader, Shantu Larma, came out in public for the first time since 1975 to hold talks with the 7-member Committee for CHT which was headed by a government minister. But despite several meetings, no final settlement was reached. After a new government headed by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League came to power in 1995, they resumed talks with the Shanti Bahini. The government set up a National Committee for CHT with other political parties joining it, but the main opposition party, the BNP, boycotted the committee. What is invaluable for Sri Lankans to note is that the new government under Sheikh Hasina did not proceed to throw away what the old government had negotiated, like successive Sri Lankan governments have done. Instead it built on what had already been negotiated. The new government also appointed a multi-party National Committee which negotiated with the Shanti Bahini just as its predecessor had done. This time the negotiations were successfully completed and the two parties signed a peace accord on 2 December, 1997. Due to the peace accords essential continuity with the past, the opposition protests against the accord would surely be seen as politically motivated by large sections of the population. This may partly explain their reluctance to be mobilized in street demonstrations against it. In addition, other influential segments of Bengali society are aware that a peace settlement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts will be crucial in enabling
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the port city of Chittagong to benefit from being a hub of Southeast Asian commerce and an economic powerhouse of the Bangladeshi economy. The dire consequences that the opposition predicted would result from the peace accord have not occurred. They include mass street protests against the Accord, the need for passports to travel to the Chittagong Hill Tracts and massacres of Bengali settlers. The present position of the opposition is that the new legislation violates the unitaryry nature of the Bangladesh constitution and, hence, is unconstitutional. The reason for the failure of the opposition protests against the peace accord is that the ordinary Bengali citizens prefer to live in a country at peace than at war. Besides, the government did not have to go way out of the political mainstream in signing the peace accord. They built on what the former government under Mrs Khaleda Zia had already negotiated with the Shanti Bahini. The peace accord has led to the formation of a single regional council for the CHT, which is an overarching body that coordinates the three district councils of the CHT. In addition, the government agreed to resettle the refugee hill people who had fled to India and to allocate them land and compensation. For its part, the Shanti Bahini agreed to disarm. They also agreed to take over an interim regional council without elections until such time as elections could be held. Model Process What Sri Lanka has to learn from Bangladesh is not so much the content of the solution. The quantum of powers to be shared and reallocated between the centre and the regions will undoubtedly vary according to the specific circumstances in the two countries. What can be emulated, however, is the process that the conflicting parties in Bangladesh adopted in working out a political solution.
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An important breakthrough was made when the government of Bangladesh stopped the futile task of attempting to militarily defeat and politically exclude the Shanti Bahini. They also did not try to monopolize the negotiation process and hog all the political credit for themselves. They formed multi-party committees to negotiate directly with the Shanti Bahini. They accepted the fact that the ethnic problem was specific to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and so limited the devolution of powers to that region only, instead of applying it symmetrically to the whole country. The Sri Lankan approach to peace making stands in contrast to the Bangladesh approach in all these key areas. The government is still trying to militarily defeat and isolate the LTTE. While several governments have tried to negotiate with the LTTE, no government has ever formed a multi-party committee to negotiate with the LTTE. Another albatross around the countrys neck is the notion that all provinces should be granted an equal amount of devolved power. This would leave the central government deprived of much of its powers, and entails such a fundamental restructuring of the state, that both politicians and bureaucrats are nervous to countenance it. Even at this late stage the idea of asymmetrical devolution put forward by the opposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe should be seriously considered instead of stubbornly being rejected. Another important feature of the Bangladesh agreement was that the parties to the conflict did not get bogged down in quibbling about the meaning of divisive political terms such as unitary, nation and self-determination. Instead they got down to the discussions of a practical framework for governance. This appears to be the approach suggested by the governments leading thinker on the ethnic conflict, Minister Prof G.L. Peiris. In a speech he delivered at the Marga Institutes commemoration of the Nobel Peace Prize, Prof Peiris made a strong case against the two sides coming to agreement on a common set of principles.
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It seems that Prof Peiris concern was that the debate over principles would revolve around the Thimpu Principles put forward by all the Tamil parties in 1985, which specified the issues of nation, homeland, self-determination and equality. However, it is necessary that any political agreement should have a value-based vision underlying it. Where Sri Lanka is concerned, the values that would have to underlie a political solution would be democracy and the equality of all peoples who live in the country, both as individuals and as members of distinct ethnic, religious and language groups. This way of approaching the problem can also be seen as integral to the Bangladesh approach to peace making. If not for far-sighted political leadership on both sides of the divide, Bangladesh too may have got bogged down endlessly in its own ethnic war. The sooner that Sri Lankas leaders emulate those of its SAARC neighbor, Bangladesh, the better it will be for its people. The CHT Conflict: Main Events
1 ) The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is located at the eastern

