1.

G.R. No. 210761, June 28, 2016

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG;

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY
ITS VICE-PRESIDENTS, REDEN ALCANTARA AND ARNOLD DELA CRUZ, CENTER FOR
TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (CTUHR), REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR DAISY ARAGO, VIRGINIA FLORES AND VIOLETA
ESPIRITU, Petitioners, v. HON. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, AND PHILIPPINE HEALTH
INSURANCE CORPORATION (PHIC), Respondents,

SC HELD: The Separation of Powers doctrine, so fundamental in our system of government,

precludes this Court from encroaching on the powers and functions of an independent
constitutional body. Our participation in the audit process is limited to determining whether the
COA committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering its audit decisions. We will not overstep
the bounds of our jurisdiction.
Moreover, the alleged improprieties pertain to PhilHealth's manner of spending its funds, not to
the assailed act of raising the premium rates. While the alleged improprieties may constitute grave
abuse of discretion, it does not follow that PhilHealth gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
assailed circulars. The argument is a non sequitur.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

2.

G.R. No. 224302 February 21, 2017

HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, HON. DANILO S. CRUZ,

HON. BENJAMIN T. POZON, HON. SALVADOR V. TIMBANG, JR., and the INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP),Petitioners
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, HON. MICHAEL FREDERICK L. MUSNGI, HON. MA.
GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG, HON. DANILO S. SANDOVAL, HON. WILHELMINA B.
JORGE-WAGAN, HON. ROSANA FE ROMERO-MAGLAYA, HON. MERIANTHE PACITA M.
ZURAEK, HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, and HON. VICTORIA C. FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO,
Respondents

SC HELD: The 1987 Constitution itself, by creating the JBC and requiring that the President can
only appoint judges and Justices from the nominees submitted by the JBC, already sets in place
the mechanism to protect the appointment process from political pressure. By arbitrarily clustering
the nominees for appointment to the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice into separate short lists, the JBC influenced the appointment process and encroached on
the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and determine seniority in the said
court, beyond its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. As the Court pronounced in its Decision
dated November 29, 2016, the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit
the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she
considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the
end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid, and he,
not the JBC, determines the seniority of appointees to a collegiate court.

President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary
when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacancies for
the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino
merely maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential
constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37
qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of
the 1987 Constitution which requires the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees
submitted by the JBC for every vacancy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, except for its motion/prayer for intervention, which the Court
has now granted, the Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition of
the Ponente) and the Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29
November 2016) of the Judicial and Bar Council are DENIED for lack of merit.

3.

G.R. No. 211269, June 15, 2016

RUBEN E. TIU, Petitioner, v. HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, ACTING CHAIRPERSON OF THE

BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, HON. FRANKLIN JESUS BUCAYU, DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, HON. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, Respondents.

SC HELD: It has long been recognized that the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding
the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, demands the exclusive exercise by the
President of the constitutionally vested power. Stated otherwise, since the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution to act in person, he may not delegate the authority to pardon prisoners
under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which "essentially postulates that the heads of the
various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken
by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President
unless the President himself should disapprove such acts."

In sum, there being no unlawful restraint on petitioner's liberty, no relief under a writ of habeas
corpus can be granted to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

 4.

G.R. No. 179334 July 1, 2013

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT

ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, Respondents.

SC HELD: When a property is taken by the government for public use, jurisprudence clearly
provides for the remedies available to a landowner. The owner may recover his property if its
return is feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation
for the land taken. For failure of respondents to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for
a long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are estopped from assailing the power
of the government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised. What is
left to respondents is the right of compensation. The trial and appellate courts found that
respondents are entitled to compensation. The only issue left for determination is the propriety of
the amount awarded to respondents.

Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who
desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government." This rule holds true
when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property
owner who brings the action for compensatio

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the pet1t10n is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated July 31, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 77997 is MODIFIED, in that the valuation
of the subject property owned by respondents shall be F0.70 instead of ₱1,500.00 per square
meter, with interest at six percent ( 6o/o) per annum from the date of taking in 1940 instead of
March 17, 1995, until full payment.

