My View: On all aviation matters and issues of corporate governance

Frank and fearless views on issues affecting society with a view to bring about a change for the better.

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

Murder of a Maharaja, Governance Now, May 17, 2011

Governance Now The report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) on aircraft purchases has confirmed what has thus far been widely known: that Air India has been forced to acquire more aircraft than it needed or could afford. It remains to be seen how far the government will go in holding those responsible for it accountable since this one single decision has virtually brought Air India to the brink of financial bankruptcy. With the benefit of hindsight one can undoubtedly affirm that the aircraft deal was apparently "well" scripted to pass muster at the various decision making levels in the Government of India. Air India had, prior to installation of the UPA 1 government in May 2004 decided, rather conservatively and in tune with its past track record of ordering no more than 8-10 aircraft at a time, to purchase 24 aircraft - ten long haul and 14 short haul. Praful Patel, the then civil aviation minister, while almost admonishing Air India officials for not thinking "big" at a meeting of senior officers soon after assuming charge as Civil Aviation minister in May 2004 asked them to review the requirement.

Air India officials either under duress or on their own volition after getting the cue upped the requirement to 68 aircraft - 50 long haul for Air India and 18 short haul for its yet to be launched low-cost subsidiary, Air India Express. Even though Air India's planning department had been cautious in recommending ordering of 35 aircraft ( whether even these 35 aircraft the pre-merged Air India could afford or gainfully deploy on international routes is another matter of debate) on firm basis and retaining the option for 15 other aircraft so that in the event of presumptions made on load factors, route expansion, revenues, etc. and the market not growing at the pace visualized or the government bringing about a dramatic shift in market dynamics through liberal grant of rights to foreign carriers, which it did subsequently, the option for 15 aircraft need not be exercised for purchase. This is a standard practice that all airlines world over follow since aviation industry has always cyclically had good and bad phases. The year 2008, within a year of start of aircraft deliveries, was one such exceptionally bad year. The eGoM appointed to fast track the placement of order for reasons best known to it, however, decided to order all 50 aircraft on firm basis. Why was this done? Who engineered this or at whose behest was it done? Only an independent investigation into the deal will be able to reveal. Even if one was to give the benefit of doubt to Praful Patel that he got Air India so many aircraft because he wanted the national carrier to regain its market share and grow aggressively in a rapidly growing aviation market, one wonders what role the then Chairman, V Thulasidas and the Board of Air India played? Were they party to the decision? If yes, they ought to be subjected to scrutiny for criminal negligence considering the fact that none of the milestones assumed for justifying increase in number of aircraft to be purchased have been attained. With no thought having been given on Air India's capacity to pay for the aircraft or bear the interest burden, Air India's finances are in total disarray today for which accountability needs to be fixed. It can be affirmed with financial data that the decline in Air India's fortunes started with Mr V Thulasidas at the helm. Whilst the airline was making a modest profit prior to his assuming charge, it did not take very long for Air India to go in red with virtually no check on expenses. Strangely, even as Air India ran out of cash to run the company he used all ploys to create an environment within the company that everything was hunky dory and the company was performing very well under his stewardship. To dress up the balance sheet, some of the owned aircraft were sold and leased back. In such an arrangement, the lump sum recovered through sale is shown as income while the lease rental, generally one per cent of the aircraft cost, paid month after month is taken as expenditure; permissible financials practices were used to reflect advance revenues for forward sales and cost of unused tickets in books and expenditures deferred to later years. As Air India had inadequate cash flows, loans were naturally availed of on a regular basis for meeting working capital requirements. By the time he demitted office in March 2008, Air India had almost exhausted the limit of Rs 14000 crore upto which loans could be taken against assets. Why was the actual financial state of the airline concealed? This is a question that will continue to baffle all unless the matter is investigated and truth determined. Was this done so that the exercise of purchases from select vendors at exorbitant rates for items required or not by Air India could be unabashedly continued? Or because he was seeking extension for continuing as Air India's CMD and the same would have been difficult for Praful Patel to grant if Air India's shoddy financial performance was publicly known. If only the real state of the airline had been known earlier the corrective action could also have been initiated earlier. It is clearly a case of one man's personal ambitions taking a heavy toll of Air India. Incidentally, Thulasidas is the only Chairman in recent past who has managed to not only complete his tenure but also managing to get extension. The last Chairman/Managing Director who managed to complete his term was Capt D Bose, who retired in 1987. All subsequent incumbents - Rajan Jaitley, Subhash Gupte, Y.C Deveshwar, Capt D.S,Mathur, Brijesh Kumar, Michael Mascarenhas, Sunil Arora, Raghu Menon either exited on their own before completing the term or were prematurely shown the door. It is apparent that Thulasidas even if he may not have managed the company well did manage the political environment incredibly well for his personal good.

