Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
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Contact
Antoine Parmentier:
Antoine.parmentier@aig.com +44(0)7809.510.373
Final presentations
Corporate governance and public debate over private equity; Private equity in emerging markets; FIP, FCPI, defiscalisation; Investments in infrastructure; Private equity post credit crunch; Private equity in retail and consumer goods.
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Content
Introduction; Why allocate assets to PE?; LBO activity in Europe; European fundraising activity; The measure of perfromance; FoF due diligence: selection of PE managers; The worlds biggest private equity firms; The mega-buyout era; Value creation in private equity; The structure of a leverage buyout deal; The pros and cons of being private; The credit crisis: impact and consequences on PE; Case study: Baneasa
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Introduction
Asset class representing the companies not publicly traded (vs. public equity traded on stock exchange); Medium to long term investment; Venture capital, growth capital, buyout PE funds are raised from pension funds, insurance companies, large corporate, HNWI, etc; Investors in PE funds are called Limited Partners; PE funds are managed by the General Partners
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LP
nsurance co pany
ension fun
ar e corporate
GP
fun
ana er
Portfolio
Co pany
Co pany
Co pany C
Co pany D
Co pany
Co pany D
The investors:
PE funds managers must be disciplined and patient;
The managers:
The success of an investment relies on the implementation of the business plan;
Buyout (1/3)
The most important strategy of PE; Buyout comes after venture and growth capital; Taking control of a company through leveraged buyout (LBO); Management team of the company is investing alongside the PE fund (alignment of interest);
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Buyout (2/3)
evelopment of a business plan over 4 to 6 years in order to add value;
Revenue growth + Margins improvement + deleveraging = added value; Mature companies with leading market position, active management team, strong cash-flow; PE funds provide capital for international expansion, corporate divestures, succession issues
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Buyout (3/3)
Buyout starts at 5 million enterprise value (EV); At the bottom end: growth/expansion capital.
Large cap
800 million and above
Mid market
100 million to 800 million
Lower market
5 million to 100 million
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Loans are rated BB and below by S&P based on usual ratio (debt/EBIT A, EBIT A interest coverage, etc);
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Secondary (1/2)
Purchase of existing (hence secondary) commitments in PE funds or portfolios of direct investments; LP selling their portfolio = secondary deal; Needs in depth valuation and bidding/auction process; Specialized investors: Alpinvest, Coller Capital, Lexington Partners; Booming specialization as most of institutional investors are seek cash.
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Secondary (2/2)
LP
Sec nda y
buye
n rance co any
en on nd
ar e cor ora e
nd
ana er
li
any
any
any
any
any
any
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Mezzanine (1/3)
Debt instrument immediately subordinated to the equity; The most risky debt instrument = highest yield; Returns generated by:
cash interest payment: fixed rate or fluctuate along an index (e.g. EURIBOR, LIBOR); PIK interest: payment is made by increasing the principal borrowed; Ownership: mezzanine financing most of the time include equity ownership.
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Mezzanine (2/3)
Mezzanine suffered before credit crunch as senior debt was easy to access; Since July 2007 and lack of funding, mezzanine is back:
As of 30 September 2008, 70% of PE deals used mezzanine vs. 48% in 2007; Q3 2008 average spread: E+1,042, versus E+979 in Q2 2008;
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E+ ps 1 1 11 6 Ma H gh st Ma 1 1 Ma 2 Jul-02 Nov-02 Ma -03 Jul-03 Nov-03 C Ma -04 Jul-04 Nov-04 Ma -05 Jul-05 Nov-05 Ma -06 Jul-06 Nov-06 Ma -07 Jul-07 Nov-07 Ma -08 Jul-08 h: E+780.5 ps 1 M 6
Ro
2003: E+1,051.5 ps
g 3-mo th v g sp
Mezzanine (3/3)
s o m zz
pt m 2008: E+1,042 ps
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Infrastructure (1/2)
Among the newest PE-like asset; Global needs for infrastructure assets Roads, ports, airports, energy plant, hospitals. Prisons, schools, etc Mix of private investors and governments through PPP (Public-Private Partnerships); Traditional PE funds raised infrastructure funds: KKR, CVC, 3i, Macquarie; Longer term investment, lower return, steady cash-flow with regular yield; French highways or Viaduc de Millau are contracted to Eiffage/Macquarie;
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Infrastructure (2/2)
A multi trillion market opportunity:
$1 trillion to $3 trillion annually through 2030; US: power industry needs $1.5 trillion between 2010 and 2030; Mexico: a 5-year and $250 billion plan will be funded 50% by private capital; EU: 164 billion to be invested in natural gas infrastructure by 2030 to facilitate import of gas to meet long-term shortfall; China: close to 100 airports will be needed.
