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AGILE WARRIOR 12 Summary of Insights

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Contents Introduction Insights 4 5 5 7 9

1 Operations in Urban Environments. 2 Cyber Operations. 3 Command, Control and Information Requirements in the FCOC Era. 4 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Command, Control and Integration. 5 Urgent Operational Requirements. 6 UK Resilience. 7 Defence Engagement and Capacity Building. 8 Professional Development.

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Battle-winning Armed Forces, smaller than before but able to reach across the world and operate across the spectrum from high-intensity combat to enduring stabilisation activity, who work with each other and with allies, equipped and trained for their task, their families well supported, trusted to shape their own future and manage their own resources within Defence1 1. AGILE WARRIOR delivers an authoritative evidence-based analysis of land capability within a joint, inter-agency, intra-governmental and multinational context. It contributes to the transformation of land component capability and force structures across all lines of development. It is designed to institutionalise a programme of experimentation, synchronised with the emergent MoD Strategy to Capability Framework. At its core is a hunger for progressive selftransformation. AW 2011 (AW 11) was the first annual report. It produced valuable findings that have already influenced our understanding of future capability requirements. 2. AW 12 identified new areas for investigation as well as building on the output of AW 11. The core of the AGILE WARRIOR programme focussed on a number of themes and questions; questions that explored future capability drivers and requirements. AW 12 used a combination of methods and a range of events and techniques including Operational Analysis, exercises and military judgment supported by lessons from operations and training, to develop a common Army position that informs future conceptual development, force design and capability development. 3. The headline themes for study in AW12 were: Operations in Urban Environments Cyber Operations Command, Control and Information Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Urgent Operational Requirements into core UK Resilience Deterrence and Capacity Building Professional Development 4. Evidence from the AGILE WARRIOR programme will inform our revision of the Armys high level concepts, the planning and delivery of capability and the ongoing revision of tactical doctrine as the Army continues to take forward its own transformation. In many areas, this work has fed directly into the parallel development of Army 2020. The headline issues are summarised in the following pages, by subject area. They continue to build the corporate body of evidence to support decision making as we transform to meet the challenges of the future. All Force Development stakeholders should read this publication and note the guiding principles that it contains. Some of the recommendations may not sit comfortably with all audiences; this is to be seen as a healthy dynamic as the Army both defines and refines the capabilities that will be required for future contingent operations. The ensuing discussions will shape further cycles of the AGILE WARRIOR programme.

1. Defence in a Changing World - The Defence Secretary Philip Hammond launching the new Defence Vision, 14 May 2012.

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OPERATIONS IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS What Are The Future Capability Requirements For Operations In The Urban Battlespace And How Might They Be Delivered? We will not want to fight in urban areas, but the urban environment represents in my view a highly credible worst case and we would be foolish indeed to plan to fight only convenient battles against stupid adversaries. Urban areas are where politics, people, resources, infrastructure and thinking enemies converge2 Urbanisation means that cities have become and will remain pivotal points for influencing national, regional, and global risks, not least as these locations attract extremists, terrorists, and organised criminals, and are the nexus for different cultures, ethnicities, and supply chains. Despite the likely political reluctance, the military must therefore be prepared to operate in urban areas given the growing strategic significance of these locations. The urban theme was identified in AW 11 as an area requiring further study. This investigation into urban capability requirements continues, beyond AW12, under the authority of Director Combat, however within AW12 two major activities sought to inform this work. Ex URBAN WARRIOR 3 (UW3). This experiment was held in Southampton. The aim was to examine operations in an urban environment, at formation level, in order to improve understanding of the demands of future urban operations, in a 2020 timeframe. A RUSI Study Group entitled: How the military can contribute to achieving effect in the urban environment. The RUSI Study Group considered how limited force elements can generate mass and effect in the urban environment for a broader range of purpose. Recommendations from UW3 included: Recognise that it is more likely than not that the Army will be required to fight in a city within the next 10-15 years. Prepare and employ combined arms brigades, with expeditionary and mobile headquarters for manoeuvring to seize the tactical initiative. Invest in the divisional level, where operational art should be practiced using a comprehensive approach. Re-mechanise. Beyond 2020, ensure that the equipment programme includes a capable main battle tank, an armoured reconnaissance vehicle, an armoured artillery piece and armoured vehicles for armoured and mechanised infantry; with command and support vehicles to match, in order to ensure the necessary levels of firepower, protection and mobility. Move from assured to confident targeting, based on judgements, the law and accountability, rather than mechanistic processes. Invest in specific preparations for operating in urban areas: inter alia, intelligence awareness of the terrain; a method for simplifying the common operating picture; communication that works in built up areas; psychological inoculation of personnel; and tactical training for fighting in buildings and underground. Re-invest in logistics, medical and equipment support pushed forward and integrated with the fighting echelon. Ensure that aviation can operate effectively in urban areas. In the future, we will be unable to avoid being drawn into operations in the urban and littoral regions where the majority of the Worlds population live and where political and economic activity is concentrated.3
2. Designing the Future Army: Ex URBAN WARRIOR 3 First Impressions Report 14 Nov 11. 3. Future Character Of Conflict

