BILL OF RIGHTS

Preliminaries

• Definition. The set of prescriptions setting forth the

fundamental civil and political rights of the individual,
and imposing limitations on the powers of government
as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights.
• Civil Rights refer to those rights that belong to every
citizen, not connected with the organization or
administration of government. They include the rights to
property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom
of contract, etc.

• Political Rights refer to the right to participate, directly

or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government, e.g., the right of suffrage, the right to hold
public office.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
• Sec. 1, Art. Ill: “No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law x x x”

• Defined as a law which hears before it condemns,

which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial. (Darmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheaton 518) [In the higher interest of justice and
fair play.]
• The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal
cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me
first!”(Ynot v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987)

• The Ynot case. RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, v.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE
STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED
NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO
and the REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
respondents.
• FACTS. Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when
they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. No. 626-A which
prohibits the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. Petitioner sued for recovery, and the trial Court of
Iloilo issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas
bond of twelve thousand pesos (P 12, 000.00). After considering
the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the
said carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
• ISSUE: Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.

• RULING:

• Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this case for the reason
that the present condition demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved
for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs, it does not
however, comply with the second requisite for a valid exercise of the said power
which is, "that there be a lawful method." The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is
missing. 

• The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its
authority in behalf of the public, it must be: 1) The interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; 2) that the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
• Doctrines.

• It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions

of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language
to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct
interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due
process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not
followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In
fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it
was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued
against it. He was sustained by the body. (Aruego, The
Framing of the Constitution (1936), pp. 153-159.)
• “The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so
it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
necessary because due process is not, like some
provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying
down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best
virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due
process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every
situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the
changing times and circumstances may require.”
• Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, would go no farther than to define
due process — and in so doing sums it all up — as
nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of
the sporting idea of fair play.” (Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp. 32-33.)
• The closed mind has no place in the open
society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear
"the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision
is made by those who sit in judgment.
• Aspects of due process:

• Substantive due process - This serves as a

restriction on government's law and rule- making
powers. The requisites are: i) The interests of the
public, in general, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the intervention of the State,
and ii) The means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive on individuals. [Otherwise, the law may be
classified as a class legislation.]
• Class legislation discriminating against some and
favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a
reasonable basis, and to made arbitrarily or capriciously,
is permitted. The trues governing classification are
briefly as follows: The classification must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not
be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class. (Malcolm,
Philippine Constitutional law, 2d ed., page 343.)
(Emphasis ours.)
• Procedural due process. - This serves as a restriction on actions
of judicial and quasi- judicial agencies of government.

• Requisites:

• i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to

hear and determine the matter before it;

• ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the

defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of
the proceeding;

• iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and

• iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

• Impartiality. “Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure
but above suspicion.” And, “As stated earlier, in Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A judge is not
only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be
impartial. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.” “Officers of the
court have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed with
evenly and fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial, but
they must also appear to be honest and impartial in the
dispensation of justice.” (FERNANDO DELA CRUZ,
complainant, vs. JUDGE JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, RTC, Branch
166, Pasig City, respondent, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1567. January 19,
2001)
• Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly
and expeditious presentation of evidence, and have the
duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the
issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses,
and address the points overlooked by counsel. (People v.
Herida, G.R. No. 127158, March 5, 2001)

• Note: RULE 128. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS in

EVIDENCE. Section 1: Evidence is the means,
sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a
judicial proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of
fact.
• Jurisdiction.

• MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC vs. HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 130974. August 16, 2006.]

• FACTS: Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court

issued a Summons addressed to petitioner at Alexandra Homes, E2
Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.

• The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served

upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at
the condominium unit mentioned earlier. When petitioner failed to file
her Answer, the trial court declared her in default. Petitioner, filed a
Motion to Dismiss via special appearance on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid
substituted service of summons.
• ISSUE: Whether or not the substituted service was valid.

• HELD: NO. Requirements for Substituted Service, Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised
Rules of Court which applies to this case can be broken down to the following requirements: (1)
Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service (2) Specific Details in the Return (3) A Person of
Suitable Age and Discretion (4) A Competent Person in Charge.

• A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material data
on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no
clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the
conclusion that personal service has become impossible or unattainable outside the generally
couched phrases of “on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the
summons . . . personally,” “at reasonable hours during the day,” and “to no avail for the
reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises.”

• Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to
locate the defendant through more direct means. Respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate that
there was strict compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section
7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the proceedings held before the trial
court perforce must be annulled.
• While jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired by the service of summons, it can
also be acquired by voluntary appearance before the court, which includes submission of
pleadings in compliance with the order of the court or tribunal. (De los Santos v. NLRC, G.R. No.
121327, December 20, 2001)

• Exception: “This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party
who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the courts jurisdiction over his person
cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.”

• Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

• (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;

• (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant
must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and

• (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially
in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the
court for resolution.(PCIB v. Sps. Dy Hong Pi, G.R. No. 171137, June 5, 2009)
• Opportunity to be heard. Note the different technicalities of
criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings, judicial and
quasi-judicial functions, and quantum of evidence required for
each.

• “Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically

in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due
process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to
respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all
in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what
happened.” Court said:
• “x x x the fear of petitioner of being ‘stripped of family,
property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds,
without an inkling of what happened’ is a mere product
of an overactive imagination. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of
one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.”
• There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to
issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to
the petition.

• The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative

of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment
which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the
hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or
dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were
required before such acts could be prevented. (JESUS C. GARCIA,
Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, G.R. No.
179267, June 25, 2013; Tua v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 170101, January
22, 2014)
• “The two principal parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
on 26 June 2000, whereby the City of Baguio authorized Jadewell to
regulate and collect parking fees for on-street parking in the city, as well as
to implement the installation of modern parking meters.”

• “The legal disputes embodied in the nine Petitions began when the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City (Sanggunian) revoked the MOA
through City Resolution No. 037, Series of 2002 (Resolution 37), alleging
substantial breach of the MOA on the part of Jadewell.”

• “In order to consider the due process argument, this Court must first
determine whether the MOA was entered into by the City of Baguio in a
governmental capacity, or in a purely proprietary capacity.”

• “The regulation of on-street and off-street parking is a governmental

function that can be exercised by local governments.”
• “x x x was it necessary for the City of Baguio to provide Jadewell an
opportunity to air its side on the matter before the former implemented the
rescission of the MOA? In the instant case, was Jadewell deprived of
procedural due process?”

• “We answer in the negative. In Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. The

Board of Transportation, we confronted the issue of whether the petitioners
were denied procedural due process when the respondent Board of
Transportation issued a circular ordering the phasing out of old vehicles
to be used as taxicabs. In the said case, the phase-out was embodied in a
circular that was promulgated without holding a public hearing or at least
requiring those affected to submit their position papers on the policy to be
implemented.”

• “Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is

neither violative of procedural due process.” As held in Central Bank vs. Hon.
Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):
• “Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process, are
constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights,
as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence
of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past
act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to
the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future
conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides
otherwise.”

• “In the instant case, the assailed act by the Sanggunian Panlungsod in
rescinding the MOA – be it first or second act of rescission – was clearly in
the exercise of its legislative or administrative functions and was
not an exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The
Sanggunian Panlungsod does not possess any judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.” (Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Baguio City v. Jadewell
Parking Systems Corporation, G.R. No. 160025, April 23, 2014)
• Note: SECTION 61, Chapter 4, Title 1, Book 1 of the Local Governtment
Code: “Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. - A verified
complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as
follows:

• (a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly

urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall
be filed before the Office of the President;

• (b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be

filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan whose decision may be
appealed to the Office of the President; and

• (c) A complaint against any elective Barangay official shall be filed

before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan
concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.”
• “All levels of the sanggunian, except the sangguniang
barangay which exercises only legislative functions, are
invested wtih dual functions, namely: (1) as a legislative
body and (2) as a quasi-judicial body.” (DILG
Opinion No. 22, Series of 2009)
• Lawful hearing. “Sin perjuicio judgment, which is a judgment without a statement of
the facts in support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the final judgment.” (2
Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court 440, 1966) cited in Dizon v. Judge
Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-961338, September 5, 1997.

• Note: “As a general rule, final and executory judgments are immutable and unalterable,
except under these recognized exceptions, to wit: (a) clerical errors; (b) nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party; and (c) void judgments.”

• In Briones-Vazquez v. Court of Appeals, [G.R. No. 144882. February 04, 2005],

nunc pro tunc judgments have been defined and characterized as follows: “The object
of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the
ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on
the record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth,
so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors,
such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the
one it did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however
erroneous the judgment may have been.”
• “A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
"chilling effect" upon protected speech. x x x” “This
rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area
of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.” (SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE
ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. v. ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL, G.R. No. 178552, October 5,
2010)
• Note:

• Appeal is not a natural right nor part of due process. But if the
Constitution or law gives a person right to appeal, denial thereof is
a violation of due process. (Translation: Hindi dapat alisan ng
buhay, kalayaan, or ari-arian ang sino mang tao nang hindi
kaparaanan ng batas, ni pagkaitan ang sino mang tao ng
pantay na pangangalaga ng batas.)

• Preliminary Investigation is not a constitutional right, but

statutory. Yet, while the right is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a component of due process in administering
criminal justice [Victor Jose Tan Uyv. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 156399-400, July 27, 2008].
• Bar. Distinguish probable cause in preliminary investigation v. warrants.

• “Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the

Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive
Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the
prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial
review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has
exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law.” (Ampatuan, Jr. v Sec. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, April 3,
2013) Note: Judicial determination of probable cause.
• Administrative due process. In Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil 635, the Court enumerated the
requisites of administrative due process, as follows:

• (a) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in
support thereof;

• (b) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

• (c) The decision must have something to support itself;

• (d) The evidence must be substantial;

• (e) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties;

• (f) The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision; and

• (g) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding will know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision.
 EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
• Sec. 1, Art. Ill: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws”. (No person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws.)

• Meaning. All persons or things similarly situated

should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Natural and juridical persons
are entitled to this guarantee; but with respect to
artificial persons, they enjoy the protection only insofar
as their property is concerned.
• Exception: Valid classification. Persons or things ostensibly
similarly situated may, nonetheless, be treated differently if
there is a basis for valid classification. The requisites are:

• a) Substantial distinctions which make for real differences;

• b) Germane to the purpose of the law;

• c) Not limited to existing conditions only; and

• d) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

• The case of “s” or Biraogo v. PTC, G.R.No. 193036, Dec. 7, 2010.
Here, petitions assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 issued by then Pres. Aquino III.

• Particularly, in Sec. 2 thereof, “Powers and Functions. The

Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body
under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,
during the previous administration and thereafter submit its
finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman.”
• Ruling. It, however, does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
(Note: Legal, not absolute, equality.)
• “Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.
The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only.
The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.”

• “Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth

commission as nobly envisioned by the present administration.
Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the
earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test of
reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution.”
• The Davao City vagrancy case of PP. v. Siton and Sagarano, G.R. No. 169364,
September 18, 2009.

• Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged, after prior
surveillance by police authorities, with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code. (Note: ‘Any person found loitering about public or semi-public
buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets
without visible means of support.’)

• Respondents challenged the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that

the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Act. No. 519, then to Article 202 (2)
RPC, apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators,
since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise
performing ordinary peaceful acts.

• They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under
the Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus
permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
• In MTC, instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed,
respondents filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Article
202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad. municipal trial
court denied the motions and directed respondents anew to file their
respective counter-affidavits. The municipal trial court also declared that
the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the States police power and
justified by the Latin maxim salus populi est suprem(a) lex.

• Further, MTC says: “In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police
officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA with Annex A lucidly shows that there was a
prior surveillance conducted in view of the reports that vagrants and
prostitutes proliferate in the place where the two accused (among other
women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night and soliciting male
customer. Thus, on that basis the prosecution should be given a leeway to
prove its case.”
• Respondents filed certiorari and prohibition with RTC. On its pronouncement that
Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution, the trial court
declared:

• The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at
present runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the constitution as it offers no
reasonable classification between those covered by the law and those who are not.

• Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to
others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon
another in like case offending.

• Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of
the Revised Penal Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to
differentiate those who have no visible means of support by force of circumstance and
those who choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the proper subjects of
vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality.
• Issue: Whether Art. 202 (2) of RPC is unconstitutional.

• Held: Ponente (Ynares-Santiago, J.) starts with: “If a man is

called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even
as Michelangelo painted, or Beethoven composed music,
or Shakespeare wrote poetry. He should sweep streets so
well that all the hosts of Heaven and Earth will pause to
say, here lived a great street sweeper who did his job well.”
-Martin Luther King, Jr. (Meaning: “No work is
insignificant. All labor that uplifts humanity has dignity and
importance and should be undertaken with painstaking
excellence.”)
• Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge
has ever been made upon the constitutionality of Article 202
except now.

• The streets must be protected. Article 202 (2) does not violate
the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against
the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order
laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor
or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under
such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or
cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being
poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act
indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
• The streets must be made safe once more. Though a
mans house is his castle, (Villanueva v. Querubin, G.R.
No. L-26177, 48 SCRA 345.), outside on the streets, the
king is fair game.

• The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.

• Discriminatory provisions in the RPC:

• Prostitution, Adultery v. Concubinage, Article 351, which penalizes

any woman from contracting marriage within 300 days from the
termination of her marriage. This provision is discriminatory for it
curtails the right of a woman to marry under the stated circumstances
when no such penalty is imposed on the man who does the same.
Similarly, the effect of the provision is an enforced mourning period
on the part of the woman although none is imposed on the man.
Granted, the purpose of the provision is the protection of lineage or
avoiding confusion relative to paternity and filiation. However, this
purpose is already met by the Family Code of the Philippines as it
provides a sufficient framework to prevent doubtful paternity and
protect the rights of common children may be achieved without
restricting women's right to remarry.
• President Aquino has signed into law Republic Act
10655 decriminalizing premature marriage as contained
in the Revised Penal Code.

• Age of sexual consent is 14 under RPC: Statutory Rape.

• Unwed women may be dismissed from work or school in

the past. Now, NO. See Leus case.

• Rape in the past only against women, now men, too.But

rape law is still not fair to gender.
 RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015

• LEONEN, J.:

• Even men can become victims of rape.

• Before us is a criminal case for rape through sexual
assault committed against a 10-year-old boy. Accused
Richard Ricalde (Ricalde) was charged with rape as
described under the second paragraph of Section 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code, committed "[b ]y any person
who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault
by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or
anal orifice of another person."
• Richard Ricalde, prompted with lewd design, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserting
[sic] his penis into the anus of XXX who was
then ten (10) years of age against his will and
consent, to his damage and prejudice.
• The Anti-Rape Law of 199767 classified rape as a crime against persons68 and amended the
Revised Penal Code to include Article 266-A on rape through sexual assault:

• Article 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed.—Rape is Committed—

• 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

• a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

• b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

 • c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and

• d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or

is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present;

• 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances

mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
• Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also
known as "instrument or object rape,” "gender-free
rape,” or "homosexual rape.” The gravamen of rape
through sexual assault is "the insertion of the penis into
another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice.”
• x x x we address petitioner’s invocation of the "variance
doctrine" citing People v. Sumingwa.90 Section 4 in relation to
Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides for the "variance doctrine":

• SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation

and proof.—When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
• SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
another.—An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged
is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former continue or form part
of those constituting the latter.
• In the instant case, no variance exists between what was
charged and what was proven during trial. The
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all
elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.

• XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into

his] anus.” The slightest penetration into one’s sexual
organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the
crime of rape.
• The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s
dignity. The degree of penetration is not important. Rape
is an "assault on human dignity."
• Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is
punished by a special law (Republic Act No. 7610). It is
a progression from the Revised Penal Code to provide
greater protection for children. Justice Velasco suggests
that this is not so. He anchors his view on his
interpretation that Republic Act No. 7610 requires a
showing that apart from the actual coerced sexual act on
the 10-year-old, the child must also be exploited by
prostitution or by other sexual acts. This view is
inaccurate on grounds of verba legis and ratione legis.
• The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 7610 clearly provides that "children . . . who . . .
due to the coercion . . . of any adult . . . indulge in sexual
intercourse . . . are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse." The label "children
exploited in . . . other sexual abuse" inheres in a child who
has been the subject of coercion and sexual intercourse.

• Thus, paragraph (b) refers to a specification only as to

who is liable and the penalty to be imposed. The person
who engages in sexual intercourse with a child already
coerced is liable.
• It does not make sense for the law not to consider rape of
a child as child abuse. The proposal of Justice Velasco
implies that there has to be other acts of a sexual nature
other than the rape itself that will characterize rape as
child abuse. One count of rape is not enough. Child
abuse, in his view, is not yet present with one count of
rape.
• This is a dangerous calculus which borders on judicial
insensitivity to the purpose of the law. If we adopt his view, it
would amount to our collective official sanction to the idea that
a single act of rape is not debilitating to a child. That a single
act of rape is not a tormenting memory that will sear into a
child’s memory, frame his or her view of the world, rob him or
her of the trust that will enable him or her to have full and
diverse meaningful interactions with other human beings. In
my view, a single act of sexual abuse to a child, by law, is
already reprehensible. Our society has expressed that this is
conduct which should be punishable. The purpose and text of
the law already punish that single act as child abuse.
• Rape is rape. Rape of a child is
clearly, definitely, and universally
child abuse. (Penalty for First
par. v. Second par. varies.)
 PEDRO PEREZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 201414, April 18, 2018

• LEONEN, J.:

• Inserting a finger in a 12-year-old girl's vagina and

mashing her breasts are not only acts of lasciviousness
but also amount to child abuse punished under
Republic Act No. 7610.
• This Court cannot emphasize enough that "lust is no
respecter of time and place.” Thus, "rape can be
committed even in places where people congregate, in
parks, along the roadside, within school premises and
even inside a house where there are other occupants or
where other members of the family are also sleeping.”
• In People v. Amarela, this Court had occasion to correct a
generalization of all women, which amounted to a stereotype,
thus:

• More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell
her story of sexual depredation, rape cases are solely decided
based on the credibility of the testimony of the private
complainant. In doing so, we have hinged on the impression
that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit
that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it
is her natural instinct to protect her honor. However, this
misconception, particularly in this day and age, not only puts
the accused at an unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of
justice.
• The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence
sometime in 1960. In the case of People v. Taño, the Court
affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed robbers who took
turns raping a person named Herminigilda Domingo. The
Court, speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador, said:

• It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos,

would not admit that they have been abused unless that abuse
had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct to
protect their honor. We cannot believe that the offended party
would have positively stated that intercourse took place unless
it did actually take place.
• This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And
while the factual setting back then would have been
appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be
reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault[,] today, we
simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a
demure and reserved Filipino woman. We, should stay
away from such mindset and accept the realities of a
woman's dynamic role in society today; she who has over
the years transformed into a strong and confidently
intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her
rights.
• This Court then found the alleged victim's statement as
less credible than the inferences from the other
established evidence and proceeded to acquit the
accused.
• This Court in Amarela, however, did not go as far as
denying the existence of patriarchal dominance in many
social relationships. Courts must continue to be sensitive
to the power relations that come clothed in gender roles.
In many instances, it does take courage for girls or
women to come forward and testify against the boys or
men in their lives who, perhaps due to cultural roles,
dominate them. Courts must continue to acknowledge
that the dastardly illicit and lustful acts of men are often
veiled in either the power of coercive threat or the
inconvenience inherent in patriarchy as a culture.
• Even if it were true that AAA was infatuated with the
accused, it did not justify the indignity done to her. At the
tender age of 12, adolescents will nonnally be misled by
their hormones and mistake regard or adoration for love.
The aggressive expression of infatuation from a 12-year-
old girl is never an invitation for sexual indignities.
Certainly, it does not deserve the accused's mashing of
her breasts or the insertion of his finger into her vagina.
• Consistent with our pronouncement in Amarela, AAA
was no Maria Clara. Not being the fictitious and
generalized demure girl, it does not make her testimony
less credible especially when supported by the other
pieces of evidence presented in this case.
• By analogy with the ruling in Ricalde, children who are
likewise coerced in lascivious conduct are "deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse." When petitioner inserted his finger into the
vagina of AAA, a minor, with the use of threat and
coercion, he is already liable for sexual abuse.
 G.R. No. 217910 - JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS, III,
PETITIONER, v. CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL,
RESPONDENT
September 03, 2019
• LEONEN, J.:

• Cultural hegemony often invites people to conform to its impositions on their

identities. Yet, there are some who, despite pressures, courageously choose to be
authentic to themselves. This case is about the assurance of genuine individual
autonomy within our constitutional legal order. It is about the virtue of tolerance
and the humane goal of non-discrimination. It is about diversity that encourages
meaningful—often passionate—deliberation. Thus, it is about nothing less than
the quality of our freedom.

• This Court does not have a monopoly in assuring this freedom. With the most
difficult political, moral, and cultural questions, the Constitution requires that we
share with the political departments of government, especially with Congress, the
quest for solutions which balance interests while maintaining fealty to
fundamental freedoms.
• Adjudication enables arguments between parties with respect to the
existence and interpretation of fundamental freedoms. On the other
hand, legislation ideally allows public democratic deliberation on the
various ways to assure these fundamental rights. The process of
legislation exposes the experiences of those who have been oppressed,
ensuring that they are understood by those who stand with the majority.
Often, public reason needs to be first shaped through the crucible of
campaigns and advocacies within our political forums before it is
sharpened for judicial fiat.

• Judicial wisdom is, in large part, the art of discerning when courts
choose not to exercise their perceived competencies.

• In this case, this Court unanimously chooses the path of caution.

• Those with sexual orientations other than the
heteronormative, gender identities that are transgender or
fluid, or gender expressions that are not the usual
manifestations of the dominant and expected cultural
binaries—the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer,
intersex, and other gender and sexual minorities
(LGBTQI+) community—have suffered enough
marginalization and discrimination within our society.
We choose to be careful not to add to these burdens
through the swift hand of judicial review.
• The pleadings assert a broad right of same-sex couples to
official legal recognition of their intimate choices. They
certainly deserve legal recognition in some way.
However, whether such recognition should come by way
of the exact same bundle of rights granted to
heterosexual couples in our present laws is a proposition
that should invite more public discussion in the halls of
Congress.

• Given the factual context of this case, this Court declines,

for now, to grant the broad relief prayed for in the
Petition.
• Furthermore, the exercise of this Court's power of
judicial review is among the most elementary matters
imparted to aspiring lawyers. One who brandishes
himself a lawyer is rightly presumed to be well-
acquainted with the bare rudiments of court procedure
and decorum. To forget these rules and practices—or
worse, to purport to know them, but really, only to
exploit them by way of propaganda—and then, to jump
headlong into the taxing endeavor of constitutional
litigation is a contemptuous betrayal of the high
standards of the legal profession.
• Lawyers, especially those engaged in public interest
litigation, should always be mindful that their acts and
omissions before the courts do not only affect
themselves. By thrusting themselves into the limelight to
take up the cudgels on behalf of a minority class, public
interest lawyers represent the hopes and aspirations of a
greater mass of people, not always with the consent of all
the members of that class. Their errors and mistakes,
their negligence and lethargy have a ripple effect even on
persons who have no opportunity to consent to the
stratagems and tactics employed by ill-prepared and
sophomoric counsels.
• From its plain text, the Constitution does not define or
restrict marriage on the basis of sex, gender, sexual
orientation, or gender identity or expression.
• Article XV of the 1987 Constitution concerns the family and
operates in conjunction with Article II, Section 12. Article
XV, Section 1 pertains to the family in general, identifying it
"as the foundation of the nation[,]" and articulates the State's
overarching commitment to "strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.” Article XV, Section 2
concerns marriage, in particular, and articulates a broad
commitment to protecting its inviolability as a social
institution. It states:

• SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is

the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
• Lacking a manifestly restrictive textual definition of
marriage, the Constitution is capable of accommodating
a contemporaneous understanding of sexual orientation,
gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics
(SOGIESC). The plain text and meaning of our
constitutional provisions do not prohibit SOGIESC.
• In a proper case, a good opportunity may arise for this
Court to review the scope of Congress' power to
statutorily define the scope in which constitutional
provisions are effected. This is not that case.
• Judicial review is inherent in this Court's judicial power. Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution states:

• SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

• Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

• Article VIII, Section 1 expands the territory of justiciable questions and

narrows the off-limits area of political questions.
• Nonetheless, the expansion of this Court's judicial power
is by no means an abandonment of the need to satisfy the
basic requisites of justiciability.
• Fundamentally, for this Court to exercise the immense
power that enables it to undo the actions of the other
government branches, the following requisites must be
satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
involving legal rights that are capable of judicial
determination; (2) the parties raising the issue must have
standing or locus standi to raise the constitutional issue;
(3) the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity, thus ripe for adjudication; and (4)
the matter of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case, or that constitutionality must be essential to
the disposition of the case.
• This Court's constitutional mandate does not include the duty to answer all
of life's questions.

• Here, the Petition cannot be entertained as a facial challenge to Articles 1,

2, 46(4), and 55(6) of the Family Code.

• A facial challenge is "an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its

flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.” It is distinguished from "as-applied" challenges,
which consider actual facts affecting real litigants.

• Facial challenges are only allowed as a narrow exception to the

requirement that litigants must only present their own cases, their extant
factual circumstances, to the courts.
• To be entertained by this Court, a facial challenge
requires a showing of curtailment of the right to freedom
of expression, because its basis is that an overly broad
statute may chill otherwise constitutional speech.
• Even now, under the regime of the textually broadened
power of judicial review articulated in Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is not dispensed with.
• The need to demonstrate an actual case or controversy is even more
compelling in cases concerning minority groups. This Court is a court of
law. We are equipped with legal expertise, but we are not the final
authority in other disciplines. In fields such as politics, sociology, culture,
and economics, this Court is guided by the wisdom of recognized
authorities, while being steered by our own astute perception of which
notions can withstand reasoned and reasonable scrutiny. This enables us to
filter unempirical and outmoded, even if sacrosanct, doctrines and biases.

• This Court exists by an act of the sovereign Filipino people who ratified
the Constitution that created it. Its composition at any point is not the result
of a popular election reposing its members with authority to decide on
matters of policy. This Court cannot make a final pronouncement on the
wisdom of policies. Judicial pronouncements based on wrong premises
may unwittingly aggravate oppressive conditions.
• The scrutiny on the existence of actual facts becomes
most necessary when the rights of marginalized, minority
groups have been thrust into constitutional scrutiny by a
party purporting to represent an entire sector.
• In Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections,175 this Court
acknowledged that the LGBTQI+ community has historically "borne
the brunt of societal disapproval":

• We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual
conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt
of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons
behind this censure — religious beliefs, convictions about the
preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or
distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these
"generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law. (Citation omitted)
• A common position taken by those who socially
disapprove of the LGBTQI+ community is that this
community violates the complementarity of the sexes.
Relying on natural law, the concept asserts that the sexual
differences between a man and a woman are constitutive
of one's identity, out of which the family is created.
• Consequently, this views the sexual orientation, gender
identity, and gender expression of members of the
LGBTQI+ community as unnatural, purely ideological,
or socially constructed. These identities are criticized for
being "often founded on nothing more than a confused
concept of freedom in the realm of feelings and wants, or
momentary desires provoked by emotional impulses and
the will of the individual, as opposed to anything based
on the truths of existence.” Lacking "an essential and
indispensable finality” —that is, procreative possibility
—"homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered and can
in no case be approved of.”
• However, contrary to this view, same-sex conduct is a natural
phenomenon:

• Homosexuality has been observed in most vertebrate groups, and

also among insects, spiders, crustaceans, octopi and parasitic worms.
The phenomenon has been reported in close to 1000* animal
species, and is well documented for half that number, but the real
extent is probably much higher.

• The frequency of homosexuality varies from species to species. In

some species, homosexuality has never been reported, while in
others the entire species is bisexual. In zoos around 1 in 5 pairs of
king penguins are of the same sex. The record is held by orange
fronted parakeets, where roughly half of all pairs in captivity are of
the same sex.
• At the moment, there is no consensus among
scientists about the exact reasons as to how an individual
develops a particular sexual orientation.
• Sexual orientation has also been correlated with
physiological features in the brain.