Source: Global Infrastructure Demand through 2030, CG/LA Infrastructure, March 2008. Infrastructure to 2030, volume 2, OECD publication, 2007.
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Portfolio management
Asset allocation is define by returns, risk (measured by standard deviations of returns) and correlations; Diversification improve returns while reducing risk; Allocation is determined using public information of traditional asset classes (equity, bonds, REIT, etc...)
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Quarterly valuation:
Risk of inconsistency: quarterly marked-to-market valuation = significant degree of subjectivity; Risk of stale valuation: quarterly valuation can understate the standard deviation and correlation to other asset classes.
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arket
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Reason to invest in PE
Adding a risky asset with a low correlation of pricing trends compared to traditional asset classes can reduce the risk of an overall portfolio; Relatively good returns of PE over the last years.
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Geography
LBO activity in Eur
12% 2% 3% 3% 4% 5% 36%
3% 3% 3% 3% 21% 4%
ran e
Ne her and
14% 21%
1 %
33
ran e
Sectors
LBO a ue in ur pe per ector (Q Q
3%
LBO
M ter s
He t c re Ret
Foo & Dr ce c s
3% 3%
I s r e
5 7
O &G s
% % %
Ot er
5 A
Serv c es & e s
2 $ 0' 0$ ' 4 23 %$ & % (& 1 0'$ $ 2 0$ 0$' $ (%'10'& (%' $ ) ' (%' & $ &%$
4%
f ct r
2 ' 4 &D '% 0C &B 4 3 0$' $ (%'10'& 0$ ' 4 23 ($ 1 0'$ $ 2 0$ (%' & $ &%$ (%' $ ) '
M f ct r He t c re Ret Foo & Bever e c s B e M ter s o ters & to ot ve Ot er
@
5 6
%
Serv c es & e s
# "
ectro c s
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35
00 0 60
UK
rance
er any
taly
or ic egion
estern Europe
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PE as a percentage of GDP
Nordic countries have the most important PE activity; Benelux figures are impacted by few mega deals.
