ARMS CONTROL AND

DISARMAMENT

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES
What is arms control?
How is this different from Disarmament?
Does one lead to another?
Normative versus practical dimensions.
What causes arms control?
Is disarmament feasible?

DEFINING ARMS CONTROL

Any agreement among states to regulate some
aspects of their military capability or potential. The
agreement may apply to the location, amount,
readiness, and types of military forces, weapons and
facilities
Arms control is an alternative approach to achieving
international security through military strategies or
peace through manipulation of force

DEFINITION
Participants jointly regulate their abilities to threaten
each other and to drive a bargaining advantage in
their context. So, an arms control agreement allows
states to retain their relative ability to bargain, but at
the same time, reducing the cost of sustaining these
abilities

ARMS CONTROL DEFINED

Jaffrey Larsen: AC can be defined as any agreement

among states to regulate some aspect of their
military capability or potential. The agreement may
apply to the location, amount, readiness, and types
of military forces, weapons and facilitiesall AC
presuppose some form of cooperation or joint action
among the participants regarding their military
programs.

FURTHER DEFINING ARMS

CONTROL
1961 - Thomas Schelling & Morton Halprin:
Adjustments in military postures and doctrines
that induce reciprocal adjustments by a
potential opponent can be of mutual benefit if
they reduce the danger of a war that neither
side wants, or contains its violence, or otherwise
serve the security of the nation.

ARMS CONTROL
In its general conception, arms control is any type of
restraint on the use of arms, any form of military
cooperation between adversaries. Arms control can be
implicit or explicit, formal or informal, and unilateral,
bilateral, or multilateral. It is a process of jointly
managing the weapons-acquisition processes of the
participant states in the hope of reducing the risk of war
Arms control [refers] to formal agreements imposing
significant restrictions or limitations on the weapons or
security policies of the signatories.

DISARMAMENT

Disarmament rests on a fundamentally different

philosophical argument than arms control. It envisions
then drastic reduction or elimination of all weapons,
looking toward the eradication of war itself.
Disarmament is based on the notion that if there
were no more weapons there would be no more war.
This is a compelling proposition,
with enough truth to give it a very long life in the
history to popular impression, it is not necessarily
abut reducing arms levels.

ARMS CONTROL AND

DISARMAMENT
Arms control attempts to stabilize the status quo and
to manage conflict, to force. Although many visceral
( )opponents would be shocked at the thought,
arms
control
is
fundamentally
a
conservative()enterprise.
Disarmament, by contrast, is a
radical one.
Disarmament seeks to overturn the status quo; arms
control works to perpetuate it.

10

MAJOR ARMS CONTROL

AGREEMENT

Agreement

Signed by

Provision

Year

Geneva Protocol

100+

Bans use of chemical weapons

1925

Antarctic Treaty Partial

Nuclear

12

Prohibits all military activity in Antarctic area

1959

Test Ban Treaty

131

Prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere In

outer space, and under water

1963

Outer Space Treaty

127

Prohibits all military activity in outer space,

Including on the moon and other celestial
Bodies

1967

Treaty of Tlatelolco

35

Prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America

1967

Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty

191

Prohibits acquisition of nuclear weapons by Nonnuclear nations

1968

Seabed Arms Control

92

Bans placing nuclear weapons in o under the

seabed

1971

Biological Weapons
Convention

80+

Ban the possession and use of biological

weapons

1972

11

Agreement

Signed by

Provision

Year

Strategic Arms Limitation

Treat (SALT 1)

Provides for freeze on aggregate number of

fixed, Land-based ICBMs and SLBMs

1972

ABM Treaty

Limits deployment of antiballistic missile

systems Two sites in each country.
Reduced to one site by 1974 agreement

1972

Threshold Test Ban

Limits U.S. and USSR underground tests to 150

kt

1974

SALT II

Limited the number and types of USSR and

USA. Strategic weapons

1979

South Pacific Nuclear FreeZone

13

Prohibits the manufacture or acquisition of

nuclear Weapons in the region

1985

Intermediate Range Nuclear

Forces (INF)

