Cisco Systems: Managing the

Go-to-Market Evolution
Synopsis:
• One of the hottest growth companies of the last decade of the 20th century, Cisco
Systems had made a remarkable recovery from the market crash of April 2001.
• Even though its 2003 sales of $18 billion were below its 2000 peak (of $22 billion),
its profits at $3.6 billion was a healthy comeback, making it a high-performing
company in the high-tech category.
• Its products, Switches and Routers, are a key component of modern day networks
and indeed at the core of all Inter-Networks or Internets.
• With market shares in excess of 60% (and even higher in large corporate
accounts), Cisco dominated the industry’s go-to-market channels. Interestingly, the
company had started out selling directly, and over the course of the decade (1990
to 2000), evolved its strategy to route nearly 90% of sales through value-added
resellers.
• Moreover, it had carefully evolved its reseller program after the 2001 market crash
to emphasize “Value-Add” away from pure “Volume.”
• Cisco’s reseller program was widely regarded as a model for indirect sales strategy,
highly regarded for the quality of the company’s relationships with its VARs.
Synopsis:
• In 2003, its CEO John Chambers announced that the company would once
again pursue a growth strategy, but given the maturation of its traditional
markets, the plan was to grow in adjacent markets, especially telecom,
through new technologies such as VoIP (voice over internet telephony).
• Naturally, such an expansion called for extending the very successful go-to-
market strategy deployed in its core market of routers and switches, and
involved accessing channels new to Cisco, telecom channels.
• This created potential channel conflicts with existing VARs, who had already
been through a gut-wrenching round of consolidations.
• This was a particularly salient issue in light of the steady evolution of its
channel strategy.
• The company’s top management had come up with an overarching channel
blueprint for the future, and it was in the context of this overarching vision
that one had to evaluate Cisco’s entry into new markets.
Lead Questions
1. How have Cisco’s channels evolved in the last 10-15 years? Why
have they evolved that way? What does the future look like?
2. What grade would you give Cisco for managing that evolution?
Good or a bad? Why?
3. Against the background of your answer to questions #1 and #2,
how should Cisco distribute VoIP products? Through voice VARs? Data
VARs? Or both?
4. What are your reactions to the “Pyramid” model advanced in
Figure C of the case? What is the core concept of the model? Is there
an alternative evolutionary model that Cisco should adopt?
 Cisco’s channel evolution
Cisco’s Channel Evolution

1995 2001 2005

Products Customized Solutions Lower Level Switches Switches and Routers

in box
Higher Layered Switches (acquisition of Linksys)

Markets Large Corporate Customers Addition of Small and Medium Small Office
Business Customers Home Office
Dot.com Boom Home Networking
Dot.com Bust