Nordic countries outhern Europe thers . . 3. 3. . . . . . . 7 3 German spea ing countries rance Benelux U
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Distributions are expected to decrease as well: this wont ease the fundraising processes; Average fundraising:
2008: 14.2 months; 2007: 12 months; 2006: 11.1 months
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Average fundraising
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Outlook
PE is set to enter its most challenging time; Increasing pressure and difficulties for managers seeking capital; Fundraising take more time; Less deals are being signed so theres no rush to raise; Historical performances and focus strategies will become key factors in the future: some GPs wont survive; Some LPs will need to free up some capital and clean up their portfolio: increase in secondary transactions. 45
Outlook
PE AUM has grown steadily since 1996:
60% of LPs are expected to increase their allocation to PE;
Fundraising sources
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Track record
Napoca Fund II
As of 30 December 2007 - $ million
Country
Exit
Cost
Unrealized value 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 131.7 55.6 52.8 55.8 46.2 72.2 150.0 564.3 564.3
Total value
Multiple of cost 2.1x 2.3x 4.0x 0.8x 1.9x 1.0x 1.2x 1.4x 1.1x 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x 1.1x 1.3x
Gross IRR
Realized investments Beverage Plus Holdings, LLC Dear Lagoon Sport Management Arizona Napoca Distressed Credit To tal re alize d in v e s tm e n ts Unrealized investments Fenchurch Street Insurance Alketechnic OutSpace Clothing Avi Construction Hospital Management Holdings Pack4Life Foxtruck Finance To tal u n re alize d in v e s tm e n ts
US UK US Other
23.3 65.6 97.7 14.6 201.2 130.0 48.2 38.0 49.7 46.2 72.2 150.0 534.3 735.5
49.6 151.0 387.7 12.1 376.9 131.7 55.6 52.8 55.8 46.2 72.2 150.0 564.3 941.2
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Measures of performance
Multiple of cost:
Also called Total Value over Paid-In capital (TVPI); (Cash distributions + Unrealized value)/capital invested; Cash returned regardless of timing (total return).
The J-curve
In the early years, low or negative valuation due to:
Management fees drawn from committed capital; Initial investments to identify and improve inefficiencies;
Th J-cur ff ct
ctual returns 5 Investments valued elow its cost: - Management fees; - Initial investments V lue
-5 Y r
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The J-curve
Fees are charged based on the funds entire committed capital; Example:
Fund size: 100 million; Management fee: annual 2% committed capital; Organizational expenses: 300,000 2,300,000 expenses/fees called regardless of any investment made.
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The J-curve
If 5 investments are made the first year for 3 million each: 5 x 3 million = 15 million; If 20% of committed capital is called the first year: 20 million;
Capital contributed Ass ts Investments emainin cash Total assets 20 million 20% of committed capital 15 million 5 investments at 3 million each held at cost 2.7 million 20-15-2.3 = 2.7 million 17.7 million = 0.89x the 20 million contributed by s
The J-curve
Underperforming investments tend to be written down more quickly than successful companies develop; Example 2nd year:
Another 20% of committed capital : 20 million; Five new deals at 3 million each: 15 million; Two first-year investments are written down/off; Annual management fee: 2 million.
0 million 0% of committed capital
apital contributed Assets: First-year investments 2nd-year investments ash on hand Total assets
10.5 million original 5 investments one written off one written down to half its value 15 million another five investments at 3 million each held at cost 5.7 cash after .3 million of expenses 2+2+0.3 and 30 million of investments 31.2 million 0.7 x the 0 million
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The J-curve
Companies performing well, held at cost or conservative valuation, understate the value of the portfolio; Interim is thus often misleading; NAV + cumulative distributions track over time relative to contributed capital:
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Qualitative analysis:
Team; Strategy; Market opportunity
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Reasons to invest
Attractive track record; Experienced investment team; Differentiated investment strategy; Proprietary deal flow; Sector/geographic focus.
Must be combined with FoF portfolio management and exposure > seek diversification.
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Track record
Entry and exit date; Realized and unrealized value (part sell off or recapitalization); Multiples of cost and IRR.