• It was not until the research of biologist Alfred Kinsey

and other scientists challenged the orthodoxy that
homosexuality was delisted as a mental disorder in the
next iteration of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.
• However, the official removal of homosexuality from the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual as a mental disorder
was not the last word on the subject. Homosexuality was
still considered a "disorder," and it was not until several
years later that all traces of what was mistakenly thought
to be a "disease" would be completely removed from the
manual.
• Homosexuality was officially removed from the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1986.
• The American Psychological Association's revision
marked the "beginning of the end of organized
medicine's official participation in the social
stigmatization of homosexuality” as similar movements
also followed. In 1990, the World Health Organization
removed homosexuality per se from the International
Classification of Diseases.
• Social forces have likewise shaped the use of penal laws
to further discrimination and persecution of the
LGBTQI+ community.
• There is a perception within the LGBTQI+ community
that the Philippines is considered among the most gay-
friendly countries in the world.
• Accounts on the pre-colonial Philippine society report that
different SOGIESC expressions were recognized and
accepted in the islands.

• For instance, the Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala, published

in 1860, and the Vocabulario de la Lengua Bicol, in 1865,
both make reference to the word asog, which refers to men
who dress in women's clothes and keep relations with fellow
men. These persons exercised significant roles in the pre-
colonial Philippine society and were even revered as
authorities.
• It was only during the arrival of the Spanish colonizers in
the Philippine islands that these activities previously
engaged in by the asog, bayoguin, and binabayi became
suppressed.
• In contemporary times, as this Court has noted, there is
no penalty in the Philippines for engaging in what may
be called "homosexual conduct."
• However, discrimination remains.
Hence, the call for equal rights and
legislative protection continues.
• To address the continuing discrimination suffered by the
LGBTQI+ community in the Philippines, a number of
legislative measures have been filed in Congress.
• While comprehensive anti-discrimination measures that
address the specific conditions faced by the LGBTQI+
community have yet to be enacted, Congress has made
headway in instituting protective measures. Republic Act
No. 11313, or the Safe Spaces Act, specifically addresses
"transphobic, homophobic, and sexist slurs" and
penalizes gender-based street and public spaces sexual
harassment.
• In the absence of a comprehensive national law, local
government units have passed ordinances recognizing
and upholding SOGIESC.
• Here, petitioner has no actual facts that present a real
conflict between the parties of this case. The Petition
presents no actual case or controversy.

• A substantive portion of the Petition merely parrots the

separate concurring opinion of retired Chief Justice Puno
in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, concerning the concept of
suspect classifications. Five (5) pages of the 29-page
Petition are block quotes from retired Chief Justice Puno,
punctuated by introductory paragraphs of, at most, two
(2) sentences each.
• A separate opinion is the expression of a justice's
individual view apart from the conclusion held by the
majority of this Court. Even first year law students
know that a separate opinion is without binding
effect.
• All told, petitioner's 29-page initiatory pleading neither cites nor
annexes any credible or reputable studies, statistics, affidavits,
papers, or statements that would impress upon this Court the
gravity of his purported cause. The Petition stays firmly in the
realm of the speculative and conjectural, failing to represent the
very real and well-documented issues that the LGBTQI+
community face in Philippine society.

• Even petitioner's choice of respondent exposes the lack of an actual

case or controversy.

• He claims that he impleaded the Civil Registrar General as

respondent because "it is the instrumentality of the government that
is tasked to enforce the law in relation with (sic) marriage[.]"
• Lest petitioner himself forget, what he asserts as ground
for the allowance of his suit is the existence of grave
abuse of discretion; specifically, grave abuse of
discretion in the enactment of the Family Code.
• Respondent Civil Registrar General was not involved in
the formulation or enactment of the Family Code. It did
not participate in limiting the definition of marriage to
only opposite-sex couples. That is the province and
power of Congress alone.
• Petitioner himself admitted that he has not suffered from
respondent's enforcement of the law he is assailing:

• JUSTICE BERNABE:

• Have you actually tried applying for a marriage license?

• ATTY. FALCIS:

• No, Your Honors, because I would concede that I do not have a

partner and that even if I do have a partner, it is not automatic
that my partner might want to marry me and so, Your Honors, I
did not apply or I could not apply for a marriage license.
• Aware of the need to empower and uphold the dignity of the
LGBTQI+ community, this Court is mindful that swift, sweeping,
and indiscriminate pronouncements, lacking actual facts, may do
more harm than good to a historically marginalized community.

• A proper ventilation of issues requires an appreciation of

marriage past its symbolic value and towards a holistic view of
its practical, cross-cutting, and even permanent consequences.
This entails an overlapping process of articulation, deliberation,
and consensus, which members of the LGBTQI+ community
must undertake within their circles and through the political
branches of the government, towards crafting a policy that truly
embraces the particularities of same-sex intimacies.
• More than being the "foundation of the family[,]” the
state of marriage grants numerous specific rights and
privileges that affect most, if not all, aspects of marital
and family relationships. (Family Code, NCC, Labor
Code, RPC, Taxation, Adoption, Succession, Insurance,
Rules of Court on privilege communication, Evidence,
Property rights, Donations, etc.)
• Yet, petitioner has miserably failed to show proof that he
has obtained even the slightest measure of consent from
the members of the community that he purports to
represent, and that LGBTQI+ persons are unqualifiedly
willing to conform to the State's present construct of
marriage.
• In truth, the question before this Court is a matter of what
marriage seeks to acknowledge. Not all intimate
relationships are the same and, therefore, fit into the
rights and duties afforded by our laws to marital
relationships.
• For this Court to instantly sanction same-sex marriage inevitably confines a class of
persons to the rather restrictive nature of our current marriage laws. The most injurious
thing we can do at this point is to constrain the relationships of those persons who did
not even take part or join in this Petition to what our laws may forbiddingly define as
the norm. Ironically, to do so would engender the opposite of loving freely, which
petitioner himself consistently raised:

• The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the other
formulaic. That is, that it is shaped alone by legal duty or what those who are dominant
in government regard as romantic. In truth, each commitment is unique, borne
of its own personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone
through, and defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the
parties creates.

• In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be different
for each couple. It is that which we should understand: intimacies that form the
core of our beings should be as free as possible, bound not by social
expectations but by the care and love each person can bring. (Emphasis
supplied)
• Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone
can delay other more inclusive and egalitarian
arrangements that the State can acknowledge. Many
identities comprise the LGBTQI+ community.
Prematurely adjudicating issues in a judicial forum
despite a bare absence of facts is presumptuous. It may
unwittingly diminish the LGBTQI+ community's
capacity to create a strong movement that ensures lasting
recognition, as well as public understanding, of
SOGIESC.
• Petitioner's supposed "personal stake in the outcome of this case" is not
the direct injury contemplated by jurisprudence as that which would
endow him with standing. Mere assertions of a "law's normative
impact"; "impairment" of his "ability to find and enter into long-term
monogamous same-sex relationships"; as well as injury to his "plans to
settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country”; or
influence over his "decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT
friendly country” cannot be recognized by this Court as sufficient
interest. Petitioner's desire "to find and enter into long-term
monogamous same-sex relationships” and "to settle down and have a
companion for life in his beloved country” does not constitute legally
demandable rights that require judicial enforcement. This Court will
not witlessly indulge petitioner in blaming the Family Code
for his admitted inability to find a partner.
• His fixation on how the Family Code is the definitive
cause of his inability to find a partner is plainly non
sequitur.
• It does not escape this Court's notice that the Family
Code was enacted in 1987. This Petition was filed only in
2015. Petitioner, as a member of the Philippine Bar, has
been aware of the Family Code and its allegedly
repugnant provisions, since at least his freshman year in
law school. It is then extraordinary for him to claim, first,
that he has been continually injured by the existence of
the Family Code; and second, that he raised the
unconstitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family
Code at the earliest possible opportunity.
• Petitioner's choice of remedy further emphasizes his
ignorance of basic legal procedure.

• Yet, petitioner's presentation of his case, which is lacking

in an actual or imminent breach of his rights, makes it
patently obvious that his proper remedy is not Rule 65,
but rather, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Still, it does not follow that this Court should proceed to
exercise its power of judicial review just because a case is
attended with purely legal issues. Jurisdiction ought to be
distinguished from justiciability. Jurisdiction pertains to
competence "to hear, try[,] and decide a case.” On the other
hand,

• [d]etermining whether the case, or any of the issues raised, is

justiciable is an exercise of the power granted to a court with
jurisdiction over a case that involves constitutional
adjudication. Thus, even if this Court has jurisdiction, the
canons of constitutional adjudication in our jurisdiction
allow us to disregard the questions raised at our discretion.
• Here, petitioner wagered in litigation no less than the future
of a marginalized and disadvantaged minority group. With
palpable vainglory, he made himself the lead plaintiff and
also represented himself, only seeking assistance from other
counsel for oral arguments. By deciding to place this
burden upon himself, petitioner should have acted with
utmost care and thoughtfulness, drawing upon the limits of
his skill and knowledge, to represent the LGBTQI+ cause.

• However, at every stage of these proceedings, petitioner

only exposed his utter lack of preparation, recklessness, and
crudeness.
• Petitioner and his co-counsel's reference to the
"impulsivity of youth” utterly fails to impress. If at all,
this Court sees this as a deodorized admission of
unreadiness and impotence.
• Diligence is even more important when the cause
lawyers take upon themselves to defend involves
assertions of fundamental rights.
• One who touts himself an advocate for the marginalized must know
better than to hijack the cause of those whom he himself proclaims to
be oppressed. Public interest lawyering demands more than the cursory
invocation of legal doctrines, as though they were magical incantations
swiftly disengaging obstacles at their mere utterance. Public interest
advocacy is not about fabricating prestige. It is about the discomfort of
taking the cudgels for the weak and the dangers of standing against the
powerful. The test of how lawyers truly become worthy of esteem and
approval is in how they are capable of buckling down in silence,
anonymity, and utter modesty—doing the spartan work of research and
study, of writing and self-correction. It is by their grit in these
unassuming tasks, not by hollow, swift appeals to fame, that they are
seasoned and, in due time, become luminaries, the standard by which
all others are measured.
• Petitioner courted disaster for the cause he chose to
represent. He must have known what was at stake. Yet,
he came to this Court scandalously unprepared, equipped
with nothing more than empty braggadocio. For a shot at
fame, he toyed with the hopes and tribulations of a
marginalized class.
• Our freedom to choose the way we structure our intimate
relationships with our chosen significant other in a large
sense defines us as human beings. Even opposite-sex
couples continually adjust the day-to-day terms of their
partnership as their relationships mature. It is in the
sanctuary of their spaces that we authentically evolve,
become better human beings, and thus contribute
meaningfully within our society. After all, the
companionship and understanding that we inevitably
discover with the person we choose to spend the rest of
our lives with provide the foundation for an ethic of care
that enriches a democracy.
• This Court sympathizes with the petitioner with his
obvious longing to find a partner. We understand the
desire of same-sex couples to seek, not moral judgment
based on discrimination from any of our laws, but rather,
a balanced recognition of their true, authentic, and
responsive choices.
• Yet, the time for a definitive judicial fiat may not yet be
here. This is not the case that presents the clearest actual
factual backdrop to make the precise reasoned judgment
our Constitution requires. Perhaps, even before that
actual case arrives, our democratically-elected
representatives in Congress will have seen the wisdom of
acting with dispatch to address the suffering of many of
those who choose to love distinctively, uniquely, but no
less genuinely and passionately.
 OBERGEFELL ET AL. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.
June 26, 2015;
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
• Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define
marriage as a union between one man and one woman.
The petitioners, 14 same-sex couples and two men whose
same-sex partners are deceased, filed suits in Federal
District Courts in their home States, claiming that
respondent state officials violate the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to
have marriages lawfully performed in another State given
full recognition. Each District Court ruled in petitioners’
favor, but the Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and
reversed.
• The history of marriage as a union between two persons
of the opposite sex marks the beginning of these cases.
To the respondents, it would demean a timeless
institution if marriage were extended to same-sex
couples. But the petitioners, far from seeking to devalue
marriage, seek it for themselves because of their respect
—and need—for its privileges and responsibilities, as
illustrated by the petitioners’ own experiences.
• The history of marriage is one of both continuity and
change. Changes, such as the decline of arranged
marriages and the abandonment of the law of coverture,
have worked deep transformations in the structure of
marriage, affecting aspects of marriage once viewed as
essential. These new insights have strengthened, not
weakened, the institution. Changed understandings of
marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new
dimensions of freedom become apparent to new
generations.

• This dynamic can be seen in the Nation’s experience with

gay and lesbian rights.
• Well into the 20th century, many States condemned same-sex
intimacy as immoral, and homosexuality was treated as an
illness. Later in the century, cultural and political developments
allowed same-sex couples to lead more open and public lives.
Extensive public and private dialogue followed, along with shifts
in public attitudes. Questions about the legal treatment of gays
and lesbians soon reached the courts, where they could be
discussed in the formal discourse of the law. In 2003, this Court
overruled its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S.
186, which upheld a Georgia law that criminalized certain
homosexual acts, concluding laws making samesex intimacy a
crime “demea[n] the lives of homosexual persons.”Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 575.
• In 2012, the federal Defense of Marriage Act was also
struck down. United States v. Windsor, 570

• U. S. ___. Numerous same-sex marriage cases reaching

the federal courts and state supreme courts have added to
the dialogue.
• The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain
personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal
identity and beliefs.
• Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying
interests of the person so fundamental that the State must
accord them its respect. History and tradition guide and
discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.
When new insight reveals discord between the
Constitution’s central protections and a received legal
stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.
• Applying these tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is
protected by the Constitution. For example, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.
S. 1, 12, invalidated bans on interracial unions, and Turner v. Safley,
482 U. S. 78, 95, held that prisoners could not be denied the right to
marry. To be sure, these cases presumed a relationship involving
opposite-sex partners, as did Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810, a one-line
summary decision issued in 1972, holding that the exclusion of same-
sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal
question. But other, more instructive precedents have expressed
broader principles. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra, at 574. In assessing
whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex couples,
the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has
been long protected. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, supra, at 453–454. This
analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise
the right to marry.
• Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with
equal force to same-sex couples. The first premise of this
Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy. This abiding connection between marriage and
liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans
under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12. Decisions
about marriage are among the most intimate that an
individual can make. See Lawrence, supra, at 574. This is
true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.
• A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that
the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a
two-person union unlike any other in its importance to
the committed individuals. The intimate association
protected by this right was central to Griswold v.
Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the
right of married couples to use contraception, 381 U. S.,
at 485, and was acknowledged in Turner, supra, at 95.
Same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex
couples to enjoy intimate association, a right extending
beyond mere freedom from laws making same-sex
intimacy a criminal offense.
• A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of
childrearing, procreation, and education. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510. Without the recognition, stability, and
predictability marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing
their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant
material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated to a
more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue
thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples. See
Windsor, supra, at ___. This does not mean that the right to marry is
less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children.
Precedent protects the right of a married couple not to procreate, so
the right to marry cannot be conditioned on the capacity or
commitment to procreate.
• Finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions
make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s
social order. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 211.
• States have contributed to the fundamental character of marriage by
placing it at the center of many facets of the legal and social order.
There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples
with respect to this principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the
constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage and
are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would
find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a
central institution of the Nation’s society, for they too may aspire to
the transcendent purposes of marriage.

• The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have

seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central
meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.
• (3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in
liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts
and are not always coextensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning
and reach of the other. This dynamic is reflected in Loving, where the Court
invoked both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause; and in
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, where the Court invalidated a law barring
fathers delinquent on child-support payments from marrying. Indeed,
recognizing that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified
inequality within fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and
unchallenged, this Court has invoked equal protection principles to invalidate
laws imposing sexbased inequality on marriage, see, e.g., Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455, 460–461, and confirmed the relation between liberty
and equality, see, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 120–121.
• The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these
constitutional safeguards in the context of the legal treatment
of gays and lesbians. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 575. This
dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. The challenged
laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and they
abridge central precepts of equality. The marriage laws at
issue are in essence unequal: Same-sex couples are denied
benefits afforded opposite-sex couples and are barred from
exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long
history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial
works a grave and continuing harm, serving to disrespect and
subordinate gays and lesbians.
• The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the
liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right
and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the
fundamental right to marry. Baker v. Nelson is overruled.
The State laws challenged by the petitioners in these
cases are held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex
couples from civil marriage on the same terms and
conditions as opposite-sex couples.
• (5) There may be an initial inclination to await further
legislation, litigation, and debate, but referenda,
legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns; studies
and other writings; and extensive litigation in state and
federal courts have led to an enhanced understanding of
the issue.
• While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is
the appropriate process for change, individuals who are
harmed need not await legislative action before asserting
a fundamental right. Bowers, in effect, upheld state
action that denied gays and lesbians a fundamental right.
Though it was eventually repudiated, men and women
suffered pain and humiliation in the interim, and the
effects of these injuries no doubt lingered long after
Bowers was overruled.
• A ruling against same-sex couples would have the same effect
and would be unjustified under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The petitioners’ stories show the urgency of the issue they
present to the Court, which has a duty to address these claims
and answer these questions. Respondents’ argument that
allowing samesex couples to wed will harm marriage as an
institution rests on a counterintuitive view of opposite-sex
couples’ decisions about marriage and parenthood. Finally, the
First Amendment ensures that religions, those who adhere to
religious doctrines, and others have protection as they seek to
teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their
lives and faiths.
• (c) The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to
recognize samesex marriages validly performed out of
State. Since same-sex couples may now exercise the
fundamental right to marry in all States, there is no
lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful
same-sex marriage performed in another State on the
ground of its same-sex character.
• No union is more profound than marriage, for it
embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion,
sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two
people become something greater than once they were.
As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate,
marriage embodies a love that may endure even past
death.
• It would misunderstand these men and women to say
they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that
they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to
find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be
condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of
civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal
dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution
grants them that right.
 The 2009 documentary “Edie & Thea: A Very
Long Engagement.”;
US v. Windsor
• On February 2009, Spyer died at home. Two months later, her widow
suffered a heart attack, later calling it “broken-heart syndrome.”

• As Windsor grieved, she was hit with $363,053 in federal inheritance taxes
on her wife’s estate. Because the federal government didn’t recognize her
marriage, she wasn’t eligible for the estate-tax exemption afforded to
spouses. With the help of prominent civil-rights lawyer Roberta Kalpan,
Windsor filed a lawsuit in 2010.

• The case made its way to the Supreme Court where, on June 26, 2013, the
justices issued a 5–4 decision declaring Section 3 of the Defense Of
Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional—and mandating that federal
spousal benefits be granted to same-sex couples. Fifty years after Spyer and
Windsor’s love story began, it fundamentally changed LGBT rights.
 Obergefell v. Hodges:
Jim & John
• The day the United States v. Windsor ruling was announced, a
couple in Cincinnati, who had been together for 20 years, decided
to wed.

• Obergefell and Arthur weren’t activists; they concentrated on

working hard and being solid citizens. Almost 20 years into their
relationship, in the winter of 2011, Obergefell noticed something
unusual: His partner’s foot was slapping the ground as he walked,
and he was starting to fall. Doctors diagnosed Amyotrophic
Lateral Sclerosis, or ALS, more commonly known as Lou
Gehrig’s disease. It progressed fast: Within two years, he was
confined to a bed and Obergefell took on the role of caretaker.
• But in Ohio, it wasn’t that simple. The state didn’t
recognize same-sex marriages. In fact, in 2004 the state’s
constitution was amended to prohibit the recognition of
same-sex marriages.

• They needed to go to a state that recognized same-sex

unions, but Arthur wasn’t well enough to travel to obtain
a marriage license in another state. Obergefell began to
search for a nearby state where gay marriage was legal
and where only one partner was required to apply for the
license.
• Maryland fit the bill. To get his wheelchair-bound partner
there, Obergefell turned to his friends and family on
Facebook, who donated $13,000 to help him secure a
medical plane and a nurse to fly them there. On July 11,
2013, one of Arthur’s aunts, Paulette Roberts (who had
gotten herself ordained) married the two longtime
partners on the tarmac at the Baltimore-Washington
International Airport. Arthur couldn’t leave the plane.
• When a neighbor mentioned their union to a local civil-
rights attorney, Al Gerhardstein, he advised them of the
legal complications ahead. Under current Ohio law, when
Arthur died, Obergefell would not be listed as his legal
spouse on his death certificate.
• Just over a week after their wedding, Obergefell filed a
lawsuit, with Ohio Governor John Kasich as the lead
defendant. The district court ruled in Obergefell’s favor.
When Arthur died three months after their wedding, in
late 2013, his death certificate listed Jim Obergefell as
his spouse.
• Officials in five states—Indiana, Oklahoma, Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Utah—appealed to the Supreme Court to
have same-sex marriage banned. Each time, the Supreme
Court refused to hear the cases, sending the issue back to
the states. In November 2014, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld bans on same-sex marriage in six
cases, from four states—including Ohio, where Arthur’s
death certificate would be updated to say “single.”
• It was the first time since the Windsor decision that a
federal appeals judge had ruled against gay marriage.
Already grieving, Obergefell was devastated that the
state was invalidating their marriage.
• The Obergefell v. Hodges decision came on June 26,
2015—the second anniversary of the ruling of United
States v. Windsor. In a 5–4 decision, the justices declared
that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to
same-sex couples.
• Theirs was a love that spanned 20 years, a terminal
diagnosis, marriage on a tarmac and ultimately one
partner’s premature death. Like Edie Windsor, Jim
Obergefell was asking for basic spousal rights. And like
her, he profoundly changed the marriage laws of the
United States.
 Loving v. Virginia
• Richard and Mildred Loving, the couple who defied the state’s
ability to dictate the terms of their love based on their skin color.
Mildred, who was of African American and Native American
descent, and Richard, who was white, wed in 1958 in Washington
D.C., because interracial marriage was illegal in their native rural
Virginia, as well as 15 other Southern U.S. states.

• When the Lovings returned to Virginia, however, local police

raided their home one early morning after being tipped off by
another resident. They declared the Lovings’ marriage license
invalid within the scope of the state, placing the couple under
arrest.
• The Lovings pled guilty to “cohabiting as man and wife, against the peace
and dignity of the Commonwealth,” and were sentenced to one year in
prison. A judge later agreed to suspend the sentence if Mildred and Richard
left Virginia and did not return for 25 years.

• The couple relocated to Washington, D.C., but they did not end their story
there. In 1964, attorneys from the ACLU filed a motion on behalf of the
Lovings, requesting the charges and sentences against the Lovings be
dropped. The Lovings appealed the local ruling all the way to the Supreme
Court, where their sentence was unanimously overturned in 1967.

• “Under our Constitution,” Chief Justice Earl Warren said in his decision,
“the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”
 SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG
KABATAAN (SPARK) V. QUEZON CITY,
[ G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017 ]

• At issue is the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances

issued by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila,
and Navotas.
• This is a case of first impression in which the
constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under
judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the
impact of these issuances on the right of parents to rear their
children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to
determine the extent of the State's authority to regulate these
rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is
of overarching significance to the public, which, therefore,
impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others,
the standing requirement.

• That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive

aspect of this case.The petition is partly granted.
• As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any
ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the
Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail
on how the age of a suspected minor would be
determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague
legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be
stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine.
• etitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth
without substantive due process.
• Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

• Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the

State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of
their children:

• Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
• As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated
to support parents in the exercise of these rights and
duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but
rather, complementary to parental supervision.
• Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew
Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain
in public places without parental accompaniment during the curfew
hours. In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of
discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to
abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors' activities.
As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit
reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her
child.

• Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances

positively influence children to spend more time at home.
Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities
to take a more active role in their children's upbringing.
• In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared
unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear
their children.
• Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the
Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel.

• Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

• That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake
an overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no
claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary,
however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed
regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
• The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a
fundamental right under Section 6, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, to wit:

• Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the

same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
• As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may
impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided
that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.
• For these reasons, the State is justified in setting
restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights,
provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.
• Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of
judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications. The strict scrutiny test applies when a
classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect
classes. The intermediate scrutiny test applies when
a classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such
as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy.
Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other
subjects not covered by the first two tests.
• Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right
in our legal system guaranteed no less by our
Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is the applicable
test.
• Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the
classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling
State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly
tailored to accomplish the interest.
• a. Compelling State Interest.

• Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests

include constitutionally declared policies. This Court has
ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to
protect and care for them as parens patriae constitute
compelling interests to justify regulations by the State.
• In this case, respondents have sufficiently established
that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to
keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night
time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally
eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to
insulate them against criminal pressure and influences
which may even include themselves.
• With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test
satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the
restrictions set forth in the Curfew Ordinances are
narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive
means to address the cited compelling State interest - the
second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
• b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

• The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems

from the fundamental premise that citizens should not be
hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the
exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may
be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to
the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address
the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for
governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to
avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must
be so narrowly drawn.
• After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective
provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while
the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
• This Court observes that these two ordinances are not
narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate
and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the
minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both
ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful
employment, and to travel at night from school or work.
However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas
Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance
still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the
minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion,
rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression,
among others.
• The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to
the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards
the minors' constitutional rights.
• As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of
exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more
narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights
of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
• To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes
his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate
activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely
observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case,
parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in
Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should
be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense.
As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this
exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic
premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary
to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes,
the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.
• To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment
of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when
the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an
offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what
they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for
violations of these regulations. Consequently, the
enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without
penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative.
• The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be
read to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation
of the regulations are without legal consequences.
Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to
adopt appropriate intervention programs, such as
community-based programs recognized under Section
54 of the same law.
• In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community
service is a valid form of intervention program that a
local government (such as Navotas City in this case)
could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the
welfare of minors.
• The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of
Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A
of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving
warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's
misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a
"gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning
against fault or oversight."
• In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-
based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties
- as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally
less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To
be clear, their objectives are to formally inform and
educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what
actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future
conduct.
• A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard
to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by
the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally
defined as "a severe or formal reproof."
• Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand,
undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our
various criminal and administrative laws and
jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, evidently prohibits.
• As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear,
categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty
shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of]
juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the
sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on
minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the
Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict
with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the
impositions of community service programs and
admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not
constitute penalties.
• CONCLUSION

• In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew

Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown
a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and
prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only
the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong
of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of
the three which provides for the least restrictive means to
achieve this interest.
• In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for
adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise
their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew
hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the
State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e.,
"[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has
also been construed to include parental permission as a
constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an
allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner
of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the
local government unit.
• In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared
unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the
Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and
thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.
• For another, the Court has determined that the Manila
Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A
of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that
ordinances should always conform with the law, these
provisions must be struck down as invalid.
SEARCH AND SEIZURES
• Sec. 2. Art. Ill: “The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue, except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by a judge,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
particularly describing the place to be searched, or the
persons or things to the seized.”
 “OFT-QUOTED in cases involving searches and
seizures is the principle that a mans home is his
castle. Not even the king would dare desecrate it. In
protecting his home, the poorest and most humble
citizen or subject may bid defiance to all the powers
of the State.[U.S. v. Arceo, 3 Phil. 381, 384 (1904).]
Indeed, a man is king in his
own house.”
–Justice Reyes’ opening statement in case of City Engineer of Baguio v.
Banuqued, G.R. No. 150270, November 26, 2008.
I. SEARCH WARRANTS
A. Meaning of Probable Cause
B. Territorial & Jurisdictional Questions
C. “One-Warrant-One-Offense” Rule
D. Particular Description of Place
E. Particular Description of Objects
F. Issues Relating to Execution of Warrants

II. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

A. Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest
B. “Stop and Frisk”
 C. Moving Vehicles and COMELEC Checkpoints
D. Plain View Doctrine
E. Waiver or Consented Search
F. Enforcement of Custom Laws
G. Airport/Seaport Security
H. Prison Search
I. Search by Private Persons
J. Exigency and Martial Law

III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

 I. SEARCH WARRANTS
A. Meaning of Probable Cause
1. For the purpose of issuing a Search Warrant, when is there “probable cause”?
Worldwide Web Corp. v. People, 713 SCRA 18 (2014) [“more likely than not”]
-An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, but a ‘special
criminal process’.
-An order quashing a search warrant may be appealed if it is applied for and
issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed. If it is issued as an
incident in a pending criminal case, it is interlocutory as in generally not
subject to appeal.
-A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and
minute detail. The warrant is valid when it enables the police offciers to
readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized.
2. How is probable cause for issuing a Search Warrant distinguished from
probable cause used as standard by the Prosecutor in charging a person in
court? Petron LPG v. Ang, 783 SCRA 162 (2016) [“both are resolved base on
the same degree of proof”].
3. Can a finding of probable cause be based on reliable information [“he
has been informed and has good reason to believe…”], and not on
personal knowledge of witnesses? Prudencio v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA
69 (1989). See also Betoy, Sr. v. Coliflores, 483 SCRA 435, (2006).
-No. Personal knowledge is required. Personal belief is not
enough.
4. What evidence is needed to establish probable cause that the person
to be searched is illegally possessing a firearm? PICOP v.
Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 (1999); People v. Estrada, 296 SCRA 383
(1998).
-Best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances, in
cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of
the offense charged for the offence, for instance absence of license
required by law, i.e. No License Certification from the Firearms and
Explosives Office of the PNP. (PICOP)
• “The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be followed strictly.”

