Bjork, R.A. (1994). Memory and metamemory ‘considerations inthe taining of humap beings. InJ. ‘Metcalfe and A. Shimamura (ils), Mesacogaiion Anowing abour Phowing (pp-185-208), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Memory and Metamemory Considerations in the ‘Training of Human Beings Robert A. Bjork ‘The convene of poral painting ar only tolerable in one who in good painter ithe only a ood portal painter be Is abody Tey 10 Secon a pine Sit and then appl) Your hiowedge to a special branch tt ot begin by lering what reed fr 4 sped Branch, OF youll becomes manners sb Singer Srgens “The mike we op Har fl into wating the obvious “Wari bad, St ‘ation istind. Dotchop down the ria forests horng much beter Yo ide I to fld the meaning int some ort of metaphor of maze, ou he and for dhe listener to haves jourmey to nd ‘ng In recent papers, Christina and Bjork (1991) and Schmidt ana Ber (1992) have argued that wainiog programs are often much less ef fective than they could be. A central part of the argument is that Individuals responsible for tining are often misled as to what a, and arent, eftective conditions of practice. Conditions thatenarie performance during wining are asuened imply or explicidy, to be the conditions of choice with respect to enhancing the goal of traning: namely long-term postraining performance. That assur tion, however, Is frequently questionable nd sometimes dramatically . trong. Manipulations that speed the rate of acquisition during trait ing can ful o support longterm postaining performance, while fther manipulations that appear to introduce dificultes for the leamer during taining can enhance postraining performance.RABE ‘The goal ofthe present chapter iso examine eo ether contib- ‘torso nonoptimal training (1) the learners own misteading of his for her progress and carent sate of knowledge during taining, and (2) nonopsimal relationships beeseen the conditions of raining and ‘the conditions that can be expected to prevail in the posuraining reakworld environment ‘Memory Considerations “The Goals of Training “The principal goals of a ypical waining program are to produce ‘optimal transfer of that traning to an anticipated postraining env ronment of some kind. With rare exceptions, then, the goals of {raining ae longterm goals. We would ike dhe knowledge ad hills sequired during training to be durable, not only inthe sense of surviving from the end of traning to later time when that know edge oral demanded ina realworid sting, butalso inthe sense ‘of suring periods of divas in the postraining environment itsel {An equally important longterm goal of taining is to produce a ‘mental representation of the knowledge or skill i question that allows for flexible acces to that knowledge or skill, We would like the leaner o be able to generalize appropriately, thats to beable to draw on what was leamed during training in order to perform ‘adequately in veaworld conditions that differ frorn the conditions ‘of taining, Veriying that some individual as ready acces to critical shils and knowlege in some standard siuation does not, unforu- rately, ensue that individual wil perform adequately ina different ‘station, or on altered versions ofthe tak in question. Even auper- ficial changes can disrupt performance marked Perceived similar iy, ofthe lack thereof, of new tsk o old tasks is crial factor in the transfer of taining (ee, eg, Gick & Holyoak, 1980). To the ‘extent feasible, a taining program should provide s learned repre: sentation that permits dhe learner to recognize when the knowledge And skils acquired during training are and are not applicable 1o new problens ‘Stated in terms of human memory, then, we would like a uaining program not oly to produce a stored representation ofthe targeted fa Memory and Weamemoy knowledge in long-term memory, but alo to yield a representation ‘hat remains accesible (recallabe) a8 time passes and contextual ‘ates change. In general, its explicit or conceptually drven process ing of information that we want to optimize, not implicit or sinus: driven processing (fr discussions ofthe dintnetion. see Richardson Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987; Roediger fe MeDermot, 1988; Schacter, 1987; Shimamura, 1986), and we want ‘© optimize the abiliy vo access knowledge and sil, not the ability ‘to judge whether knowledge or sills produced by someone else seem appropriate tothe situation, Such datinctons ae discussed further in the metamemory section of this chapter. Relevant Peculiartes ofthe Human a6 a Memory Device Torard achieving the gol of tinng cis important 16 remind ours of sme of he wa hat hua fr from mancnase ‘ecoding devices: We donot for example sore informal ont toogerm memories by making ay Ko eral recording ofthat information, ut rather, yang that new informa oat ne already know ~ that i othe information tat lea ext ta Sur tmemories The process fundamentally semantic nature sre information in terms of meaning os, dcined by to octane andelaonshisto other information nour memories For alla. tal purposes, ur capaci for ack worage ewe uninte ~soring information rather than wing up emory eae peas to