CCS 007 LECTURE NOTES (PHILOSOPHY) LECTURE ONE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY Lecture Outline Introduction Objectives

jectives Relationship between Pure Science and Technology Presentation of Results in the two Fields Why Support Basic Research? Science and Values Summary References

Introduction The tremendous advances in pure science and technology during the last century have completely changed the relation between science and society. Science through technology has brought great improvements in the quality of human life. Today we live with more freedom, power and knowledge than our ancestors could dream of. However, science and technology have also contributed to the pollution of the environment, global warming, and the development of nuclear weapons which threaten the very survival of the human species. But what exactly is the relationship between science and technology? Can science be said to be ethically neutral? These are some of the questions that we will attempt to answer in this lecture. Objectives By the end of this lecture you should be able to: 1. Distinguish science from technology 2. Explain the relationship between science and technology. 3. Discuss the impact of science on society

Relationship between Pure Science and Technology Pure sciences are concerned with the discovery of natural laws and the description of nature, and nothing else. Immediate practical results are only of minor importance to the pure scientist Technology, on the other hand, is doing something with one s physical environment. It is a practical endeavor, one of altering the world rather than of understanding it. Thus while science produces knowledge; technology helps to produce wealth. The goal of technology is the creation of artifacts and systems to meet people s needs. It aims at providing material objects for human sustenance and comfort. The practical usefulness of technology is evident. It is through technology that our living today is so much more comfortable than it was in the past.

Technology can use scientific knowledge and, in this sense, can be applied science. Indeed, much of today s technology is science based and this has led some commentators to describe technology as a parasite that lives on the findings of pure science .

However, the intimate relationship which science today enjoys with technology is a much more recent thing. Technological change has generally been derived empirically, simply by trial and error. The invention of the wheel and the windmill and the production of most weapons including gunpowder, do not owe their origins to laboratory work. In fact, contrary to popular belief, the industrial revolution was not based on science; and James Watt s steam engine preceded rather than followed any improved understanding of the laws of thermodynamics. As Sergio Sismondo aptly puts it: science owes more to the steam engine than the steam engine owes to science (Sismondo 2010: 94). Similarly, the invention of the aircraft promoted rather than followed the science aerodynamics.

It is important to note that the contribution of science to mechanical technology is relatively weak. In this field, it is often possible to make rather important inventions without deep knowledge of underlying science. By contrast, chemical, electrical and nuclear technologies are profoundly dependent upon science, and most inventions in these fields are made by people with considerable interest in science.

Science and technology reinforce each other. Their relationship is symbiotic. Technology is dependent upon science for knowledge of the properties of materials, for predicting the behavior of natural forces and for opening up new areas of technology. Indeed, science serves as a direct source of ideas for new technological possibilities. Science, on the other hand, is dependent upon technology for its tools and instruments, for the storage and dissemination of information and for the stimulation of further research. Indeed, technology has played a crucial role in making it possible to measure natural phenomena that were not previously accessible to research. Advances in technology have revolutionized the sciences of cosmology, astrophysics and fundamental particle physics. Presentation of Results in the two Fields The difference in the basic motives of science and of technology results in practical differences in the presentation of results in the two fields. In scientific work, the knowledge acquired is the important product, consequently the scientist endeavors to impart this knowledge to others engaged in similar work, by means of publication in journals and by means of oral presentations in meetings of scientists. By contrast, technological development generally results in new or improved products of some sort, so the results of technological work are kept secret until a legal claim to ownership can be established by means of patent applications. A patent is a government authority to manufacture something invented and to protect it from imitation. Thus widespread and rapid publication of results is sought in science, whereas secrecy is sought in technology. This is not to say that there is no technological literature, but that the literature that exists serves a different purpose, namely, boasting and heroics. The technologist is not communicating knowledge openly but is often concealing knowledge in order to gain commercial advantage over his/her competitor. Why Support Pure Science? Can there be any justification for the expenditure of large sums of money for work in pure science, that is, for work that is directed toward gaining increased or refined knowledge without any immediate practical application? Should poor countries such as Kenya fund research in pure science?

If we look at the many reports and surveys of science policy to see why we should support basic research (i.e. pure science), the first lesson is that it is an investment in the future. As the saying goes today s science is tomorrow s technology.

The point has often been made that pure scientific knowledge is one of the raw materials needed for technological advance, and therefore the storehouse of such knowledge should continuously be replenished and increased. This is a plausible explanation and numerous examples can be cited to illustrate the technological usefulness of scientific knowledge that is first gained or developed without any specific expectation of the applications that eventually arise.

Michael Faraday, for example, reported on the laws of magnetic induction in 1832 but it was not until 1885 that the first electromagnetic generator was built. Lord Rutherford, on the other hand, was fond of saying that his work on the structure of the atom in the 1920s was completely useless, and yet the first atomic reactor was operated in 1942. It is important to note that the magnitude of the time lag between the establishing of scientific knowledge and its technological application is decreasing.

Many economists have argued that governments must support pure science because the free market will always fail to support it adequately. Hence, in a welfare economy, it is argued, government has a responsibility to fill the gap between the level of basic research that the market will support and the level that is socially desirable. Indeed, if all scientists were to forsake pure science and interest themselves only in technology, progress would quickly come to a halt. Progress demands a continued study of pure science. Many countries have realized that without their own indigenous basic research their technology eventually will become out of date. Furthermore, countries with advanced technology are not always willing to export their ideas to their competitors. In-text Question To what extent should governments in the third world fund research in astrophysics?

Science and Human Values Let us now to the question of values as they relate to both science and technology. Over the years, critics of science have drawn attention to the benefits as well as the dangers of pure scientific knowledge. In some quarters, there is a feeling that science has gone out control and that scientists are playing God by meddling with nature. There are apocalyptic predictions about the harmful effects of cloning, genetically modified foods and the threat of a nuclear war. The question we want to address is this: Is science good or bad or is it ethically neutral? In-text question What connotations does the word science have for you? Are they positive, negative or mixed?

Before attempting to answer this question, we must clearly distinguish between science proper and the applications to which science is put. Science is knowledge; it aims at arriving at the truth. To the extent that truth and knowledge of truth are good, science is good. In general, however, it seems to be more reasonable to consider that pure scientific knowledge and, indeed all knowledge, is ethically neutral rather than either good or bad.