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HEADLINE DEDUCTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - Operations in Urban Environments Recent experimentation has shown that the Army is not fully ready, in both preparedness and capability terms, for the demands of future operations in urban environment. Force Preparation. The demands and complexity of operations in the urban environment pointed clearly to the need for a fundamental reappraisal of our approach to force preparation. Whilst this demands enhancements in the physical component (manpower, equipment, training and sustainability) underpinned by a strong and resilient moral component, significant advances can be made in the short term and at relatively low cost by investment in the conceptual component in particular training and education. Understand. To be able to delineate its role and operate effectively with a small footprint, the Army needs to develop methods for understanding the physical and social infrastructure (including interdependencies), power relationships and sources of economic health in cities. Based on current resourcing, our inability to adequately understand the urban environment was recognised. This understanding must be developed prior to deployment, including by incorporating lessons learned from policing, planning studies, and disasters in urban areas into relevant doctrine, training and exercising. Yardsticks. URBAN WARRIOR 3 confirmed the inadequacy of currently published planning yardsticks for operations in the urban environment. Many of these yardsticks should be refreshed by focussed experimentation, Operational Analysis and research. Offensive Support. The utility of indirect fires in urban operations was confirmed. Conventional fires to defeat or neutralise the enemy remain highly relevant although the balance between yield, precision and suppression demand a range of capabilities to be available. Non-explosive natures were also seen to have utility, e.g. marker and smoke. Further study is recommended to investigate how novel munitions could enable operations in the urban environment where avoiding collateral damage is a major factor. Military Assistance to Civil Effect (MACE). Urban communities will expect the provision of services and utilities that the Army is not equipped to deliver, either because of lack of capabilities or because land forces will have competing priorities. The Army will need to be realistic about its own ability to deliver, limiting its ambitions to what is achievable and maximising its advantages; what are the Armys critical capabilities and vulnerabilities when operating in the urban environment? Next Steps. To exploit the work of AW 12, UW3 and UW4, an Urban Concept and an Urban Roadmap are being developed to identify the path through which the Army should develop its urban capabilities. URBAN WARRIOR 5 will examine the issue further in a series of live, virtual and constructive experiments in the latter half of 2012

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CYBER OPERATIONS What Land Forces capability requirements are needed for cyber operations at the tactical level? Future war will always include a cyber dimension and it could become the dominant form - Chief of the Defence Staff, 2011 The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and associated National Security Risk Assessment recognised the risks of Cyber Attack as a Tier 1 risk to the national security of the UK. Whilst it is hard to extrapolate the threat out to 2020, 3-5 year assessments indicate that risks of Cyber Attack are on the increase4. The threat of cyber attack from hybrid adversaries was highlighted in the Future Character of Conflict (FCOC)5. With military operations dependent on the use of cyberspace, the requirement to integrate cyber activity into the conduct of mainstream military operations has become essential6. Freedom of manoeuvre within cyberspace is necessary in order to conduct planning, achieve situational awareness, enable command and control, realise the synchronisation of effects, and support administrative and logistic services. Defence is reliant on network connectivity with industry and with coalition partners. Our adversaries are also becoming increasingly dependent on cyberspace; so with increased threat so comes opportunity. Defence must be effective at defending itself within cyberspace, and must capitalise on opportunities to exploit adversaries weaknesses through the conduct of full spectrum cyber operations. The Defence Cyber Security Programme has been established to deliver cyber capability across the Department, recognising that activity in cyberspace needs to be conducted in a manner which is inherently Joint. Equally the complex nature of operations in this domain, and the need for coherence of activity, means that cyber operations need to be coordinated at the strategic and operational levels. Nevertheless there are clear and discrete capability requirements that Land Forces will need at the tactical level in order to ensure it can conduct effective and fully integrated cyber operations in the 2020 era. The Army Cyber Plan provides the framework for that activity.