• “Sec. 3 and 4 of ROC details the requisites for the issuance of search warrant, to wit:

• Probable cause;

• Such presence is determine personally by the judge;

• The complainant and the witnesses he may produce are personally examined by the judge,
in writing and under oath;

• The applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and

• The warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the thing to be seized.”
(PICOP)

• Note: Above must be strictly followed. Otherwise, invalid. Here, no personal examination
by the judge, no personal knowledge, and the place to be searched was not described with
particularity.
5. What is the effect if a Search Warrant is
issued for the seizure of two (2) prohibited
items [shabu and drug paraphernalia] but
there is probable cause only for one of
them? People v. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683
(2001).
-Severable. Valid as to shabu, invalid as to
drug paraphernalia.
B. Territorial/Jurisdictional Issues
1. Where should an application for a Search
Warrant be filed? Rule 126, Sec. 2,
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
(a) Any court within whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed. [See
Sony Computer v. Supergreen, Inc., 518
SCRA 75 (2007) (transitory offense]
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any
court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
   However, if the criminal action has already been
filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending.
[Note: Subject to Omnibus motion rule and forum
shopping. See latest case of Laud v. People on search
applied in Manila for property in Davao City in re: DDS.]
2. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Pasay City issued a Search Warrant
for the search of a residence in Quezon City because the applicant stated
in his deposition that the “shabu” to be seized might be removed [leakage].
Is that a “compelling reason”? People v. Chiu, 424 SCRA 72 (2004).
-Yes, otherwise enforcement of any search warrant would be a useless
effort.
3. Where a Search Warrant was issued by an RTC Judge (Naga City) to be
enforced in another place outside his jurisdiction (Iriga City), but accused
raised the issue only in his motion for reconsideration after his original
motion to quash was denied, can the warrant be voided on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the issuing court? Pilipinas Shell v. Romars
International, 750 SCRA 547 (2015) [“special criminal process”, “not a
criminal case”].
-Proceedings for search warrants are not criminal in nature, mere process,
a special criminal process. So, the rule that venue is jurisdiction does not
apply thereto. Evidently, the issue should have been filed in RTC Iriga or
Naga, is not involving jurisdiction because the power to issue a special
criminal process is inherent in all courts. (Note: Jural concepts and
provison on our search warrant are takne from American jurisdictions.)
4. The Vice Executive Judge of Manila, upon application of the Police
Senior Superintendent, who did not state any compelling reason,
issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of 6 human
remains inside the Laud Compound in Magtood, Maa, Davao City. Is
the Search Warrant valid? SPO4 Laud v. People, 741 SCRA 239
(2014).
-GR: Sec. 2, Rule 126 of ROC. (Court where the crime was
committed.)
Exc: For compelling reasons, judicial region.
Exc2x: If criminal action is filed, in court where action is pending.
Exc3x: Sec. 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, the rule on
search warrant applications before Manila and Quezon City RTCs for
special criminal cases “shall be an exception to Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of
ROC.” So long as requirements therei nare complied with (heinouse
crimes, etc.) These special criminal cases are compelling reasons
itself.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M.No. 03-8-02-SC.
[RTCs of Manila and Quezon City: "involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession
of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-
Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and
Customs Code.” Filed by “the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF),"
and "personally endorsed by the heads of such
agencies."]
5. Can the RTC of Cebu, Branch 12, which is not a Special Commercial Court, issue a
Search Warrant in connection with violation of the Intellectual Property Law?
Kenneth Roy v. Taypin. 331 SCRA 697 (2000) [“special criminal process”, “not a
criminal case”].

Facts: Petitioners KENNETH ROY SAVAGE and K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING,

owned and managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE, seek to nullify the search
warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of wrought
iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. Their
motion to quash the search warrant was denied by respondent Judge as well as
their motion to reconsider the denial. Acting on a complaint lodged by private
respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general manager of Mendco
Development Corporation (MENDCO),[1] Supervising Agent Jose Ermie Monsanto
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed an application for search warrant
with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The application sought the
authorization to search the premises of K Angelin Export International located in
Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, and to seize the pieces of wrought iron furniture found
therein which were allegedly the object of unfair competition involving design
patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
• Petitioners claim that respondent trial court had no jurisdiction over
the offense since it was not designated as a special court for
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), citing in support thereof Supreme
Court Administrative Order No. 113-95 designating certain branches
of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities as Special Courts for IPR. The
courts enumerated therein are mandated to try and decide violations
of IPR including Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code committed
within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The sala of Judge
Benigno G. Gaviola of the RTC-Br. 9, Cebu City, was designated
Special Court for IPR for the 7th Judicial Region. Subsequently
Supreme Court Administrative Order No.104-96 was issued
providing that jurisdiction over all violations of IPR was thereafter
confined to the Regional Trial Courts.
• The authority to issue search warrants was not among
those mentioned in the administrative orders. But the
Court has consistently ruled that a search warrant is
merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of
its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which
it may entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction. The
authority to issue search warrants is inherent in
all courts and may be effected outside their
territorial jurisdiction. In the instant case, the
premises searched located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, are
well within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent
court.
• Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the
designation of Special Courts for IPR. Administrative Order
No. 113-95 merely specified which court could "try and
decide" cases involving violations of IPR. It did not, and
could not, vest exclusive jurisdiction with regard to all
matters (including the issuance of search warrants and other
judicial processes) in any one court. Jurisdiction is conferred
upon courts by substantive law; in this case, BP Blg.129,
and not by a procedural rule, much less by an administrative
order. The power to issue search warrants for violations of
IPR has not been exclusively vested in the courts enumerated
in Supreme Court Administrative Order No.113-95.
• The last question to be resolved is whether unfair
competition involving design patents punishable under
Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code exists in this case.

• The IPR Code took effect on 1 January 1998. The

repealing clause of the Code provides - “All Acts and parts
of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly, Republic
Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as
amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised
Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including
Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby
repealed.”
• The issue involving the existence of "unfair competition" as
a felony involving design patents, referred to in Art. 189 of
the Revised Penal Code, has been rendered moot and
academic by the repeal of the article.

• The search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue of a

possible violation of the IPR Code. The assailed acts
specifically alleged were the manufacture and
fabrication of wrought iron furniture similar to that
patented by MENDCO, without securing any license
or patent for the same, for the purpose of deceiving
or defrauding Mendco and the buying public.
• There is evidently no mention of any crime of
"unfair competition" involving design patents in
the controlling provisions on Unfair Competition. It is
therefore unclear whether the crime exists at all, for the
enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment
of Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code. In the face of this
ambiguity, we must strictly construe the statute against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused, (People v.
Subido, G.R. No. 21734, 5 September 1975, 66 SCRA
545.), for penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended
by intendment, implication or any equitable
consideration.
• Respondents invoke jurisprudence to support their contention that
"unfair competition" exists in this case. However, we are prevented
from applying these principles, along with the new provisions on
Unfair Competition found in the IPR Code, to the alleged acts of the
petitioners, for such acts constitute patent infringement as defined
by the same Code-

• Sec. 76. Civil Action for Infringement. - 76.1. The making, using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing a patented product or a
product obtained directly or indirectly from a patented process, or
the use of a patented process without authorization of the patentee
constitutes patent infringement.

• Thus, the acts as alleged refer to patent infringement, not unfair

competition. As patent infringement merely gave rise to a civil
action, no crime to speak of.
• Timeline: RPC, the present case (1997), and IPC (1998).

• Although this case traces its origins to the year 1997 or

before the enactment of the IPR Code, we are constrained
to invoke the provisions of the Code. Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall be
applied retrospectively, if such application would be
beneficial to the accused. Since the IPR Code effectively
obliterates the possibility of any criminal liability
attaching to the acts alleged, then that Code must be applied
here. (So, IPR Code was applied retroactively as it is
beneficial to an accused.)
• In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a
finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

• Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does
not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore
defective on its face.

• Since the assailed search warrant is null and void, all property seized
by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance with
established jurisprudence. (Note: Petitioners lost in their arguments
but won the case. One may lost a battle but may win the war.)
6. Can a Municipal Trial Court (Gattaran, Cagayan
Valley) issue a Search Warrant for Illegal Possession
of Dangerous Drugs jurisdiction to try drug cases
under RA No. 9165 is exclusively in the RTC?
People v. Castillo, GR No. 204419, Nov. 7, 2016
[“special criminal process”, “not a criminal case”]
C. The “One-Specific-Offense” Rule
1. Is a Search Warrant for violation of RA No. 6425 and
PD No. 1866, as amended, specifically directing the
seizure of “shabu, paraphernalia and a .38 caliber
revolver, valid? People v. Simbahon, 401 SCRA 95
(2003). See also Vallejo v. CA, 427 SCRA 658 (2004)
[“Falsification of Land Titles under Art. 171, Revised
Penal Code, Article 213, RPC, and R.A. 3019 (Anti-
Graft)”]
2. Is a Search Warrant for violation “Violation of RA No.
6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended” a general warrant for failure to specifically
state a specific offense? People v. Dichoso, 233 SCRA
174 (1993).
3. Where there are multiple counts of the same offense
(PD No. 49 /Intellectual Property Decree), must the
court issue individual search warrants for each movie
title alleged to have been the subject of copy right
infringement? Columbia Pictures v. CA, 261 SCRA 144
(1996). See also SPO4 Laud v. People, 741 SCRA 239
(2014).
4. Where a Search Warrant was issued for Robbery but
the Information was withdrawn without prejudice
because the Search Warrant was quashed, may the
objects taken under it be used in evidence in a case for
Qualified Theft against the same accused? Sy Tan v.
Sy Tiong Gue, 638 SCRA 601 (2010).
5. The Municipal Trial Court of Naga City
issued a search warrant for the seizure of
Coca Cola Bottles hoarded inside a
warehouse belonging to Pepsi Cola. Is the
Search Warrant issued for “hoarding a
competitor’s product containers,” valid?
Coca-Cola v. Gomez, 571 SCRA 18
(2008).
D. Particular Description of Place
1. The judge issued a Search Warrant ordering
the search of Abigail Variety Store, Apartment No.
1207 in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, and the
seizure of firearms and explosives found therein,
but the police instead served the warrant not on
the store, but at Apartment No. 1, which was
immediately adjacent to the store. Is the seizure
of guns and explosives valid? People v. CA, 291
SCRA 400 (1998). See, also, People v.
Francisco, 387 SCRA 569 (2002).
2. Upon application by the Philippine National Police
(PNP), the judge ordered the search and seizure of
firearms in possession of the Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines “located at PICOP
Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.” Is
the description of the place to be searched sufficient?
PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 (1999).
[The compound is made up of 200 offices/buildings, 15
plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23
warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and
some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are
spread out over one hundred fifty-five hectares.]
3. The Search Warrant commanded the search of
MASAGANA compound located at Governor’s
Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite
City, which is 10,000 square meters with several
structures in it all owned by MASAGANA. Is the
Search Warrant valid? Yao, Sr. v. People, 525
SCRA 108 (2007).
4. What about if the compound is smaller, 5,000
square meters, with 15 structures but occupied and
used for various purposes by different persons?
People v. Estrada, 296 SCRA 383 (1998).
5. What is the effect if the Search Warrant
particularly described the place to be
searched but it erroneously named the
occupant of the premises? Quelnan v.
People, 526 SCRA 653 (2007) [Bernard Lim,
Room 615 City Land Condominium, South
Superhighway, Makati City]. See also Nala
v. Barroso, Jr., 408 SCRA 529 (2003).
[Bernard, not Romulo Nala].
E. Particular Description of Objects
1. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856, issued for violation of paragraph
one (1) of Article 308 (theft or stealing of PLDT’s business revenues
from international long distance calls with the use of certain
equipment) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
against WWC, directed the seizure of:
a) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting
information, applying the process of the information and supplying
the results of this process;
b) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for
recording or storing information; and c) Manuals, application forms,
access codes, billing statements, receipts, contracts,
communications and documents relating to securing and using
telephone lines and/or equipment.
Is this a general warrant? Worldwide Web v. PLDT, 713 SCRA
18 (2014).
See also Columbia Pictures v. CA, 261 SCRA 144 (1996)
[“Television sets, video casettes records, rewinders, tape
head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other
machines and paraphernalia or material.” Kho v.
Makalintal, 306 SCRA 70 (1999) [“Unlicensed radio
communications equipment such as transmitters,
transceivers, handsets, scanners, monitoring devices and
others.”] Microsoft v. Maxicorp, Inc., 438 SCRA 224
(2004) [“Computer hardware, including central processing
units including hard disks, CD-Rom drives, keyboards,
monitor screens and diskettes, photocopying machines
and other equipment or paraphernalia”].
2. For the crime of Falsification allegedly committed in
the office of the ROD, the Search Warrant ordered the
seizure of the following: (1) Undetermined number of
Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier’s
Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry
Book under No. 496 and other pertinent documents
related therewith; (2) Blank Forms of Land Titles kept
inside the drawers of every table of employees of the
Registry of Deeds; (3) Undetermined number of Land
Transfer transactions without the corresponding
payment of Capital Gains Tax and payment of
Documentary Stamps. Is it valid? Vallejo v. CA, 427
SCRA 658 (2004) [ it gives the “executing officer
virtually unlimited discretion as to what property shall be
seized.”]
3. Search Warrant No. 90-12 authorized the seizure of:
“Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and ammunitions
for the said firearms.” Is it valid? Kho v. Makalintal, 306
SCRA 70 (1999). See also Al-Ghoul v. CA, 364 SCRA
363 (2001). Also People v. Tee, 395 SCRA 419 (2003)
[“undetermined amount of marijuana].

4. If a Search Warrant contains a general description of

some objects, but a specific description of other items
subject of seizure, is the entire warrant voided? Uy v. BIR,
344 SCRA 36 (2000). [“The search warrant is severable,
and those items not particularly described may be cut off
without destroying the whole warrant.”]
5. If the object is particularly described in
the warrant, is it necessary that what is
seized must exactly fit the description? Al-
Ghoul v. CA, 364 SCRA 363 (2001) [“articles
subject of seizure need not be so invariant
as to require absolute concordance between
those seized and those described in the
warrant”].
 6. The search warrant commanded the police to
search for and seize “shabu” and paraphernalia. In
the course of the search, believing that certain objects
were bartered for “shabu”, they also seized a lady’s
wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers,
electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer,
drill, and bolo. Is the seizure valid? People v. Nunez,
591 SCRA 394 (2009).

7. Since under the Rule 126 of the Rules of Court

only “personal property” may be the subject of search
and seizure, can human remains, which cannot be
appropriated or alienated, be the subject of a Search
Warrant? Laud v. People, 741 SCRA 239 (2014). [Art.
416, Civil Code (“can be transported from place to
place”) and Rule 126, Sec. 2 (“personal property
subject of the offense”)]
F. Issues Relating to Execution of Search Warrants
1. When the police searched the house of the accused
by virtue of a search warrant, they found nothing. A
“barangay tanod” called by the police to assist them,
however, searched a nipa hut were accused ran for
cover. The hut was about 20 meters from the house of
the accused which was the object of the search. In the
hut, the “tanod” found “shabu” inside four (4) heat-
sealed transparent plastic packs. Is the “shabu”
admissible? Del Castillo v. People, 664 SCRA 430
(2012).
2. When is a “no-knock” entry justified in the execution of
a Search Warrant, as opposed to the “knock-and-
announce“ principle? People v. Huang Zhen Hua, 439
SCRA 350 (2004) [knocking “would be dangerous, or
futile or would inhibit the effective investigation of a
crime”].
3. When the police searched the house by virtue of a
search warrant, they ordered the occupants to remain
seated in the sala. The policemen, however, were
accompanied by “barangay tanods” who acted as
witnesses when the search was going on in the upper and
lower portions of the house. Is this valid? People v. Del
Castillo, 439 SCRA 601 (2004).
4. May a Search Warrant be served more than once
during its 10-day lifetime? Mustang Lumber v. CA, 257
SCRA 430 (1996).
5. The house of accused was searched by virtue of a
Search Warrant and “shabu” as well as paraphernalia for
its used were seized. While the Search Warrant stated
that it was issued after the judge conducted searching
questions on the applicant and his witnesses, the
deposition was not attached to the record nor was there
evidence that in fact the judge actually took their
deposition. Are the objects taken under the warrant
admissible? Ogayon v. People, 768 SCRA 670 (2015).
See also People v. Mamaril, 420 SCRA 662 (2004).
 II. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES
A. Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest
1. For driving a motorcycle without a helmet accused
was brought to a police station, issued a citation ticket
and ordered to empty his pocket from which “shabu”
was found. Was there a search incident to a lawful
arrest? Luz v. People, 667 SCRA 421 (2012). [RA No.
4136: confiscation of the driver’s license].
2. For shouting “Putang ina mo! Limang daan na ba
ito?” in a busy street accused was arrested purportedly
for violating Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of
the City of Manila which punishes breaches of the
peace, and searched during which “shabu” was taken
from him? Was the search valid? Martinez v. People,
690 SCRA 656 (2013).
3. Receiving information that a pot session was being conducted by
the accused inside a house, without a warrant the police raided the
place, arrested accused and seized 115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of
rolled used aluminium foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminium
foil. Are the confiscated items admissible? People v. Martinez, 637
SCRA 791 (2010).

4. After a buybust outside the door of Unit 122 of Roxas Sea Front
Garden in Pasay City, the police arrested accused and proceeded to
search the Unit, wherein they found 5,578 grams of “shabu”. Is it
admissible in evidence? People v. Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592
(2000), [“the search must have been conducted at about the time of
the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the
suspect was arrested, or the premises or surrounding under his
immediate control’].
5. After executing a Search Warrant and arresting accused inside his
house for illegal possession of “shabu”, the police also searched a
Honda Civic car in front of his house belonging to his co-accused
wherein they found small bags of “shabu”. Is the search of the car
valid? People v. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA 280 (2003). [“To be valid,
such warrantless search must be limited to that point within the reach
and control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with
the means of committing violence or of escaping.”]

6. After arresting accused in the sala of his house during a buybust

operation, NARCOM agents went to the kitchen and found marijuana
leaves wrapped in a newspaper. Is the marijuana admissible in
evidence? People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993).
7. After arresting accused by virtue of an arrest
warrant for kidnapping with ransom, they also
searched the tables and drawers in the room and
found, in a locked cabinet, a gun for which he was
charged with illegal possession of firearm. Is it
admissible in evidence? Valeroso v. CA, 598 SCRA
41 (2009). [“The phrase ‘within the area of his
immediate control’ means the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.”]
B. “Stop and Frisk”
1. Policemen on patrol at Caloocan Cemetery chanced
upon a male person observed to have reddish eyes and
walking in a swaying manner as though he was high on
drugs. When they searched his wallet they found
marijuana. Is it admissible in evidence? Manalili vs. CA,
280 SCRA 400 (1998) [“Where a police officer observes
an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in the light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the person with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identified himself
as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,..
and where nothing in the initial stage of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or other’s
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.”
Terry b. Ohio]. See also Esquillo v. People, 629 SCRA
530 (2010) [Where a police officer saw a woman 3 meters
away holding a transparent plastic sachet and when he
approached her she “started acting suspiciously.” ]
2. When a person scampers away at sight of a police
officer, does it constitute probable cause for the police to
arrest him without any warrant? People v. Villareal, 693
SCRA 532 (2013). See also Valdez v. People, 538 SCRA
611 (2007) [where accused, after alighting from a bus,
looked around, and when approached by a barangay
tanod, attempted to run away]. See further People v.
Mengote, 210 SCRA 174 (1992) [where accused looked
from side to side, held his abdomen and tried to run
away]. But see Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990)
[carrying a “buri” bag and attempting to run].
C. Moving Vehicles and COMELEC Checkpoints
1. Can the police extensively search vehicles passing
through checkpoints? Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA
211 (1989), [if there is no probable cause, only visual
search is allowed]. Valmonte v. De Villa, 185 SCRA 665
(1990) [if there is probable cause, they can conduct
extensive search].
2. Can the police inspect the bag of motorcycle
occupants who initially speeded away past their check
point and later became nervous when asked about the
contents of their back pack? People v. Vinecario, 420
SCRA 280 (2004).
3. Based on a tip that an Ilocano person, described
as thin and carrying a green bag, the police officers
searched a bus passenger who fitted the
description and found marijuana in his bag. Was
the warrantless search valid? People v. Valdez,
304 SCRA 140 (1999). See also People v.
Gonzales, 365 SCRA 17 (2001) [“a woman with
long hair, wearing “maong” pants and jacket, and
Ray Ban sunglasses”]. People v. Quebral, 606
SCRA 247 (2009) [“two men and a woman on
board an owner type jeep with a specific plate
number”]
4. In COMELEC Check Points during election
period, can all passing vehicles be subjected to
extensive searches? COMELEC Resolution No.
10029, December 22, 2015.
“(a) Upon approach to any COMELEC
Checkpoint, the team manning it must require the
motorist(s) to slow down and courteously request
to dim the headlights and turn on cabin lights. In a
checkpoint inquiry, the occupants cannot be
compelled to step out of the vehicle;
“(b) Only visual search is required. The search which is
normally permissible is limited to visual search where
the officer simply looks into the vehicle and flashes a
light therein without opening the car's door.;
“(c) No person may be subjected to a physical or body
search in the absence of any reasonable ground to
believe that a person has just committed, is about to
commit, or is committing a crime;
“(d) The public is not obliged to open the glove
compartment, trunk or bags. The personnel manning
the checkpoint cannot compel the motorist to open the
trunk or glove compartment of the car or any package
contained therein.”
People v. Sapla, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020
(Vote is 12-3)

Concurring Opinion:
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier
Justice Mario V. Lopez
Separate Concurring Opinion
Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan
Ponente: Caguioa, J.:
Issue: Can the police conduct a warrantless
intrusive search of a vehicle on the sole basis of
unverified tip relayed by an anonymous
informant?
The Case: Sapla lost in RTC and CA for violating Section 5, Art. II
of Republic Act No. 9165. He won in the SC. This is his story.

The Facts: For the Prosecution’s version, on January 10, 2014, at

around 11:30AM, an officer on duty received a phone call from a
concerned citizen, who informed the said office that a certain
male individual would be transporting marijuana form Kalinga
and into the Province of Isabela. Said officer relayed the
information to their deputy commander, who subsequently called
the drugs task force for a joint operation, coordinated with PDEA.
Later, a team was organized and went to the detachment.

At 1PM, the police hotline received a text message which stated

that the subject male person who would transport marijuana was
wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap,
and was carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with
plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela. Subsequently, a
joint checkpoint was strategically organized at a command post.
At 1:20PM, the police officers flagged down the said vehicle and
told its driver to park on the side of the side of the road. Police
officers approached the jeepney and saw Sapla seated at the rear
side of the vehicle. The police officers, asked Sapla if he was the
owner of the blue sack in front of him, which the latter answered
in the affirmative. The said officers requested Sapla to open th
blue sack. After Sapla opened the sack, officers saw four (4)
bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wrapped in
newspaper and an old calendar. An officer arrested Sapla,
informed him of the cause of his arrest, and his constitutional
rights in the Ilocano dialect. Another officer searched Sapla and
found one (1) LG phone unit. Then, another officer seized the
four (4) bricks of suspected suspected dried marijuana leaves
and brought them to their office for markings, inventory, and
turned over the seized items to the investigator of the case.
Chemistry Examination revealed that indeed said specimens “A-
1-4”, with a total net weight of 3,9563.111 grams, did contain
marijuana, a dangerous drug.
Sapla’s defense is denial. He offered a different version. He
claimed that on 8 January 2014, he went to Tabuk City to visit a
certain relative. Two (2) days later, Sapla boarded a jeepney,
and left for Roxas, Isabela to visit his nephew. Upon reachign
Talaca checkpoint, police officers flagged down the said jeepney
in order to check it passengers’ baggages and cargoes. The police
officers then found marijuana inside a sack and were looking for
a person who wore fatigue pants at that time. From the three (3)
passenger who wore fatigue pants, the said police officers
identified him as the owner of the marijuana found inside the
sack. Sapla denied ownership of the marijuana, and asserted that
he had no baggage at that time. Then, the police officers
arrested Sapla and brought him to the barracks, wherein the
sack and marijuana were shown to him.
RTC: Guilty, reclusion perpetua, fine 5M. CA: Affirmed with
modifications, life imprisonment, fine of 1M.

Issue: Whether there was a valid search and seizure conducted

by the police officers.

Ruling: Sapla’s appeal is impressed with merit, orders his release

from incarceration.
As eloquently explained by the Court in Pp. v. Tudtud, “the Bill of
Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are
stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy
cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This
explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of
the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the
fundamental law way above the articles on government power.”
And in the Bill of Rights, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizure is “at the top of the hierarchy of rights, next only to,
if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property,
x x x for the right to personal security which, along with the right
to privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable
search and seizure.”
The right of the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures is found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
Here, as a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the
authorities is reasonable only when a court issue a search
warrant after it has determine the existence of probable cause
through the personal examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses presented before the court,
with the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized particularly described.
Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures in the hierarchy of rights,
any deviation or exemption from the aforementioned rule is not
favored and is strictly construed against the government.

The known jurisprudential instances of warrantless searches and

seizures are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Seizure of evidence in plain view;
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
According to jurisprudence, “warrantless search and seizure of
moving vehicle are allowed in recognition of the impracticability
of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however,
are limited to routine checks where the examination of the
vehicle is limited to visual inspection.”
On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is
permissible, but only when “the officers made it upon probable
cause, i.e. upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle
contains an item, article or object which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction.

The situation presented in the instant case cannot be

considered as a search of a moving vehicle.
In Pp. v. Comprado, is controlling, as it is virtually identical here. In
Comprado, a confidential informant sent a text message to the
authorities as regards an alleged courier of marijuana who had in his
possession a backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling
from Bukidnon to CDO. The CI eventually called the authorities and
informed them that the alleged drug courier had boarded a bus with
body number 2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for CDO. The
CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and
violet colors with the marking “Lowe Alpine.” With this information,
the police officers put up a checkpoint, just as what the authorities
did in the instant case. Afterwards, upon seeing the bus bearing the
said body and plate numbers approaching the checkpoint, again
similar to the instant case, the said vehicle was flagged down. The
police officers boarded the bus and saw a man matching the
description given to them by the CI. The man was seated at the back
of the bus with backpack placed on his lap. The man was asked to
open the bag. When the accused agreed to do so, the police officers
saw a transparent cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves.
In Comprado, the Court held that the search conducted “could
not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this
particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not
a specific person.” The Court added that “in search of a moving
vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to
transport illegal items. It i worthy to note that the information
relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that
particular bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police
officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person
matching the description given by their informant and not the
cargo or contents of the said bus.”
Applying this here, it cannot be seriously disputed that the target
of the search conducted was not the passenger jeepney boarded
by Sapla nor the cargo or contents of the said vehicle. The target
of the search was the person who matched the description given
by the person who called the hotline, i.e. the person wearing a
collared white shirt with green striped, red ball cap, and carrying
a blue sack.
Therefore, the search conducted in the instant case cannot be
characterized as a search of a moving vehicle.

Probable cause as an indispensable requirement for an extensive

and intrusive warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

In any case, even if the search conducted can be characterized as

search of a moving vehicle, the operation undertaken by the
authorities in the instant case cannot be deemed a valid
warrantless search of a moving vehicle.
In Pp. v. Manago: The setting up of military or police checkpoints is
not illegal per se for as long as its necessity is justified by the
exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists.