extremity of Bangladesh and borders India. It constitutes about 10 percent of the territory of the country and has a population of little over 1 million, which is less than 1 percent of the population. It is populated by anon-Bengali people. They are called tribals. But they prefer to be known as hill people or Jumma people. The largest of the groups is the Chakmas who are largely Buddhist by religion. Across the border in India are a similar people in the states of Mizoram, Tripura etc. ( 2 ) During the partitioning of India, the middle classes of the hill people preferred to join India as it was ethnically diverse and secular. But the British rulers gave the CHT to Pakistan. Hill leaders who protested were harassed and fled to India. From then on India became the destination of refugee hill people, including the
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leaders of the militancy. They also became seen by the Bengali population as pro-India and anti-national. (3) During the Liberation War of 197 1 in which Bangladesh was formed, certain key leaders of the hill people supported Pakistan rather than the Bengali liberation movement. For a second time, at a key junction the leadership of the hill people went against the sentiment of the people by whose side they lived. During and in the immediate aftermath of the war, many atrocities were perpetrated on the hill people in the name of getting rid of proPakistan collaborators. In June 1972, shortly after the liberation of Bangladesh, activists among the hill people formed the Parbatyo Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS). The armed wing of the PCJSS was called the Shanti Bahini. For a short time the leadership of the hill people worked together with the government of Bangladesh. But with the assassination of the Father of the Nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in August 1975, they went underground and declared armed struggle to secure a political solution to their problems. The new leaders of Bangladesh were not happy with the position taken by the hill people during the Liberation War. They were also not prepared to respect the different identity of the hill people or give the region a special status. In addition, the government sent in about 400,000 Bengalis to settle down in the CHT, both to ease the pressure on the land in other parts of Bangladesh and to dilute the dominance of the hill people in the CHT. The population balance shifted dramatically. In the census of 195 1, Bengalis were only 9 percent of the population; in the census of 199 1 they were 49 percent of the population. Some of the initial demands of the hill people were
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(4)
(5)
(6)
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(a)
Compensation for the approximately 100,000 people who were displaced by the construction of a giant hydro- electric Expulsion of the new Bengali settlers Reservation of 3 seats in the Parliament Declaration of an exclusive region for the hill people A regional council with autonomy
(b) (c) (d) (e) (7)
In 1980, President (General) Ziaur Rahman termed the problem to be an economic one. He called for unconditional surrender of the miscreants. In 1987, President (General) Mohamed Ershad said We may continue the fight but peace will not come. He spoke of the need for a political solution. At peace talks held in December 1987, the government agreed to 26 points put forward by the PCJSS, but refused to accept the following: (a) (b) (c) (d) To take back the Bengali settlers To withdraw the army To merge the three districts of the CHT to set up a single regional council with autonomy To exclude from the peace talks those whom it termed national betrayers (ie. those hill groups who opposed the PCJSS)
(8)
(9)
In February 1989, the government of President Ershad signed an agreement with prominent leaders of the CHT who were not from the PCJSS. The government established three district councils with limited autonomy. This was rejected by the PCJSS
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but accepted by the other hill groups. Elections were held to these district councils. Polls observers were not permitted and the elections were rigged. ( 10) The PCJSS rejected the establishment of the three district councils and called for their dissolution. They demanded the formation of a merged regional council with a guarantee clause in the constitution. The armed conflict continued. Soon it became clear that there could be no peace in the CHT without the PCJSS (Shanti Bahini) coming into the peace process. (11) A new spirit entered the peace process with the formation of a non-military-based democratic government under Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. In 1992 the BNP government of Khaleda Zia formed a multi-party Committee for CHT formed with members of all mainstream political parties in parliament, including the opposition Awami League. The Shanti Bahini also declared a cease-fire. The PCJSS leader, Shantu Larma, came out in public for the first time since 1975 to hold talks with the 7-member Committee for CHT which was headed by a government minister. But despite several meetings, no final settlement was reached. (12) Afler a new govemment headed by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League came to power in 1995, they resumed talks with the PCJSS. The government set up a National Committee for CHT with other political parties joining it, but the main opposition party, the BNP, boycotted the committee. After several meetings, a peace accord was signed between the government and PCJSS in December 1997. (13) The peace accord has led to the formation of a single regional council for the CHT, which is an overarching body that
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coordinates the three district councils of the CHT. In addition, the government agreed to resettle the refugee hill people who had fled to India and to allocate them land and compensation. For its part, the Shanti Bahini agreed to disarm. They also agreed to take over an interim regional council without elections until such time as elections could be held. ( 14) The government passed the legislation based on the peace accord with a simple majority only, as the main opposition parties refused to support it and provide the necessary 2/3 majority for constitutional amendment. The main opposition parties also tried to mobilize popular opposition to the peace accord but failed. Their warnings of an Indian takeover of the CHT and passports that would be required for travel there failed to mobilize the people. The opposition parties now say that the peace accord is illegal since it violates the unitary nature of the constitution, and therefore requires a 2/3 majority to amend the constitution. For its part, the PCJSS is also critical of the implementation of the peace accord. They complain that the law that was passed in parliament was diluted and less than what was promised in the peace accord.
In peace negotiations, it is important that a government change does not result in a change of strategy. Even when the governments changed, the new government in Bangladesh in 1992 built on what had already been achieved by the previous government. Although opposition parties tried to mobilize people against the peace accord between the government and rebels, they failed. The main reason was that people in Bangladesh preferred a country at peace, and not at war.
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Bangladesh had a successful process of negotiations. No single party tried to get the political credit for peace. Government and rebels, instead of getting locking themselves into difficult issues, focussed on practical issues of governance and worked out a mutually acceptable settlement.
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9
Lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement
Jehan Perera The conflict in Northern Ireland is one that has had a longer history than many other conflicts in the world. The partitioning and separation of Ireland from Great Britain in 1920 gave birth to Northern Ireland, with its Protestant majority and Catholic minority. The two communities were bitterly polarized and they failed to work together. Violence was seen as the way to change. But, instead of generating change that was constructive, violence led to stalemate and to immense suffering. The parallels to the Sri Lankan situation are clear. Not so long ago, it seemed that there was no way out of the violent conflict in Northern Ireland. The Protestant majority wanted to remain within the United Kingdom. The Catholic minority wanted to join with Ireland. The British wanted to defeat and disarm the guerillas on both sides, especially the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and so they had sent their army in, but to no avail. That is, until both the British and the IRA were prepared to openly admit that they could not solve the problem and achieve their aspirations through warfare. On the British side, there was a public acknowledgement that the army could only limit but not suppress IRA guerilla action. In mm, the IRA admitted that while they could fight on for another decade if need be, at the end of the decade they would be nowhere near pushing the British army out of Northern Ireland. In the meantime, the people on whose behalf they were fighting became the losers.
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Unfortunately, we in Sri Lanka have still to come to this stage of realization. For sure, the government has on many occasions said that a political solution is necessary to end the conflict. But it seems that in their heart of hearts, many government leaders continue to believe that a military victory is possible. Instead, on and off we hear stories that the LTTE is on their last legs. These stories may firm up the determination of the government decision makers to hang tough, to wait another six months, for the tide to turn decisively in the armys favor. So far, it never has. The constant feature of the war in Sri Lanka is that the LTTE is around and remains able to hit targets, especially in the north-east. As for the LITE, they have never conceded that they might not be able to achieve Tamil Eelam by force of arms. On the contrary, they keep alive the myth of invincibility of themselves and of their leadership, to keep on going the way they are. The LTTE war machine may be welloiled, but the people always pay the price. Prerequisites The Northern Ireland agreement shows that human ingenuity can solve virtually anypoliticalproblem. A problem that seemed impossible to resolve, is now in the process of resolution. But solving long drawn and major civil wars requires several prerequisites. The first prerequisite is that the two warring sides should acknowledge, both publicly and to themselves, that the war cannot be won. In Northern Ireland there was an acknowledgement. In Sri Lanka, such acknowledgment has yet to come, which is why we are still faraway from a peace agreement. The second prerequisite for a peace agreement is that there should be a bi-partisan consensus among the major political forces that represent the state. In the United Kingdom there was this bi-partisan consensus. Much of the spade work that led to the Northern Ireland
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peace agreement had been done by the Conservative government of Prime Minister John Major. But when the man who succeeded him from the opposing political party clinched the deal, John Major did not try to undermine the efforts of his successor, Prime Minister Tony Blair. Instead, he went along with him, and stood on the same platform and supported the agreement that had been arrived at. Needless to say, we in Sri Lanka are still far from seeing such a bi-partisan agreement being honored by our two largest political parties. It is very unfortunate that to this day, years after the President and Leader of the Opposition signed a bi-partisan agreement, the leading members of the government and opposition should be publicly squabbling about who let down the other. The lack of consensus among the two major parties would indicate to the LTTE their lack of seriousness in seeking an end to the ethnic conflict. By way of contrast, in the case of Northern Ireland, the bipartisan consensus in the United Kingdom reassured them that the talks were for real objectives of conflict resolution and not mere election gimmicks. In addition to these two prerequisites of a recognition of military stalemate and the existence of a bi-partisan consensus, the Northern Ireland experience demonstrates that there are at least three other prerequisites for a peace agreement that are needed. The first among them is the existence of a framework documentfor constitutional reform on which there is basic agreement. In Northern Ireland a big challenge to be overcome was to devise a procedure by which democracy and majority rule would prevail, but not simply rule by the ethnic majority. Majority Rule A weakness of the Westminster system in general, which relies upon the unitary form of government, is that in ethnically divided societies, it permits the largest ethnic community to obtain the largest
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number of seats in parliament, and then take unilateral decisions that affect the smaller ethnic communities. In Northern Ireland this system enabled the Protestants to rule over the Catholics, and to discriminate against them. In Sri Lanka, the results of the Westminster system are well known to us. The peace agreement in Northern Ireland specifies that there will be stringent protections of human rights that will prevent a majority riding rough shod over a minority. The agreement provides for arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed to ensure that they do not infringe the European Convention on Human Rights and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. It includes setting up of an Equality Commission to monitor the legal obligation to promote equality of opportunities and parity of esteem between the two main communities, and to investigate individual complaints against public bodies. The framework document that led to the Northern Ireland peace agreement also has several novel mechanisms to ensure that both Protestants and Catholics share equitably in the power to make decisions that will bind both communities. This operates through the mechanism of Paralle1 Consent and Weighted Majorities. Certain key decisions requiring cross-community support (that is, both Protestant and Catholic support) have been designated in advance, to include the election of the Chairman of the Assembly, the First Minister, the Deputy First Minister, standing orders and budgetary allocations. In other cases, such decisions could be triggered by a petition of concern brought by a significant minority (30 out of 108) members of the Assembly. In the Northern Ireland context, the principle of parallel consent means that certain key decisions can only be taken if a majority of both unionists (Protestants) and nationalists (Catholics) vote for the decision. The principle of weighted majority means that at least 60
13.5
percent of the assembly must vote in favor of the decision, together with at least 40 percent of each of the unionist and nationalist members voting for the decision. A further protection against the winner takes all mentality that plagues Sri Lanka, and which drives the opposition to despair and even revolution, has been developed in the Northern Ireland peace agreement. It is to share ministerial positions on the proportional basis of the number of seats won by each party in the Assembly. Not only does this permit the smaller communities to share executive authority, it also enables rival political parties to share power. Open-ended Possibilities The fourth prerequisite that had to be satisfied for the peace agreement to work was the tacit agreement of the British government that the IRA would not disarm at the outset of the peace agreement itself. After many years of fighting and breakdown of talks, the parties to the conflict simply do not trust each other. A guerilla group will not wish to lay down its arms, even if it is genuine about seeking peace, until it is reasonably assured that the government will deal with it, and implement the agreement, in an honorable way. The Northern Ireland peace agreement has given the IRA and other paramilitary groups two years to disarm following endorsement in referendums North and South of the agreement and in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement. Equally important is that a peace agreement must take care not to shut the door entirely to the ultimate goal for which a guerilla organization has taken to arms. The guerilla leadership has to be able to convince its rank and file that all the sacrifces of the past have not been in vain.