erate opportune for adional orage avo apps Skat once new information ssoceslly mapped to exaing -svoviedgein longterm memory remains stored ifnot cesar ‘ccesbl, for an indie long penod of tne The process af acceing red iforaon given cern cvesako docs no corepond othe “payback ofa ypieal econdng dee ‘The ecieva of tote information fli, provable process as mae fren and coche thera Iarmaon ati ey ccesibeat one point inte, ona gen staan, snay be impose to eal anther pot in neon another sisaton. The information in our longterm memories ta and fot accesible at agen point in time heal dependent onthe ‘cs aalble tu not onl on ces hat exile te seteRAB for the information in question, but also on environmental, inter ‘petonal, mood sate, and body state cues ‘A final relevant peculiarity of human memory is thatthe act of retricving information is elf a potent learning event, Rather than tieing left im the same state it yas in prior © being recalled, the retrieved information becomes more recalable in the fore than it ‘would ave been without having ben accesed. In that sense, the act of etsevaisa “memory modifier” (Bjork, 1975) Asalearning event, in fac, tappear that a saceesful retsieval cn be considerably more potent han an addtional study opportunity, particularly in terms of facilitating longterm recall (see, eg, Gates, 1917, Hogan & Kinsch, 1971; Landayer & Bjork, 1978). Though not as relevant to the con- ‘cerns of tis chapter, there is also evidence that such positive effects ‘of prior recall on the later recall of she revived items can be accom panied by impaied retrieval of competing information, that i, of| ‘ther items associated to de sme cue or set of ees as the retieved items (for discusions of such retieval dynamics, see Anderson & Bjork, 1095; Bjork & Bjork, 1992) Tn very general way, then, cresting durable and flexible acces to critical information in memory i party a matter of achieving a cer- tain pe of encoding ofthat information, and partly @ matter of rating the retieval process On the encoding side, we would like the learner to achieve, for lack of beter word an understanding of the knowledge in question, defined as an encoding that is part of 2 broader framework of interrelated concepts and ideas Critical infor ‘mation needs to be multiply encoded, not bound to single sets of semantic oF situational cues, On the Fetival side, practicing the Actual production of the knowledge and procedures that sre the target of taining is esential: One chance to actually pion fasten, and inflate an inflatable life ext, for example, would be of more value —in terms ofthe Ukeihood that one could sewally perform {hat procedure correctly in an emergency —than the multitude of times any frequent flier has st on an airplane and been shown the proces by steward or stewardess. Similar to the argument for mul -nowiege and procedures na variety of stations that differ in the ‘oes they do and do not provide Memaryand Weamenon ‘The Need to introduce Difficulties for the Learner ‘What specific manipulations of training, then, are best able to foster the longterm goals of tining, whether stated in terms of measures ‘of posuraining performance or in terms of undesying memory rep. Fesentations? Attempting to answer that question in any detail would involve prescribing a mixture of desirable manipulations and there ‘would clearly be some disagreement among researchers a8 to what se of manipulations constitute the optimal mixtre. Any such pre- scription would alo need to be tailored to the specifics of a gen traning mission, Whatever the exact mauve of manipulations that ‘might tur out to be optima, however, one general characteristic Of {that mixture seems clear: It would introduce many more difficulties and challenges for the earner than are present fa routines, Recent surveysthe relevant research lteratites (seep (Cristina & Bjork, 191; Farr, 1987; Reder & Klay, 1998; Schmidt 4€ Bjork, 1992) leave no doubt that many ofthe moi effective mae nipulations of training — in terms of posctraining tctention and twansfer—share the property that they intcodce diffu forthe learner Some ofthe clearest examples of sich manipulation are the folowing. Varying the Condition of Practice thas now been demonstrated ina variety of ways and witha variety ‘of motor, verbal, and problem-solving tacks, that introducing varia ‘ion and/or unpredictability in the training environment causes dif ficulyy for the learner but enhancer longterm performance — Particularly the abi to transfer training to novel but related task vironments, Where several differing motorsmovement tasks are to be learned, for example, scheduling te practice tials on those tasks in random fashion, rather than blocking the trials by task type, has ‘been shown to impair perrormance during taining but enhance longterm performance (Shea & Morgan, 1979; Hall, Domingues 8 (Cavazos, 192). Analogous resuls have been obtained with problem solving tasks (eg, Rede, Charney, & Morgan, 1986). Silly, vary. ing the parameters ofaso-beleamed tak ~ by, for example, varying the speed or distince of a target impairs performance duringRAB taining but enhances postraining