Villaflor vs.

Vivar Facts: An information for slight physical injuries was filed agaist Dindo Vivar for beating Gian Paulo Vivar outside the Fat Tueasday Bar. On his way out, Gian met Dindo who told that next time, I will use my gun on you. The injuries sustai ned by Gian turned out to be more serious than they had appeared so an Informati on for serious physical injuries was filed and the charge for slight physical in juries was withdrawn. Another Information for grave threats was filed against Vi var. Vivar, instead of filing a counter affidavit, he filed a Motion to Quash th e Information for grave threats since it was made in connection with the charge of serious physical injuries should have been absorbed by the latter, and becaus e the court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. MTC denied the motion to quash . Vivar filed for a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. He was ar raigned and pleaded not guilty. Vivar filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC RTC granted the motion to quash and denied the motion for reconsideration file d by Villaflor. Villaflor filed a petiton for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issues: (1) Can the court motu proprio order the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of preliminary investigation? (2) Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct preliminary investiga tion be considered a ground to quash the informations? Held: (1) The Court ruled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not imp air the validity of the information. In the case a bar, a preliminary investigat ion was for slight physical injuries was conducted by the assistant city prosecu tor. But the Information was however amended when petitioners injuries turned out to be more serious. However the change in the information was only a formal ame ndment and did not violate the right of Vivar against hasty, malicious and oppre ssive prosecution, since it still involves the same facts. (2) Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the grounds on which an accused can move to quash the complaint or information. Nowh ere in the rule mention of a lack of preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to quash. When accused failed to assert any ground for a motion to quash before arraignment, he has deemed waived his right. =============== HO vs PEOPLE (1997) On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, represented by its chief prosecutor Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the Ombud sman a complaintagainst Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 106632 and 106678,respectively), Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos a nd Leonardo Odoo. Thecomplaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Repu blic Act 3019 prohibiting a publicofficer from entering into any contract or tra nsaction on behalf of the government if it ismanifestly and grossly disadvantage ous to the latter, whether or not the public officerprofited or will profit ther eby.According to the information, Rolando Narciso, being then the Vice-President of the NationalSteel Corporation (NSC), a government-owned or controlled corpor ation organized andoperating under the Philippine laws, and Doris Ho, the Presid ent of National MarineCorporation (NMC), a private corporation organized and ope rating under our Corporationlaw, was said to have entered without legal justific ation into a negotiated contract of affreightment disadvantageous to the NSC for the haulage of its products at the rate of P129.50/MT, from Iligan City to Mani la. Such contract was entered into despite their fullknowledge that the rate the y have agreed upon was much higher than those offered by theLoadstar Shipping Co

mpany, Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in theamounts of P10 9.56 and P123.00 per Metric Ton, respectively, in the public bidding, therebygiv ing unwarranted benefits to the National Marine Corporation.Ho and Narciso alleg ed that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for theissuance of the warrant for their arrest, merely relied on the information and the resolutionatt ached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other supporting evidence, in viol ation of the requirements of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and set tled jurisprudence. Theycontend that a judge, in personally determining the exis tence of probable cause, must havebefore him sufficient evidence submitted by the parties, other than the information filed b ythe investigating prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuanc e of an arrestwarrant. Such evidence should not be merely described in a prosecut ors resolution.Sandiganbayans Denial: Considering, therefore, that this Court did no t rely solely on thecertification appearing in the information in this case in t he determination of whetherprobable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest but also on the basispredominantly shown by the facts and evid ence appearing in the resolution/memorandum of responsible investigators/ prosec utors, then the recall of the warrant of arrest, or thereconsideration sought fo r, cannot be granted. More so, when the information, as filed,clearly shows that it is sufficient in form and substance based on the facts and evidenceadduced b y both parties during the preliminary investigation. To require this Court to ha vethe entire record of the preliminary investigation to be produced before it, i ncluding theevidence submitted by the complainant and the accused-respondents, w ould appear to bean exercise in futility. ISSUE May a judge determine probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the resolution of the prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of th e SpecialProsecutor of the Ombudsman) who conducted the preliminary investigatio n, without havingbefore him any of the evidence (such as complainants affidavit, respondents counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been submitted at t he preliminary investigation? SC: Art III Section 2, 1987 Constitution : The right of the people to be secure in theirpersons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and s eizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no searc h warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined person ally bythe judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and thewitnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be sear ched and thepersons or things to be seized. (Art III Section 2, 1987 Constitutio n) The word personally does not appear in the corresponding provisions of ourprevious Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present Constitutions intent toplace a gr eater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed underthe prev ious Charters. First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not forthe Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor or for the Election Supervisor to ascert ain. Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. Third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry w hichdetermines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from thepr eliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should behe ld for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of oneand the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives .

Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutors bare report, upon whichto legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probablecause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining p ersonally andindependently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lo dged in him byno less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor couldease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to thelatter not only the information and his bare resolution fin ding probable cause, butalso so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whethe r to issue a warrant of arrest Lastly, it is not required that the complete or e ntire records of the case during thepreliminary investigation be submitted to an d examined by the judge. We do notintend to unduly burden trial courts by obligi ng them to examine the completerecords of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of anaccused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affi davits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of sten ographic notes, if any) upon which to make hisindependent judgment or, at the ve ry least, upon which to verify the findings of theprosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solelyand entirely on the prose cutors recommendation, as Respondent Court did in thiscase. Although the prosecut or enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in theperformance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report thepresumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probabl e cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Courthas consistently held t hat a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on thecertification or the report of the investigating officer.IN THE INSTANT CASE, the public responde nt relied fully and completely upon the resolutionof the graft investigation off icer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, attachedto the information filed before it, and its conjecture that the Ombudsman would not haveapproved th eir recommendation without supporting evidence. It had no other documentsfrom ei ther the complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines) or the People fr omwhich to sustain its own conclusion that probable cause exists. Respondent Cou rt palpablycommitted grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challen ged warrant of arreston the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and recommenda tion, and without determiningon its own the issue of probable cause based on evi dence other than such bare findings andrecommendation. =============== People v. Ayangao - Policemen received an information that a woman would be traveling with marijua na from Maountain Province to Pampanga. - The informant went with them in the place pointed and he personally identified the woman. They approached the woman. The policemen noticed a protruding mariju ana leaves from the sacks of sweet potatoes. - The policemen identified themselves and asked the woman to put out the content s of the sack. The sack contains sweet potato with a bricklike substance packed with a masking tape. In plain view of the policemen it was identified to be mari juana. She was arrested and was convicted in the trial court. - She argued that the marijuana is inadmissible since the warrantless search is invalid, not having been pursuant to lawful arrest. SC: The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as appellant was actually committ ing a crime when she was arrested transporting marijuana, are act prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made, the resulting warrantless search on appella nt was also valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the arresting police officers to validly search and seize from the offender. This Court has already ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable caus e to effect a warrantless search. Although the apprehending officers received th e tip two weeks prior to the arrest, they could not be faulted for not applying

for a search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of appellants arrival was not kno wn by the informant. AFFIRMED. ===================== People v. Aminudin (Inadmissible Evidence; Invalid Search) - Aminudin was arrested shortly after disembarking from a ship. His bag was insp ected which contained marijuana. - The prosecution had earlier an information that a marijuana would be transport ed in Iloilo. Acting on the tip, they waited till evening when the ship embarked . They informant pointed on Aminudin followed by the arrest and search. - Aminudin disclaimed of the marijuana. He also invoked that he was arbitrary ar rested and was searched without warrant. He was convicted by the trial court. - In this court he pleaded to reverse the ruling on the ground that the evidence against him was inadmissible. SC: Tip they received from the informant was alleged to be 2 days prior the arre st. The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declaration s of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to jus tify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comp ly with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieute nant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had ju st done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 a nd there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearance s, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vess el. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. This is not inf lagrante delicto. ACQUITTED. ===================== People v. Tangliben - Policemen were having surveillance within the Victory Liner premises. During t hat time, they saw someone (Tangliben) carrying a bag who is acting suspiciously . He was approached and asked for the content of the bag. The accused refuses at first but when the policemen identified themselves he acceded. The bag containe d marijuana. - The trial court convicted him of violation of RA 6425. The defense set up was that the evidence presented should be inadmissible for having it obtained unlawf ully without warrant. SC: One of the exception in the general rule requiring search warrant is search incidental to a lawful arrest. Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was car rying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely wi thin the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and i s consequently valid. In contrast with Aminudin, this instance presents urgency. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly . There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot therefore appl y the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, juete ng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extrem ely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated. AFFIRMED. Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dar

k or deserted and secluded places away from prying eyes, and the crime usually c ommences solely upon the word of the offended woman herself and conviction invar iably turns upon her credibility, as the prosecution s single witness of the act ual occurrence. (People vs. Molleda, G.R. No. 153219, Dec. 1, 2003, 417 SCRA 53) ===================== Umil v. Ramos - This is a consolidated motion for reconsideration filed by different petitione rs assailing the order of the Court holding the validity of their arrest without warrant. - They are contending that they were illegally imprisoned. The SC in determining if there is illegal detention, looked at the validity of the arrest. SC: Contention without merit. Dural (Dural Case) was arrested because he is a me mber of the NPA. The crime is a continuing one. He was identified to have shot 2 CAPCOM policemen in a patrol car. The arrest made to Umil was anchored in Sec 5 b. of Rule 113 (Hot pusuit arrest) because he just committed the offense and th e arresting officer has the personal knowledge of the crime committed. In Umil case, the arrest is considered pursuant to Sec 5 a and b of Rule 113. th e confidential information that the hospital management had furnished the law au thorities is sufficient ground for the arrest of a NPA who had an encounter with the law enforcers. In other cases, the arrest is legal after they were searched pursuant to a searc h warrant and was found to possess illegal firearms therefore they were caught i n flagrante delicto. In Espiritu case, he was arrested upon the information of the arresting officer based from reliable sources that he uttered word inciting to sedition during a p ress lunch. In Nazareno case, the Court upheld the validity of the arrest without warrant ev en though the arrest was made 14 days after the commission of the crime. It is h eld that the arrest is valid since it was only after 14 days that the arresting officer came to have knowledge that there is probable cause of the offense commi tted by Nazareno. DENIED.