EAST TIMOR AND ISSUE OF POST CONFLICT STABILITY AND RECOVERY

Paubiakmang. S

Timor Island; East Timor

Introduction
Geography
Located in the eastern part of Timor, an island in the Indonesian archipelago. East Timor includes the enclave of Oecussi, which is located within West Timor (Indonesia). Australia; closest neighbor after Indonesia, 400 mi to the south

Cultural
The mixed Malay and Pacific Islander culture of the Timorese

Religion
Roman Catholic Catholic with local animist practice

Language
Constitution designates Portuguese and Tetum as official languages and English and Bahasa Indonesia as working language

Part I: Background of East Timor (1850 1975)

The Portuguese and Dutch made first contact with East Timor in the 16th century. The Portuguese colonize East Timor in 1520s. The Dutch control many of the surrounding island. Portugal and the Netherlands fought over the island until an 1860 treaty divided Timor, granting Portugal the eastern half of the island, western enclave of Oecussi, and the Dutch the western half. Imperial Japan occupied East Timor from 1942-45. 50,000 east timorese died during Japan occupation. In 1949 the Dutch gave its colonies in Dutch East colonies.

 In April1974, military coup in Lisbon. Portuguese announce their withdrawal for overseas territories. Sought establishment of provincial government and popular assembly to decide the future of East Timor. In 1975 the Portuguese withdrew from East Timor. Civil war broke out between those favoring independence and those favoring integration with Indonesia. Timorese Democratic Union Party (UDT) defeated by Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) On November 28, FRETILIN declared East Timor an independent state Indonesia militarily intervene and annexed it as its 27th province. UN never recognize the integration and call for Indonesian withdrawal.

Part II: Indonesia Occupation and Emergence of New Conflict (1976 -1999)
On January 13, 1976, Indonesia declare a provincial government. Indonesia claim it was acting to forestall civil strife in East Timor and to prevent the consolidation of power by the FRETILIN party. The Indonesian occupation of Timor was initially characterized by a program of brutal military repression. Beginning in the late 1980s, initiate programs to win the "hearts-and-minds" of the Timorese. Strict political repression maintained.

 Serious human rights continues-Santa Cruz massacre. Estimates of the number of Timorese who lost their range from 100,000 to 250,000. 1982 Indonesia proposed limited autonomy for East Timor. UN took initiative and talks was held between Indonesia and Portugal. In 1999, agreement was signed, both agreed the involvement of the Security Council to consult the desire of the East Timor.

Part III: UNAMET, INTERFET AND UNTEAT Intervention and Challenges/Issue of post conflict Security and Recovery (1999-2002)
UNMET established on July 11, 1999. On August 30 poll was conducted. 98 percentage of registered voters went to the poll. 78.5 % reject the propose autonomy. Security deteriorated following the poll, violence erupted after announcement of result. Pro integration militias, conducted organized, coordinated operations through population centers, ransacking towns and forcibly displacing hundreds..of. thousands of East Timorese to West Timor, and the hinterlands. In a three week, campaign, so called Operation Clean Sweep, Indonesian armed forces and locally organized militia executed hundreds, possibly thousands of East Timorese.

 East Timor provided fresh evidence of the limit of UN peacekeeping.

The Security Council cannot or will not forcefully intervene until catastrophe strikes, even when it has good reason to anticipate such catastrophe. UN failed to examine and anticipate the consequences of rejection of autonomy. There was a gross underestimation of resistance which the East Timor initiative would generate in Indonesia.

No provision of military component in UNAMET in a way is responsible to the catastrophic event. Australia and Portuguese demand for Security council action with Australia offer to lead the multinational force. On Sept 13, President Habibi convey his acceptance of Australian led peacekeeping force.

Formation of INTERFET and its Mission and Achievements

International Force, East Timor (INTERFET)established and deployed on Sept. Face passive resistance from militia. Free hand in securing east timor. The main challenge to INTERFET was not from the militia, but the retrieval of as many as 260,000 East Timorese forcibly transported to West Timor. Allowed the United Nations, through its UNAMET mission, to begin large-scale humanitarian relief to the shattered region. Help in convincing Indonesia of the futility; of attempting to hold East Timor in part or in full. On September 28 Indonesia agreed in principle, to transfer all authority over East Timor to the UN

Establishment of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTEAT)

On October 25, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) as an integrated, multi dimensional, peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the administration of East Timor during its transition to independence. Sergio Vieira de Mello appointed as transitional administrator. Hand over of command and military operations from INTERFET toUNTAET completed on February 28, 2000. UN exercises a free hand in East Timor, as the Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999) has effectively granted it absolute power, although it makes clear that the rationale for-that power is to give birth to a free-standing and democratic Timorese state. It is also empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority including the administration of justice. Office set up in Dili.

 UNTAET's mandate consists of the following elements:

To provide .security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor. To establish an .effective administration To assist in the development of civil and social services; To ensure the coordination, and delivery of humanitarian assistance/rehabilitation and development assistance. To support capacity building for self-government. To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.

The UNTEAT is not only helping the government, but act as a government itself. Sign treaties and issue postages. UN achieved a form of statehood in East Timor in the agreements with the financial institutions. The World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) was designated as the trustee of the reconstruction, trust fund for East Timor.

Issue faced by UNTEAT in post conflict Stability and Recovery

UNTEAT need to established from scratch. No pre-existing institution exist, all important standing structure destroyed. All book of law burned or stolen. Establishment of legal system required to device body of law for the country. The first statute the transitional administration passed was one that delineated its own authority and stipulated that Indonesian law would remain in force unless it conflicted with U.N. Human rights standards or with the UNTEAT mandate. The second new law set up a "National Consultative Council" to give the Timorese a say in the legislative process (although the transitional administrator remains free to ignore its advice). Other laws established a judicial system, a fiscal authority, a tax regime, a civil service, and a currency (U.S. dollars). Strohmeyer a counsel to the transitional administration said, "and what we're actually required to do, there's a huge gap, and we have to come to terms with that. He also pointed out the difference between the two missions by saying, "In Kosovo, we had judges, lawyers, prosecutors; the trouble was finding one who didn't have a Yugoslav past or a Serbian collaborator past. Here you don't have a single lawyer."

 UNTAET has been slow in providing jobs and housing and thus is becoming a genuine target of resentment in the region. New and increasing threat from pro Indonesian militia. Claim of establishing stronghold in East Timor. West Timor border became the most heavily guarded frontier in Southeast Asia. Another major problem is that the force that was destined to become East Timor's own army is in shambles. The UN mandate does not incorporate turning FALINTIL into a more professional force. East Timor definitely needs, to build up a defense structure in order hold its independence. Emergence of regional divide between Fikaru and Khalidi in . The split had serious implication for security institution. F-FDTL dominated by FALINTIL from Fikaru, PNTL by Khaladi officers. Competition among the two institution.

 Social dimension of Khalidi/Fikaru competetion in the rise of gang of unemployed and unskilled youth. Armed ethno regional conflict broke out. Violent tension pose a serious potential threat to internal peace, security and stability. UNTEATs face bureaucratic problems is that the peacekeeping division has neither the staff nor the experience to manage so massive and complex an operation. Nation-building, Compared to traditional peacekeeping is a much complicated and gradual process. It needs more than peace building.

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