THE LEO BAECK MEMORIAL LECTURE 31 p A CONFLICT OF MEMORIES? THE NEW GERMAN DEBATES | | ' | ABOUT THE “FINAL SOLUTION” BY SAUL FRIEDLANDER Leo Baeck Institute / New York / 1987Nea A CONFLICT OF MEMORIES? ‘THE NEW GERMAN DEBATES ABOUT THE “FINAL SOLUTION” By Saul Friedlander(OFFICES OF THE LEO BAECK INSTITUTE NEWYORK: 129 ast 78rd Sueet, New York, N.Y, 10021 LONDON: 4 Devonshire Sweet, London WIN 28H JERUSALEM: 88, Bustanai Suet, Jerusalem, Israel Obrouvesoven.a year and a hal after the beginning of the Garman historians: controversy, the “Historikersteit, the Ce question remains: what was the controversy really abou? Among those involved themselves, as among the observers, the ‘common argument has been that although the debate mani festly concerned the history of Nazism and its crimes, the real issues were political and the confrontation an essentially leological one, related to present-day German political options more than to history. In a way, history was but a pretext. Thus, on the Left, the explicit target was the revival of anew German nationalism within the context of global “neo- conservative” positions brought forth following the political changes of the early eighties. The conservatives argued that the Left started this historical controversy in order to regain, at least on the intellectual scene, the ideological hold it had steadily been losing since the mid-seventies. In both cases, therefore, the historical debate was presented asa means used by the other side towards political-ideological ends.! No doubt, the confrontation was in great part political- icological and is perceived as such by all concerne with the passage of ts |. However, e, one gets the impression that the very intensity of the debate and its highly emotional aspects asore Na Ths at emaly eal wo ha of he Hate diced om November intent, ome se minor wang ot eres asstemmed from another source too. I would argue that the manifest historiographical issue was possibly no less real thag the political one; it was defined in the sub-title of the fing major collection of articles relating to the “Historikerstrei¢' published in West Germany in the summer of 1987: ‘Ty. Documentation about the Controversy concerning the Uniqueness of the National-Socialist Extermination of the Jews. This question had obviously been debated, over the decades since the end of the war, in numerous scholarly meetings and it sporadically appeared on the public scene too, but it had never been openly discussed in the terms which came to the fore during the “Historikerstreit”. One could not escape the impression that, this time, some overall consensus - and not merely technical-historiographical issues - was partly being put in question, on a grand scale. Hence, the exchanges and the attention which they attracted both within and outside of West Germany took on an unusual degree of intensity, even beyond professional circles. The debate about history was a debate about the shape of the past in terms of public memory and national identity. mn order to grasp the essentials of this reevaluation, I shall tty first to define the elements of the traditional historical epresentation being questioned, then o the challenge and, finally, I shall consi the new approaches in terms of public uutline some aspects of ider the implications of memory. some common understanding was established concerning the place and interpretation of Nazi crimes, from the end of the war on. This was hardly due to the “injunctions” of the victors, but essentially to the very evidence brought forth not only by the testimonies of perpetrators and surviving victims, but by the overwhelming mass of documents collected with the collapse of the Third Reich. This evidence did not only serveasa basis for the immediate post-war tials; it established the global attitude towards Nazism, at least on the official evel, among a growing section of the German population and among the majority of historians. In that sense, the accepted representation dealt with historical responsibility, with the nature of Nazi crimesand, ina more complex way, itimplied a certain approach to the study of the Nazi period as such. 1. On historical responsibility It should be clearly stated that the issue here concerns essentially Nazi annihilation policies and, incidentally, that of the unleashing of World War Hand the attack on the Soviet Union. Indeed, these issues remained, for several decades, the core elements in the representation of the criminality of the Hitler regime. If we stay at this global level, and