le-Grand in Paris, from which he gained entrance to the Ecole Normale Supérieure. Bourdieu studied philosophy with Louis Althusser in Paris at the École Normale Supérieure. After getting his agrégation Bourdieu worked as a lycée teacher at Moulins from 1955 to 1958 when he then took a post as lecturer in Algiers.[3] During the Algerian War in 1958-1962, Bourdieu undertook ethnographic research into the clash through a study of the Kabyle peoples, of the Berbers laying the groundwork for his anthropological reputation. In 1960 Bourdieu returned to the University of Paris before gaining a teaching position at the University of Lille where he remained until 1964. From 1964 onwards Bourdieu held the position of Director of Studies at the École Pratique des Hautes Études (the future École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales), in the VIe section, and from 1981, the Chair of Sociology at the Collège de France, in the VIe section (held before him by Raymond Aron and Maurice Halbwachs). In 1968, he took over the Centre de Sociologie Européenne, the research center that Aron had founded, which he directed until his death. In 1975, with the research group he had formed at the Centre de Sociologie Européenne, he launched the interdisciplinary journal Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, with which he sought to transform the accepted canons of sociological production while buttressing the scientific rigor of sociology. In 1993 he was honored with the "Médaille d'or du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique" (CNRS). In 1996, he received the Goffman Prize from the University of California, Berkeley and in 2001 the Huxley Medal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.[4] Bourdieu died of cancer at the age of 71. Influences
Bourdieu's work is influenced by much
of traditional anthropology and sociology which he undertook to synthesize into his own theory. From Max Weber he retained the importance of domination and symbolic systems in social life, as well as the idea of social orders which would ultimately be transformed by Bourdieu into a theory of fields. From Karl Marx, among other insights he gained an understanding of 'society' as the ensemble of social relationships: "what exist in the social world are relations – not interactions between agents or intersubjective ties between individuals, but objective relations which exist 'independently of individual consciousness and will'."[5] (grounded in the mode and conditions of economic production), and of the need to dialectically develop social theory from social practice. From Émile Durkheim, finally, through Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss, Bourdieu inherited a certain structuralist interpretation of the tendency of social structures to reproduce themselves, based on the analysis of symbolic structures and forms of classification. However, Bourdieu critically diverged from Durkheimian analyses in emphasizing the role of the social agent in enacting, through the embodiment of social structures, symbolic orders. He furthermore emphasized that the reproduction of social structures does not operate according to a functionalist logic. Maurice Merleau-Ponty and, through him, the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl played an essential part in the formulation of Bourdieu's focus on the body, action, and practical dispositions (which found their primary manifestation in Bourdieu's theory of habitus). Bourdieu was also influenced by Wittgenstein (especially with regard to his work on rule- following) stating that "Wittgenstein is probably the philosopher who has helped me most at moments of difficulty. He's a kind of saviour for times of great intellectual distress". Bourdieu's work is built upon the attempt to transcend a series of oppositions which characterized the social sciences (subjectivism/objectivism, micro/macro, freedom/determinism). In particular he did this through conceptual innovations. The concepts of habitus, capital, and field were conceived, indeed, with the intention to abolish such oppositions. Bourdieu as Public Intellectual During the 1990s Bourdieu became more and more involved in political debate, turning himself into one of the most important public faces of intellectuality in France. While a fierce critic of neoliberalism, Bourdieu was also critical of the "total intellectual" role played by Sartre, and he dismissed Sartre's attempts within the political sphere of France as "irresponsible" and "opportunistic."[8] Bourdieu saw sociology not as a form of "intellectual entertainment" but as a serious discipline of a scientific nature. The paradox between Bourdieu's earlier writings against using sociology for political activism and his later launch into the role of a public intellectual involved some highly "visible political statements"[8] asking whether the role of the academic, in this case the sociologist, is preparation for life as a public intellectual, especially when considering the political implications of Bourdieu's work in the public domain. 2. Bourdieu’s Concept of Capitals
2.1 Preliminary Remarks
