Explaining the Arab democracy

deficit the role of oil and

conflicts
Ibrahim Elbadawi, Samir Makdisi and
Gary Milante

Prof. Ghassan Deibah

Prepared by: Mohammed Ghiath HASAN AGHA

Outline:
Introduction
Democratization in the Arab
world
Assessing the Arab democracy
deficit
Modeling the democratization
process
Results
Democracy and economic
growth

Introduction

The distance between world and Arab median polity scores

has widened dramatically, and authoritarian regimes have
thrived in the Arab region. (1960-2003).

The Arab Human Development Report (UNDP and Arab Fund

for Economic and Social Development, 2002) state that 'There
is a substantial lag between the Arab countries and other
regions in terms of participatory governance,

whether lasting economic growth equitable and sustainable

development are possible in autocratic regimes?

Introduction

The failures of Arab authoritarian regimes to sustain earlier

gains, or to at least contain mounting economic and social
crises of the Arab world, have been directly linked to the nondemocratic and non participatory nature of the regimes.

the difficulty of managing the consequences of frequent oil

shocks which affect all Arab oil and non oil-producing alike has been linked to the lack of political institutions for
mediating the conflicting interests of various social groups in a
way that ensures sustainability of growth-promoting policies
and maintenance of a basic social development agenda.

Democratization

world
The Lipset

in the Arab

hypothesis and modernization theory in

suggest that standard of living is the most robust
determinant of a
country's propensity
to
experience
democracy. While countries in the Arab world enjoyed
substantial economic growth between the 1960s and the
1980, it is puzzling that these gains have not been
associated with increased political rights.
Economic growth is necessary condition but not sufficient for
political liberalization in the Arab Countries.
The main factors driven the legitimacy were Arab
nationalism, socialism and the declared struggle to liberate
Palestine.

Democratization

in the Arab

world

The graph illustrates that the Arab world has lagged

behind the rest of developing world with little to no
progress in political representation in the past average
Arab country entered the 1960s with a polity score of
-5.3.

Democratization

world

in the Arab

Assessing the Arab democracy

deficit

To describe the state of democracy in the Arab world, we

consider three measures of democracy: the Gastil concept
of political and civil liberties embodied the Freedom
House Index; a classification system of political regimes
proposed Przeworski; and the Polity IV Index of
democracy.

The Freedom House Index measures both political and

civil liberties. Political rights refer to the extent to which
the people in a regime are able to participate in the
electoral process, including voting in free and fair
elections, participate in political parties and organizations,
competition for accountable and the impact of those
offices on public policies.

Assessing the Arab democracy

deficit

Assessing the Arab democracy

deficit

A global classification of political regime for 141

countries between 1950 and1990 using more objective
criteria was compiled by a team led by Przeworski and
detailed in Democracy and Development (Przeworski et
2000).

According to this system, a regime is classified as a

dictatorship if any of the following conditions holds: the
chief executive is not elected; the legislature is not
elected.

Polity IV Index as a measure of democracy. This measure

is somewhat more objective than the Freedom House
Index because it uses objective questions with a wider
range of measurement and more current data than the
democracy and development classifications. The Polity
IV Index is based on two concepts: 'institutionalized
democracy'
(DEM:) and
'institutionalized autocracy'
(AUT).

Assessing the Arab democracy

deficit

Modeling the democratization

process

The positive relationship between levels of development and

democracy was advanced by Seymour Lipset and expanded
upon by Robert Barro (Lipset, Barro, 1996). In this worldview,
increases in the level of income result in pressures for
democratization because a growing middle class demands
political representation to ensure that their interests are met
through the provision of public goods by the state.

The modernization variables

historical effects of colonization;

religion as a foundation for the political system;

cohesion, including its effect through system of governance;

type and breadth of social development;

oil as a source of regime-supporting finance;

regional wars, international and

international intervention through aid and strategic support

Modeling the democratization

process

The positive relationship between levels of development and

democracy was advanced by Seymour Lipset and expanded
upon by Robert Barro (Lipset, Barro, 1996). In this worldview,
increases in the level of income result in pressures for
democratization because a growing middle class demands
political representation to ensure that their interests are met
through the provision of public goods by the state.

The modernization variables

historical effects of colonization;

religion as a foundation for the political system;

cohesion, including its effect through system of governance;

type and breadth of social development;

oil as a source of regime-supporting finance;

regional wars, international and

international intervention through aid and strategic support

Results

Results

Democracy and economic growth

Democracy and economic growth

Countries with low

probabilities of 'successful
democratization' that attempt reforms and revert to
autocracy likely experience economic unrest associated
with this political reversion. Meanwhile, countries that
successfully democratize, such as Thailand (1992-2002),
Malaysia (1971-81), Brazil (twice, 1974-95) and Argentina
(1983-93) experience higher levels of growth, perhaps in
synergy with political reforms.
The impact of quality of institutions and the ability to
absorb exogenous shocks suggests that these shocks
tended to be magnified by the inadequate capacity for
conflict management found in autocratic Arab states. As the
results in indicate, those countries that were able to
successfully democratize in the period 1960 to. 2003 were
able to halve volatility, suggesting that democratizing
countries are better able to absorb economic shocks.

Conclusion
The democracy deficit is identified through a significant
and negative dummy Variable for Arab countries in an
extended Lipsetian model of democracy that accounts for
the economic, Social and historical variables assumed to
be associated with democratization in the current literature.
we argue that region specific factors, most notably oil and
war.
Arab oil dependency has been a hindrance to the region's
Democracy.
Arab democracy deficit appears to be uniquely associated
with inter-state wars (notably the Arab-Israeli conflict) and
violent conflicts.
Arab democracy deficit may very well be attribute able to
the large reliance on oil and on the Low participation of
women in the economy.

Conclusion
A major reason for the collapse of economic growth in the
Arab region has been the poor capacity of the Arab
countries to manage conflicts following external shocks
suffered in the region.
Credible economic argument for democratization in the
Arab world. Indeed, greater diversification of Arab economies
associated with accelerated growth would help to reduce
the impact of external shocks, minimizing the pressure on
Arab states to manage domestic social conflicts and saving
on economic costs.