Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
By : MSd
Oct. 2004
Philosophy
ECPL believes that Process hazards analysis (PHAs) shall be conducted on regular basis to Identify, Evaluate and Develop methods to control significant hazards associated with Highly Hazardous Processes (HHP) and Lower Hazard Operations (LHO).
Oct. 2004
To assure that hazards of "catastrophic and major" Safety or Environmental Consequences are:
Oct. 2004
Training
Concept
Oct. 2004
What is Risk?
Risk =
or
Oct. 2004
Consequence
Hazard
Oct. 2004
Consequence
Consequence
Hazard
Oct. 2004
High
Medium
2 3 Consequence
8
Annual PHA planning. Conduct PHA (including consequence analysis), Documentation and Follow up.
Oct. 2004
Team
Oct. 2004
10
Consequence Analysis
Consequence Analysis - Based on scientific and empirical information. Estimate a range of potential release quantities including worst case. Estimate down wind effects, concentration for toxic, heat effects for ignition and overpressure for explosives. Estimate impact on on-site and off-site people and their environment. Documentation of Consequence Analysis includes reasons for Worst Case Scenario Selection, Methods used and Assumptions made.
11
Oct. 2004
Process Hazard Review (PHR) shall be conducted using one of following 04 methodologies.
What If / Checklist Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
Oct. 2004
12
Deviation
Cosequence
Legends
What / If Checklist
Strengths
Covers a broad range of hazards Requires little prior training Is effective as a learning tool Challenge design
Limitations
Oct. 2004
Select the process segment to be studied. List the worst case consequence and other hazardous events. Generate a list of "what if" questions
Do not discuss answers There are no dumb questions. Cover all parts of process segment.
Use checklist to prompt additional questions. Review human factor and inherently safer processes checklists. Assign questions to individuals to develop responses. Develop responses to all questions Ensure that team reaches a consensus on all questions Summarize the recommendations, highlighting the high priority items.
15
Oct. 2004
HAZOP
Strengths
Limitations
Oct. 2004
More Of
high flow
Less Of
low flow Low temp
As well AS
contaminants
Other Than
wrong material
low pressure too short too soon misses a step steps backward action missed wrong time
Oct. 2004
17
HAZOP Method
Oct. 2004
18
FMEA
Strengths
Limitations
Oct. 2004
19
FMEA Method
Recommended for analysis of small segments Select process segment to be studied List the worst case consequence
Describe the system in drawing Describe each component and number it.
Oct. 2004
FMEA Method
Develop approximate ranking of events Evaluate adequacy of existing process safe guards Identifies hazards that may require Fault tree analysis Document review findings Assign a "Hazard rating" to each failure Assign a "Probability of failure rating" to each failure. Calculate "criticality" for each failure List the curent protection against failure Determine whether additional protection is needed for high criticality items Review human factor Make recommendations where needed
Oct. 2004
21
Strengths
Defines various routes to top event Quantifies probability of reaching top event Analyze combination of events Analyzes human error
Limitations
Oct. 2004
FTA Method
The Undesired event is placed at the top of the tree The possible causes of top event are portrayed in the form of tree in reverse order
Oct. 2004
23
The possible harmful effects of each event versus The current protection and Decides on whether additional protection is needed.
For each hazardous event identified, the PHA team shall document:
Consequence (C1 C4) Frequency rating (F1 F4) and A risk level (1 IV) Inherently Safer Process Human factors if the process in a HHP Facility Siting"
24
Oct. 2004
Recommend ation
Get the seal replaced with double mechanical seal design None
Oct. 2004
Recycle valve on standby pumps kept open. NH3 cannot go back thru pump
C-4 Death or irreversible health effects. Liability for injury + damages more than $ 1 MM. One or more fatalities or irreversib le health effects.
Not realistically expected to occur Not expected to occur, but not incredible
F-3 Unlikely
F-4 Likely
Unlikely to occur in the plants lifetime, but 10-2 to 10 -3 could occur in one of number of similar plants May occur at least once in the life time of the > 10-2 installation
Frequency category
Increasing likelihood
IV IV IV IV C-1
II III IV IV C-2
Oct. 2004
26
Recommendations are made based on Risk Score for each and every identified risk. PHA recommendations shall be reviewed and approved by Sub SOC Case of Substantial Cost and / or Risk of noncompliance is very high are also reviewed in Sub SOC(P/M) & SOC. PHA report completion and circulation responsibilities lie with the sponsor (Operations Unit Managers / Relevant Section Head) Follow up on recommendations is done by Unit Manager.
27
Oct. 2004
PHA Follow up Coordinator is Safety Advisor. PHA follow up lists are issued monthly by Site Safety Advisor. Completed PHA Recommendations are filed for the life of facility. Training of employees on the PHA methods would be conducted periodically - record kept. The Emergency Response Coordinator is responsible for follow up of risk analysis reviews related to Emergency 28
Oct. 2004
Closing Recommendations
Oct. 2004
29
Frequency
18
13
1
324
Consequence
When the team considers risk and concludes that a recommendation is appropriate, the recommendation should be specific and accomplishable. Do Not make make recommendations to study, consider or investigate a situation. The team should do any investigation needed, except in cases where a long range investigation by an expert is needed.
31
Oct. 2004
Questions.
Oct. 2004
32