Bourdieu argues that all action is interest-oriented. Action is a strategy that attempts to maximize material and symbolic advantage. He sees individual interests as defined by an actor’s position within the social hierarchy. This action as interest-oriented is pre- reflective and occurs through time. He thinks of those interests as embodied dispositions of actors that operate at an implicit or taken-for-granted level. Viewing action as interest oriented, it consequently aims at accumulation of capital. Resources are conceptualized as capital when it operates as “a social relation of power Bourdieu identify four generic types of capital, namely: 1. economic capital (money or property) 2. cultural capital (cultural goods and services including educational credentials) 3. social capital (acquaintances and networks), and 4. symbolic capital (legitimation). 2.2 The Capitals The unequal distribution of capitals result into violence and domination. Bourdieu’s focus is on the role that cultural processes, producers, and institutions play in maintaining inequality in contemporary societies. Bourdieu argues that all symbolic systems such as art, religion, science, or language itself simultaneously perform three interrelated but distinct functions: 1. Cognition 2. Communication 3. Social Differentiation. On one hand, symbolic systems exercise cognitive function when it function as “structuring structures” – as a means for ordering and understanding the social world. Dominant symbolic systems provide integration for dominant groups, distinctions and hierarchies for ranking groups, and legitimation of social ranking by encouraging the dominated to accept the existing hierarchies of social distinction. Hence, symbolic systems also fulfill a political function. With these functions Bourdieu develops a sociology of symbolic forms, a theory of symbolic violence and capital that overlap and interpenetrate one another. Bourdieu adopted binary opposition as a building block in his theory of symbolic power. He believes that symbolic systems are classification systems built upon the fundamental logic of inclusion and exclusion. As such, all symbolic systems follow classification logic of dividing and grouping items into opposing classes and hence generate meanings through binary logic. This logic consequently builds an ordered set of basic dichotomous distinctions, such as dominant/dominated, good/bad, high/low, right/wrong, that operate as “primitive classifications” underlining all mental activities. Bourdieu adopted binary opposition as a building block in his theory of symbolic power. He believes that symbolic systems are classification systems built upon the fundamental logic of inclusion and exclusion. As such, all symbolic systems follow classification logic of dividing and grouping items into opposing classes and hence generate meanings through binary logic. This logic consequently builds an ordered set of basic dichotomous distinctions, such as dominant/dominated, good/bad, high/low, right/wrong, that operate as “primitive classifications” underlining all mental activities. Moreover, cognitive structures which social agents implement in their knowledge of the social world are internalized, embodied social structures. This means that the social world is also classified into paired opposition. Binary logic therefore determines our mode of apprehending the social world. It predisposes us to organize the social world according to the same logic of polarity and thus produce social as well as cognitive distinctions. Bourdieu provides an example of this when he explains that not everyone could smash a bottle into the ship and name it. In order then to name a ship and make it legitimate a person must have the ability to name it. He must be the captain or the owner of the ship, otherwise naming it will be nonsense. 12. The capacity to “name” something Bourdieu understands this as “symbolic violence.” Symbolic violence is the capacity to impose the means for comprehending and adapting to the social world by representing economic and political power in disguised forms Bourdieu stresses how the dominated accept as legitimate their condition of domination. He called this “Misrecognition”. Misrecognition is tied up with Bourdieu’s strong claim that all actions are interested. The misperception of disinterested character legitimizes the reproduction of the social order. The dominated fails to sense the social elements or practices that control them. 2.3 Habitus As mentioned before Bourdieu regards action as interest oriented or as a strategy. By strategy he does not mean conscious choice of action or rational calculation. These actions are like cultural unconscious,” “habit-forming force,” “set of basic, deeply interiorized master-patterns,” or “mental habits.” These “habits” are transmitted by institutions, practices, and social relations that function as a “habit-forming force” that generate schemes of thought and action. It tends to shape individual action so that existing opportunity structures are perpetuated. It legitimates economic and social inequality by providing a practical and taken-for-granted acceptance of the fundamental conditions of existence. Habitus therefore is “necessity made into virtue.” The dispositions of habitus represent master patterns of behavioral style that cut across cognitive, normative, and corporeal dimension of human action. They find expression in language nonverbal communication, tastes, values, perceptions, and modes of reasoning The function of habitus as a “structuring structure” lies in Bourdieu’s emphasis of collective basis of habitus, stressing that individuals who internalize similar life chances share the same habitus. It is possible that people who occupy the same class have the same perception on looking to the society. Moreover, habitus entails that behaviors, expectations, and aspirations of individuals are unconsciously patterned to what his class regard as proper Habitus is fairly resistant to change
The Hebrew word berit, which is used most often to express idea of a covenant, originally meant a “shackle” or “chain”, but it came to be any form of binding agreement