Channels Direct Sales Force Transitioning to VARS Addition of Retailers

and Internet Channels

D-Link, Dell, and a host

of small vendors
 Cisco’s channel evolution

1985 1995 2001 2005

Sales Mind Share

Market Share Wallet Share

 Cisco’s channel evolution
• In the early 1990s, the market need was almost exclusively from large companies
needing customized solutions, and Cisco was one of the few companies that had
the technology to offer a solution.
• Most of the switches were of the layer 2 or layer 3 types with software intelligence
built in, but customers needed much hand holding to make use of the applications
being offered.
• There was no expertise available in the industry at the distributor level, and so
Cisco chose to sell products and perform the services itself.
• Once the applications took hold, and sales grew, more customers started adopting
Cisco’s products, the market started to dramatically expand, and Cisco met this
demand by expanding its sales force.
• But to increase their penetration, Cisco cut its sales territories by half. Sales people
were forced to seek additional customers to maintain their sales quotas, and thus
Cisco’s reach and penetration continued to saturate the local region.
 Cisco’s channel evolution
• After 1995, with the boom in high technology, the market for its products
grew exponentially and Cisco could not reach the nooks and corners of
where the demand was occurring.
• Value-added resellers started to play an important role in its go-to- market
strategy, because they were closer to customers who needed the
solutions. But these dealers had to be trained on Internet technology and
so Cisco started its program of training and certification.
• It rapidly appointed VARs, and those that were bringing in the sales and
had the requisite skills, were given the highest rating—Gold. Below them
were the Silver and Premier VARs.
• But even those without training or the requisite throughput were given
product because they brought in the customer demand.
 Cisco’s channel evolution
• This is when the company’s go-to-market strategy evolved steadily from
“90% direct” to “90% indirect.” Its number of VARs in the U.S. shot up to
over 2,000.
• It must be noted, however, that much of a VAR’s sales were actually
generated by Cisco’s sales force.
• The VARs became effective fulfillment houses, and also generators of
demand in customer segments that Cisco’s sales force found hard to reach.
Accompanying this evolution was also the steady addition of competitors.
• While Extreme and Foundry competed at the level of large customers, HP,
3Com, Huawei, and Nortel competed in the market for small and medium
businesses (SMB).
 Cisco’s channel evolution
• It is interesting to note that throughout this evolution, Cisco simultaneously
evolved its channels; not just going from direct to indirect, but among its
indirect channel partners it had added distributors (Ingram-Micro, Tech Data),
value-added resellers, as well as retailers.
• In the first phase, the company’s emphasis has been to get product adoption
and customer mind share; at that stage channel refinement is hardly on the
radar of the firm’s sales managers.
• At the next stage, having gained product acceptance, the company quite rightly
directed its energies towards gaining market share and all that it takes to build
such market share - a rapid deployment and scaling up of its sales force.
• And finally, after the market growth slowed down in the post 2001 phase, the
company refined its channel strategy to gain the confidence of its channel
partners.
• Its marketing strategy emphasized increase in the depth and breadth of its
customer relations - “Wallet Share.”
 What grade would you give Cisco for its
channel evolution and management?
• The crux of the channel conflict is with VARs (who account for about 35%
of sales), who are being squeezed by Channel 2 (system houses) and
Channel 3 (telecom service providers).
• The competition from Channel 3 especially seems unfair, but they are a big
future customer for Cisco, which cannot be ignored.
• Even though Channels 5 and 6 account for only about 10% of Cisco’s sales
now, the firm seems to be enthused by the potential of the Internet as a
way of reaching mass-market customers.
Evaluation of Cisco’s Channel Evolution
Positives
• Dynamic, Adaptive, Flexible
• Arranged by 3-tiers to reflect levels of Value-Add
• Demand pull by Cisco sales force
• Cisco school for training, certification and support
• Channel Compensation linked to end-user satisfaction
measures
• Cisco’s involvement in models that enhance their
channel partners’ profitability
Negatives
• Opportunistic expansion, perhaps with too many dealers
-- at least initially
• Multiple channels, especially telecom channels, undermine
VAR position
• Expansion into lowered products/markets/channels not in
keeping with Cisco’s value-adding capabilities
• Channel consolidation & rationalization could open
opportunities for competitors to make inroads
 Positives:
• It is instructive to follow Cisco’s channel strategy and its evolution, especially in
light of the double-digit growth it sustained for nearly 10 years, which was
punctuated by an abrupt slowdown in the industry beginning in 2001.
• More specifically, it is useful to note how Cisco began to reward its value-added
partners on the basis of the functions they provide to support customers, rather
than on the basis of the volumes they sell, when the industry slowed.
• Simultaneously, Cisco also downsized its distribution intensity, not afraid to use
its power to decide who would continue to be part of its distribution system.
• Within the system, however, Cisco treated its chosen channel partners with great