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The Northern Ireland peace agreement leaves the door open to the IRAs goal of achieving the reunion of Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic. It recognizes that at this time the majority of people of Northern Ireland desire to live as a part of Britain. But it also provides that when a majority of the people of Northern Ireland freely give their consent to a united Ireland at a referendum, Northern Ireland may leave Britain. On the other hand, a similar solution may not be possible in Sri Lanka because the unit that should conduct such a referendum, whether it is the north-east, or the north and east separately, or the whole island, is a matter of dispute. In the case of Northern Ireland, there was no dispute that the unit in question was that of Northern Ireland, which had been artificially partitionedby the British in 1920. In Sri Lanka a viable alternative to Tamil Eelam which accords with the four principles articulated at the Thimpu peace talks in 1985 may still be able to satisfy the LTTEs ultimate goal as it is a phrase that they have coined themselves.
Role of Mediation
The fifth prerequisite for a successful peace agreement in Northern Ireland was the skilful mediation done by Senator Mitchell from the United States. Senator Mitchell and his team of mediators did much more than facilitate the discussions between the British government, the IRA, the Northern Irish political parties and the other paramilitary parties. They did not merely carry messages, arrange the tables and the place to meet. In addition, they prepared documents, suggested alternatives and counseled the different parties. This mediation work was necessary because of the mistrust that existed between the parties, and also because of the lack of negotiation skills of many of them.
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By way of contrast in Sri Lanka, both the government and opposition have balked at foreign mediation. The rather bad example of Indian mediation may account for this reluctance to accept foreign mediation. But it was plain to see that India was not an impartial mediator during its period of involvement. On the contrary, it was a very involved one, being a neighbor that had many interests in Sri Lanka not least of which was actively supporting some of the guerilla organizations. At present in Sri Lanka, there appears to be a consensus that is building up that third-party facilitation is acceptable. This is an improvement on the attitudes prevalent some time ago. As much as the government needs to be rethinking its strategy on how to end the war, and the sufferings of the people, so must the LTTE also engage in rethinking its strategy, so that both parties can move away from war and killing to achievepolitical endsthroughpolitical means.
Summary
Following lessons from the experience of Northern Ireland are relevant to Sri Lanka:
l l
Human dignity can solve seemingly intractable political problems. Solving long-drawn civil wars require certain prerequisites: The warring sides should acknowledge that the war cannot be won. - There should be consensus among major political parties.
In Northern Ireland, parties first negotiated a Framework Document setting out principles for constitutional reform. The Framework Document introduced novel constitutional features to enable Protestants and Catholics to share power on the basis of equality.
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Steps are taken to prevent majority rule with provisions for stringent protection of human rights. The settlement is not a closed one. It leaves room for open-ended possibilities. The skilful mediation by a third-party mediator was a major reason for the success of Northern Ireland negotiations.
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10
The Philippines: Key to Success in Peace Making
Jehan Perera The Philippines is of interest to Sri Lanka due to the peace agreement arrived at on the island of Mindanao, and its relevance to Sri Lanka. The breakthrough to peace on Mindanao came after a quarter century of guerilla warfare that pitted the original Muslim majority on the island against the government. The peace accord which was signed in 1996, now appears to be breaking down. There are lessons in both peace making and peace losing that are of great relevance to Sri Lanka. Mindanao had been for many centuries a Muslim majority area. But successive waves of Christian colonization, some of which was state sponsored, led to a change in the demographic composition. The new Christian settlers came to be seen as the new elite, upsetting old social relations. They became the owners of large tracts of land. Along with these changes came a transformation in the nature of the institutions serving the public. They too tended to serve the Christian population first, with the result that the Muslim population on Mindanao felt that they were being sidelined and had become second class citizens in the land of their birth. Thus, a clear parallel can be seen to the grievances of Tamils in Sri Lankas formerly Tamil majority Eastern province in relation to state-sponsored settlement of Sinhalese. The guerilla war begun by organizations such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) became a protracted one with neither the government nor the rebels able to defeat the other. Foreign support from several Muslim countries, most notably Libya, led to a situation of stalemate. By the time of the peace agreement in 1996, an estimated
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125,000 people are believed to have died as a result of the conflict. Therefore, the peace settlement in the Philippines, the problems that were overcome and those that remain offer many lessons for peace makers whether in Sri Lankaor in other countries facing ethnic conflicts, such as Bangladesh. The success of peace making in the Philippines came after several failures. The most dramatic breakdown occurred in February 1987 when the newly-elected president, Corazon Aquino, who was elected to power as the peace and democracy candidate, declared an all out campaign to militarily eradicate the rebels. The parallel to Sri Lanka and to the election of its own peace and democracy candidate, President Chandrika Kumaratunga, is striking. Both presidents, who were widows of slain political leaders in whose shadows they had lived, had not had experience of administering political office. They both went into the peace talks with good intentions, but without having done the requisite hard work in planning. Adequate Preparations According to Professor Ed Garcia, While the sincerity of the new (Aquino) government to talk was widely acknowledged, it has been recognized even by members of the peace panel that the government was unprepared when it went into negotiations. The relevance of his observation becomes clearer when he further pointed out that. What made the talks possible was the popular clamor for it, effectively overriding the militarys objections to peace talks. It was this support from a peace constituency, consisting principally of religious leaders and non-governmental organizations, that provided the impetus for the peace talks, but it was no substitute for the adequate preparations necessary to ensure a significant breakthrough into negotiations. In 1993 the newly elected president, Fidel Ramos, adopted a more sophisticated policy towards negotiations. He appointed a three141
member National Unification Commission with wide ranging powers and with Cabinet status, so that they would not be subjected to any form of political interference. Backed by a team of researchers and assistants, the Commissioners did their own investigations and made their recommendations directly to the President. This led to the much acclaimed peace settlement between the Philippine government and the MNLF, which is the largest of the Muslim rebel organizations. Disillusionment However, the situation today in Mindanao is growing precarious. There are two major reasons for this. The first problem is that the Philippino government is not delivering on all that it promised to the MNLF when it obtained their acquiescence in the peace settlement. After President Ramos, President Estrada, who succeeded him, is not very sympathetic to the aspirations of the Muslim people of Mindanao for self-government. The second problem is that the MNLF leader, Nur Misuari, who became the Governor of Mindanao, has shown himself to be a poor administrator. He has not been able to show results in terms of eradicating corruption and promoting economic development. The more extremist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which did not sighe devolution proposals made their appearance in February 1996 the package had been substantially diluted. Likewise, in the Philippines the first agreement signed by the Ramos government and the MNLF rebels on a transitional implementing structure and mechanism in June 1996 met with severe opposition and public uproar in the country. This led to to the watering down of the peace agreement by the time it was finalized and signed into law in October 1996. In other words, the MNLF ended up getting quite a bit less than it had been promised at the outset. But by entering into a watered down agreement, the MNLF is now in danger of losing ground to the much smaller and more extreme MILF, which has now become
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the main rebel organization. The MILF is making much of the sell out of Muslim interests by its rival which, it claims, wanted to get some small share of governmental power. Important Lessons An important lesson from the Philippines is that, unless both the government and the rebel organization with which it has signed the peace agreement cooperate with each other, extremists on either side can gain in strength. They will try to undermine the peace agreement. This is what can also be seen in the case of the PalestinianIsraeli peace agreement. The hardline stance taken by the new Israeli government has weakened President Arafat and also the moderates among the Israelis. But the structures of power are such that a weakening of the moderates after peace may affect the rebel organization more than it does the government. While the war rages the guerillas are strong, because they can always hope to rely on their weapons to get what they want. But after peace comes they are not expected to resort to their weapons, but only to political negotiations. This is the realm of political intrigue and double talk where the advantage will tend to lie with established politicians rather than with guerillas in the bush. Further, it is governments, and not the rebels, who have access to massive resources, both local and international, available to legitimate states and to the diplomatic power that being a legitimate state confers. In turn, the international community feels much more comfortable with democratically elected politicians than with rebels who have just left the jungles. Therefore, it is natural that the rebels will feel that the cards are stacked against them once peace returns. This is why making peace with a guerilla organization calls for special mechanisms to build trust and confidence. Or else the guerillas will not be prepared to come out of the jungles to negotiate but will prefer to fight it out from the jungles, despite the misery that the war brings to everyone, including their own people.
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Thus, for peace making to be successful there are three important lessons from the Philippines. First is the need to have careful preparations madeprior to negotiations. Second, is to ensure that the rebels do not feel cheated after the peace agreement has been signed because of any watering down of the agreement. This can lead to a defection from the ranks of those who signed the peace accord, who will cross over and join more extreme rebel groups. Third, is to keep in mind that a basic principle of conflict resolution by peaceful means is that both parties to a conflict should contribute towards the envisaged solution. For instance, if only one side develops the solution, the chances are that the benefits of the solution would accrue primarily to that side. Further, the other side would not feel a sense of ownership of the solution. On the contrary they would probably feel that the solution belongs to the other side alone, and not to them also. Joint participation in the formulation of the solution to a problem is key to mutual acceptance of that solution, The basic requirement in any negotiated political solution is that the two sides shouldjointly come up with the answers and thereby feel that they own the solution. For instance, the peace accord signed in the Philippines between the government and the Muslim rebels, was based on the 1976 Tripoli agreement. On that occasion, the Philippine government, the rebel MNLF and the Organization of Islamic States jointly came up with a mutually agreed framework of a political solution. Twenty years later, after several failures, this framework was fleshed out and given content as a result of a successful negotiation. In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, there has been no commonly agreed framework on which a solution may be reached. In 1985 the Tamil parties, including the LTTE, met with the Sri Lankan government and came out with the Thimpu declaration and affirmed four principles on which they wished the solution to be based. But the Sri Lankan government did not agree to this framework which was unilaterally decided on by the Tamil parties. The Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987
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brought together the Sri Lankan and Indian governments, and all the Tamil parties, but not the LTTE. Both of these negotiations failed because they did not accommodate both parties to the conflict but sought to be unilateral impositions. Now in a continuation with past trends, there is the devolution package that excludes the LTTE. It too seeks to be a unilateral imposition on one party to the conflict. Devolution Package Despite the best efforts of the government to obtain broad and non-partisan support for the devolution package, this has not been readily forthcoming either from the rebel LTTE, the opposition UNP, or civic organizations. The reason seems to have less to do With the content of the package (for example, the unitary state versus union of regions issue) than it has to do with the non-participation problem. The fact is the devolution package is one that was crafted by the government acting more or less on its own, and only thereafter presented to the larger society for their observations and amendments. But whatever the shortcomings may be in the present set of government proposals, they do continue to deal directly with the greatest obstacle to the genuine devolution of powers. This is Article 2 of the constitution which asserts that Sri Lanka shall be a unitary state. In terms of constitutional law while Article 2 remains the autonomy that can be granted is necessarily limited. Article 2 perpetuates centralization and restricts devolution. It means that the central government can always, by itself, either override or dissolve a regional body. Such a power is bound to be abused, if not for ethnic reasons, then for party political reasons. What is most noteworthy about the governments devolution proposals is that they seek to remove Article 2 from the constitution. This is certainly a courageous decision on the part of the government because it is the removal of Article 2 that necessitates a referendum. In its willingness to go to the people with the most far-reaching devolution
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proposals ever made by a Sri Lankan government, the government has given an indication of its sincerity to pursue a negotiated political settlement. But for them to be really worthwhile, these proposals, as we shall see, should be part of a strategy to bring the LTTE back to negotiations. The unfortunate fact is, that even if the devolution package more or less meets Tamil aspirations, in its present formulation it will fail to be acceptable to the LTTE. The devolution package is an endeavor to squeeze the LTTE into a solution framed by others. This is a strategy that is unlikely to work if peace now is the goal.
Summary
In this lesson, you learned: A breakthrough for peace in the Philippines came after a quarter century of guerilla warfare and conflict. Peace talks between the government and the rebels were made possible when there was popular clamor for it. A peace constituency is crucial to create conditions for peace talks. If the government and the rebels that sign the peace agreement do not cooperate to implement the settlement extremists of either side can gain in strength. Making peace with a guerilla organization calls for special mechanisms. Careful preparations for talk made before the talks can make peace talks successful. It is important that the rebels do not feel cheated after the peace agreement is signed. One key principle in conflict resolution by peaceful means is that both parties should contribute to the envisaged solution.
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Constitution-Making in a Plural Society: Conflict Prevention/Resolution