However, in order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-

violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable searches, the
search must be limited to the following:

a. Where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant

vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds;
b. Where the officer simply looks into a vehicle;
c. Where the officer flashes a light therein without opening the
car’s doors;
d. Where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body
search;
e. Where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search
or visual inspection; and
f. Where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte blanche
discretion to conduct intrusive warrantless searches in the
absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, as opposed to a mere routine
inspection, “such a warrantless search has been held to be
valid only as long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that they will fin the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.”

Simply stated, a more extensive and intrusive search that goes

beyond a mere visual search of the vehicle necessitates
probable cause on the part of the apprehending officers.
In Caballes v. CA, probable cause means that there is the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the items, articles, or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched, which is:

“x x x not determined by fixed formula but is resolved

according to the facts of each case.”

Sheer unverified information from an Anonymous Informant does

not engender probable cause on the part of the Authorities that
warrants an Extensive and Intrusive Search of a Moving Vehicle.
Here, the singular circumstance that engendered probable
cause on the part of the police officers was the
information they received through the hotline (via text
message) from an anonymous person.

Does the mere reception of a text message from an anonymous

person suffice to create probable cause that enables the
authorities to conduct an extensive and intrusive search without
a search warrant? THE ANSWER IS A RESOUNDING NO.
The Court held with unequivocal clarity in Veridiano v. Pp. (2017)
in situations involving warrantless searches and seizures, “law
enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or
tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how
reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance
that will arouse suspicion.”

Considering that the doctrine that an extensive warrantless

search of a moving vehicle necessitates probable cause was
adopted by the Court from US jurisprudence, examining US
jurisprudence can aid in a fuller understanding on the existence
of probable cause vis-a-vis tipped information received from
confidential informants.
In US jurisprudence, in Aguilar v. Texas, Illinois v. Gates, there:
the SCOTUS adopted the totality of circumstances test and held
that tipped information may engender probable cause under “a
balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various
indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant’s
tip.” In Gates, the SCOTUS found that the details of the
informant’s tip were corroborated by independent police work.

The SCOTUS emphasized however that “standing alone, the

anonymous letter sent to the police department would not
provide the basis for a magistrate’s determination that there was
probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the
Gateses’ car and home. x x x Something more was required,
then, before a magistrate could conclude that there was probable
cause to believe that contraband would be found in the Gateses’
home and car.”
The Line of Philippine Jurisprudence on the Inability of a Solitary
Tip to Engender Probable Cause.

As early as 1988, SC had ruled that an extensive warrantless

search and seizure conducted on the sole basis of a confidential
tip is tainted with illegality.
In Pp. v. Aminnudin, the authorities acted upon an information
that the accused would be arriving from IloIlo on board a vessel,
the M/V Wilcon 9. The authorities waited for the vessel to arrive,
accosted the accused, and inspected the latter’s bag wherein
bundles of marijuana leaves were found. The Court declared that
the search and seizure was illegal, holding that, at the time of his
apprehension, Aminnudin, was not “committing a crime nor was
it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so.
x x x To all appearances, he was likely any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of marijuana that
he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension.
Then, in Pp. v. Cuizon, the Court, via CJ Panganiban, held that
the warrantless search and subsequent arrest of the accused
were deemed illegal because “the prosecution failed to establish
that there was sufficient and reasonable ground for the NBI
agents to believe that appellants had committed a crime at the
point when the search and arrest of Pua and Lee were made.” In
reaching this conclusion, the Court found that the authorities
merely relied on “the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly
received that morning.” The Court characterized the tip received
by the authorities from an anonymous informant as “hearsay
information” that cannot engender probable cause.
In Pp. v. Encinada, the authorities acted solely in an informant’s
tip and stopped the tricycle occupied by the accused and asked
the latter to alight. The authorities then rummaged through the
to strapped plastic baby chairs that were loaded inside the
tricycle. The authorities then found a package of marijuana
inserted between the two chairs. The Court held that “raw
intelligence” was not enough to justify the warrantless search
and seizure. “The prosecution’s evidence did not show any
suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the
ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating
a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such
bare circumstances.”
In Pp. v. Aruta, where an informant had told the police that a
certain “Aling Rosa” would be transporting illegal drugs from
Baguio by bus. Hence, the police officers situated themselves at
the bus terminal. Eventually, the informant pointed at a woman
crossing the street and identified her as “Aling Rosa.” Then, the
authorities apprehended the woman and inspected her bag,
which contained marijuana leaves.
In fining that there was an unlawful warrantless search, the
Court in Aruta, held that “it was only when the informant pointed
to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the
carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect.
The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-
appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant
because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence record, there was
no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant
was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant.” Hence, the Court held that the search conducted
on the accused therein based solely on the pointing finger
of the informant was a “a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure.”
In recent Pp. v. Cogaed (2014), which likewise involved a search
conducted throught a checkpoint put up after an “unidentified civilian
informer” shared information to the authorities that a person would be
transporting marijuana.

In finding that there was no probable cause on the part of the police
that justified a warrantless search, the Court, through Justice Leonen,
astutely explained that in cases finding sufficient probable cause for
the conduct of warrantless searches, “the police officer using their
senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with
reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their
experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit
drugs.” However, the Court reasoned that the case of the accused was
different because “he was simply a passenger carrying a bag and
traveling abroad a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover,
criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of
suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney
driver. It was the driver who ignaled to the police that Cogaed was
‘suspicious’.”
In Cogaed, the Court stressed that in engendering probable
cause that justifies a valid warrantless search, “it is the police
officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable
degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not
adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is
necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searced. Anything less than this would be an
infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person
and effects. The Court explained that “the police officer, with
his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts
leading to the suspicion of an illicit act,” and not merely
rely on the information passed on to him or her.”
In Esquillo v. Pp., the Court emphasized that the matching of
information transmitted by an informant “still remained only as
one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to
search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search
warrant.”

In Veridiano v. Pp., a concerned citizen informed the police that

the accused was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal
drugs. Based on this tip, the authorities set up a checkpoint. The
police officers at the checkpoint personally knew the appearance
of the accused. Eventually, the police chanced upon the accused
inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. The
jeepney was flagged down and the police asked the passengers
to disembarked. The police officers instructed the passenger to
raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and
to remove the contents of their pockets. The police officers
reovered from the accused a tea bag containing what appeared
to be marijuana.
In finding that the warrantless search invalid, the Court, via
Justice Leonen, held that the accused was a “mere passenger in a
jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give police
officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his
possession. x x x There was no evidence to show that the police
had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow
them to infer anything suspicious.”

The Court correctly explained that “law enforcers cannot act

solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is
still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient
to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other
circumstance that will arouse suspicion.”
A year after, the Court decided Comprado, which the Court
explained that “no overt physical act could be properly
attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in
the minds of the arresting officers that her had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime.”

The Court emphasized that there should be the “presence of

more than one seemingly innocent activity from which
taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity.” In the said case, as in the instant case, the
accused was just a passenger carrying his bag.
Recently, the Court unequivocally declared in Pp. v. Yanson,
(2019) that a solitary tip hardly suffices as probable cause that
warrants the conduct of a warrantless intrusive search and
seizure.

In Yanson, which involves an analogous factual milieu as in the

instant case, “the Municipal Police Station of M’lang, North
Cotabato received a radio message about a silver gray Isuzu
pickup — with plate number 619 and carrying three (3) people —
that was transporting marijuana from Pikit. The Chief of Police
intructed the alert team to set up a checkpoint on the riverside
police outpost along the road from Matalam to M’lang.”
Afterwards, “at around 9:30AM, the tipped vehicle reached the
checkpoint and was stopped by the team of police officers on
standby. The team leader asked the driver about inspecting the
vehicle. The driver alighted and, at an officer’s prodding, opened
the pickup’s hood. Two (2) sacks of marijuana were discovered
beside the engine.”
Leonen, in it, said in his ponencia: “in determining whether there
is probable cause that warrants an extensive or intrusive
warrantless searches of a moving vehicle, “bare suspicion is
never enough. While probable cause does not demand moral
certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify conviction, it requires
the existence of “a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstacnes sufficiently strong in themsleves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.”
In ruling that the sole reliance on tipped information, on its own,
furnished by informants cannot produce probable cause, the
Court held in Yanson, “exclusive reliance on information
tipped by informants goes against the very nature of
probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to “the
existence of such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place to
be searched.”
Yanson explained: “to maintain otherwise would be to sanction
frivolity, opening the floodgates to unfounded searches, seizures,
and arrests that may be initiated by sly informants.”

And very recently, on September 4, 2019, the Court, via CJ

Bersamin, in Pp. v. Gardon-Mentoy, facts of which are: police
officers had set up a checkpoint on the National Highway in
Barangay Malatgao, Narra, Palawan based on a tip from an
unidentified informant that the accused-appellant would be
transporting dangerous drugs on board a shuttle van. Eventually,
the authorities flagged down the approaching shuttle van
matching the description obtained from the informant and
conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle, yielding the
discovery of a block-shaped bundle containing marijuana.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure were without
probable cause, the Court held that “the tip, being actually
double hearsay as to them, called for independent verification as
its substance and reliability x x x. In short, the tip, in the
absence of other circumstances that would confirm their
suspicion coming from the personal knowledge of the searching
officers, was not yet actionable for purposes of conducting a
search.”

The Court is not unaware that in the recent case of Saluday v.

Pp., a bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a
military checkpoint was considered valid. However, in the said
case, the authorities merely conducted a “visual and minimally
intrusive inspection” of the accused’s bag — by simply lifting the
bag that noticeably appeared to have contained firearms.
This is markedly dissimilar to the instant case wherein the
search conducted entailed the probing of the contents of the blue
sack allegedly possessed by Sapla.

In Saluday, no tip but authorities relied on their own senses in

determining probable cause, i.e., lifting the bag revealing that a
firearm was inside, as well as having seen the very suspicious
looks being given by the accused therein.
In Saluday, the Court laid down the following conditions in
allowing a reasonable search of a bus while in transit:

1. the manner of the search must be least intrusive;

2. the search must not be discriminatory;
3. as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to
ensuring public safety;
4. the courts must be convinced that precautionary measures
were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the
accused.
The divergent line of jurisprudence.

1990 cases of Pp. v. Tangliben, and Pp. v. Maspil, Jr.. Pp. v. Bagista,
doctrines are not strong.

Tangliben: probable cause was not based exclusively on tip.

Pp. v. Malmstdedt: Tip that a Caucasian man from Sagada in possession

of drugs. At checkpoint, officers inspected the bus, personally observed
that there was a bulge on the accused’s waist. Police asked for papers.
Accused failed. Asked to reveal waist, marijuana. Here, the Court ruled
that the probable cause was based on personal observations and not
solely on tip.

Pp. v. Tuazon: Authorities did not rely solely on tip. Firearm tuvked in
waist of accused. When as for document, accused failed. This is probable
cause.

Pp. v. Quebral: Not rely solely on tip. Surveillance and co-accused was on
drugs list.
Pp. v. Saycon: Prior buy-bust. Accused was engaged in
transporting and selling of shabu. So, not rely solely on tip.

Manalili v. CA and Pp.: (Bar 2009): Police observed accused

reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Avoid
policemen. When approached what he was holding in his hands,
he tried to resist. The Court held that the policemen had
sufficient reason to accost the accused to determine if he was
actually “high” on drugs to his suspicious actuations, coupled
with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for
drug addicts.

Pp. v. Solayao: police noticed a man who appeared drunk,

wearing camoufalge uiform, fled, which added his suspicion.
then, “homemade firearm” was found. There is valid probable
cause.
Pp. v. Lo Ho Wing, not rely solely on tip. Deep Penetration Agents
were recruited.

Pp. v. Tampis, not rely solely on tip. Surveillance. Tampis relied

on Aruta, which held that officers have prior knowledge.

Pp. v. Maspil, Jr., relied on Valmonte v. de Villa, which delved

into the constitutionality of checkpoints. Valmonte never delved
into validity of warrantless searches and seizures on sole tip.

Pp. v. Bagista, relied on SCOTUS Carroll v. US, which not

invovled warrantless search on sole tip. Undercover. So, probable
cause.
The Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine
that exclusive reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip
cannot engender probable cause that permit a warrantless
search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual
search — which include both the long-standing and the most
recent jurisprudence —should be the prevailing and
controlling line of jurisprudence.

Here, there is absence of probable cause to engender an

intrusive search. The information received through a text
message was not only hearsay evidence; it is double hearsay.
Therefore, with the glaring absence of probable cause that
justifies an intrusive warrantless search, considering that the
police officers failed to rely on their personal knowledge and
depended solely on an unverified and anonymous tip, the
warrantless search conducted on Sapla was invalid and
unlawful search of a moving vehicle.

Other exceptions to reasonable warrantless searches and

seizures, not applicable.

Not search incidental to a lawful arrest. Lawful arrest precedes

the search, not in plain view, customs, and emergency
circumstances.
Not stop and frisk. Cover: “protective search of outer clothing for
weapons”. Here, went beyond. While Malacat v. CA, probable
cause in not required in stop and frisk, mere suspicion is not
enough. A genuine reason must exist, in light of police
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person has weapons concealed.

Invalid consented warrantless search. In Pp. v. Tudtud, waiver of

rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, if the
following requisites are present:

1. It must appear that the right exist;

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Here, Sapla was subjected to a coercive environment (confronted
by several armed police officers) in a checkpoint. Sapla’s alleged
act of opening mere passive conformity to a warrantless search
conducted in a coercive and intimidating environment.

Hence, Art. III, Se. 3(2), exclusionary rule applies: inadmissible.

No evidence, Sapla is acquitted of the crime charged.
Epilogue:

A battle waged against illegal drugs that tramples on the rights of

the people is not a war on drugs; it is a war against the people.
(Pp. v. Narvasa, 2019)

The Bill of Rights should never be sacrificed on the altar of

convenience. Otherwise, the malevolent mantle of the rule of
men dislodges the rule of law.” (id.)
D. Plain View Doctrine
1. Spencer was arrested after a buy-bust but he
managed to free himself and run inside the house of
Elamparo. They pursued Spencer inside the house and
found Elamparo repacking 5 bricks of marijuana on top
of a table. Is the marijuana admissible in evidence?
People v. Elamparo, 329 SCRA 404 (2000) [Requisites:
1) the law enforcer has a prior justification for the
intrusion; 2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view
is inadvertent; and 3) the illegality of the object is
immediately apparent.]
2. While on board a patrol car conducting a patrol in Pasay City,
police officers saw two unidentified men rush out of a house and
immediately boarded a jeep. Suspecting that a crime had been
committed, the police officers approached the house, pushed open
the door and saw accused in possession of drug paraphernalia. Was
his subsequent arrest and the seizure of the paraphernalia lawful?
Antiquera v. People, 712 SCRA 339 (2013).

3. The Police Officers seized a caliber .38 revolver, a .22 long barrel
and a fragmentation grenade when they searched the house of
Nalagon by virtue of a Search Warrant, which was later on voided.
Can the seizure of the items be justified under the plain view doctrine?
Nala v. Barroso, Jr., 408 SCRA 529 (2003).
 4. The Search Warrant issued by the judge ordered the seizure of
“shabu” and drug paraphernalia. After finding the “shabu” in a cabinet,
they proceeded to search further until they found and seized 2 bricks
of dried marijuana leaves weighing 1,254 grams. Is the marijuana
admissible in evidence? People v. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683 (2001).
5. The search warrant for violation of RA No. 6425, as amended,
directed the seizure of “shabu”, weighing scale other drug
paraphernalia and proceeds of the above crime. In the course of the
search, policemen also seized assorted documents, passports, bank
books, checks, typewriter, dry seals, stamp pads, and Chinese and
Philippine currency. Can the seizure of the items not listed in the
warrant be justified under the plain view doctrine? People v. Go, 411
SCRA 81 (2003).
E. Waiver or Consented Search

1. How should a waiver of one’s right against unreasonable search

be effected? People v. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427 (2014) [“For a
valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not
sufficient that the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be
known as a police officer. The police officer must also inform the
person to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will
amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the
circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police
officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known to
the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights.
There must be an assurance given to the police officer that the
accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature
of a person’s constitutional right to privacy requires no less.” See
also Valdez v. People, 538 SCRA 611 (2007) and People v.
Compacion, 361 SCRA 540 (2001).
2. After accused was invited to the police station
in connection with a shooting incident, the police
frisked him and ordered him to take out the
contents of his pocket, which yielded marijuana.
Was there a valid consent to the search?
Villanueva v. People, 740 SCRA 456 (2014). But
see People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 (1998) [act
of accused of readily handing out his luggage was
construed as consent to the search.]
3. Accused, a deaf-mute, was a suspect in
a robbery with homicide case. When the
police came to his house, his wife handed
to the police a bag which contained the
bloody pair of shorts belonging to the
victim. Was there a valid waiver of the
right against unreasonable searches?
People v. Asis, 391 SCRA 109 (2002).
See also People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA
547 (1992).
F. Enforcement of Custom Laws
1. Without a Search Warrant customs police
searched a cargo truck somewhere in Port Area,
Manila, based on information that it is connected
with smuggling activities, and they seized imported
cigarettes with unpaid import taxes. Is the search
valid? Rieta v. People, 436 SCRA 237 (2004).
[“Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search,
seizure and arrest may be made even without a
warrant for the purposes of enforcing customs and
tariff laws.” See also Salvador v. People, 463
SCRA 489 (2005).
2. The RTC of Cebu City quashed a Warrant of
Seizure and Detention issued by the District
Collector of Customs of Cebu and ordered the
return to the consignee of 25,000 sacks of rice on
the ground that there was no probable cause for its
issuance. Is it proper? Bureau of Customs v.
Ogario, 329 SCRA 289 (2000) [“Actions of the
collector of customs are appealable to the
Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn
is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Tax Appeals.”]
G. Airport/Seaport Security Procedure
1. Five hundred eighty (580) grams of “shabu” was
taken from accused hidden in a girdle on her abdomen
after she was search at the NAIA departure area by a
lady frisker. Is it admissible in evidence? People v.
Johnson, 348 SCRA 527 (2000). [“… minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with air travel.”] See also People v. Canton,
394 SCRA 478 (2002) (Sec. 9 of RA No. 6235). Sales
v. People, 690 SCRA 141 (2013).
2. At the Cebu Domestic Port on his way to
Iloilo, the bag of accused was subjected to
x-ray scanning and subsequently manually
inspected during which three (3) firearms
were taken. Are they admissible in court?
Dela Cruz v. People, 779 SCRA 34 (2016)
[“reasonable security regulation to safeguard
passengers” and it was voluntary as
“accused had the option to travel or not.”]
H. Prison Search/Jail Security
1. The bag of the wife of accused was searched
without a warrant on her way out after visiting her
detained husband, and knives allegedly used in a recent
jail killing were found. Are they admissible? People v.
Conde, 356 SCRA 415 (2001). [“part of police standard
operating procedure, and is recognized as part of
precautionary measures by the police to safeguard the
safety of the detainees as well as the over-all security of
the jail premises.”]
 2. Detained for participating in a coup d’etat attempt
against the government, the personal mails of accused
military officers were opened and read by the jail warden?
Is there a violation of the right to privacy of
communications? In re: Alejano, 468 SCRA 188 (2005).
[the “citizen’s privacy rights is a guarantee that is available
only to the public at large but not to persons who are
detained or imprisoned” and “pre-trial detainees and
convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of
privacy rights.”] 
I. Search by Private Persons
1. Because of a complaint by a passenger that
jewelry was stolen from him, security officers of
the vessel search the luggage of all passengers
of M/V Super Ferry 5 bound for Iligan City, and
found, instead of jewelry 400 grams of “shabu” in
the suitcase of Bongcarawan, another passenger.
Is the “shabu” admissible in court? People v.
Bongcarawan, 384 SCRA 525 (2002). See also
Sesbreno v. CA, 720 SCRA 58 (2014).
 2. Accused, charged with parricide, questioned the
admissibility of the Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt for .38 caliber Colt Revolver issued to him and
handed by his father-in-law to the police, as being
violative of his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Is he correct? People v. Mendoza, 301 SCRA
66 (1999). [“refers to the immunity of one’s person from
interference by government and it cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.”]
J. Exigency/Martial Law
1. At the height of a coup attempt in December 1989,
during which there was sporadic fighting between
government forces and rightist military elements who had
occupied government installations, an office building was
searched by the military without a warrant during which
they seized dynamites, bullets and Molotov bombs. Is the
search valid? People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994)
[“urgency and exigency of the moment”]. [Note CJ
Sereno’s Directive for Mindanao Judges to Remain in
Their Stations During Martial Law].
2. Does the declaration of Martial Law authorize searches
and arrests without court issued warrants? David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006) [“Specifically,
(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants xxx are
powers which can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid
declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus.“] Kulayan v. Tan, 675 SCRA 482 (2012)
[“In addition, the general search and seizure order,
including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their
supporters, is being violative of the constitutional
proscription on general search warrants and general
seizures, which even the President during martial law,
may not issue.”]
3. Does the 1987 Constitution textually grant or
deny the President the power to order arrests and
searches during the period when Martial Law has
been validly proclaimed? Art. XII, Sec. 18, 1987
Constitution: [“A state of martial law does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts and
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function…”]
[See also Proclamation No. 216].
4. With or without a validly declared Martial
Law, can military and police officers arrests
and search suspected rebels without the
benefit of judicially issued warrants? Umil
and Dural v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990).
[“Continuing Offense Doctrine”]
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

1. Since Rule 126, Sec. 14 of the Rules on

Criminal Procedure speaks of Motion to Quash or
Suppress Evidence only in relation to a defectively
issued search warrant, is it permissible to file a
Motion to Suppress Evidence taken as a
consequence of a warrantless search? See
Candelaria v. RTC, 730 SCRA 1 (2014).
2. What are the remedies against an order of the trial
court denying or granting a motion to quash Search
Warrant on the ground of lack of probable cause?
Worldwide Web Corp. v. People and PLDT, 713 SCRA 18
(2014) [where “there is still no pending criminal case, the
order quashing the warrant ends the judicial process”,
and “the quashal would be a final order, not
interlocutory”.] People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 204419,
November 7, 2016 [where “the petition alleges grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the judge that ordered
the said quashal”]. Oebanda v. People, 792 SCRA 623
(2016) [order finding probable cause for issuance of
search warrant (denying Motion to Quash) cannot be
raised under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court].
3. Is the defense of illegal search waived if one
agrees to be arraigned? Villanueva v. People, 740
SCRA 456 (2014) and Valdez v. People, 538 SCRA
611 (2007). [“A waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless search.”]
4. When is there a waiver of objection to the
admissibility of evidence seized by virtue of a
warrantless search or a search by virtue of a void
warrant? Demaisip v. People, 193 SCRA 373
(1991).
5. If “A’s” house was search illegally, during which
the police obtained evidence tending to incriminate
“B”, can “B” invoke the exclusionary rule if he is
charged in court? Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383
(1967). See also Joaquin Bernas, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: a
Commentary, 1996, p. 201. [“The legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.”]
• Right to privacy. Or the right to be left alone.

• Cases.

• In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L.
SABIO v. HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al., G.R. No. 174340 17 October
2006:

• Facts: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners  to appear as resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.

• Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same
time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall
be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Contempt order was
issued. Petitioners argued that subpoenae violated petitioners rights to privacy and
against self-incrimination.
• Ruling: Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987
Constitution.

• Senate Committees inquiry does not violate their right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination.

• Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within

these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by
law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous
regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that
the right to privacy is a constitutional right and the right most valued by
civilized men, but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which mandates that, no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy and everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
• Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution,
provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create zones of
privacy. It highlights a persons right to be let alone or the right to
determine what, how much, to whom and when information about
himself shall be disclosed.

• Section 2 guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.

• Section 3 renders inviolable the privacy of communication and

correspondence and further cautions that any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
• In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy,
a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion. Applying this determination to
these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy?;
and second, did the government violate such
expectation?
• This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute
where there is an overriding compelling state
interest.

• In Valmonte v. Belmonte,[170 SCRA 256 (1989)] the

Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of
the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited
right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals,
and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking
this into consideration, the Court ruled that the right of
the people to access information on matters of public
concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial
transactions.
• "A public official, more especially an elected one, should
not be onion skinned. Strict personal discipline is
expected of an occupant of a public office because a
public official is a property of the public. He is looked
upon to set the example how public officials should
correctly conduct themselves even in the face of extreme
provocation." Yabut v. Ombudsman.
• “Such right to be left alone has been regarded as the
beginning of all freedoms.”

• “But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,90 the

United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two
categories: decisional privacy and informational
privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to
independence in making certain important decisions, while
informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right—the
right to informational privacy—that those who oppose
government collection or recording of traffic data in real-
time seek to protect.”
• “Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not
to have private information disclosed, and the right to
live freely without surveillance and intrusion.91 In
determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the
right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test.
The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right
must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy
over a certain matter. The second is an objective test,
where his or her expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.”
• Doctrines. The right is personal; it may be invoked only by the
person entitled to it [Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383].

• The protection cannot extend to acts committed by private

individuals so as to bring them within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government [People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57].

• In People v. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002, the

shabu in the baggage of the accused was found by (private)
security officers of the interisland passenger vessel who then
reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard. The search and
seizure of the suitcase and contraband items were carried out without
government intervention. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule may not
be invoked.
• “Indeed, even assuming that their arrest was illegal, their
act of entering a plea during their arraignment constituted
a waiver by the accused of their right to question the
validity of their arrest [People v. Cachola, G.R. Nos.
148712-15, January 21, 2004].
• This does not mean, however, that a Court, whose territorial jurisdiction
does not embrace the place to be searched, cannot issue a search warrant
therefor, where the obtention of such search warrant is necessitated and
justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and
place [llano v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 346], which is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, subject to review by the appellate court
in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction [People v. Chui, G.R. No. 142915-16, February 27, 2004].

• The case of Laud v. People (G.R. No. 199052, Nov. 19, 2014) upheld
the validity of the search warrant issued by Vice Eecutive Judge Peralta
of RTC-Manila, applied by PNP, for the for the search of three caves in
the Laud Compound in Davao City, where, as alleged, the remains of
the so-called “Davao Death Squad” could be found, based on A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC.
• Rule: Only a judge has the sole authority to issue a warrant.

• Thus, Secretary of Labor may not issue as he is not a judge.

(Salazar v Achacoso);

• PCGG may not direct a person to submit bank documents,

which is in the nature of a warrant. As PCGG is not a judge, it
cannot issue such. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan);

• DOJ Secretary may not issue an order to restrict or block access

to such computer data that is found to prima facie violating the
provisions of the Cybercrime LAw (R.A. 10175), which is in
the nature of warrant. As DOJ Secretary is not a judge, he
cannot issue such order.
• Requisites of a valid warrant:

• a) Probable Cause;

• b) Determination of probable cause personally by a

judge;

• c) After examination, under oath or affirmation, of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and

• d) Particularity of description.
• Probable cause. For a search: “such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched”
[Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800]. See also Corro v. Using, 137 SCRA 541;
Prudente v. Dayrit 180 SCRA 69.

• Must refer to one specific offense [Asian Surety v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312; Castro v.
Pabalan, 70 SCRA 477].

• However, in People v. Dichoso, 223 SCRA 174, it was held that the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs, and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species, thus,
one search warrant may be validly issued for several violations thereof.
This is reiterated in People v. Salanguit, G.R. No. 133254-55 April 19 2001. Where a
search warrant was issued for the seizure of shabu and drug paraphernalia, but
probable cause was found to exist only with respect to the shabu, the warrant cannot
be invalidated in toto; it is still valid with respect to the shabu [People v. Salanguit,
supra.] (Note: Separable.)
• Personal determination by the judge of probable
cause.

• In People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788, the Supreme Court

emphasized that the determination of probable cause is
the function of the judge; and the judge alone makes
this determination.

• Issuance of a warrant of arrest. ’Personal

determination’ does not mean personal examination of
the complainant and his witnesses. (Soliven v.
Makasiar)
• It is sufficient that the judge should personally evaluate the
report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution
in determining probable cause [Cruz v. People, 233 SCRA
439], This was reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and
Cerbo, G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999 and in Raro v.
Sandiganbayan, July 14, 2000. And, must be shown that the
court personally determined the existence of probable cause by
independently examining sufficient evidence submitted by the
parties during the prelminary investigation. Judge must not
only rely on prosecutor’s finding of probable cause. (Allado v.
Diokno, G.R. no. 113630, May 5,1994) (Meaning: SC is
merely telling the judges to be more circumspect.)
• Q: Whether a trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the
basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause?