sensitivity and attempted to assist them with construction of business models
that would boost working capital productivity and their profits.
 Positives:
• Growth Years: Cisco’s products—routers and switches—were the perfect components for the
rapid growth in Internet infrastructure, and Cisco converted its technology advantage to gain
leverage over its channel intermediaries.
• During the sustained Internet boom of the1990s, when healthy margins on routers and switches
was assured, Cisco instituted a “value-added reseller pyramid,” based on hardware sales
volumes and other criteria, by which “Gold,” “Silver,” or “Premier” status was awarded to
authorized resellers.
• With higher status came a greater discount on gear for the reseller, and thus a greater profit
margin.
• At the bottom of the pyramid, below the “Premier Partner,” was the plain and undifferentiated
“Authorized Reseller.” Cisco, of course, as one can see from the income statement in the case,
had already extracted its healthy margins before onward sale to the reseller.
• But Cisco did not rest on its laurels, far from it. It used its power to ensure that its distribution
channels would be well equipped to handle the technical aspects of the sale going forward. Thus
even though channel partners were provided volume discounts, very early in the growth cycle
Cisco instituted a three-tiered pyramid to distinguish the different levels of effort represented by
each.
 Positives:
• Each status level required a certain number of technicians and engineers who had
been certified at “Cisco School”—Cisco, through its training facilities, both brick
and mortar as well as web based, ran extensive courses for network
professionals.
• On qualification, they received certifications such as CCDA-Cisco Certified Design
Associate, CCNA-Cisco Certified Network Associate and so on.
• VARs had to meet sales volume quotas to attain their status regardless of their
engineering qualifications, which were stated in terms of the FTEs (full-time
equivalents) of trained engineering personnel required at each level.
• Within status levels, the manner in which the various criteria were applied meant
that partners at the same level could receive different discounts.
• Each level had to demonstrate dedicated capability, and towards that end the
reseller would have to hire and train its people to acquire the certifications
specified by Cisco.
 Positives:
• Stewardship Changes with Market Decline: Before the business slowdown in 2001,
demand for networking gear was strong enough for money to be made by mere “box
pushing.” But after the downturn, only those resellers who could bring solutions were
valued.
• Cisco had too many dealers to cover the significantly shrunken demand; the company
knew it had to rationalize its channels. But Cisco had the clout and channel power, so in
the spring of 2001, Cisco announced a bold gambit.
• Cisco dropped volume requirements entirely, and made reseller discounts contingent on
specialization requirements in certain emerging technologies, using a point system.
• Specialization points were awarded to reseller firms who arranged to build the
appropriate team and the requisite expertise. I
• t was a step beyond certification requirements, which applied to individuals, the
specialization points applied to reseller entities.
• Moreover, specialization points were awarded to areas of new product focus, thus
gaining for Cisco the alignment of its VARs to its business growth strategy.
 Positives:
• Cisco’s Gold and Silver partners had already been required to have specializations in place for
some years, so the changes affected Premium partners the most. See case Exhibit 5 for the
details of the make over. For example, IP Telephony, a hot new technology for which Cisco was
attempting to establish a position, earned 40 points, and so on.
• Under the new system, points were awarded for exceeding those minimums.
• Points for customer satisfaction were awarded for exceeding numerical targets based on a
customer satisfaction survey.
• The surveys were conducted by an independent third-party research house, working for Cisco.
Resellers could access their results and get suggestions and training from Cisco on how to
improve.
• As a result of these changes and the higher degree of specialization and certification needed to
qualify, nearly half of Cisco’s dea
• lers were eliminated and only about a thousand dealers (Gold, Silver and Premier) were
retained. As mentioned in the case, according to an industry VAR “whereas before, two or three
companies with a ‘solutions’ approach would compete with seven or eight ‘ankle-biters’ doing
product fulfillment with deep discounting, the field was now tilted towards the solutions
approach,” and Cisco had done it deliberately and carefully in keeping with the new channel
environment.
 Positives:
• The changes made Cisco’s channel structure unique in the industry in terms of the absence of volume
requirements.
• The transition was to an entirely “value” based system such that “specialization” points were weighted
according to Cisco’s view of future demand for a technology.
• Cisco’s channel editing process brought it closer to customers’ needs, and when implemented successfully
would certainly endear it to its customers. Its channel system was also much more selective, and provided
opportunities for those who were part of it to make stable margins without the fear of competition.
• Initially Cisco had used its product power to gain intensive channel coverage, but realizing how such an
aggressive scheme destroyed value for many of its channel partners, when the markets ceased to grow,
the company pulled back to rationalize.