N. Selvakkumaran Introduction In countries where internal conflicts have defined the nature of political relations among communities, constitution-making is usually a complex and difficult exercise. Sri Lankas experience during the past two decades provides a lot of lessons concerning constitutional reforms in a society in conflict. However, constitution-making can also be approached from a conflict resolution perspective. Constitutions may generate conflicts when they do not provide political structures and institutions suitable for the plural nature of society. Sri Lanka provides a good case in point. At the same time, constitutions can also be imagined as initiatives for conflict resolution. In this chapter, we will discuss some salient aspects of constitution-making for conflict resolution. Aims of a Constitution It is hardly imaginable that any country or state calling itself a democracy can be without a constitution. Every state needs a constitution. It has been said that a constitution is a necessity and every state must and does in fact possess one. A constitution is necessary even in the case of despotism. A state without a constitution is not a state but a regime of anarchy. (Jellinek) Why is a constitution essential for a state? A constitution of a state serves many a purpose. To name a few, it serves to enumerate
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the powers and functions of different organs of government; it describes the relationship between the different organs of government; it enunciates the norms which underpin the exercise of powers by these organs; it defines the relationship between the organs of government and the people of a country; it describes the relationship of a state with the rest of the world; it curbs the government on behalf of the individuals and groups; it also limits the vagaries of present and future generations. Due to a variety of these reasons, it may be observed that many writers have given different definitions to a constitution. In the words of Woolsey, a constitution is the collection of principles according to which the powers of the government, rights of the governed and the relations between the two are adjusted. Dr. Wheare, on the other hand, defines a constitution as that body of rules which regulates the ends for which and the organs through which governmental power is exercised. Similarly, Gilchrist states that a constitution consists of that body of rules or laws, written or unwritten, which determine the organization of government, the distribution of powers to the various organs of government and the general principles on which these powers are to be exercised. Jellinek also sees a constitution in the same light. To him a constitution is the body of juridical rules which determine the supreme organs of the state, which prescribes their mode of creation, their mutual relation, their sphere of action and finally the fundamental place of each of them in their relation to the state. There are others who give importance to some other aspects. For example, Charles Borgeaud envisions a constitution as the fundamental law according to which the relations of individuals or moral persons to the community are determined. Lord Bryce states as one of the definitions that a constitution is the complex totality of laws embodying the principles and rules whereby the community is organized, governed and held together. It is evident that the constitution of a state serves a variety of purposes. When making a constitution, different degrees of importance
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may be attached to different purposes depending on the experience a state has undergone or on the basis of emphasis placed by its people on certain matters. This may vary from country to country though some of the core values and norms may, of necessity, find a place in all the constitutions. One of the objectives of the constitution in a democratic state must be to maintain law and order and create an environment where people can live happily andpeacefully, enjoy their peedoms and rights, and develop themselves and the country without causing any harm to others or infringing the peedoms and rights of o thers. One cannot but agree that these concerns should, if not will, come uppermost in the people who are concerned with making a satisfactory and workable constitution which ensures peace and harmony amongst the different peoples of the country. If the basic organic law of a country which is plural in nature fails to provide the necessary environment and space for diverse communities to coexist with amity and mutual respect, it will not take very long for the country to disintegrate and go down the lane of destruction and distrust. No country can ever be capable of developing itself if there is mistrust, hatred and disunity among its various communities. Lack of unity, among goodwill and trust amongst a countrys different communities is a sure recipe for disintegration and disaster. It is noteworthy that the fundamental law of any land should neither constitutionalize nor institutionalize disunity, suspicion and mistrust amongst the various communities inhabiting the country. Sri Lanka is not an exception to this general notion. Therefore, it is essential to know the constitutional structures and mechanisms that should be in place if a plural society can exist and let its different peoples live peacefully and amicably for the good of themselves as well as that of their country. Constitution in a Plural Society There are three main concerns, amongst others, which a pluralistic country should pay attention to when it embarks upon the task of making
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a new constitution for itself. These relate to (i) mechanics and manner of preventing conflicts from arising between different communities, (ii) early warning signals of any potential conflicts, and (iii) if conflicts do arise, mechanisms for resolving or dealing with them in a manner that will engender harmony and peace as opposed to acrimony and divisiveness. Conflict prevention It is essential that the constitution of a country should not be the very source of creating conflicts amongst the various communities of a plural state. The structure of government formulated in the constitution can be a fertile ground generating disharmony and discord amongst various peoples of a country. For example, a country, composed of multi-ethnic or multi-religious societies needs a system of government which will not allow one ethnic community or religious majority to trarnplti over the rights and freedoms of other communities. The system should not facilitate and foster hegemony of one community over and above the other communities. These concerns could be addressed by incorporating different mechanisms in the fundamental law of a country. The constitutional structure of the government should be designed in such a way that it provides opportunity and space for each and every community to manage their affairs without any interference from the other communities. In other words, the different communities must enjoy relative autonomy when it comes to internal affairs of their respective communities, without allowing such autonomy to adversely impact on the general welfare and good of the country. Overcentralization of powers does not facilitate or provide such space or opportunity. A system of effective devolution of powers becomes handy in this respect. Devolution of powers provides opportunities for different groups or regions to look after and develop themselves with regard to matters which pertain to them exclusively without any impact or adverse effect on other people.
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This will in other words permit different groups to mind their own matters without being minded by others. They will get a feeling that they are not subjected to the whims and fancies of people who do not share their sense and sensibilities. This facilitates the enjoyment of autonomy of individuals and groups. One may go to the extent of arguing that this should be a fundamental human right of every person and group. A system which permits or perpetuates a person being dominated or ruled by another, or a group being dominated or ruled by another, where the matter over which this happens is exclusively within the first person or group, is oppressive in nature. Such a system will be a sure recipe for generating conflicts and dissension. History shows that in many a state, the unitary system of government has failed to provide the necessary space and autonomy to different groups to live in amity and harmony. Having said that, one should also ensure that devolution of powers does not become the vehicle for disintegration of states or countries. This lurking fear, that when powers are devolved it provides the stepping stone for disintegration, bothers the minds of constitution makers. It is imperative that adequate and effective safeguards are incorporated in the constitutional structure against such eventualities. This could be ensured in different ways. The centre should enjoy swift and decisive powers to deal with any potential attempt by periphery to break away or endanger the integrity of the country. On the other hand, the constitution should also ensure that the periphery is not alienated with regard to matters which are handled by the centre. There should be effective power-sharing in the centre as well. This will be operative as an interlocking mechanism to ensure the active participation and involvement of the periphery in the national matters as well. Constitutional mechanisms providing for interdependency are welcome features to foster unity, as against divisiveness amongst diverse groups. Where constitutional structures do not permit space and opportunity for peripheries to share and involve in the national
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affairs, it becomes a difficult exercise, naturally, to hold them together. As such, the fundamental law of the country should provide for mechanisms which will truly require the active and necessary participation and contribution to the decision-making as well as implementation process of national matters. When these opportunities are availed of, the system becomes interlocking as well as interdependent, which will ensure and engender togetherness rather than separateness. It is also necessary that fundamental human rights of people, in particular the right to life and integrity of a person, as well as the right to equality, are well and meaningfilly fortified in the constitution. The promotion, protection and enjoyment of these rights by every person go a long way in reducing conflicts amongst themselves. Effective mechanisms against any violation of these rights by legislative, executive orjudicial action, as well as by any private sector action, are essential if these rights are to have any practical meaning. Efficient and easily accessible means of redress and enforcement provide these rights effectiveness, and thus serve towards the prevention of conflicts. It is hardly necessary to stress the importance of an independent and impartial judiciary, as well as other quasi-judicial fora, for upholding and safeguarding these rights. Therefore, the basic law of the land should contain provisions which establish and ensure such a set of bodies. Constitutions and Conflict Prevention Early Warning Signals and Conflicts: It is impossible to provide systems which will fully prevent conflicts from arising. What has been discussed in the earlier section of this chapter is ways and means to prevent conflict from arising; however, that does not, and surely will not, ensure a society free from all conflict. It is an attempt at reducing the sources of conflicts. Conflicts can be said to be as old as mankind. Perhaps life will not be as good if there were to be no conflicts!
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Having said that, one needs to look for signals or indicators which forewarn of a potential conflict. The constitutional fabric should include within itselfmechanics which will facilitate such early signals being given. People who have the facility of being forewarned of any disaster are better prepared to face them or could take prudent and proper steps to avert such disaster beforehand. In this section, let us consider how the fundamental law of the land can provide early warnings about potential conflicts. One of the important instruments which should be strengthened in the fundamental law, is the right to freedom of speech, expression and information. If this right is protected and promoted in its varied forms, individuals and groups will be able to voice their concerns about matters which provide fertile sources of potential conflicts. When there is a fear of persecution or oppression, if one were to express himself or herself, it leads to the suppression of information which may be vital to conflict prevention. Lack of freedom of speech and expression contributes in a great way to the bottling up of dissatisfaction and dissension until it becomes unbearable and bursts as a conflict. Free flow of thought and ideas, viewpoints and counter-arguments are essential tools for harmonious coexistence. If these are not permitted or space is not provided for democratic dissent, conflicts cannot be identified well in time. Therefore, the fundamental human rights of people to enjoy the freedom of speech, expression and information, coupled with the freedom of association and assembly, are to be protected and promoted in a meaningful way in the constitution. As stated earlier, a n independent and impartialjudiciary which is sensitive to theplural character of a society is a sine qua non for the protection and promotion of this right us well. It is the responsibility of the constitution makers to enshrine in the constitution such provisions which will ensure, safeguard and promote such a judiciary.