4. Quintepartite Intelligence Production Plan Strategic 3 to 5 Year Outlook for the Cyber Environment (QUIPP-210-36Q dated Sep 10). 5. Future Character of Conflict (FCOC), DCDC, 17 Sep 09 6. JDN 3/12.

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HEADLINE DEDUCTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - Cyber Operations The conduct of operations within cyberspace will be inherently Joint and will see a blurring of decision making (and action) between the strategic and tactical levels. Land Force tactical cyber capability development will need to be seamlessly integrated within Defence cyber capability development strategies at the strategic and operational levels. Joint Doctrine Note 3/12: Cyber Operations: The Defence Contribution, will provide the doctrinal basis for capability development. The Single SIGINT Battlespace (SSB) provides the framework on which cyber operations capability development is set to take place. Land Forces must act to integrate activity throughout the Electromagnetic Environment (of which cyber operations will represent one element). This must include the development of greater coherence between the J2, J3 and J6 functional areas. The focus of cyber capability development must be its integration into the Joint Action framework through the Full Spectrum Targeting process. This will allow Land Forces to not only do things better but also to do better things. The majority of cyber capability is set to be controlled at the strategic/ national level but will have the capacity to be employed at the tactical level. Unlocking such capability at the tactical level will principally involve three things; a clear doctrinal framework (set to be based on the SSB), tactical manpower resource (most significantly measured in cyber specialist, analyst and linguist manpower) and specialised Information and Communication Service connectivity. Maintaining cyber specialist skill sets will represent a key capability requirement. There is a requirement to get the basics right in terms of Information Assurance (IA) policy compliance and the development of Cyber Defence awareness. Individuals must be seen as the first line of defence. Implementing individual IA/ Cyber Defence training, alongside cultural change initiatives which seek to reinforce the implications of inappropriate conduct within cyberspace, will prove critical. Cyber hygiene must become culturally engrained. Tactical forces will need to operate under a presumption of [cyber security] breach. They must develop agile mechanisms to respond to threats on a risk-balance basis and ensure that they develop and exercise robust business continuity plans in order to be able to operate post-incident/ attack. There will be a requirement for Cyber Defence training objectives to be more effectively incorporated into Land Force collective training. Attaining cyber situational awareness (via network monitoring tools) and the means to plan post-incident responses (via network planning tools) will represent key capability requirements. Next Steps: The Army needs to re-invigorate Cyber Defence and Information Assurance awareness through training and behavioural change initiatives. An Army Tactical Doctrine Note on cyber should be issued as soon as possible. The recommendations of the Defence Cyber Security Programme Training Needs Analysis must be embedded into individual training and education courses. Army CIO has developed a Cyber Plan within the Army Information Programme. This should be implemented in full. Capability Directors must consider the implications of cyber in the development of existing and future capabilities.