The performance of Air India was also being reviewed by Praful Patel and the bureaucrats of civil aviation ministry periodically. How is it that they failed to "discover" the real state of the airline or did they wittingly allow Thulasidas to hoodwink them? This is also a subject matter that needs to be investigated in the quest for unearthing truth. Also answerable are the people who functioned as members of the Board of Air India. In addition to bureaucrats of the Civil Aviation Ministry, the AI Board also had Mr N Vaghul. What were these Board membrrs doing when the foundation of destroying Air India, was being mischievously laid, after all the public perception that Air India was being deliberately destroyed has been in the air for quite a few years now. With multiple systems to check misuse of authority existing, how could Thulasidas and company ruin Air India and getaway with it so far? The saddest part is that some senior management personnel instead of raising their voice in protest agaimst such planned destructive designs joined in the annihilation of the airline, which was once the nation's pride. Even more disgustful is the fact that these individuals - not difficult to name - have reaped in recent years or currently

reaping the benefit of post retirement jobs. Should they not be summarily dismissed and taken to task? If one looks at the names of these beneficiaries and relate it to their 'performance' which marred the company's finances, identifying them is a no brainer. Air India today stands at the crossroads with some seeking privatization and others, mostly those associated with it or having nostalgic memories of its heydays, wanting infusion of fresh life. With losses growing year after year; market share dwindling year after year, peoples' perception of the airline's image on the decline, absence of a realistic turnaround plan on the anvil, the government, in its capacity as the owner, ought to take emergent note of the real state of the airline for corrective action, lest it is too late. Also for taking the guilty to task so that it serves as an abject lesson for others wishing to play dirty with public assets. Jitender Bhargava, Former executive director, Air India

2. Dear Prime Minister, is Air India being sabotaged?

Open letter from Jitender Bhargava, so that the PMO doesn't say it didn't know the facts
JITENDER BHARGAVA | JUNE 14 2011

Dear Mr Prime Minister, It has almost been two years since you reassured the nation from the ramparts of Red Fort while addressing the nation on the occasion of Independence Day that requisite help will be extended to Air India for its survival. We in Air India were particularly relieved at those assuring words. I am not sure how updated are you about the real state of the national carrier now. As the condition of Air India has gone from bad to worse on all key performance parameters since your statement, I wish to share the real facts so that at a later stage no one in the prime minister's office can say that the real facts were not brought to your kind notice in time for your intervention. Reality check on Air Indias performance Air Indias market share is going down month after month. Air Indias losses have been on the rise and the airline has now begun to default even on interest payments. All other airlines in India and abroad have seen their losses going down in the same period. The much talked about turnaround plan has been a non-starter. Passengers perception of the airline is at its nadir with most having given up on Air India. Air India has been luring passengers only by offering low fares, adversely affecting financial viability. The airline has been low on productivity of men and machines, nowhere close to industry benchmarks or even its own past track record. The employees morale is virtually non-existent. Simply put, the airline is in the pits with more and people losing hope regarding the airlines ability to survive. Whilst some have in their wisdom already concluded that the airline is gradually heading towards an imminent closure by looking at the way in which the airline is being managed, I would like to go a little further and aver that the airline is being systematically killed in broad daylight by those administering it, and possibly even those who are monitoring the airline's performance. I wish to elaborate on this for better understanding of the harsh realities.