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Apart from this mechanism, there should be a constitutional device to periodically assess and report on the existing relations between various communities in a plural society. Such a system should be institutionalized so that it meets regularly, and representatives bring to the fore the problems, or what they perceive as problems, and find early solutions before they take the form of conflicts. This institution or forum must be constitutionally provided for and mandated to meet regularly. This will provide a meaningful and effective space for people to air their concerns and fears which will act as a forewarning signal. Constitutions and Conflict Resolution/Management Early warning systems or indicators of potential conflicts do go a long way to nib them in the bud. However, there are circumstances where conflicts do flare up for one reason or other amongst various communities. In such a situation, the constitutional mechanism, to deal with such conflicts in order to resolve them or manage them, becomes very important. There have been many non-constitutional and informal methods adopted to deal with such situations. However, they mainly depend on the goodwill and temperament of the people involved. Similarly, success or otherwise too depends on personalities and not on structures. However, the constitutions provide a judicial system to deal with conflicts and disputes. Inter-personal conflicts are brought before such judicial bodies or quasi- judicial tribunals. Similarly, disputes between persons and governmental institutions are also brought before such bodies. The adversarial nature of the procedures adopted in the adjudication of these causes of action is not conducive in all cases to bring about harmonious future relations amongst the contesting parties. It has been found quite often, that the judicial system works in a manner which favors the winner takes all system. Such a system does not help in many cases to bring about a tranquil and harmonious atmosphere which facilitates reconciliation between parties. The prevailing system 154
divides the parties, rather than bringing them together, in a majority of cases. Such a system is not at all suitable and advisable when dealing with issues of conflicts between communities in a plural society, though in certain situations adversarial systems with penal sanctions are not ruled out as inappropriate. It is a challenging task for constitution makers to create and establish institutional structures and systems which will provide for negotiation, mediation and resolution of disputes instead of adjudication on them. In this way, the chances are more for the resolution of conflicts by a process which facilitates give and take rather than winner takes all. Therefore, the constitution of a country with plural society should provide for high-level instruments for negotiation and mediation of disputes between communities. This will go a long way in keeping the relations between communities in a favorable way. Conclusion Constitution makers in a plural society have to be mindful that inter-community conflicts are inevitable and that the constitution they make should cater for this concern. They should draft the constitution in a manner which will try to reduce the possibilities of conflict arising, which will contain indicators and signals which forewarn potential conflicts, and which will provide effective and beneficial mechanisms to resolve such conflicts. Failure to address these issues when making a constitution, will provide ample opportunities for conflicts to arise and bedevil the country. Summary In this chapter, you learnt:
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Constitutions can provide mechanisms and structures for conflict management and resolution.
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Constitutions in plural societies should reflect the diversity of society. The constitutional fabric should include within itself mechanisms to facilitate early warning signals about possible conflicts. Constitutional devices can periodically assess the nature of intergroup relations in plural society to prevent conflicts. A strong fundamental rights chapter in the constitution and an independent judiciary are effective mechanisms to prevent conflicts. Constitutions can provide for institutions and mechanisms for conflict resolution and management.
Works referred to: Jellinek, Recht des modernen Staates, cited in J.W. Gamer, Political Science and Government Wheare, KC., Modern Constitutions Gilchrist, R.N., Principles of Political Science Charles Borgeaud, Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions Lord Bryce, J., Studies in Histow and Jurisprudence Mahajan, V.D., Political Theory
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The South African Constitution of 1996 Lessons for Sri Lanka
Rohan Edlrisinha Introduction The South African Constitution of 1996 is considered one of the most progressive constitutions in the modern world. Not only does the constitution provide for the protection of human rights and impose effective restraints on the wielders of political power, but it also helped heal the wounds of the nations bitter apartheid legacy. The conflict between the white supremacist minority and the black majority had been violent for several years. The African National Congress(ANC) and its allies had been involved in a long armed struggle for liberation. The apartheid rulers stubbornly refused to countenance democratic reforms even in the wake of international sanctions and isolation. However, in the early 1990.54 a dramatic shift took place which led eventually to a peaceful and negotiated settlement to the conflict. A peaceful transfer of power to the black majority with a restoration of democracy and basic human rights was the culmination of this unique process of conflict resolution in South Africa. In this chapter we focus on the process of constitution making in South Africa. One cardinal lesson we can learn from South Africa is that constitution making is not merely drafting and adopting a constitution. More importantly it can be an integral component of a conflict resolution and peace-building initiative. In deeply divided societies like South Africa and Sri Lanka, a new constitution should
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mean a qualitatively new phase in the political life of the state and its people. A new constitution should embody the consensus of all those who constitute the nation. It should give expression to the democratic aspirations of the people. It should be an instrument for national reconciliation and the healing of old wounds in the body politic. It should be a covenant that binds people with people and people with the state. As Nelson Mandela has observed about the new South Africa: We enter into a covenant that we will build a society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk, talk without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity, a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world. Beginnings The adoption of the final constitution in South Africa was the culmination of a remarkable process of change or transformation which began in February, 1990 when then President F. W. de Klerk in a famous speech took the whole of South Africa by surprise by launching the process of democratization. Since then, there had been ups and downs and serious set backs, but, over the years there has been progress. South Africa is an example of a success story ofreconciliation and hope. Before we focus on the details of the constitution, we need to mention the fact that the drafting of the final constitution took place within the political context of the amazing statesmanship of President Nelson Mandela, who personified the reconciliation and generosity of spirit which the new constitution sought to enshrine. President Mandela played a crucial role and that spirit of reconciliation and generosity of spirit trickled down to the political leadership of the country and also to the main actors in the Constitution-drafting process. The relationship between the President of the Constitutional Assembly, Cyril Ramaphosa, and the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Rolf Meyer, and also the
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Deputy Chairman of the Assembly, Leon Wessels, both of whom were leaders of the National Party, was crucial in bringing about the adoption of the final constitution. The entire process gives us a lesson in constitution making. The non-partisan approach, the peoples participation in the constitution-making process, the professionalism and competence displayed in drafting the constitution, attempts to address the aspirations of the different communities, to forge compromise and consensus, and the emphasis on values and principles which has permeated the whole constitution-drafting process, are significant lessons for Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, in Sri Lanka we appear to lack some of these important values and principles in drafting a new constitution and these values were sadly lacking even when the 1972 and 1978 Constitutions were drafted. Political Context The road to change in South Africa began in February, 1990 and until December, 1993 there were a series of negotiations between the ANC and the National Party Government. Various issues had to be resolved - the unbanning of the ANC, the Communist Party and the Pan African Congress (PAC), the curbing of violence and the release ofpolitical prisoners, notably President Mandela himself The complex process of political negotiations and constitutional reform was a key element in this project of achieving political liberation. There were different attitudes among the main political actors towards the drafting of a constitution. The National Party, which was about to give up power was very concerned that many of the traditional constitutional safeguards be incorporated in the constitution. There was a fear of change. They perceived the ANC as an undemocratic, communist and terrorist movement. There was a fear to let go of power and to hand over power to the ANC before adequate safeguards were in place. The ANC, however, was steadfast in its commitment to the
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issue of legitimacy. They wanted a constitution which was to be drafted by the people or at least by the elected representatives of the people. There was a problem of how to bridge this gap, this difference of attitude. A compromise was reached whereby an interim constitution was adopted. This was to be followed by a general election held under the interim constitution, and then the newly- elected representatives of the people were to convene as a constituent assembly to draft the final constitution. The National Party and other white parties wanted even more safeguards. They were concerned that certain core principles of governance and human rights be accepted and entrenched as a condition for the transfer of power. They therefore wanted as much detail as possible, as many safeguards for minorities as possible, in the interim constitution itself. In contrast, the ANC wanted as few details as possible in that interim constitution, because to them it was a transitional document which was not meant to last very long. There was, therefore, a difference of minds. Because of this, the interim constitution contained some unique features. The first was two very impressive sections in the interim constitution. They were the preamble at the beginning and the postamble. There was a postamble which referred to reconciliation right at the end of the constitution. These were remarkable provisions in terms of their substance. The postamble stressed that the interim constitution was to be a bridge, a bridge between the past and the future. Secondly, the interim constitution contained thirty four constitutional principles. They were seen as a mechanism to address the concerns of the white community, in particular, that the final constitution might promote majoritarian democracy at the expense of the rights of the whites and other minorities. They insisted that the interim constitution contained some basic principles which the final constitution could not depart from. This was their security that there wouldnt be total or radical change in the final constitution. Thirty four basic values or
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principles which the final constitution had to conform to were entrenched in the interim constitution. For example, the first constitutional principle read as follows: The Constitution of South Africa shall provide for the establishment of one sovereign state, a common South African citizenship and a democratic system of government committed to achieving equality between men and women and people of all races. The Constituent Assembly elected under the Interim Constitution had the mandate to draft and adopt a final constitution for South Africa. However, it had to fit within the frameworkd of a set of comprehensive principles agreed upon through a process ofpolitical negotiations and incorporated in the interim constitution itself. The Constituent Assembly adopted the constitution on 8 May 1996. It was then reviewed by the Constitutional Court to ascertain whether it was consistent with the thirty four principles. Public hearings were held for this purpose at which submissions were heard by the court. The court ordered that certain provisions be amended as they were inconsistent with several principles and finally, at the end of the year, the Constitutional Court gave its imprimatur to the final document. The Constitution-Making Process Sri Lanka can learn a lot from the Constituent Assembly process that commenced in 1994. The first democratic election in South Africa was held in April, 1994 and a National Assembly or Parliament consisting of 400 MPs and the Senate consisting of 90 members were elected. These 490 elected representatives together constituted the Constituent Assembly, and the interim constitution required that they draft and adopt the final constitution within two years of the first sitting of the Constituent Assembly. Now, the way in which this final Constitution was drafted was quite remarkable. In August, 1994, the Secretariat was established by the Constituent Assembly to coordinate
