HAZID WORKSHEET

Project Node Description Date of HAZID Study

: ANOA PHASE 4 - AGX COMPRESSION RECONFIGURATION PROJECT : DLB Activities in the vicinity and moored alongside AGX Platform : 25 May 2012 Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures) 1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 2. Reliable / maintained work boat 3. Weather limit 4. Adequate illumination of work area 5. Trained work boat operation 6. Maintain good communication 7. JSA for work boat operation 8. FRC/MOB Boat ready at all time 9. Suitable PPE: include work vest

No 1

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Consequences 5

Initial Risk S L 2 R HR

Residual Risk S 1 1 L R LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

Anchor Handling Work Boat collision with Boat damage / lost boat the platform / AHT Personnel injury (Running Messanger Line Under the Bridge) using Work Boat

3 Running Anchor Lost control of wire due Damage to redundant umbilical / subsea structure / Anchor Wire to failure of comunication or control system

MR

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 2. DP Vessel as AHT 3. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with MWS approval) 4. Competence Vessel Captain 5. Maintain good communication between Anchor Tower and AHT 1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 2. JSA for Anchor Handling 3. Weather limit for Anchor Handling 4. Parachute Buoy 5. DP Vessel as AHT 6. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with MWS approval) 7. Competence Vessel Captain 8. Maintain good communication between Anchor Tower and AHT 9. Weather limit 10. Briefing about the facility for all Vessel Captain including the location of risers 11. Secondary AHT standby in the field at all time

LR

AHT collision with the platform / complex

Damage to vessel or complex (damage to riser) Personnel injury Schedule delay

HR

LR

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards Drop/Drag Anchor on Subsea Facility

Consequences Damage Subsea Facility Environmental HC Discharge Potential fire/explosion Company reputation 5

Initial Risk S 3 L R HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S 1 L R LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

1. Subsea / Seabed Survey DONE 3 2. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure and Approved Anchor Pattern 3. Anchor on Deck of AHT 4. Mooring Analysis 5. BMS/Survey Equipment Calibration 6. Pull test the anchors 7. Continue anchor wire tension monitoring by Anchor Tower 8. Shut Down & Depressurize West Lobe line 9. Compliance with POI Marine Procedure

DLB Approach / Final Departure of AGX

DLB colission with platform and riser

Damage to both DLB and 5 Platform Personnel injury / Lost of life Schedule delay Environmental impact

HR

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 3 (Step by Step DLB Approach to AGX) 2. Weather limit 3. Maintain good communication with all parties 4. Final approach only after all anchors are installed / laid and DAY Light only. 5. Shut Down the platform and Depressurize West Lobe line during Final Approach 6. AGX Riser is inside the Jacket 7. Responsible person on DLB monitoring the gangway tip during final approach 8. Minimize personnel on AGX during DLB final approach 9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist for the DLB Final Approach to AGX 10. Anchor removal for final departure is the reverse of anchor installation. (Meeting will be performed with relevant parties including MWS for removal anchors).

LR

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No 4

Type of Event DLB Crane Operation

Potential Hazards

Consequences 5

Initial Risk S L 4 R HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S 1 L R MR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

Dropped loads / objects Damage asset causing HC on Topside of AGX / leak Subsea Facilities Personnel injury Schedule delay Environmental delay

1. Approved Lifting Procedure 4 2. Certified and good condition Crane (include MWS inspection/approval) 3. Certified and good condition Rigging 4. Certified and experienced Crane Operator and Rigging Personnel 5. Maintain good communication among parties involved 6. All lift within the SWL of the crane / rigging 7. Weather limit 8. Stay clear from load 9. Suitable PPE

Crane Boom collision Damage asset causing HC with the AGX Topside leak and/or with Other Crane Personnel injury Schedule delay

HR

1. All Cranes will be under the control of the 3 Project (CTR). 2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift 3. Good illumincation 4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations (SIMOPS) 5. Detail planning meeting for Crane Operations 6. Trained and experienced Crane Operator and Rigging Personnel 7. Maintain good communication among all involved parties

LR

Crawler Crane fall over the side due to bad weather related during lifting (overloaded / dynamic load)