The law of gravitation, the Newtonian laws of motion, the periodic relationships of the chemical and physical properties of elements, the chemical structure of the DNA and Einstein s wellknown equation E=MC2 are certainly neither good nor bad. They are ethically neutral.

However, when we consider the applications to which scientific knowledge is put we clearly do encounter ethical considerations. Indeed, it has long been recognized that scientific knowledge, however pure at the time of discovery can, in the hands of others, be a power for evil.

Knowledge of the chemical and physical aspects of the reaction, by which trinitrotoluene (TNT) decomposes, for example, is intrinsically neither good nor bad. Nevertheless, the application of this knowledge in the manufacture and use of TNT explosives may be either good or bad, depending upon whether the explosive is used in a legitimate manufacturing operation or in a criminal act.

Should scientists be concerned with the ethical issues and the social impact of their work?

As another example, scientific knowledge of the nuclear and radioactive properties of uranium and plutonium is in and of itself neither good nor bad. However, this knowledge may be applied both in nuclear power plants and in the manufacture of atomic explosives such as the ones that were dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. In exercising value judgments, many persons would consider the former to be good and the latter bad. These judgments are, however, complex and involve values upon which not all human beings would agree.

The consequences of discoveries in basic research are impossible to foresee. However, the scientific community must recognize the potential for such discoveries and be prepared to address the questions that they raise. Today the distinction between pure and applied science is largely non-existent and scientists cannot afford to adopt an amoral attitude towards their work. If scientists find that their discoveries have implications for some important part of public affairs, they have a moral responsibility to call attention to the public the issues involved.

In this lecture we have discussed the relationship between science and technology. Whereas science is concerned with the discovery of laws and the description of nature, the goal of technology is the creation of artifacts and systems to meet people s needs. The intimate relationship that science and technology enjoy today is very recent. There are very many technological knowledge traditions that are independent science. However, much of today s technology is science based. Pure scientific knowledge is one of the raw materials of technological advance and the storehouse of this knowledge should continuously be replenished.

We have also discussed in this lecture the question of values as they relate to both science and technology. We have seen that although pure scientific knowledge is ethically neutral, the application such knowledge does raise ethical issues.

Activity 1. Distinguish between pure science and technology. 2. Give two examples of technology that is based on science. 3. Give two examples of technology that is not based on science. 4. Give two examples from the history of science to support the claim that today s science is tomorrow s technology .

References: Mitcham, Carl and Mackey, Robert (eds.) Philosophy and Technology: Readings in the Philosophical Problems of Technology. New York: The Free Press, 1972. Russell, B The Impact of Science on Society. New York: Routledge, 1998. Sismondo, Sergio. An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 2010.

LECTURE TWO THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD Lecture Outline Introduction Objectives The Traditional View of Scientific Method Criticism of the Traditional View of Scientific Method Summary References

1.1 Introduction In this lecture we shall examine on the traditional view of scientific method (also known as the nave inductive view). We shall attempt to demonstrate the shortcomings of this view by critically examining its basic presuppositions.

1.2 Objectives By the end of this lecture you should be able to:

1. Give an account of the traditional view of scientific method.

2. Identify the assumptions underlying the traditional approach to scientific method.

3. Demonstrate the shortcomings of the traditional view of scientific method.

1.3 The Traditional View of Scientific Method

The traditional view of scientific method asserts that science begins with simple and unbiased observations of phenomenon or groups of phenomena. These observations provide secure base from which we can make generalizations in the form of laws and theories. From these generalizations, predictions and explanations can be made. The following are the steps that the scientist is supposed to follow:

Observe and describe some phenomenon. Form hypotheses to explain the phenomenon and its relationship to other facts. In physics, the hypothesis often takes the form of a causal mechanism or a mathematical relation.

Use hypotheses to predict the existence of other phenomena. Test those predictions by experiments and observations to see if they are correct. If the experiments bear out the hypothesis, it may be elevated to the status of a theory or law of nature. But if the experiments do not bear out the hypothesis, it may be modified or discarded altogether.

According to this view, the scientific method attempts to minimize the influence of bias or prejudice in the experimenter when testing a hypothesis. One way to minimize bias is to have several experimenters to test the hypothesis. If the hypothesis survives experimental test, it may elevated to the status of an accepted theory, but if its predictions are incompatible with experimental tests it is eliminated or modified 1.4 Criticism of the Traditional View of Scientific Method This traditional account of scientific method grossly oversimplifies scientific method. The truth of the matter is that the actual thought processes of scientists are much richer and more complex than the traditional view of science suggests. Science is a human endeavor, and real world scientists approach their work with a combination of imagination, creativity, speculation, prior knowledge and sometimes plain luck.

What is wrong with this account of scientific method? The problem with this account is that observations are rarely objective and free from pre-held assumptions. This is because:

Our observations are not determined by our senses alone. They are theory-laden; which means that they depend in part on underlying theory that is used to frame the observations. As the saying goes There is more to seeing than meets the eye ball . Our minds are not blank slates (tabula rasa). The brain processes and interprets the images that enter our consciousness in terms of prior knowledge, pre-held assumptions, beliefs, expectations and prior experience. For this reason what we experience with our senses can vary from one individual to another.

Observation

statements presuppose theory.

Scientists

must

express particular

observations in a language and this language always has theoretical assumptions built into it.

Observation and theory are guided by experiment. This means that theory precedes observation in science. First a scientist has a hypothesis then she tests it with observations. Observation is a selective process otherwise the scientists would not know which observations were relevant. It is not possible to observe things which you don t expect or don t know how to look for.

Scientists use apparatus such as telescopes, microscopes and particle accelerators to observe and measure. These indirect observations require theory to read and interpret.

The traditional account of science is not historically accurate. It grossly oversimplifies scientific method. There are very many episodes in the history of science where a great scientist did not go out to observe a lot of facts, generalize and discover a new law or theory. Instead the new law or theory came in a flash of creative imagination. This is exactly what happened when Archimedes and Newton discovered the principle of buoyancy and the law of universal gravitation respectively. They were not generalizing facts but having imaginative insights. Many

philosophers of science such as Karl Popper have taken the view that this idea of scientific method is not workable but we can make it better. Activity

1. What are the major tenets of the traditional view of scientific method?

2. What exactly is wrong with the traditional view of scientific method?

3.

There is more to seeing than meets the eyeball . What is the import of this statement?