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COMMAND, CONTROL AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS IN THE FCOC ERA. What are the Command, Control and Information (C2I) Requirements at Theatre, Divisional and Brigade Levels to operate in the FCOC Era? The exponential growth in information technology has revolutionised operations. The demand for complex, rich information services in the current and future operating environments has outstripped delivery. Information and Communications Services (ICS), and their applications and data, need to be made available, securely, to a very large number of dispersed users and if necessary within a contested environment. These users will need access to information services through points of presence, interconnected by high bandwidth links, and will need to be able to reach across the deployed force, to allies and coalition partners, to the home base and to others in the country of deployment. While reversionary working needs developing and practice, there is, essentially, no going back. C2 elements, large and small need access to a flat, ubiquitous ICS network to allow them to achieve an operational advantage; all within the context of cyberspace - with its associated opportunities and threats. Military communications specialist, supported by DE&S and contractors, will need to operate a common equipment platform, carrying common NATO services and applications, using a single Service Management regime. The scaling of Dii(S) and Dii(R) to deliver medium scale enduring operations, requires review. There is also a lack of an agile (smaller/lighter) solution. It will be essential that the ICS regiments use common infrastructure, networks and service management, and that there is a common set of user applications. Without this common platform, the multi-role approach will be difficult to implement. Delivering rich information services into the fast moving manoeuvre elements of a force is challenging and services at this level will be optimised for voice, situational awareness and battle planning and control, with some tailored access to richer services; fixed or static HQs, with relative stable power supplies, can expect the full range of ICS to be provided; BGs and Coys will rely on Tactical CIS. As there is a direct correlation between the quality and timeliness of information and decision making9, manoeuvre force elements will need to readjust to making decisions with less information and thus reduced understanding, which will have a concomitant impact on the level of assurance, risk and tempo of operations.

7. Operational activity comprising a number of processes, each with its associated information exchange requirements (IERs). 8. Estimated broadband WAN bandwidth requirements range from 10 Mbps at the smallest C2 nodes up to 32 Mbps at the larger nodes. 9. Information from the cognitive, physical and virtual domain leads to enhanced situational awareness, which when analysed leads to comprehension (insight) and after judgement is applied, leads to understanding (foresight).

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HEADLINE DEDUCTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Command, Control and Information Requirements in the FCOC Era. Their is an emerging imbalance between the demand for rich ICS and the ability for supply to keep pace. Gaining and maintaining operational advantage will require ICS structures that are flat ubiquitous. Delivering rich information services into the fast moving manoeuvre elements of a force is challenging and services at this level will be optimised for voice; greater mobility will result in reduced situational awareness, which has implications for risk, tempo and the ability to conduct mission command. Contingent operations will challenge Land Forces in different ways to that for which established ICS structures have developed in Afghanistan. Interoperability (voice and data), via TacCIS and broadband Wide Area Network (WAN) is a critical requirement to support all mission threads7 in the CJIIM environment. A medium scale stabilisation operation requires 74 x broadband (WAN) points of presence.8 FALCON is the trunk system that will provide the high capacity broadband communications WAN. Whilst MISSION SECRET will be the primary security domain, a variety of information infrastructure (security domains) are required as it is not yet possible for security reasons to carry all security domains on a single, physical network. There are sufficient FALCON to allow medium scale enduring operations. There is also a potential mismatch between protection and mobility. Further analysis is required to inform the Equipment Programme, and information exchange requirements need to be regularly reviewed to maintain accuracy and currency. A properly resourced JF CIS Comd and J6 staff is required to ensure the networks, infrastructure and applications are effectively managed. A review of staff user training is also required to ensure that staff users are able to maximise exploitation of information delivered to increasingly complex CIS. Next Steps A C3I CONEMP is being developed in parallel with the Deployable Divisional Headquarters CONEMP; these CONEMPs will be validated during subsequent AGILE WARRIOR work, notably the AGILE WARRIOR Experiment in 2013. Concurrency assumptions need to be tested to a greater extent and the C2I requirements for a single complex intervention need to be captured and validated across a range of operational scenarios.