Damage asset causing HC 3 leak / Environmental impact Personnel injury Schedule delay

MR

1. Weather limit 2. Barge rails in place 3. Certified and good condition crane 4. Certified and good condition rigging equipment 5. Certified and experienced Crane Operator and Rigging Personnel 6. Operate cranes within the design limit

LR

1. Risk Assessment to be Timas/POI performed for using the Crawler Crane for Personnel Transfer related to the visibility (ability of the Crane Operator to see the FROG)

2. Review Crawler Crane Operation Procedure

Timas

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No 5

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Consequences Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release 1

Initial Risk S L 1 R LR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S 1 L R LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

Ignition Source DLB Exhaust on DLB - Gas Release (10mm hole on Gas-Gas Exchanger) with 20knots wind speed toward the DLB

1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD 1 Forward. 2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation) 3. F&G and ESD System on AGX 4. ERP Procedures 5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

Electrical Equipment on Increase risk of DLB (Lights, Etc) Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

LR

1. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger 1 is +16 elevation) 2. F&G and ESD System on AGX 3. ERP Procedures 4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 5. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 6. Switch off the light on Crane Boom during the Day Light 7. Weather proof lighting/electrical system on the barge deck and crane boom 8. DLB can be pulled / winched away (winch speed approx 60m per minute) 9. Construction activities around process area controlled by PTW asper integrated project plan 10. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

LR

Explore the possibility to Timas switch off the lights and other ignition source on crane

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards Crawler Crane Exhaust

Consequences Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release 1

Initial Risk S 1 L R LR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S 1 L R LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60 1 meters away 2. Crawler Crane Exchaust is fitted with Spark Arrestor 3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation) 4. F&G and ESD System on AGX 5. ERP Procedures 6. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 7. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

Welding Machines on DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

LR

1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are 1 located on DLB are 60m away from the platform. 2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding leads to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding machines on DLB. 3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation) 4. F&G and ESD System on AGX 5. ERP Procedures 6. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 7. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 8. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

LR

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards Hot Works on DLB

Consequences Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release 1

Initial Risk S 1 L R LR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S 1 L R LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered 1 by PTW 2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding machines on DLB. 3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation) 4. F&G and ESD System on AGX . ERP Procedures 5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

COMMENT: The probability (frequency) of having leaks will be further elaborated (POI)

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No 6

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Consequences Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release 1

Initial Risk S L 1 R LR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S 1 L R LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

Ignition Source DLB Exhaust on DLB - Gas Release (100mm hole on Gas-Gas Exchanger) with 20knots wind speed toward the DLB

The release of HC with 100mm hole is 1 demonstrated to unlikely because: 1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process. 3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS 4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south 5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would occur the severity would be less. Additional Safeguards: 1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD Forward. 2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation) 3. F&G and ESD System on AGX 4. ERP Procedures 5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB NOTE: based on 100mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB Exhaust.

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Consequences 5

Initial Risk S L 1 R HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S 1 L R MR

REC # 4

Recommendation

Action Party

Electrical Equipment on Increase risk of STERN of DLB (Lights, Fire/Explosion in the event Etc) of HC release

The release of HC with 100mm hole is 4 demonstrated to unlikely because: 1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process. 3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS 4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south 5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be less. Additional Safguards are: 1. F&G and ESD System on AGX 2. ERP Procedures 3. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 4. Close water tight doors on the crane tub 5. Portable Multi Gas Detector on the Stern of DLB. 6. Any lifting over the process during the SIMOPS shall be covered by PTW, Risk Assessment.

Requirement of Multi Gas Timas Detector on the STERN of DLB to be captured in Project Procedure

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards Crawler Crane Exhaust

Consequences Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release 5

Initial Risk S 1 L R HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S 1 L R MR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

The release of HC with 100mm hole is 4 demonstrated to unlikely because: 1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process. 3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS 4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south 5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be less. Additional Safguards are: 1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60 meters away 2. F&G and ESD System on AGX 3. ERP Procedures 4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 5. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 6. Crane Crawler will be shut down upon the detection of Gas Release after operation is secured.