eali ed invest ents Be erage l s l i gs, ear ag rt Ma age e t ri a a ca istresse re it T o tal p artially re alize d i v e s t e t s Unreali ed invest ents Fe c rc treet I s ra ce l etec ic t ace l t i g i str cti s ital Ma age e t l i gs ac ife Foxtr c Fi a ce T o tal r e alize d i v e s t e t s
t er
Belgi
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Exit
Cost
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ll zn |z l q l p l l n l y l o n m l z l nl o mn l y mj m k g pg f hf h h f r hff h g fe d c i b W ` Y
U R T PPS R Q PI p ii
H G FE
Napoca
II Initial invest ent ate eali ed value Unreali ed value Total value Multiple of cost ross I
Benchmark analysis
und by fund basis Napoca und I 2001 $714.0 $713.8 $2,518.5 $67.4 $2,585.9 Napoca und II 2005 $1,305.0 $611.3 $303.4 $333.7 $637.1 5.3% Too i Eu ro p e . Vi tage Year Fund i e ontri uted ca ital istri utions Residual alue Total Value
Lower oundary of Quartile DPI Na oca Lower oundary of Quartile RVPI Na oca Lower oundary of Quartile TVPI Na oca Lower oundary of Quartile
er Quartile
3.53x
0.50x
0.09x er Quartile
0.55x
3. x er Quartile
Eu ro p e 1.04x 1st
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Eu ro p e NA
US 0. x st
Eu ro p e NA
US 1.03x t
er Quartile
Eu ro p e . x st
US 0. x st
Eu ro p e 0. x st
US 0. x st
42.3% Eu ro p e . st US . st
Net I a oca
Gross I
55.6%
ature US .
Average
5.20 11.90 14.10 21.70 22.80 27.20 27.70 27.40 16.70 5.90 7.10 10.00 15.10 15.80 12.10 21.70 5.90 -1.50
32.30
Pooled Average
9.30 9.20 16.90 27.20 17.30 42.50 36.00 11.40 14.60 8.90 11.00 14.60 26.00 23.30 26.50 21.90 6.30 -12.90
1.80
Maximum
23.30 35.70 40.20 42.80 87.90 59.80 107.30 268.10 132.80 30.20 40.80 35.00 64.80 110.10 45.50 234.10 82.40 91.30
436.50
Lower Lower Lower boundary of boundary of boundary of 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile
14.30 19.50 23.60 32.30 26.80 49.20 60.10 21.00 21.30 9.70 12.70 17.80 28.20 27.50 22.90 17.50 11.50 5.60
12.80
Minimum
-24.20 -3.40 -17.50 1.70 -9.90 -1.80 -16.00 -12.40 -17.40 -11.10 -16.40 -9.60 -5.30 -7.10 -8.50 -19.60 -50.90 -40.10
73.80
8.70 8.90 13.20 22.10 15.70 16.50 13.90 12.80 6.70 4.30 6.00 8.80 11.30 8.30 6.10 -0.20 2.70 -4.40
-0.10 3.00 6.20 10.20 9.00 14.60 1.00 6.90 -0.60 -0.90 -0.20
2007
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Presentation
Private equity investors and their managers: Vivre avec un fond dinvestissement, Les Echos, October 2006
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Carlyle
Founded in 1987 by David Rubenstein, Daniel DAniello and William Conway; Since inception, Carlyle has invested $49.4 billion of equity in 836 deals for a total purchase price of $220 billion; Over $89 billion AUM throughout 64 funds in buyouts (69%), growth capital (4%), real estate (12%) and leveraged finance (15%); Over 525 investment professionals operating in 21 countries; Assets deployed in Americas (59%), Europe (28%) and Asia (13%); Currently: 140 companies, $68 billion in revenues and 200,000 workers.
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Source: www.carlyle.com
Carlyle deals
Hertz Zodiac Terreal Le Figaro VNU
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Blackstone
Founded in 1985 by Steven Schwarzman and Peter Peterson; Global AUM $119.4 billion in private equity, real estate, Funds of Hedge Funds, CLOs, Mutual funds; 89 senior MDs and total staff of over 750 investments and advisory professionals in US, Europe and Asia; Blackstone is the first major PE firm to become public: IPO was in June 2007 at $36 under water since first day ! Currently: 47 companies, $85 billion in annual revenues and more than 350,000 employees.