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INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)- COMMAND, CONTROL AND INTEGRATION Determine the optimum Command and Control for integral ISR assets at Bde level, and also for reinforcing ISR assets that may be task-organised to the Bde; and the optimum means of integrating all of these assets within the Bde HQs process. The operating environment has become more complex; achieving an advantage over an opponent in the cyber and information spaces to enable understanding is becoming ever more important. The unprecedented growth in ISTAR capabilities at the brigade level and below has highlighted gaps in our ability to control, integrate and exploit the significant advantage such capabilities should deliver. A lack of education is at the heart of this issue. Bespoke procedures, training regimes and staff cells have been generated to resolve this issue for Operations TELIC and HERRICK, not all of these solutions have enduring utility but they provide an effective start point for contingent operations. ISTAR is a process involving collect (STAR), analysis (Intelligence), exploitation and is supported by CIS/G6. G2, G3 and G5 all require to be supported by parts of the ISTAR process. The key principles are centralised coordination; responsiveness and timeliness; robust and flexible sensor mix; interconnectivity and Information Management; mass, soak, layer and cross-cue, and multisource approach. Maintaining coherence through ISTAR capabilities and staff functions at the tactical level will be fundamental while addressing these key principles. We must avoid using ISTAR as a catch-all term but rather use it appropriately in line with endorsed doctrine, which needs to be better understood and taught at all levels. Robust ISTAR structures at each level of command are essential to meet future contingent needs. Whilst forming a bespoke IX/ISTAR Group on operations (as seen on Op HERRICK) may be an option it should not necessarily be the default setting. What is needed is better alignment of collection assets and the process of collection management, with that of Information Requirements Management in order to better support a commanders decision making with an analysed output (Intelligence). The key to success is the effective grouping of special-to-arm I, S, TA, R force elements in barracks, holding them at the appropriate readiness and force generating them at the right stage of the supported HQs Collective Training; CT5 and CT6 events must include the full suite of ISTAR capabilities. Specialist support must be scalable and adaptable to the HQ structure; start small (lean) and get bigger as required. Following the plug and socket philosophy, which is a key tenet of the A2020 proposition, there is a need for a combination of better educated generalists with appropriate training and experience to be core staff members in Battlegroup, Brigade and Divisional HQs, responsible for integrating ISTAR; and specialists (EW, UAS, HUMINT, GMR etc) that are task-organised when required to bring professional/SME advice and input to both collection (FIND) and exploitation.
10. ISTAR is the coordinated acquisition, processing and dissemination of timely, accurate, relevant and assured information and intelligence which supports the planning and conduct of operations, targeting and the integration of effects, enabling commanders to achieve their goals throughout the spectrum [mosaic] of conflict (JDP 0-01.1).

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HEADLINE DEDUCTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) - Command Control and Integration The unprecedented growth in ISTAR capabilities at the brigade level and below has highlighted gaps in our ability to control, integrate and exploit the significant advantage such capabilities should deliver; a lack of education is at the heart of this issue. We must avoid using ISTAR as a catch-all term, but rather use it appropriately in line with endorsed doctrine, which needs to be better understood and taught at all levels.10 There is a need for a combination of better educated generalists to be core staff members in Battlegroup, Brigade and Divisional HQs, responsible for integrating ISTAR; and specialists that are task-organised when required to bring professional/subject matter expert advice and input to both collection and exploitation activities within the ISTAR process. Specialist support must be scalable and adaptable to the HQ structure, flexible and robust enough to meet the demands of any contingent operation; start lean and augment as required for the operation. The key to success is centralising special-to-arm I, S, TA, R force elements in barracks (enhanced coherence and professionalism), holding them at the appropriate readiness and delivering them as part of a coherent and fully trained force package at the right stage of the supported HQs Collective Training; Level 5 and 6 Collective Training events must include the full suite of ISTAR capabilities. Structures should be reviewed in accordance with the Army 2020 Find and Understand Brigade Concept of Employment (CONEMP) which will deliver greater coherence between the processes involved in Collection Management with that of Information Requirements Management in order to better support a commanders decision making with an analysed output. Each deployed brigade should have its own organic ground mounted recce, Intelligence, Communication, Geo and Battlespace Management elements. The division may require the development of a bespoke deployable reconnaissance / surveillance organisation that manoeuvres to find but in direct support of divisional information requirements. A One-Star proponent (Capability Director Information) will reinforce the professionalisation of ISTAR as a discipline and bring coherence to its delivery. Consideration should be given to introducing a tactical intelligence career stream for infantry and armoured regiments.