performance (eg, Catalano &e Kleiner, 1084; Kee & Booth, 1978), And the effect of increasing the ‘ares, pes, oF range of exercises or problems (eg, Carton & Wiegand, 1979; Gick& Holjoak, 1983; Hons & Cul, 1984) tend to exhibit the same general pate. Even varying the ineidental environmental conrexc in which learning sessions are sated hax bbcen shown to enhance longterm retention (Smith, Glenberg, & Bjork, 197: Smith & Rothkopf, 1984) Prosiding Cnetua!efrnce ‘Such ways of making the ttk environment more variable or unpre slictable can be considered one set ofa broader category of manip ‘ulaons that produce “contextual interference” (Battig, 1979), Other examples of contextual interference include designing or intrleay ling materials ob learned in away that creates, at least temporarily, imesference for the learner (eg. Mannes & Kinsch, 1987), and adding tothe task demands (eg, Batg, 1956; Langley & Zelaznik, 1984). Tm Mannes and Kintsch’s experiment, for example, subjects Ina to lear the content of a technical article (on industrial uses of microbes) after having first studied an outline chat was eter consi. tent with the organization ofthe article or inconsistent with that ‘organization ib provided the same information in ether cas), ‘The inconsistent condition impaired subjects verbatim recall and recognition ofthe article's content (compared to the consistent con stantially — compared wo the same number of tests administered at constant (and eater) delays Ttusaot the mision ofthe present chapter to put forth any detailed conjectures as to why each ofthe foregoing manipulations induces desirable encoding and/or retienl operations In a general way, seems safe to say thatin responding tothe difficulties and challenges induced by such manipulations the learners forced into more elab- orate encoding processes and more substanual and varied retrieval Processes. As Batig (1979) argued with respec to context ine Terence, and Schmidt and Bjork (1902) have argued more broadly ‘sch manipulations are likely to induce more “transfer appropeate processing” (Bransford, Franks, Mori, Stein, 197; Morris Brans- ford, & Franks, 1977), thas, processing that wll transfer to he postraining environment. For present purposes, however, he cen- teal point thatthe research picture is unambiguous A variety of ‘manipulaons that impede performance during training facilitate performance on the longterm Misperceptions of the Trainer 1 the research picture isso clear, why then are masted practice, execsive feedback, fixed conditions of training, and limited oppor. ‘nities for retrieval practice — among other nonproductive manip- ‘lations—bich common features of reabword taining programs? is tempting te argue that there should be more venues for inter~ action, and vehicle» of communication, between researchers and practitioners and that might be tue. More important than any un ‘derexporure to relevant research findings, however, i dhe fact that the pica trainers overexposed, 30 10 speak, to the day-to-day performance and evaluative reactions of his or her uainees. A trainer In effect. vulnerable w a ype of operant conditioning, where the feinforeing events are improvements in the performance and/or happiness of trainees. Such a conditioning proces, over ime, can act to shift the wainer toward manipulations thatinereate the rate of correct responding — that make the trainee’ life ear, s0 to speak Doing that, of course, wil mote the wainer away from introducing, the pes of desirable difculies summarized in the preceding section. ‘The tendency for instructors to be pushed toward uaining peor sgrams that maximize the performance or evaluative reaction oftheir trainees during s exacerbated by certain instiutonal characteristics thatare common in reabworld organizations. Fit, those responsible for taining are often themselves evaluated in terms of the perfor- mance and satstaction of thelr uinees during taining, oF at the ‘end of taining. Second, indvidoals with the day-today responsibilty for uaining often do not get a chance to observe the porttraining performance of the people they have uained: a wainee's ater suc cesses and alures tend w oceurin settings that are far removed from the orginal training environment, and from the trainer himeelf O¢ herself. Ie isalso rarely the case tha systematic measurements of post ‘aining on-hejob performance are even collected, let alone ro- vided 1 a uainer ata guide to what manipulations da and do not Achieve the postrsining goals of taining. And, finally, where re- Iesher or revaining programs exis, they are opically the concern individuals other than those tesponsibe for dhe orginal training,14 195, RRO Memoryand Weamenony Metamemory Considerations traces that vary om avnidimensional stag continsm — that past ‘experiences of differing duration and intensity leave impressions oF Azecond consideration in dhe taining of human beings, ang a8 of important ae the actual earning produced bya training program, is theentent to which tance gain a valid assessment oftheir own state of teaming or competence. Individuals who have illusions of com prehension or competence pose a greater