particularly at that of Nazi annihilation policies, the problem of historical responsibility, within the waditional image, is based on the identification and interaction of three collective actors: perpetrators, bystanders and victims. In itself, this basic framework comprised at least two different approaches, both of which formed the basis for converging interpretations of Nazism among German and non-German historians and political scientists, from the early Sixties on. The first of these approaches, which could be called “the liberal view" of the Nazi period, to use the terminology coined by Geoffrey Barraclough in a well-known series of articles Published in the New York Review of Books in 1972, was Tepresented by such historians and political scientists as Hajo Holborn, Karl-Dietrich Bracher, Walter Hofer and George Mosse, to name but a few. It emphasises the ideological a\ sisical and criminal dimensions of Poth destruction of the cereoctade Nach preps sate COM TVET OCY and of terror spn. ean enemy he FEOF ea cre coreg A Lebensraum”, racial policies and eet areesle ipgainst the Jews. 29 well as other massive el et minal of te stem. 1 is gieraly exes Sapte the teres of toralitarianton with pres eet gondernrg”. From this point of view, rr exantiatty wnderstood as political and Ae ocak evince from the Western liberal model. ty ern ge wes that of ener Liberal democracy. engin ss wets she “ieral” reeset istenical responsibility, the perpevrauns are clearly identified: Hitler himself, such Perrenainns as the 9S. the Nazi Party and its periphery, aaretane ite bateaucratic instruments, etc. The bystanders ad here we ate dealing, with the German scene only — Frelode German seciety at large, with limited exceptions, a eeiery widely iengnegnated with prejudice on the one hand ad inereasingly enthusiastic adherence to the “Volksgemnein- Seat” ideal om the other. These bystanders are characterised, during the Nazi petied and particularly during the war, by partial knowledge of the crimes committed and by more or Tess susained indifference and passivity * The victims range from political oxgnmenis imyniemed in concentration canps, carsiers of Mereday dincaes and mentally ill people killed in the uthanasia® program, Gypsies, Slavs and other victirnised 07mg, wo the very ultimate category: the Jews. Within this famewe ation be ink, there is no opacity as to the inter- een yeryerat ie bystanders and victims, By their ne et iletenc (with the exception of conn lint dy Nemes, 1 and oppeniion to the nines of 1941), the ted the task of the perpetrators, as Ah tices wo their most extseme the reactions of the populace the victims, {he vicuims, there iste they could ntermsof sell-perception within contemporary West German Imray, this narrative implies the recogniucn of 2 basic we tonical responsibility both anchored in the pre-Hitler pat sett naving found its expression inthe events which accusted anding the Third Reich. ‘The overall background for the saris may well be found im various tends in Eusopcan ico, but the immediate supporting system is irra rooted i eran soil. The perpetrators and the bystanders are part iH German society. After the war, this representation shaped Oltcial German memory, as well as Western memory in general. It had, for sure, its functional importance for the eitdefinition of the new German democracy as entirely distinct from and opposed to the previous systern. “The acceptance of such a representation of the immediate past and the responsibility it entailed were clearly expressed from the carly years of the Federal Republic to President Richard von Weirsacker's May 1983 Bundestag speech. “The structuralist approach to the history of the Third Reich, born from traditional left wing interpretations and the new left historiography of the Sixties, differson many counts from the traditional “liberal” vision. Its initial theoretical frame work is essentially that of fascism. This approach also refers “Sonderweg”, but puts much greater emphasis on the comtinuity of social structures, which offered the necessary breeding ground for the rise and development of Nazism. structures which, more often than not, were deemed as still existing within the Federal Republic. This left-wing ques- tioning of the liberal image has put much stress on the dynamics of institutions and on the relatively secondary importance of ideology and personalities within the Nazi system, including Adolf Hitler himself, whatever essential symbolic role the myth of the “Fabrer” may have fulfilled. “This mode of