The Use of

Leading Indicators
to measure the performance of the Occupational Health and Safety System
by: Steve Oakley
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bjectives
At the end of this session participants will understand:
A common definition of leading indicators;

How to use leading indicators to measure organizational OHS performance;

How leading indicators can be used to create an OHS system or refine an 2 existing system.

esearch for Presentation

T. Krause U.S. Consultant/Author J. Reason U.K. University of Manchester Psychology Transportation Consultant /Author D. Petersen U.S. Consultant/Author A. Sefton U.K. HSE - Offshore Safety Division R. Flin U.K. University of Aberdeen
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ndicate
To point out, make known, show, be a sign of, or suggest a call for treatment (Medical)

ndicator
Person or thing that points out or indicates

ead

To guide, go in front

eading Indicator
1) A measure of conditions or activities that are believed to precede, and consequently affect, injury rates.
(OHSCO)

2) A metric used for its ability to measure incremental progress, or quality, or to indicate the direction of future results (predictive). (Dupont, 2000)
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Cross Section of an Airfoil

Leading Edge

Trailing Edge
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afety Management Model

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esults-directed Indicators
Loss time case rate: Number of lost time cases x 200,000/number of hours worked
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esults-directed Indicators
Loss and restricted day rate: Number of days lost and restricted x 200,000 hours/number of hours worked
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ehaviour-directed Indicators
Frequency and Quality of: Workplace safety and loss control inspections Job safety observations

Employee safety training

Safety program audits

Employee safety meetings

(Prieskop & Woessner, 1997)

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ehaviour-directed Indicators
Frequency and Quality of: Safety communications to employees

Safety performance appraisals

Employee safety suggestions

Personal protection equipment inspections and observations

(Prieskop and Woessner, 1997)

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ehaviour-directed Indicators
Frequency and Quality of:
Safety committee meetings

Employee involvement in program implementation

(Prieskop and Woessner, 1997)

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ehaviour-directed Indicators
Timeliness of required responses to employee safety suggestions

Timeliness and quality of accident/incident investigations

(Prieskop and Woessner, 1997)

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nputs/Outcomes
Inputs
(leading indicators)

Outcomes
(trailing indicators)
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anaging for Outstanding Safety

Line Ownership of Safety Safe Equipment & Physical Environment Outstanding Safety Performance Safety Aware, Trained & Committed Workforce

Management Vision, Commitment & Drive

Involvement in Safety Activities, Training Comprehensive Safety Systems & Practices

Safety Organization, Specialists

Begin with the end in Mind Process Implementation

Short Term Outcomes

Long Term Outcomes 18

afety
Concerned with injury causing situations Concerned with hazards to humans that result from sudden severe conditions
(Goetsch, 1993)

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ealth
Concerned with disease causing situations Deals with adverse reactions to prolonged exposure to dangerous, but less intense hazards.
(Goetsch, 1993)

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There are probably more occupational health fatalities than safety fatalities, but the statistics will not reflect this difference because the health fatalities are delayed and are often never diagnosed.
(Asfahl, 1999)

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The most valid method of achieving sustainable, long-term results is to steer a facilitys safety efforts by a variety of behaviour-based indicators, in judicious combination with accident frequency.
(Krause et al, 1991)

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ive Indicators Worth Measuring

1) Frequency of observation 2) Percentage of actions rated as safe

3) Safety related maintenance information 4) Safety climate surveys

5) Accident frequency
(Krause et al, 1991)

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ix Quality & Safety

Constancy of purpose develop long term strategies and stick to them Process, not program

Do it right the first time

Do not blame the employees Specify standards in operational terms
(Krause et al, 1991)

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ix Quality & Safety

Use measurement of upstream factors to assess performance

Improve the process, not the downstream results Use statistical techniques to distinguish variation due to common cause from variation due to special cause
(Krause et al, 1991)

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azards, Defences & Losses

Defences

DANGER

Losses

Hazards

(Reason ,1997)

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ynamics of Accident Causation

Local triggers Intrinsic defects Atypical conditions
Latent failures at the managerial levels

Psychological precursors Unsafe acts

Trajectory of accident opportunity

Defence-in-depth
(Reason, 1990)

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atent Conditions are Important

1) They undoubtedly combine with local factors to breach defences. In many cases, they are weakened or absent defences. 2) Resident pathogens within the workplace and the organization can be identified and removed before the event. 3) Local triggers and unsafe acts are hard to anticipate and some proximal factors are almost impossible to defend against (for example, forgetfulness, inattention).
(Reason ,1997)

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Thus, despite their inherent problems, identifying and eliminating latent conditions proactively still offer the best routes to improving system Fitness. But it has to be a continuous process. As one problem is being addressed, others will spring up in its place. There are no final victories in the safety war.
(Reason, 1997) 29

Only if the managers of a system had complete control over all the possible accident-producing factors couldaccident rates be linked directly to the quality of safety management. The large random component in accident causation means the safe organizations can still have bad accidents, and unsafe organizations can escape them for long periods.
(Reason, 1997) 30

ountervailing Currents within the Safety Space

Increasing resistance Increasing vulnerability

Very Safe

Currents acting
within the safety space

Very Unsafe

(Reason, 1997)

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afety Management
The only attainable goal for safety management is: To reach that region of the safety space associated with maximum resistance.

To stay in that region by sustaining the improvement.