hazard to themselves and others than do individuals who correctly assess that they lick some ‘requisite information or ski. The reading we ike of our own sate Of knowledge determines whether we sek further stay or practic, Gnhether me olunteer for certain jobs, whether we instill confidence in others and xo forth, In general chen, as argued by Jacoby, Bjork, and Kelley (1998), its as import educate subjecive experience as itis to educate objective experience. ‘As it tums out, tis not ast ose individuals responsible for tain- ing who are susceptible 12 being fooled by the level of performance fof trainees daring training, Recent revearch suggests hat the learner bimact or herself i susceptible othe same ype of inferential exo Rapid progress in the form of improved performance is reassuring to the learer, even though litle learning may be aking place, Inveresstruggling and making errors are distressing, even though [ubstanial earning may be taking place. Such a misreading of one's progress together wih the other (pes of misasessments dseused Eelam, can lead wainees to prefer les effective waining over more etfecve taining. Baddeley and Longman (1978), for extmple found that Brdsh posal workers who were taught a keyboard ski under massed practice (and les efficent) conditions actally were more sated with dhe taining than were workers taught under spaced-practice (and more efficient) conditions. Relevant Pecelarites of the Human as a Memory Device [At the soot of such problems is our misunderstanding of the com: plextes of our own temories, Human memory is multidimensional ic nulfaceted in waye that we apparently do not come to realine ‘mn ehe basis of the trials and erots of everday experience alone {Wesseem to peri in holding to kindof implicit assumption that tina we can and cannot real or recognize is governed by memory traces in the brain that ae ike footprints of differing eps in the sand, And such traces or footprint ave subject to blurting over time, becoming harder to read as function of retention interval and intervening events. From a research standpoint, any sich unidimensional dea, if ever plausible, is now preposterous. During the lat decade particularly, the research of behtioral scietists, neuroscientists, and clinicians, employing subject populations ranging from animals and children {amnesic palients snd normal adultshas yielded a picture of hus ‘temory tht is remarkably nulifaceved. In response to am array of ‘vidence of rarious pes tht implicate dfering procestes and pes ‘of memories, researchers have proposed a bewildering assortment of ‘overlapping. and nonoverlapping distinctions: shorcterm verse Tongstrm memory, semantic vers epitodic knowledge, declarative versus procedural Knowledge, atimulusdriven versus conceptually driven knowledge, explicit versus implicit memories, controlled ver ‘ss atomatic processing. and memory as ool vers memory a8, ‘object, to name a few ‘Whatever the resolution of the current terminological turmoil the {important point for present purposes i that one subjective or objec tive measure ofthe “strength” of a memory representation may not correlate with the “srengih” ofa different sibective or objective ‘measure. The research literature is now replete, for example, with 2 ‘aries of dramatic interactions of encoding condition and test cou dition on performance. Encoding ondliions or proceses that yl {good shortteem performance can fil to spport longer perfor ‘mance assessed above. Encoding conditions /procenes that faci tate later recognition may not support later recall, and vice vers ‘And inital conditions of exposure that do and do not prime perfor: mance on indiest measures of performance, such 3 percept identification or word-ragment completion, ean differ markedly from de conditions that fata performance on direct measures, ‘such a8 recall and recognition (fr some suiking examples, see Roe diger & Blaxion, 1987; fora review see Richardsom Kiavebn & Bjork, 1988)16 RAGer Misperceptons of the Learner: Using One Index to Predict Another Failing to understand the mulifaceted nature of human memory opens the learner toa variety of misassessments of his of her state of ‘rrowledge during taining, As mentioned already, the learner may ‘be footed by his or heron stcceses during taining, Manipulations sch a blocking practic by subtask, providing continuous feedback {uring raining ana xing the conditions of practice act ike crutches that aril support performance during taining. When those ‘crutches ate absent in the postining environment, performance collapres. The leamer, however, will Qpically lack the perspective land experience to realize that he of she hat not yet achieved the level of learning demanded by the postaining envizonment. Con- sere, the erors and confusion caused during training by spaced practice, infrequent feedback, and variations in the tsk or task e® sonment can lead trainees to underestimate their own state of learning and comprehension ‘Ata somewhat oversimplified level of analy sch misasesoments arse at function of trainees observing their own objective perfor. mance during waining. They then astime, implicitly or