Key Establishment Protocols

Maithili Narasimha
April 30, 2012

Contents

Classification and framework Key transport based on symmetric encryption Key agreement based on symmetric techniques Key transport based on public-key encryption Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques Secret sharing Conference keying Analysis of key establishment protocols

Concepts and Classification

Key establishment: a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent cryptographic use.

key transport protocol

one party creates, and securely transfers it to the other(s).

key agreement protocol: key establishment technique in

which a shared secret is derived by two (or more) parties

key pre-distribution vs. dynamic(session) key establishment

Use of trusted servers

trusted third party, trusted server, authentication server, key distribution center (KDC), key translation center (KTC) and certification authority (CA).

secure key establishment

each party in a key establishment protocol be able to determine the true identity of the other(s) which could possibly gain access to the resulting key, implying preclusion of any unauthorized additional parties from deducing the same key secrecy of key and identification of those parties with access to it

Authentication
authentication entity authentication data origin authentication (implicit) key authentication key confirmation explicit key authentication depends on context of usage identity of a party, and aliveness at a given instant

identity of the source of data

identity of party which may possibly share a key evidence that a key is possessed by some party evidence that an identified party possesses a given key

Classification and concepts

(Implicit) Key authentication

one party is assured that no other party aside from a specifically identified second party may gain access to a particular secret key independent of the actual possession of such key by the second party, or knowledge of such actual possession by the first party

Key confirmation

one party is assured that a second (possibly unidentified) party actually has possession of a particular secret key
both (implicit) key authentication and key confirmation hold

Explicit key authentication

Motivation for use of session key

Session key

ephemeral secret, i.e., one whose use is restricted to a short

time period after which all trace of it is eliminated

Motivation

to limit available cipher-text to limit exposure in the event of (session) key compromise to avoid long-term storage of a large number of distinct secret

keys to create independence across communications sessions or applications

Key Establishment Protocol Characteristics

nature of the authentication reciprocity of authentication: unilateral vs. mutual key freshness key control: key distribution vs. key agreement efficiency

number of message exchanges bandwidth complexity of computations pre-computation? on-line (real-time), off-line, or no third party degree of trust required in a third party

third party requirements

type of certificate used non-repudiation

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Assumptions and Adversaries

Attacks

passive attack: adversary simply records data and analyzes active attack: adversary modifies or injects messages

What are the attackers roles?

deduce a session key using information gained by eavesdropping; participate covertly in protocol initiated by one party, and influence it by altering messages so as to be able to deduce the key initiate one or more protocol executions, and combine messages from one with another, so as to carry out one of the above attacks without being able to deduce the session key, deceive a legitimate party regarding the identity of the party with which it shares a key In entity authentication, adversarys objective is to arrange that one party receives messages which satisfy that party that the protocol has been run successfully with a party other than the adversary.

PFS and Known Key Attacks

perfect forward secrecy

Compromise of long-term key does not compromise past session keys PFS ensures that previous traffic is locked securely in the past

known-key attack

compromise of past session keys allows either a passive adversary to compromise future session keys, or impersonation by an active adversary in the future

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Contents

Classification and framework Key transport based on symmetric encryption Key agreement based on symmetric techniques Key transport based on public-key encryption Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques Secret sharing Conference keying Analysis of key establishment protocols

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Point-to-Point Key Update

Key Transport with one pass

Long term symmetric key K shared between A and B A B: EK(rA) {rA is the session key} Implicit key authentication Additional fields timestamp, sequence number: freshness target identifier: prevent undetectable message replay Hence A B: EK(rA, tA, B) Mutual authentication: B A: EK(rB, tB, A): K = f(rA, rB)

Key Transport with challenge-response

B A: nB : for freshness A B: EK(rA, nA, nB, B) B A: EK(rB, nB, nA, A) Does not provide PFS
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Point-to-Point Key Update

Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol 2 (AKEP2)

rA (B, A, rA, rB), hK(B, A, rA, rB) (A, rB), hK(A, rB) Session key W = hK(rB)

AKEP1

B A: (B, A, rA, rB, (r, W hK(r)), hK(B, A, rA, rB, (r, W hK(r)) Optimization: r = rB

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Shamirs no key algorithm

Protocol
KA mod p (KA)B mod p (KAB) A mod p
-1

Properties

Provides key transport No a priori information is required Protection from passive adversaries Does not provide authentication

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Kerberos

Basic setup

A, B, a trusted server share long-term pairwise secret keys a priori Server either plays the role of KDC and itself supplies the session key, or serves as a key translation center (KTC) A and B share no secret, while T shares a secret with each Goal: for B to verify As identity, establishment of a shared key A requests from T credentials to allow it to authenticate itself to B T plays the role of a KDC, returning to A a session key encrypted for A and a ticket encrypted for B The ticket contains the session key and As identity authentication of A to B when accompanied by appropriate message
created by A containing a timestamp encrypted under that session key

