eight | DISILUUSTON WITH BEMOCRACY right to have rg “Acts” decreed between 1965 and 1974, €lections for mayor, gover dent were suspended. Regime opponents were routinely arrested, “disappeared.” For the urban poor, howeve, citizenship was not Favela residents did not join protest demo The were consumed with the day-to-day struggle for survival concem was to prevent their children from "What does Brazilian democracy in the frst dec look ike from the viewpoint of the urban poor? Have the favela rei thei own view—been inchaded as fll citizens? Have their lives and com ties improved since the end of the dicta knowledge, and parti ‘underclas, it appears thatthe 20 years of political repress tary government have been replaced by more than 20 years of growl acy those in upscale communities, while Catacumba lacked even running water clectrcity, he replied, oe Tes not ike that, not at al, We litle people [gente ume have alot of patience. We do not compare ourselves to them...Even asa biter [odd jobber] I ive ‘much beer than anyene in my family back home. We ae not ina rush. After the Gratis in sn i ka he Men espe on during the time span of my longieudi- ion to democracy in 1985 and the new struggle. wela resident, these vast sea changes made little difference Jn many aspects of daly life and appeared to make some things worse even as others improved.a FAVELA {in Catacumba and now at the age of 74 lives in Padre intment with democracy to me as follows: never do anything. Atelee- they come to our community, hang up shang up a huge banner across one of the buildings; once the election is ove, they disappear and never return! in my studies reveal some polit parson vm follow-up question for those who responded affirmatively, we asked mest politically knowl of change? Just under aFAVELA (20s) 7 woxe who gave an . *helped.” Figure 8.x shows the comy erg es viewees ch government ot ten Of Perception ofthe orginal ricune 8.1 Perception of Various Levels of Government as Helpfil or Harmful ep revalent answer in all sgeneratons was that ther way—a governme ‘many, including Nilton, who was outraged that the government had lost control Profound problem of the city to the bandi compare your life during the mili dictatorship ended? What got better, stayed the same, oF got most frequently mentioned improvet public ras better now); hot hhad gotten worse. We did not ask them orruptior am, and Cronyism changes were linked to the return of a know! ‘We did find a much greater awareness of citizens’ rights than we found in the 1960s, ut when i came to exercising those rights, 69 percent reported feel~ ing more excluded than they had been during the dictatorship. Even faith inthe fora return to the pre-1964 telisin or cronyism—which 11S, OF government appointments ‘control under President José good government had eroded since the height of the dictatorship. Tn 1969, 61 percent of our sample thought "government tries to understand and c death of Tancredo Neves. solve the problems of people like ourselves"; while in 2001 and 2003 only ind dedication to the public although he was chosen by the con. percent thought so “Theoretically, the closer the level of government to the people, the more i jon responsive and helpful i shouldbe. To see whether this eld up, we asked: "In “ tie had lived, Brazilian democracy the past few years, hve you and people like yourself been by: the city council, the mayor/city agencies the govemor/ presidentfederal agencies and international develop the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, et.) The ms quent response from all three generations, as well as from the new sample, was that “goverament does not affect our lives atall’—regardless of————_— FAVELA fas] of elientetim is the legitimacy of | ‘over the poor majority cripples the govern: ey to work professionally, and weakens svial programs through poor performance and by diverted resources. all the old patronage system—even atthe height ofthe dictatorship atlewed some benefits to ow into favelas in exchange for voes, which were negotiated through the Residents ¢. This channel of favors to the poor has been increasingly cl 1 mid-198s, when drug lords began dominating the Resi "As Desmond Arias has shown i his recent work on eiminal networks, the drug dealers who sa ken over the Residents! Associations negotiate directly withthe cane venezes and “actives” the votes ofthe community, taking the spoils for chem the favelas does not protect the right to fond, the police are afraid to come out indows-—in a sense becoming the prisoners. in her book City of Wall Associations, they have ygness of the gangs to use the drug money—and the wi ‘way to the top. That is ase the faith the complicity of officials all jn democracy forall. How THe DRUG LORDS CONTROL THE VOTE “When I was in Ro forthe eo week prio tothe mayoral and city coun is tions in October 2008, I leamed jst how litle choice the faves electorate a) fave in the voting booth. Pong one ofthe worst create ro electoral dernona5f thet] had ever cen are the arrangements between the dug gang leaders and candidates. Pavel residents explained to me that one of the worst creat indePey dent voting inside te favelas wat that the drug dealers made dels with poi Citicombip, Rights, and Duties Tin terms of rights an ‘ight and freedoms, however, not ll is negative. The newly won freedom of speech was met sp tioned many those we interviewed as one the conjunto of Quitungo (2003) Maria Fernandes got her rights. Regard Fem rights. Regardless ofthe pros and eons I discus Soci ef ea nal ular oor i mer fa Nghe di oul at de comm Bee eee oe es aoe ate Dat easily happened in these US ite when te mobilization was ‘no one was paying attention was that things just “rolled along,” a it according to the origin ing riginal intent. The thing that could not be eroded was the feeling of in each person who part thing could make an participated, and nothing could persons go back to believing that their cause had no merit. rememberin each of the cerviews, virtually everyone we interviewed in cach of OISILLOSION WITH pewoceAcY (209) ‘Without the Fundamental rights ofa decent income, health, eduction and security, Riv urban poor wll contin as mere cogs in lea and regional politica machines being eased by new forms of clintelsm. The notions of “lack of citizenship” or “new citizenship" never gined much currency among the feds because thei iv- ‘ng conditions never permitted them the kosury Instead, other actors such at NGOs, political parses and academics wer the ones that had their to coin new terme for describing what infact continues tobe structural impediments ofall participa ‘tion [ofthe