explicitly, “hat successes predict future successes and falures predict future failures In effect, the learner telies too heavily on an unreliable index — ene cursenteate of access toa correct anewer or procedure ‘asa measure ofthe extent to which learning in broader sense has beet achieved ‘Asa overall generalization fsom all of our past experiences, of course eae of feieving rome procedure or information des pro- vide 4 meanire of how well that procedure o: information is regis. tered in-memory. The problem i that there are multple fleterminants of speed or ease of rericval, only some of which are commensurate with degree of learning The pe of taining “crutches” mentioned above inereates the speed and probability of reuziewal va such mechanisms as constraining te posible responses, ‘ulpingretreral cues, and taping sortierm memory — hati, processes different from those tht might tral build the longterm representation of some procedure or knowledge. Apparently, how: fever, we lack the pe of understanding of our own memories that 1 Meany and Metemany ‘would permit us to distinguish between the diferent sources of re: teva speed or probability. ‘Arecent experiment by Kelley and Lindsay (1993) serves asa good istration ofthat point. Using a general knowledge test, Kelley and Lindsay found, not surprisingly, that subject's confidence inthe cor recinessof agen answer ineeased asa function of how rapidly dhat answer was given. They azo found that hating subjects red ist of. answers prior to being given the general knowledge tet increased the speed with which those answers were given, and the subject? confidence in thote answers-—whether those answers were Fight or wrong. That is, fa closely elated but incorrect answer (eg. Hick- {0ck) to a given question (What was Buffalo Bills Inn name?) had ‘been read earlier, subjects gained anillasion of knowing: Such stud Jed incorrect answers were not only given more Fequenly, they were Riven more confident Speed or case of retuieval acces is only one pe of index or scare that ie subject to misimterpretaion. A wealth of recent ex perimental evidence ftom several research paradigms suggest the sense of familias of luency during the encoding of retrieval ‘ure can alto be a source of illusions of knowing or comprehending. [eder {1987, 1988), for example, found that she could alter aubjects feclingotknoving judgments simply by making certain words im a jgencrabinformation question more familiar. When key words i 4 ‘Question (sich as "golf "ard ‘par"in the question, What iste term In golf for scoring one under pas") were prefamilarzed by virtue ‘of having appeared on an earlier experimental task, subjects were then more likely to judge the quesuon as answerable Schwartz and Metcalfe (1992) and Reder and Rites (1992) have demonstrated that not only is ce familiarity a factor im wbjects feelingotbnoving judgmens, it may be a more important factor than target familiarity. Schwartz and Metcalfe had subjects study a list of unrelated cuetarget word pairs (uch as OAK TURTLE) and then later tested subject’ cued recall of the target words. When, subjects were unable to recall a given target (such a “TURTLE in Fesponse to is cue OAK"), they were asked to give a feeling of oowing judgment, which took the form of rating thei Ukelthood of being aie wo later recognize the correct target ftom among several alternatives With certain pps generabinforrsation questions suchRAB Judgments can be quite accurate (e4., Hart, 19672), dhough subject tend to be overconfident (fora review see Nelson &e Naren, 190), nd one theory is that itis recall of paral information —-a ft Jeter, for example, or whether the word is short or long — thats ‘he bass or such judgments Schwartz and Metalfe found, however, that prefimilariing eve words increased subjects fecling-of know ‘ng judgments without increasing the Likelihood of eecall ofthe t= {gets associated with those cues, or having an effect on the accuracy ‘of such judgments, whereas prefmlarzing the target words had no effect on subjects feling of knowing. Consistent with that pattern, Reder and Riter (1992) found that subjects” speeded judgments of whether they knew the answer to a given arithmetic probiem (sich 3513 mes 27) was more heal influenced by the frequency of piot fexponire to the terms of the problem than by the act degree of learning (as indexed by the frequency of prior exposures tothe intact problem ite) Tn terms of thei real-world implications, posible concern about ‘the foregoing results thatthe experimental sks employed may be 10 arifcial- and/or simple to be compared tothe types of tasks that are the rpial objects of training. However, an impressive series of ‘experiments by Arthur Glenberg,Willam Epstein, and thei collsb- orators (Epstein, Glenberg, & Bradley, 1984; Glenberg & Epstein, 15, 1987; Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein, Mori, 1987; Glenberg, Wilkinson, Se Epstein, 1982) does much to ally that concern. The base paradigm invones having subjects read expository text covering relatively technical content and ther rate their comprehension of ‘hat material — in term ofthe ieinood that they