Given the critical situation of the airline one would have expected the airline to be administered efficiently, steps being taken to upgrade the services at all customer interface points, concerted efforts being made to enhance revenues, seriousness being reflected at all levels of management Board to the lowest level of employees, so that the imminent financial bankruptcy staring the airline could be averted. It is shocking to see that no such efforts are being made by the management as a consequence of which the airline is sinking, and sinking fast. Why is this being allowed? Somebody needs to answer this question! If we keep attributing this to global trends and ignore the ground realities, I am sorry to say that we will only be hoodwinking ourselves. Anyone with even a modicum of economic sense would know that to be on the path of recovery, the gap between income and expenditure has to be gradually bridged, not widened. Two valuable years for turning around the airline have gone by since your statement but there is no sign of efforts for revival on the horizon by increasing revenues. The entire thrust seems to be on cutting costs and seeking aid from the government which while giving a short term relief just cannot be a permanent solution to the woes of Air India. It is common knowledge that for generating higher revenues and igniting hope for any revival, the product quality has to match that of the competition. Notwithstanding the new fleet, the product is nowhere close to that offered by either private airlines operating in India or the international carriers with which Air India is competing globally. Sadly enough, product quality does not seem to be a priority or an essential requisite for turning around as is evident from the way customer services related departments are being managed or mismanaged, knowingly or by default. Lack of vision In the airline industry, the product quality is to a significant extent constituted by the ground experience i.e. when a passenger checks in for a flight and after he disembarks; the on-board experience i.e. food, wines, warmth of service, in-flight entertainment besides a neat and fresh ambience in the aircraft. I wish to apprise you of the total lack of efforts on these fronts which compels me to conclude that Air India as a product is not suffering by default but the future of the airline is being deliberately and systematically sabotaged. Please look at the factual position as it exists in Air India. Ground Services Department and the Customer Services Department, responsible for ground services and on-board services respectively, are being neglected like never before. If these two departments are regarded to be having no significant role to play in refurbishing the product, it only shows that the management has no clue of what the airline business is all about. Inexperienced and part-time heads for key customer-related departments The ground service department after seeing multiple changes in the past two years at the departmental head level is today headed by an IPS officer, Mr SCMathur, on deputation to Air India for looking after security department. Can you believe this! Besides the fact that he has no experience in the field of customer services how can a part-time head (in addition to security) do justice to the demanding job of ensuring good quality experience for passengers. Why has the department been subjected to such frequent changes under the present chairman and finally entrusted to an IPS officer? To improve or destroy! Likewise, the customer services department has witnessed four changes in two years Manjira Khurana, Capt AKSharma, Chitra Sarkar and is now headed by Director- Operations, on part-time basis, who besides being in charge of administering the operations department also undertakes international flights and is hence away from headquarters. How many hours can the incumbent Captain AS Soman devote besides the fact that he has no experience of what in-flight service is all about. Instead of upgrading on-board services to match competition, the services have deteriorated considerably in the past few months. These two illustrative examples of how key customer-oriented departments are being managed should convince anyone that the management is not at all serious in ensuring a good product for getting more passengers to fly Air India, which will eventually translate into higher revenues. While enhancement of revenues ought to have been the top most priority for an airline in deep financial crisis, what we are witnessing today is just the opposite - the management is paying no attention and is having the departments managed by inexperienced officers on part time basis. Am I not therefore correct in my analysis that Air India's future is being sabotaged? What surprises me even more is that there is no one to question the management about such absurd placements defying all logic and sense. Human resources department, the weak link managed by heads with no HR background In a service industry, employees have a key role to play. Human resources department, therefore, has to perform a major role in motivating employees, introducing innovative work practices and ensuring teamwork in a challenging situation that Air India faces today. The HR department has been virtually destroyed in the past two years. Whilst the airline had Anup Srivastava as Director-Personnel, selected by the Public Enterprises Selection Board, till a few weeks ago, he had been sidelined with no work entrusted to him. The Personnel work was first given as an additional charge to the Head of Medical Services Department, an MBBS doctor, yes MBBS doctor, and later to Mr V Srikrishnan, who belonged to the Materials Management cadre. The incumbent, having no managerial accomplishments to boast, has only strictures from Chief Vigilance Commission on record for flagrant violation of tendering procedures and causing loss to Air India. Why such experimentation unless of course the objective is to hasten the pace of Air India's demise? With no proper thinking on HR policies how does one get the best out of the employees, most of whom are as it is a demoralised lot. There is no dearth of similar examples involving other departments; they are also in a state of total disarray as a consequence of which the aircraft utilization is much below industry standards, passengers are being lured through 'attractive' (Please read low) fares with no marketing schemes or efforts to get passengers to patronize Air India. The softer option of seeking more and more financial aid to tide over the current crisis can't be the ultimate solution. Air India has to work towards generating higher revenues. Is anyone accountable for sinking Air India? With this kind of a shoddy performance on all fronts being allowed to go unchecked, even though the airline's performance is said to be being monitored by the Committee of Secretaries, how else can one infer but to state that Air India's existence is being sabotaged with the government, as its owner, unfortunately being a mute spectator. It is therefore my earnest plea that lest Air India becomes a further disgrace for the nation and the blame for the same is placed at your doorsteps, there is a need to act with a sense of extreme urgency and getting the Chairman of Air India to perform for Air India's survival and not otherwise; and to also hold those responsible for wayward decisions affecting Air India's fortunes accountable.