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards Welding Machines on DLB

Consequences Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release resulting: - Personnel injury - Asset damage 5

Initial Risk S 1 L R HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S 1 L R MR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

The release of HC with 100mm hole is 4 demonstrated to unlikely because: 1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process. 3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS 4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south 5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be less. Additional Safguards are: 1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are located on DLB are 60m away from the platform. 2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding machines on DLB. 3. F&G and ESD System on AGX 4. ERP Procedures 5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 7. Refer to Technical Note for Control of Welding Machines Isolation 8. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the DLB.

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards Hot Works on DLB

Consequences Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release resulting: - Personnel Injury - Asset Damage 5

Initial Risk S 1 L R HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S 1 L R MR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

The release of HC with 100mm hole is 4 demonstrated to unlikely because: 1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process. 3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS 4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south 5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be less. Additional Safguards are: 1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered by PTW 2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding machines on DLB. 3. F&G and ESD System on AGX 4 ERP Procedures 5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention 7. Portable Gas Detector on STERN of DLB

Emergency (Fire) Fire as Ignition Source and its Impact to the on DLB Safety of the Platform Complex

Increase Risk of Fire on Platform (AGX) if there is concurrent HC Release

LR

1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the 1 Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per minute). 2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on the DLB 3. ERP 4. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the DLB. NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

LR

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Emergency (Fire) on DLB

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards Helicopter Emergency on DLB

Consequences Increase Risk of Fire on Platform (AGX) if there is concurrent HC Release 2

Initial Risk S 2 L R LR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S 1 L R LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the 1 Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per minute). 2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on the DLB 3. ERP 4. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the DLB. NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

Failure of Main Generator / Black Out on DLB

DLB cannot pull away in case required

LR

1. Redundancy of Generators 2. Emergency Power Generator 3. Fail Safe Brake on the anchor winches 4. AHT / Tow Tug standby in the field at all time 5. PM System on DLB

Process Upset on AGX

Increasing Flaring Rate Increase Radiant Heat in the 2 due to Blow Down Event vicinity of AGX Crane NOTE: No Effect anticipated to the DLB based on Flare Radiation Study

LR

1. Radiant Heat Study for AGX shows that it 1 is safe for the Crane Operator to be inside the Crane Cabin during Full Process Blow Down. 2. Proximity of DLB Crane Operator is farther from the Flare Tip therefore impact of Radiant Heat is minimal.

LR

ESD Event Causing Creates changes in Process 2 AGX Process Instability System Pressure, Temperature, and Liquid Inventory which could lead to an increase potential for HC release

LR

1. Process System is designed to fail safe 1 2. Process is continuosly monitored from CCR 3. Process System will be maintained and functional with no significant case to operate in place during SIMOPS 4. Contingency Plan in place such that AGX Project Team will be asked to leave AGX until ESD event has been rectified 5. COntingency Plan in place such that HOFO will communicate potential for escalation to DLB such that preparation may made for DLB withdrawl from AGX vicinity.

LR

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards Gas Release Anoa Riser

Consequences Fire / Explosion Personnel Injury 5

Initial Risk S 2 L R HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures)

Residual Risk S 1 L R HR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

1. Mitigation as per CTO Procedure 5 2. F&G System on AGX 3. ERP Procedures 4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated 5. DLB can be pulled / winched away to clear from platform (winch speed approx 60m per minute)

Helicopter Operation on DLB

Interference with Crane Helicopter collision with 4 Operation Cranes / Crash Personnel injury / Lost of life

HR

1. Crane Operations on DLB will be shut down and/or crane boom would be clear for Helicopter Operations 2. Trained and experienced HLO 3. Inform Crane Operators of Incoming Helicopters 4. ERP

LR

10 Vessel Movement / alongside on DLB

Collision with the DLB / Platform / Material Barge / Anchor Buoy / Anchor Wire

Asset damage 4 Personnel injury / Lost of life Schedule delay

HR

1. Suitable Vessels (Include MWS 2 inspection/approval) 2. Competent Vessel Captain 3. Slack Anchor Wires if required 4. Good communication between paties involved 5. Weather limit 6. Adequate fendering on DLB and vessels 7. Briefing to all Vessel Captain prior to entering 500m zone 8. High Vis painted Anchor Buoys 9. Comply with POI Marine Operation Procedure 10. Establish communication with HOFO prior to entering 500m Zone and/or Marine Supertindent prior to approaching DLB 1. All Cranes will be under the control of the 3 Project (CTR). 2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift 3. Good illumincation 4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations (SIMOPS) 5. Detail planning meeting for Crane Operations