• There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial.
The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who
is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law
and thus should be held for trial.

• The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by
the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted,
there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant.
• The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause
concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an
Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.

• In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the
public prosecutor’s finding of probable cause, the accused can appeal such
finding to the justice secretary and move for the deferment or suspension of the
proceedings until such appeal is resolved. (Note: 60-day period)

• Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options
upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest
if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of
probable cause.
• But the option to order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first
option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause."

• It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is

filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to
its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.
• Final caveat: Although jurisprudence and procedural rules
allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in
dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering
the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only
when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely
fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she
can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds
probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with
arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.
(ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC.,
Respondents, G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014)
• Now. Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure embodies
the rulings in Soliven and Lim, with modifications, as follows:

• “Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court
- Within ten days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge
shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already
been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to Sec. 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty days from the filing of the complaint or information.”
• Issuance of a Search Warrant. Section 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court requires that the judge must
personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainants
and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them, and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted. See
Silva v. Presiding Judge, 203 SCRA 140; Mata v.
Bayona, 128 SCRA 388.
• Personal examination. Must be probing and
exhaustive, not routinary or pro forma.

• Requires ‘personal knowledge’. Otherwise, arbitrary

or grave abuse of discretion.
• Particularity. In People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546- 47,
January 20, 2003, it was held that this requirement is
primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the
warrant to (1) readily identify the properties to be seized
and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and
(2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding
the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable
searches and seizures.

• Otherwise, the warrant is a ‘general warrant’ which is

proscribed and unconstitutional. (Nolasco v. Pano)
• A warrant of arrest is said to particularly describe the
person to be seized if it contains the name/s of the person/s
to be arrested. If the name of the person to be arrested is
not known, then a “John Doe” warrant may be issued. A
“John Doe" warrant will satisfy the constitutional
requirement of particularity of description if there is some
descriptio persona which will enable the officer to
identify the accused.

• In Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599, warrants issued

against “50 John Does”, none of whom the witnesses could
identify, were Considered as “general warrants”, and thus,
void.
• A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the
things to be seized when the description therein is as specific
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow [People v. Rubio,
57 Phil 384];

• However, in Kho v. Judge Makalintal, G.R. No. 94902-

OS, April 21, 1999, it was held that the failure to specify
detailed descriptions in the warrant does not necessarily
make the warrant a general warrant.

• Thus, in People v. Tee, “an undetermined amount of

marijuana” was held to satisfy the requirement for
particularity of description.
• A search warrant is severable. Thus, in Uy v. Bureau of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 129651, October 20, 2000, the
Supreme Court said that the general description of most of the
documents in the warrant — if there are others particularly
described — will not invalidate the entire warrant. Those items
which are not particularly described may simply be cut off
without destroying the whole warrant. This ruling is reiterated in
Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946,
September 13, 2004.

• Only the articles particularly described in the warrant

may be seized. In People v. Salanguit, supra., where the
warrant authorized only the seizure of shabu, and not marijuana,
the seizure of the latter was held unlawful.
• In Veroy v. Layague, 210 SCRA 97, it was held that even while the
offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum, it does
not follow that the subject firearm is illegal per se. Thus, inasmuch as
the consent to the search was limited in scope to the search
for NPA rebels, the confiscation of the firearm was held invalid.

• Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had
permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their
residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the
presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not
include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside
the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal
search, violative of their constitutional rights As such, they are
inadmissible in evidence against them.
• The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported
by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are:
(1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193
SCRA 122]).

• None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house
of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment
center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not
enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not
present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he
did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission
to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house
but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is
undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant
but did not.
• In a number of cases decided by this Court, (Guazon v.
De Villa, supra.; People v. Aminnudin, G.R. No. L-
74869, July 6, 1988 [163 SCRA 402]; Alih v. Castro,
G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987 [151 SCRA 279]),
warrantless searches were declared illegal because the
officials conducting the search had every opportunity
to secure a search Warrant. The objects seized,
being products of illegal searches, were inadmissible in
evidence in the criminal actions subsequently instituted
against the accused-appellants (People v. Cendana, G.R.
No. 84715, October 17, 1990 [190 SCRA 538]).
• Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum
prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily
illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of
this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are
prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.

• Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable,
the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected
by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the
petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of
firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides,
assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita,
while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that
the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no
crime.
• Place to be searched. The place to be searched should, likewise be
particularly described.

• It is sufficient that the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended, and distinguish it
from other places in the community. (Laud v. People)

• In Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion, 307

SCRA 253, the search warrant issued to search the compound of
petitioner for unlicensed firearms was held invalid for failing to
describe the place with particularity, considering that the compound
is made up of 200 buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1
airstrip, 3 piers, 23 warehouses, 6 depots, and 800
miscellaneous structures, spread out over 155 hectares.
• Thus, where the warrant designated the place to be searched as “Abigail’s
Variety Store, Apt. 1207, Area F, Bagong Buhay Ave., Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan”, and the search was made at
Apt. No. I which was immediately adjacent to the store (but an
independent unit), it was held in People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
126379, June 26, 1998, that there was an infringement of the constitutional
guarantee, the clear intention of the requirement being that the search be
confined to the place so described in the warrant.

• Yousef Al Ghoul v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126859, September 4,

2001, where the search warrant authorized the search of Apartment No.
2, Obinia Compound, Caloocan City, but the searching party
extended the search and seizure of firearms to Apartment No. 8 in the
same compound, the Supreme Court, while upholding the validity of
the search of Apartment No. 2, invalidated the search done at
Apartment No. 8.
• The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly
describe not only the place to be searched, but also the
persons to be searched. In People v. Tiu Won Chua,
G.R. No. 149878, July 1, 2003, the validity of the search
warrant was upheld despite the mistake in the name
of the persons to be searched, because the authorities
conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation before
obtaining the search warrant and subsequently
implementing it. They had personal knowledge of the
identity of the persons and the place to be searched,
although they did not specifically know the names of the
accused.
• he situation in People v. Priscilla del Norte, G.R. No. 149462, March
29, 2004, is different. The search warrant was issued against one Ising
Gutierrez Diwa, residing at 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St.,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Arrested in the house at the address named,
and eventually charged, was Priscilla del Norte, who claimed to be a
resident of 376 Dama de Noche, Caloocan City, as later shown by the
certification of the Barangay Chairman, a receipt evidencing rental
payment for the house at Dama de Noche, and the school ID of her
daughter who testified in court. The authorities did not conduct any
prior surveillance. It was only when they implemented the warrant that
they coordinated with barangay officials, and one of the barangay officials
informed the police officers that Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla del
Norte were one and the same person, but said barangay official was
not presented in court. Thus, the Court held that the prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
• Conduct of the Search. Sec. 7, Rule 126, Rules of Court,
requires that no search of a house, room or any of the
premises shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family, or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion,
residing in the same locality. Failure to comply with
this requirement invalidates the search [People v.
Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743].
• But in People v. Benny Go, G.R. No. 144639, September
12, 2003, even as the police officers were armed with a
Search Warrant of appellant’s residence and to seize shabu,
the Supreme Court declared that the manner in which the
officers conducted the search was unlawful. The police
officers arrived at appellant’s residence and to gain entry into
the house, they “side- swiped (sinagi) a little” appellant’s car
which was parked outside. Jack Go, appellant’s son, the only
one present in the house at the time, opened the door, and the
policemen at once introduced themselves, informed Jack that
they had a warrant to search the premises, and promptly
handcuffed Jack to a chair.
WARRANTLESS
ARRESTS
• Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

• (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

• (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and

• (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. (Section 5, Rule 113,
ROC)
• a. When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.

• In Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the Supreme Court held

that rebellion is a continuing offense. Accordingly, a rebel
may be arrested at any time, with or without a warrant.

• Parulan v. Director of Prisons, kidnapping with serious

illegal continuing crime, it can be considered as such only
when the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing
from one place to another.
• People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388, it was held that when a
police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once
to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a
warrant. The offense is deemed committed in the presence of
or within the view of the officer.

• Hot pursuit. In People v. de Lara, September 5, 1994, and

reiterated in People v. Recepcion, G.R. No. 141943,
November 13, 2002, the arrest of the accused inside his
house following hot pursuit of the person who committed the
offense in flagrante was held valid.
• An arrest made after an entrapment operation does not
require a warrant of arrest; it is reasonable and valid
under Sec. 5 (a), Rule 113 [People v. Bohol, G.R. No.
171729, July 28, 2008].

• A “buy-bust” operation is a valid in flagrante arrest. The

subsequent search of the person arrested and of the
premises within his immediate control is valid as an
incident to a lawful arrest [People v. Hindoy, G.R. No.
132662, May 10, 2001]
• In People v. Yong Fung Yuen, G.R. No. 145014-15,
February 18, 2004, the Court said that an allegation of
frame-up and extortion by the police officers is a
common and standard defense in most dangerous drugs
cases. It is, however, viewed with disfavour, for such
defenses can be easily concocted and fabricated. To
prove such defenses, the evidence must be clear and
convincing.
• In People v. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791, the police
officer, acting as poseur-buyer in a “buy-bust operation”,
instead of arresting the suspect and taking him into
custody after the sale, returned to police headquarters
and filed his report. It was only in the evening of the
same day that the police officer, without a warrant,
arrested the suspect at the latter’s house where dried
marijuana leaves were found and confiscated. It was held
that the arrest and the seizure were unlawful.
• People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007,
“reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative
of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view
of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause to justify the arrest. It is necessary that
two requisites concur:

• [1] the person to be arrested must execute an overt act

indicating that he had just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and

• [2] such overt act is done in the presence or within the

view of the arresting officer.
• In People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19,
2001, the accused while holding a bag on board a tricycle
cannot be said to be committing, attempting to commit or
to have committed a crime. It matters not that the
accused responded, “Boss, if possible, we will
settle this”, as such response is an equivocal statement
which, standing alone, will not constitute probable cause
to effect an in flagrante arrest.
• Caveat: People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 136790, March 26,
2001, and People v. Conde, G.R. No. 113269, April 10,
2001, although in these cases, for failure of the accused
to assert their constitutional right prior to arraignment,
and by entering a plea of not guilty and participating
actively in the trial, they were deemed to have waived
their right to raise the issue of the illegality of the arrest.
(Note: Lawyer must be keen on this technicality.
Otherwise, rights of client may be prejudiced.)
• For a successful prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs after a
buy-bust operation, what is important is the fact that the
poseur-buyer received the goods from the accused-appellant
and the same was presented in court as evidence. There is no
rule of law that requires that there must be simultaneous
exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher. There is also no rule
that requires the police to use only marked money in buy-bust
operations. The failure to use marked money or to present it in
evidence is not material since the sale cannot be essentially
disproved, by the absence thereof [People v. Antinero, G.R.
No. 137612, September 25, 2001].
• However, the mere discovery of marked money on the
person of the accused did not mean that he was caught in
the act of selling marijuana. The marked money was
not prohibited per se. [People v. Enrile, 222 SCRA
586],
• It is imperative for the successful prosecution of illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, Sec. 21 of
R.A. 9165, as amended by R.A. 10640, which prescribes
the requirements of the chain of custody. Non-
compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing the
identity of the corpus delicti.
• Sec. 21, as amended, provides that PDEA shall take charge and custody of all dangerous
drugs x x x as well as instruments x x x so confiscated, seized, or surrendered for proper
disposition in the following manner:

• The apprehending team shall, immediately sfter seizure and confiscation, conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom such items were confiscated, or his representative or
counsel, with an elective public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service of the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory x x x
provided that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizure and custody over said items;

• Within 24 hourse from confiscation/seizure x x x the same shall be submitted to the

PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

• A certification (partial or final) of the forensic laboratory examination results, x x x shall

be issued immediately upon receipt of the subject items;
• BAR: What is the "chain of custody" requirement in drug offenses? What is its rationale?
What is the effect of failure to observe the requirement?

•  Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which
implements the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines “chain of
custody” as follows:

• “Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt
in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.  Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

• Compliance with the chain of custody requirement forecloses opportunities for

planting, contaminating, or tampering or evidence in any manner. (Pp. v. Garry de la
Cruz, G. R. No. 205821, Oct. 1, 2014.)
• In Pp. v. Butial, G.R. No. 192785, Feb. 4, 2015, where PO2
Martinez admitted that he did not put any markings on the two
plastic sachets handed to him by Borlagdan after the latter’s
purchase of the same from the accused in the buy-bust
operation, the Court held that there was failure to comply with
the chain of custody requirement, and the accused must be
acquitted. Marking after seizure is the starting point in
the custodial chain, thus it is vital that the seized contraband
be immediately marked, becuase succeeding handlers of the
specimen wil use the marking as reference x x x the absence of
the markings creates an uncertainty x x x and the lack of
certainty on a crucial element of the crime warrants the reversal
of the judgment of conviction.
• b. When an offense had iust been committed and there is probable cause
to believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts or of other
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed the offense.

• Under this paragraph, two stringent requirements must be complied with, namely:

• (i) an offense had just been committed, and

• (ii) the person making the arrest has probable cause to believe, based on his
personal knowledge of facts or of other circumstances, that the person to be
arrested had committed it.

• Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense
is committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of
time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest
must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that
the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of certain facts indicating
that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime.
• No valid arrest.

• “a day after” arrest - not valid. (Pp. v. Del Rosario);

• “eights days” prior to arrest - invalid. (Pp. v. Samus);

• “six days” after the shooting arrest - invalid. (Go v. CA);

• “two days” arrest - invalid. (Pp. v. Olivarez);

• “two days from escape” arrest - invalid. (Pp. v. Kimura);

• “seven day” arrest - invalid. (San Agustin v. Pp.).

• Valid arrest.

• In People v. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756, where the policemen saw the victim dead at the
hospital and when they inspected the crime scene, they found the instruments of death
— and the eyewitnesses reported the happening and pointed to Gerente as one of the
killers, the warrantless arrest of Gerente only three hours after the killing was held
valid, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim
and of the facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed the victim. Further,
the search of Gerente’s person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves were valid as
an incident to a lawful arrest.

• In celebrated case of Robin Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12,
1997, the-Court held that there was a valid arrest, as there was neither supervening
event nor a considerable lapse of time between the hit-and-run and the apprehension.
After the policemen had stationed themselves at possible exits, they saw the fast
approaching vehicle, its plate number, and the dented hood and railings thereof.
These formed part of the arresting officers’ personal knowledge of the fact that
Padilla’s vehicle was the one involved in the incident.
• “less than an hour” arrest - valid. (Pestilos v. Generoso);

• Car-chase scene. Valid. (Pp. v. Abriol)

• Re: Personal knowledge for warrantless arrest. In Cadua v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123123, August 19, 1999, the
Supreme Court, quoting Ricardo Francisco, Criminal
Procedure, 2nd ed. (1994), pp. 207-208, said that it has
been ruled that “personal knowledge of facts” in arrests
without a warrant must be based on probable cause, which
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
• In Cadua, Supreme Court held that the arrest without
warrant was valid. The fact that the robbery case
was never brought to trial does not mean that the
legality of the arrest was tainted, for such arrest
does not depend upon the indubitable existence
of the crime. The legality of apprehending the accused
would not depend on the actual commission of the crime
but upon the nature of the deed, where from such
characterization it may reasonably be inferred by the
officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment
leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of
suspending the liberty of the citizen.(Note: Room for
error.)
• c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

• It is necessary, therefore, that the petitioner should

question the validity of the arrest before he enters his
plea. Failure to do so would constitute a waiver of his
right against unlawful restraint of his liberty [People v.
Cachola, G.R. Nos. 148712-15, January 21, 2004;
• The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment
from questioning the illegal arrest or the lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation applies only if he voluntarily enters
his plea and participates during trial, without previously
invoking his objections thereto. There must be clear and
convincing proof that petitioner had an actual
intention to relinquish his right to question the
existence of probable cause. When the only proof of
intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to
voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that
no other explanation of his conduct is possible. (Leviste v.
Alameda)
• Note, however, that the waiver is limited to the illegal
arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an
incident thereto, or to the subsequent seizure of evidence
allegedly found during the search. Thus, when the arrest
is incipiently illegal — even if the right to question the
same is deemed waived by the accused entering his plea
— it follows that the subsequent search is similarly
illegal. Any evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in
evidence under the exclusionary rule [People v. Peralta,
G.R. No. 145176, March 30, 2004].
• Under Sec. 26, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, an application for, or admission to, bail, shall
not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his
arrest, provided that he raises the challenge before
entering his plea.

• The consequent filing of charges and the issuance of a

warrant of arrest against a person invalidiy detained will
cure the defect of such detention or, at least, deny him
the right to be released [Francisco Juan Larranaga v.
Court of Appeals]
WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES
• a. When the right is voluntarily waived.

• Consensual seach is not lightly inferred via clear and

convincing evidence. Onus with State. (Caballes v.
CA)

• Intelligently done with actual animus to relinguish the

right.

• It is a question of fact, based on totality of

circumstances.
• What to do? Protest. Object to admissibility. File Motion
to Quash and/or Supress Evidence Illegally Obtained.

• Airports. Read: Sec. 9, R.A. 6235. “Holder hereof and

his hand-carried luggage are subject to search for, and
seizure of, prohibited materials and substance.”
Otherwise, not allowed to board the aircraft unless
confiscated. Privacy expectations are reduced in airline
travels.
• Intimidating or coercive circumstance (14 armed
policemen) is not consent with the purview of
constitutional guarantee. (Aniag v. COMELEC)

• Silence is not always yes. Silence of the accused was not

construed as consent. (Pp. v. Barros)

• Waiver must be given by the person whose right is

violated. Not by an unauthorized helper. (Pp. v. Damaso)
• A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires
the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the
right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had
knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or
she had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
(People vs. Salangga, 234 SCRA 407, 417-4187, July 25,
1994, per Regalado, J.)
• b. When there is a valid reason to “stop-and-frisk”.

• Concept of “suspiciousness”. Personal knowledge and

genuine.

• “Stop-and-frisk” - the vernacular designation of the

right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him and pat him for weapons whenever he
observes unusual conduct which leads him to conclude
that criminal activity may be afoot. (Terry v. Ohio)
• Facts: Cleveland, Ohio detective McFadden was on a downtown beat that
he had been patrolling for many years when he observed two strangers
(Terry and another man, Chilton) at a street corner. He saw them proceed
alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the
same store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times.

• Suspecting the two men of ‘casing a job, a stick-up’, the officer followed
them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of
a store. The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman,
and asked their names. The men mumbled something, whereupon
McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing, and felt in
his overcoat pocket – but was unable to remove – a pistol. He removed
Terry’s overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall
with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and
Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton’s outside overcoat pocket.
• Issue: Was the gun seized from Terry admissible in evidence against
him and thus his conviction of carrying concealed weapon was proper?

• Held: Yes. “ x x x where a police officer observes unusual conduct

which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him.”
• Facts: At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City
conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
This was done after receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said
area.

• Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner,
in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had
reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner.

• Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce
themselves and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted.
Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The
petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu
found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana
contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated.

• The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.
• Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence
inadmissible as evidence.

• Held: The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in
violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any proceeding.

• The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of
their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may
be made only with probable cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of
suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the place to
be searched.

• Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant. In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the
evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.
• The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark
case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop
a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s).

• Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their

surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk
along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police
information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his
experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan
City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts
who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop
petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such
investigation, they found marijuana in petitioners possession.
• Facts: SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant
that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in
Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group
positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the
hotel. The other group acted as their back up.

• Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just

arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from
the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly
accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled
out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded
from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search
which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back
pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it
contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small
transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber
firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police
operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col.
Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
• Issues: (1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant
was lawful; and (2) WON the search of his person and
the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on
him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.
• Held: Trial court convicted Sy Chua. the SC reversed it and acquitted him on reasonable ground.

• First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made upon accused-
appellant, the court a quo made the following findings:

• “Accused was searched and arrested while in possession of regulated drugs (shabu). A crime
was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects x x x allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. x x x x

• While it is true that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal affects (sic) of the accused, however, under the circumstances of the
case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and
there committing a crime.

• xxxxxxxxx

• In the present case, the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs
that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and
there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a stop and
frisk.”
• A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the
findings and conclusion of the trial court. It confused the
two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest (in flagrante delicto) and of a stop-and-frisk.

• In Malacat v. Court of Appeals, we distinguished the

concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search incidental to
a lawful arrest, to wit:
• “At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-
frisk and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

• In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the

validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a
large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first
be arrest before a search can be madethe process cannot be reversed. At
bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of
the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for
evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in
the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be
used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.”
• “We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a stop-
and-frisk as a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons, as
laid down in Terry, thus:

• We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety,
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth amendment.”
• “Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a stop-and-frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.”
• In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is applicable
to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police
operatives on accused-appellant.

• In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is

committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search
be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings. Accordingly, for this exception to apply
two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.

• We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The record reveals that
when accused-appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car
along the McArthur Highway, alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance of
the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious
manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
• However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act strongly
manifesting a violation of the law, the group of SPO2 Nulud
hurriedly accosted accused-appellant and later on introduced
themselves as police officers. Accused-appellant was arrested before
the alleged drop-off of shabu was done. Probable cause in this case
was more imagined than real. Thus, there could have been no in
flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search, in light of the lack of an
overt physical act on the part of accused-appellant that he had
committed a crime, was committing a crime or was going to commit
a crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that
reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that
would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
• Hence, in People v. Aminudin, we ruled that the accused-
appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about
to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing
was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.
To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It
was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier
of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension
• People v. Tangliben ruling is not applicable as in the said case,
based on the information supplied by informers, police officers
conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal
compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who
may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be
engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the
evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red
travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted
him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He
acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves.
Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic
wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of
Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
• In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already
had prior knowledge from the very same informant of
accused-appellants activities. No less than SPO2 Mario
Nulud, the team leader of the arresting operatives,
admitted that their informant has been telling them about
the activities of accused-appellant for two years prior to
his actual arrest on September 21, 1996.
• The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged
illegal activities of accused-appellant. Considering that the
identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was
already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest,
there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not
have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-
appellant and searching his person. Whatever information their
civilian asset relayed to them hours before accused-appellants
arrest was not a product of an on-the-spot tip which may
excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest. Accordingly,
the arresting teams contention that their arrest of accused-
appellant was a product of an on-the-spot tip is untenable.
• In the same vein, there could be no valid stop-and-frisk in this case.

• A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a

citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and
make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests
unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer
clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police
officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police
officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed
about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure
should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
• This principle of stop-and-frisk search was invoked by the Court
in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In said case, the policemen
chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a
swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus,
we upheld the validity of the search as akin to a stop-and-frisk.

• In People v. Solayao, we also found justifiable reason to stop-

and-frisk the accused after considering the following
circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his
companions, the fact that his companions fled when they saw
the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely
on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons
where roaming the vicinity.
• The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was no valid
stop-and-frisk in the case of accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant
was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found
in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial
inquiry into accused-appellants business in the vicinity or the contents of the
Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only
introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.
Besides, at the time of his arrest, accused-appellant did not exhibit manifest
unusual and suspicious conduct reasonable enough to dispense with the
procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There was, therefore, no
genuine reasonable ground for the immediacy of accused-appellants arrest.

• Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the information
given to them by their confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during that
time of the arrest, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that accused-
appellant had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.
• At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal
drugs actually occurred, accused-appellants warrantless
arrest and consequent search would still not be deemed a
valid stop-and frisk. For a valid stop-and-frisk the search
and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so in
this case. Besides, as we have earlier emphasized, the
information about the illegal activities of accused-
appellant was not unknown to the apprehending officers.
Hence, the search and seizure of the prohibited drugs
cannot be deemed as a valid stop-and-frisk.
• Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized
items found in accused-appellants possession. (Not inadvertently
discovered)

• In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving

vehicle, a consented warrantless search, or a customs search. It cannot
even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at
hand is bereft of any such showing.

• All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot
simply validate, much more cure, the illegality of the arrest and
consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can the
presumption of regularity of performance of function be invoked by an
officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an
encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.
• Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items
allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the very
same items presented at the trial of this case. The record
shows that the initial field test where the items seized
were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP
headquarters of Angeles City. The items were therefore
not marked at the place where they were taken. In People
v. Casimiro, we struck down with disbelief the reliability
of the identity of the confiscated items since they were
not marked at the place where they were seized,
• The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that
sets him free. ([G.R. Nos. 136066-67. February 4, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant.)
• In Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12,
1997, where police officers, conducting a patrol on the strength
of an information that a Muslim group would explode a grenade,
saw petitioner and companions attempting to explode a grenade
but who, upon seeing the policemen, desisted and ran away; then,
two days later, police officers saw petitioner at a street corner,
accosted him when his companions ran away, then searched him
and found a grenade. In this case, the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid search because there was nothing in the
behavior or conduct of the petitioner which could have elicited
even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving
fast. There was no reasonable ground to believe that the
petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon.
• c. Where the search (and seizure) is an incident to a
lawful arrest.

• Sec. 12, Rule 126, as clarified in the 1985 Revised

Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides that “a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant”.

• To protect law enforcers and evidence from being

destroyed. (Pp. v. Calantiao)
• The search must, however, be contemporaneous to the
arrest and made within a permissible area of search.
(People v. Estella, G.R. Nos. 138539-40, January 21,
2003)

• Requisite: As a rule, the arrest must precede the

search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a
search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search [People v.
Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007].
• People v. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915, April 13, 1998, the Court invalidated
the search and seizure made on a woman, “Aling Rose”, who, upon
alighting from a bus, was pointed out by the informant. The Supreme
Court declared that in a search and seizure as an incident to a lawful
arrest, it is necessary for probable cause to be present, and probable cause
must be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has
been committed or is about to be committed. In this case, the accused was
merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner which
would engender a reasonable ground to believe that she was committing
or about to commit a crime. [Note that in this case, there was the
additional fact that the identity of the accused had been priorly
ascertained and the police officers had reasonable time within which to
obtain a search warrant.*-The presence of this circumstance distinguishes
this case from People v. Malmstedt, 196 SCRA 401.]
• In People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220, where two
policemen on surveillance, after receiving a tip from an
informer, noticed a person carrying a red bag acting
suspiciously, then confronted the person and found inside
the bag marijuana leaves, the Supreme Court held that
the seizure was valid, as “an incident to a lawful arrest”.
The Court said that the matter presented urgency; when
the informer pointed to the accused as one who was
carrying marijuana, the police officers, faced with such
on-the-spot information, had to act quickly. There was
not enough time to secure a search warrant.
• In People v. Malsmtedt, 198 SCRA 401, where soldiers
manning a checkpoint [set up because of persistent
reports that vehicles were transporting marijuana and
other prohibited drugs] noticed a bulge on the accused’s
waist, and the pouch bag was found to contain hashish,
the search was deemed valid as an incident to a lawful
arrest [as the accused was then transporting prohibited
drugs] — and there was sufficient probable cause for the
said officers to believe that the accused was then and
there committing a crime.
• However, in People v. Chua Ho San, G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999, the
Supreme Court said that while a contemporaneous search of a person arrested
may be effected for dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the
commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his
immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he
can destroy, a valid arrest must precede a search. The process cannot be
reversed. In this case, there was no valid arrest that could justify the search,
because none of the tell-tale clues --- e.g., a bag or package emanating the
odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug [People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646;
People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561], or a confidential report and/or positive
identification by informers of couriers of prohibited drugs and/or the time and
place where they will transport the same [People v. Maspil, 188 SCRA 751;
People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122], or suspicious demeanor or behavior
[People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220; Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA
288], or a suspicious bulge in the waist [People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401]
— accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest was
present.
• There was no classified information that a foreigner
would disembark at Tammocalao Beach bearing
prohibited drugs on the date in question. The fact that the
vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to
the fishing vessels in the area did not automatically mark
him as in the process of perpetrating an offense.

• “Tell-tale” clues, or probable cause.

• Permissible area of search. “immediate control”.

• The accused was arrested in a “buy-bust” operation while standing

by the door of the store which was part of the house, it was proper
for the police officers to search the house of the accused, the same
being in the area within his immediate control.