• Additionally, Cisco instituted a series of reseller schemes to assist them in the management of their
working capital, inventory levels, and customer satisfaction. The intention was to make them more
profitable.
• The company worked out elaborate models of their financial performance, and based on benchmarked
criteria, enabled them to make changes in key operating parameters to boost performance.
• Cisco often had nearly 50% or more of a reseller’s business portfolio, and as such its management
recommendations had much bite and credibility with its channel partners.
Summary - Positives
1. Its emphasis on training its VARs and ensuring that the reward
systems are aligned to their value-adding capabilities and investments.
2. Its constant efforts to evolve its channels with changes in the channel
environment.
3. At the same time, in order to keep a control of the explosive growth in
demand, Cisco’s sales force calls on the medium and large accounts, even
though a number of them may be ultimately served by the VARS
4. After the market for its products slumped in 2001, the company did
not hesitate to consolidate its channel intensity, yet at the same time by
working closely with existing VARs on their business model, the company
made a serious attempt to improve their profitability.
Negatives
By and large most of the negatives revolve around Cisco’s ambitious channel
expansion policies until 2001, and the annoying channel conflict situations it
causes.
There were two kinds of conflict caused by Cisco’s policies. Both affected the
VAR channel buffeted in between.
The first had to do with large VAR partners serving important large
customers. Here the conflict was with telecom companies entering the fray
as distributors with Cisco’s blessings.
The second had to do with conflict at the lower end from Cisco’s Online
Retailers who would now be able to use Cisco’s direct website to route
products small business customers. Cisco’s VARs feared that large customers
too might use the direct online channel to order the lower end products.
 Negatives
• Conflict between VARs and Telecom Companies Acting as Distributors:
• A significant portion of Cisco’s sales, for example, went to telecommunications
service providers such as Verizon, SBC, and so on. Some of these larger
telecommunications service providers quite often served the same enterprise
accounts as Cisco’s large value-add resellers, except that they came at it
through telecommunications products and services, whereas the value-add
resellers specialized in networking products and services.
• This was a new market segment that arose as the telecommunications service
providers themselves chose to enter the Internet Service Provider (ISP)
business, especially so after the availability of broadband.
• Until then this segment of the market was mainly the domain of startups that
leased the “fixed lines,” from the service providers.
• For Cisco, the three tiers of Gold, Silver, and Premier VARs represented one
type of channel, then there were the thousands of “Authorized Resellers,” and
finally the service providers constituted yet another type of VAR.
Negatives
• By April 2001, as many dotcoms went belly-up, as did many small ISPs
that hosted and managed the thousands of websites. Telecom
companies, which had built excessive capacity, saw demand for their
telecom services fizzle.
• These companies, which owned the long haul and local transmission
“pipes,” decided to get into the networking business and “data” services.
For telecommunications carriers this was a logical new source of
revenue, as well as a lure to customers choosing carrier services.
• The telecoms that owned the wires that connected most companies’
WANs (wide area networks) sought to expand beyond the end of the
pipe, into the solutions game, as an additional means of tying customers
to their carrier services.
 Negatives
• Financially, the telecommunications service providers were behemoths next to
most solutions providers. Although officially reseller discounts went as high as
42% for Gold partners, some telecom companies were offering Cisco gear for
as much as 45%–50% off. Such service providers controlled the fixed line
(copper or fiber-optic) as well as the central office switch that facilitated the
voice-data-video pipeline that served the information needs of their
customers. In fact, in some cases, some of the service providers themselves
were classified as resellers and had the Gold or Silver label.
• The heart of the problem, however, lay in their business model. Unlike
resellers who made their money by adding value to the networking hardware
through installation and integration services, telecommunications service
providers provided an overarching set of products of which the network gear
was only a small part. They could thus afford to price such items aggressively,
completely undercutting the business model of the resellers.
Solutions to Channel Conflict
• -- set product boundaries
• -- set market/customer boundaries
• -- promote price convergence
• -- compensate for cost-to-serve differences
Option #1 - Construct Penalties or Incentives to
Level the Playing Field:
• It is clear that in Cisco’s case, seduced by the rapid expansion of the
markets and its exponential growth rates, the company had expanded
distribution.
• But when service providers like SBC, operating on a very different cost
structure and strategy, go up against Cisco’s VAR channel there is very little
they can do to gain an equal footing.
• As long as the service providers were direct end-users of Cisco’s networking
products, supplying them product for their own use was well within Cisco’s
stated multi-channel strategy and ensuring Customer Boundaries should