Summary The traditional account of scientific method holds that scientists begin with theory-free observations before they formulate theories to explain those observations. There are various objections to this point of view. The most prominent one is that faithful observations are not independent from the observer s past experience, expectations and knowledge. Moreover, observation statements have to be made in the language of some theory. Therefore theory must precede observation in science.

References Campbell, Norman, What is Science? New York: Dover Publications, 1952.

Chalmers,

Allan,

What

is

this

Thing

Called

Science?

Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994.

LECTURE THREE THE PROBLEM INDUCTION Lecture Outline 1.1 Introduction 2.2 Objectives 2.3 Induction and Deduction 2.4 Possible solutions to the Problem 2.5 Inductivist Response 2.6 Probabilistic Response 2.7 Linguistic Response 2.8 Popperian Response 2.9 Summary 2.10 References 2.2 Introduction The problem of induction is one of the perennial problems in philosophy. It was first identified by the great Scottish empiricist philosopher, David Hume (1711-76), in the nineteenth century. Hume realized that as a matter of habit all of us go beyond the evidence of our senses, and form beliefs about things we have not experienced. We all do this everyday of our lives. Repeatedly burnt by hot water, for example, we jump to the conclusion that the next time I put my hand in boiling water it will be burnt.

2.3 Objectives By the end of this lecture you should be able to: 1. State the problem of induction.

2. Distinguish inductive reasoning from deductive reasoning.

3. Explain and evaluate the different responses to the

problem of induction 2.4 Induction and Deduction Inductive reasoning proceeds from finite bodies of data to general laws and theories. Put differently, it is the kind of reasoning where we argue from several particular cases to the truth of a generalization covering them. Induction is often contrasted with deduction, which is concerned with valid reasoning from premises whose truth is not being examined. Whereas the conclusion of a valid deductive argument follows with mathematical certainty from the given premises, that of an inductive argument follow with probability.

Consider the following inductive argument:

Premise: All American presidents have been men. Conclusion: The next American president will be a man.

From this example we can clearly see that the conclusion does not follow from the premises with certainty. In fact, the premises may be true and the conclusion false.

But consider the following deductive argument:

Premise: All metals are good conductors of heat. Premise: Copper is a metal. Conclusion: Therefore copper is a good conductor of heat.

Here the conclusion follows with mathematical certainty from the given premises.

As we shall see in the fifth lecture, one of the primary objectives of science is to discover laws of nature. Laws of nature are inductively derived from observation. But a law of nature is more than a description of an invariance observed in the past. It says All As one Bs not only here but also everywhere else, not only now but always. In other words, laws of nature are arrived at through

the method of induction. But if we are in a position only to say some As are Bs, how can we validly infer that All As are Bs?

What evidence do we have that the laws of nature will continue hold in the future? Why, for example, are we so convinced that planets will always move around the sun in elliptical orbits and that at sea level water will always boil at 1000C? Can the formulation of a general law on the basis of a few observed instances be rationally justified?

The unreliability of induction is best illustrated by Bertrand Russell s well known example of the inductive turkey. The farmer fed the turkey every morning and the turkey jumped to the conclusion that the farmer would always feed it. Unfortunately, the farmer wrung its neck on Christmas day and made a delicious meal out of it. David Hume regarded induction as incapable of rational justification. In his Treatise on Human Nature, he maintained that because inductive arguments are invalid, the appeal to past experience cannot be used to justify our beliefs about the future. Consequently, the reasonable person will be a total skeptic about the future.

The problem of induction is that positive instances don t seem to increase out confidence in a hypothesis. Hume s critique of induction is widely taken to claim at least that science is inevitably fallible, more radically that scientific knowledge cannot be justified by experience at all. This is an important problem because induction has a critical role to play in scientific method. 2.5 Possible Responses to the Problem of Induction Many philosophers since Hume have attempted to solve the problem of induction. However, these attempts have ended in one of two ways either they have failed, or they have succeeded in solving a problem, but not the problem of induction. But it is important to note at the outset that Hume s problem is a problem for philosophers as no scientist can afford to suspend empirical inquiry until it is resolved.

In the following sections we shall consider four possible responses to the problem of induction. 2.6 Inductivist Response Some defenders of induction have argued that induction is justified because inductive reasoning has been seen to work on a large number of occasions. For example, scientists have been able to predict the occurrence of eclipses using Kepler s laws of planetary motion which have been arrived at inductively. Similarly, the laws of optics derived by induction have been successfully employed in the design of optical instruments that have worked satisfactorily.

This argument can be stated as follows:

Induction worked on occasion X1 Induction worked on occasion X2 Induction worked on occasion Xn Therefore, induction always works.

The problem with this response is that it employs the very kind of inductive argument the validity of which is in need of justification. To argue that past success in inductive reasoning is a reason for being confident that future inductive reasoning will be successful, is itself to argue in an inductive manner. The proponents of this argument are therefore guilty of circular reasoning. 2.7 Probabilist Response Sophisticated inductivists have attempted to solve this problem by invoking the theory of probability. They have argued that although we have no secure basis for scientific knowledge, we can be sure that cautious generalization will give us knowledge that is probably true.

According to this view, we can validate inductive arguments by weakening their conclusions to statements of probability. Thus instead of concluding that the sun will rise tomorrow because it has done so in the past, one should conclude that the sun will probably rise tomorrow. Thus probabilities rather than certainties are all we need to avoid Hume s charge of irrationalism.

This solution was severely criticized by Hume himself. He denied that weakening the conclusion of an inductive argument by simply inserting the word probably could render valid. He insisted that you would still need to strengthen the premises with a probabilistic inductive principle such as nature is probably uniform or that the future probably resembles the past and that his argument applied with equal force against such premises. The point is that the probability of an event occurring in the future is based on how often it has happened in the future. Thus, like the proponents of the inductivist response, proponents of this response are guilty of circular reasoning. You cannot rationally justify induction by appealing to a method whose rationality is in dispute. 2.8 Linguistic Response This is another attempt to resolve the problem of induction. It was first put forward by F P Strawson. According to this view, the demand for a justification of induction is illegitimate and incoherent. This is because our understanding and use of the word reasonable includes the idea of conformance with inductive standards. On this view, the statement induction is reasonable is a self-evident truth and its denial would be a contradiction. It can be compared to the statement all bachelors are unmarried . It is incoherent to ask whether all bachelors are unmarried since the concept unmarried is contained in the concept bachelor. The person who believes that his hand will freeze if he puts in boiling water would be considered unreasonable since he would not be making use of induction.