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URGENT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS INTO CORE Identify and prioritise the capabilities developed for Afghanistan (and Iraq) that have enduring relevance for the future in order to determine those that should be brought into the core programme for Army 2020. Recent operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have seen a proliferation of deployed capabilities procured under the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process. Following SDSR and the future of the current campaign in Afghanistan, there is a requirement to determine which of these capabilities, measures and equipment procured and developed for these campaigns, should be retained by the Army on Return to Contingency. The analysis of which capabilities to retain, considered all the Defence Lines of Development. Key stakeholder engagement from across defence seeks to achieve coherence between the single Services. The scale of the task has meant that the full findings will not be available until later in 2012, although some emerging headlines have been made available in this report.

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HEADLINE DEDUCTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS UORs into Core Fires, Targeting and ISTAR. Retain the significant enhancement in collect capability Retain and nurture the significant enhancement in staff dissemination and processing skills. Lethality. Review of training progression and the use of simulation. Maintain the competence levels among reserves and support forces across the wide spectrum of new weapon systems that they have used. Counter-IED. Future training will need to balance between scenarios constrained by an IED environment with training for operations that demand speed of manoeuvre. UK must maintain its world class R&D and manufacturing capability. Vehicles Those vehicles used to provide Equipment Support must have mobility and protection matched to those that they are supporting. Future fleet requirements must enable units to train as they fight as opposed to wholesale conversion to type prior to deployment. Dismounted Close Combat A coherent assessment of night operating capability is required. ISTAR / Base ISTAR Need for an integrating hub for all ISTAR collect assets. Provision of robust Full Motion Video capable Information Support Service, separate from Base ISTAR infrastructure should be investigated in order to support contingent operations. There is an enduring requirement for a layered ISTAR mix ranging from heavy to light and including a capable aerostat. Provision of simulation in support of ISTAR training. ISTAR Specialists must be made available for Level 3 Collective Training activities, and above. Aviation Enhanced Defensive Aid Suites are fundamental for the use of aviation, particularly as the future airspace is likely to be increasingly contested. Training The investment in training in support of current operations, and its clear benefits, has been hard earned and must be retained Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) that have evolved during HERRICK (and which will have utility in future operating environments) need to be hard wired into training and Tactical Doctrine. Next Steps: Output has informed Army 2020 and will be used to inform MoD and Army capability balance of investment decisions. Study continues on this theme in 2012.

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UK RESILIENCE By 2020, what capabilities will Land Forces require to provide UK homeland security and resilience? UK Military /Civil Integration (MCI) and UK Engagement UK Engagement is the activity conducted by the Army with national and local agencies and partners that will, if effectively delivered, create a secure environment, at home, that sustains the Army, enables training for and deployment on operations and ensures the consent and support of the public. Success shapes national and community perceptions and creates a supportive community from which to recruit, within which to serve, and to which to return at the end of service. It is a regionally relevant bottom up rather than top down approach and one that shapes the local and regional environment to deliver, inter alia, 4 key outcomes: Maintaining Inflow: Support to Recruiting. Shaping the Firm Base. Enabling Effective Defence Communication at the Regional Level. Support to UK Ops: Contribution to Regional Resilience.

Successful engagement in this space will make a vital contribution to a broader outcome - an Army that continues to operate and thrive through the consent of the people, confidence of government and commitment of its soldiers and their families. The Provision of Resilience and Homeland Security National security and resilience encompasses a wide range of threats, from traditional state-on-state aggression through terrorist groups to civil emergencies such as flooding or pandemics. It also encompasses a spectrum of capabilities and responsesnot merely preventing or dealing with attacks or natural disasters (security), but also ensuring that vital services are maintained and life can continue as close to normal as possible (resilience). There are two broad categories of capabilities that the MoD maintains: niche capabilities and augmentation capability. Provision of Capacity. High readiness bulk manpower, capable of enduring and sustaining operations in adverse conditions, with flexible attitudes of mind and a Mission Command philosophy, will continue to be an important contribution from the military, either to augment the emergency response or to free up civilian personnel from other tasks to allow their redeployment. There is the traditional, and assumed, public expectation that the military will be able to provide both specialist and general duties manpower to conduct tasks at short notice. Niche Capabilities. The armed forces currently provide guaranteed, smallscale niche capabilities that civil authorities cannot be expected to develop (at least on a significant scale). Despite significant investment in civilian capabilities over recent years, capability gaps will endure where the military could add to their current contribution: Command and control at scale and on a pan regional basis. Developing a common operating picture during a crisis. Urban Search and Rescue. Providing transport and logistics at scale. Specialist engineering. Military Resilience Units / Groups, small C2 and logistic support hubs to which other capabilities could be attributed and which would be tailored to meet the demands of a specific situation.