historiographical interpretation of the Nazi system offered an explanation of the “Final Solution” in terins quite different from the liberal approach: if ideology and stage-by-stage progression in the persecution of the Jews were essential aspects of the first representation, here we are faced with the dynamics of political rhetoric leading hap- 7on results, or with the no less. bj to unforeseen Tes! " ind harandly to ompeting institutions fostering what Hang raction OF ey process of “cumulative radicalization ment leads towards the mist Mommesen called nore or less chaotic developn extreme results. However, if one focusses on the problem of historical ‘tlewene from the liberal one, although some nuances have ¢o be pointed out brietly “The same three collective actors we encountered in the first presentation interact equally within the stracturalist view of the Nazi epoch, The difference lies in the fact that, in the structuralist view, there is a whole array of almost indepen. dent sub-groups within the wide category of perpetrators; these sub-groups interact with one another in such a way that ‘becomes extremely difficult to pinpoint where the responsi: bility lies, as each partial decision flows from some partially perceived context. One may argue that such a view of the Perpetrators considerably widens the field of responsibility and encompasses many more elements of German society within the tortuous criminal processes; on the other hand, it bolsters the argument that the very fluid and nebulous aspect ef time processes made any kind of opposition extremely domuit 18 amy case, we are faced with a somewhat para- Kal image of mass murder ofa totally unprecedented kind being enacted without an without any clear representation of a locus of responsibility sorstenraton of primary ons involy “ collaboration of tha eas Mhatever the relative passivity or Population. bath apenas diverse strata of the ‘German On the fundamen ot hes just described would still focus trators as a Gorn the roots of which were to be i ah both cases, some kind of 2. On the nature of the crimes “This issue is closely linked to the previous one: the problem of responsibility became so central for the traditional tepse gentation because the nature of the crimes perpetrated by the Nazi regime was considered as historically unprecedented No doubt, comparisons were established from the very end of the war between Nazi crimes and those of other national or ideological groups, particularly within recent history. The theory of totalitarianism systematically compared the crimes of Nazism and those of Stalinism, whereas the concept of fascism induced vaguer but nonetheless explicit comparisons between the criminal policies of fascist regimes Although both “totalitarianism” and “fascism” led to generalizations which could have eliminated the unprece- dented aspect of Nazi crimes (in the fifties this was the tendency of the theories of totalitarianism and in the late sixties and carly seventies, that of the theories of fascism) itean be safely stated, that, on the whole, these comparisons did not raise any fundamental controversies and were presented in a way which, on the one hand, aimed at conceptualization and, on the other, ultimately maintained the Nazi case as the nec plus ultra, in relation to which the other crimes were measured. “The Nazi regime", wrote Hannah Arendt in “Questions of Moral Philosophy", “from a moral and not a social point of view, was much more extreme than the Stalin regime at its worst." Moreover, many historians considered all along, that Nazi crimes could not be incorporated within comparative categories and they defended, as they still do, the thesis of the historical “originality” of the Third Reich in this domain,” Whatever the case may be, as far as these various approaches are concerned, the comparisons were not linked at least not in academic literature? - to a reevaluation of historical responsibility 3. The overall perspective on the Nazi era Finally, within the traditional representation of the Nazi ¢poch, an immense historiographical production dealt with almost every conceivable aspect of those twelve years. None- theless, in the overall representations of the period, the Predominance of the political dimension gave these accountssome kind of global similarity, whatever 4 concerning the analysis of the internal dynamic The importance given in the sixties and eg 5s mrarauctural factors was nonethelen (atl even politica outcome and in that sense, wecan spay inf 9 the a“ primacy of