(Reason, 1997) 32

avigating the Safety Space

Increasing resistance Increasing vulnerability

Driving Forces

Very
Safe

Target Zone

Very
Unsafe

Commitment Competence Cognisance

Navigational Aids Reactive Proactive outcome process measures measures

(Reason, 1997) 33

eactive & Proactive Measures

Reactive Measures
Local &
Organizational Conditions Analysis of many incidents can reveal recurrent patterns of cause and effect.

Proactive Measures
Identify those conditions most needing correction, leading to steady gains in resistance of fitness.

(Reason, 1997)

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eactive & Proactive Measures

Reactive Measures Proactive Measures
Regular checks reveal where holes exist now and where they are most likely to appear next.

Defences, Barriers &

Safeguards

Each event shows a partial or complete trajectory through the defences.

(Reason, 1997)

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roactive Process Measurement

Proactive Channels Unsafe Acts 1

Local Workplace Factors

Safety Information System

Organizational Factors

(Reason, 1997)

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nvestigation of Organizational Accidents

Defences

DANGER
Losses

Hazards

Latent Condition Pathways

Unsafe Acts

Causes Investigation

Local Workplace Factors

Organizational Factors
(Reason, 1997) 37

Cross Section of an Airfoil

Latent Conditions Organizational Factors Local Workplace Factors Unsafe Acts Defences

Leading Edge

Trailing Edge
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rimary Process Subsystems

Safety-specific factors

Training
Management factors CULTURAL FACTORS

Training
Procedural factors

Training

Commitment Competence Cognisance Training

Technical factors
(Reason, 1997) 39

afety Management Systems (SMS)

Measuring indicators selected from the inputs to the safety management system requires a change in the way of thinking. Companies who put greater effort into developing their SMS have better performance and this effort rubs off profitably onto other business systems.
(Sefton, 2000)

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evels for Benchmarking

Leading indicators show company managers that an effective system exists to put the lessons learned from accidents, incidents and near misses into practice.
(Sefton, 2000)

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evels for Benchmarking

Leading indicators populate the management system as a whole to demonstrate a positive safety culture exists within the organization.
(Sefton, 2000) 42

evels for Benchmarking

A virtuous cycle exists in which teams develop their own indicators to grow and learn. Accident and incident statistics are trending to zero.
(Sefton, 2000)

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easurement of Safety Performance

Leaders in safety performance use metrics that effectively drive their continuous improvement efforts.

Leading indicators (e.g., observations) are used to predict changes in safety performance. Monitor safety performance versus program implementation at all sites.
(Petersen, 1996)

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easurement of Safety Performance

Performance targets are defined and communicated. Review targets based on feedback from staff, metrics and benchmarking. Safety performance targets should align with business targets.
Petersen, 1996

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easurement of Safety Performance

Safety performance (operational) should be tied to bonuses and merit pay; this is consistent among leaders in business.

(Petersen, 1996)

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easurement of Safety Performance

Discipline is consistent with welldeveloped guidelines. Leading companies ensure in depth root cause analysis of accidents in formulating disciplinary actions.
(Petersen, 1996) 47

Trailing indicator data generally provide limited answers about relationships between causes and effects, so only broad accident preventive measures can be taken. Checklists and analyses are more suitable, detailed, and effective for safety accomplishments.
(Hammer & Price, 2001) 48

afety Management Systems

In the book Safety Management Systems the author advocates doing what many organizations fail to do: 1) Establish and apply a coherent set of measures of safety performance; 2) Link the set of safety performance measures coherently to the set of business performance measures.
(Waring, 1996) 49

agging/Leading Indicators
In recent years there has been a movement away from safety measures purely based on retrospective data, or lagging indicators such as fatalities, lost time accident rates and incidents, towards so called leading indicators such as safety audits or measurements of safety climate.
(Flin et al, 2000) 50

eading Indicators
The most common themes assessed in safety climate questionnaires are:
Management/supervision

Safety system
Risk

Work pressure
Competence
(Flin et al, 2000) 51

tress
While organizations have traditionally emphasized stress management, the emerging focus includes stress abatement, cutting off negative stress at the source.
(Pratt, 2001) 52

trategies for Preventing Workplace Stress Align workloads with workers capabilities and resources Design stimulating, meaningful jobs

Define workers roles and responsibilities clearly

Give workers the opportunity to participate in decisions about their jobs
(Pratt, 2001) 53

trategies for Preventing Workplace Stress

Improve communications Provide opportunities for social interaction among workers

Establish work schedules that are compatible with demands and responsibilities outside the job
(Pratt, 2001) 54

tress Can Lead to Incidents/Injuries

Certain stressors in the workplace can contribute to accidents and injuries by making people, to one degree or another:

Sleep badly Over-medicate themselves Drink excessively

(Health Canada, 2001) 55

tress Can Lead to Incidents/Injuries

Feel depressed Feel anxious, jittery and nervous

Feel angry and reckless (often due to a sense of unfairness or injustice)

(Health Canada, 2001)

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tress Can Lead to Incidents/Injuries

When people engage in these behaviours or fall prey to these emotional states, they are more likely to: Become momentarily (but dangerously) distracted

Make dangerous errors in judgement

(Health Canada, 2001) 57

tress Can Lead to Incidents/Injuries

Fail in normal activities that require hand-to-eye coordination Put their bodies under stress, increasing the potential for strains and sprains

(Health Canada,2001)

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onclusion
OHS risk factors are often complex
Numerous causal layers provide various opportunities for anticipation, detection, monitoring and control of the risk factors Appropriate identification and action based on the use of leading indicators, will address the risk factors, improving the performance of the OHS system
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