wil Inter be able to answer questions on that materi In general, dhe subjects were ‘poory calibrated: The correlations oftheir jadged comprehension their ater seta bility to anawer coreecy were surprisingly low. ‘Consistenewith the work of Reder (1987, 1988; Rede & Ritter, 1992) and Schwarte and Metealfe (1902; see also Metale, Schwart, & Josquim, 1998), subjects appear tobe vulnerable to sions of come pretension bad on the general familiarity of the domain in ques ‘Son. Glenberg and Epstein (1987), for example, found that subject judgments were apparently more influenced by their selfclassificn tio of their own level of expertise than by their actial comprehen son ofthe specif content of text pasage. Wihin a given domain, 199 Meary and Metamerny such as physics or music, level of expertise was actully inversely related to the calibration of comprehension! With a different para digm, Costermans, Lores, and Ansay (1992) also obtained results consitent with the idea that subjects use one index, their general familiarity with a knowledge domain, to predict another, the degree {owhich the answer toa specific question exists in the memories. Afinal important point, closely related to misreaing te meaning of subjective familiarity, i that the learner is subject to hindsight biases (Fischhoff, 1978). Once an answer is promi oF xslt is demonstrated, we appear unable 19 correctly asses the likelihood ‘that we could have provided that answer or solved that problem ‘ourselves. More specicaly we are subject to an “I knew tall along” fect, Given the nature of realwosldinsteuction and taining the implicationsof the hindsight effec are profound, In avariey of ways ‘we are putin the poston of judging our level of comprehension on the basis ofan exposure wo the information oF problem-solving pro cedure in question. Asa student, for exaimple, we make judgments fof what we know and do not kaow (and, hence, how we should allocate our study time) based om reading a text or listening tal Insuctor. Sueh judgments, however, contaminated as they ae by famliavty effect hindsight biases, and other factors —such ae the ‘ease of following a wel polished” lecture —are a poor bass for Jdging ones ability o produce an annwer or solve a problem, ‘The Need to Inuoduce Difficulties forthe Learner ‘One implication of such misperceptions of the learner i tha the conditions of taining should provide meaningful rather than mie leading subjective experiences. In designing training programs we are a rik of denying uainees the opportunity for certain ypes of Feedback that are esental to their achieving a valid astexsment of their curtent sate of knowledge ‘We can, in effect, inadvertently ruin the learner's subjective exe perience. Experiments by Jacoby and Kelley (1987) and Dunlosky and Nelo (1992; se algo Nelson & Dunlosiy, 1901) ihutrate that point. Jacoby and Kelley presented a numberof anagrams to subjects, and asked the subjects to rate the difficulty ofeach anagram in terms ofthe likelihood that other people could solve i. In one condition,RADA subjects had to first solve dhe anagram (eg. FSCAR 72777), and in another consion the anagram was presented together with it o- Tion GESCAR SCARF). Subjects ratings in the former condition, presumably based largely o entirely on their own subjective solution experience, wete considerably more accurate than subject ratings {nthe later condion, Being given the solution toa given anagram apparently ruined a subject's opportunity to experience de slution proces, which then forced them tose some les predictive “theory” fof what makes anageams more or les dificult to solve Dunlosky and Neon (1992) had subjects study a series of une Inted cue target word pairs (e,, WEED JURY). Dterisved among, the study trials were jugmentsoFlearning ( JOL) wals on which subjects were to judge their degree of learning ofa particular pair resented earlier Such JOL tals were immediate or delayed in terms fof when they followed the undy til of the pair to be judged, and they consisted of the cue alone (WEED 27) or the intact ve target pair (WEED JURY). Subjects were asked to predict the likelihood {cy would be able, 10 manuses later, o recall the target when given the cue. Such predictions were unreliable for ether ype of JOL trial administered immediately, were not much better on delayed cue target JOL trials and were very good on delayed cucalone JOL was (One iaterpreation is that i is only on the delayed evealone cals that subjects ge any kind of valid subjective experience at to their state of learning of2 given pair foram expansion ofthat argument, Se Speliman & Bjork, 1992). the immediate cuealone JOL uals ‘subjects can interpret ease of accens from shorticrm memory a dence of learnings on cuesarget JOL trials, either immediate oF elayed, subject are vlnerableto de effets of failarity ad hind sight ciscssed inthe preceding section, Te general, then, a major goal of tang should be to inform the learner's own subjective experience. People need to experience the ‘ype af reaing to which they wil later be subjected (ere Glenberg & Epstein, 1987), and, to the extent possible, questions embedded in