One criticism sometimes leveled against the linguistic response is that it does not fully address the inductive skeptic s concern. It has been pointed out that even if our everyday usage of the word reasonable includes the idea of conformance to inductive standards, it would still be within our rights to ask whether such conformance is itself reasonable especially when one considers that induction sometimes issues in unreliable predictions. 2.9 Popperian Response Karl Popper has offered another solution to the problem of induction. According to him, the invalidity of induction does not undermine scientific rationality because scientists do not make use of induction in the first place. What scientists do is to put forward a theory as an initially

uncorroborated conjecture and then compare its predictions with observations to see whether it stands up to tests. If such tests prove negative, then the theory is experimentally falsified and scientists will propose a new theory. Thus Popper as we saw in the last lecture does not make use of induction.

If the tests fit the theory, then the scientist will continue to uphold it as an undefeated conjecture. Thus, according to Popper, if we look at science in this way we see that it does not make use of induction. Rather, it makes use of what he describes as the hypothetical deductive method.

The central objection to Popper s account is that instead of resolving the problem of induction he has actually circumvented it. He has explicitly denied that scientists make use of induction in the first place. Since he claims that scientists do not make use of induction, Popper will be committed to the view that the following to hypotheses are equally rational:

H1: If I put my hand in the boiling water it will get burnt.

H2: If I put my hand in the boiling water it will freeze.

Intuitively it is more rational to believe H1 than to believe H2 because H1 is based on induction. Popper has not solved the problem of induction he has simply avoided it.

Activity 1. What exactly is the problem of induction?

2. Can we do without induction in daily life?

3. Will the future always be like the past? If not, does it mean that water will not always boil at a 100 degrees Celsius at sea level?

4. Of the four possible solutions to the problem of induction, which

one appeals to you most? Why?

2.10 Summary The problem of induction was first raised by David Hume and is one of the most enduring problems in philosophy. It is the problem of how we may know that the future will always resemble the past. Various philosophers have attempted to justify induction in different ways. However, their arguments have not been convincingly successful in giving a decisive solution to the problem of induction. The probabilist and inductivist arguments have been found to be circular while the linguistic and Popperian solutions circumvent the problem instead of resolving it.

LECTURE FOUR KARL POPPER AND FALSIFICATIONISM Lecture Outline Introduction Objectives Growth of Knowledge Criterion of Demarcation Degrees of Falsifiability Criticism of Popper Summary References

Introduction Karl Popper (1901-1994) is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. In the first lecture we saw how he attempted to resolve the problem of induction. In his view, scientists do not employ the method induction. Instead, they use the hypothetical-deductive method. In this lecture we shall focus on his account of scientific growth and especially his criterion for demarcating science from non-science.

Objectives By the end of this lecture you should be able to: 1. Explain and discuss Popper s model of scientific change. 2. Explain how Popper distinguishes science from pseudo science 3. Critically evaluate Popper s criterion of demarcation.

Growth of Scientific Knowledge Popper was dissatisfied with the traditional account of scientific method, which we discussed in the first lecture, and so he set out to save scientific method by proposing falsificationism. According to Popper science begins with the formulation of a hypothesis in an attempt to give an account of the world or to overcome problems encountered by a previous theory. Once a theory is proposed, it has to be subjected to observational and experimental tests. Theories that fail to stand up to these tests are discarded and replaced by further speculative conjectures.

According to Popper, science progresses by trial and error -by conjectures and refutations. Only the fittest theories survive. This evolutionary process is characterized by the following schema: P1 TT EE P2 (Where P is the problem situation, TT tentative theory and EE error

elimination). Popper s fundamental point is that scientists ought not to be trying to find evidence that confirms their theories; rather they should be trying to find evidence that conflict with their theories. In other words they should try to falsify their theories.

Popper called this methodology critical rationalism. He viewed criticism and conflict as essential for progress not just in science but also in politics. In his book Open Society and its Enemies he asserted that politics required the fair play of ideas and criticism and contrary to what the Marxists said, dogmatism would not lead to utopia, but totalitarian repression. Criterion of Demarcation Popper also uses the idea of falsifiability to demarcate science from non-science. According to this criterion, for any theory to be granted the scientific status, it must be falsifiable. In other words, it must make predictions that are capable of being found to be false. It is important to emphasize that Popper is not saying that a theory is scientific if it is false; rather it is scientific if it is capable of being proven to be false. In other words, if you have to make a scientific statement, a law or a theory, you have to say something that when put to test, might be found to be false. What this in essence means is that irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory but a vice. Here are some examples of statements that are falsifiable in the intended sense:

(i)

All metals are good conductors of heat.

(ii) (iii)

Water boils at a hundred degrees Celsius It never rains on Sundays.

The above assertions are falsifiable and therefore scientific. A hypothesis is falsifiable if there is a logically possible observation statement or sets of observable statements that are inconsistent with it. Such statements, if established as true, would falsify the hypothesis in question. But consider the following assertions:

(i) (ii) (iii)

God exists. Jesus will come back. Either it is raining or it is not raining.

Clearly no number of observations would be sufficient to refute any of these assertions. Popper insists that scientific hypotheses be falsifiable because it is only by ruling out a set of logically possible observation statements that a law or theory is informative. Indeed, if a theory is unfalsifiable, then the world can have any properties whatsoever. Besides, no amount of positive evidence can render a theory absolutely true.

In-text question What exactly is it for a theory to be falsifiable ?

Popper singles out Marxism and psychoanalysis as theories that pretend to be scientific yet they are not falsifiable. The problem with statements like All ideological disputes are the expression of class conflict , or Every dream is a wish fulfillment , he argues, is that they are propounded in such a way that they are unfalsifiable. Any falsifying evidence will always be dismissed or reinterpreted so as to leave the main hypothesis intact. Psychoanalysis proposes a model of human behavior based on a subconscious and repression mechanism. To deny the theory is to affirm it. Degrees of Falsifiability

Popper thought that theories could be ranked according to their degree of falsifiability. On this view, the more falsifiable a theory is the better. A good theory will be one that makes wideranging claims about the world and is consequently highly falsifiable. Such a theory must however resist falsification when subjected to critical tests.