I would while looking forward to your response like to reiterate for your satisfaction that I stand by every word that I have stated in this earnest plea to you for your urgent intervention. Warm regards. Yours sincerely, Jitender Bhargava, Former executive director, Air India.

3. Broken wing: Not all is lost for the national carrier, not yet
We must redefine Air India's role: do we want it to be a commercial airline or a social one?
JITENDER BHARGAVA | JUNE 02 2010

The first-class cabin of Air Indias B777 (above) is among the best in the industry, yet occupancy is poor because the government gives free upgrades to even ex-ministers and former secretaries for life! View

JITENDER BHARGAVA

Air India, an institution which once evoked enormous pride in Indians because of its superlative performance globally, has indubitably fallen on bad days. Its ability to survive has become a subject matter of animated discussions which in a way also reflects the significance of this corporate entity. Companies can exist; companies can perish. With Air India, however, people in the country have had an emotional bond and therefore few would like to see it go into oblivion. What has led Air India to its current state? An apparent answer: failure of Air India to transform itself to face competition arising out of the opening of Indian skies in the nineties. The argument, though right to an extent, does not, however, fully justify the factual position. A dispassionate study of companies worldwide, across all industrial sectors, which commenced operations in the first half of the last century, would reveal that not many have flourished in the intensely competitive environment. The current state of Air India is therefore certainly not an isolated case. Numerous companies of Air Indias vintage have either perished or are struggling to survivea far cry from the days when these companies commanded leadership in their respective industrial sectors. This declining trend in their fortunes can best be attributed to what I would like to call an early-mover disadvantage. Companies that have emerged in the last two decades have been found to be advantageously placed with regard to productive work practices, focus on customer, sound financial management, aggressive marketing strategies, etc. vis-a-vis companies of the earlier era because they have had their baptism by fire in the market place unlike the companies of yesteryear, which were born in a monopoly era, and therefore had policies and practices to suit the environment that then existed.

Early-mover disadvantage The study will further show that in most cases the later a company has been established the better has been its performance and ability to adapt to changing requirements of customers. This can be illustrated by taking the example of the auto sector. Hindustan Motors and Premier Automobiles have been in the business of manufacturing cars since the fifties and the sixties. How do these companies rank today in the automobile sector with respect to their peers? How good are their cars as compared to those produced by companies that set up their assembly lines in the nineties and in the current decade? The response is so obvious that it need not even be stated. The two companies referred to have been in the private sector where organisations enjoy relatively greater flexibility to adapt to emerging changes than a government controlled organisation, like Air India. These two companies are incidentally not the only ones to have been afflicted by the earlymover disadvantage syndrome. In fact, look up any sector and the companies that emerged at the time of Indias independence or soon thereafter and you will have several instances of companies meeting the fate akin to that of Air India. I thought it prudent to give this illustrative example so as to demonstrate that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with Air India today except that it is paying the price of being a company cast in the mould of yesteryear. Remember brands like PANAM, TWA, Chrysler and General Motors, which once generated awe, but have either perished or are no longer regarded as leaders. This, however, is not to suggest that no company of yesteryear has survived or can flourish. Mercedes is still a much sought-after global brand. Closer home, Tata Steel continues to lead the steel sector in spite of being over a century old. The credit for such institutions goes to the vision their respective managements have had; the re-engineering of work processes on an ongoing basis that they undertook, their keenness to always stay ahead of the competition and, more importantly, ensuring a product that can be counted as amongst the best at all times. Has Air India succeeded in re-engineering itself over the years for ensuring its survival in a competitive market? No would be the obvious and emphatic answer. Besides being a victim of the early-mover disadvantage phenomenon it also has all the drawbacks of being a government owned company. As a public sector undertaking, Air India has to work within the framework prescribed by the owners that is simply not conducive for efficient functioning. For better understanding and an impartial conclusion on Air India, one can look at any other sector, where both government-owned and private companies are operating: Reliance and ONGC in the field of oil exploration, Airtel and BSNL in the telecom sector, Airports Authority of India and GMR/GVK for running airports. Few, if any at all, government sector companies can claim to be performing better than their private sector counterparts on any of the key performance parameters. Government ownership a drag If viewed in the context of the above, it will be grossly unfair to expect Air India to emerge as a market leader by having a product that can match that of competing airlines. When a discerning customer looks for value for money while buying a ticket, Air India can naturally not be his first or second choice. And if a company cannot feature as a top of the mind product it will undoubtedly lose out on premium passengers and revenue. In this reality, which should be obvious to most, lies the cause of Air Indias decline in recent years. If the obvious causes of decline are overlooked for equally obvious reasons by those at the helm at the Rajiv Gandhi Bhawan, Air India would continue to bleed and be seen gasping for breath. Nomination of corporate bigwigs from the private sector and appointment of an expat chief operating officer can best be described as cosmetic actions with no significant results likely to emerge from them. If the government, in its capacity as the owner, is serious in its desire to see Air India prosper, it will have to free the airline from its shackles as a first step. Dont get me wrong, we are not talking privatisation here, but operational freedom. Litmus test What are the factors that distinguish successful companies from others? Successful companies are professionally run; they have a well-deliberated business plan, etc. In other words, they:

Operate as a commercial entity. Have work practices that are productive, efficient and customer friendly. Have the flexibility to change work practices with changing times. Have a renowned and experienced set of individuals on the board to guide the destiny of the company with a missionary zeal. Have a management team at the top that can be described as the best. Have a team of motivated, disciplined and committed work force. All decisions taken by the board and senior management are governed solely by what is good and in the interest of the company.

Air India, in todays context, will possibly falter on all counts. So, if the ingredients for a dish given to the master chef are not of good quality, can he, howsoever good, turn out a class product? This is the moot question that needs to be answered if Air India has to be salvaged. Salvaging Air India As if these drawbacks were not sufficient to ground Air India, civil aviation minister Praful Patel has in recent times been guilty of creating confusion on the role of Air India by stating ad nauseam that all airlines need to be treated equally and that Air India need not enjoy a special place. The foremost action that needs to be taken by the government, in its capacity as the owner, is therefore to redefine Air Indias role after being convinced that it wants the national carrier to survive. Should Air India function as a commercial airline like other private carriers or differently (carry the burden of social objectives)? If Air India is not to be allowed to operate on commercial lines, comparison with private airlines on various performance parameters must stop. Such unwarranted comparisons take a heavy toll of the companys image and morale of employees. More importantly, the government has to reaffirm in no uncertain terms that Air India is the countrys national carrier; and shall remain so. While Patel can have his business interests in private airlines, as is the general speculation, it is Air India which serves the nation on the social platform. When Air India places an order

for aircraft on Boeing or Airbus it extracts an offset business running into millions of dollars for Indian companies. However, when Jet Airways and Kingfisher place orders no such benefit comes to India. Numerous examples of this nature can be cited to demonstrate the latent gains that Air India brings to the country. For all the new flights that Air India operates at the governments behest because it helps serve bigger national interests, it must financially compensate Air India for it. There are numerous government policies that render Air India at a disadvantage in comparison to private airlines, viz., being accountable to over a dozen parliamentary committeeson which several hundred hours of top management time are spent annually; adherence to government policies and procedures, which besides being time consuming also come in the way of selecting the best, etc. Today the government has unfortunately created a scenario as if Air Indias Maharaja is standing outside the precincts of the finance ministry with a begging bowl for survival. Managing it professionally One of the biggest myths perpetuated over the years is that our PSUs, including Air India, enjoy full autonomy in their day to day functioning. If Air Indias survival has to be ensured it should be the management of Air India, operating out of Air India building at Nariman Point, Mumbai, taking decisions and not Rajiv Gandhi Bhawan in Delhi, which currently takes decisions on all major issues without a shred of accountability. All key decisionsmerger, aircraft acquisition, frequent change of CEO, etcresponsible for Air Indias current travails were taken at Rajiv Gandhi Bhawan. If anyone thinks otherwise, he is only deceiving himself. In fact, the two parliamentary committeesthe Standing Committee on Transport, headed by Sitaram Yechury, and the Committee on Public Undertakings, headed by V Kishore Chandra Deohave lambasted the civil aviation ministry on aircraft acquisition and merger, describing them as the two main issues responsible for Air Indias huge financial losses. Moving forward Air India and erstwhile Indian Airlines have in the past six decades developed core competencies in all aviation related fieldsairport terminal services, cargo, MROs (maintenance, repair, overhaul) besides of course the main business of running airlines. Though separate Strategic Business units were created at the time of merger in 2007 no significant headway has been made in the past two years. All three fields have enormous scope for generating additional revenues, if operated as independent business units. If Capt Gopinath can set up Cargo 360 and make it a success what prevents Air India from doing the same? Likewise, in the fields of MROs and airport terminal services. Instead of being the natural leader in aviation business in India and the adjoining countries, Air India is being unfortunately projected as one which may not live to see another day. Air India, for most, isnt a lost cause as yet. There are many Air India loyalists who swear by it. But, for how long? There is still hope provided that Air India is freed from the shackles of the government; is allowed to operate as a Board-driven company with no external interference; exploits its core competencies in various fields and carry all its employees as a team without treating them as liabilities. Sooner it is done, greater the hope; later it is done, faster the sounding of the death knell. This first appeared in the May 1-15 issue of the Governance Now magazine (Vol. 01, Issue 07).

