Microprocessor-Based Relays:

Implementation, Conflicts, and Corrective Actions

Steven V. Deases
AEP Station Engineer

Intro: Discussion Focus

Level: High-Level Topic Discussion Scope: Station Protection Questions: Reserve Questions until the Conclusion Time Limitation: Approximately 30 minutes total Prospective: AEPs Experiences

Intro: Discussion Focus

Structure: Implementation Strategy Conflicts Encountered Corrective Actions Topics: Engineering Processes SCADA Communications Commissioning Procedures

Intro: Presenters Background

Work Group: AEP Transmission Region Operations Texas Technical Support Engineering Station Equipment and Protection & Controls Job Functions: Application Engineering & Design Review Technical Aid to Field Personnel Project Coordination & Administrative Support Technical Training of Technicians and Engineers Process Improvement & Quality Control System Performance Analysis & Reporting

Microprocessor Technology

Evolution of Protection Devices

Electromechanical

Steady State

Microprocessor

Microprocessor Technology
Advantages
More sensitive and scalable Communication Options Fault Oscillography and SER data Better targeting and annunciation More reliable; failure alarm also included Advanced protection features all in one box Economical both Financially and Physically Shift in Thought: Digital Logic v. Circuitry More Complex Logical Systems Longer Commissioning Procedures Additional Training Requirements

Disadvantages

Engineering Processes
Engineering Aspects Affected: Standards Design Documentation Philosophy

Engineering Processes
Implementation Strategy: Develop internal Standard Schemes for Protection & Control using Microprocessor-based Relays that would replace existing Electromechanical Relays and phase them out These replacement schemes would be designed with a protection zone scope (Line, Bus, Transformer, etc.) The developed standards defined details such as: relay brand/model options general protection scheme with generic wiring relay panel plate configurations relay setting templates with predetermined logic

Engineering Processes
Documentation: The intent of the documentation was to communicate the standards to the design groups for implementation Application Guides were written which described What standard schemes were available Where the standard schemes were to be applied What kind of protection was intended The general relay setting philosophy CAD drawings with multiple layers were also developed to match the standard relay schemes

Engineering Processes
Conflicts Encountered: Despite the large effort in strategizing the implementation process, there still were several conflicts encountered:

Perpetual evolution of standards due to newly gained experiences

Design Interpretation of standards resulted in inconsistent implementation Lack of adequate communication and training of standards

Engineering Processes
Corrective Actions:
To combat these engineering problems, we created and adopted Design Module concept that specifically lays out the entire intended design package of protection for a specific station application E.g. 25MVA Power Xfmr w/ LV CB (Xfmr and LV Bus protection included)

Consistent Relay Setting Calculation Sheets Additional Training of how to use these tools and the philosophy intent Revision control of Standards

SCADA Communications

SCADA Communication Components: Relay RTU SCADA Master

SCADA Communications
Implementation Strategy:
Send all potentially necessary data points to RTU, then filter which were actually deemed necessary for Dispatchers to be sent to the SCADA Master Let local personnel decide which points the SCADA system are needed, configure the devices themselves, and commission the data path Use existing equipment and communication protocols when able

SCADA Communications
Conflicts Encountered:
Inconsistent amounts / types of data being sent to Dispatch Project Slowdown due to communication discussions on every project Little documentation of what was implemented Confusion regarding data identity due to lack of data point naming conventions SCADA Alarm Logging was not chronological

SCADA Communications
Corrective Actions:
RTU Point Assignment documentation Communication Configurations for relays & RTUs delivered by engineering Training of advanced commissioning techniques Convert RTUs and Communication Protocol

Hard Wired

Harris

DNP

Harris

DNP

DNP

Commissioning

Commissioning Aspects: Practices Procedures Troubleshooting

Commissioning
Implementation Strategy:
It was initially assumed that commissioning Microprocessor-based relays was essentially very similar to commissioning Electromechanical relays. Test each protection element individually while monitoring trip output. Technician can create his own test plan based on past electromechanical procedures.

Commissioning
Conflicts Encountered:
The Black Box phenomena: one device that performs multiple functions with several different outputs (trips, alarms, targets, annunciations, etc.) Element Testing vs. Functional Testing Those installing the scheme often asked, Whats the intent of the design? How should the scheme operate for this scenario? The procedure for troubleshooting a mis-operation or failed test is much different than that of an electromechanical relay scheme

Commissioning
Corrective Actions:
Commissioning Guides Automated Testing Procedures with Pre-determined Test Plans Design Intent Documents provided with each engineered job Logic Diagrams matching actual programmed internal logic New Training Program at New Training Facility

Lessons Learned
Process Improvements Re-engineering the process is sometimes needed Continual auditing of the process Specify Process Feedback Loops Identify Experts for Focus Groups Defined Time Interval for Revisions to take place Quality Control Adding quality analysts to team Strengthening peer-review ideals Workforce Solutions Invest in additional engineers, technicians, and support staff Invest in Training Programs