Realism: Power and the Security

Dilemma in International Relations

PO 201: Introduction to International Studies and Political
Science

Power and Mistrust in the Realist Worldview
Last class we discussed the importance of mistrust
and power (inherent to human nature and the
individual struggle in the state of nature) to the
realist view of international relations. Today, we
expand upon our discussion of these concepts
What exactly is power? How do states get it, and
how does it determine relations amongst them?
How does the mistrust and animosity inherent in the
international system, when combined with the
importance of power, lead to war in some instances
and peace in others?
Morgenthaus Realism: Overview
IR should be concerned with two major themes: the
roots of peace, and the power politics of war. For
Morgenthau, these two concepts are inextricably
related
The main impetus for war and, for that matter, the
main impetus for peace is the constant and
omnipresent struggle for power amongst states on
the international stage
This conceptualization which inherently considers
peace to be only the absence of war is the starting
point for Morgenthaus discussion of power and IR

Morgenthaus Take on Power
Political power, for Morgenthau, is the control over the
minds and actions of others
What constitutes the capacity to wield control over the
minds and actions of other states?
Geography: Natural barriers, large amounts of buffer territory, etc.
Natural Resources: Food self-sufficiency capacity, energy
resources, military materiel resources
Industrial capacity: Enables military competitiveness, economic
stability
Population: Strength in numbers
Military Preparedness (short term): Numbers, capabilities, training
National Character/Morale: Resiliency, military ethos, patriotism,
etc.

Morgenthaus Take on Power
The optimal exercise of political power
obviates the need for the use of military
force. At the same time, however, the
only way that a state can wield political
power over others is to convince them
that it is willing and able to defeat them
militarily (roots of the balance of power)
Morgenthaus Take on Power
Therefore:
Peace results from deterrence through military strength, and NOT from
human attempts to change the qualitative nature of the international
system
In other words, the struggle for power is the result of the laws of the world in
which we live (individually, domestically, and internationally); we are incapable
of changing these laws, no matter how much we try
Like Machiavelli and Hobbes, Morgenthau believes that this results from the human
desire to dominate
Domestic and international politics differ only in degree, not in kind
Peace is thus only the result of the skillful exercise of political power, and not
of the attempts of humanity to remake the world
Americas aloofness from Europes power politics was contrary to the realities of IR
only possible because of geographic isolationism, not some moral ascendancy
If the desire for power cannot be abolished everywhere in the world, those
who might be cured would simply fall victims to the power of others
War begins mainly as a disagreement over which state holds more
political power, and is thus a failure of political power
War ends only when that disagreement is resolved through military
contest

Morgenthau, Power, and State Action
Because power is thus the currency of all politics, all state action is
geared toward three goals, each of which is entirely concerned with
power but which call for different foreign policy strategies
Power maintenance: Pursue policy of the status quo
Maintenance of the current distribution of power across states through
deterrence, coercion, agreements, etc. (Concert of Europe, Monroe Doctrine;
parallel to conservative domestic political agenda)
Power acquisition: Pursue imperialist policy
Must be geared toward restructuring of power relations by overthrow of status
quo
More likely given the existence of weaker states/politically empty spaces
Likely calls forth a policy of imperialism by vanquished
Imperialism NOT determined by economics, but politics (contra Marxism)
Power demonstration: Pursue policy of prestige enhancement
Prestige rarely an end in and of itself; it is only through a reputation for
excellence that political power can be exercised
Diplomacy is thus an important adjunct to power politics; but credibility can
only be established when military might is present to back up diplomatic
threats

What Power Does TO States
Morgenthau teaches us what power does for
states. But what power does to states both
ones own acquisition of it and the acquisition
of it by others can tell us more about when
war and peace is most likely
Specifically, given the realist notion that
individuals are inherent suspicious and
untrusting, state power is itself the root of
additional suspicion, mistrust, and ultimately
war, at the state level

What Power Does TO States
Power, however it is defined, is essential to
all realists for achieving the ultimate goal of
states in the anarchic international system
SURVIVAL (Hobbes)
However, as Morgenthau notes, the particular
distribution of power (if unfavorable in any
way) can compel states to the conquest of
others for the achievement of further security
The Security Dilemma
The essential and intractable problem that results from this state of
affairs is known as the security dilemma
Assume that a particular state seeks only to survive by pursuing a status
quo policy (which necessitates the maintenance of power)
This states possession of power no matter how much the state tries to
assure others that it is for defensive purposes only must necessarily
result in fear/suspicion on the parts of others
Main reason: The same tools that are used for status quo and prestige policies
are used for imperialist policies
Absent any enforceable guarantee against the use of force for expansion
and anarchy precludes the enforcement of any guarantee the realist
worldview stipulates that the global community is fraught with arms races
and the constant threat of both imperial and preventative war
Thus, war is likely to occur even when political reasons for war like
revenge, but even territorial disputes, etc. are absent

The Security Dilemma in History: The Peloponnesian Wars
Evidence of the security dilemma can be found in
the earliest examples of IR, as illustrated by
Woodruffs introduction to Thucydides account of
the Peloponnesian Wars
Greece, 3
rd
Century BC: Athens and Sparta dominate
Two very different city-states
Athens: Sea-faring, commerce-based, democratic, home of
the new thinking
Sparta: Land-based, self-sufficient, oligarchic, military ethos
Despite all these differences, there seem to be very few
political reasons to go to war
Thucydides only answer: the Peloponnesian Wars were
caused by Athens rise to power, and the fear that that
power caused for Sparta no more, no less

Classical Realism Recap
All of the authors addressed today believe that the key to understanding
state actions at the international level lies in a clear understanding of
human nature and the state of nature
In general, the very activities that allow for individual survival in the
anarchic state of nature allow for state survival in the anarchic interstate
system
Power as the ultima ratio; need for power as the cause of mistrust, security
dilemma
Only way to get what you want from others; only way to stop others from destroying
you in the process of getting what they want (survival and more)
The laws of power are immutable; human beings cannot change them
The mere fact that power ensures survival results in the security dilemma
Morality largely insignificant; diplomacy and agreement are merely tools of
power implementation
Peace can only result from deterrence, and is not a qualitatively different
state of affairs than war
Balances of power thus ensure peace, but such balances are delicate, as they are
always contested by those who do not benefit from them
Allows for analysts to treat states as though they are unitary actors
(individuals) in the state of nature