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the whole process. A full-time Executive Director and several fulltime members of staff were appointed. The Constituent Assembly then divided itself into six, thirty- member theme committees to deal with some of the main features of the constitution. The six theme committees were: a committee dealing with the character of the state, the structure of government the relationship between the different levels of government, fundamental rights, the judiciary and legal systems and specialized structure of government. Each of these six theme committees was assisted by a team of technical experts consisting of lawyers, legal academics, and drafting experts. In fact, they brought down a plain language expert from Canada to go through the entire document at the end of the process to ensure that the language used was as simple and as easily comprehensible by the ordinary person as possible. To give an example, the fundamental rights team committee was probably the most complicated. They had technical experts on each fundamental right. The report on the right to property, which was one of the most controversial rights incorporated in the final constitution, is like a text book. In a comprehensive survey, all the positions of the various parties are recorded, the right to property provisions in all constitutions in the world are tabulated, evaluated and critically analyzed. So you can imagine the documentation that went into this whole process. At the end of the process the Constituent Assembly appointed a 46 member Constitutional Committee consisting of representatives from all the parties in parliament, which functioned like an Executive Committee. They had to put everything together, resolve the disputes and come up with the final document. While this process unfolded, there was another parallel process that went on simultaneously, a massive public participation and awareness raising campaign. There was a concerted effort to involve the people in the constitution-makingprocess. The Constituent Assembly was very conscious that ultimately it was the people who were drafting a
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constitution for themselves. A media campaign which called for responses from the people on specific issues - freedom of expression, what should the flag look like, what should the national anthem be was designed every submission sent by every organization or individual was acknowledged by the Secretariat of the Constituent Assembly. There were over two million signatories to the submissions and petitions that went before the Constituent Assembly. An official newsletter of the Constituent Assembly was published and distributed free to all citizens of South Africa. It was published in eleven official languages. Every week there was a television discussion program on specific aspects of the constitution. The moderator was a Professor at the University of the Witwatersrand. Representatives from all the political parties were invited. Each representative had to come out with his or her partys respective position and be subject to hostile questions, criticism from the moderator and also from the representatives of other political parties. They had to explain, justify and defend. There was thus a concerted attempt at making the whole constitutional drafting process open, transparent andparticipatory. Basic Features Concerning the basic features of the constitution, we may first focus on the first two articles of the South African Constitution. They show vividly the difference between the South African and Sri Lankan approaches. The first chapter is titled Founding Provisions, or the basic principles. Article 1 states that the Republic of South Africa is one sovereign democratic state founded on the following values: human dignity, the achievement of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism, the supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law, universal adult suffrage regular elections, a multi-party system of democratic government and to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.
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Article 2 unequivocally incorporates the principle of supremacy of the Constitution: This constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled The emphasis in the first few articles of the constitution is therefore on principles that bind the South African nation. The concept of equality is stressed which is understandable, given South Africas particular political context. The supremacy of the constitution, the cornerstone of constitutionalism, is doubly emphasized both in Article ( 1) and Article (2). It is not only law that has to be consistent with the constitution, but conduct too, which is broader in scope than the phrase executive action which is found in the Sri Lankan constitution. The South African constitution is absolutely clear. Parliamentary sovereignty was the cornerstone of the apartheid era. Parliament could do anything under apartheid. There were no norms in the constitution. There was no value laden constitution. The judiciary was weak. As a result of that, this new South African constitution is categorical in its total rejection of parliamentary sovereignty and its incorporation of the principle, the alternative principle, of the supremacy of the constitution. Human Rights The Bill of Rights is the Second Chapter in the constitution, after the founding provisions. The constitution recognizes the important link between the Bill of Rights and democracy. The constitution declares that the Bill of Rights applies to all law. No law is immune from the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights which binds the legislature, executive and judicial branches of government and all organs of the state. There is also a liberal locus standi provision in the new South African Constitution. Any person, not necessarily only a citizen, has the right to petition the courts for constitutional protection with respect to most matters.
Thirdly, with regard to interpretation, the courts are required, when interpreting ,fundamental rights provisions, to give an interpretation which promotes the values that underline and open a democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The court must also consider international law, may consider foreign law, and must also adopt an interpretation which promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Given the legalism and technical approach to interpretation of many judges schooled in the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy and the fidelity to the letter of the law, such an interpretation clause is significant. A word must be said about the substance of the rights because this is also very significant. The South African Bill of Rights does not only recognize civil and political rights. It also recognizes the so-called second and third generation rights - social, economic and cultural rights are recognized in the constitution and are made justiciable. Secondly, it is perhaps one of the first constitutions to bar discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Thirdly, the state is secular. All religions are treated equally, given equality. That is basically what a secular state stands for. All religions are treated equally. It is significant that the campaign for a secular state was led by the Christian Church in a country where over two thirds of its population is Christian. Anglican Archbishop Tutu was at the forefront of insisting that Christianity should not be made the state religion, and that South Africa should be a secular state. The constitution provides that religious observances may be conducted at state functions provided the attendance is voluntary and that religious activities are conducted on an equitable basis. The way in which economic, social and cultural rights have been made justiciable addresses the concerns of more traditional legal scholars and human rights activists who fear giving the judiciary power to determine matters involving complex questions of public and economic policy. There is a powerful argument that if a constitution enunciates rights and thereby claims, which cannot be provided by the
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state, all rights, including civil and political rights, will be diluted overall. There was considerable debate about this among the legal scholars. The approach finally adopted was that while the state would be given a wide margin of appreciation when dealing with economic issues, the state would be required to justify its economic decisions if a citizen felt that the economic policy or the amount of money given for particular subjects was unjust. Etienne Mureinik, one of the leading constitutional academics in South Africa, used the example of the legislature deciding to spend vast amounts of money on building a nuclear submarine or on constructing a replica of St. Peters Church. He argued that it would then be possible for an aggrieved person to challenge that before the courts and for the courts to ask the government to justify its decision to spend vast amounts of money on activities like that, rather than on progressively realizing the attainment of economic, social and cultural rights recognized in the constitution. The right to property was one of the most controversial provisions in the new South African Constitution and again a very satisfactory compromise was worked out. The African National Congress was very suspicious of the right to property as they thought it could obstruct initiatives to redistribute land, provide land to the landless and try to shift resources from the white elite to the black majority On the other hand, the white community which feared large scale nationalization and expropriation of their land, wanted a safeguard for private property. A compromise was reached. The right to property is recognized in the Bill of Rights. There is a bar to arbitrary declaration of property, but property can be taken over by the state for public purposes. On the vexed question of compensation, the compensation payable to a person would take into account how the property was acquired, how it was used, and the court would have power to review the quantum of compensation determined upon, depending on the circumstances of the case and the type of land in question. The right to property provision also included a sub-section which mandated the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures
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to enable citizens to have access to land on an equitable basis. Thus, the right to property was not merely a negative right but also contained elements of a positive right as well. Another important feature of the Bill of Rights was the limitation clause. The South African Constitution adopted a mechanism similar to the Canadian approach. Rights can only be restricted by law of general application. The limitation must be only to the extent as is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and the court can consider the limitation, scrutinize it to ascertain the nature of the right and the nature of the restriction, the purpose of the limitation, the relationship between the objective that the state wants to achieve and the restriction. The court can also suggest less restrictive means to achieve the same purpose that the state might want to achieve. There is, therefore, comprehensive judicial scrutiny on any attempts to curtail human rights which is quite a contrast with the position in Sri Lanka. Devolution of Power Another area which has posed enormous challenges to Sri Lankas constitution makers and promoters of conflict resolution is the regional autonomy and the devolution of power. The concept of federalism is very controversial in South Africa as it is in Sri Lanka, but for different reasons. In South Africa, the ANC and the parties of the left felt that the central government should have power to transform South African society and they see federalism as a limitation on the power of the central government to effect such transformation. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the far right Freedom Front and even the National Party are avowed federalists because they see it as a way of imposing limits on the power of the national government. Even though the new South African Constitution does not declare expressly that it is afederalstate (it does not have a unitary
