OUTPUTS, PROGRESS TO DATE AND PLANS TO CLOSURE G3: Water Governance and Community Based Management Ganges Basin

Development Challenge

PRESENTATION
1. Reminder on our objectives 2. G3 research activities
Overall puzzle: description of the activities, outcomes Experimental games Preliminary results from household survey

3. Upcoming research questions

G3: Objectives
Main objective:

Better governed polders

Understand the different institutions and key actors involved in water governance in the coastal polders Understand the role of communities in such governance, conflict resolution and productive use of land and water

Suggest implementable policy suggestions for improving polder governance in Bangladesh

G3: Objectives
Understanding the actors, communities and institutions

G3: Research Questions

Is community management the best way of managing coastal polders? If so, under what circumstances does it work? If community management is indeed the way forward, what are the constraints that communities face in polder management? What kind of policies and institution are needed so that communities can participate in management of polders?

G3: Study sites

G3: Research framework and impact pathway

Activities
Data & Cases
Participatory mapping Situation analysis In-depth case studies Experimental Games Household survey WMO survey

IMPACT
Policy Analysis & Communications
Research papers Policy briefs Workshops

Contribute for building up longer term resilience among the communities who live in coastal areas in Bangladesh

Informed scientific research

Participatory Research Research Validation

Collaboration with local universities Focusing on PRA methods and inviting different opinions from different stakeholders Validation workshops

Outcomes

Policy impact

Partners
Shushilan (NGO), IWM, BAU, BWDB , LGED, consultants Regional and national policy makers Coastal communities, local government institutions

Capacity building

Polders managed in a way that helps improve food security and livelihoods

G3 RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Outputs
Desk reviews 3 Literature reviews

Water management institutions and policies Gender in water management WMOs

Partners Status

IWM, IWMI Completed

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Desk reviews

Outputs

51 FGDs 87 KIIs 9 Situation analysis reports Sushilan, IWMI Completed

Partners Status
Qualitative survey

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Desk reviews

Outputs Partners
Infrastructures mapping

9 infrastructure maps IWM

Status

Completed

Qualitative survey

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Outputs
Desk reviews

9 flooding maps 21 cropping patterns 9 canals maps IWM Completed

Partners
Infrastructures mapping

Status

Qualitative survey

Participatory maps

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Desk reviews

Official consultations

Infrastructures mapping Output

Consultation meetings

Partners IWMI
Status
Qualitative survey
Completed, but more can be done Participatory maps

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Desk reviews Output

Official 3 validation workshops consultations

Partners IWMI, Shushilan Status

Completed, but more Infrastructures will be done mapping Community consultations

Qualitative survey

Participatory maps

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Desk reviews

Official consultations

Outputs Research papers Partners IWMI

Infrastructures Completed Status mapping Community consultations

Qualitative survey

Experimental games Participatory maps

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Conflict case study Desk reviews Official consultations

Output Research report Partners BELA

Infrastructures Completed Status mapping Community consultations

Experimental games Participatory Qualitative maps survey

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Conflict case study Desk reviews Official consultations

Outputs
Gender case study Infrastructures Partners mapping

KIIs Research report

Dr Maniruzzaman Community consultations On going

Status

Experimental games Participatory Qualitative maps survey

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Conflict case study Desk reviews Official consultations

Gender case study

Infrastructures mapping

Community consultations

KII, FGD Evolution of coastal zone West Bengal case study Experimental games policies in West Bengal Participatory Qualitative Situation analysis report maps survey The Researcher Partners

Outputs

Status

On going

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Students thesis Desk reviews Official consultations 5 student thesis Community consultations Conflict case study

Output

Partners Gender BAU Infrastructures

case study Completed mapping Status

West Bengal case study Experimental games Participatory Qualitative maps survey

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Students thesis Desk reviews Official consultations Conflict case study

Gender case study

Infrastructures mapping

Household WMO survey

Community consultations

Database 1000 households Database 40 WMOs West Bengal case study Experimental Descriptive report games Participatory Qualitative Research papers maps survey Partners IWMI, Shushilan

Outputs

Status

On going

ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

Students thesis Desk reviews Official consultations

Conflict case study

Gender case study

Infrastructures mapping

Household WMO survey

Community consultations

West Bengal case study Experimental games Participatory Qualitative maps survey

Household WMO survey

HOUSEHOLD SURVEY Preliminary descriptive results

INTRODUCTION
G3: Water governance and community based management
Phase 1 Qualitative phase Focus group discussion, key informant interviews Participatory mapping Cases studies: institution, gender Situation analysis, to identify institutions livelihoods, social processes, operation and maintenance in the polders and subproject.

