The Mind-Body Problem

Some Theories of Mind

Dualism
Substance Dualism: mind and body are differerent
substances. Mind is unextended and not subject to physical
laws.
Interactionism: mind and body interact
Occasionalism/Parallelism: mind and body dont interact
Property/Event Dualism
Epiphenomenalism: physical events cause mental events
but mental events dont cause anything (may not be a
substance theory)
Property Dualism:(some) mental states are irreducibly
non-physical attributes of physical substances

Some Theories of Mind

Physicalism: mental states are identical to physical states,

in particular, brain states or, minimally, supervene upon
physical states.
(Analytical or Logical) Behaviorism: talk about
mental states should be analyzed as talk about behavior
and behavioral dispositions
The Identity Theory (Type-Physicalism): mental
states are identical to (so nothing more than) brain
states
Functionalism: mental states are to be characterized in
terms of their causal relations to sensory inputs,
behavioral outputs and other mental states, that is, in
terms of their functional role.

Dualism(s)

Pro
Qualia

Con

Causal closure of the

physical

Simplicity

Irreducibility of psychology
The Zombie Argument
The Cartesian Essentialist
Argument

Descartes Arguments for Dualism

Empirical Argument
The complexity and flexibility of human behavior, including
linguistic behavior, couldnt be achieved by mere
mechanism so we need to assume some non-physical
substance as an explanation for such behavior.
Essentialist Argument
It is conceivable that ones mind might exist without ones
body
Whatever is conceivable is logically possible
Therefore, it is possible ones mind might exist without
ones body
Therefore ones mind is a different entity from ones body

The Zombie Argument

A (philosophical) zombie is a being which is a perfect

duplicate of a normal human beingincluding brain and
neural activitybut which is not conscious.

The Zombie Argument for property dualism

Zombies are conceivable
Whatever is conceivable is logically possible
(Some) mental states/properties/events are not identical
to any brain states/properties/events

Note: this argument doesnt purport to establish substance

dualism or, as Descartes wished to show, that
minds/persons could exist in a disembodied state.

Problem with Cartesian Dualism

We do not need that hypothesis: complex behavior can be

explained without recourse to irreducibly non-physical states.
Contra Descartes, purely physical mechanisms can exhibit the
kind of complex, flexible behavior, including learning (or
learning) characteristic of humans.

All physical events have sufficient causes that are themselves

physical events
Physicalism is an aggressor hypothesis: we explain more and more
without recourse to non-physical events/states
Agency explanations are eliminated in favor of mechanistic
explanationsincluding explanations for agency itself.
Claims to the effect that non-physical events cause physical
events introduces an even bigger mystery: what is the
mechanism?

Epiphenomenalism
Motivation for Epiphenomenalism
All physical events have sufficient causes that are
themselves physical events
But some mental eventsqualitative states, the what-it-islike experienceseem to be irreducibly nonphysical: it
seems implausible to identify them with brain events.
Problem: intuitively some mental states cause behavior
E. g. pain causes people to wince
Moreover, part of what we mean by pain seems to involve
an association* of with characteristic behavior
*Well leave association intentionally vague

(Philosophical) Behaviorism
Motivation
We want to hold that there are no irreducibly non-physical
causes of physical events
But we also need to accommodate the fact that what we
mean by terms designating mental states involves an
association with characteristic behavior.
Problems
Intuitively, theres more to some mental states: the problem
of qualia
Intuitively, there can be less to mental states: its
conceivable that one may be in a given state without even
being disposed to characteristic behavioror that one may
be disposed to uncharacteristic behavior
Dispositions arent causes so, while behaviorism associates
mental states with behavior, they still dont cause behavior.

The Identity Theory

Motivation
We want to hold that there are no irreducibly nonphysical causes of physical events
But we also want to understand them as inner states
that are causally responsible for behavior

Problems
Qualia again: intuitively there is more to consciousness
than brain states
Species chauvinism: if we identify a type of mental
state, e.g. pain, with a type of brain state that is
responsible for pain in humans, e.g. the firing of C-fibers,
what do we do about non-humans who dont have the
same kind of brain states but who, we believe, can
never the less have the same kind of mental states?

What a theory of mind should do

Make sense of consciousness: The Hard Problem
Avoid commitment to irreducibly non-physical states, events or
substances
Explain the causal role of mental states as
Effects of physical events
Causes of behavior
Causes of other mental events
Allow for multiple realizability in order to avoid species
chauvinism
We want to be able to ascribe the same kinds of mental states
we have to humans who may be wired differently, other
animals and, possibly to beings that dont have brains at all,
e.g. Martians, computers

Functionalism
What makes something a mental state of a particular type does
not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it
functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a
part.
Topic Neutrality: mental state concepts dont specify their
intrinsic character, whether physical or non-physicalthats a
matter for empirical investigation.
So Functionalism is in principle compatible with both
physicalism and dualism
Multiple Realizability: A single mental kind (property, state,
event) can be "realized" by many distinct physical kinds.
The same type of mental state could, in principle, be
realized by different physical (or non-physical) states
Disagreement about how liberal we should be in this regard

An Example: Pain
Were interested in analyzing or ordinary concept of pain
We understand it in terms of its causal role
As being typically produced by certain stimuli, e.g. bodily
injury
As tending to produce certain behavior, e.g. wincing
As producing further mental states, e.g. resolving to
avoid those stimuli in the future
We recognize that different kinds of physical (of nonphysical) mechanisms may play that role
Compare to other functional concepts like can opener
We leave empirical questions to empirical investigation

The Big Questions About Functionalism

Consciousness: some mental states appear to have intrinsic,

introspectable featuresand those features seem to be essential
Inverted Qualia (see Block Inverted Earth)
Zombies
The Knowledge Argument (see Jackson What Mary Didnt
Know)

Understanding: controversial whether understanding can be

reduced to the ability to mediate input and output by
manipulating symbols (see Turing Computing Machinery and
Intelligence vs. Searle on The Chinese Room

Some sly questions: Can the program of analysis be plausibly

carried through? Compare to the problem of carrying through the
phenomenalist program. And, if so, could we be stuck with
species chauvinism again?