Description

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Kerberos

Protocol

A T: A, B, NA NA: freshness T A: EKBT(k, A, L), EKAT(k, NA, L, B): L: lifetime A B: EKBT(k, A, L), Ek(A, TA, Asubkey) B A: Ek(TA, Bsubkey) Optional mutual authentication Since timestamps are used, the hosts on which this protocol runs must provide both secure and synchronized clocks If initial shared keys are password-derived, protocol is no more secure than secrecy of such password or their resistance to password-guessing attack Asubkey and Bsubkey allow transfer of a key from A to B Lifetime is intended to allow A to re-use the ticket A creates new authenticator with new timestamp and same session key k

Properties

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Needham-Schroeder

important primarily for historical reasons Protocol

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
A T: A, B, NA T A: EKAT(NA, B, k, EKBT(k, A)) A B: EKBT(k, A) B A: Ek(NB) A B: Ek(NB-1)

Properties

The protocol provides A and B with a shared key k with key authentication (4) and (5) provide entity authentication of A to B. B to A can be obtained using redundancy check on NB upon decrypting message (4). If acceptable for A to re-use key k with B, A may securely cache (3) with k To prevent replay of (4), Ek(NA) should be appended to message (3), and (4)
should be replaced by Ek(NA1, NB) allowing A to verify Bs knowledge of k
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Needham-Schroeder vs. Kerberos

Kerberos lifetime parameter is not present in N-S In N-S, (2) (which corresponds to Kerberos ticket) is doubleencrypted authentication here employs nonce rather than timestamp since B has no way of knowing if k is fresh, should k ever be compromised, any party knowing it may both resend message (3) and compute a correct message (5) to impersonate A to B

This situation is ameliorated in Kerberos by the lifetime parameter which limits exposure to a fixed time interval.

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Otway-Rees protocol

Protocol

A B: M, A, B, EKAT(M, A, B, NA) M: Another nonce B T: M, A, B, EKAT(M, A, B, NA), EKBT(M, A, B, NB) T B: EKAT(k, NA), EKBT(k, NB) B A: EKAT(k, NA) Only 4 rounds Does not require timestamps Provides key authentication and key freshness but not entity authentication and key confirmation NA could be eliminated in (1), (2), and replaced by M in (3), (4) Could provide key confirmation and entity authentication (5 round) B A: EKAT(k, NA), Ek(NA, NB) A B: Ek(NB)
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Properties

to recap
Server point-to-point key update Shamirs no-key protocol Kerberos Needham-Schroeder shared-key Otway-Rees none none KDC KDC KDC timestamp optional no yes no no messages 1-3 3 4 5 4

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Contents

Classification and framework Key transport based on symmetric encryption Key agreement based on symmetric techniques Key transport based on public-key encryption Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques Secret sharing Conference keying Analysis of key establishment protocols

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Key Agreement(Symmetric key encryption)

KDS is said to be j-secure if coalition of j or fewer users can do no better at computing the key shared by two than a party which guesses key without any pieces whatsoever Blom KDS bound: In any j-secure KDS(m-bit session key), secret data by each user must be at least m(j + 1) bits Bloms scheme

engineered to provide unconditional security against coalitions of a specified maximum size initial keying material assigned to each user allows computation of larger number of derived keys one per each other user derived keys of different user pairs are not statistically independent

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Contents

Classification and framework Key transport based on symmetric encryption Key agreement based on symmetric techniques Key transport based on public-key encryption Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques Secret sharing Conference keying Analysis of key establishment protocols

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Key Transport using PKC without signature

Needham-Schroeder
PB(k1, A) PA(k1, k2) PB(k2)

No signatures, Mutual authentication(key+entity), mutual key transport

Modified NS
PB(k1, A, r1)

PA(k2, r1, r2)

r2

eliminating third encryption

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Combining PK encryption and signature

Encrypting signed keys

A B: PB(k, tA, SA(B, k, tA)) Problem: Data for encryption is too large

Encrypting and signing separately

A B: PB(k, tA), SA(B, k, tA) Acceptable only if no information regarding plaintext data can be deduced from the signature

Signing encrypted keys

A B: tA, PB(A, k), SA(B, tA, PB(A, k)) Can provide mutual authentication with two messages(timestamps) or three messages(challenge-response)

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X.509 strong authentication protocols

Assurances of X.509 strong authentication

identity of A, and that the token received by B was constructed by A the token received by B was specifically intended for B; the token received by B has freshness the secrecy of the transferred key.