5.

G.R. No. 203655, March 18, 2015

SM LAND, INC., Petitioner, v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

AND ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA, ESQ., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT
AND CEO OF BCDA,Respondents.

SC HELD: As to SMLI’s proposal security, suffice it to state that it is not covered by the clauses–
–hence will not be returned even if the competitive challenge is terminated––because SMLI
cannot be considered as a PSE within the context of the TOR and the JV Guidelines.

It must be emphasized that while an Original Proponent necessarily comes from the private
sector, the term “Private Sector Entity” has a definite meaning in the Swiss Challenge
procedure. Under the TOR, a “Private Sector Entity” means “the party/ies that shall have
submitted proposals in compliance with the requirements specified in Article V, Volume 1
of these TOR for the privatization and development of the property.”30On the other hand,
under the same document, an “Original Proponent” means “SMLI, whose unsolicited
proposal for the development and privatization of [the] subject Property through JV with
BCDA has been accepted by the latter, subject to certain conditions, and is now being
subjected to a competitive challenge.”

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court’s August 13, 2014 Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED. Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration is
accordingly DENIED with FINALITY.

6.

G.R. No. 212426 January 12, 2016

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR.,

SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H.
HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-
ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASIÑO, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, Respondents.

SC HELD: The power of judicial review specially refers to both the authority and the duty of this
Court to determine whether a branch or an instrumentality of government has acted beyond the
scope of the latter's constitutional powers. As articulated in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, the power of judicial review involves the power to resolve cases in which the
questions concern the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court exhaustively discussed this "moderating
power" as part of the system of checks and balances under the Constitution. In our fundamental
law, the role of the Court is to determine whether a branch of government has adhered to the
specific restrictions and limitations of the latter's power:

The concept of "executive agreement" is so well-entrenched in this Court's pronouncements on

the powers of the President. When the Court validated the concept of "executive agreement," it
did so with full knowledge of the Senate's role in concurring in treaties. It was aware of the
problematique of distinguishing when an international agreement needed Senate concurrence for
validity, and when it did not; and the Court continued to validate the existence of "executive
agreements" even after the 1987 Constitution. This follows a long line of similar decisions
upholding the power of the President to enter into an executive agreement.

Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the
legal mandate with which they are concluded. As culled from the afore-quoted deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted
scholars, executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation
of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements. They are concluded (1) to adjust the details of a
treaty; (2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; 2 or (3) in the exercise of
the President's independent powers under the Constitution. The raison d'etre of executive
agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petitions.

7.

G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016

JOSE M. ROY III, Petitioner, v. CHAIRPERSON TERESITA HERBOSA,THE SECURITIES

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, AND PHILILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY,Respondents.

SC HELD: The words "own and control," used to qualify the minimum Filipino participation in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, reflects the importance of Filipinos having both the
ability to influence the corporation through voting rights and economic benefits. In other
words, full ownership up to 60% of a public utility encompasses both control and economic
rights, both of which must stay in Filipino hands. Filipinos, who own 60% of the controlling
interest, must also own 60% of the economic interestin a public utility.
"Full beneficial ownership" found in the FIA-IRR is to be understood in the context of the entire
paragraph defining the term "Philippine national". Mere legal title is not enough to meet the
required Filipino equity, which means that it is not sufficient that a share is registered in the name
of a Filipino citizen or national, i.e., he should also have full beneficial ownership of the share. If
the voting right of a share held in the name of a Filipino citizen or national is assigned or
transferred to an alien, that share is not to be counted in the determination of the required Filipino
equity. In the same vein, if the dividends and other fruits and accessions of the share do not
accrue to a Filipino citizen or national, then that share is also to be excluded or not counted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DENIES the Petition and Petition-in-Intervention.