Deepening

Measuring

Phase 2 Quantitative phase Use findings from qualitative phase for quantitative research that models different livelihood impacts based on different governance modes and structures.

PURPOSES OF THE QUANTITATIVE SURVEY

Bring quantitative answers to our research questions Draw a comprehensive overview of the household vulnerability Focus on operation and maintenance in water management at the household and community level

DETAILED SAMPLE
Number of households Latabunia Jabusa Jainkati 104 2,267 71 Number of villages 1 2 1 Number of sampled households 40 80 36 Number of sampled villages 1 2 1

Polder 30
Polder 3 Poler 43-2F TOTAL

8462
35356 6457 52,542

44
117 12 177

280
280 284 1000

14
14 12 44

HH questionnaire
Section 1 Identification Section 2 Demography Section 3 Housing and assets Section 4 Lands Section 5 Agriculture Section 6 Aquaculture Section 7 IGA Section 8 Saving and credit Section 9 Social capital Section 10 WMO

WMO questionnaire
Section 1 Identification Section 2 Institutional features Section 3 Financial features, income Section 4 Financial features, expenses Section 5 operation and maintenance

PROJECT SITES AND DESCRIPTION

Polder Subprojects Polder 3 Agency BWDB Level of Salinity High WMOs (Yes/No) and project No informal management Yes IPSWAM Yes IPSWAM Yes- SSWRDP Yes SSWRDP Yes SSWRDP Management challenges Shrimp- paddy conflict Water logging Water scarcity Disaster vulnerability Salinity Water scarcity

Polder 30 Polder 43-2F Latabunia Jabusha Jainkathi

BWDB BWDB LGED LGED LGED

Low to Average Low High Average to High Low

FINDINGS

POVERTY LEVEL
Assets index
3 different indices has been created using Principal Component Analysis to capture the wealth level of each HH

Housing Index - - - using material of roof, floor, toilet, tube-well Domestic Asset Index - - - using information about 20 household items like radio, sewing machine, table etc. Productive Asset Index - - - using information about 22 productive assets like tube-well, pump, livestock etc.

Next for each index the 33rd & 66th percentile is identified based on the whole sample. Used to create a discrete index with 3 levels

POVERTY LEVEL
Assets index Cont
Housing Index
100%

Polders 30 & LT fare very badly ; while JB AND 43 do quite well at housing index.

Group 3 50% 0% Group 2 Group 1

TOTAL

Jabusha

Jainkati

Latabunia

Polder 3

Polder 30

Polder 43-2F

Clear ranking : JB>3>JK>30>LT>4 3

100%

Domestic Assets Index

Group 1 = Very Good Group 2 = Not so good not so bad Group 3 = Bad

Group 3 50% 0% TOTAL Jabusha Jainkati Latabunia Polder 3 Polder 30 Polder 43-2F Group 2 Group 1

Agricultural and Productive Assets Index

100% 50% 0% TOTAL Jabusha Jainkati Latabunia Polder 3 Polder 30 Polder 43-2F

Surprisingly JK & LT are best ; 30 & 43 are also just slightly behind, while 3 & JB lags behind
Group 3 Group 2 Group 1

LAND
Land holding distribution
Small farmer (< 2.49) 3.91 15.75 2.53 10.13 8.33 5.56 Medium farmer (2.5 - 7.49) 12.5 4.32 15.11 Large farmer (> 7.5) 4.64 20

Latabunia has a lower proportion of small farmers although it is one of the poor polders