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Blackstone deals
The weather channel: $3.6bn in September 2008; Hilton: $26.9bn in October 2007; Center Parcs: $2.1bn in May 2006; Deutsche Telekom: 3.3bn in April 2006 (minority); Orangina: $2.6bn in February 2006;
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KKR
Founded in 1976 by James Kohlberg, Henry Kravis and George Roberts; Total AUM $68.3bn from $25.4bn invested capital; Total of 165 deals since inception with an aggregate enterprise value of $420bn; KKR is currently from a one-trick pony to a multi asset manager with infrastructure and mezzanine funds being raised; The $31bn buyout of RJR Nabisco inspired the book Barbarians at the gate; Currently: 35 companies, $95 billion in annual revenues and more than 500,000 employees.
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KKR deals
Legrand; Pages Jaunes; Tarkett; Alliance Boots; ProSieben; TDC; Toys R Us.
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PAI Partners
The biggest French PE firms formerly known as Paribas Affaires Industrielles; Since 1998, PAI invested 3.92bn in 36 deals across Europe; Last fund raised reach 5.2bn Investments include: Kaufman & Broad, Vivarte, Neuf Cegetel, Panzani Lustucru, Atos Origin
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Source: AFIC/Ernst&Young
As of 30 June 2006:
55% of PE-backed companies have less than 100 empoyees and 83% have less than 500 employees; 79% have less than 50m revenues; 4852 PE-backed companies in France; Work force of 1.5 million people (9% of total private employees); 199bn in revenues including 128bn generated abroad.
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Source: AFIC/Ernst&Young
Presentations
KKR Blackstone Carlyle
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Fund growth
PE AUM 1980-2006: 24%CAGR; 2003-2006: PE commitments increased 260%; Cost of debt historically low Global volume of LBOs increased to $700 billion in 2006 (4x 2003 level); Global volume of LBOs in H1 2007 reached $560 billion (25% of global M&A).
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Target companies
Very large companies are attractive targets:
Mature companies need restructuring effort to get rid of the fat; The value-addition is thus often obvious an obvious path; Usually less competition among the buyers.
Rise of Club-deals
Club-deals are iconic of the concentration trends of private equity; 91% of US buyouts of over $5 billion were club-deals... ... but also 38% of P-to-P valued between $250 million and $1 billion were club deals:
Many firms shared the risks and pooled resources.
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Disappearance of club-deals
Collusion charges; Difficulties to share informations; Tendency to monopolize the control the control; Ego-issues.
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a ue
$32.7 billion $27.4 billion $25.7 billion $21.6 billion $17.6 billion $15.0 billion $13.9 billion
Buyers
Bain Capital, KKR, Merrill Lynch Apollo, TPG Bain, Thomas H Lee Carlyle, Riverstone, Goldman Sachs Blackstone, Carlyle, Permira , TPG Carlyle, CD&R, Merrill Lynch Apax, Blackstone, KKR, Permira, Providence 88
Presentations
Caveat Investor / the uneasy crown, The Economist, Feb 2007; Whos next, The Deal, July 2008
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90
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EBITDA generation
EBITDA is generated by:
Sales expansion; Margin improvement; Add-on acquisitions; Organic growth (=GDP growth)
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Multiple expansion
Multiple: EV/EBITDA; Based on comparable transactions; Multiple expansion: Difference between entry and exit multiple; =Multiple uplift x Exit EBITDA Multiple uplift:
=Exit EV/EBITDA entry EV/EBITDA
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Debt reduction
= Entry net debt exit net debt
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Example
EV creati
323.6
345.1
764.0
En y E
gene a ion
ele e aging
Exi E
61.0
1 493.7
95
C mpany A
EV 1,275.0
Multiple 8.5
EV 1,97 .0
Multiple 9.
EBITDA generati n
1,275.0 = Enty EBIT A x Entry multiple (1) 1,785.0 = Exit EBIT A x Entry multiple (2) =( )-( ) 0.7 = Multiple uplift (exit EV/EBIT A - entry EV/EBIT A) (3) 210.0 = Exit EBIT A (4) = ( ) x (4) 45.0 = Entry net debt (5) 5.0 = Exit net debt ( ) 4 . = (5) - (6) 697. 1,97 .0 = Entry EV + Total value creation
Multiple expan i n
Debt reducti n
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D g
r i
M li l
si
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Objectives must be well defined; Management is incentivized: alignment of interest between Board members and shareholders; Must create value for the next acquirer: PE is not necessarily short term focused.
