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On Implementing Real-time Detection

Techniques in Future Network Access


Control

Engr. Arain, Adnan Ashraf


Mehran University of Engineering & Technology,
Pakistan
adnanlooking@ieee.

Ph.D. (Security Models of Wireless Sensor Networks-


06/09)
M.E. (Communication Systems & Networks-2004)
B.E. (Computer Systems Engineering-2003)

ICTTA’08, Damascus, 7th -11th


April, 2008
Agenda
Introduction of ideal network security/
access control
Potential threats to network access control
General pitfalls of existing “traditional
security techniques”
 The proposed network security technique
Real-time test results (pros & cons)
Future integration
Summary

2
Introduction of Ideal network
security
Fantastic 4s
Integrity
Authenticity
Confidentiality AUTHENTICATION

Availability FIREWALL (Client-Server) SPECIAL FILTERS (server)

BORDER ROUTER ANTIVIRUS (Client-Server)

DIRECT REGULAR
LOG MAINTENANCE
UPDATES FOR EACH
NEED BASE SERVICE `

ID and IP SENSORS ALERTS/ NOTIFICATIONS Host or Client

VPN DEVICES IPS (Host/Server)

IDS (Host/Server)
Fig 1. Ideal security perimeter

3
Potential threats to security
Bad 4s
Interception
Intrusion
Modification
Fabrication

4
Defense-in-depth (existing)
Border routers
Firewalls
IDS
IPS
VPN devices
Software services of DMZs
Server-side/ client-side web filters
Server-side/ client-side antivirus services

“Castel without gate is not the security


solution”
5
Defense-in-depth
(..continued)
AUTHENTICATION ALERTS/ NOTIFICATIONS

AVAILABIITY VPN DEVICES LOG MAINTENANCE INTEGRITY

DIRECT REGULAR
UPDATES FOR EACH

`
FIREWALL (Client-Server)
ANTIVIRUS (Client-Server)

IPS (Host/Server)

SECURITY ID and IP SENSORS


CONFIDENTIALITY

SPECIAL FILTERS (server) BORDER ROUTER

IDS (Host/Server)

Fig 2. Optimal requirements from a traditional


network

6
Defense-in-depth (exemplified by ‘antivirus
application’)

• General Pitfall of traditional


security
• Minimum synchronization

1 Gbps
Server farm

of network components/ AV-update

services due to individual/ Gigabit Switch


AV-update

independent solutions
• Higher traffic load due to bp
s
AV-update
10
recursive dictation from
M 0
0 M
10 Router bp
s
the core-servers for AV-update

10/ 100 Mbps

10/
administrating the

100
Switch AV-update
Switch

Mbp
network.

s
AV-update

• Non-modularized `
AV-update
`
`
component services due to Client Client
`

monopolization of
backdoors by the Fig 3. Updates in a traditional
manufacturer/ developer network

7 of the security devices/


application.
Proposed objectives
Maximizing synchronization among security
component services.

Modularizing the solution for potential


threats.

Minimizing the unnecessary traffic load

8
Switch with resident
virus updates

Proposed security solution Requires


NO
HELLOs?

• Firewall, secure routing


schemes, authentication
YES

mechanisms, antivirus HELLO


handshake

applications should be
logically, one entity. AV-HELLO
handshake

• Each of the component Frame for

services should be clearly


ACK error? NO
Authenticity

identified and run YES

separately. Check if
Request to
retransmit YES
retransmit
HELLOs?