Consider the following examples: (a) (b) Mars revolves around the sun in an elliptical orbit. All planets revolve around the sun in elliptical orbits.

The second statement is more falsifiable than the first because any falsification of (a) will automatically falsify (b). Criticism of Popper Popper s account of scientific method is appealing in many ways. For example, it provides an answer to Hume s skeptical challenge, namely, that the invalidity of inductive reasoning does not undermine the rationality of science since science does not use induction. It also captures important aspects of how scientists work. However, there are serious problems with the Popperian account.

One criticism of falsificationism is that it is not historically accurate. As Thomas Kuhn and others have pointed out, for most of its lifetime a major theory is developed rather than criticized. Instead of seeking refutations, scientists uncover more facts by applying the theory to the many different kinds of situations it promises to explain. Popper seems to have overlooked this part of science. If scientists really followed Popper s method, then great theories such as those of Copernicus, Newton, Einstein and Darwin would have been rejected in their infancy. Each one of these theories was faced with apparently crushing falsifying evidence. The history of science shows that apparent refutations, often are, and have been ignored in the hope that they will prove inaccurate. Scientists are known to ignore anomalies that apparently threaten their own theories.

Activity Find and explain in detail an episode in the history of science where scientists ignored anomalies that threatened a well established theory.

Another major problem with Popper s account of scientific method concerns the way he uses falsifiability as a criterion for distinguishing science from non-science. His criterion is too rigid and stringent. If this criterion were to be strictly applied, it would exclude from the category of science some of the most useful and accepted theories. Take the Darwinian principle for example. It asserts that the species that survive in the course of evolution are those that are best suited to their environment. To falsify this theory one would have to look for a species that has survived in spite of its being environmentally disadvantaged. But a Darwinian can respond by saying that the existence of that species confirms his theory: it has survived because it has adapted to the environment. Clearly Darwin s principle of natural selection is not falsifiable.

To this objection, most philosophers of biology would argue that the real content of evolutionary theory lies not in the phrase the fittest survive , but in the idea that organisms developed gradually from simple to increasingly complex form. This hypothesis is falsifiable for it predicts that under the pre-Cambrian rock formations which are older, one should expect to find simpler fossil forms than in the younger Cambrian rocks.

It is also useful to point out that many theories in science only predict probabilities and are therefore not falsifiable. For example, the atomic theory predicts that the probability of a radon atom disintegrating in the next 3.82 days is 50%. Clearly, there is no possible outcome that will ever falsify this theory since the atom will either decay or it will not and this is precisely what the theory predicts.

Another limitation of Popper s account is that it does not adequately distinguish between two separate questions: the question whether a theory is scientific and the question whether a theory is handled scientifically. The point is that a theory may well be invalidated by known evidence,

even as its advocates refuse to accept the refutation. The fact that some followers of Marx, for example, refused to accept the falsification of Marxism does not mean that Marxism itself is unfalsifiable. Popper himself describes Marx as a false prophet which means that Marxism has been falsified.

It has also been pointed out that Popper s criterion of demarcation is not scientific because it is unfalsifiable. Popper acknowledges this but says that his criterion was never intended to be a scientific theory in the first place; it is methodological rule. So, this objection misses the target.

1. Explain in your own words what Popper means when he says that a scientific theory should be falsifiable. 2. Find some examples of theories that you think are scientific but not meet Popper s criterion of falsifiability.

Summary Popper describes the growth of science as the replacement of one (falsified) theory with another theory of greater content and greater verisimilitude. For him, once a theory has been proposed, it has to be subjected to critical tests and the best test is one that seeks to show that the theory in question does not hold. Popper has also provided a criterion by which to distinguish science from pseudo-science. According to this criterion, a theory will be considered scientific only if it is falsifiable. Although Popper s methodology has been welcomed by some, especially practicing scientists, it has also come under heavy criticism. Some people have argued that his account of scientific

growth is not historically accurate and his criterion of demarcation of science from non-science is too stringent. References Popper, Karl, Conjectures and Refutations. New York: Harper and Row, 1968. Popper, Karl, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchison, 1959.

LECTURE FIVE THOMAS KUHN AND THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE Lecture Outline Introduction Objectives Growth of Scientific Knowledge Pre-Science Paradigm Mature and Immature Science Anomalies and Crises Revolution Incommensurability Criticism of Kuhn Summary References

Introduction In this lecture we are going to discuss the philosophical thought of Thomas Kuhn (1924-1996). Like Popper, Kuhn is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. His ground breaking work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), had an impact far beyond what Kuhn had envisioned. We shall be primarily concerned with Kuhn s view of science and how it progresses. Objectives By the end of this lecture you should be able to: 1. Describe Kuhn s account of scientific growth. 2. Compare and contrast Kuhns s view of science with that of Karl Popper. 3. Explain why Kuhn has been accused of relativism.

Growth of Scientific Knowledge

Kuhn offered a radically different way of thinking about scientific methodology and how scientific knowledge grows. He argued that science does not progress via a linear accumulation of knowledge. On the contrary, it undergoes intermittent changes, in which the nature of scientific inquiry within a given field is abruptly transformed. According to Kuhn, scientific knowledge grows in the following way:

Prescience
Pre-science

Normal science

Crisis

Revolution

Pre-science is the disorganized activity that precedes normal science. During this stage, the theories of the emerging paradigm are in flux and hotly debated. Unlike normal science which is guided by a paradigm, pre-science has no common methods of data selection and explanation, confirmation or refutation. Kuhn offers optics before Newton as an example. During this period, competing theories about the nature of light existed. The rival theorist disagreed not just about the fundamental theoretical assumptions but also over the kinds of observational phenomena that were relevant to their theories. A general agreement was only reached when Newton proposed and defended his particle theory of light. Paradigm The most fundamental concept in Kuhn s philosophy is that of the scientific paradigm. A paradigm, according to Kuhn, is a great research tradition or a world-view. It is a collection of procedures or ideas that instruct scientists what to believe and how to work. Examples of paradigms in science include:

Ptolemaic astronomy (according to which the sun is at the center of planetary orbits) Phlogiston theory of combustion (which was based around the idea that combustion is the release of a substance called phlogiston) Relativistic physics (according to which the time elapsed between events is relative to the state of motion of the observer)

Quantum physics (according to which the energy possessed by material objects or electromagnetic waves comes in discrete units, rather than taking a continuous range of value).