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Example of bad deal in the wrong industry: Foxton deal The deal of the century, FT
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Recruitment/management; Buy-and-build; New investments to develop to new markets; Optimization/cost cutting; Divesture of non core business(es)
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Company outperformance 3%
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Presentation
Foxtons: The sale of the century, FT magazine, June 2008
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106
Debt is either:
Unsecured Secured
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LBO structure
Senior debt Nine-year Nine-year Nine-year Nine-year average: E+284.5; median: E+287.5; minimum: E+249.5 in une 2007; maximum: E+287.5 in une 2008*.
Secured
2nd lien
2nd lien have disappeared ith the credit crunch; they ere seen as cheap me anine.
Me
anine
Me anine benefits from the credit crunch; Me anine reimbursement has cash and PIK components; 1 2008 cash spread: E+414.7 1 2008 PIK spread: E+535.3
nsecured debt
nsecured Equity contribution 10-year minimum: 29.6% in 1997; 10-year maximum: 42.9% in 1 2008; 10-years median: 35.9%; 10-year average: 36.0%
Equity
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Equity
Common equity, preferred equity, shareholder loan; Equity is unsecured and the most risky and rewarding tranche; Equity is held by the shareholders: private equity fund, management, various investors, often debt mezzanine providers, sometimes intermediaries.
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Mezzanine debt
Secured debt but subordinated to senior debt; Mezzanine is provided by mezzanine funds and sometimes hedge funds; Reimbursement after the senior debt but has priority over the equity holders Reimbursement is cash or PIK; PIK note: payment made in additional bonds or preferred stocks which increase the performance of the investment; Mezzanine is usually reimbursed at exit if not refinanced before. H1 2008 cash spread: E+414.7bps H1 2008 PIK spread: E+535.3bps
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Second lien
Developed pre-July 2007 and does not really exist anymore: as of Q3 2008, 12% of LBOs used 2nd lien versus 52% in 2007; Reimbursement in cash, priority level between senior debt and mezzanine; Second lien was seen as a cheap mezzanine.
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Senior debt
Negotiated for a period of time between 7 and 9 years usually based on expected cash flow; Tranche A is first reimbursed. Other tranches (B and C) are usually reimbursed in fine; Tranche D is a revolving credit to refinance previous debt of the target company; H1 2008 spread: E+337.48bps
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Capital structure
enior debt Nine-year Nine-year Nine-year Nine-year average E+284.5 median E+287.5 minimum E+249.5 in une 2007 maximum E+287.5 in une 2008 .
Secured
2nd lien
2nd lien have disappeared with the credit crunch they were seen as cheap me anine.
Me
anine
Me anine benefits from the credit crunch Me anine reimbursement has cash and IK components H1 2008 cash spread E+414.7 H1 2008 IK spread E+535.3
Unsecured debt
Unsecured Equity contribution 10-year minimum 29.6% in 1997 10-year maximum 42.9% in H1 2008 10-years median 35.9% 10-year average 36.0%
Equity
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5 5 15 1 5 1
115
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Ev lution f
1
1
it l structur
v ry
rs
r r r r n Mezz n nly ien ien Mezz
1H
1 7
11 7
117
Cost of debt
C st f ebt increase significantly in 2008
LBO c st f f
. . . . . . . 1 1 . . . Se ior debt Se ior debt Me i e -Se 8 9. .9
ing in b s
118
LBO spread
Avera e rea f r initial and ec ndary uyout
E+344. 8 in June 2008
n00 ay -0 0 ep -0 Ja 0 n0 M 1 ay S e 01 p0 Ja 1 n0 M 2 ay -0 2 ep -0 Ja 2 n0 M 3 ay -0 3 ep -0 Ja 3 n0 M 4 ay -0 4 ep -0 Ja 4 n0 M 5 ay -0 5 ep -0 Ja 5 n0 M ay -0 ep -0 Ja n0 M 7 ay -0 7 ep -0 Ja 7 n0 M 8 ay -0 8 M
Ja
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Consequences
The market is stuck:
sellers have not yet adjusted their price; Buyers dont want/cannot pay high price.
