Human & Animal Consciousness: A Brief Reflection on our Differences

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PreparededitNoelle Leslie dela Cruz, Ph.D. Click to by Master subtitle style

Key points for discussion

Why talk about animal minds? Two kinds of consciousness:

1. 2.

Phenomenal consciousness (or sentience) Self-consciousness or higher-order thought

Should self-consciousness be a prerequisite for moral rights? Conclusion: On the ethical treatment of non-human animals
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Why talk about animal minds?

The traditional assumption is that animals are meant to be used for human ends

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Why talk about animal minds?

And God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.--Genesis 1:28

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Why talk about animal minds?

Our species uses other animals for food, clothing, medicine, sport, transportation, labor, protection, and companionship

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Why talk about animal minds?

Some human products--pain-killers, contraceptives, shampoos, and colognes--are tested on animals

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Why talk about animal minds?

Most of us have been to zoos where animals are confined and exhibited for our entertainment

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The evolution of the brain from fish to human

In identifying the salient differences between human and animal minds, philosophers have pointed to mental features such as ego formation, higher-order thought, and language abilities, among others, as unique to human 4/21/12

Why talk about animal minds?

How do such distinctly human characteristics factor in our considerations about how we should treat animals? Does the fact that animals do not have our kind of consciousness justify our use of them as means to an end? Or does our very capacity for reason indicate that we should protect and defend animals, even and especially from human intervention? 4/21/12

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Phenomenal consciousness

pertains to the experience of sensory mental events and states 4/21/12 or qualia (Kim 1998: 157)

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Phenomenal consciousness

Thomas Nagels formulation of this kind of consciousness is, There is 4/21/12 something it is like to be

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Phenomenal consciousness it is like to While there is something

be a bat or a human being, there is 4/21/12 nothing it is like to be a chair or a

Most animals possess a degree of phenomenal consciousness. They are sentient or capable of having feelings or felt sensations and emotional states (De Grazia 2002: 40).
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Vertebrates or creatures that possess backbones are generally considered sentient: E.g. Humans, the Great Apes and dolphins, other mammals from elephants to rodents, birds, reptiles and amphibians, and 4/21/12 fish (De Grazia

Two kinds of consciousness

Discriminating among sentient and nonsentient animals is necessary in formulating a moral stand in regard to them The principle behind the ethical treatment of animals rests on their capacity to feel pain, an unpleasant or aversive sensory experience typically associated with actual or potential tissue damage and suffering, a highly unpleasant emotional state associated 4/21/12

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Self-consciousness

a state of inner awareness by which one is capable of higher-order thought.

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Self-consciousness

David Rosenthal sums it up thusly: a mental states being conscious consists in 4/21/12 ones having a thought that one is in that

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Self-consciousness

Self-consciousness also implies a unity of all phenomenal perceptions in an 4/21/12 individual ego.

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Self-consciousness

There is a perceived subject who binds these overlapping experiences together, who 4/21/12 understands that these events are

Two kinds of consciousness

Some philosophers, notably Carruthers (2003) and Dennett (1995), argue that animals do not have self-consciousness According to Carruthers, for a creature to be conscious it must have a theory of mind that will equip it with the concepts it will need to think about its own mental states. Since there is little scientific evidence in favor of animals having a theory of mind, Carruthers does not consider animals conscious 4/21/12

Should self-consciousness be a prerequisite for moral rights?

The three main criteria for personhood (Anderson 2004: 2) are:

Sentience - the subjective experience of sensory impressions and internal thoughts; a sentient being is one whom there is something it is like to be. - the capacity to understand and cope with new situations - the subjects knowledge of the things external to him or her and his or her internal states as well. 4/21/12 It implies the capacity to reflect on his or her own

Intelligence

Self-awareness

Should self-consciousness be a prerequisite for moral rights?

Not all humans are persons, e.g. Babies, very young children, braindamaged individuals, those who are in a comatose state, and the insane

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Should self-consciousness be a prerequisite for moral rights?

Not all persons are human, e.g. robots or artificially-intelligent creatures (C3PO in Star Wars, Agent Smith in The Matrix), the ghosts at Hogwarts in the Harry Potter series, and some animals in films such as Garfield or in comic books such as the precocious tiger in Calvin and Hobbes

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Should self-consciousness be a prerequisite for moral rights?

Animals are not persons. Even though they satisfy the first requirement, sentience, they do not possess either intelligence or self-awareness.

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Should self-consciousness be a prerequisite for moral rights?

Traditionally, moral responsibility is ascribed only to persons, who are uniquely capable of rational choice. But it is not the case that only persons have or deserve moral rights

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Should self-consciousness be a prerequisite for moral rights?

Some of the most basic moral rights as we commonly understand them include any and all of the following:
The The The The The

right to live, right to liberty and security of person,

right to equality and to be free from all forms of discrimination, right to be free from torture and illtreatment, and right to development
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Should self-consciousness be a prerequisite for moral rights?

I argue that the case for animal liberation need not be predicated on a one-to-one correspondence between human and animal consciousness

Sentience--the fact that a being can feel pain and experience suffering should be enough to ground the ethical demand for us not to harm that being

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Conclusion: On the ethical treatment of non-human animals

We should not eat animals

We should stop using animals for sport or games We should stop mass-producing animals solely for the purpose of eating them We should not remove animals from their natural environments for our own amusement or entertainment We should refrain from using animals for 4/21/12 clothing and accessories

References

Carruthers, Peter. Why the question of animal consciousness may not matter very much. 2004. Http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/people/facu /animal-consciousness-might-notmatter.pdf. [Available online.] Accessed 17 September 2004. De Grazia, David. 2002. Animal rights: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4/21/12 Dennett, Daniel C. 1995. Animal