Evolutionary theory

Mature and Immature Science Kuhn maintains that the stability given to a discipline by the acceptance of a paradigm is a reflection of that disciplines maturity. In other words, a paradigm is the criterion for demarcating mature from immature sciences. Using this criterion, Kuhn says that sociology is an immature science because it does not have a discernible paradigmatic structure to which all sociologists can subscribe. It is characterized by competing schools with different fundamental ideas.

Physics, on the other hand, is a mature discipline because it has a number of highly articulated theoretical traditions. It is useful to note that whereas Popper is concerned with demarcating science from non-science, Kuhn is concerned with distinguishing mature from immature science. Normal Science Normal science is what scientists do most of the time. It is the science conducted within an established paradigm and is never designed to produce fundamental novelty. It involves elaborating and extending the success of the paradigm, for example, by gathering lots of new observations and accommodating them within the accepted theory, and trying to solve minor problems with the paradigm. This is what Kuhn calls mopping up operation a strenuous and

devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education (Kuhn 1962: 24).

It is for this reason that Kuhn likens normal science to puzzle solving, where the rules for solving puzzles are quite strict and determined by the paradigm. Examples of normal science include searching for the chemical structure of familiar compounds and coming up with more detailed predictions and experimental determinations of planets and other heavenly bodies.

According to Kuhn, normal scientists are fairly conservative. They do not question the fundamental principles of their discipline. Indeed, during the normal science phase the vast

majority of scientists are busy solving problems within a paradigm while taking the paradigm itself for granted. Anomalies are not treated as refuting the underlying theory. They are treated as puzzles to be resolved. Indeed, Kuhn is very critical of Popper who says that scientists should seek to refute their theories rather than confirm them. According to Kuhn, a scientist who pauses to examine every anomaly he notes will seldom get significant work done. Anomalies and Crises Sometimes scientists become aware of anomalies that will not go away no matter how much effort is put into resolving them. This is the crisis period. Initially, this will not necessarily cause much serious questioning of the basic assumptions of the paradigm. In most cases normal science will ultimately prove capable of handling the crisis caused by the anomaly.

However, when the number of serious anomalies accumulates and stick out like the proverbial sore thumb, scientists will begin to question some of the core assumptions of the paradigm. Their faith in the paradigm is eroded and attempts will be made to articulate alternative theoretical structures. This eventually leads to a revolution. Revolution Kuhn argues that science does not always grow gradually, as the inductivists and falsificationists have claimed. On the contrary, science leaps forward through major revolutions. A revolution in science occurs when an old paradigm is replaced by a new one. Here are some examples of such revolutionary changes in the history of science:

In astronomy, the change from the earth centered theory of Ptolemy, to the sun centered theory of Copernicus. In physics, change from Newton s theory that space and time are absolute, to the Einstein s theory of relativity which says that time and spaces are relative. In biology, the change that both animal and plant species do not change, to Darwin s theory of evolution.

Kuhn likens a paradigm shift to a gestalt switch of the kind one experiences when alternately seeing the picture below as a duck and then as a rabbit. He also compares it with religious conversion because it cannot be forced by logic or neutral experience.

Duck-rabbit

Kuhn says that whereas some scientists (usually the old guard) will continue to hold on to the old theory, others (usually the younger) will become disciples of the new theory. New research programs will be developed for the new theory, which eventually becomes the new paradigm. Upcoming scientists will then be indoctrinated into the new paradigm. Incommensurability Theories within different paradigms are incommensurable, in the sense that the terms and concepts of scientific theories in different paradigms are not mutually intertranslatable; this is called meaning incommensurability.

According to Kuhn, scientific terms get their meaning from the structure of a whole theory. His favorite example is represented by the encounter between a proponent of Newtonian physics and a proponent of relativistic mechanics. Even though both may express their theories in the same language and even use the same words such as mass, space and time, it does not follow they mean the same thing by these words. On this view, the different languages of different theories

correspond to the different worlds of different theories, and the proponents of rival paradigms inhabit different worlds.

Kuhn s incommensurability thesis seems to entail that theory choice is fundamentally irrational. If competing theories cannot be compared, then it means that one cannot make a rational choice as to which theory is better. That is why Kuhn asserts that it is not unreasonable to stick to an old paradigm. In fact many prominent scientists such as Joseph Priestley and Lord Kevin stuck to the old paradigm even when there was overwhelming evidence against it. Kuhn further argues that often the new paradigm triumphs only after the older, more conservative scientists die.

1. Explain the meaning of the following terms in the light of Kuhn s theory of scientific change: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) Pre-science Normal science Paradigm Crisis Anomaly Gestalt switch Revolution

2. Kuhn says that old people are more suspicious of new ideas than younger people. Find out how old the key figures in the history of science were when they came up with the ideas for which they later came to be famous. 3. Give your own example from the history of science of a revolutionary theory change

Criticism of Kuhn Kuhn s account of science has been tremendously influential both within philosophy and outside it. His account of science has been particularly popular among social scientists because it appears to permit a very liberal conception of what science is a conception that could accommodate

social sciences such as sociology and psychology. Kuhn is also credited with contributing to the demise of logical positivism.

But Kuhn s image of science has also been severely criticized. One frequently recurring criticism is that he uses the term paradigm rather loosely. Margaret Masterman has identified 21 different senses in which Kuhn uses the term in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Masterman 1970: 59-90). Dudley Shapere has argued that the ambiguity and vagueness of the term paradigm is a hindrance to the understanding of some central aspects of science (Shapere: 1964: 3-16).

Another criticism of Kuhn s account of science is that it is not historically accurate. As we have already seen, Kuhn proposes normal science as the sole mode of growth for a mature science. But as a number of critics have pointed out, science also grows in other ways. Sometimes a theory is proposed, not in response to accumulation of anomalies, as Kuhn suggests, but to resolve a conflict between two rival theories. Einstein, for example, proposed the restricted theory of relativity to reconcile Newtonian mechanics with Maxwell s electrodynamics. Besides, Kuhn does not explain why anomalies which are always there, will sometimes precipitate the search for a new paradigm and sometimes not.

Kuhn s notion of incommensurability has also come under severe criticism. Many critics, unable to accept that rival paradigms are incommensurable, have accused Kuhn of propagating a subjectivist and relativist model of scientific growth. For him, the first supporters of a new paradigm are moved by faith rather than by reasons that can be discussed publicly. Of course Kuhn has suggested some standards of theory choice but they are too general to offer explicit guidance to the practicing scientist. Criteria like problem solving ability and simplicity, for example, can be interpreted very differently by different scientists.