EBITDA multiples
Average LBO
12. x 1 . x
.2x 9. x . x . x . x .1x . x . x . x . x . x
ltiple)
1 .9x 1 . x
. x . x . x 2. x . x
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2Q
3Q
19
19
19
122
Purchase prices
econdary buyou s are he mos impac ed as: hey were radi ionally he mos e pensi e ransac ions = price adjus men ; ellers are ery likely forced o sell so accep l wer prices
Purchase rice er deal t
11 0 10 5 10 0 95 90 ll 85 80 75 70 65 60 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 uyou s ponsor o ponsor orpora e Public o Pri a e
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More extensive and transparent approach to governance and more explicit balancing of stakeholder interests.
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Source: cKinsey
c vs. Pr v te Eq ty
Strategic leaders ip
verall effectiveness
127
Different priorities and demands: CEOs need to learn to cope with this very diverse range of investors; In case of P2P, HF can block the privatization (95% threshold to delist): Alain Afflelou purchase by Bridgepoint.
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136
Top priorities
Private e uit 18 oards Publi o panies oards
ample of 20 based dire tors o ave served on t e boards of bot private and publi ompanies, most it an of million.
11
0
alue re tion it str te tr te i initi tives in lu. ternal relations 1 da plan Governan e, o pli n e nd ris r ni tion desi n nd su ession
138
our e
Surveys conclusion
Public companies Directors are more focus on risk avoidance than value creation:
They are not as well financially rewarded as PE Directors by a companys success but they can still lose their hard-earned reputations if investors are disappointed.
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141
In reality, the default rate over the last years is much lower that those predictions; 146
Private equity deals should be seriously impacted very soon; Deals signed in 2005, 2006 and H1 2007 are the most risky deals; 147
Consequences
June 2007 Top of the cycle June 2008 Recession
Prices are too high Risk levels are extraordinary Liquidity is driving behaviour Sellers market No distressed opportunities
Prices are falling. More to go The risk profile has changed fundamentally Lack of liquidity is driving behaviour Buyers market but must proceed carefully and beware the falling knives Some interesting distressed situations (and even more to come)
149
Crisis = opportunities
Recession years have produced the best vintages for private equity; Although some LPs are facing liquidity crisis, more money should be deployed now and in 2009 ! Recession years considered to be 1991 + 2 years and 2001 + 2 years.
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151
Recession vs Non-recession
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153
Investment rationale
Market leader in French retail (#1 in Footwear and #2 in clothing); Experienced management team: Bogdan Novac has a long standing experience of the sector and the group; Strong financial performance and strong growth in sales expected over the next 3 years; Resilient business model: lower end of the market and diversified range of products; Diversified offering: geography (city centre or out of town, France and overseas, apparel and footwear); Potential growth prospect: organic growth (new stores openings) and consolidation (fragmented industry).