X.509 strong two-way authentication

DA=(tA, rA, B, data1, PB(k1)), DB=(tB, rB, A, rA, data2, PA(k2)), A B: certA, DA, SA(DA) B A: certB, DB, SB(DB)
Since the protocol does not specify inclusion of an identifier within the scope of the encryption PB within DA, one cannot guarantee that the signing party actually knows (or was the source of) plaintext key
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Comments

Hybrid Key Transport using PKE

Beller-Yacobi (4 pass)

Properties mutual authentication, explicit key authentication for applications where there is an imbalance in processing power between the
two parties identity of the weaker party remains concealed from eavesdroppers

Algorithm B A : certB = (IB, nB, GB) : certificate generated with RSA A B : PB(K) =K3 mod nB B A : EK(m, {0}t) : symmetric key encryption A B : EK((v, w), certA) : DSA signature with precomputation Comment To achieve mutual authentication, each party carry out at least one private-key
operation, and one or two public-key operations careful selection of two separate public-key schemes RSA public operation and ElGamal private-key operation are cheap
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Hybrid Key Transport using PKE

Beller-Yacobi (2 pass)

Algorithm

Properties: slightly weaker authentication assurances B obtains entity authentication of A and obtains a key K that A alone knows,
while A has key authentication with respect to B For A to obtain explicit key authentication of B, a third message may be added whereby B exhibits knowledge through use of K on a challenge or standard message (e.g., {0}t )

A precompute x, v = gx mod nS verify certB via PT(GB) compute (v, w) =SA(m, IB) send PB(v), Ev(certA, w) certA = (IA, uA, GA)

B select random challenge m send m, certB certB = (IB, nB, GB) recover v, set K = v verify certA, signature (v, w)

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Key Transport based on PKC

Sign required entity authentication #msg

basic PK encryption (1-pass)

Needham-Schroeder PK encrypting signed keys separate signing, encrypting signing encrypted keys X.509 (2-pass) timestamps X.509 (3-pass) random #s Beller-Yacobi (4-pass) Beller-Yacobi (2-pass)

no
no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

no
mutual data origin only data origin only data origin only mutual mutual mutual unilateral

1
3 1 1 1 2 3 4 2
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Contents

Classification and framework Key transport based on symmetric encryption Key agreement based on symmetric techniques Key transport based on public-key encryption Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques Secret sharing Conference keying Analysis of key establishment protocols

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Diffie-Hellman and ElGamal

Diffie-Hellman

Setup: prime p, generator g of Zp* gx mod p

gy mod p
gyx mod p

fixed exponent: zero-pass key agreement with special certificates Signature is required!

ElGamal one-pass key agreement

b is Bs secret key A B : gx mod p Shared key gxb Unilateral key authentication no entity authentication or key confirmation
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MTI/A0

Protocol

A B : gx mod p B A : gy mod p A: k = (gy)aPKbx = gya gbx = gya+bx B: k = (gx)bPKay

Properties

Message independent Secure against passive attacks only Provides mutual (implicit) key authentication but neither key confirmation nor entity authentication

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STS

Algorithm
gx mod p

gy mod p, Ek(SB(gy, gx))

Ek(SA(gx, gy))

Properties

Mutual entity authentication Mutual (explicit) key authentication

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Gunthers implicitly-certified ID-based PK

Algorithm

Summary: TTP creates an implicitly-certified, publicly-recoverable DH PK for A, and transfers to A the corresponding private key.

1. TTP selects p and g of Zp*, a random integer t, gcd(t, p 1) = 1 as its private key, and publishes its public key u = gt mod p 2. TTP assigns to each A DN IA and a random integer kA with gcd(kA, p1) = 1, then computes PA = gkA mod p
PA is As reconstruction public data, allowing other parties to compute PAa below.

3. T solves the following equation for a

h(IA) = tPA + kAa (mod p 1)

4. T securely transmits to A the pair (r, s) = (PA, a) (ElGamal signature on IA) 5. Any other party can then reconstruct As public key PAa(=gkA a ) by computing PAa = gh(IA) uPA mod p
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DH with Implicitly-certified keys

Algorithm

A B : IA, PA B A : IB, PB, (PA)y mod p A B : (PB)x mod p Shared key K = PAya PBxb

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Key Agreement (Asymmetric technique)

key authentication Diffie-Hellman ElGamal key agreement none unilateral entity authentication none none #msg 2 1

MTI/A0
Gunther STS

mutual-implicit
mutual-implicit mutual-implicit

none
none mutual

2
2 3

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Contents

Classification and framework Key transport based on symmetric encryption Key agreement based on symmetric techniques Key transport based on public-key encryption Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques Secret sharing Conference keying Analysis of key establishment protocols