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HEADLINE DEDUCTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS UK Resilience UK Military/Civil Integration. Regional UK engagement must: Be delivered at the 1* level; in a regional context; and as a command function with the authority and resources to achieve effect. Have the ability to develop and sustain a deep and profound understanding of the region. Have boundaries coincident with local authority / regional boundaries and operate from within the region for which they have responsibility. Support brigades with regional responsibilities with a superior 2* HQ that links with the Army HQ / departmental policy branches, and has the capacity and competencies to ensure efficient and coherent implementation of policy and delivery of effect across regional boundaries; Be part of a coherent continuum of military civil engagement from Local Authority to Government Departments and access to those Army and Defence Policy staffs that routinely engage with such departments (Health, DWP, Education, DCLG etc). Provision of Resilience and Homeland Security. There is little formal national guidance or nationallevel requirements for homeland security; this hinders military preparation and involvement. There is an opportunity and, the study would argue, an imperative to develop a national resilience concept that is not just predicated on a bottom-up approach and involves the military. Homeland security should take its place as a relevant military task to meet increased threat, growing political demands and to allow the Army to maintain currency and competency in this area. Defence generally, and the Army specifically, is conditioned by the expeditionary focus of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and the contemporary experience of large and enduring overseas interventions of the last 20 years. There is an opportunity to develop common doctrine between the military and Civilian responders. Next Steps. Output has informed Army 2020 and will be used in the development of the Army Operating Concept (AOC).

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DEFENCE ENGAGEMENT AND CAPACITY BUILDING By 2020, what capabilities will LF require to deliver capacity building abroad and support civil emergency organisations abroad in time of crises? Defence Engagement and Capacity Building Deductions from the FCOC paper suggest that Army 2020 will require the ability to deliver capacity building and to support civil emergency organisations abroad in times of crisis. Dependent on the nature of the crisis, and in some cases potential security threats, A2020 will need to provide the means to build capacity in both military and civilian domains, and in both benign and threatening environments. The report built on the work of the Future Army Structures (Next Steps) (FAS (NS)) MACE Paper which created the Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG), by recommending a modest investment in MSSG to establish subordinate Civil-Effects Units - independent organisations able to deliver upstream prevent activity; force elements for contingency operations; training support to wider the Defence community and coherent MACE within enduring stabilisation operations. This report reinforces the findings of AW11 (Work Package 4) and other associated work, recommending the establishment of a One-Star Military Assistance and Stabilisation Group (MASG) as a centre of excellence for capacity building and the development of coherent MACE and MCB capability. Evidence from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the direction of the National Security Strategy all strongly suggest that MCB will play a pivotal role for the Army of 2020. The newly published Joint Concept Note 2/12: Future Land Operating Concept identifies the future roles of Land Forces. As part of Defence Engagement and in the context of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) has put in place an integrated cross-government strategy to address conflict issues. The paper recognises the need for upstream prevention to anticipate instability and potential triggers for conflict. Indigenous capacity-building and upstream security assistance is likely to play a key role in generating the necessary indigenous capability, mass, insight and understanding that we will need in these environments in the future. Upstream Capacity Building will be examined in the next round of AGILE WARRIOR.