• Where the accused was frisked and arrested in the street for
possession of two cellophane bags of marijuana, and when asked if
he had more answered that he had more marijuana at his house, the
search conducted by the police officers in the house and the
consequent seizure of ten cellophane bags of marijuana was held
invalid, because the house was no longer within the reach and
control of the accused [Espano v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558]
• People v. Che Chun Ting, G.R. No. 130568, March 31,
2000, where the accused was outside the apartment unit
and in the act of delivering to the poseur-buyer the bag of
shabu — and the apartment unit was not even his
residence but that of his girlfriend — the inside of the
apartment unit was no longer a permissible area of
search, as it could not be said to be within his reach and
immediate control. The warrantless search therein was,
therefore, unlawful.
• P.D. No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials
involved in the violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, even if the
accused was acquitted. (Nogales v. People.)

• Note: There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text
of Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165 relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of
the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that of Article 45 of
the Revised Penal Code, which states:

• Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the

Crime. – Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry
with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools
with which it was committed.

• Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in

favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third
person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not
subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.
• d) Search of vessels and aircraft.

• With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had

been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. (Pp. v. Bagista)
• In People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, where the accused was searched
and arrested upon disembarkation from a passenger vessel, the Court held
that there was no urgency to effect a warrantless search, as it is clear that
the Philippine Constabulary had at least two days (from the time they
received the tip until the arrival of the vessel) within which they could
have obtained a warrant to search and arrest the accused. Yet, they did
nothing; no effort was made to comply with the law. A similar ruling was
made in People v. Encinada, G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997, when a
search and seizure was made of a passenger who disembarked from MA/
Sweet Pearl. The court noted that since the informer’s tip was received at
4:00 p.m. on the day before the arrival of the vessel, the authorities had
ample time to obtain a search warrant.

• The Tangliben ruling cannot apply because the evidence did not show that
the accused was acting suspiciously when he disembarked from the
vessel. (Note: Chill.)
• e) Search of moving vehicles.

• Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said

checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of
being harassed and of their safety being placed at the
arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that
their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court
order.
• Held: Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined
by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case.

• Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which
is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

• True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by

the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the
price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. (Valmonte
v. De Villa)
• One such form of search is the “stop and search” without a warrant at
military or police checkpoints, which has been declared not to be illegal
per se so long as it is required by the exigencies of public order and
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.

• A checkpoint search may either be a mere routine inspection, or it may

involve an extensive search. For a mere routine inspection, the search is
normally permissible when it is limited to a mere visual search, where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search. On the other
hand, when the vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, it
would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search had reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search,
that either the motorist is a law offender or they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be
searched [Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15,
2002; People v. Libnao, G.R. No. 136860, January 20, 2003].
• In Caballes, petitioner’s vehicle was flagged down
because the police officers on routine patrol became
suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle
was covered with kakawati leaves. The fact that the
vehicle looked suspicious because it is not common for
such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not
constitute probable cause as would justify the search
without a warrant.
• In Pp. v. Libnao, there is probable cause. The Tarlac Police
Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance
operations for three months in the area. The surveillance
yielded the information that once a month, appellant and her co-
accused transport drugs in big bulks. At 10 p.m. of October 19,
1996, the police received a tip that the two will be transporting
drugs that night riding a tricycle. The two were intercepted
three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-
looking bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When
they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both
became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless
search and seizure of appellant’s bag was not illegal. (Note:
Chill.)
• In People v. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, January 20. 2004,
when the appellants sped away after noticing the checkpoint and
even after having been flagged down by police officers, their
suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the
contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, the
reply of Vinecario that he was a member of the Philippine Army,
apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from
proceeding with the inspection, and the smell of marijuana that
emanated from the package wrapped in paper: all these showed
probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the
law enforcers that the appellants were offenders of the law and
the contents of the backpack were instruments used in, or
subject of the offense. (Note: Chill.)
• In Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 615, where
respondent Roxas confiscated and impounded
petitioner’s motorcycle which was believed one of the
vehicles used by the killers of Rep. Moises Espinosa, the
Supreme Court ruled that the confiscation, without
warrant, was unlawful. The constitutional provision
protects not only those who appear to be innocent but
also those who appear to be guilty but are
nevertheless presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.
• f) Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary and building regulations.

• This is basically an exercise of the police power of the State, and

would not require a search warrant. These are routine inspections
which, however, must be conducted during reasonable hours.

• g) Where prohibited articles are in plain view.

• Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence. The “plain view” doctrine is usually applied where the
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes upon an incriminating object
[People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597].
• Requisites. In People v. Musa, supra., reiterated in People v. Aruta, G.R.
No. 120515, April 13, 1998; People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, January
22, 1999, and in People v. Sarap, G.R. No. 132165, March 26, 2003, the
Supreme Court enumerated the elements of a valid seizure based on the
“plain view” doctrine, as follows:

• (i) a prior valid intrusion based on the warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

• (ii) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have
the right to be where they are;

• (iii) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and

• (iv) “plain view” justified the seizure of the evidence without any further
search.
• In People v. Macalaba, G.R. Nos. 146284-86, January 20,
2003, the evidence clearly shows that on the basis of
intelligence information that a carnapped vehicle was
driven by Abdul, who was also a suspect in drug pushing,
the members of the CIDG of Laguna went around
looking for the carnapped car. They spotted the suspected
carnapped car which was indeed driven by Abdul. While
Abdul was fumbling about in his clutch bag for the
registration papers of the car, the CIDG agents saw four
transparent sachets of shabu. These sachets of shabu
were, therefore, in “plain view” of the law enforcers.
• An object is in “plain view” if the object itself is plainly
exposed to sight. Where the object seized is inside a closed
package, the object is not in plain view and, therefore, cannot
be seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to
an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be
seized [Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292,
January 15, 2002], If the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains
prohibited articles, then the article is deemed in plain view
[People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007].
• In People v. Salanguit, G.R No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001,
the peace officers entered the dwelling armed with a search
warrant for the seizure of shabu and drug paraphernalia. In
the course of the search, they (presumably) found the
shabu first, and then came upon an article wrapped in
newspaper which turned out to be marijuana. On the issue
of whether the marijuana may be validly seized, the
Supreme Court said once the valid portion of the search
warrant has been executed, the “plain view” doctrine can
no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items
subsequently found. (Note that the marijuana was
wrapped in newspaper which was not transparent.)
• The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement
the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for
being present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. It is
recognition of the fact that when executing police officers come across
immediately incriminating evidence not covered by the warrant, they should
not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of
the crime they are investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be
needless to require the police to obtain another warrant.

• The “immediately apparent” test does not require an unduly high degree of
certainty as to the incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely that
the seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is probable cause
to associate the property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between
the viewed object and criminal activity. [United Laboratories v, Isip, G.R. No.
163858, June 28, 2005].
• In People v. Huang Zhan Hua, 439 SCRA 350, police officers, in
implementing a warrant which authorized the search of the
residence of the accused for methampethamine hydrochloride,
also seized credit cards, a passbook, a passport, photographs, and
other documents and papers. On the contention of the accused
that the seizure of such items was illegal, the Supreme Court
ruled that the seizure was legal because the articles were in plain
view. Their seizure was authorized because of their close
connection to the crime charged. The passport would show
when and how often the accused had been in and out of the
country; her credit cards and passbook would show how much
money she had amassed and how she acquired them; the pictures
would show her relationship to the co-accused.
• h) Search and seizure under exigent and emergency
circumstances.

• During coup d’etat, martial law, state of emergeny,

rebellion, exercise of military powers of president,
calling-out powers, especially wher courts are closed.
• Exclusionary Rule: Evidence obtained in violation of
Sec. 2, Art. Ill, shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding [Sec. 3 (2), Art. Ill], , because it is “the
fruit of the poisoned tree.”

• In People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 110829, April 18, 1997,

because of the failure of the accused to object to the
admissibility of evidence obtained through an unlawful
arrest and search, it was held that the accused were
deemed to have waived their right, and the trial court
did not err in admitting the evidence presented. (File:
Motion to Supress Illegally Obtained Evidence.)
• However, even if the accused were illegally arrested,
such arrest does not invest eye-witness accounts with
constitutional infirmity as “fruits of the poisonous tree”;
thus, where the conviction could be secured on
the strength of testimonial evidence given in
open court, the illegality of the arrest cannot be
invoked to reverse the conviction [People v. Salazar,
G.R. No. 99355, August 11, 1997].
• It does not necessarily follow that the property illegally
seized will be returned immediately; it could remain in
custodia legis [Alih v. Castro, supra.; Roan v. Gonzales,
145 SCRA 687].

• But in Tambasen v. People, the money which was not

indicated in the warrant, and thus, illegally seized, was
ordered returned. For the retention of the money, the
approval of the Court which issued the warrant is
necessary [People v. Gesmundo]; in like manner, only the
Court which issued the warrant may order its release.
• But, the property illegally seized may be used in evidence in the
case filed against the officer responsible for the illegal seizure.

• In Alih v. Maj. De Castro, on November 25, 1984, a contingent of

more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the home
defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov.
Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms,
ammunition and other explosives.

• The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and

sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed,
paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military
also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine
rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the
premises. Accused objected.
• Held: (Penned by J. Cruz). The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga
City at the time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no
state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions
committed therein against the petitioners.

• It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the arbitrary
treatment they received to take them into custody; but that is a criminal argument.
It is also fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in the conclusion that the petitioners
were unquestionably guilty on the strength alone of unsubstantiated reports that
they were stockpiling weapons.

• The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or
fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of
the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere
suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced
by the military.
• Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that
they were guilty, they would not have been any less entitled
to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the
innocent and the guilty. This is not to say, of course, that the
Constitution coddles criminals. What it does simply signify is
that, lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the
armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from a
deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every
person is entitled to due process. It is no exaggeration that the
basest criminal, ranged against the rest of the people who
would condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights,
a majority of one.
• In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that
"civilian authority is at all times supreme over the
military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution.
11 In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed
the civil courts, which had the authority to determine
whether or not there was probable cause to search the
petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the
raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized
determination of the petitioner's guilt.
• The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the
raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where
the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a
search warrant before making the raid. If they were
worried that the weapons inside the compound would be
spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises
in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was
absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the
orderly processes required by the Constitution and
instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the
petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military
invasion.
• Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might
not the search and seizure be nonetheless considered
valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely
not. If all the law enforcement authorities have to do is
force their way into any house and then pick up anything
they see there on the ground that the occupants are
resisting arrest, then we might as well delete the Bill
of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
• When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant
from any of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in
Zamboanga City, they instead simply barged into the beleaguered
premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot
just force his way into any man's house on the illegal orders of a
superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel
is protected from official intrusion because of the ancient rule,
revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle.

• It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the
rain may enter. But the King of England may not enter. All
the forces of the Crown dare not cross the threshold of
the ruined tenement. (U.S. v. Arceo, 3 Phil. 381.)
• If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the
Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be
committed, being committed, or just committed, what
was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of
such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed
that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer
making the arrest must have personal knowledge of
the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of
People v. Burgos.
• If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was
violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition
taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in
any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are
"fruits of the poisonous tree.”

• The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-

testing of the petitioners deserves slight comment. The prohibition
against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion
only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, "The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”
• The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded
operations should remain in the past, banished with the secret marshals
and their covert license to kill without trial. We must be done
with lawlessness in the name of law enforcement. Those
who are supposed to uphold the law must not be the first to
violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his
concurring opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon, "It is time that the martial
law regime's legacy of the law of force be discarded and that there be a
return to the force and rule of law."

• All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and
democratic, where every individual is entitled to the full protection of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid sentinel for
all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the basest of
criminals. (Note: Drug-lords?)
 RIGHT TO PRIVACY

• OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the

preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
• THE NEW CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE 723: Letters and
other private communications in writing are owned by
the person to whom they are addressed and delivered, but
they cannot be published or disseminated without the
consent of the writer or his heirs. (Special co-ownership
regime)
 RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES vs
ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
• Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at
St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while
changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend,
Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then
uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.

• At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school

department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted
pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in
brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in
the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among
others.
• Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their
respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the
identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard
liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne
along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.

• Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to
or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to
the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any
Facebook user.

• Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved

were barred from joining the commencement exercises.
• Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the
petition for habeas data on the following grounds:

• Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened

violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data.

• The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as

to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way.

• STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal
purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules
on discipline.
• ISSUE:

• Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened

violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a
right to informational privacy in online social network
activities of its users?)
• Facebook Privacy Tools

• To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different
privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by
the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their
privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every
effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.”

• For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images (photos),
posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting
his or her desired privacy setting:

• Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

• Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

• Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

• Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and

• Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

• The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook
users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the
visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses,
and photos, among others, from another user’s point of
view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an
avenue to make the availability of their Facebook
activities reflect their choice as to “when and to what
extent to disclose facts about themselves – and to put
others in the position of receiving such confidences.”
• The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate
petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject
digital photos were viewable either by the minors’
Facebook friends, or by the public at large.

• Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’

statement that the images were visible only to the five of
them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim
that the other students were able to view the photos, their
statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant
consideration.
• It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn
account that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,”
showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only
goes to show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly
private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it
is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at
large.

• Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it

can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children
positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy.
• The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a
post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that
it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook
friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook
friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook
friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter
is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook
friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can
view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.”
Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility
set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so automatically, be
said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’ argument.
• No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of
minors

• Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived

privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends
who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere
recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was
voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access
to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends
of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors
nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the
students who showed the images to Escudero.
• Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”

• Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were
limited to the original uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy
setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result
may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to
limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted
to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes
more manifest and palpable.
 G.R. No. 215305, April 03, 2018
MARCELO G. SALUDAY, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

• Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket

prohibition. Rather, it operates against "unreasonable"
searches and seizures only.25 Conversely, when a search
is "reasonable," Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
does not apply.
• The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure
ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy. Hence,
only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation
of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the
Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a
person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's
expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the
alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. (Like, in this case
checkpoint in bus and pasenger said “yes, just open it”)
• Indeed, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of
privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis
since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding
the case.37 Other factors such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity may
diminish this expectation. (Malls, buses, airports, etc.)
 [ G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019 ]
SIMEON LAPI Y MAHIPUS, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

• LEONEN, J.:

• The right to question the validity of an arrest may be

waived if the accused, assisted by counsel, fails to object
to its validity before arraignment.
• A citizen's right to be secure against any unreasonable
searches and seizures is sacrosanct. No less than the
Constitution guarantees that the State cannot intrude into
the citizen's persons, house, papers, and effects without a
warrant issued by a judge finding probable cause:
• Article III, Bill of Rights

• SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

• The Constitution guarantees against "unreasonable" warrantless

searches and seizures. This presupposes that the State may do so as
long as they are reasonable.
• People v. Aruta outlines the situations where a warrantless search and seizure may be
declared valid:

• 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;

• 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

• (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

• (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are;

• (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and

• (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
• 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity;

• 4. Consented warrantless search;

• 5. Customs search;

• 6. Stop and Frisk; and

• 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

• For a warrantless arrest to be valid, the arrest must have been committed under the
following circumstances:

• RULE 113, ARREST

• SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

• (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

• (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

• (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
• Here, petitioner was seen by police officers participating
in a "pot session.” Petitioner was arrested and subjected
to drug testing. When he tested positive for shabu, he was
subsequently charged with having violated Article II,
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165, on Use of
Dangerous Drugs. Petitioner argues that his warrantless
arrest was illegal since PO2 Villeran had to peep through
the window to ascertain that something illegal was
occurring.
• Here, however, petitioner admits that he failed to
question the validity of his arrest before arraignment. He
did not move to quash the Information against him before
entering his plea.He was assisted by counsel when he
entered his plea.Likewise, he was able to present his
evidence. (Comment: A good trial lawyer must know
the Rules of Court very well).
• It is much too late in the day to complain about the
warrantless arrest after a valid information has been filed,
the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed,
and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.
 [ G.R. No. 200370, June 07, 2017 ]
MARIO VERIDIANO Y SAPI, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
• Leonen.

• Case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

• The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are:

(a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b)
criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search
incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired
as constitutionally inadmissible.

• Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid

arrest must be raised through a motion to quash before an accused enters
his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and an accused
is "estopped from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest."
• The voluntary submission of an accused to the
jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation
during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have
attended an arrest. The reason for this rule is that "the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the accused."
• Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of
an arrest does not preclude an accused from questioning
the admissibility of evidence seized. The inadmissibility
of the evidence is not affected when an accused fails to
question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in
a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an
accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of
evidence are separate and mutually exclusive
consequences of an illegal arrest.
• As a component of the right to privacy,[62] the
fundamental right against unlawful searches and seizures
is guaranteed by no less than x x x Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution.

• To underscore the importance of an individual's right

against unlawful searches and seizures, Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution considers any evidence
obtained in violation of this right as inadmissible.
• The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms
of searches and seizures. It is only directed against those
that are unreasonable. Conversely, reasonable searches
and seizures fall outside the scope of the prohibition and
are not forbidden.
• There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a
search and seizure is reasonable. In any given situation,
"[w]hat constitutes a reasonable . . . search . . . is purely a
judicial question," the resolution of which depends upon
the unique and distinct factual circumstances.
• Pertinent to the resolution of this case is the
determination of whether the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest.
• A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there
must first be a lawful arrest before a search is made.
Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search;
"the process cannot be reversed.” For there to be a lawful
arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant.
Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a
warrant.
• There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

• Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

• (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

• (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

• (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
• The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante
delicto arrest. The validity of this warrantless arrest requires
compliance with the overt act test as explained in Cogaed:

• [F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected,

"two elements must concur:

• (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act

indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and

• (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer."
• Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in
flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In
Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in
flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not
exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers
suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at
the time he was apprehended.
• Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a
hot pursuit arrest. The rule requires that an offense has
just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point
of time.” That a crime was in fact committed does not
automatically bring the case under this rule. An arrest
under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court
entails a time element from the moment the crime is
committed up to the point of arrest.
• Law enforcers need not personally witness the
commission of a crime. However, they must have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it.
• People v. Gerente illustrates a valid arrest under Rule
113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court. In Gerente, the
accused was convicted for murder and for violation of
Republic Act No. 6425. He assailed the admissibility of
dried marijuana leaves as evidence on the ground that
they were allegedly seized from him pursuant to a
warrantless arrest. On appeal, the accused's conviction
was affirmed. This Court ruled that the warrantless arrest
was justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of
Court. The police officers had personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances indicating that the accused killed
the victim:
• The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours
after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw
Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of
the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood
and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him,
they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If
they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he
would have fled the law as his two companions did. (Emphasis
supplied)
• In Re Salibo involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers
suspected Datukan Salibo (Salibo) as one (1) of the accused in the
Maguindano Massacre. Salibo presented himself before the authorities to
clear his name. Despite his explanation, Salibo was apprehended and
detained. In granting the petition, this Court pointed out that Salibo was
not restrained under a lawful court process or order. Furthermore, he was
not arrested pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest:

• It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu

Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the
accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of
the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing
nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no
personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. (Emphasis
supplied)
• In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an
in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of
the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the
checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not
exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law
enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the
warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the
tip they received. Reliable information alone is
insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any
overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a
crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is
about to be committed.
• The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule
113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge
of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had just
committed an offense.

• A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest.

Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts,
based on their observation, that the person sought to be
arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to
probable cause that would justify a warrantless search
under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
• The warrantless search cannot be justified under the
reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and frisk"
searches.

• A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua

as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband.” Thus, the allowable scope of a "stop and
frisk" search is limited to a "protective search of outer
clothing for weapons."
• Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law
enforcement measure specifically directed towards crime
prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

• Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting

"stop and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not required,
a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a
suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers must have a genuine
reason to believe, based on their experience and the
particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may
be afoot. Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none
at all, cannot produce a reasonable search.
• In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the police officers
conducted surveillance operations in Caloocan City
Cemetery, a place reportedly frequented by drug addicts.
They chanced upon a male person who had "reddish eyes
and [was] walking in a swaying manner.” Suspecting
that the man was high on drugs, the police officers
approached him, introduced themselves, and asked him
what he was holding. However, the man resisted. Upon
further investigation, the police officers found marijuana in
the man's possession. This Court held that the circumstances
of the case gave the police officers justifiable reason to stop
the man and investigate if he was high on drugs.
• In People v. Solayao, the police officers were
conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the
presence of armed persons within Caibiran. They met a
group of drunk men, one (1) of whom was the accused in
a camouflage uniform. When the police officers
approached, his companions fled leaving behind the
accused who was told not to run away. One (1) of the
police officers introduced himself and seized from the
accused a firearm wrapped in dry coconut leaves. This
Court likewise found justifiable reason to stop and frisk
the accused when "his companions fled upon seeing the
government agents."
• The "stop and frisk" searches in these two (2) cases were
considered valid because the accused in both cases
exhibited overt acts that gave law enforcers genuine
reason to conduct a "stop and frisk" search. In contrast
with Manalili and Solayao, the warrantless search in
Cogaed was considered as an invalid "stop and frisk"
search because of the absence of a single
suspicious circumstance that would justify a
warrantless search.
• In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain
Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana. A passenger jeepney
passed through the checkpoint set up by the police officers. The driver
then disembarked and signaled that two (2) male passengers
were carrying marijuana. The police officers approached the two (2)
men, who were later identified as Victor Cogaed (Cogaed) and
Santiago Dayao, and inquired about the contents of their bags.

• Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3)

bricks of marijuana in Cogaed's bag. In holding that the "stop and
frisk" search was invalid, this Court reasoned that "[t]here was not a
single suspicious circumstance" that gave the police officers
genuine reason to stop the two (2) men and search their belongings.
Cogaed did not exhibit any overt act indicating that he was
in possession of marijuana.
• Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere
passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act
that would give police officers reasonable
suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his
possession. Reasonable persons will act in a
nervous manner in any check point. There was no
evidence to show that the police had basis or personal
knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer
anything suspicious.
• The validity of a consented warrantless search is
determined by the totality of the circumstances.This may
involve an inquiry into the environment in which the
consent was given such as "the presence of coercive
police procedures.”

• Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless

search is only an implied acquiescence, which amounts
to no consent at all.

• The presence of a coercive environment negates the

claim that petitioner consented to the warrantless search.
• Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of
a moving vehicle. Checkpoints per se are not invalid.

• Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving

vehicles are allowed if they are limited to a visual search.
This holds especially true when the object of the search is a
public vehicle where individuals have a reasonably reduced
expectation of privacy. On the other hand, extensive
searches are permissible only when they are founded upon
probable cause. Any evidence obtained will be subject to the
exclusionary principle under the Constitution.
• That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a
moving vehicle does not justify an extensive search absent
probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely
on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is
still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any
other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

• Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of

moving vehicles based on tipped information, there have
been other circumstances that justified warrantless searches
conducted by the authorities.
• here are different hybrids of reasonable warrantless
searches. There are searches based on reasonable
suspicion as in Posadas v. Court of Appeals where
this Court justified the warrantless search of the accused
who attempted to flee with a buri bag after the police
officers identified themselves.
• On the other hand, there are reasonable searches because
of heightened security. In Dela Cruz v. People, the
search conducted on the accused was considered valid
because it was done in accordance with routine security
measures in ports. This case, however, should not be
construed to apply to border searches. Border
searches are not unreasonable per se; there is a
"reasonable reduced expectation of privacy" when
travellers pass through or stop at airports or other ports of
travel.
• The warrantless search conducted by the police officers
is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag containing
marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible
under the exclusionary principle in Article III, Section
3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to
support his conviction, petitioner must be acquitted.
 G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee, v.

VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.

• Leonen.

• The mantle of protection upon one’s person and one’s effects through Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to
avail themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle against
dangerous drugs is more apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there because law
enforcers neglect to perform what could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they
pursue those who traffic this scourge of society.

• Squarely raised in this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a
warrantless arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that
were not based on their personal knowledge. The information as to the accused’s
whereabouts was sent through a text message. The accused who never acted suspicious
was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly contained the contraband was required to
be opened under intimidating circumstances and without the accused having been fully
apprised of his rights.
• This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of
the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that
would allow a legitimate “stop and frisk” action. The
alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done
intelligently, knowingly, and without improper pressure
or coercion.

• The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should

be excluded consistent with Article III, Section 3 (2) of
the Constitution. There being no possible admissible
evidence, the accused should be acquitted.
• The Constitution provides:

• Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right

against unreasonable searches and seizures]
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

• Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit

of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional
provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. This rule
prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage
law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.
• Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were
founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the
illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to
convict Cogaed.

• Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society. In the
fight to eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be equipped
with the resources to be able to perform their duties better.
However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s
fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we
will be seen as slowly dismantling the very foundations of the
society that we seek to protect.
FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
 Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, et
al., G.R. No. 194192, 16 June 2015

• Came the anniversary, officers and members sported t-

shirts with inscriptions "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir.
Braganza Pahawa Na!" at the beginning of the Fun Run
at VictoriaPlaza at around 6:30 in the morning and
continued to wear the same inside the premises of the
DCWD office during the office hours.
• Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much
right as any person in the land to voice out their protests
against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and
interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their
freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by
joining the government service, the members thereof have
renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be
reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.

• In simple paraphrase we say, regulation of the freedom of

expression is not removal of the constitutional right.
• CONCURRING OPINION, LEONEN, J.:

• This case involves freedom of expression in the context

of airing workplace grievances on employment benefits
in the public sector, the constitutional right to self-
organization, and peaceful concerted activities.
Specifically, during their office anniversary celebrations,
respondents wore matching t-shirts that stated their plea
for payment of CNA incentive: "CNA Incentive Ihatag
Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa na!"
• Thus, the pronouncements in this case must be limited only to its
context, that is, expressions in t-shirts during the office
anniversary where there was no showing that that exercise
obstructed or eroded the public functions of the government
agency involved.

• In the determination of the extent of the exercise of this

fundamental freedom, the nature of the government agencies
where there may be some employment grievances should be
taken into consideration. There are some, like the uniformed
military and police services requiring a greater degree of
discipline within its ranks, where certain forms of expression—
not part of the ambient facts of this case—may not be
constitutionally permissible.
• Freedom of expression is guaranteed in its fullest outside
government but, perhaps, more regulated when one assumes the
role of a public officer. The right to speech is inherent. However,
the act of joining a government office should be construed as an
understanding that the individual’s exercise of this basic right is
subsumed by the necessity of providing public services to the
greater majority.

• The limits are inherent in the nature of governance. The

Constitution states that "[p]ublic officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."
• Public accountability and a commitment to giving
priority to the public interest above private ones demand
some level of limitation on the exercise of the right to
freedom of expression by government employees.
• Traditional classifications distinguish between those that
perform governmental or sovereign functions and those
that exercise proprietary functions.

• Government-owned and controlled corporations also

exercising proprietary functions, not "mere agenc[ies] of
the Government," should thus have a wider scope of
freedom of expression compared to other government
agencies.
• As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself
qualifies its exercise with the provision "in accordance
with law." This is a clear manifestation that the state may,
by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain
sectors such right.
• Employees of government-owned and controlled
corporation can freely exercise their right to freedom of
expression, subject to law, including Civil Service
Commission issuances that prohibit mass actions causing
work stoppage. Government employees must uphold
their commitment to public interest and act in accordance
with the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officials and Employees. This level of limitation
or regulation also applies to governmental financial
institutions, often grouped with government-owned and
controlled corporations.
• On the other hand, government bodies that perform
governmental functions can be further classified based on
different factors.

• Some hold public office based on popular vote such as elected

Senators and Representatives of Congress. These public
officials are in the position to pass laws for better employment
benefits for all government employees. Law-making involves
deliberating on political questions, thus, the extent of freedom
of speech appears wider for those in Congress. The
Constitution even provides that "[n]o Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech
or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof."
• On the other hand, members of the judiciary must
maintain independence, integrity, impartiality, propriety,
equality, competence, and diligence.33 "Judges, like any
other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression,
belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such
rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office
and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary."
• These standards present a more limited freedom of
expression for judges.
• The strictest limitation applies to those in the military
and the police. They maintain peace and prevent crime.
Those in the military are subject to Commonwealth Act
No. 408 known as the Articles of War.
• Gonzales v. Abaya involves the July 27, 2003 incident when
heavily armed Armed Forces of the Philippines members
wearing red armbands with the emblem "Magdalo" entered
Oakwood led by Navy Lt. Antonio Trillanes IV. They
announced in broadcast media "their grievances against the
administration of [then] President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,
such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale
of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and the
bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military
assistance from the US government." Those involved were
charged with coup d'etat before the regular court, and violation
of the Articles of War before the military tribunal.
• The constitutional right to freedom of expression belongs
to all. But its exercise may be reasonably regulated.
Those who chose public service embraced the public's
interest with a priority higher than their own.
 THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

• LEONEN, J.:

• "The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.

Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." – Article II, Section 1,
Constitution.
• All governmental authority emanates from our people.
No unreasonable restrictions of the fundamental and
preferred right to expression of the electorate during
political contests no matter how seemingly benign will
be tolerated.
• This case defines the extent that our people may shape
the debates during elections. It is significant and of first
impression. We are asked to decide whether the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the
competence to limit expressions made by the citizens —
who are not candidates — during elections.
• On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2)
tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They
were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within
public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
"IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This
tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and
lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a
check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.
• On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department
issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the
tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an
election offense against petitioners.
• RULING: The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article
VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution.This provision provides for this court’s
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. This should be
read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section
1 of the Constitution.

• Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is

grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of the notice and letter
coming from COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.

• During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of
discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by the
COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this court’s constitutional mandate to protect the
people against government’s infringement of their fundamental rights. This
constitutional mandate out weighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.
• This court finds that this is indeed a case of first
impression involving as it does the issue of whether
the right of suffrage includes the right of freedom of
expression. This is a question which this court has yet to
provide substantial answers to, through jurisprudence.
Thus, direct resort to this court is allowed.
• The present petition does not involve a dispute between
the rich and poor, or the powerful and weak, on their
equal opportunities for media coverage of candidates and
their right to freedom of expression. This case concerns
the right of petitioners, who are non-candidates, to post
the tarpaulin in their private property, asan exercise of
their right of free expression. Despite the invocation of
the political question doctrine by respondents, this court
is not proscribed from deciding on the merits of this case.
• The case before this court does not call for the exercise
of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It
can be acted upon by this court through the expanded
jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution.
• Marcos v. Manglapus limited the use of the political
question doctrine:

• When political questions are involved, the Constitution

limits the determination to whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the
Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
official concerned and decide a matter which by its
nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.
• The concept of judicial power in relation to the concept
of the political question was discussed most extensively
in Francisco v. HRET. In this case, the House of
Representatives arguedthat the question of the validity of
the second impeachment complaint that was filed against
former Chief Justice Hilario Davide was a political
question beyond the ambit of this court. Former Chief
Justice Reynato Puno elaborated on this concept in his
concurring and dissenting opinion:
• “To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court becomes
more feeble in light of the new Constitution which expanded the
definition of judicial power as including ‘the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.’ As well
observed by retired Justice Isagani Cruz, this expanded definition of
judicial power considerably constricted the scope of political
question. He opined that the language luminously suggests that this
duty (and power) is available even against the executive and legislative
departments including the President and the Congress, in the exercise
of their discretionary powers.”
• In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference
to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right
may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not
fall squarely into any doubt that a political question
brings.
• The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable
with the present case. First, petitioners allegethat the
assailed issuances violated their right to freedom of
expression and the principle of separation of church and
state. This is a purely legal question. Second, the
circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency of
judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH
Law as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require
the exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case
would be unreasonable.
• COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions
made by private citizens. (Comment: The Church may
intervene, the State may not.)
• Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
jurisprudence to support their position that they had the
power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do theybelong to
any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right
to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate
in this case.
• Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for
the removal of the tarpaulin violate their fundamental
right to freedom of expression.

• On the other hand, respondents contend that the tarpaulin

is an election propaganda subject to their regulation
pursuant to their mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4
of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed notice and letter
ordering itsremoval for being oversized are valid and
constitutional.
• Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III,
Section 4 of the Constitution:

• Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom

of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.

• While it is true that the present petition assails not a law

but an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this
court has applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution
even to governmental acts.
• Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom
of expression, separate and in addition to the freedom of
speech and of the press provided in the US Constitution.
The word "expression" was added in the 1987
Constitution by Commissioner Brocka for having a wider
scope.
• The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the
entire continuum of speech from utterances made to
conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic
manner of communication.
• In Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools
of Cebu, students who were members of the religious
sect Jehovah’s Witnesses were to be expelled from
school for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Cruz discussed how the salute is a
symbolic manner of communication and a valid form of
expression. He adds that freedom of speech includes
even the right to be silent:
• “Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has
it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the
individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also
guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that
conveys its messageas clearly as the written or spoken word. As
a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more
than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections
like those raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners
is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids
them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in
the free society.” (Comment: Applies to law school)
• The State cannot make the individual speak when the
soul within rebels.
• Size does matter.

• The form of expression is just as important as the

information conveyed that it forms part of the expression.
The present case is in point.

• It is easy to discern why size matters.

• First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger
tarpaulin allows larger fonts which make it easier to view
its messages from greater distances.
• Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and
place. They are fundamentally part of expression
protected under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
• There are several theories and schools of thought that
strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom
of expression.

• First, this relates to the right ofthe people to participate in

public affairs, including the right to criticize government
actions.
• Proponents of the political theory on "deliberative
democracy" submit that "substantial, open, [and] ethical
dialogue isa critical, and indeed defining, feature of a
good polity."
• Speech that promotes dialogue on publicaffairs, or airs
out grievances and political discontent, should thus be
protected and encouraged.
• Second, free speech should be encouraged under the
concept of a market place of ideas. This theory was
articulated by Justice Holmes in that "the ultimate good
desired is better reached by [the] free trade in ideas:"
• Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances
human dignity. This right is "a means of assuring
individual self-fulfillment,"
• Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
• Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is
supposed to "protect individuals and minorities against
majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework
[of democratic governance]."
• Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety
valve theory. This provides that "nonviolent
manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of
violence[.]"
• This court has held free speech and other intellectual
freedoms as "highly ranked in our scheme of
constitutional values.” Property and property rights can
belost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the
passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless
attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to
be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials,
of majorities, ofthe influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
• We distinguish between politicaland commercial speech.
Political speech refers to speech "both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about
some issue,” "foster[ing] informed and civicminded
deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has
been defined as speech that does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from
the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely
political speech.
• While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure
of the named candidates and political parties, this does
not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in return for
consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-
list group.
• Personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered. (In the definition of “election
propaganda/political advertisement)
• We have adopted the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and
that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials. Too many restrictions will deny to people the
robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating
of interest essential if our elections will truly be free,
clean and honest.
• Speech with political consequences is at the core of the
freedom of expression and must be protected by this
court.
• Justice Brion pointed out that freedom of expression "is
not the god of rights to which all other rights and even
government protection of state interest must bow."
• The right to freedom of expression is indeed not
absolute. Even some forms of protected speech are still
subjectto some restrictions. The degree of restriction may
depend on whether the regulation is content-based or
content-neutral. Content-based regulations can either
be based on the viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of
the expression.
• Content-based regulation

• COMELEC contends that the order for removal of the

tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation. The order was
made simply because petitioners failed to comply with
the maximum size limitation for lawful election
propaganda.
• On the other hand, petitioners argue that the present size
regulation is content-based as it applies only to political
speech and not to other forms of speech such as
commercial speech.
• The regulation may reasonably be considered as either
content-neutral or content-based. Regardless, the
disposition of this case will be the same. Generally,
compared with other forms of speech, the proposed
speech is content-based.
• Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present
danger rule as measure.
• Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents
failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling
and substantial state interest endangered by the posting
of the tarpaulinas to justify curtailment of the right of
freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post
the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the
tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional
rights.
• Content-based restraint or censorship refers to
restrictions "based on the subject matter of the utterance
or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation
includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech
such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
• We reiterate that the regulation involved at bar is content-
based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from
the size of its medium.
• A content-neutral government regulation is
sufficiently justified:

• [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the

Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if
the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech &
expression] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
• In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the
suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum sizeof the
tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners’ message
and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression.
• The COMELEC’s act of requiring the removal of the
tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading expressions with
political consequences. These should be encouraged,
more so when exercised to make more meaningful the
equally important right to suffrage.

• The restriction in the present case does not pass even the
lower test of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral
regulations.
• The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties.
Satire is a "literary form that employs such devices as
sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or
follies,"
• The tarpaulins exaggerate. Surely, "Team Patay" does not
refer to a list of dead individuals nor could the
Archbishop of the Diocese of Bacolod have intended it to
mean that the entire plan of the candidates in his list was
to cause death intentionally. The tarpaulin caricatures
political parties and parodies the intention of those in the
list. Furthermore, the list of "Team Patay" is juxtaposed
with the list of "Team Buhay" that further emphasizes the
theme of its author: Reproductive health is an important
marker for the church of petitioners to endorse.
• Regulation of speech in the context of electoral
campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or
who do not speak as members of a political party which
are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social
issue that the public must consider during elections is
unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the
guarantee of according the fullest possible range of
opinions coming from the electorate including those that
can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the
criteria for the choice of a candidate.
• This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of
speech by a private citizen which will not amount to an
election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.
• Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if
it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do
not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates,
only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a
whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only.
The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c)
narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of
all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee
of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to
achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the
time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation
may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For
this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on
private property.
• This is not the situation, however, in this case for two
reasons. First, as discussed, the principal message in the
twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social
advocacy.
• Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of
Justice Antonio Carpio, the present law — Section 3.3 of
Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 — if applied to this case, will not
pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election
posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance
from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At
certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no
longer be read by the general public and, hence, would
render speech meaningless. It will amount to the
abridgement of speech with political consequences.
• Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the
right to property. There may be no expression when there
is no place where the expression may be made.
COMELEC’s infringement upon petitioners’ property
rights as in the present case also reaches out to
infringement on their fundamental right to speech.
• We proceed to the last issues pertaining to whether the COMELEC
in issuing the questioned notice and letter violated the right of
petitioners to the free exercise of their religion.

• At the outset, the Constitution mandates the separation of church

and state. This takes many forms. Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution, for instance provides:

• Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
Noreligious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
• There are two aspects of this provision. The first is the
none stablishment clause. Second is the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship.

• The second aspect is at issue in this case.

• In Estrada v. Escritor, this court adopted a policy of
benevolent neutrality:

• With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,

benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under
certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically intoaccount not to
promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or
institution’s religion.
• This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case,
such that a regulation is constitutional when: (1) it has a
secular legislative purpose; (2) it neither advances nor
inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion.
• As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin,
on its face, "does not convey any religious doctrine of the
Catholic church.” That the position of the Catholic
church appears to coincide with the message of the
tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring
the expression within the ambit of religious speech. On
the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates
classified under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay"
according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
• A FINAL NOTE

• We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in

attempting to do what it thought was its duty in this case.
However, it was misdirected.
• The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a
caricature of those who are running for public
office.Their message may be construed generalizations of
very complex individuals and party-list organizations.

• They are classified into black and white: as belonging to

"Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."

• But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still

protected speech.
• Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions
expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression
protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression
designed to invite attention, cause debate, and hopefully,
persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation of
petitioners of their ecclesiastical duty, but their
parishioner’s actions will have very real secular
consequences. Certainly, provocative messages do matter
for the elections.
• What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech
forms: expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the
public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by
candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion
of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their
election. It is the substantive content of the right to
suffrage.

• This is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy

that we should all deserve. It is protected as a fundamental
and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in
the medium chosen by petitioners deserves our
protection.
 Freedom from Censorship

• Movie censorship. MTRCB’s power to regulate can only

be exercised for purposes of “classification”, not
censorship, subject to grave abuse of discretion clause
and test of clear and present danger test, among others.
 LIBEL
• Freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place in the
hierarchy of constitutional rights. Free expression
however, is not absolute for it may be so regulated that
[its exercise shall neither] be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to
the rights of the community or society. Libel stands as an
exception to the enjoyment of that most guarded
constitutional right. (Lopez v. People)
• A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of
a crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or
juridicial person or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.

• For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites

must concur: a) it must be defamatory; b) it must be
malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim
must be identifiable. Absent one of these elements
precludes the commission of the crime of libel.
• To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or
slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his
public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
[Borjal v. Court of Appeals]
• A public official, more especially an elected one, should
not be onion skinned. Strict personal discipline is
expected of an occupant of a public office because a
public official is a property of the public. He is looked
upon to set the example how public officials should
correctly conduct themselves even in the face of extreme
provocation. (Yabut v. Ombudsman)
• “Bro. Eli Soriano: Hindi ko kontrata iyang babayaran na iyan. I am not even a
signatory to that contract. Pagkatapos para pagbintangan mo ako na humingi
ako para sa pangangailangan ko, gago ka talaga Michael. Masahol ka pa sa
putang babae. O, di ba? Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang
doon yung ibaba, kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!
O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa
putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. Sige,
sumagot kayo. At habang ginaganyan ninyo ako, ang mga miyembro ninyo
unti-unting maliliwanagan. Makikita n'yo rin, magreresulta ng maganda iyan.”
(Cited by J. Carpio in his dissent in Soriano v. Laguardia. Majority said
statements are obsence. Carpio: While we may not agree with petitioner's
choice of language in expressing his disgust in this word war between two
feuding religious groups, let us not forget that freedom of speech includes the
expression of thoughts that we do not approve of, not just thoughts that are
agreeable. To paraphrase Voltaire: We may disapprove of what petitioner has
said, but we must defend to the death his right to say it.)
• Obscenity. Determination is a judicial function. (Pita v. CA.

• Criticism of official conduct. “Criticism is a special scalpel that

relieves the abscesses of officialdom”

• “A criticism after a case has been disposed of can no longer

influence the Court, and on that ground int does not constitute
contempt. But an insult hurled against the Court, even after a
case is decided, can under no circumstance be justified x x x
and would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the
people in the honesty and integrity of its members x x x and it
constitutes contempt.” (Cagas v. COMELEC)
• “We also remind Cagas that this Court’s decisions, though assigned
to be written by one Justice, are always collegial. This Court was
unanimous in its Decision to dismiss Cagas’ Petition for Prohibition
for lack of merit. Apart from his emotional exasperation, Cagas
offered no further explanation for his statement about the “level of
deceitfulness” of the ponente and that the decision can “poison the
minds of law students.” He then points to his “continuing faith
in the Court’s capacity to act on the truth,” hence his admission that
he requested Court Administrator Marquez to distribute the DVDs to
the members of this Court.

• “The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court

is an abuse of the right to free speech and degrades the
administration of justice.” (Cagas v. COMELEC)
 MEDELARNALDO B. BELEN, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
February 13, 2017

G.R. No. 211120

• On March 12, 2004, petitioner, then a practicing lawyer and now a former
Judge, filed a criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle, Nezer D.
Belen, Sr. before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo
City, which was assigned to then Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria
Sufiega-Lagman for preliminary investigation. With the submission of the
parties and their respective witnesses' affidavits, the case was submitted
for resolution. In order to afford himself the opportunity to fully present
his cause, petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing. Without acting
on the request, Lagman dismissed petitioner's complaint in a Resolution
dated July 28, 2004. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint,
petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify),
the contents of which later became the subject of this libel case.
• "OMNIBUS MOTION (FOR RECONSIDERATION &
DISQUALIFY) in the case entitled "MEDEL B. BELEN,
Complainant vs. NEZER D. BELEN SR., Respondent, "for
Estafa docketed as I.S. No. 04-312, the pertinent and relevant
portions are quoted hereunder, to wit:

• In the instant case, however, the Investigating Fiscal was

not impartial and exhibited manifest bias for 20,000
reasons. The reasons were not legal or factual. These
reasons were based on her malicious and
convoluted perceptions. If she was partial, then she
is stupid. The Investigating Fiscal's stupidity was
clearly manifest in her moronic resolution
• x x x Unfortunately, the Investigating Fiscal's wrongful
assumption were tarnished with silver ingots. She is also
an intellectually infirm or stupidly blind. x x x For all the
20,000 reasons of the Investigating Fiscal, the slip of her
skirt shows a corrupted and convoluted frame of mind - a
manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity in her
resolution. x x x the invocation of the dismissal of I.S.
No. 03-1412 was a nail in the coffin for the idiocy and
imbecility of the Investigating Fiscal.”
• “x x xThus, she should resign from the prosecutorial arm
of the government and be a defense counsel. Then her
infirmed intellectual prowess and stupid assumptions be
exposed in trial on the merits under which complainant is
afforded the due process requirement of the law. At that
stage of trial, she would be exposed as a fraud and a
quack bereft of any intellectual ability and mental
honesty.”
• Issue:

• Whether or not the element of publication is absent and that petitioner cannot be found is
guilty of libel.

• Held:

• No. Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written,
known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. A communication of
the defamatory matter to the person defamed alone cannot injure his reputation though it
may wound his self-esteem, for a man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself,
but the estimation in which other hold him. In the same vein, a defamatory letter contained
in a closed envelope addressed to another constitutes sufficient publication if the offender
parted with its possession in such a way that it can be read by person other than the offended
party. If a sender of a libelous communication knows or has good reasons to believe that it
will be intercepted before reaching the person defamed, there is sufficient publication. The
publication of a libel, however, should not be presumed from the fact that the immediate
control thereof is parted with unless it appears that there is reasonable probability that it is
hereby exposed to be read or seen by third persons.
• Dissent of Leonen:

• Medel Arnaldo B. Belen has indeed made callous,

acerbic, and intemperate comments through his motions
before the prosecutor. His comments betray a lack of
empathy for another human being. They also reveal his
sense of undeserved superiority, which is as empty as it is
comical.

• However, in my view, he cannot be criminally liable for

libel.
• I reiterate my view that libel ought to be decriminalized.
It is inconsistent with the constitutionally protected right
to freedom of speech. There is no state interest served in
criminalizing libel. Civil actions for defamation are
sufficient to address grievances without threatening the
public's fundamental right to free speech.
• The libel provisions in the Revised Penal Code are now
overbroad. They do not embody the entire doctrine of
principles that this Court for decades has expounded on
under the free speech principles to which the State
adheres.
• The history of the criminalization of libel in the
Philippines shows that libel started as a legal tool of the
Spaniards and the Americans to protect government and
the status quo. It was promulgated to regulate speech
that criticized foreign rule. Jurisprudence has expanded
and qualified the bare text of the law to give way to the
fundamental right to expression.
• Thus, in theory, only private parties ought to be protected
from defamatory utterances. However, in practice,
notable personalities who are powerful and influential-
including electoral candidates and public officers-are the
usual parties who pursue libel cases. The limitations set
out in jurisprudence have not been enough to protect free
speech. Clearly, the libel laws are used to deter speech
and silence detractors.
• The libel provisions under the Revised Penal Code
invade a constitutionally protected freedom. Imposing
both criminal and civil liabilities to the exercise of free
speech produces a chilling effect.

• Civil actions do not endanger the right to free speech,

such that they produce an unnecessary chilling effect on
critical comments against public officers or policies.
• Declaring criminal libel as unconstitutional, therefore,
does not mean that the state countenances private
defamation. It is just consistent with our democratic
values. (J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Disini, Jr. v.
Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28, 389 (2014) [Per J.
Abad, En Banc].
 The “Putang-Ina” Principle
The letter containing the allegedly libelous
remarks is more threatening than libelous and
the intent to threaten is the principal aim and
object to the letter.

Have you heard of the Putang Ina Principle? The

picture is from the book authored by Judge
Marlo Bermejo Campanilla. He cited Reyes vs.
People (G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529; March
28, 1969).
DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE;

G.R. NO. 203335, FEB. 18, 2014

• These consolidated petitions seek to declare several

provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
• RULING: SC invalidated Sec. 4[c]3 which penalizes the
transmission of unsolicted commercial electronic
communications. (Spam emails). Reason: Among others,
to prohibit it would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads; and the State
cannot rob him of this right without violating his
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
• Sec. 4[c]4 is valid and constitutional which penalizes
online libel with respect to ORIGINAL AUTHOR of the
post; it declared as void and unconstitutional the same
provision as applied to others who simply receive the post
and react on it.

• Sec. 5 on aiding and abetting the commission of

cybercrimes in SEc. 4[c]4 on Libel, Sec. 4[c]3 on
unsolicited commercial communications and in Sec. 4[c]2
on child pornography, for being vague, chilling effect on
freedom of expression but valid as to other provisions on
“aiding and abetting” cybercrimes as they do not touch
upon freedom of expression.
FREEDOM OF
RELIGION
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
• Two guarantees:

• Non-establishment clause; and

• Freedom of religious profession and worship.

• The case of A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC RE: LETTER OF TONY Q.
V ALENCIANO, HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT
THE HALL OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY.

• SC held:

• One of our fundamental differences lies in our chosen

religion. Some put their faith in a god different from ours,
while some may not believe in a god at all. Nevertheless,
despite the inconveniences this difference may cause us, we
must accept it unconditionally for only upon acceptance of
the fact that we are different from each other will we learn to
respect one another.
 Case of MSU

• Read:
http://www.abogado.com.ph/sc-says-msu-dean-professor
-cannot-force-sabadista-student-to-attend-saturday-classe
s/
• The Holding of Religious
Rituals in the Halls of Justice
does not Amount to a Union of
Church and State.

• Section 6, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

• The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

• Justice Isagani Cruz expounded on this doctrine, viz.:

• The rationale of the rule is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences
make good neighbors." The idea is to delineate the boundaries between the two
institutions and, thus, avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a
misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. The
demarcation line calls on the entities to "render therefore unto Caesar the things that
are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's."
• This, notwithstanding, the State still recognizes the inherent
right of the people to have some form of belief system, whether
such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life,
or even an outright rejection of religion.

• Thus, the right to believe or not to believe has again been

enshrined in Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:

• Section 5. xxx. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious

profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. xxx.
• Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware
that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good.
• "The right to religious profession and worship has a two-
fold aspect - freedom to believe and freedom to act on
one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare."
• Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the
principle of separation of Church and State. In fact, these
two principles are in perfect harmony with each other.

• Clearly, allowing the citizens to practice their religion is

not equivalent to a fusion of Church and State.
• Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot
have its way if there is a compelling state interest.
To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must
be demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of Justice
unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect
the judges and employees in the performance of their
official functions.
• Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion

• In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of

religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation.
Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some
governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain
portion of the population for the reason that these measures
are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be
shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the
public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or
prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional
encroachment.[Cruz, Constitutional Law (2007), p. 189.]
• In Estrada v. Escritor, the Court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:

• With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,

benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under
certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that
take religion specifically into account not to promote the government's
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise
their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take
religion into account ... to exempt, when possible, from generally
applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs
and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without
state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise
may flourish." [Emphases supplied]
• Non-Establishment Clause

• On the opposite side of the spectrum is the

constitutional mandate that "no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion," otherwise
known as the non-establishment clause. Indeed, there
is a thin line between accommodation and
establishment, which makes it even more imperative to
understand each of these concepts by placing them in
the Filipino society's perspective.
• BQ: Distinguish Establishment v. Accomodation, anent
to religious freedom.

• Establishment entails a positive action on the part

of the State. Accommodation, on the other hand,
is passive.

• In the former, the State becomes involved

through the use of government resources with the
primary intention of setting up a state religion. In
the latter, the State, without being entangled,
merely gives consideration to its citizens who
want to freely exercise their religion.
• Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of
Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case
of establishment, but merely accommodation. First, there is no law,
ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities
expressly mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic
masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary employees attend the
masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are
there on their own free will and volition, without any coercion from the
judges or administrative officers. Third, no government funds are being
spent because the lightings and airconditioning continue to be
operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the
basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor
has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of its
faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other
religions.
• No Appropriation of Public
Money or Property for the
Benefit of any Church

• Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides,

"No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium."
• Said constitutional provision "does not inhibit the
use of public property for religious purposes
when the religious character of such use is
merely incidental to a temporary use which is
available indiscriminately to the public in
general." [Cruz Philippine Political Law (2002), pp.
174-175.]
• Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or
employed for the sole purpose of supporting the Roman Catholics.

• Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel for the exclusive
use of its faithful contrary to the claim of Valenciana. Judge Maceren reported
that the basement is also being used as a public waiting area for most of the day
and a meeting place for different employee organizations. The use of the area for
holding masses is limited to lunch break period from twelve (12) o'clock to one
(1) o'clock in the afternoon. Further, Judge Sagun, Jr. related that masses run for
just a little over thirty (30) minutes. It is, therefore, clear that no undue religious
bias is being committed when the subject basement is allowed to be temporarily
used by the Catholics to celebrate mass, as the same area can be used by other
groups of people and for other purposes. Thus, the basement of the QC Hall
of Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for public
use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere
incidental consequence of its primary purpose.
• In fine, the Court denies the plea that the holding of
Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice be prohibited because the said practice does not
violate the constitutional principle of separation of
Church and State and the constitutional prohibition
against appropriation of public money or property for the
benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other
system of religion.
• In no case shall a particular part of a public building be a
permanent place for worship for the benefit of any and all
religious groups. There shall also be no permanent display of
religious icons in all halls of justice in the country. In case of
religious rituals, religious icons and images may be displayed but
their presentation is limited only during the celebration of such
activities so as not to offend the sensibilities of members of other
religious denominations or the non-religious public. After any
religious affair, the icons and images shall be hidden or concealed
from public view.

• The disposition in this administrative matter shall apply to all

halls of justice in the country. Other churches, religious
denominations or sects are entitled to the same rights, privileges,
and practices in every hall of justice.
• Leonen’s dissent.

• "Imagine there's no countries, it isn 't hard to do. Nothing to kill

or die for, and no religion, too. Imagine all the people living life
in peace …” Lennon, John. "Imagine." Imagine. Ascot, 1971.
Vinyl.

• "But Jesus, aware of their malice, said, 'Why put me to the test,
you hypocrites? Show me the money for the tax. ' And they
brought him a coin. And Jesus said to them, 'Whose likeness and
inscription is this?' They said, 'Caesar's. ' Then he said to them,
'Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to
God the things that are God's.' When they heard it, they
marveled; and they left him and went away. “ Matthew 22: 15-
22
• Tolerating and allowing court personnel to hold and celebrate
daily masses within public Halls of Justice is a clear violation
of the Constitutional prohibition against the State's
establishment of a religion. It has no secular purpose other
than to benefit and, therefore, promote a religion. It has the
effect of imposing an insidious cultural discrimination
against those whose beliefs may be different. Religious
rituals should be done in churches, chapels,
mosques, synagogues, and other private places of
worship.

• To provide that all faiths of all denominations may likewise

avail of the same public space within courts of law is a
painful illusion.
• After a review of religion cases, the Court in Escritor
formulated a two-part test in resolving cases involving
freedom to worship. First, "the spirit, intent, and
framework underlying the religion clauses in our
Constitution” is benevolent neutrality or accommodation.
Government actions must neither burden nor facilitate
"the exercise of a person's or religious liberty be
burdened.” Second, there must be a compelling state
interest should religious liberty be burdened.

• Escritor therefore is not the proper precedent.

• Since Escritor's promulgation, benevolent neutrality has
been constantly but erroneously quoted as a talisman to
erase all legitimate constitutional objections to religious
activity that impinges upon secular government policy.
Yet, in the 2003 Decision, where the two-part test was
formulated, only five Justices fully concurred with
Justice Puno’s ponencia. Two other Justices wrote
separate concurring opinions. There were five other
Justices who dissented, with Justice Carpio leading in the
dissent.That benevolent neutrality is even doctrine is,
therefore, suspect.
• Benevolent neutrality in practice, thus, favors the already
dominant.

• The majority opinion cites Father Bernas in discussing

the non- establishment clause. Unfortunately, Father
Bernas, even as a celebrated author in
Constitutional law, is not the Supreme Court.
Neither are his statements precedents for purposes ofthis
Court. He is also a Catholic priest and therefore his
opinions on the impact of law on religion should be taken
with a lot of advisement.
• There is no reason for the Holy Eucharist to be celebrated
in our Halls o f Justice. Catholic churches are ubiquitous.
Should the faithful among our judges and employees find
the need to worship, I am of the belief that they should
practice the compassion for others and the virtue for
humble sacrifice

• taught by no less that Jesus Christ himself. Thus, they

should muster the patience to walk to the closest church
and there to fervently pray for more humility and a socially
just and tolerant society.