1.41 13.73

25

80.34

87.34

86.11

62.5

80.58

75.36

84.86

TOTAL

Jabusha

Jainkati

Latabunia

Polder 3

Polder 30

Polder 43-2F

Area measured in acres

120

Average number of plots per HH varies from 3 - 4.5 The most important cropping season is Kharif-2
Intensivity of plot use

% of plots cultivated

100 80 60 40 20 0 Total Jabusha Jainkati Latabunia Polder 3 Polder 30 Polder 43-2F

3 seasons
2 seasons 1 season

AGRICULTURE & AQUACULTURE

Importance of Agriculture and Aquaculture
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% TOTAL JB JK LT 3 Agriculture Agriculture and aquaculture 30 43 No agriculture, no aquaculture Aquaculture

Latabunia is totally dependent on agriculture + aquaculture, while Jabusa has least dependence

Aquaculture is important for polders 3 & 30, while 43 & LT has some No aquaculture activities in JK & JB

Water problems while practicing agriculture

120 100 80 60 40 20 0 3 30 43 JB JK LT Total 100% 80%

Aquaculture activities across polders

yes
no

60% 40% 20% 0% 3 Bagda Golda 30 mixed fish 43 other fish/crab LT

Except for JB, in all the polders approximately 20% of the people face water problems

3% 3%

JB
3%

5%

Cropping pattern across polders

6% Aman 60% Aus

5%

1% 1%

26%

44% 28% 9% 1%

1%
5% 2%

2%

11%

Betel Boro

LT
5% 2%

4% 43% 5% Chilli Lentil/Masur Oilseeds 34% Chickling etc.

30

7%

46%

95%

11% 10% 2%

Other Veg Other crops

1%
3% 6% 4%

6%

JK
4% 6% 10% 43% 27% 6% 4%

Potato
1%

43
1% 1%

Aman rice is the most important crop, across all polders. Polder 43 & JK are most diversified in terms of crop production , whereas Latabunia is at the other extreme with just two crops.

Sesame
4%

3% 7%

35% 16% 9% 3%

20%

INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES across Gender

Significant difference in yearly income earned from other activities between male (BDT 75530) and female(BDT 32543). Female participation is less in High Income Generating Activities like Trade & Services. Female participation in terms of numbers is highest in Poultry, Sewing, Agricultural Labourer, Cash for Work, NGO and Petty commerce, which are the Low income generating activities Across Polders, daily labour seems to be the main source of IGA. However, in JB since it is close to industrial area trade and service are main sources. Activities done per HH=1.333 42% Males & 7.6% Females are involved in IGA

SOCIAL GROUP : Participation

% of HHs that participate in different Social Groups No. of Groups 0 >0
3 64 36 30 59 41 43 65 35 JB 63 37 JK 33 67 LT 33 67 Total 61 39

Group membership across Polder Water Related Political Party Youth/Sport NGO Others

17

17 48 6 7 23 30

6 61 2 6 25 43

0 42

11 22 22 3 42

12

57

68 0 24 JB

0 58

53
7 6 22 Total

13 10 3 3

JK

LT

Participation in social group among females (8.81%) is significantly less than that among males (12.21%) In social groups influencial positions like president , secretary , etc are mostly held by male members NGOs dominates female participation in social groups

WMO : Water related problems

Reasons for BWDB/LGED intervention across polders
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Other 100% 80% 60% 40% 20%

Water intrusion in high tide is the most common reason. Salinity is also important, specially for 30 and JB.

Extent to which problem was solved across polder

Natural disaster
River erosion Water-logging Salinity Crop damage Water intrusion in high tide

High Medium Low

0%
3 30 43 JB JK LT Total

Who should act to solve the problem?