Eliminates all U.S. and Soviet missiles with

ranges Between 500 km and 5500 km

1987

Missile Technology Regime

25

Limits transfer of missiles or missile technology

1987

Conventional Armed Forces

in Europe

30

Sets limits on NATO and WARSAW Pact tanks,

Other armored vehicles, artillery, combat,
helicopters And air craft

1990

MAJOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Agreemen
t

Signatories

Provisions

Year

CTBT

Over 180

Bans nuclear
Tests, Allows
sub-critical
tests

1996

ARMS CONTROL
Washington
Naval Treaty, 1922 (as
TREATIES
naval conferences)

part of the

Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological

weapons, 1925 and its two augmentations:
Biological Weapons Convention, 1972
Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993

Outer Space Treaty, 1967

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1972

ARMS CONTROL
TREATIES
Environmental Modification Convention, 1976
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1987
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR ), 1987
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,
1992
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I ), 1994
Wassenaar Arrangement, 1996

ARMS CONTROL
TREATIES
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 1996
Open Skies Treaty, 2002
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty(SORT), 2003

ARMS CONTROL THE

COLD
Theory developed
as
an adjunct ()
WAR
DAYS
to national security from 1958 62
Instead of disarmament it emphasized
enhancement of cooperative security
arrangements
Numerous institutional mechanisms
Problems of trust
Problems of verification

 The driver of arms control agreements

COLD
WAR DAYS
was the shared perception regarding the
fear of a nuclear war between the two
powers.
Arms control seen as a prime means of
restraining strategic arms race, especially
restraining the use of certain types of
technologies that exacerbated the threat
of war
The objective was also to reduce the cost
of war,
And reduce the damage if a war did occur

ARMS CONTROL EXPLAINED

According to Thomas Schelling and
Morton Halprin:
We believe that arms control is a
promising, but still only dimly
perceived, enlargement of the scope
of our military strategy. It rests
essentially on the recognition that
our military relations with potential
enemies is not one of pure conflict
and opposition, but involves strong
elements of mutual interest in the
avoidance of a war that neither side
wants, in minimizing the costs and
risks of the arms competition, and in
curtailing the scope and violence of
war in the event it occurs.

BENEFITS

Reduces possibility of war

Reduces political and economic costs
Minimizes the scope and violence of war
So it primarily depends on cooperation
of some level between adversaries

THE PURPOSE OF ARMS

It is aCONTROL
means to an end which is
enhancing security, especially security
against nuclear weapons
The three underlying principles of arms
control are:
It is a means to an end national security
States have a common interest in
avoiding nuclear war
Arms control and military strategy should
work together to promote national
security (deployment of weapons or an
adverse tactical maneuver)

OBJECTIVES OF ARMS
Should
be in broad harmony with
CONTROL
national security strategy

Arms control theory was developed

during the Cold War to deal with the
questions of:
What deters?
How much is enough?
What if deterrence fails?

METHODOLOGY

Institutional mechanisms involving a

certain understanding regarding force
buildup, strategic deployment, etc
Improve strategic signaling
Build channels of communication
Increase exchange of information

INSTITUTIONS

Alliance or agreements - Incidents at Sea

(INCSEA) Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) or Indus Water Treaty
Potential tools but remain on the sidelines
of statecraft (Track-II, III)
Institutions are important because they
have the potential of generating powerful
impact on the policymaking process e.g.
Anglo-French Entente ( ) 1904
Institutional mechanisms create enduring
patterns of shared expectation of behavior
that gradually receive some degree of
formal assent INCSEA or Indus Water
Treaty

INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
Institutions will not have
substantial VIEW
any
ANOTHER
impact because, as Charles Glaser
Points out:

Institutions are the product of the same

factors states interests and the
constraints imposed by the system that
influence whether should cooperate

ISSUES WITH ARMS

Additional information cannot change
CONTROL
the strategic
choices
There is also the issue of trust
The concept will not work because
relations between states are driven by
their interest in enhancing their power
Prisoners dilemma

 Choices made by two players between

PRISONERS
DILEMMA
two possible outcomes
Hedley Bulls perspective - players do
not act in total ignorance of each
others choices and no one can count on
having the last word. Hence, a
pessimistic outcome could be avoided
and a condition of conditional
cooperation can be maintained which is
termed as an equilibrium outcome