politics”. Such choice of focus was mnt Ong of by any kind of taboos or moralistic preoccupations 4 perception ofthe massive political nature of the eve plausibility ofthis perspective, in terms of whar cntS2athe thecrucialaspecs of National-Socialism, whatever eo enceof theoretical and methodological approachea sill. been (let us remember that the most convincing nent Be interpretations of Nazism, those of Tim Mason, for nt Girmly established the notion of the “primacy of pea" thus adhering to the non-orthodox Marxist i Politics, inerpre the Thitivand to Karl Marx’sown theory of "Boo inieser ene butby ine tations of ;Partismy") Moreover, the “uaditional” views, be it in their « tionalist” form or in the presentation of structurally ori models had usually — at least implicitly — set the cna. Uwophic/criminal dimensions at center stage. This doa. a that history was considered from the known outset vents backwards, but authors as well as readers tacitly agreed that the sense of those 1 of those twelve years was to be Senate seo /e years was to be found in its The historical a their basic diffe the thee: 1 for in any alitarianism” to relativize the conceiva Mam inde peakaltne ce eable Way. In that sense, ene enon non ‘ablishment of some kind of moral te standing ide differences, nding ideological and historiographical Wis in relay conse ae this new chalet 2b@l Consens nges, us that we may now DQ OO —aii 1 The New Challenges “The complenity of the issue of the ew challenges does stem re tetrom the fact thatwearefacing twoapprontesehils in pavairely opposed in terms of ideology and ul histones atieal agendas, but which, nonetheless, sant fom sone Frentical premises. ‘Acommon aspect 10 both approaches is to be found, ist of GIL in a presentation of the traditional historiography and public attitudes towards the Nazi petiog as being strongly Faluenced by the views of the victorious Allies, those of the political opponents of the Nari regime and particularly the Pnigrés. Hence, a kind of "Gegen-Mythos" (counter myth) or, in milder terms, “moralistic view" of these twelve years, had been established after the war and, as the argument goes, its basic tenets were still keeping their hold on the funda- mental historical representations of Nazism, in its scholarly form (at least in part), in its official expression, as well as in other public representations (textbooks, films, ete). Seen from this angle, this “Gegen-Mythos" or moralistic view of history, was partly compounded by taboos and by implicit limitations put on the questions asked of the historical evidence. On the basis of this assumption about the main- stream representation of the Third Reich, the challenge of the Eighties, seems to be an obvious imperative: the elimination of any kind of moralistic-pedagogic (volkspidagogisch) history, that is, in short, the historicization of this period, its representation as that of any other historical epoch. Four decades after the end of the Third Reich, itisargued, one may consider the Nazi past inn objective way, all the moreso because the very stability of West German democracy obviates the need for a functional counter-image. Thus, both con servative and liberal or left wing historians would, probably in their majority, agree to the necessity of reinserting the Navi period within a “normal” historical narrative. In both cases, it implies a confrontation with what was traditionaly con- sidered as the specific character of Nazism, that is, its crimesAtthat point, however, there is undoubtedly ways between the conservative an nd liberal left ing lori tOtiang As is well known by now, iMlustrated by the recent texts of Ernst Nolan And eroah, fruber or Joachim Fest, aims at questioning gh speci ar a monde, essentially, to contexvalige pet of historical responsibility and thereby to sole the in™ German identity within a wadivional national Th responsibility of the Nazis for their crimes is not denieg, aed the method of a wholesale comparison with ote: Dat committed under other regimes and in aii n different places aden 4 shift of the traditional points of reference. + the conservative J. The new approaches to historical responsibilty What attracted most of the attention in thedel the specificity of Nazi crimes was, obvious} exceptionality or non-exceptionality of Policies and particularly of the annihii Much less emphasis was put on the fact Konal position was equally challenged, that of the nature of Nazi aggression, Let me briefly deal with this point belore turning to the major issue of Nazi