Community people WMO 2% 9% 24% 28% 35% 2% UP BWDB LGED Other

Most Important Problem in village

Water Logging Water Scarcity Lack of irrigation Salinity Canal Siltation Sluice gate condition

30

43 16.9

JB 17.5

JK 0

LT 15 25 0 27.5 0 7.5

Total 16.7 38 5.9 7.1 7.7 7.5

11.79 23.57

47.86 24.29 47.54 31.25 22.22 1.43 9.29 3.57 2.5 10 3.93 12.86 10.36 7.39 2.82 7.39 7.39 2.5 16.25 7.5 2.5 11.11 5.56 11.11 36.11

The most important problem is water scarcity across polders followed by water logging

GATES
Who operates Gate?
Others 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 3 30 43 JB JK LT Total Several people depending on the needs Voluntary gateman living nearby Gateman appointed by gher owners Gateman appointed by committee Khalasi

Percentage of HHs doing voluntary gate work

35.0 30.0 25.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 Yes 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 3 30

Percentage of People participating

20.0
15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0

Physical participation of gate operations

Decision making in the gate operation

30

43

JB

JK

LT

Total

43

JB

JK

LT Total

CANALS AND EMBANKMENT

Condition of Gate
100% 100%

Canal Condition
100%

Embankment Condition

50%

50%

50%

0% 3 30 43 JB JK LT Total Very Good Neither Good nor Bad Very Bad

0% 3 30 43 JB JK LT Total Very Good Neither Good nor Bad Very Bad

0% 3 30 43 JB JK LT Total Very Good Neither Good nor Bad Very Bad

Monetary payment for embankment and voluntary work for canal?

Average monetary payment for canal and embankment maintenance
100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 3 30 43 JB JK LT Spend for maintainence of the Canal Spend for maintainence of the embankment 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 3 30 43 JB JK LT No of days worked voluntary last yr to maintian the canal No of days worked voluntary last yr to maintian the embankment

Av. No. of days of voluntary work for canal and embankment

CONCLUSION
Next steps .
Use Regression analysis to find out what affects the decision to participate in operation/maintenance and the willingness to pay ,at the HH level. Create and use village Level characteristics like Social capital , Income inequality and Land distribution, geographic characteristics etc. to understand the dynamics of Water governing Institutions that develop there. Understand how water related issues affect livelihood choices and create economic vulnerabilities , by using the collected data on water related problems faced by the HHs and the data on their economic activities .

Use hydrological data like salinity, level of land, etc to find out how livelihood choices, cropping pattern, etc are affected

Experimental games

EXPERIMENTAL GAMES

INTRODUCTION
Embankments constructed by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) across the entire coastal zone in the 1960s and 1970s. 1st objective: Protection for tidal surge, flood, natural calamity 2nd objective: Increasing agricultural productivity Operation and maintenance of the infrastructures is the key challenge to ensure the sustainability of the system. GoB that requires local communities to organize themselves into Water Management Organizations (WMOs) and contribute towards minor maintenance of water infrastructure. National Water Policy of 1999 (MoWR, 1999) Guidelines for Participatory Water Management, (MoWR, 2001).

RESEARCH PURPOSE To understand the factors that help or impede collection of voluntary maintenance funds from members of WMOs.

POLICY PURPOSE Improve water governance and the maintenance of the infrastructure for enhancing the productive uses of land and water resources.

MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND Water policy in Bangladesh

Before 60s
Protection by temporary and seasonal earthen Maintenance by the landlords (zamindars) Voluntary labour from their tenants. Coastal Embankment Project (CEP) No mention of participatory water management. BWDB khalashis responsible for managing and maintaining coastal embankments. Involvement of communities in design and implementation of projects introduced. Financial contribution towards maintenance not required. Late 1980s, entry of LGED in the water sector Community contribution towards maintenance tested for the first time. Realization that regular upkeep of infrastructure is the Achilles heel of entire infrastructure investments. GoB enunciated community participation as its core principle of water management through its NWP (MoWR, 1999) and GPWM (MoWR, 2001). Requirement of financial contribution by the community for maintenance

60s 80s

80s

90s

MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND Maintenance situation

Perception of the infrastructures condition 20% of the households consider the gates as being in good condition 15% of the households consider the canals as being in good condition
70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0

Very bad canal condition

Very bad gate condition

Contributions Both for LGED and BWDB data shows that maintenance funds always fall to answer to the requirements. 91% of the household did not contribute to maintain the gates in 2012 95 % of the household did not contribute to maintain the canals in 2012

MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND Institutional differences

