Ankerlig Power Station

Risk Assessment

Islam Genina
Mohammed Kamar
Zewail City of Science and Technology 19 December 2016

Agenda

Introduction
Environment
Process and Storage tank facility
Hazard Identification
Physical and Consequence modelling
Risk Calculations
Risk Reduction and Mitigation
Conclusions
Recommendations

OCGT Plant
The first project on site.
Consists of 4 diesel operated Open Cycle Gas Turbines (OCGT).
Diesel is pumped from offloading bay to the first diesel tank,
where it is filtered to remove particulate matter.
It is then transferred to clean tanks where it is pumped to the
tines for power generation
Two propane tanks of 6.5 m3 each

Gas1 Plant

Currently under construction.

5 turbines
4 x 6.5 m3 propane tanks
2 x 2700 m3 and 1 x 5400m3 diesel tanks

CCGT Plant
The plan is to construct a CCGT plant.
8 x 5400 m3 diesel storage tanks

Aim of the Study

This study was about the hazards posed by the fuel oil storage
Determine the extent of impact from accidental fires with regards
to the proposed CCGT conversion

Plant Layout

The layout must be done to protect the

safety of employees and the public
Storage and distribution of petroleum products in
above ground bulk installations.
Liquefied petroleum gas installations involving
storage vessels of individual water capacity
exceeding 500 .

SANS

A guideline for the handling and storing of

petrochemical and derivative chemicals
are available.
A guideline for the handling, storage, and
distribution of liquefied petroleum gas in
domestic, commercial and industrial
installations is available.

For Risk Analysis

Calculating Safety Distances
To develop accidental spill and fire scenarios for the
proposed offloading and storage.
Determine the probability of each accident scenario
(tanks, pumps, valves, flanges, pipe work, gantry,
couplings, etc.)
Determine the consequences
Calculate Maximum Individual Risk (MIR)

Safety Distances

Hazard Identification
First Step for Risk Assessment

Considerations for
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Chemical identities
Location of facilities that use, produce, process,
transport or store hazardous materials
The type and design of containers, vessels or pipelines
The quantity of material that could be involved in an
airborne release
The nature of the hazard most likely to accompany
hazardous materials spills or releases.

Equipment Failures may result

in
Release of flammable materials and fires upon ignition; and/or,
Release of to toxic materials

Failure Frequencies for

different scenarios

Failure Frequencies for

atmospheric tanks

Failure Frequencies
for pressure vessels

Failure Frequencies
for pipes

Failure Frequency of
Valves
The ratio of the leak size (d) to the valve size (D)

Probability of
Ignition

Background
hazard: anything that has the potential to cause damage to life, the
property and the environment
Risk is therefore the probability that a hazard will manifest itself

Acceptable Risk:
Accepted risk associated with driving a car = 1 in 10,000 death per year
NOT accepted risk, associated with Nuclear Facilities= 1 in 10,000,000 death
per year.

PHYSICAL AND
CONSEQUENCE MODELLING

Background
Impact of accident:
1.Estimate the physical process of the accident
2.Estimate the consequence on humans, fauna, flora. Dose
response analysis.

Thermal radiation due to pool fires, jet fires and flash fires.

Bund and Pool Fires

1. pool fires: tank or bund
fires consist of large
volumes of flammable
material at atmospheric
pressure burning in an
open space
2. Thermal radiation
contours due to loss of
containment of diesel.
3. Contour within plant
boundaries

Road/Rail
transportation fires
Delivery of fuel to site via rail
tankers and roads.
Maximum offloading capacity
of 10 rail tankers
fire would decrease until the
entire spilt diesel was consumed.

Propane Gas Fire

The thermal radiation from

propane pool fires would not
have direct offsite impacts
requires no further
investigation.
fire would extend to the limit of the
pool but would shrink rapidly as the
fuel within the pool is consumed.

Jet Fires
Jet fires occur when flammable
material of a high exit velocity
ignites.
Damage from flame occurs only
through direct contact.
Thermal radiation decreases
rapidly from flame
HFL near tank, LFL away from tank

Flash Fires

A loss of containment of flammable

materials would mix with air and
form a flammable mixture.
Ignition of flammable cloud
Propagation by pressure =
Explosion
Propagation by heat = Flash fire

Consequences of
OverPressure
The overpressure of 69 kPa would
represent almost total destruction.
The 6.9 kPa would not cause direct
fatalities but could destroy building
with indirect fatalities.
The 2 kPa is accepted as the
endpoint or of the explosion and
only minor damage

Gas Explosion

Unconfined gas explosion Overpressure not sufficient to

results in fatalities Not Considered
Confined Gas Explosion proposed CCGT adds structures that
confine vapour clouds
Detonation & Explosion

Gas Explosion
Fig 5-6, for 6.5m^3 Propane and fig 5-7 for 20m^3 Propane

BLEVE
The 1% lethality (158 m from the exploding vessel) and a 10%
fatality (122 m from the explosion). The 100% was not reached.
BLEVE of 20m^3 Fire ball No Consequence beyond site no
further analysis

RISK CALCULATIONS

Risk Calculations

Identify the hazard and its zone DONE

Risk Calculations involve the effects of wind speed and
atmospheric turbulence
Assessed by the Maximum individual Risk
Is the Risk level acceptable?

Accidental Fire Scenarios

1. Pool Fires

Risk Calculations

2. Jet Fires
No consequences beyond the boundary of the site and thus the risks
are acceptable
3. Flash Fire
From offloading tanker failure rate of the tanker at 5x10-7 events per year
Risk is Trivial

4. Explosion Risk
tank failure accompanied by a detonation less than 3 x10-7 events per annum
acceptable

RISK REDUCTION

Risk Reduction
National Codes plant layout, safety distances, secondary containment

1.Plant Layout
2. Bund Height : 1.8m
3. Process Hazard Analysis (PHA):
-HAZOP STUDY + suggest mitigation of risks
4. Overfilling of Fuel Tanks
-Adequate instrumentation and operating procedures.
-SANS 10089 Part 1 (formally SABS 089-1) is specific to the storage of large volumes of petroleum products.
-SANS 10087 Part 3 (formally SABS 087-3) is specific to the storage of LPG products

CONCLUSIONS
1. Pool Fires
1x10^-4 fatalities per person per year short distance over the boundary
Reduce risks by Engineering and adminstrative controls
2. Jet Fires
Flame length form propane = 20.4m reduce risk within the plant
3. Explosions
Large propane release explosion beyond boundary acceptable risk
4. Major Hazardous Installation Regulation
CCGT conversion risk excessive of 1x10-^6 fatalities per person per year
Major Hazardous Installation Risk Assessment with Final design and layout

Conclusions
Plant assessment assures the safety
If we are an authority, we would
accept the proposal
Where the plant?

Recommendations
Compliance to all statutory requirements.
Compliance with applicable SANS codes.
A safety document detailing safety and design features reducing the impacts
from fires, explosions and flammable atmospheres must be prepared
Emergency response documentation must be done with input from local
authorities
A risk assessment in accordance to the prescribed Major Hazard Installation
A recognized process hazard analysis (HAZOP, FMEA, etc) should be
completed for the proposed plant prior to construction.
to ensure design and operational hazards have been identified adequate mitigation put
in place