• The same doctrine applies for all other religions.#

RIGHT TO PROSELYTIZE

• In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil

386, the SC recognized the “right to proselytize”
(convert) as part of the religious freedom, right to
disseminate religious information.
 LIBERTY OF ABODE AND
OF TRAVEL

• Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same

within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall
the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health,
as may be provided by law.
 LIBERTY OF ABODE AND
OF TRAVEL
• In Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court rejected therein
accused Silverio’s argument that the Constitution allows restriction on the
right to travel exclusively on grounds of interest of national security,
public safety or public health. The Supreme Court clarified that Article III,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that
while the liberty of travel may be imposed without a court order, the
executive and administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary
discretion to impose limitations, and can only impose limits on the basis
of national security, public safely or public health; but said provision
should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent
power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them.
• The sui generis case of Marcos v. Manglapus.

• Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to

return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering
the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when
the stability of government is threatened from various directions
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has
stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and
his family.

• This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case
of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing
twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the
country and who within the short space of three years seeks to
return, is in a class by itself.
• It must be emphasized that the individual right involved
is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the
right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the
right involved is the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right under international law,
independent from although related to the right to travel.
• The right to return to one's country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of
abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-
considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of
the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,
against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12
(4).]
• To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general
welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is the
President's residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the
President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore
Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his
duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the
laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at
153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and
defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power
implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed.
• Here, there exist factual bases for the President's decision.
“The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and
pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-
organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in
Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism,
the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and
civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented
history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to
destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia
bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this
time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed
against the State and instigate more chaos.”
• But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses
that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would
break the camel's back. With these before her, the
President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and whimsically in determining that the
return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the
national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return.
• WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion
that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present
time and under present circumstances poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED. (Barred by reason of
national security.)
• CRUZ, J., dissenting:

• It is my belief that the petitioner, as a citizen of the

Philippines, is entitled to return to and live — and die —
in his own country. I say this with a heavy heart but say it
nonetheless. That conviction is not diminished one whit
simply because many believe Marcos to be beneath
contempt and undeserving of the very liberties he
flounted when he was the absolute ruler of this land.
• In about two hours of briefing, the government failed
dismally to show that the return of Marcos dead or alive
would pose a threat to the national security as it had alleged.
The fears expressed by its representatives were based on
mere conjectures of political and economic destabilization
without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their
apprehensions.

• Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the conclusion

that there exist "factual bases for the President's decision" to
bar Marcos's return. That is not my recollection of the
impressions of the Court after that hearing.
• I have no illusion that the stand I am taking will be met
with paeans of praise, considering that Marcos is perhaps
the most detested man in the entire history of our
country. But we are not concerned here with popularity
and personalities. As a judge, I am not swayed by what
Justice Cardozo called the "hooting throng" that may
make us see things through the prisms of prejudice. I
bear in mind that when I sit in judgment as a member of
this Court, I must cast all personal feelings aside.
• The issue before us must be resolved with total objectivity, on
the basis only of the established facts and the applicable law
and not of wounds that still fester and scars that have not
healed. And not even of fear, for fear is a phantom. That
phantom did not rise when the people stood fast at EDSA
against the threat of total massacre in defense at last of their
freedom.

• I cannot turn back on the lessons of liberty that I taught for

more than three decades as a professor of Constitutional Law.
These principles have not changed simply because I am now
on the Court or a new administration is in power and the shoe
is on the other foot.
• Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino who also wanted to
come back to the Philippines against the prohibitions of
the government then, Marcos is entitled to the same right
to travel and the liberty of abode that his adversary
invoked. These rights are guaranteed by the Constitution
to all individuals, including the patriot and the homesick
and the prodigal son returning, and tyrants and charlatans
and scoundrels of every stripe.
 MANOTOC V. CA
• A lawful order of the is also a valid restriction on the right to
travel.

• Like, Hold-departure Order. (Note: Neither shall the

right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health,
as may be provided by law. Sec. 6, Art. III).

• So, right to travel may be denied even without court

order but this is expanded in Manotoc v. CA and Silverio
v. CA.
INTERNATIONAL LAWS ON
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
• Art. 13(2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
provides that everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.

• Art. 12(4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

provides that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived pf the
right to enter his own country.

• But, in Marcos v. Manglapus, Marcos family was

denied right to return due to national security.
 RIGHT TO
INFORMATION
• Section 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
 RIGHT TO
INFORMATION
• Freedom of Information. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 02 (S.
2016) — OPERATIONALIZING IN THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH THE PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO INFORMATION AND THE STATE POLICIES TO
FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY
IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND PROVIDING
GUIDELINES THEREFOR.

• But, consider its exceptions:

https://op-proper.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Excep
tions-to-Right-of-Access-to-Information.pdf
.
• 9 exceptions:

• 1. Information covered by executive privilege

• 2. Privileged information relating to national security, defense, or international relations

• 3. Information concerning law enforcement and protection of public and personal safety

• 4. Information deemed confidential for the protection of the privacy and certain individuals such as minors,
victims of crimes or the accused

• 5. Information, documents, or records known by reason of official capacity and are deemed as confidential,
including those submitted or disclosed by entities to government agencies, tribunals and boards or officers, in
relation to the performance of their functions or to inquires or investigation conducted by them in the exercise of
their administrative, regulatory or quasi-judicial powers.

• 6. Prejudicial, premature disclosure

• 7. Records of proceedings or information from proceedings which pursuant to law or relevant rules and regulations
are treated as confidential or privileged

• 8. Matters considered confidential under banking and finance laws and their amendatory laws, and;

• 9. Other exceptions to the right to information under laws, jurisprudence, and rules and regulations.
• In Chavez v. PEA: “Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement.

• Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the peoples right to information on
matters of public concern in this manner:

• Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

• The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest
reinforces the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. This State
policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:

• Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
• We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions
like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and
public order.
• 2009 BQ:

• The Philippine Government is negotiating a new security treaty with the United
States which could involve engagement in joint military operations of the two
countries' armed forces. A loose organization of Filipinos, the Kabataan at
Matatandang Makabansa (KMM) wrote the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and
the Department of National Defense (DND) demanding disclosure of the details of
the negotiations, as well as copies of the minutes of the meetings. The DFA and the
DND refused, contending that premature disclosure of the offers and counter-offers
between the parties could jeopardize on-going negotiations with another country.
KMM filed suit to compel disclosure of the negotiation details, and be granted access
to the records of the meetings, invoking the constitutional right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.

• a Decide with reasons.   

• b Will your answer be the same if the information sought by KMM pertains to
contracts entered into by the Government in its proprietary or commercial capacity?
Why or why not?
• Answer:

• a. The suit filed by KMM should be dismissed. It is true that the details of the treaty
negotiation, including the offers and counter-offers between the Philippine Government and
United States, are matters of public concern. However, it is also well-established in
jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor the policy of full public disclosure is
absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public concern or public interest, are
recognized as privileged in nature.

• As held in the recent case of Akbayan vs. Aquino (G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008), the
privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In
discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Supreme Court in Chavez v.
PCGG (360 Phil. 133, 764 [1998]) held that “information on inter-government
exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may
be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.” Even
earlier, the same privilege was upheld in People’s Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v.
Manglapus (G.R. No. 84642, September 13, 1988) wherein the Supreme Court stressed that
“secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
information.”
• b. No, the answer will be different. Information pertaining
to contracts entered into by the Government in its
proprietary or commercial capacity are not covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege. These information are
matters of public concern to which the people have the right
to information under Section 7 of the Bill of Rights. Under
Section 7, citizens shall be afforded access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
government transactions. Moreover, Section 28 of the
Declaration of Principles directs the State to adopt and
implement a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
 SEC. 28, ART. II V.
SEC. 7, ART. III
• Sec. 28 is mandatory disclosure. Sec. 7 requires a
demand or request for one to gain access to documents
and papers of the agency.

• Sec. 28, the duty to disclose covers only transactions

involving public interest, while Sec. 7, the duty to allow
access covers a broader scope, which embraces any
matter contained in official communications and public
documents of the particular agency. (See IDEALS v.
PSALM, GR No. 192088, 2012)
• Remedy: Not being discreationary, mandamus lies. (Legaspi v. CSC)

• Note: Ombudsman rule ( not to give copy of SALN without consent of the
public official. Comment.

• In Memorandum Circular No. 1 Series of 2020 uploaded on the

Ombudsman's website on Tuesday, September 15, access to SALNs shall
only be given to: 

• The official or a duly authorized representative;

• A requester acting on a court order in relation to a pending

case; and

• The Office of the Ombudsman's Field Investigation Office for

the purpose of conducting fact-finding investigation.
 RIGHT TO FORM
ASSOCIATION

• Section 8. The right of the people, including those

employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
 RIGHT TO FORM
ASSOCIATIONS
• It includes the right not to join.

• In delistment case of Atty. Dionisio Canete: “Please take

notice that the court en banc issued a resolution dated
January 31, 2017. The court resolved to grant the Petition
for Voluntary Delisting in the Roll of Attorneys
filed by the petitioner,” said the High Court’s Clerk of
Court Felipa Anama in a Notice Lawyer Dionisio Cañete
was elated upon receiving the Notice last Wednesday.
• In PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW of
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, B.M. No. 1678:

• “Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

• The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in

the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship
ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
• The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by
reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].
[17] Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
• Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.[18] Stated otherwise, before a
lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice,
he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

• (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

• (b) the payment of professional tax;

• (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this
is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws
and update him of legal developments and

• (d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

• Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
• In Edillon: Compulsory membership of a lawyer in the
IBP does not violate the constitutional guarantee.
 DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT REPRESENTED BY ITS
GENERAL MANAGER, RODORA N. GAMBOA, Petitioner, v.
RODRIGO L. ARANJUEZ
G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015

• On 8 November 2007, the officers and members of

NAMADACWAD held an Emergency General Assembly
and they agreed to wear NAMADACWAD t-shirts with
inscriptions stating, "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir.
Braganza Pahawa Na!" on the day of the anniversary.
• To the kernel, then.

• It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-

shirts with inscriptions on CNA incentives was not to effect work
stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out by the
respondents, they followed the advice of GM Gamboa "to be
there" at the fun run. Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the
fun run. They were in sports attire that they were allowed, nay
required, to wear. Else, government employees would be
deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.40
This, then, being the fact, we have to rule against the findings of
both the CSC and Court of Appeals that the wearing of t-shirts
with grievance inscriptions constitutes as a violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.
• More importantly we need to refer to GSIS v. Villaviza
(GSIS case).41 It was there ruled that the acts of GSIS
employees wearing similarly colored shirts while
attending a public hearing inside the GSIS Office, with
clenching of fists and orating against the then President
Winston Garcia, were not constitutive of a prohibited
activity but were only an exercise of their constitutional
freedom of expression.
• It is correct to conclude that those who enter government
service are subjected to a different degree of limitation on their
freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to
the relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression
otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their
employment.45 Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public
employment "must accept certain limitations on his or her
freedom." But there are some rights and freedoms so
fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a
contract for public employment. It is the Court's responsibility
to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these fundamental
rights by virtue of working for the government.
• The GSIS case pronounced:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

• Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as

any person in the land to voice out their protests against what they
believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil
Service does not deprive them of their freedom of
expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the
government service, the members thereof have renounced or
waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated
only but can never be taken away.

• In simple paraphrase we say, regulation of the freedom of

expression is not removal of the constitutional right. (CSC:
Government employees may strike and negotiate, for those not
fix by law.)
 Section 9. Private property shall
not be taken for public use without
just compensation.
Section 10. No law impairing
the obligation of contracts
shall be passed.
 NON-IMPAIRMENT
CLAUSE

• Limitations: Police Power; Eminent Domain, Taxation.

 Section 11. Free access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person
by reason of poverty.
 FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

• In Sps. Algura v. LGU City of Naga, J. Velasco’s opening

statement is:

• “Anyone who has ever struggled with poverty knows

how extremely expensive it is to be poor.” — James
Baldwin.
• In the light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2)
rules can stand together and are compatible with each other. When
an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court
shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted
by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the
income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19
of Rule 141that is, the applicants gross income and that of the
applicants immediate family do not exceed an amount double the
monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not
own real property with a fair market value of more than Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP 300,000.00). If the trial court finds
that the applicant meets the income and property requirements, the
authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and
the grant is a matter of right.
• Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if
the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property
requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the
grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand,
when the application does not satisfy one or both
requirements, then the application should not be denied
outright; instead, the court should apply the indigency
test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound
discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for
exemption.
MIRANDA DOCTRINE
 MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
384 US 436
Decided: June 13, 1966
Vote: 5-4

• The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases
involving custodial interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was questioned
by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut
off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and
effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases,
the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that
were admitted at trial.

• Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a
police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then
interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed, written
confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were presented to the jury.
Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30
years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held
that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the confession.
• Other cases are: Vignera v. New York, Westover v. US,
and California v. Stewart.

• Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is

subjected to custodial police interrogation” are
admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether
“procedures which assure that the individual is accorded
his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself”
are necessary.
• The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court
proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in
which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant
way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” As
such, “the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.”
• The Court further held that “without proper safeguards
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would otherwise do so freely.” Therefore, a
defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning that
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.”
• In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that detained
criminal suspects, prior to police questioning, must be informed of their
constitutional right to an attorney and against self-incrimination. The case
began with the 1963 arrest of Phoenix resident Ernesto Miranda, who was
charged with rape, kidnapping, and robbery. Miranda was not informed of
his rights prior to the police interrogation. During the two-hour
interrogation, Miranda allegedly confessed to committing the crimes,
which the police apparently recorded. Miranda, who had not finished ninth
grade and had a history of mental instability, had no counsel present. At
trial, the prosecution's case consisted solely of his confession. Miranda
was convicted of both rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 20 to 30 years
in prison. He appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, claiming that the
police had unconstitutionally obtained his confession. The court disagreed,
however, and upheld the conviction. Miranda appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which reviewed the case in 1966.
• The Miranda Warning reads:

• “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say

can and will be used against you in a court of law. You
have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided for you. Do you
understand the rights I have just read to you? With these
rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?”
• Retrial, Conviction, Murder

• Miranda’s case was remanded for re-trial, with the confession

excluded from evidence. While his Supreme Court case
changed the course of U.S. criminal procedure, Miranda’s
own fate would not be so altered.

• In his retrial, his ex-girlfriend, Twila Hoffman, offered

testimony against him, revealing that he had told her about
his crimes while he was in prison. In October 1967, Miranda
was convicted and sentenced to 20-30 years in prison.
(https://www.history.com/topics/united-states-
constitution/miranda-rights)
• Miranda was paroled by December 1975, but just over a
month later, on January 31, 1976, he was stabbed to death in a
Phoenix bar fight.

• Officers would detain two acquaintances who were with

Miranda that night for questioning. Before asking each about
the evening, officers recited the Miranda warning (in
Spanish). Both men were released after questioning.

• Later, witness accounts would narrow the investigation to one

of the men. But by that time, the main suspect had fled and
was never apprehended. No charges were ever filed for
Miranda’s murder.
 MIRANDA DOCTRINE
• In PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DINDO "BEBOT"
MOJELLO, appellant. G.R. No. 145566, March 9, 2004, SC held:

• “x x x the law on custodial investigation enshrined in Article III,

Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides:

• Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense

shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
• The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what
jurisprudence has termed as "Miranda rights" stemming from the landmark
decision of the United States Supreme Court, Miranda v. Arizona, which
requires that:

• (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain
silent;

• (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law;

• (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to
have his counsel present when being questioned; and

• (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any

questioning if he so desires.
• The Miranda doctrine under the 1987 Charter took on a modified form
where the right to counsel was specifically qualified to mean competent
and independent counsel preferably of the suspect's own choice. Waiver
of the right to counsel likewise provided for stricter requirements
compared to its American counterpart; it must be done in writing, and in
the presence of counsel.

• Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial

investigation has evolved to provide for more stringent standards
than what was originally laid out in Miranda v. Arizona. The purpose of
the constitutional limitations on police interrogation as the process shifts
from the investigatory to the accusatory seems to be to accord even the
lowliest and most despicable criminal suspects a measure of dignity and
respect. The main focus is the suspect, and the underlying mission of
custodial investigation – to elicit a confession.
• The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the
choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude
other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense;
otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by
simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest.

• We ruled in People v. Continente that while the choice of a lawyer in cases

where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of
counsel – or where the preferred lawyer is not available – is naturally lodged in
the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice as he may reject the
counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any
objection against the counsel's appointment during the course of the
investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the
statement before the swearing officer.
• The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. The lawyer, however, should never
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth.
• Compliance with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 by police
authorities is central to the criminal justice system;
Miranda rights must in every case be respected, without
exception.

• Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the

constitutional requirements under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1,
is deemed admissible in evidence against appellant. It
follows that the admission of culpability made therein is
admissible. It is therefore not "fruit of the poisonous tree"
since the tree itself is not poisonous.
• Rights are available only during custodial investigation.

• Rights include:

• To remain silent;

• To competent and independent counsel;

• To be informed of such rights;

• Rights cannot be waived except in writing and signed by the person in the presence
of his counsel;

• No torture, force, etc., which vitiates the free will shall be used;

• Secret detention places, etc., are prohibited;

• Confessions/admissions obtained in violations of rights are inadmissible in

evidence.
• Waiver. The right to be informed on Miranda Rights may
not be waived.

• Note the exclusionary rule.

 Magtoto v. Maguera (1975)

• Miranda doctrine applies prospectively, not retroactively.

See dissents.
 BAIL

• A matter of right or a matter of discretion.

• Discretion, for heinous crimes and evidence of guilt is
strong.

• Prosecution has the burden of proving that the

evidence if strong, being a positive allegation.
• The case of the immortal JPE. [JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION),
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.]

• J. Bersamin, also an Ilocano and from North, opened: “The

decision whether to detain or release an accused before and
during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power
to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the
Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s
propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is
subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to
ensure that the accused appears at trial.”
• In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.The presumption of
innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, and
further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any
punishment on the accused.

• It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent

the accused from committing additional crimes. The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
• The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence
of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed
under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the
law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under
the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is
charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence
of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the
evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.
• As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts
have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
• On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2)
if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none
of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows:

• (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed

the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

• (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

• (c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;

• (d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or

• (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
• For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in
Concerned Citizens v. Elma , "such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree
of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic,
therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a
matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there
has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.
• We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix
Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that
should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily
surrendered.
• Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or
not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite
the crime alleged against him being punishable with
reclusion perpetua , simply because the determination,
being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made
by the trial court.
• Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for
certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court.
• The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the
international community arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

• x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II,
Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.
• This national commitment to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 )
that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community; and (2 ) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.[Rodriguez
v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 17, G.R.
No.157977, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 290, 298.]
• In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged
in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the
onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years
ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail
during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight
risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private
lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of
him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
• The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents
another compelling justification for his admission to bail,
but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

• It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty

to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This
will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his
defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.
• Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily
ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the
accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear
showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such,
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the
ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
excess, or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
[1M Bail.]
• Leonen dissented.

• After his release solely on the basis of his frail health,

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile immediately reported for
work at the Senate.

• Until the end of his term on June 30, 2016, he actively

and publicly participated in the affairs of the Senate.
The majority maintains that his release on
humanitarian grounds due to his frail health still
stands. This is a contradiction I cannot accept.
• When the offense charged is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail is
automatic. The only discretion of the court is to determine the amount
and kind of bail to be posted.5 When the crime is not punishable by
reclusion perpetua, there is no need for the court to determine whether
the evidence of guilt is strong.

• Equally fundamental, from the clear and unambiguous text of the

provision of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our jurisprudence,
is that when the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail
shall be granted only after a hearing occasioned by a petition for bail.
The phrase "except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong" found in the Constitution is a
sovereign determination that qualifies the presumption of innocence and
the right to bail of persons detained under custody of law. There is no
room for equity when the provisions of the law are clear.
• The opportunity granted to the prosecution to prove that
evidence of guilt is strong so as to defeat the prayer of an
accused to be released on bail is a mandatory
constitutional process. It is part of the prosecution's right
to due process. It is an elementary requirement of
fairness required by law and equity. In criminal
prosecutions, it is "not only the accused that is involved.
The state represents the People. Thus, violating the
prosecution's right to due process of law trivializes the
interest of the People in criminal actions.
• When bail is a matter of discretion, an application for
bail must be filed and a bail hearing must be mandatorily
conducted to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong.
Absent this, bail can neither be granted nor denied.
• To repeat for purposes of emphasis, the prosecution did
not have the opportunity to present evidence of whether
the evidence of guilt was strong. This opportunity was
truncated by accused himself when his counsel filed a
Motion to Fix Bail, and not an application or a petition
for bail as required by existing rules.
• Petitioner is accused of plunder, which requires a charge that he has
defrauded the people of at least P75,000,000.00 or more and has taken
advantage of his public office. He was not accused of stealing bread
because he was driven by the hopelessness of fearing that his children
would go hungry.

• Petitioner did not share the crowded spaces of the impoverished hordes
in detention facilities. He was given the privilege of being incarcerated
in special quarters, and then later, in a government hospital. There was a
constant stream of clothes and food that came to him through his
friends, family, and staff.

• Upon his release, petitioner would have mansions to go home to, with
facilities full of comfort. He would not need to live in unnumbered
shanties that could barely survive the vagaries of our weather systems.
• Narrowing our vision and making his privileges invisible
will result in unfounded judicial exceptionalism. Judicial
exceptionalism, consciously or unconsciously, favors the
rich and powerful. Injustice entrenches inequality.
Inequality assures poverty. Poverty ensures crimes that
provide discomfort to the rich. But crimes are
expressions of hopelessness by many, no matter how
illegitimate.
 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE ACCUSED
• Criminal due process;

• Presumption of innocence;

• Right to be heard by himself and counsel;

• Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him;

• Right to speedy, impartial, and public trial;

• Right to meet witnesses face-to-face;

• Right to compulsory process;

• Trial in absentia;
• In G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015 - JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG,
HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE
THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents, “Enrile
claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion
for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information
filed against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

• Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific
participation in the crime of plunder had been. He posits that the Information
should have stated the details of the particular acts that allegedly constituted
the imputed series or combination of overt acts that led to the charge of
plunder. Enrile essentially reiterates the “details desired” that he sought in
his motion for bill of particulars.
• Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a
criminal offense has the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. This right
has long been established in English law, and is the same
right expressly guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution. This
right requires that the offense charged be stated with
clarity and with certainty to inform the accused of the
crime he is facing in sufficient detail to enable him to
prepare his defense.
• The objective, in short, is to describe the act with
sufficient certainty to fully appraise the accused of the
nature of the charge against him and to avoid possible
surprises that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the
accused would be left speculating on why he has been
charged at all.
• A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information
while a motion to quash is a jurisdictional defect on
account that the facts charged in the Information does not
constitute an offense.

• That every element constituting the offense had been

alleged in the Information does not preclude the accused
from requesting for more specific details of the
various acts or omissions he is alleged to have
committed. The request for details is precisely the
function of a bill of particulars.
 HABEAS CORPUS
• IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY
JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA,
TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON
HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, Respondents, G.R. No. 197597, April 08,
2015, J. Leonen opens:

• “Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of

liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not
under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally
detained.”
• From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo
(Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage.
"While in Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of Medina,
Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah." He returned to the Philippines on December 20,
2009.

• On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station
in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.

• Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for
allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had
a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v.
Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.

• Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to
clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he
could not have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre
because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.
• To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police
"pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other
documents"10 tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang
Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19,
2009.

• The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not
arrest him because he was not Butukan S. Malang.

• Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo

and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his
departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then
detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three
(3) days.
• Called the "great writ of liberty[,]" the writ of habeas
corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as
the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom."
The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and
summary in nature, consistent with the law's "zealous
regard for personal liberty."
• It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be
issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.
The restraint then has become legal, and the remedy of
habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.
• In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile, elements of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police arrested Atty.
Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission
Order allegedly issued by then Minister of National Defense,
Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty.
Ilagan's arrest, from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where
he was detained.

• Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano

(Atty. Arellano). Atty. Arellano, however, no longer left
Camp Catitipan as the military detained and arrested him
based on an unsigned Mission Order.
• Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and
Arellano, the military informed the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of
Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To verify his arrest
papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. Like Atty.
Arellano, the military did not allow Atty. Risonar to
leave. He was arrested based on a Mission Order signed
by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.
• The lawyers, according to respondents, allegedly "played
active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic
Front.”

• The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal

Assistance Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism filed before this
court a Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Attys.
Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.
• After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered
the temporary release of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar
on the recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes.

• Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar,

however, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-
Gatue filed a Motion for Reconsideration. They filed an Urgent
Manifestation/Motion stating that Informations for rebellion
were filed against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar. They
prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus
for being moot and academic
• This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus,
ruling that it became moot and academic with the filing
of the Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar in court.
• Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant
charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a
lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally
deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed
himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

• The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City in People
of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.
charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan
Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection
with the Maguindanao Massacre.
• It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself
before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name
and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S.
Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of
the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was
neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense.
The police officers had no personal knowledge of any
offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo
was also not an escapee prisoner.
• The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of
Atty. Risonar in the “disturbing" case of Ilagan. Like
petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan
to verify and contest any arrest papers against him. Then
and there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant.
In his dissenting opinion in Ilagan, Justice Claudio
Teehankee stated that the lack of preliminary
investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with Attys.
Ilagan and Arellano, of his right to due process of law —
a ground for the grant of a petition for habeas corpus.
• Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash
Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to
Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere
amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the
name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest
from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the
lack of preliminary investigation in this case.

• A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of preliminary
investigation. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on
the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the
same person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by
virtue of these processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person
named Datukan Malang Salibo.
• People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the most complex
case pending in our courts. The case involves 57 victims and 197 accused, two (2) of which
have become state witnesses. As of November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been
arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have already been resolved. To
require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his
liberty. Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong
evidence that he is not Butukan S. Malang.

• In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his innocence.
However, between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty
without due process of law and the government that has all the "manpower and the resources
at [its] command” to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the
citizen.

• Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper
remedies against him as provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is
illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.
 SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF
CASES
• Read: Speedy Trial Act (R.A. 8493), Revised Guideline for Continuous
Trial of Criminal Cases (OCA 101-2017, A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, and
Judicial Affidavit Rule.

• The case of Caballero vs. Alfonso, Jr., laid down the guidelines in
determining the applicability of the “speedy disposition” formula:

• “. . . (S)peedy disposition of cases’ is a relative term. Just like the

constitutional guarantee of “speedy trial” accorded an accused in all
criminal proceedings, “speedy disposition of cases” is a flexible
concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.”
SELF-INCRIMINATION

• Applies to testimonial compulsion only, not object

evidence. [Pp. v. Malimit]

• What is actually proscribed is the use of physical or

moral compulsion to extort communication from the
accused and NOT the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material.
• Hence, substance emitted from the body of the accused,
hair samples, taken from the accused may be admitted in
evidence against him. [Pp. v. Rondero]
• BQ ’09: The Vallejo standard refers to jurisprudential norms considered by the court in assessing the probative value of
DNA evidence. True or False? Explain in two sentences.

• Answer: Yes. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider the following: 

• (a) How the samples were collected 

• (b) How they were handled 

• (c) The possibility of contamination of the samples 

• (d) The procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed

• (e) Qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests

• If a DNA test was conducted, the following are possible results that it may yield:

• 1. The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (Rule of Inclusion). In such a case, the
analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the similarity. 

• 2. The samples are different hence it must have originated from different sources (Rule of Exclusion). This conclusion
is absolute and requires no further analysis; 

• 3. The test is inconclusive. This might occur due to degradation, contamination, failure of some aspect of protocol, or
some other reasons. Analysis might be repeated to obtain a more conclusive result (People v. Vallejo, G.R. No.
144656, May 9, 2002).
 NON-DETENTION BY REASON
OF POLITICAL BELIEFS OR
ASPIRATIONS;
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE;
PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTS;
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT;
 DOUBLE JEOPARDY
• In Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, SC held:

• “The right of the accused against double jeopardy is protected by no less than the Bill of Rights (Article III)
contained in the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

•  Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.

• Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it
was made on motion of the accused, to wit:

• (1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has
rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.

• (2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a
speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.
• In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless
present. A valid information for the crime of bigamy was filed
against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a criminal
case against them before the proper court. They pleaded not
guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case was
dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case.

• As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to

evidence is not appealable because it will place the accused in
double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review only by a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a
denial of due process.
 EX POST FACTO LAW AND
BILL OF ATTAINDER

• Characteristics: criminal matters; retroactive in

application, and prejudice the accused.