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HEADLINE DEDUCTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Defence Engagement and Capacity Building Military Assistance to Civil Effect (MACE). MACE should continue to have two separate but complementary aspects: Military Support to Stabilisation a capability that is required primarily when civilians are unable to deliver civil effect in non-permissive environments. Whilst only required periodically, it is a complex area that requires experienced MACE planners and access to a broad range of civilian skill-sets. Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) a capability that is required all the time, at home and abroad, to deliver co-ordination and co-operation, between the military and civil actors. MACE capability is required across the tactical-strategic spectrum. Most pressingly, the UK needs to address: A lack of truly dedicated MACE staff in UK Formation HQs. Incoherence in the selection, training and preparation of Individual Augmentees filling MACE related posts within Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Coalition HQs. A lack of dedicated 1* and 2* CIMIC capability. Apparent incoherence and lack of clear ownership of military staff seconded to the UK Stabilisation Unit. MACE specialists are better centralised as de-centralisation has historically resulted in misemployment by formation headquarters and a loss in MACE currency. Effective MACE requires a mix of Specialist and Generalist capability. There is a requirement for Generalist Regular force elements reinforced by Reservists as well as access to Specialists most of whom are Reservists. Military Capacity Building (MCB). In an era where our exit strategies are transition strategies, MCB might arguably be the most important military activity in any future stabilisation operation. Military success in the Future/Contemporary Operating Environment is measured partially through the capability of the indigenous forces left behind to deal with the residual threats to security. MCB is strategically and operationally decisive. MCB, therefore, is core business, not a niche activity. However developing appropriate structures is only one part of the challenge: doctrine; training; and equipment need to be aligned. Effective MCB requires a mix of Specialist and Generalist capability. Next Steps. The study informed development of Army 2020 and will be used in the development of the Army Operating Concept (AOC) and Upstream Capacity Building doctrinal development.

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PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT How do we develop personnel with the mental and physical resilience required by the new Army 2020 structure; and how do we attract the right people to sustain it? People will remain the Armys strategic edge at the heart of capability. However the challenge will continue to be delivering personnel, in sufficient numbers, that are capable and motivated to meet the demands of the future. The study focussed on the emerging Army 2020 structure and the accompanying transformations being introduced by Whole Force Concept (WFC), Future Reserves 2020 (FR2020) and the New Employment Model (NEM). The framework for the study focussed on the three elements of: Attract; Develop; and Retain, and was thus focussed onto the following issues: (1) How do we recruit the sort of people we need? (2) What manning criteria do we need to be cognisant of? (3) What sort of qualifications (artisan skills) do they need? (a) Before joining? (b) During service? (4) How do we maintain resilience through Physical Development? (5) How do we identify (and manage) potential and ability to match the needs of the structure? (6) What is the optimum career progression cycle - 3 years? (7) How do we retain the ones that we need to maintain Operational Efficiency and Business Efficiency? (8) How do we give our specialist the experience that they need (during non-op periods)? (9) What is the balance required between generalist and specialist? (10) How do we develop the necessary mindset and culture? The study of future Professional Development continues and is inextricably linked to both the New Employment Model and the A2020 Study.

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HEADLINE DEDUCTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Professional Development Army of Specialists. A future Army is likely to experience a paradigm shift in which there will be a reduction in the number of generalists who have served in numerous career fields, to more career streaming and specialisation, with the associated post-graduate educational opportunities. Career Partnerships. Maintaining experience and expertise will be a challenge in the post-Afghanistan campaign era, for which a solution might be the further development of Defence Career Partnerships. This would involve a more developed relationship with civilian organisations in order to maintain currency, experience and retention within the Army. Motivation. Better understanding of the motivation of potential recruits needs to be established in relation to the Offer of a career in the Army. The impact of Government changes in school leaving age (18 from 2015) and the introduction of university fees, need to be assessed. The balance between the Army being perceived as a job or profession rather than a vocation needs to be examined and the implications understood. Personnel Development Fund (PDF). For the Army to maximise the benefits that additional qualifications and training provides personnel, the Army should consider the proposal to develop a central PDF incorporating Enhanced Learning Credits (ELC), Standard Learning Credits (SLC) and Resettlement funds.

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Any comments on the content of this report should be addressed to: Lt Col Charlie Barker RA SO1 Force Development 2 Directorate of Force Development Force Development and Training Command Army Headquarters Blenheim Building Marlborough Lines Monxton Road Andover Hampshire SP11 8HT Mil Tel: 94393 6360 Civ Tel: 01264 886360 Mil e-mail: DFD-FD2-SO1@mod.uk Civ e-mail: charles.barker295@mod.uk
Design: Design Studio, Army Headquarters, ADR000990