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Secret Sharing

Motivation

To safeguard cryptographic keys from loss, desirable to create backups The greater the number of copies made, the greater the risk of security exposure; the smaller the number, the greater the risk that all are lost enhanced reliability without increased risk facilitate distributed trust or shared control for critical activities by gating the critical action on cooperation by t of n users. to start with a secret, and divide it into pieces called shares which are distributed amongst users such that the pooled shares of specific subsets of users allow reconstruction of the original secret may be viewed as a key pre-distribution technique, facilitating one-time key establishment, wherein the recovered key is pre-determined

Basic idea

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Secret Sharing

Trivial (n, n) scheme

S = Si Shouldnt split r bit key into r/t pieces

Threshold schemes

A (t, n) threshold scheme (t n) is a method by which a trusted party computes secret shares Si, 1 i n from an initial secret S and
securely distributes Si to user Pi such that the following is true: any t or more users who pool their shares may easily recover S but any group knowing only t 1 or fewer shares may not

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Secret Sharing

Shamirs threshold scheme

based on polynomial interpolation, and that a uni-variate polynomial y = f(x) of degree t 1 is uniquely defined by t points (xi, yi) Algorithm Setup: T begins with a secret integer S it wishes to distribute among n users.
T chooses a prime p, defines a0 = S, selects t1 random coefficients a1, , at1 defining the polynomial over Zp, f(x) = t1j=0 ajxj T computes Si = f(i) mod p for all i (1<=i<=n), and securely transfers the share Si to Pi

Pooling of shares: Group of t or more users pool shares, which provide t

distinct points allowing computation of ajs

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Secret Sharing

Properties

perfect: Given knowledge of any t 1 or fewer shares, the shared secret remain equally probable ideal: The size of one share is the size of the secret extendable for new users: New shares (for new users) may be computed and distributed without affecting shares of existing users. varying levels of control possible: Providing a single user with multiple shares bestows more control upon that individual no unproven assumptions

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Contents

Classification and framework Key transport based on symmetric encryption Key agreement based on symmetric techniques Key transport based on public-key encryption Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques Secret sharing Conference keying Analysis of key establishment protocols

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Conferencing Keying

A conference keying protocol is a generalization of two-party key establishment to provide three or more parties with a shared secret key Cliques, BD, TGDH, STR

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Contents

Classification and framework Key transport based on symmetric encryption Key agreement based on symmetric techniques Key transport based on public-key encryption Key agreement based on asymmetric techniques Secret sharing Conference keying Analysis of key establishment protocols

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Attack strategies and classic flaws

Intruder-in-the-middle

man-in-the-middle attack on unauthenticated DH Original protocol

1. A B : rA 2. B A : Ek(rA, rB) 3. A B : rB

Reflection attack

Attack
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. A E : rA E A : rA : Starting a new session A E : Ek(rA, rA) : Reply of (2) E A : Ek(rA, rA) : Reply of (1) A E : rA

Can be prevented by using two different keys k1 and k2 for encryption

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Attack strategies and classic flaws

Interleaving attacks

Flawed protocol
1. A B : rA 2. B A : rB, SB(rB, rA, A) 3. A B : rA, SA(rA, rB, B)

Attack
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. E B : rA B E : rB, SB(rB, rA, A) E A : rB A E : rA, SA(rA, rB, B) E B : rA, SA(rA, rB, B)

Due to symmetric messages (2), (3)

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Analysis methods

ad hoc and practical analysis (Provide heuristic security)

convincing arguments that any successful attack requires resource level greater than the resources of the perceived adversary May uncover protocol flaws establishing that a protocol is bad Subtle flaws in protocols typically escape ad hoc analysis

reducibility from hard problems

proving that any successful protocol attack leads directly to the ability to solve a well-studied reference problem provably secure protocol A challenge is to establish that all possible attacks have been taken into account, and can be equated to solving the identified reference problems

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Analysis methods

complexity-theoretic analysis

Model of computation is defined, and adversaries are modeled as having polynomial power. Security proof relative to the model is then constructed The existence of underlying cryptographic primitives with specified properties is typically assumed. An objective is to design cryptographic protocols which require the fewest cryptographic primitives, or the weakest assumptions. Polynomial attacks which are feasible under such a model may in practice be computationally infeasible Despite these issues, complexity-theoretic analysis is invaluable for formulating fundamental principles and confirming intuition.

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Analysis methods

information-theoretic analysis

mathematical proofs involving entropy relationships to prove protocols are unconditionally secure Adversaries are modeled to have unbounded computing resources not applicable to most practical schemes for several reasons many schemes can at best be computationally secure typically involve keys of impractically large size, or can only be used once

formal methods

logics of authentication (BAN), term re-writing systems, expert systems, and other methods combining algebraic and state-transition techniques help in finding flaws and redundancies in protocols the proofs provided are proofs within the specified formal system, and cannot be interpreted as absolute proofs of security Absence of discovered flaws does not imply the absence of flaws

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Thank You!

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