• Routing, ACL, NO

cryptography, and likely Discard

resource consuming
MAC entry
& Report

services must be Fig 4. Switch-based


9 performed before the updates

arrival of the next packet


Implementation of the proposed
solution
Internet

• Switches does not


generate/ direct the DHCP

redundant traffic every


Authentication &
Corporate Access server
firewall server

time towards the core- AV datafiles AV-Client server 1 Gbps

server. Core Device Web server


Mail server

Distribution device 1
Distribution device 3

• Regular updates,

Mbps

100 Mbps
Distribution device 4.
Distribution device 2

100

100 Mbps
alerts, REQ/ACK, and log

100 Mbps
Flash update Flash update

are accessible to clients


Flash update

s
Flash update

0 Mbp

Mbps

ps
Switch 1 Switch x2

Mb
Mbp
at near-by locations.
10/ 10
Switch 30

10 0
10/ 10
Switch x1

100

10 /
1 0/
` ` `
`
Client 1-30 Clients 1-30
Clients 1-30 Clients 1-30

• Minimal sinkholes/ Fig 5. Proposed solution: Campus-


wide security perimeter
10 continuous pings/ hello
Implementation of the proposed..
(continue)
Internet

• Gives protection against


backdoors and trapdoors.
DHCP
Authentication &
Corporate Access server
firewall server

• Feasible in existing AV datafiles AV-Client server 1 Gbps


network infrastructures.
Core Device Web server
Mail server

• Technique was tested for Distribution device 1


Distribution device 3

500+ nodes in campus-

Mbps

100 Mbps
Distribution device 4.
Distribution device 2

wide network.

100

100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Flash update Flash update
Flash update

s
Flash update

0 Mbp

Mbps

ps
Switch 1 Switch x2

Mb
• Higher number of threats

Mbp
10/ 10
Switch 30

10 0
10/ 10
Switch x1

100

10 /
detected as compared to

1 0/
` ` `
`
traditional network Client 1-30
Clients 1-30 Clients 1-30
Clients 1-30

security threat. Fig 5. Proposed solution: Campus-


wide security perimeter (Repeat)
11
Test results of the proposed
network security technique

Almost 63% better Name of attacker


Total
Number
of attacks
Statistic of attacks (blocked)

2500 results
NUMBER OF THREATS DETECTED
DOS malware 50
T.N.P.M

8
P.N.P.M

16
TRADITIONAL
2000 UNIX viruses 44 8 8
PROPOSED

1500 Script malware 232 35 24

Worms 517 111 324


1000
Backdoors 3851 1477 2130
500

Trojans 3653 725 1461


0

e
s

ar
se

w
s
ru

Other malware 371 279 269


m

al
e

an
vi
ar

m
or
r

e
s
wa

ar
IX

oj
w

or
W

S
Tr
al

w
N

al

O
do
m

al
U

tm

er
ck

m
S

th
Ba
rip
O

er

Other OS malware 137 19 8

O
D

Sc

th
O

Total 8855 30.1% 47.9%

Fig 6 & 7. Traditional versus Proposed network security


techniques: Analysis and quantification of malicious codes in
the network (Tabular & Graph format)

12
Future extensions
UNDERGRAD PROJECTS

To develop APIs for CISCO/ Alcatel switches


to update an antivirus application/ firewall
policy by some GUI.

To re-write flash memory of network switches


in order to reserve memory dedicated for the
storage of updates/source in passive mode.

13
Conclusion
We discuss the true definition of “network
security perimeter” or “defense-in-depth”.

We present a hierarchical model with


logical separation between different
services to analyze the integration
possibility of components services.

We show that how synchronization among


network component services/ applications
may be achieved among clients in their
neighborhood core-servers, thus
14
minimizing the traffic load @ core-servers.
Conclusion (..continued)
By emulating the proposal we quantify the
results in a real-time network environment.

We compare the results of existing and


proposed security technique and found the
later one ‘better’.

We identify the possible extension to this


research work.

15
Acknowledgement

Department of network operations @


Mehran UET, Pakistan

Miss: Marvi Mussadiq (IT specialist,


UoSindh, Pakistan)

16
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17
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18  Glen Kunene, “Perimeter security ain't what it used to be, experts Say” Senior
Editor, DevX, www.devx.com/security/ Article/20472
Thanks
Q&A

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