CBI and RTI: why Vahanvati is wrong

The attorney general's arguments to keep the CBI out of the RTI Act are unreasonable
DANISH RAZA | JULY 14 2011

Author Profile

DANISH RAZA

I cover issues related to the Right to Information act for Governance Now. Share

An 11-page note dated May 9, prepared by attorney general Goolam E Vahanvati, has all you want to know about the exemption of the central bureau of investigation (CBI) from the purview of the Right to Information (RTI) Act. CBI had sent its request for exemption from the RTI Act to the Department of personnel and training (DoPT) which forwarded it to the department of legal affairs along with a note dated May 3. The very next day, legal affairs prepared a note and forwarded the matter to Vahanvati for his opinion. Vahanvatis 11-pager will go down in history as a legally unreasonable document. The irony is that it is coming from the governments topmost legal advisor. Not only are the attorney generals arguments weak to say the least, they are also bound to encourage other law enforcement agencies to ask for similar exemptions in future. Let us have a look at the arguments given by the attorney general and the flaws in them. Vahanvati was asked if it was legally feasible to include the CBI in the second section 24 of the RTI Act (the section includes the list of agencies exempted from the Act). He said, yes, CBI should be included in the list of exempted agencies because it is involved in a wide range of cases. These include cases where the economic security of the nation is at riskIt cannot be disputed that the CBI does intelligence work which is directly related to the security agencies. Vahanvati goes on to give a list of 10 important cases having bearing on national security. These include the Naval war room leak case, Mecca Masjid blast and Rajiv Gandhis assassination. What the attorney general did not consider was that he was supposed to give his opinion on the functioning of the CBI in the context of the RTI Act and not the working of the agency in general. A Google search would give us the list of sensitive cases with the CBI. What we do not know and expected the attorney general to tell us is how has the RTI Act (or the availability of information in public domain) might affect the CBIs investigation in these cases, or in any case for that matter. His remarks are silent on that. Further, if we apply the logic that the agency is involved in intelligence work which is directly related to the security agencies, then CBI is not the only agency doing so. Using the same argument, police can also ask for exemption and it should be granted the same. Second query before Vahanvati was if it was practically possible to keep matters pertaining to administration, personnel, accounts/finance, budget and training excluded from such exemption. He said that there should not be any qualification with regards to the exemption. Offering such exclusion to any agency would make intelligence gathering and intelligence work difficult if not impossible, he opined. The respected attorney general seems to have ignored the fact that the Act provides enough provisions for not divulging information of sensitive nature. Section 8 says that the public authority can withhold information which can affect the process of investigation or prosecution of offenders. Plus, there is exemption for disclosure of information that would prejudicially affect the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign countries, law and order. One would expect the attorney general to run us through the kind of RTI queries the CBI has received since the enactment of the RTI Act to know whether they pertained to the administration, personnel, accounts/finance, budget or intelligence gathering part of the agency.

And what about the cases which have been closed by the agency? Suppose there is case, investigation in which was over 10 years ago. Why should I not have the right to know about its details? Justifying a blanket exemption to the agency without analysing these factors is uncalled for. Lastly, the attorney general was asked would it be possible to separate within the CBI that part which deals with intelligence collection and notify only this part of the organisation under the second schedule of the RTI Act? He answered in the negative saying it should not be done for the reason that we are concerned not just with intelligence but also with security of the State. It is to be noted here that at the time of the enactment of the act, only intelligence and security organizations were kept out of its purview. The attorney general believes that the CBI, primarily an investigative agency fulfills the criteria of being both and hence the exemption. Here, Vahanvati is also undermining the wisdom of the law- makers who fell short of acknowledging the fact that CBI should have been in the list of agencies exempted from the RTI Act.