tining ced to be phrased sch that the processes tapped nan ‘swering thowe queaions are the same proces chat support long term retention (se Begg, Df, Lalande, Melnick, k Santo, 1989) Stated more broadly, te conditions of tning need to be com Memory and Weamenon structed to reveal tthe subject what knowledge and procedures ae, and are not, uuly accessible under the types of conditions that con bbe expected to prevail inthe posttsining environment. Some of the ‘est ways to achieve that goa involve making fie seem more dfficl for the earner, Manipulations uch as varying the conditions of tein ing inducing contexiuatinterference,distibuting practice, ducing the frequency of augmented feedback, and using tests 3 learning events share the property that they acto better educate the learner's rubjectve experience: It may be necessary, however, to educate the leamer in another respect aswell. For people wo be receptive o the sypes of manipula tions of erining suggested herein, institutional nd individual ati tudes toward the meaning of errors and mistakes must change. Pope lesen by making and correcting mistakes. We have known at least since an influential paper by Estes (1985; see ako Cuddy fe Jacoby, 1982) hac it may be necesary to znduce Forgetting during ‘raining to enhance learning. Training conditions that prevent cet- tain mistake from happening (and give trainees 2 false optimism bout theese of comprehension and competence) candeferthoxe ‘mistakes © a postraining setting where the really master. That isan ‘specially itnportan consideration in certain job contexts, such as police work, sireaffic control, and nuclear plant operation, where Society cannot afford the kind of onsheob learning such mistakes ‘might entail Stated most strongly, when embarked on any sbxta learning enterprive we should probably find the absence, aot the presence, of ettors, mistake, and difficulies to be diresing —a Sigh that we are aot exposing ousses tothe kindr of conditions that most facilitate our learning, and our selFassessment of that learning ‘Should the Postraining Environment be Simulated ring Training? ‘A broad implication of the foregoing analyes that waning is re quendy nonoptimal because it fails t9 incorporate the vaya Sela, uncertainties, and other challenges the eamer can be ex ected o face n'a reabword jot setting of some kind, I wouRAB then, that optimizing raining maybe a simple matter —in principe, ifnot i practice — of simulating the postrsining environment dur ‘ng raining. Such an asumpton iclarly one atonae for spending ‘masive amounts of money on high Seliy simulators in the aieraft indusuy and elsewhere. ‘Atone level, it acems incontestable that the leamer should expe Fence conditions during taining that are analogous oF identical lose expected in the postaining envitoament- But to what degree sit necessary to simulate the physical and social details of realwoeld sewings in order to achieve dat end? A strong posion on that se Isstaked out by advocates of the “stuated learning” approach (see, 4, Greeno, Smith, & Moore, 1908; Lave & Wenger, 191). In that theoretical famework ti crital to situate the learner inthe cn text of application. The argument is that learning processes cannot ‘eseparated from contextual determinants of performance, pare- ularly social aspects of context, and that learning by abstraction — sin a lassroom — is ineffecual. That extreme position i the topic of considerable current debate among social sciemistsand educators (for an excellent review ofthe ities and relevant dat, see Reder & laws. 1993), Bat s it eally necessary to simulate the posteaining environment to induce processing that wil transfer to that environment [8 an intriguing! possbiiy chat the condions of learning should, ina sense, go beyond situated learning. Tht i it may be opuinal, trom both a memory and metamemory standpoint, 1 invaducedifficul ties of certain types that are not anticipated in the tealworld envi ronment. Introducing more vray thax one expectsto be present Inthe real worl, fo example, of redcing the anticipated frequency of augmented feedback, may rule in a more elaborated and inter alized representation of knowledge and skill Such a posibiliy suggested by the results of certain ofthe ex: periments on induced variability of practice cited earie. Shea and Morgan (1979), for example, fund that a random schedule of prac: een several different motor movement pattems — ae opposed to blocked practice on those patterns — not only produced much si petor wansfer wo a postwainng text carried out under random com ‘ions, but alo produced better wansfer to 4 posttaining tes me caricd out under blocked conditions That Shea and Morgan's re- ulls— which were obtained using relatively simple motor task in a Iaboratory environment may well generalize to real-world settings Issuggested by the renuls of arecentexperiment by Halletal (1982), ‘With the cooperation ofthe coaches ofthe varity baseball team at the California Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo, they arranged for extra batting practice tobe given under either blocked or random conditions. Twice a week for 6 weeks, two