“A Closer Look on the Bangsamoro

Basic Law:
A Beginning of Peace or
Another Layer of Complexity?”
 Abstract
• This paper analyzes the ff:
– possible advantages and corresponding
drawbacks that both the Bangsamoro and the
Government of the Philippines will face if the BBL
will be passed or not.
– Significant hurdles to overcome by both parties
– The controversial provisions of the said bill and
challenges the grounds of unconstitutionality of
the BBL
 Introduction
• Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro was
completed last 2014.
– Previous agreements:
• 1976 Tripoli Agreement
• Final Peace Agreement signed by Ramos administration in 1996 (led
the formation of ARMM)
– In recognition of the MNLF’s eroding Moro mandate, the
Government of the Philippines began negotiating with the
MILF in 1997.
– 2008 agreement on ancestral domain (MOA-AD) was
unconstitutional.
– Negotiations only started again after President Aquino met,
at his personal request, MILF Chairman Murad Ebrahim in
August 2011 in Tokyo.
 Better Visions
• The framework agreement was remarkable for
two reasons:
– First, the MILF made a major concession in
agreeing to a formula for determining which areas
would be under a new Bangsamoro government.
– Second, the new pact makes it clear the present
ARMM will be gone by the time President Aquino
leaves office in 2016.
 THE BANGSAMORO BASIC LAW
• The Framework Agreement provides in its Article 4 Section 2
that the MILF will appoint eight members, including the chair,
while the government will select seven in the creation of
transition commission.
• The commission will have three tasks: drafting a basic law,
proposing amendments to the Philippine constitution and
coordinating development programs in Bangsamoro
communities, using two MILF-run institutions, the
Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute (BLMI)
and the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA).
 THE BANGSAMORO BASIC LAW
TERRITORY
• The present ARMM;
• The six municipalities in Lanao del Norte that voted yes in the 2001 plebiscite on
expansion of ARMM.
• All barangays in six municipalities in North Cotabato that also voted yes in the
same plebiscite.
• Cotabato City (the hub of Central Mindanao) and Isabela City (the main city on
Basilan); and
• All other contiguous areas where there is a resolution of the local government unit
or a petition of at least 10 per cent of the qualified voters in the area asking for
their inclusion at least two months prior to the conduct of the ratification of the
Bangsamoro Basic Law and the process of delimitation of the Bangsamoro.
(Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 2014: op. cit., Section V Article 1).
POWERS
• Establishment of Bangsamoro Government
• “Assymmetric” Relationship between Central and Bangsamoro Government
 THE POTENTIAL PAYOFFS
• More autonomy
- The Bangsamoro Basic Law promises the MILF and the wider Moro community
greater and more sustainable autonomy. This should contribute to greater MILF
and wider Moro community commitment to the peace deal and Moro autonomy
within the Philippine state.

• Broader support
- Manila and the MILF have been very successful in expanding international support
and involvement in the peace process. Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Japan, Norway
and the European Union (EU) have committed personnel to the International
Monitoring Teams established in 2004 to oversee the ceasefire between Manila
and the MILF. (Abubakkar, 2013).
 THE HURDLES
• The problem of MILF fighters
• Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing
• ARMM absorption
• Tight timing
• Court challenges
CONCLUSION
• Politically, it would be the most fundamental change in the
nature of the unitary Philippine state which would better
reflect the diversity of the multi-ethnic Philippine archipelago.
• Economically, an enduring political solution to the Moro
insurgency would greatly assist in unlocking the vast natural
resource wealth of Mindanao, such as the $5.9 billion
Tampakan project.
• In terms of security policy, political peace would support the
AFP’s reorientation towards external defense at a time when
external challenges to the Philippines’ territorial and
jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea are mounting
CONCLUSION: LOOKING
FORWARD
• In terms of the differing provisions between Constitution and
the Bangsamoro Basic Law, without inflicting prejudice on the
power of the 1987 Philippine constitution, the Bangsamoro
Transition Commission should first define clearly and discuss
those ambiguous provisions.
• The beginning of peace in Muslim Mindanao can be perceived
from the Framework Agreement as well as the passing of the
Bangsamoro Basic Law yet the sustainability of such peace is
far from guaranteed and adds another layer of complexity in
both National Government and Bangsamoro.