Summary Kuhns s account of scientific change emphasizes the importance of tradition and the stability of scientific communities. In his view, science depends on the existence of communities bound together by shared concepts, assumptions, and methods or what he calls a paradigm. Under the guidance of the paradigm, science prospers. Anomalies will always arise during this period, but they are either ignored or explained away. However, as the anomalies continue to accumulate, scientists faith in the paradigm is shaken and a crisis develops. Scientists will then search for a new paradigm and a revolution will have taken place. Kuhn s image of science has been tremendously influential, but it has also come under heavy criticism. He has been accused of being a relativist, and depicting science as a fundamentally no-rational process. References Kuhn, T, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Kuhn, T, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. Masterman, M, The Nature of a Paradigm . In: Criticism and Growth of Knowledge, Lakatos, I and Musgrave (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 59-89. Suppe, Frederick, The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2nd ed., Urbana: University of Illinois, 1977.

Shapere,

D,

The

Structure

of

Scientific

Revolutions ,

Philosophical Review, 73, pp 383-394.

LECTURE SIX PAUL FEYERABEND AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD Lecture Outline Introduction Objectives Against Method Incommensurability Science and other Fields of Knowledge Science and Society Criticism of Feyerabend Summary References

Introduction In this lecture we shall discuss the thought of one of the most controversial philosopher of science in the twentieth century, Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994). Feyerabend is a self-confessed epistemological anarchist and unlike most philosophers of science who have attempted to say what the scientific method is, Feyerabend s main thesis is that there is no valid universal scientific method. He maintains that there are no methodological rules that have been applied at all times in history, and if they had been so applied, science as we know it today would not have come into existence (Feyerabend 1975). He further emphasized that if there has been any progress in science, it was because scientists broke every conceivable rule of rationality. Feyerabend s criticism of science earned him the title the worst enemy of science . Objectives By the end of this lecture you should be able to: 1. Describe Feyerabend s account of scientific method 2. Explain why Feyerabend criticizes modern science. 3. Critically evaluate Feyerabend s view of science

Against Method As an epistemological anarchist, Feyerabend was opposed to all systems of rules and constraints of rationality of science. In his famous book titled Against Method (1975), he asserted that the methodologies of science that have so far been proposed have failed to provide rules for guiding the activities of scientists. He therefore concluded that there is no special, rational scientific method. In his view, restricting science to a particular methodology such as inductivism, Popper s falsification scheme or Kuhn s normal science mode, would inhibit scientific progress. According to Feyerabend, no episode in real science is simple enough to fit any one of these conventional methodologies. Furthermore, there is no rule of research that has not been broken at some time in the best interests of science. One cannot therefore insist that that in a given situation the scientist must follow a certain course.

From this Feyerabend concluded that no method should be discarded by science. He asserted that there is only one principle that does not inhibit scientific progress and it is the principle anything goes (Feyerabend 1975: 23). By this he meant that the scientist should be free to do whatever he wants without being constrained by any methodology.

What is scientific method according to Feyerabend?

To support this thesis, Feyerabend undertook a detailed historical case study of Galileos s defense of the heliocentric theory, the theory that the sun was the center of the universe. This theory contradicted the geocentric theory which held that the earth is at the center of the universe. Feyerabend maintained that contrary to popular opinion, Galileo did not present decisive arguments in favor of the Copernican theory. Rationality had nothing to do with the acceptance of Copernican theory. Galileo resorted to trickery, rhetoric and propaganda to get his views accepted.

Feyerabend pointed out that the existing astronomical evidence at the time of Galileo was incapable of allowing a meaningful comparison between the heliocentric and geocentric

hypotheses. Moreover, Galileo s telescope was of very mediocre quality. To put the point differently, within the context of the available scientific standards, Copernicanism was an absurd and unrefined theory, according to Feyerabend. However, it is important to note that

Feyerabend s intention was not to criticize Galileo. On the contrary, the point he was trying to make was that Galileo s defense of Copernican astronomy contributed to scientific progress but this progress came about through irrational means that clashed with all accepted scientific methods. Moreover, had these methods not been violated, no progress would have occurred. Incommensurability Like Thomas Kuhn, Feyerabend believed that rival theories are incommensurable, that is, it is not possible to understand one theory through the terminology and conceptual framework of another theory. His conception of incommensurability stemmed from the theory-dependence of observation. He asserted that, in some cases, the fundamental principles of theories may be so fundamentally different that it is not even possible to formulate the basic concepts of one theory in terms of the other. In such cases it is not possible to compare the two rival theories logically. One such example of incommensurability is the relationship between classical mechanics and relativity theory.

The incommensurability thesis is controversial because it undermines the rationality of science. The claim that scientific theories are incommensurable means that theories cannot be rationally compared because no comparative tests of predictions can be undertaken. And if there are no shared standards of theoretical evaluation, then there can be no neutral basis for theory choice. Science and other Fields of Knowledge Feyerabend argued that many methodologists take it for granted that science constitutes the paradigm of rationality. He argued that defenders of science typically judge it as superior to other forms of knowledge without adequately investigating those other forms.

But Feyerabend was not prepared to accept the alleged superiority of science over other forms of knowledge. Feyerabend was particularly enraged by the tendency of Western governments to impose the products of science such as evolution, nuclear power plants and particle accelerators,

on people against their will. Such imposition, he argued, often leads to severe social and environmental damage.

Feyerabend emphasized that science is not the only avenue to knowledge. He observed that many non-industrialized people such as the !Kung bushmen of the Kalahari have survived for centuries without science. The methods of voodoo and witchcraft should be accorded respect too.

According to Feyerabend, the results of science do not prove its superiority over other avenues of human knowledge, since those results have partly been realized through non-scientific methods. Medicine, for example, has benefited from herbalism, from the psychology, the metaphysics, and the physiology of witches, midwives, cunning men and wandering druggists (Feyerabend 1978: 105). He further argued that the reason why science prevails was because the show has been rigged in its favor and other traditions have not been given a chance (Ibid: 102)

If Feyerabend is correct, then we have to abandon the view of scientific knowledge as growing cumulatively and as representing a special cognitive achievement of the modern world. Feyerabend also calls for the separation of science and the state in the same way as the church has been separated from the state.