ARMS CONTROL IN
There is a need for institutionalizing
SOUTH
ASIA because:
arms
control arrangement

Nuclear weapons
Conventional buildup
Existing disputes
Endemic (
) mistrust a
generational change that would
undermine peace
Countries pursing independent
trajectories of socio-political and military
development

PRESENT
TechnologicalSITUATION
expansion
Asymmetrical balance
No arms control arrangement
CBMS only

EXISTING CBMS
Communication Measures
Hotline between DGMOs since
Dec 1971.
After Brasstacks IV (1986-87)
tensions DGMO hotline
activated weekly.
Telephone links between sector
commanders on LoC

COMMUNICATION
Hotlines between PMs:
MEASURES
Installed
in 1989 by Benazir Bhutto
and Rajiv Gandhi.
In November 1990, re-established
by Chandra Shekhar and Nawaz
Sharif to facilitate direct
communication.
In May 1997, I. K. Gujral and Sharif
pledged to reinstate the hotline.

EXISTING CBMS

Notification Measures

Agreement on Prior Notification of Military

Exercises, 1991:

10,000 or more troops.

No manoeuvres towards IB.
Exercises at Corps-level minimum
45 km and Division-level minimum
25 km from IB. No Division
exercise near LoC.
No military activity within five km
of IB.

Border
Security
EXISTING
CBMS
Measures
Karachi Agreement, 1949: no
deployment less than 500 yards
from CFL (now LoC). (Observed
more in breach!)
Indo-Pakistani Agreement on
Border Disputes in the West, 1960.

EXISTING CBMS

Border Security Measures

Agreement on Prevention of Violation of
Airspace, August 1992:
Armed fixed-wing aircraft not to fly within 10
nautical miles of IB.
Armed helicopters not permitted within one NM.
No aircraft within 1,000 metres.

Often breached: helicopters shot down at

Siachen.

EXISTING CBMS
Transparency
Measures
Observes invited for
major exercises:
Zarb-e-Momin in 1989.
Several Indian exercises.

DGMO clarifications
Brasstacks, 1990, Kargil
1999, ongoing.

POTENTIAL
CBMS
Demilitarisation
of Siachen (?):
Permanent Ceasefire.
Demarcation of

ActualGroundPositionLine (AGPL) on
ground and map.
Joint verification agreement.
Redeployment to mutually agreed
positions.
Agreement to resolve dispute.

POTENTIAL
CBMS
Verification:
Joint
patrolling of LoC to
counter infiltration
(?).
Reduction in Indian
troops deployed in
Kashmir (?)

POTENTIAL
Ferry service CBMS
between
Mumbai and Karachi
Security of Oil and Gas
pipelines
Maritime disaster
management
Joint search and rescue at
sea
Protection of fishermen

ARMS CONTROL IN
Cycle of conventional and nonSOUTH ASIA
conventional technology
proliferation
Various CBMs that have the potential
of gradually moving towards an
arms control agreement
Prisoners dilemma in the region
Increasing the cost of the adversary
is part of the calculus
Varied threat perceptions
Varied political cultures

POTENTIAL ARMS
Mutual troop reduction/disarmament (?)
CONTROL
MEASURES

Notification of mobilisation (?)

Exchange of data (Detailing of existing military

holdings, planned purchases, military personnel and

budgets can clarify a states current and projected
military capabilities and provide advance notice of
destabilising arms build-up. Data exchanges can take
place bilaterally or multilaterally)

Ground-based electronic sensor systems (Manned or

unmanned, these can verify compliance to agreed
restrictions on equipment deployment or troop
movements)

Incidents at Sea Agreement (first proposed at

Lahore, 1999)

 Is it possible to build institutional

mechanisms for arms control in the
region?

SOME QUESTIONS

What will deter either sides from a

surprise attack or destabilizing the
military-strategic balance?
What will be the institutional guarantees
to ensure that the parties will not shirk
(
) from honoring their
commitment?
What kind of asymmetrical (

) military balance will ensure

deterrence in the region?