MHA returns IPO submitted towards RTI

Says one postal- order had expired and the date of issue of the other was not clear
GN BUREAU | JULY 13 2011

Share

Do not be surprised if next time a government department returns a postal order which you had submitted as application fee or copying charges under the right to information (RTI) act. Last month, the union home ministry (MHA) refused to accept postal-order saying that the validity of the postal- order was only for six months from the date of issue and it had expired by the time it reached the department. Delhi based social activist Subhash Chandra Agrawal had submitted an additional fee of Rs 27 through postal- orders. The section officer of the MHA responded by saying that one of the postal- order had already been expired and issued date of another was not clear. Therefore, accounts officer of this ministry has refused to accept the same, said the section officer. The applicant said that the department of personnel and training (DoPT) should take up with postal department to either issue special RTI stamps on lines of revenue-stamps or notary-stamps etc as convenient mode of making RTI related payments.

Share

Here we reproduce the reaction of the National Association of People Movements (NAPM) to the new draft of the land acquisition bill (which is also attached below). 2011 Land bill militates against 'public purpose' Favours Companies, Legitimises Private Acquisitions and Ignores Community Concerns: Movements Demand Democratic, Development Planning Act The much awaited comprehensive draft of the land acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Bill promised by Union Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh was put in public domain for comments yesterday. It is commendable that the Ministry has now agreed to reopen the whole process and focus on the prelegislative consultations and not introduce such an important legislation in hurry in this Monsoon session of the Parliament. However, the proposed draft is not a comprehensive draft but mere combination of the earlier proposed Two Bills and fails to take in account the concerns raised by the millions of project affected people. The Bill focuses on only one concern which is to facilitate land acquisition and serve the land needs of private and public corporations and facilitate urbanization as inevitable. There is no concerted attempt to fulfill the task of land reforms and protect the land and livelihood rights of the communities across the country. Nor does the Bill realize the gravity of urban displacement and its linkages with the enormous corruption of the land sharks builder mafia. NAPM and many grassroots movements across the country have been struggling to protect the land rights of the farmers, forest dwellers and other nature-based communities and ensure their control over natural resources through the Gram Sabha and Basti / Area Sabhas, deciding the development plans for public purpose in their area. Proposed provision of consent of the 80% project affected people is only required wherever the private entities are involved in the process of acquisition whereas all the acquisitions for the government requires no such consent, keeping intact the eminent domain principle of the state. This will mean that the proposed projects like Jaitapur, Fatehabad or dams, thermal power plants, airports etc. to be built by the government will not require any consent of the people. The Bill provides the much needed legitimacy for the acquisitions for the private companies since today only by violating the existing LAA 1894 state governments could acquire land in POSCO, Noida or many other places for the private entities. This Bill is regressive that way, since the definition of public purpose covers almost everything from building educational institutions to airports to mining, where a large number of private companies are involved. These companies are not there for the public purpose but for making profit and it is in their private interest. Housing for any income group and by private entities will mean legitimising the real estate activities in all its forms. The broad definition of public purpose reduces the process of deciding the public purpose by a committee full of bureaucrats to a farce; it will be reduced to a mere rubber-stamp authority. The Bill also does not satisfactorily take into account the decades long experience and progressive inputs by the displaced communities on land and livelihood based rehabilitation. The provision that R&R shall be provided only when more than 100 families are displaced is unreasonable. The proposed Bill goes back on the significant debates around the concept of public purpose in last two decades and fails to take in account the provisions mentioned in the Draft Development Policy of NAC I, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Rural Development recommendations in 2008 and submissions made by many social movements. The land struggles in Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, AP, Narmada Valley or even in urban centres like Mumbai and Chennai are not just for fair rehabilitation and appropriate compensation, but more fundamentally for communities control over the resources land, water, forest, minerals and their right to decide the kind and process of development they need or what constitutes public purpose. Unless and until the Bill tries to address these concerns and take in account the Constitutional status of gram sabhas, basti sabhas / municipalities under the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments which mandate the formulation of district and metropolitan level development plans for public purpose by them, the Bill itself will serve no real public purpose. The Bill is high on rhetoric but low on content and is many steps backward in the overall debate over the land conflicts in the country today. It will in no way quell the ongoing conflicts across the country, armed or otherwise; but will surely facilitate acquisitions in the areas like Haryana, UP and other plain areas, promote real estate and make corporations rich, happy and unruly. However, the communities will have to continue their struggle to save their resources from being taken over by the public and private corporations in the name of public corporations. Although the Bill contains some necessary provisions such as under no circumstances should multi-cropped, irrigated land be acquired, it does not address the challenge of large scale diversion of agricultural land across the country for nonagricultural purposes and the consequent impact on the nations food security and pauperization of communities. India is not Noida, the architects of the Bill doesnt seem to recognize the diverse realities of the country and are only concerned about the nine percent growth, creation of infrastructure and urbanization; extremely unfortunate for a Bill drafted by the Ministry of Rural Development which is obsessed with the ambitions of Urban Development. To oppose these draconian provisions being pushed by the government in the name of protecting farmers interest and legitimizing the acquisitions by the private entities for their profit ventures, NAPM, along with many other social movements of the country from 15 states will be assembling at the Jantar Mantar from August 3rd till 5th under the banner of Sangharsh. We continue to demand enactment of a *Comprehensive Development Planning Act* which will protect the land, resource and livelihood rights of the communities and ensure democratic participation of the people in deciding developmental plans for public purpose. Medha Patkar Prafulla Samantara Anand Mazgaonkar Dr. Sunilam Rajendra Ravi Akhil Gogoi Madhuresh Kumar D. Gabriele Sr. Celia Ramakrishna Raju