poor] in the decision-making proces for allocating public resources * describes the changes ‘meaning of citizenship as new demands are made that enlarge the scope of the concept, and new forms of exclusion, including exposure to lethal violence, ‘erode those guins. He contends that “the sites of insurgent citizenship are found at the in these processes of expansion and erosion.” ‘The democratically elected political leaders in assure al eitizens personal fey, decent py for ‘The legacy of division between masters ad slave transactions. Standing ia i ing les blatant, the expectation such deference still prevails. Many examples of this are recounted in the tobiography of Benedita da Silva, a black woman bor in the favela Praia do Pinto, who rose from community leader to positions on the city council, the national congress, and the senate. Later she became the vice-governor and then ‘governor of the State of Rio an secretary of social action dung the fist term of President Lula in or not favela residents are aware of their rights as citizens, they the bottom of the political as well asthe social and atthe urban poor are indifferent to injustice. The reason, does not translate into physical rage—or into politicalFAVELA ‘a prerogative of the privileged, and the poor are in no position ‘As one woman in Nova Brasilia said to me, “Janice, what can ‘only the policemen, but the judges and the politicians ‘way up there’ who look the other way and fill their pockets.” ‘This sense of impotence means that while favela residents have embraced the theory of democracy, in practice, democracy has not embraced them. ‘The Belief- Behavior Disconnect Despite the broken promize of citizenship and the feling that government has harmed more than helped, when it made any difference at all, the belief in the ideals of democracy took root among the urban poor—increasingly with each generation. ‘One striking example isthe degree to which the ideal of participatory democracy was embraced. In 1969 and again in 2001 we asked “should deci ‘or should all Brazilians partici razilian democracy literature that ideals within stigmatized groups. But to demonstrate that transformation. At the time of the dictatorship only 34 percent of the study participants believed that “all should participate.” Now, among the children and grandchildren, 8 and go percent respectively. Figure 8.2 below shows the progression ia shift in attitude. ‘This finding about the steady increase of belief in an engaged citizenry was reinforced by the responses of the 2003 random sample. Among this group, the percentage saying that “all Brazilians should participate” rose from 34 percent in 1969 to 81 percent in 2003, proving to my satisfaction that the value placed Oczna Imervieweet Original Imervionees rioune 8.2 Belief in Democra Ideals (6 agresing that “every Braz participate") comparing percents i 1969 and among the tee generations in an imited to the descendents of the people who partci- efficacy is all the more interesting in intentions of government. When asked. raiment tries to understand and solve the prob- percent said yes in 1969 and only 38 percent ing portrait is emerging that has not been mach h that participation can make a difference cally elected government. As I show later id tes of these politcal ideas is in political action, $o in political ation, So I wanted to look and levels of political parcpaton then and now. found that there n linear increase in participation as there isin belief participation, levels of political participation remain low. —————— FAYE tl Some of those who have been around for awhile, like Alaerte from Nova Brasilia, are surned off entirely by the futility of voting. Jong history of top-down polities ‘Most striking, however, were the low rat every group—with the single exception of Vout 2s Ee f Signa Peition? a 5 . 8 6 3 saree lowe “RT grea for he 3005 dom sample show snr paren bit isonly one of many forms of fea} of active engagement belies the high rates of enthusiasm for “all Brazilians participating” and “making a difference” reported above. Even the percentage who voted—the most frequent form of political participation—is much lower than would be expected given voting is mandatory for those 18 to comprovante de votasdo (proof of having «argo piblico (public employment) or to receive institution. Failure to vote in three consecutive elections results in the annulment of as found out the ard way when Twas ving in Bei without one. A possible explanation for such low voting rates might be that not voting {is regarded asa form of protest, But that is not convincing given the option of. casting a blank ballot, referred to as watar em brance (voting in white). The sense of disenfanchisement among the urban poor must be etreme for them to risk ‘exclusion from government jobs, schools, and other benefits simply by failing Knowing tha voting rates are notoriously low for young voters, I compared of those ages 16-24 with those 24 and older in response to the “Did you vote in the previous election?" Only one in ten (12 Younger group said yes, compared with about s in ten (47 percent) of ‘or older—but a 50 percent default rate on the most basic civic tion, yet they are the least politically engaged. This isthe most striking example of the overall finding here, which I call the “belie-behavior disconnect.” WHO PARTICIPATES IN WHAT? scape of political participation at the grassroots level is variegated to the time, place, and viewer. The high level of com8.3, Community-based partzipation ‘The four that rurmed out to be correct were: (1) males did p than females (although the gap di ‘The four that proved inlevant or inversely related to (2) race made no difference in levels of political participat favela in ‘opposed to a conjunto,lteamento, or diverse walks of life) demonstrated higher levels of politcal participation while those with more “bonding networks” ‘Those raised in South Zone favelas, such as Catacumba, in the city’s elite, tended toward greater political awareness andFAVELA ‘were aso less satisfied with their lives and more likely to perceive a lack of in their communities.” tuccessive generation, there is more evidence of self-blame and self-deprecation. This showed up clearly in response to our inter- ns about Participation (which revealed increasing alien- in the perceived failure to elect candidates who ring the dictatorship, when voting was merely a ‘memory, there was more faith in the capacity of the electorate than there is 4 Lack of confidence in candidate selection. (Increase inthe percent of saying that “Brazilians do not have the capacity to make wise clections for candidates”)