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label either), it contains many quasi-federal features. There is substantial devolution of power to provinces, a division of powers between the centre and the provinces, provincial representation at the centre, the constitution is supreme in South Africa. South Africa is divided up into nine provinces which have several powers which the provinces in Sri Lanka and even the regions under the proposed legal draft do not have. Secondly, the South African provincial legislatures have exclusive power over certain subjects. A provincial legislature can draft its own constitution which our provinces and our regions cannot; a provincial legislature cannot be dissolved by the President of South Africa. Under the draft constitution of Sri Lanka, the President can dissolve a Provincial Council in certain circumstances. Both devolution of power and local government are constitutionally recognized. Cooperative Government Chapter 3 of the constitution describes the principle of Cooperative Government which declares that the government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. In Sri Lanka, you cannot even refer to a provincial government as a provincial government. In South Africa, it is absolutely clear that there are provincial governments and there are local governments. All three tiers of government have constitutional status, their powers are recognized and the other branches of government, the other organs of governments have to respect the constitutional status of the other spheres of government. In Sri Lanka the central government has taken back powers which were given to Provincial Councils under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. This would be clearly unconstitutional, and therefore, void in South Africa. There is a concurrent list, like under our 13th Amendment. But the concurrent list mechanism is drafted in a way which ensures that the provinces have far greater say over concurrent list subjects than under the Sri Lankan Constitution.
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If the central Parliament introduces legislation on a concurrent subject, the National Council of provinces has also to approve it. If it rejects it, the matter is sent to a Mediation Committee consisting of nine people from the centre and nine people from the provinces. These eighteen people have to meet together and hammer out a compromise. If a compromise is reached it is enacted into law. If all attempts at compromise fail, the central Parliament will have to pass that particular item of legislation with a two-thirds majority. It is clear, therefore, that provincial interests with regard to concurrent list subjects are far better protected than under the Sri Lankan Constitution. With respect to ordinary legislation, the Council of Provinces has a right to participate in the law-making process. If they reject a Bill it is sent back to the National Assembly for re-consideration. The South African Constitution is, therefore, in certain respects more federal than either the Draft Constitution of Sri Lanka or the Thirteenth Amendment to the present Constitution of Sri Lanka. In federal or quasi-federal states it is vital to have the devolved units or entities represented at the centre. The South African Constitution has come up with an unusual way of protecting provincial autonomy. They have decided to do away with the traditional notion of a Senate, and they have introduced instead, an institution called the National Council of Provinces. It functions very much like a Senate. Each of the nine provinces can send a ten-member delegation led by the Provincial Prime Minister, equivalent to our Chief Minister, to this National Council of Provinces. Each province would have a tenmember delegation. Out of ten members, six arc permanent delegates of the provinces, nominated by the political parties in the Provincial Council, four are floating delegates. Thus, depending on the subject matter of the legislation that is coming up in parliament, the four members of the delegation can be changed so that they can contribute to the deliberations ofparliament.
The second interesting feature is that each province has only one vote. This compels the tenmember delegation from each province to work together, to cooperate, to cross party lines and decide on a common provincial position with respect to voting in the council. This promotes a culture of consensus and compromise and encourages a provincial rather than a partisan outlook on matters discussed in the national parliament. This is a further example of the notion of cooperative government which the new South African Constitution stresses. There is a separate chapter on Local Government in the constitution. Local Government authorities derive their powers from the constitution, not from the provincial legislature nor from the central parliament. These powers are guaranteed by the constitution Local Government is, therefore, betterprotected under the South African Constitution. An example of the imaginative and creative constitutional provisions that may be necessary to bridge the gap between opposing viewpoints, is Article 235 of the South African Constitution. It addresses the sensitive and difficult issue of self-determination in a plural society In Sri Lanka several Tamil parties and political groups have advocated the Thimpu Principles as the basis of a political solution to the islands ethnic conflict. The Thimpu Principles generally evoke a hostile response from the majority Sinhalese community and the main political parties in Sri Lanka. A compromise may have to be worked out, and the South African constitutional provision on self- determination may prove a useful reference point. The right of the South African people as a whole to selfdetermination, as manifested in this constitution, does notpreclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the notion of the right to self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation.
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The Judiciary The South African constitution provides that the judicial authority is vested in the constitution. Parliament does not enter the scene at all. In our constitution, we have judicial power exercised by parliament through courts. The Constitutional Court, the most important court in South Africa, consists of eleven persons, and if one examines the composition of the present court, it consists ofjudges, human rights activists, academics and practitioners and as required by the constitution, it broadly reflects the gender and racial composition of South Africa. The South African Constitutional Court is an amazing mix of eleven people from very different backgrounds and experiences. Any qualified man or woman can be a member of the South African judiciary. Judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, the most important courts in South Afiiica, are appointed by the President on the recommendations of the Judicial Services Commission. The Judicial Services Commission is a large representative body consisting of the main stakeholders in an independent judiciary. It includes the Chief Justice, President of the Constitutional Court, the Minister of Justice, two advocates elected by the advocates, two attorneys elected by practicing attorneys, one teacher elected by all legal academics in South Africa, six MPs, three of whom have got to be Opposition MPs, four permanent delegates from the National Council of Provinces, so that the provinces are also represented, four nominees of the President appointed after consulting all the political parties in parliament. Judges can be removed only when this body, the Judicial Services Commission, finds that they have been either grossly incompetent or have engaged in gross misconduct. It is only when they have been found guilty that the National Assembly can remove them with a two-thirds majority. The provisions on the judiciary are better than the corresponding provisions in the Sri Lankan constitution, which permit too much legislative and executive interference in the judicial branch of government. The Rule of Law and the independence of the judiciary
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are vital elements in a constitutional scheme for good governance, human rights and conflict resolution. Constitutional arrangements often play a pivotal role in political solutions for complex national problems involving ethnicity or religion. These arrangements need to be secure and guaranteed. The judiciary is the institution charged with such a responsibility. If it is not independent then it will be unable to perform its function effectively. In addition to independence, it must also display sensitivity to the concerns of pluralism, devolution and the rights of minorities. This is a particular problem in Sri Lanka. Diversity and Language Rights Recognition of diversity is one of the most important aspects of the South African Constitution. The linguistic diversity is a very good case in point. There are eleven official languages in South Africa. There is a language board which has to promote not only these official languages but also other languages, including Tamil even though it is spoken by a very small minority, and even sign language. On the issue of language, the approach of the ANC and most political parties was refreshing: get the principle right, worry about the practical implications later. Sri Lankans think they have an enormous problem with just two or three national languages. Customary international law is automatically a part of the legal regime of South Africa and there is a provision that whenever a court interprets a law or a provision of the constitution, an interpretation which is inconsistent with international law is to be preferred over any other possible interpretation. Conclusion The South African Constitution of 1996 is an amazing document for many reasons. The process, the way in which it was drafted and adopted, the participation of so many people and constituencies, the substance, the commitment and professionalism displayed by all the
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main political parties, were truly remarkable. The constitution became a consensus document that helped to bring the different communities together, heal the wounds of a bitter and violent past and establish a new order of government which conformed to basic human rights norms and standards. Sri Lanka would do well to seek to emulate the process, substance and the generosity of spirit that permeated the process in South Africa. Perhaps then, constitution making for conflict resolution will be more successful in Sri Lanka.
In this lesson, we learnt the following from the South African experience: Constitution making in a deeply divided society should be an exercise in conflict resolution. Constitution making for conflict resolution requires imaginative and fresh approaches to rebuild the political system and structures. The best approach to making a new constitution is through consensus. Consensus provides legitimacy as well as general political acceptance to the new constitution. Political leadership can play a constructive role in conflict resolution and constitution making. The process of making the constitution is as important as the substance. In consensus building for conflict resolution, it is better to start with an agreement on general principles and then proceed for details.
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Appendix
A. 1. Bibliography Mediation Bercovich, Jacob and Rubin, Jeffrey, (Eds.) (1992) Mediation In International Relations, St. Martins Press Inc.:London Folberg, Jay and Taylor, Alison (1984), Mediation, A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflicts Without Litigation, Jossey - Bass Publishers:USA Kegal, Sam and Kelly, Kathy (1989), The Anatomy of Mediation, What Makes it Work, The Bureau of National Affairs Inc.: Washington Mitchell, C. R, (1981), Peacemaking and the Consultant 's Role, Nicholas Publishing Company:New York Mitchell, C. R and Webb, K, (Eds.) (1988), New Approaches To International Mediation, Greenwood Press 1nc: USA Moore, Christopher W, (1986), The Mediation Process, Jossey-Bass Publishers: San Francisco Princen, Thomas, (1992), Intermediaries in International Conflict Princeton University Press:USA E Yarrow, Mike CH, (1978) Qua k err xperiences in International Conciliation, Murray Printing Corporation:USA
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Negotiations Dutch Center for Conflict Prevention, (Ed.) (1996), Prevention and Management of Conflicts, Dutch Center for Conflict Prevention The Netherlands Faure, G.O. and Rubin, J. Z. (Eds.) (1993), Culture and Negotiation, SAGE Publications Inc.:USA Fisher, Roger and Ury, William (199 l), Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, Penguin Books:USA Fisher, Roger and Brown, Scott (1988), Getting Together, Building Relationships as we Negotiate, Penguin Books:USA Korzenny, Felipe and Toomey, Stella, (Eds.) (1990) Communicating for Peace, Diplomacy and Negotiation, SAGE Publications:USA Kremenyuk, V. A. (Ed.) (199 l), Znternational Negotiation, JosseyBass Publishers: Oxford Lax, A. David and Sebenius, James (1986), The Manager as Negotiator, The Free Press:USA Manikkalingam, Ram (1994), Prudently Negotiating a Moral Peace, Social Scientists Association: Sri Lanka Pillar, Paul R, Negotiating Peace, War Termination as Bargaining Process, Princeton University Press:USA Pruitt, Dean G. and Camevale, Peter J. (1993), Negotiation in Social Conflict, Open University Press:Buckingham Raiffa, Howard (1982), The Art and Science of Negotiation, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press:USA