Theoretical and empirical research shows the importance of institutions in forging cooperative outcomes (Bardhan, 2005; Agarwal, 2001; North, 1990). Importance of institution in sustainable management of common property resources (Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Baland & Platteau, 1996)

LGED
Entered the water sector in 1980s, culture of community participation was already well entrenched. Small Scale Water Resources Sector Development Project (SSWRDSP), phase I in 1994, now phases III and IV, funding support until 2017. WMCAs registered with the cooperative department. Communities contribute 4% of the capital cost of physical infrastructure. Maintenance funds , yearly audit statements

BWDB
NGOs and extension agencies for implementing community participation Declining field presence. WMGs or WMAs registered as rural cooperatives since 2008. No contribution of the WMO required at initial stage. Encouragement of the WMO for starting maintenance fund and collecting subscriptions

METHODOLOGY Public good game

Purpose of the game Designing a fictive situation to reproduce real life Understanding the determinants of contribution to maintain a public good. Understanding the willingness to contribute to common maintenance funds. Understanding the behaviours: from cooperation to free-riding

Sample Game played 18 times:

- Polder 3, polder 30, polder 31 - Latabunia, Jabusha, Bagachra-Badurgachra

5 players per game 90 players 30 rounds per game 2700 decisions

METHODOLOGY Procedure of the game

Each player has to decide the allocation of a cash amount (20, 35/10) among a common fund and private fund. The incentive for contributing in the common fund is that if the fund reaches a certain threshold (50 or 95), a payment is added (25 or 75). The common pool is then distributed between the players. The rules vary from one session to another to reflect real life conditions.

TREATMENTS
Information Initial cash Gains distribution Threshold

C
No

T1
Yes

T2
Yes

T3
Yes

T4
Yes

T5
Yes

= =
50

= =
50

=
50

=
50

50

=
95

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS Average contribution per round

14 10 12

Control 0 5

Treatment 1 10

Treatment 2 15 Rounds

Treatment 3 20

Treatment 4 25

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS Information effect

Control No information Individual variables Individual contributions Individual gains Group variable Proportion of rounds with success Contribution standard deviation, within group 11.448 26.117 0.744 5.009 Treatment 1 Information 9.442 22.702 0.533 4.174 T-test of differences (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.020)

Control Round 5 No information Individual variables Individual contributions Individual gains 12.277 27.666

Treatment 1 Round 6 Information 10.233 22.488

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS Unequal gain distribution effect

Treatment 1 Equal gains distribution
Individual variables Individual contributions Individual gains Group variable Proportion of rounds with success
Equal Endow Contribution ment

Treatment 2 Proportional gains distribution 13.224 27.842 0.777 4.005

T-test of differences (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.640)

9.442 22.702 0. 533 4.174

standard deviation,

within group

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS Inequalities in endowments effect

Treatment 1 Equal endowments Individual variables Individual contributions Individual gains Group variable Proportion of rounds with success Amount Equalcollected in the collective fund Contribution standard deviation, within group ment
Endow

Treatment 3 Unequal endowments

T-test of differences (p-value)

9.442
22.702 0.533 47.211 4.174

10.208
24.602 0.611 51.044 8.394

(0.156)
(0.010) (0.294) (0.274) (0.000)

REGRESSION ANALYSIS Model

Individual contribution Individual earning
Individual characteristics Age, sex, religion Level of education Main source of income, land size Participation and contribution

xijt = 1 R t + 2 Ii + 3 Gj + ijt
Equal Endow ment

Round characteristics Game-rules variables Past events from the game

(success, contributions, earning)

Group characteristics Number of relatives and friends Heterogeneity of the group

(sex, religion, wealth)

Institutional context

REGRESSION ANALYSIS Game variables - Results

VARIABLES Initial endowment Information Inequalities in endowments Unequal sharing of the pot Previous round unsuccessful Round, learning effect Observations R-squared (1) OLS Individual contribution 0.566*** (0.0348) -1.851*** (0.449) -2.497*** (0.753) 1.204** (0.508) 0.249*** (0.0747) -6.277*** (0.559) 2,250 0.523 (3) OLS Individual earning 0.963*** (0.0270) -3.754*** (0.871) -3.400** (1.425) 1.270 (0.901) 0.423*** (0.144) -7.717*** (0.668) 2,250 0.473

Equal Endow ment

Information has a negative and significant effect on the individual contribution as well as on the earning Endowment heterogeneity in the game design has a significant negative influence on the individual earning and contribution. Proportional distribution of the common fund has a significant and positive effect on the contributions.