LR

11 SIMOPS Operation Between DLB Crane and AGX Crane

DLB Crane Boom collision with the AGX Crane

Damage asset Personnel injury Schedule delay

HR

LR

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Consequences

Initial Risk S L 3 R HR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures) 1. Certified and good condition Crane 2. Certified and good condition FROG 3. Certified and good condition rigging 4. Provision of safety sling 5. No personnel transfer untill the Vessel will be securely moored 6. Distance of free board between DLB and vessel is small 7. Provision of tag lines 8. Familiarization for transfer using FROG 9. Maintain good communicaton among parties involved (CO, Bunksman, and Riggers). 10. Weather limit defined for personnel transferring using FROG and Crawler Crane

Residual Risk S 2 1 L R LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

12 Personnel Transfer

Personnel being Transferred Fall from Height

Personnel injury / Lost of life 5

13 MAE on AGX/ANOA

Pool Fire on ANOA coming from ANOA 8" Riser Pipeline

Personnel injury / Lost of life 5 Impair both ANOA and AGX Muster Area

HR

1. All personnel shall muster to DLB including 5 POI Personnel 2. Corrosion Monitoring and Pigging Pipeline covered by FIMS 3. PSLL on the pipeline 4. Daily surface inspection 5. DLB will be pull / winched away 1. Level Management 2. Daily surface inspection 3. DLB will be pull / winched away 1

HR

Condensate on the sea Personnel Injury / Lost of due SKIM pile overfilled Life

MR

LR

14 N2 Operation

Extreme Temperature Personnel injury (minus 160 - minus 200 Cryogenic C) Embrittlement

MR

1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage Tanks 2. Scaffold and bunded area 3. Use of planks and tarpaulin

MR

Verify the certification of the storage tank and inspection prior to mobilization offshore

Timas / PNS

6 N2 Spill Personnel Injury Cryogenic Embrittlement 3 3 MR 1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage Tanks 2. Scaffold and bunded area 3. Use of planks and tarpaulin 3 2 MR

Review the N2 handling and storage procedure

Timas / PNS

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HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Consequences Personnel Injury Asset Damage Schedule Delay 3

Initial Risk S L 2 R MR

Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures) 1. High Vis Anchor Buoy 2. Standy By Vessels 3. Radar Watch 4. Intensity of Marine Activities would deter the 3rd Party Vessel to stay away 5. Liaison Officer onboard of DLB

Residual Risk S 3 1 L R LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

15 3rd Party Vessel Collision with the Anchor Buoy / Anchor / Security Wire

16 Sabotage

Construction Crew Increase risk of incident tempering with Platform and DLB system

MR

1. Socialization of work to the offshore construction team in advance 2. PTW, JSA, and workpacks 3. Involve operation team during work pack review and execution of the works 4. Maintain positive working environment, provide motivation 5. Restriction to sensitve areas (security measures) e.g. safety / warning signs, socialize restricted areas during meeting/awareness, Access Control 6. Maintain adequate supervision / QC 7. Reward program

LR

Operation to review the existing "security measures" and improve as required

POI

17 Communication between DLB and its Support Vessels and between DLB and AGX/ANOA

Clear Communication Method NOT established

Increase risk of miscommunication / interference leading to incident resulting to: - Personnel injury - Asset damage

MR

1. ANOA HSE Induction / Awareness 3 2. Various coordination meeting e.g. daily planning meeting 3. Provision of radio communication 4. English speaking key personnel 5. Permission to be obtained from HOFO prior to entering 500m zone 6. Permission to be obtained from Marine Superintendent for approaching DLB or entering the Anchor Pattern 7. Competent Vessel Captain 8. Briefing of all support vessels include socialization of procedures 9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist.

LR

Establish radio communication channel for all parties to minimize interference

Timas/POI

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