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Stein, Janice Gross, (Ed.) (1989), Getting to the Table, John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore Ury, William (1993), Getting Past No, Negotiating Your Way From Confrontation to Cooperation, Bantom Books:USA William J. and Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (1993), Negotiation Theory and Practice, Cambridge, Massachusette: The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School Zartman, W. and Berman,. MR, (1982), The Practical Negotiator, Yale University Press: USA Peace Processes Azar, Edward E, (1990), The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Dartmouth Publishing House: England Bailey, Sydney D. (1993), Peace is a Process, Swarthmore Lecture Committee: London Berridge, G. R. (199 l), Return to the U ,UN Diplomacy in Regional N Conflict ts, Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd: London Brown , Sheryl, J. and Schraub, Kimber M. (Eds.) (1992), Resolving Third World Conflict, Challenges for a New Era, United States Institute of Peace:USA Boulding, Else, (1990), Building a Global Civic Culture, Syracuse University Press: USA Carnegie Cooperation, (1997), Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Cooperation: New York
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Carter, April, (1992), Peace Movements , Longman Group U.K.Ltd:London Chatfield and Llukhina, (1994), Peace/Mir: An Anthology of Historic Alternatives to War, Syracuse University Press New York Curie, Adam (1987), True Justice, Peace makers and Peace making, Quaker Home Service:London Doucest, Ian (Ed), Resource pack for Conflict Transformation, London:Intemational Alert Femea, Elizabeth,Wamock and Hoching, Mary, Evelyn (Eds.) (1992), The Strugglefor Peace, Austin: University of Texas Press Foster, Le Corn Mary and Rubinstein, A. Robert, (Eds) (1986), Peace and War Cross Cultural Perspectives, Transaction Inc. :New Jersey Folger, Joseph P., Poole, Marshall Scott and Stutman , Randall K, (Eds.) (1993), Working Through Conflict, Harper Collins College Publishers: New York Holsti, J, Kalevi (1995), Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648 - 1989, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge Hollins, Harry, Powers, Aver-ill and Sommer, Mark, (1989), The Conquest of War, Alternative Strategies for Global Security, Westview Press:USA Isard, Walter, (1992), Understanding Conflict & the Science of Peace, Blackwell Publishers: USA Jones, Dorathy V. (199 l), Code of Peace, Ethics and Security in the World of the Warlord States, University of Chicago Press: USA
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Klare, Michael T, (Ed.) ( 1994), Peace & World Security Studies, A Curriculum Guide, Lynne Reinners Publishers Inc.:USA Kodama K and Vesa U., (Eds.), (l990), Towards a Comparative Analysis of Peace Movements, Billing & Sons Ltd:Great Britain Kriesberg , Louis and Thorson, Stuart, (Eds.) (199 1), Timing the De-escalation of Internationa1 Conflicts, Syracuse University Press: New York Kriesberg, L., Northrup, T. A. and Thorson, S. J, (Eds.) (1989) Intractable Conflicts and their Transformation, Syracuse University Press: USA Marullo, Sam and Lofland, John, (Eds.) (1990), Peace Action in the Eighties, Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick Miall, Hugh, (1992), The Peacemaker Macmillan Press: UK Mitchell, CR, (1981), The Structure of International Conflict, Macmillan Press Ltd: London PIOOM and the Berghof Research Institute for Constructive Conflict Management, (1998), Prevention and Management of Violent Conflicts, European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation: Netherlands Rao, Bhaskara, D.,(Ed.) (1996), Global Perception on Peace Education, Discovery Publishing House: New Delhi Rothman, Jay, (1992), From Confrontation to Cooperation, Sage Publications Inc.: USA Rupesinghe, Kumar and Kuroda Michiko, (Eds.) (1992), Early Warnings and Conflict Resolution, St.Martins Press, Inc.: New York
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Shellenberg, James A, (1982) The Science of Conflict, Oxford University Press: Oxford Ury, W. L, Brett, Jeanne M. and Goldberg S.B, (Eds.),( lSSS), Getting Disputes Resolved, Harvard Law School:Cambridge
Middle East
Aburish, Saaid K, (1993), Cry Palestine, Inside the West Bank, Westview Press: USA Corbin Jane (1994), Gaza First, The Secret Norway Channel to Peace between Israel and the PLO, Bloomssburry Publishing Ltd: London Fisk. Robert, (1992), Pity the Nation, Lebanon at War, Oxford University Press: USA Kustick, Ian S. (1982), Arab - Israeli Relations: A Collection of Contending Perspectives and Recent Research, New York and London:Garlan Publications Kellerman B. and Rubin J., eds., (1988), Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East, Praeger Publishers:USA Quandt, William B, (1986), Camp David; Peace Making and Politics, The Brookings Institution:Washington Quandt, William B, (1993), Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conjlict since I967, University of California Press:Califomia Sharoni, Simona, (1995), Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Syracuse University press: USA
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Saunders, Harold H., (1985), The Other Walls: The Arab -Israeli Peace Process in a Global Perspective, Princeton University Press New Jersey Saunders, HaroldH., and Kipper, Judith, (Eds.) (199 l), The Middle East in Global Perspective, Westview Press: USA Speigel L. Stevened., (1992) Conflict Management in the Middle East, Westview Press: USA Smith D, Charles (1988), Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, S t. Martins Press: New York Africa Davidow, Jefiey (1990), A Peace in Southern Apica: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia 1979, Programme on Negotiation Books: Massachusetts Deng, Francis M. and Zartman, William, (Eds.) (199 l), Conflict Resolution in Africa The Brookings Institution: Washington Jabri, William (1990), Mediating conflict; Decision -making and Western Intervention in Namibia, Biddles Ltd:Great Britain Stedman, Stephen John, (1991), Peace Making in Civil War, International Mediation in Zimbabwe 1974-1980, Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers Zartman, William I., (1989) Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa New York and Oxford University Press
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Ethnic Conflict Resolution Gurr, Robert and Harft, Babara, (1994), Ethnic Conflict in World Ted Politics, Boulder: Westview Press Hassall, Graham (1992), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in the Pacific Islands, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism Horowitz, Donald, (1985), Ethnic Groups in Conflict, California University Press McGarry, John and OLeary, Brendan, (1995), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation, London and New York:Routledge Tambiah, Stanley J. (1995), Leveling Crow&, University of California Press. Europe Graubard, Stephen R.,(Ed.) (1991), Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Europe, Westview Press:USA Nelson, Sarah, (1984), Ulster 's Uncertain Defenders, Loyalists and the Nothern Ireland Conflict, Appletree Press:Northern Ireland Paterson, Thomas G., (Ed.), The Origins of the Cold War Heath and Company:USA Silber, Laura and Little Allan (1995), The Death of Yugoslavia, Penguin Books:USA Conflict Resolution Barash, David, Introduction to Peace Studies, Wadsworth Publishing Company: California
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Bose, Anima, (Ed.) (199 l), Peace and Conflict Resolution in the World Community, Vikas Publishing House Ltd.:New Delhi Boulding, Else, (Ed.) (1992), New Agenda for Peace Research, Lynne Reinner Publishers ,Inc.:USA Burton, John and Dukes, Frank (Eds.) (1990), Conflict; Readings in Management and Resolution, The MacMillan Press Ltd.:USA Cornelius H. and Faire Shoshana, (1992) Everyone can Win How to Resolve Conflict Simon Schuster:Australia Elsthain, Jean B, (1995), Women and War, University of Chicago Press: Chicago Fisher J, Ronald (1990) The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution, Springer-Verlag 1nc: New Jersey Gallie, W. B,( 1978), Philosophers of Peace and War, Cambridge University Press: USA Goldberg, Stephen .B., Green Eric D and Sander Frank EA, (Eds.) (1985), Dispute Resolution, Little, Brown and Company: Boston Klare, Micheal T and Thomas, Daniel C, (1994), World Security, Challenges for a new Century, St.Martins Press: New York Kriesberg, Louis, (1992), International Conflict Resolution, Edward Brothers:USA Larsen, Knud S.,(Ed) (1993), Conflict and Social Psychology, Sage Publications: London Lederach, John Paul (1995) Preparing for Peace, Syracuse University Press: New York
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Rahim, Afzalur M, (Ed.) (1990), Theory and Research in Conflict Management, Praeger Publishers: USA Rao,P. C. and Shedfield, William, (Eds.) (1997), Alternative Dispute Resolution, Universal Law Publishing Co.Pvt.Ltd.:New Delhi Rappopart, Anatol, (1994), Fights, Games, and Debates, The University of Michigan Press:USA Rieber, Robert. W. (199 l), The Psychology of War and Peace: The Image of the Enemy, Plenum Press:New York Rubin, Jeffrey, Pruitt ,Dean and Kim,Sung Hee (1994), Social Conflict Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement, Mc.Graw-Hill, Inc.:USA Sandole, Dennis and Merwe, Hugo (Ed.), Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice, Manchester University Press: Manchester Siegel, D. David, (1982), Conflicts, West Publishing:USA Smoker, P. & Davies, Ruth & Munske, Barbara, (1990), A Reader in Peace Studies, Pergamon Press:Exeter Susskind, Lawrance and Cruikshank, Jeffrey, (1987), Breaking the Impasse, Basic Books:USA Vayrynen Raimo, (Ed.) (1991), New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, International Social Science Council Vayrynen, Raimo, (Ed.) (1987), The Quest for Peace, SAGE Publications: London Williams, Colin and Kofman Eleonore, (Eds.) (1989), Community Conflict, Partition and Nationalism, Routlegde: London
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A. 2. Internet Addresses
Some Internet Addresses of important institutions involved in conflict resolution and peace- building activities Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (Berlin Germany)
Center for Conflict Resolution University of Bradford (Bradford, U.K.) www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/es/dislearn/dislearn.html Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael- Institute ( The Netherlands) www.clingendael .nl European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (Utrecht, The Netherlands) www.euconflict.org Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy ( Washington, U.S.A.) www.igc.apc.org International Alert (London, U.K.) www.international-alert.org International Christian Service for Peace- EIRENE ( Neuwied, Germany) d International Fellowship of Reconciliation- IFOR (Alkmar, The Netherlands) www.ifor.org
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International Peace Research Association ( Copenhagen, Denmark) www.copri.dk International Peace Research Institute Oslo (Oslo, Norway)
www.prio.no
National Peace Foundation (Washington, U.S.A.) www.nationalpeace.org Oxfam (Oxford, U.K.) www.oxfam.org.uk Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (Bonn, Germany) wwwsef-bonn.org Schweizerische Friedensstiftung www.swissneace.ch (Bern,Switzerland)
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm, Sweden) www.sipri.se Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (Lund, Sweden) www.transnational.org UNESCO Culture of Peace Project www.unesco.org/cpp
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Note: The Internet addresses which are given above represent only a small selection out of hundreds of organizations and institutions specialized in the subject of conflict resolution which can be visited in the Internet. Most of the recommended addresses provide further links so that organizations and institutions not mentioned here can be easily found. We especially recommend to visit the pages of the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (Berlin/ Germany ) and of the Center for Conflict Resolution of the University of Bradford (West Yorkshire/ U.K.). Both Institutes have produced their own Handbooks on Conflict Transformation which are presented in the Internet. These publications would allow the interested reader to complement the information given in our Handbook. Dietmar Kneitschel

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Conflict Resolution & Peace Studies

Center for Policy Research and Analysis (CEPRA)

in association with Eriedrich Ebert Stiftung Colombo office

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

Editor Cover Design

: Jayadeva Uyangoda : Dietmar Kneitschel

Copyright FES, 2000

4, Adams Avenue, Colombo 4 Sri Lanka

Jehan Perera N. Selmkkumran

Dietmar Kneitschel Resident Representative Friedrich-Ebert-Stif

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STlJDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

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A Party A Party B Arbitration

A Party A - Party B Negotiation 4

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AND PEACE STUDIES

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Making decisions/solving problems Making it work

Solve problems - Make decisions

(Implementation etc. post-agreement)

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characterized by these tactics:

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Negotiation is a rational choice.

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There exists a situation of deadlock and deadline.

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peace thus remain and scale series understand

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