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Banesa is #1 Fragmented industry, footwear retailer with gives M&A 14.4% of the French opportunity/growth by market and #2 acquisition clothing retailer in France with only 3.7% of the French apparel market
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Indication about competition: Zara, H&M, Mango, etc are city centres = Baneasa has a dominant position where those competitors are not present. Zara, H&M, Mango, etc are thus the main city centre competitors;
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Historically, Baneasa has always been active in OOT: created suburban discount shoe stores in 1981 with Osier Chaussures; and in 1984 with Osier Vetements
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Clothing business: 44% sales and 43% of EBITDA and Footwear business: 56% sales and 57% EBITDA
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France: 93% sales and 95% EBITDA; Out Of Town: 68% sales and 72% EBITDA
Baneasa is diversified (but maybe not as much as the investor thinks); Sales and EBITDA indicates that city centres and overseas stores are more expensive (lower margins, Baneasa has lower performances abroad and in city centres where is the tough competition)
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Bogdan Novac was CEO of Baneasa from 2000 to 2003 and 2004 to today. EBITDA has grown from 231m to 365m (a CAGR of 16.4%)
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Nataf estimates sales and EBITDA in the financial year to 28 February 2007 of 237 million and 23 million respectively (9.7% margin). Berrilio had sales in the 12 months to 30 September 2006 of 64.5 million and EBITDA of 4.6 million (7.3% margin).
Nataf and Berrilio offer potential margin improvements as the margin is 9.7% and 7.3% respectively versus 16.1% margin for Baneasa.
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The actors must gain French clothing market share to grow: market has been no organic growth stable since 2000 with 0.2% CAGR resulting from industry growth
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Average prices have decreased by 1.5% CAGR. Price-volume elasticity is high with declines in average prices driven by the passthrough of purchasing gains from lower-cost sourcing (Asia) to endcustomers and from the increasing development of value retail.
Pressure on cost, margins are difficult to increase and can only be increased through cost reduction (rather than price increase): price pressure on Baneasa + tough competition + need to keep production cost low (cost cutting and tough negotiation with suppliers)
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Womenswear represents the majority of the French market with 51% of sales. It was the strongest growing segment as well as the most competitive and innovative until 2002.
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Menswear has experienced fast growth rates in recent years due to the introduction of semi-annual collections and has increased its share of the total French clothing market (from 31% in 2002 up to 35% in 2004).
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Baby and childrenswear are expected to remain broadly stable, with upside coming from increased spend per child and the emerging trend of higher-priced designer baby and childrenswear.
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Between 2001 and 2003, out-oftown banners saw their market share decline from 11.9% in 2000 to 10.9% in 2003. This reflected the impact of hard discount retailing and the growth of citycentre banners. Since 2003, however, OOT specialised chains have regained share and have returned to 11.7% market share, growing by 3.9% in 2004 and 4.7% in 2005, to 3.1 billion. This dynamism has been driven by new store openings and volume increases supported by increased price-competitiveness.
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Specialist out-of-town (OOT) distribution has seen the strongest growth in share (2.3% growth per annum over 2003-05 and 3.2% over 1998-2003) and continues to gain market share on the food retailers and the lowerend city-centre players due to a broad product range and low prices.
Footwear: OOT has a strong growth in share; OOT is where Baneasa is the best with 45% market share (with Osier Chaussures, Velo and Blue Shoes) while the closest competitor has only 10%.
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The Spanish footwear market is more dynamic than the French one (3.9% p.a growth since 2000) but experiences the same volume and price trends with volumes up 6.5% p.a while prices decreased by 2.6% p.a largely driven by growing Asian imports. The market is still dominated by independent city centre stores (40% market share vs 15% in France) and OOT footwear is gaining share (8.4% p.a between 1998 and 2003).
Spanish market: active market at the time of the investment (quid now?) but city centres have more market shares than OOT (risk: Baneasa is better in OOT).
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Suburban stores are typically large format value stores and account for the great majority of sales and profits, whilst city centre stores are more fashionable premium stores.
OOT stores need high volume sales to be profitable // city centres are more fashionable products so potentially higher margins although probably higher costs (including marketing costs)
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Over 2003-06, gross margin has grown at a 9.5% CAGR and EBITDA at 16.4% CAGR while sales CAGR was 5.8%, of which like-for-like sales growth of 3.7%.
Indicates that Baneasa has grown organically and by acquisitions but acquisitions are the main growth factor.
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