matched subsets of players were thrown 45 pitches—15 fst balls, 15 curve ball, and 15 change ‘upe-— under blocked or random conditions Players in the blocked ‘ondiion got those pitches blocked by ype, whereas successive pitcher in the random condition were determined by a random Schedule, At the end of those 6 weeks, two transfer tests were admin {stered, the fst under random conditions and the second under blocked conditions AS in Shea and Morgan's experiment, random practice prodaced beter transfer to blocked as well as random con ‘Sidons than did blocked practice. Using Syearold and T2yearcold children as subjects, Kerr and ‘Booth (1978) obtained analogous results with a somewhat different paradigm. The tsk involved throwing miniature beanbags undet- handed ata 4 inch by 4 inch target on the floor. In the case of the Syearold children, one group was given training ata fixed distance (819, while another group ws piven the sme number of uaining, tual haf a¢ 2 fe and half at 4, (but mixed acros eas). On a postrsining ranser test carried out at 3 fe distance, the group that practiced at 2 and 4 f but never 3t $f, performed beter thas did the group that practiced atthe criterion distance! With the same procedure, but withthe ditance increased by afoot, the outcome tras the same for 12-year-old subjects Results of the foregoing pe suggest that certain benefits that accrue from contending with variation and unpredictability may out weigh the benefits of having an exact match of the taining and postirtning task environments. Another important consideration ‘may argue agains constraining the training envionment to be the sume as the anticipated postraining environment: It may not be ‘optimal eo “contexte” the learning process, even within the om text tha isthe target of training. The problem is twofold, On thePn RA fone hand, xing environmental and tsk conditions during wining, whether those conditions correspond tothe posuraining target cot {ext oF not, may reduce the frequency ofthe types of desirable pro- cesing induced by variation. On the other hang, the environmental, social, and tak characteristics of any given job environment are not all at predicuble. Equipment, physical seuings, procedures, and ‘coworkers usally fer across locations, or change with time. And ‘emergencies and other unusual event ar, ainostby definition, hard to predict. [tis in sich special cicumstances tha the rik of having contextualized taining maybe greatest. fe want people to respond ‘optimally to wnantcipated norel condivons, such as emergencies and/or unique conditions of some other pe, the evidence sum- ‘marine in thischapter suggests chat we do Not want to have trained those people under fixed conditions. ‘Such sues are obvi crucial in the complex busines of opti ining the design of suitors, Comparisons of high ides (and igh | os) simulators 0 simpler (and lower cost) simulators have often failed to demonstrat that high idelityfaciliateslearing.Ithasbeen argued that high fidelity can even be detrimental eaey in learning by providing cues and complexities that are confusing in the eatly stages of learning (Andrews, 1988). Consistent with the theme ofthis chapter, it could also be argued that there ae some benefits of not providing every ell and wins present in the realworld apparatus Simulators that require the leaner to subsiute imager for external tes as 4 means of Keeping Wack of the state of the system, for ‘example, might facilitate higher levels of learning "To argue that high Fidelity is never necessary in a smalator is easly unvarranted theoretically and empirically Research wih ait= craft simulators has demonstrated that high fidelity can be very in portant for certain aspects of performance. But overall, as Patick (1992) has argued, the mostimportant determiner of transfer islikely ‘o be psychological Fidelity, not engineering fidelity. An extension of ‘that argument may be the bes single answer tothe question raised atthe startof dissection. Iisnot the nominal overlap of the taining Sra reabworld environments that really mates, but, rather, the functional overlap. Our goal shouldbe to best exercise during tain i the pps of processing that performing at high level in the postraining environment will demand, emo and Meteor Concluding Comments (One implication of the considerations summarized in this chapter is {at intuition and standard practic are poor guides to uaining. The body of research on human cognitive processes, though far from fully developed, has grown tothe point where i provides far beter fulde. A second implication is that. a a guide to waining, research ‘on the leamer’s metacognitve processes is a important, and insep- arable fom, research on the objective consequences of tning, Acknowledgment ‘This chapter was written while the author, as a Visiting Scholar, enjoyed the support and hospitality ofthe Department of Psychology, Dartmouth CollegeAcknowledgment “This caper mas writen while the autor 888 Vising Seb, Bae trond pty fe Dera of ayo REFERENCES, Anderson MC. rk BA, press nin ng ‘con ind thortoch Car (LP Mion Reman. 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