annihilations ate surrounding y, the issue of the Nazi extermination lation of the Jews, that another tradi. During the very same months which saw the development of the “‘Historikerstreit”, some West German publications among which the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung becamethe carers of a stream of interpretations presenting Hitler's {tack on the Soviet Union either as openly preventive or, at least as the result of an aggressive planing eajuivalen to that Of the Soviet side. In such a symmetrical situation, the Nae Ghslaught becamea matter of military preemption. tshall not cll at any length on Gunther Gillessen’s or Klaus Hilde. brand's positionson these issues, hut they representa context within which the more widely-known stand taken by Andreas Hillgruber can be better understood In the first part of his book, Zweierlei Untergang, the one which became the obj a Hect of major controversies, Andreas itu deals essentially with the sitaation in the Enern id 8 of the sof Germany in 1941/1985. Htonev, ane pattjmportant, deals with the aggreniee se pains Germany" Theat A ae tes Hiligruen as her point, no, pions of the rersnans trot, destruction of the newer" tothecrimes ot the Kazi ter0F regime, as these crimes were not Laown ig hen full scope during the war; they tather teuloat f airns onceived a long time previously by the enemy Gina Pon ever Germany would have done, theaim was todoncane Fieve, the Western Allies are associated with the Sevier This point has to be emphasized because it shows that even more than traditional anti-communism, some kind of nex rationalism is the source of such an historical representation responsibility for the course of the war as such. In fact, from such a viewpoint, the thesis of the “Nazi war of aggression” crumbles. However, even in Hillgruber’s text, the main issue became, indirectly, that of the annihilation policies. It is superfluous to reiterate the main arguments brought forth in the ftst part of Zweierlei Untergeng, tegarding the situation in the Eastern part of the Reich in 1911/45, Intentionaly or not, the author suggests by his descriptions and his explicit personal identification, a symetric framework of responsibility. The responsibility of the Nazis in extermi- nating their victims is certainly not denied, the less so since it is analysed in the second essay of the book, but itis, ina way, balanced against the responsibility of the Red Army for the crimes committed on German soil. Thus, instead of the three initial collective actors whom we identified in the traditional harrative, we are squarely presented here with four actors, now including two categories of perpetrators: the Nazisand, facing them, some mixed representation of Allied plans and Soviet behavior. Moreover, as mentioned, the author clearly identi- fies with the fighting units in the East, although he knows and writes — that their resistance allowed the continuation of Nazi exterminations. For the first time, within academic literature, the reader is presented with two contrary options: the aditional point of view, usually considered that of the 18acta anda “eaonal” point of view with which theau TEEEi Mtumasety idenaifies (whether this iMentificaras Pi ae ner aath Germany. of with some hary Europaens » Pres T points We ate back, it seems, at some hind of Ms: qafitional Wilhelmine nationalism, In fat. the doubling of the perpetrator image Ba ee Lind af doubling ofthe collective set Fiunznution and thes tothe transformation of the erstwhile crite eaplicat supporters of the Nazi system into victims of be Sones aod the Western Allies, not unlike, in their satierings tothe other victians, suchas, for instance. the Jews, One could ay that in this new narrative, both the perpetators and the victims are symmetrically doubled: there are two Spposite categories of victims, whereby part of the erstwhile Iestanders becomes the new category of victims. Such sym. snetry for Teng a basic staple of an image of the past = part of the West German population. essentially that of the consmporariesof the Third Reich. thus becamean elementof the learacd discourse. This move from the periphery to the ‘enter of the public scene is of no small significance. In Era Nolte’s texts, we move from symmetry to the frin; of a reversed representation of historical responsibility. The ‘Suval acor within the global historical context is now the Beith. The Bolshevik isthe original perpetrator of global RaghibGow in madern history the historical agent who fron into practice the visions of social therapy through aistaoon born with the rise of modernity. The Naris — EET Aicumnations are, again, certainly not denied, came ait tid to have merely copied the Bolsheviks — sedge Nolt's presentation, perpetrators who may have sesuish at the idca of being themselves potential annibilationism — § Fy Sones ronejabrsheft far Zetec eomot dis Exchange. 