REGRESSION ANALYSIS Individual variables - Results

VARIABLES Main income from agriculture Main income from aquaculture Sex, men Religion, Muslim Age Education level WMCA, WMO member Contribution in maintenance fund Land size (1) OLS Individual contribution 2.364** (0.955) 2.753*** (0.917) -0.516 (0.988) 3.768*** (0.898) 0.0539* (0.0321) 0.319*** (0.101) 0.683 (0.678) -0.497 (0.881) -0.00208** (0.000942) 2,250 0.523 (3) OLS Individual earning -2.223** (0.895) -1.500* (0.846) 0.244 (0.750) -1.711** (0.833) 0.0312 (0.0336) -0.0843 (0.0812) -1.541** (0.662) -1.400 (0.976) 0.00162 (0.00131) 2,250 0.473

Equal Endow ment

Observations R-squared

Players are drawing most of their income from agriculture or aquaculture they are contributing more to the common fund.
Age as well as the highest level of education achieved determine positively and significantly the individual contribution.

REGRESSION ANALYSIS Group variables - Results

VARIABLES (1) OLS Individual contribution (3) OLS Individual earning

LGED sub-project
Number of relative in the group Number of close friend in the group Same religion within the group Standard deviation of land size Group of men Constant Observations R-squared

2.376*** (0.876) -1.073** (0.418) -0.312 (0.405) 0.767 (0.902) 0.00177 (0.00141) 0.765 (0.781) -7.898*** (2.250) 2,250 0.523

2.637*** (0.831) 0.641 (0.475) 0.718 (0.450) -0.304 (0.841) 0.00189 (0.00132) 1.452* (0.731) 7.467*** (2.264) 2,250 0.473

Equal Endow ment

Group composition in terms of gender, religion or wealth doesnt have any significant effect on the individual contribution. The more a player is surrounded by relatives in his group, the less he contributes. Players from LGED villages are contributing higher amounts in the common fund than other players whatever are the individual, group and game characteristics.

MAIN RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Principal users and beneficiaries of the infrastructures should be targeted first for contributing.

2. Homogeneous groups would contribute more and maintain their infrastructure better.
But: How to create homogeneous groups in heterogeneous villages? Solution: Membership conditions Ex: In some WMOs, only landowners can be members.

3. Contributions are higher when there are related benefits.

Equal Endow ment

But: In reality, benefits are not related to the contributions. Solution: Introducing benefits for members, even if not related to water Ex: In some WMOs, access to micro-credit for members, fishing rights

4. Strong institutions support individual contributions for maintenance.

Institutions created by the community itself Involvement at the early stage of the project, create an ownership, a willingness to cooperate in the future.

REMAINING RESEARCH QUESTIONS

G3: Water Governance and Community Based Management Ganges Basin Development Challenge

How to do expenses?
We can improve the collection of funds for maintenance at the community level. But: How to ensure that the funds will be used for maintenance? The problem: In some WMCAs with ability to collect funds and to generate incomes, the infrastructures are not really in better condition because the funds are not allocated to maintenance. Reasons: Preference for the present Corruption Project cycle: minor reparation will become major and will be solved

What is behind institutions?

We notice that institutions matters: Villages from LGED subprojects contribute more for maintenance. What are these institutions? Where does it come from? Social trust among the community members? Commonality of interest? Long term interactions? Community involvement? Leaders, influential people? How to create better institutions for a better water governance?

How socio-economic factors and hydro-ecological factors interact?

How the hydro-ecological situation within the coastal zone determines the livelihoods and the adaptation strategies of the households? Is the geography of the coastal zone a constraint or an opportunity for the farmers? How households implement adaptation strategies and which are the constraints they face?

DATA GIS data from G1, G4 Socio-economic data from G3

Thank you