have sufficed.
• That is, Cisco could have served them directly and let the VARs know that
they were being treated as a house accounts. But when an end-customer
also acts as a distributor, it creates debilitating conflict.
Option #1 - Construct Penalties or Incentives to
Level the Playing Field:
• Other suppliers in other industries in a situation similar to Cisco have
usually addressed such a dilemma by working on the incentive structure.
• The products are billed and shipped to the end-user at full list price, and
end-user discounts provided only for those items where the user provides
proof of internal consumption.
• That way the cost of participating in the distribution business is rather
steep for the channel aspirant, who is then not eligible for the
Gold/Silver/Premier level type of discounts.
• Alternatively, of course, the supplier has to bite the bullet and avoid such a
relationship, even if this means providing an opening to competitors, or
forcing customers to receive products and services only from its already
appointed resellers.
Option#2 - Rationalize Distribution Intensity:
• Cisco’s solution, however, took a somewhat different turn than the one we
just sketched out. It did not solve the problem directly, tacitly
acknowledging the need to have telecom service providers as part of its
network.
• Instead, understanding that the root cause of the conflict was incumbent
dealers losing sales and margins, Cisco decided to offer them a chance to
boost these parameters.
• The company did this by cutting down its number of authorized resellers by
almost 50%. Much of the top 500 or so Gold, Silver and Premier
distributors continued to hold the Cisco franchise, but beyond that Cisco
was very selective in who it retained as part of its distribution system.
Option#2 - Rationalize Distribution Intensity:
• In the new environment, any general “box-mover” who neither had
scale nor value-adding expertise was cut. Cisco retained the
“juggernauts,” that is the consulting companies like IBM and
Accenture at one end, and the hardware value add resellers like
Select of Westwood, Massachusetts, at the other end, who brought
networking expertise to the hardware and software bundle, stayed as
part of the new Cisco distribution system.
• The rest, who were merely box pushers, were left out. Thus having
cleared the intense overlap of its distribution network, it created
breathing room for existing VARs to grow their business.
Option#2 - Rationalize Distribution Intensity:
• Moreover, Cisco implemented customized distribution profitability models to
help their channel partners manage their working capital, inventory and other
aspects of their business to enhance bottom-line performance.
• Certified channel partners improved their return on working capital by 50%,
return on invested capital by 300%, and customer satisfaction scores from an
average of 4.1 to 4.4 (on a 5-point scale).
• All this had the advantage of accomplishing two important goals for Cisco.
• First it provided Cisco a better handle on its channel partners’ business model, and their
customer service parameters.
• Second and most importantly, it communicated Cisco’s good faith efforts in addressing dealer
concerns with the loss of business in a tough competitive environment.
Providing qualified leads and assisting dealers in cultivating new markets and customers in
their assigned markets goes a long way in redressing a channel’s faith in their steward.
Conflict with the Small VARs over Direct Medium
and Small Customers through the Internet Channel
(i.e., Online Retailers):
• Cisco’s motivation in establishing the Online channel was to enable its
small customers the flexibility of receiving product from well-known online
retailers like CDW, under the assumption that these customers were
already shopping their for their other requirements.
• Essentially these customers would click on Cisco’s website to configure
and choose products; they then had the choice of getting products
through the local Cisco VAR or through one of the newly appointed
Internet retailers such as CDW or Micro Warehouse and so on.
• For Cisco the construction of this channel was a mere extension of its
already well-known B2B electronic supply chain for its resellers.
• The entire order entry and fulfillment system was automated to reduce
supply chain costs and make them effective and efficient
 Conflict with the Small VARs over Direct Medium
and Small Customers through the Internet Channel
(i.e., Online Retailers):
• While Cisco’s motivation in incorporating the large telecom companies can be justified by the
large volumes they could potentially bring to the business, the business logic of internet sales
through direct fulfillment retailers is hard to fathom, unless the company expects a
forthcoming explosion in demand from SMB businesses.
• This might be one more unnecessary straw when a lot was already going on in the VAR
channel.
• Conflict Resolution: It is clear that the internet retailer would have to go, unless the demand
projections indicated a need for them.
• VARs would have no problems if the company put up its site and either redirected customers
for fulfillment to them, or simply fulfilled the demand and paid them a commission. But the
situation could be more complicated.
• VARS value the customer access and information more than just the commission, because
with such an access, they would be able to cross-sell other products.
• Most importantly, they and not Cisco would have control of the customer.
Against the background of your answer to questions #1 and #2, how should
Cisco distribute VoIP products? Through voice VARs? Data VARs? Or both?