Vimalbhai Shrikanth *** Himanshu Thakkar of the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP) has written a letter to rural development minister Jairam Ramesh, giving the first quick reaction on the draft land acquisition bill. We reproduce the letter here to start off a debate. Dear Sir, Broadly, the draft bill seems to lack confidence in grassroots democratic institutions and also a sense or vision of social justice and is basically designed to facilitate land acquisition, as the forward says and not to ensure social justice or democratic planning. It does not show the sense of understanding the injustices done in the past, and nor does it provide a credible manner of ensuring that they are not repeated in future. It seems to suggest that urbanisation, industrialisation and infrastructure development are inevitable, but democratic norms or social justice can be given a go by. It lacks credible manner of ensuring that land acquisition is allowed only for genuine public interest projects, that too when no other options are available (established in credible manner) and when the decision making process is democratic. Its process of scrutiny of SIA or public purpose lacks credibility. It proposes a strange notion that consent of people is necessary if project is in private sector, but not when the project is in public sector, when history of development in India shows that this is completely unsustainable proposition. The fact that there is no land based R&R (resettlement and rehabilitation) means that the authors have not understood the situation on ground as to how the majority of people of this country get their livelihood. At best it provides one acre of land in case of irrigation projects, which is less than the land holding of a marginal farmer as per the definition, half the land proposed in earlier versions and one fifth of the land stipulated in the Narmada award. Even when there is provision of employment, there is option of giving Rs 2 lakh instead, which is likely to be used by most developers. On the whole quite a disappointment, in spite of some positive aspects. We hope that the one-month consultation process will be sufficiently credible, transparent and confidence inspiring. Please ensure that the Hindi (and other major languages) translation of the draft is done soon and sent to all gram panchayats with a request to respond after calling the meeting of gram sabhas. Incidentally, the MRD has such a bad track record on these issues. The institutions that were supposed to be set up under the National R&R policy of 2003 or 2007 have never been set up. So the crisis of confidence in such official mechanisms is natural. May be some steps are immediately required in that regard. Best wishes, Himanshu Thakkar For SANDRP

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The Bill focuses on only one concern which is to facilitate land acquisition and serve the land needs of private and public corporations and facilitate urbanization as inevitable. There is no concerted attempt to fulfill the task of land reforms and protect the land and livelihood rights of the communities across the country The Bill does not realize the gravity of urban displacement and its linkages with the enormous corruption of the land sharks builder mafia Proposed provision of consent of the 80% project affected people is only required wherever the private entities are involved in the process of acquisition. Emiall acquisitions by the government requires no such consent, keeping intact the eminent domain principle of the state. This will mean that the proposed projects like Jaitapur, Fatehabad or dams, thermal power plants, airports etc. to be built by the government will not require any consent of the people. The Bill provides the much needed legitimacy for the acquisitions for the private companies since today only by violating the existing LAA 1894 state governments could acquire land in POSCO, Noida or many other places for the private entities.