He laments that while American citizens are free to belong to any religion, students are not allowed to learn magic instead of science at school. He even defends the right of religious fundamentalists to demand that creationism be taught alongside Darwin s theory of evolution by natural selection in public schools. In-text Question Should witchcraft be taught alongside science in public schools? Explain your answer?

Science and Society In a paper entitled How to defend society against science , Feyerabend sought to undermine science s privileged position within culture. For him, science is but one ideology among many.

He argued that the 17th and 18th century science was an instrument of liberation and change. It liberated mankind from religious dogma, authoritarianism, superstition and other rigid forms of thought. But Feyerabend says that modern science has deteriorated and become as oppressive as the ideologies it had once to fight (Feyerabend 1992). Like medieval theologians, scientists have become the modern spokesmen of an absolute and incontestable authority.

Feyerabend attacked science because he recognized its potential to undermine the diversity of human thought and culture. He asserted that like religious heretics in the medieval times, heretics in science are today made to suffer from the most severe sanctions. He further claimed that today scientific facts are taught in exactly the same way that religious facts were taught a hundred years ago and at a very early age. No attempt is made to awaken the critical abilities of the students and any attempt to question the basic presuppositions of science is frowned upon.

Do you agree with Feyerabend s assertion that modern science inhibits freedom of thought?

Feyarabend asserted that in an ideal situation, children should be exposed to as many modes of thought as possible so that they can choose freely among them. He went on to advocate the setting up of the ideal society -a society in which all traditions have equal rights and equal access to the centers of power (Feyerabend 1978: 9). Among these traditions are traditional medicine, witchcraft and astrology. Criticism of Feyerebend Although Feyerabend has been described by some as the worst enemy of science, there is something positive that can be said about his anarchistic epistemology. Like John Stuart Mill in his famous essay, On Liberty, Feyerabend has been praised for defending the freedom of the individual. Like Mill, Feyerabend was advocating the cultivation of individuality which alone produces, or can produce, well developed human beings (Feyerabend 1975: 20). The point is that without choice there is no chance of fully developed human beings. Within science, this humanitarian attitude encourages the removal of methodological constraints which can retard

scientific progress, and in the wider society, it encourages a freedom for individuals to choose between science and other forms of knowledge such astrology, traditional medicine, and various branches of magic and witchcraft.

The foregoing observations notwithstanding, Feyerabend s image of science has come under very intense criticism for denying that science is rational and for failing to offer a theory of scientific growth. As we have already seen, Feyerabend s main argument is that the primary reason that scientific ideas survive is because of irrational arguments based on the political and moral appeal of new ideas. This thesis was based on his historical analysis of Galileo s arguments for Copernican hypothesis of heliocentricism, which was then opposed to the then prevailing geocentric view developed by Ptolemy.

Critics have been quick to point out that the sweeping lessons that Feyerabend drew from this episode in the history of science are not justified. Even if Galileo disregarded widely accepted scientific standards, his ad hoc arguments and propagandist tricks would not have contributed to the acceptance of the heliocentric theory if it had not eventually been corroborated by empirical evidence. In any case, few scientists today would consider Galileo s method as a paradigm case for scientific reasoning. During Galileo s time, mathematics was not yet established as the language of argument in science and his writings were literal in nature.

Feyerabend has also been criticized for wanting to have it both ways. His dictum, anything goes , is self-contradictory. He advocates complete freedom of the scientist, but he recommends certain counter rules as worth following. The point is that in submitting rules of any kind, Feyerabend is telling us that it is not reasonable for the scientist to do whatever he likes. His critique of method presupposes the viability of method. To be consistent, perhaps Feyerabend should have concluded that different rules apply in different situations and that no rule applies universally, and that it is up to the individual scientist to decide which rules are most suited to his situation.

Summary Paul Feyerabend was one of the most radical philosophers of science. He rejected the long-accepted notion that science was the paradigm of rationality. Feyerabend maintained that since there is no one scientific method, scientific success flows not only from rational arguments, but also from a mixture of ad hoc arguments, propaganda politics and deception. To support this position, he carried out a historical case study of the Galileo affair where he showed that Galileo used nonrational means to promote Copernican s heliocentric system. But as we have already seen, Galileo s case was too unique to justify the sweeping lessons that Feyerabend drew from it.

References Feyerabend, P, Against Method. London: Verso, 1975. Feyerabend, P, Science in a Free Society. London New Left Books, 1978.

Feyerabend, P, How to Defend Society Against Science . In Hacking, I (ed) Scientific Revolutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 156-167. Horgan, J. The End of Science. New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996.

LECTURE SEVEN Cloning Technology: Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer

Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), commonly referred to as cloning is the technology of making genetically identical organisms through nonsexual means. It has been used for many years to produce plants (even growing a plant from a cutting is a type of cloning). Animal cloning has been the subject of scientific experiments for years, but garnered little attention until the birth of the first cloned mammal in 1997, a sheep called Dolly. Since Dolly, several scientists have cloned other animals, including cows, mice and dogs. The recent success in cloning animals has sparked fierce debates among scientists, politicians and the general public about the use and morality of cloning plants, animals and possibly humans. Reproductive and therapeutic cloning Two types of cloning can be identified: reproductive and therapeutic. In both reproductive and therapeutic cloning SCNT technology is used. In both cases, we begin with a parent s somatic cell (shown in the figure as a gray circle) that contains the nucleus (red dot) that we want to copy. (A cell s nucleus has the complete instructions coded in its DNA for making another cell).

First we extract the desired nucleus from the parent s cell. Then, we obtain an egg cell (yellow circle) from another animal that is the same species as the one we wish to copy. We discard the egg s nucleus (green dot), and replace it with the desired nucleus. The drawing illustrates the result: an egg (yellow circle) containing the desired nucleus (red dot). Then we stimulate the

modified egg with a chemical or an electrical shock to start it dividing. The egg divides to form a cloned embryo (yellow circles enclosing red dots).

At this point, the cloning processes differ. For reproductive cloning, we implant the cloned embryo into the womb of a surrogate mother and let the embryo develop. After the gestation period, the surrogate mother gives birth to the clone. In the case of therapeutic cloning, we halt the embryo s further development by removing some of the cells, which we cultivate in the lab in a petri dish. The resulting specialized cells are then available to treat diseases or injuries.

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