• The entry into the VoIP market is an important strategic thrust for the company.
The only way Cisco, a hot-growth company, can continue to grow is to enter other
important growth markets, and VoIP was estimated to grow from $3.5 billion to
$10.5 billion by 2008 making it very attractive for Cisco to enter.
• A 10 point market share would fetch it $1 billion in revenues, and obviously Cisco
would aim for considerably more than that. Even though VoIP was based on
Internet technology, it was clearly a substitute for traditional voice switches sold
by telecom companies through “voice VARs.”
• Moreover, telecom equipment companies like Avaya, Nortel and Siemens had
begun to offer VoIP switches, with Avaya leading the pack in terms of market
share. They already had relationships with voice VARs, who commanded higher
margins—20% plus, compared to “data VARs” who earned only about 12%. In
addition to the 20% margin, the voice VARs also earned margins on service flows.
Against the background of your answer to questions #1 and #2, how should
Cisco distribute VoIP products? Through voice VARs? Data VARs? Or both?

Cisco’s dilemma then is:

• Option #1- Go ahead and appoint voice VARs for VoIP.
• Option #2- Stay with existing data VARs to sell VoIP products.
• Option #3- Give VoIP products to existing data VARs, but also appoint
voice VARs.
Against the background of your answer to questions #1 and #2, how should
Cisco distribute VoIP products? Through voice VARs? Data VARs? Or both?

Option #1
Appoint Voice VARs Pros

Provides readymade access to customers

Creates an automatic channel for future products

Cons

They need higher margins

Creates conflict with existing data VARs

Most good VARs are probably already aligned with traditional telecom switch makers
Against the background of your answer to questions #1 and #2, how should
Cisco distribute VoIP products? Through voice VARs? Data VARs? Or both?

Option #2
Stay with Data VARS Pros

With market maturation, they need additional sources of income, and this will be a reward for their loyalty.

They would be willing to work with the lower “data” margins.

Cons

Do not have connections to the customer and do not understand their service needs
Against the background of your answer to questions #1 and #2, how should
Cisco distribute VoIP products? Through voice VARs? Data VARs? Or both?

Option #3 Appoint Both

Pros

Can appoint the best dealer for the task and market at hand.

Cons

Margin structure will be problematic. Lower margin will not work for voice VARs. Higher margins could corrupt Data VARs.

Will exacerbate intra-channel conflict on the full line.

What Happened?

• Cisco chose to go with voice VARs in selected markets. Some of its

Data VARs who were either qualified, or were willing to invest in the
learning, were also awarded the distributorship. To harmonize the
channel margins, VOIP products were backed up by a VIP (Value
Incentive Program), which rewarded a VAR with additional discounts,
90 days after the transaction was completed. This was a way of
attenuating the potential to bleed away the channel margins. With
aggressive VIP discounts of 20% initially, Cisco gained rapid
distribution.
•
The Concept of the Pyramid Model in Figure A
and what it Entails.
• In 2004, Cisco’s gross margins are about 69%, its net profit has soared in
2004 to about 20%. This number was in the 15% range in years prior. Its
ROA is about 12% and ROE about 16%. Its SG&A at 24% is higher than its
R&D expenditure at about 15%. By and large Cisco is almost like a
pharmaceutical company, high R&D and high selling costs.
• Dell’s model is very different. Its R&D is minimal and so is its SG&A. By
comparison IBM is service intensive. The question is, can Cisco be a
consulting company like IBM for A and B customers and an intensely cost
competitive hardware company like Dell for customers in the B, C & D
segments? The answer is perhaps not.
• And of course as one gets to even smaller segments the channel blueprint
does not initially appear to make sense. So one has to go behind the Sidhu
quote to understand Figure A
The Concept of the Pyramid Model in Figure A
and what it Entails.
• Essentially the company is espousing its desire to fit different pipes to the different
segment that bring a different channel skill (appropriate to the customer need in that
segment).
• It is an innovative concept in that it is not dependant on the channel intermediaries or
the system as it stands today, but is aimed at evolving with the changing needs of the
customer environment.
• Much of its channel evolution thus far has indeed tracked the philosophy outlined in that
figure. Its implications for the new segments that Cisco wants to get into must be
explored.
• Given the aggressive growth goals set by its CEO, Chambers, the Pyramid model would
certainly entail creating multiple channels to best fit the markets’ needs.
• What this means is that managing multiple channels and going through a constant
evolution, as characterized by its “Data” channels, will become a way of life at Cisco.
There is a limit to how much churn the channel can take. Even though the concept is
innovative, unless growth can be sustained, the success of such a plan is questionable.