266 veh he "Historikerttit tg. Deno wir er Proves de “Defense ate a A ‘ie Zeit. Nicht : pifinde zeit gen auch 0 gecaton cher Em - 4 eet Fragestcltones Ser wh ‘mache sie "8 Dake oe rinende Zeit antaulen, Ase Bas en ap Ge ustosern Sache: ‘Hi OE seed om agit, die mich vengehen wi is “erga ne og, “HrstonsRersret ‘op. cits Pe a viptoas noch Historische ve nen ru wollen. Sat inet Deutsche For an a, Bria nih cengcben ‘alt al 9 die aw neue! jovisierang wi “Jenkbarc gern a9,“ ge ae on 8 28 ‘stelle 0 cht ante soe He ie ee Leh : he Auschwit®LEO BARCK MEMORIAL LECTURES, 1 (1958) Fite Bamberger Leo Bacck, the Man and the Hdew 2 (1989) Hans Kohn Heinrich Heine, the Man and the Myth Max Gruenewald Theology and History 4 (961) Hans Mongenthaut The Tragedy of German-Jewish Liberalism 5 (1962) Salo W. Baron World Dimensions of Jewish History 6 (1963) Robert Gordis Jewivh Learning and Jewish Existence, Retrospect and Prospect 7 (1964) Oscar Handliny Jews in the Culture of Maddle Europe 8 (1965) Gershom Scholem ter Benjamin 9 (1966) Gerson D, Coben Messianic Postures of Ashkenazi and Sephardi (Prior to Sabbathai Zev) sa 10 (1967) Nahum N. Glauer Beeck—Buber—Rosensweig Reading the Book of Job . 12 (1968) Johannes Uridil The Living Contribution of Jewish Pr " bution of Jewish Prague to Modern German Literature 72 (1969) Emit L. Fackenbeim Hermann Cohen—After Fifty Years 13 091 wast) Uriel Tal Religious and AnticReligious Roots of Modern ‘Anti-Semitism ys (2972). Peter Gay rene Berlun-Jewish Spirit. A Dogma in Search of Some Doubts q973)_Emnest Hamburger ee ews, Democracy and Weimar Germany 17 (974) Aloander Alums ‘Lea Baech and the Jewish Mystical Tradition js cag7a) Anbar A, Coben fs Thinking the Tremendum. Some Theological Implications of the Death-CamPs Samuel Sandinel ‘Leo Baeck on Christianity 20 (1976) Ismar Schorscty ‘On the History of the P Jew 21 (1977) George L. Mosse me Gores amd the German War ESPEN 1014-1918 gg (1978) Felix Gilbert Bis 19 (1979) political Judgment of the society's Image of the Jee alter Laquet The First News of 1gsd) Peter Loewenbers, . . as Walther Rathenat and Henry Kass! ee bbe Jew asa Modem S aman in Two Poll tau as (98 ane reat Pressureand Jewish Religions: German Poli Aesponse an the Z3th Genury § (19g2)_ Yoset Haye Yerushal #6 1989 Assimilation and Ra German Model 23 (1979) the Holocaust Toerian and the 38LEO BAECK MEMORIAL LECTURES 1 (1958) Fritz Bamberger Leo Bacck, the Man and the Idea 2 (1959) Hany Kohn Heinrich Heine, the Man and the Myth $ (1960) Max Gi Theology and History 4(1961) Hans Morgenthau The Tragedy of German: Jewish Liberalism 5 (1962) Salo W. Baron World Dimensions of Jewish History 6 (1963) Robert Gordis Jewish Learning and Jewish Existence, Retrospect and Prospect 7 (1964) Oscar Hand Jews in the Culture of Middle Europe 8 (1965) Gershom Scholem Walter Benjamin 9 (1966) Gerson D, Cohen Messianic Postures of Ashkenazi and Sephardim (Prior to Sabbathai Zevi) 10 (1967) Nahum N. Glaver Bacck—Buber—Rosen of Job 11 (1968) Johannes Uriidit The Living Contribution of Jewish Prague to Modern German Literature 12 (1969) Emil L. Fackenbeim Hermann Cohen—After Fifty Years renewald 'eig Reading the Book oa 13 (1970) 14 (1971) 15 (1972) 16 (1973) 17 (1974) 18 (1974) 19 (1975) 20 (1976) 21 (1977) 22 (1978) 29 (1979) 24 (1980) 25 (1981) 26 (1982) 27 (1983) Robert Weltsh Max Brod and his Age Usiel Tat Religious and 4 AnticSemitisn Pevet Gay The Berlin-Jewish Some Doubs, Emest Hamburger Jews, Democracy and Weimar Germany Alexander Aimann Leo Bacck and the Jewish Mystical Tradition Arthur A. Cohen Thinking the Tremendum. Some Theological Implications of the Death-Camps uel Sandmel Leo Baeck on Christianity Ismar Schorsch On the History of the Political Judgment of the Tew George L. Mosse The Jews and the German War Experience 1914-1918 Felix Gilbert Bismarckian Society's Image of the Jew Walter Laqueur The First News of the Holocaust Peter Loewenberg, Walther Rathenau and Henry Kissinger: The Jew a5 @ Modern Statesman in Two Political Cultures Michael Meyer German Political Pressure and Jewish Religious Response in the 19th Century inet yin Yerashale Qeanatation and Bacal Antemitism: The Iberian and the German Modet Fritz Stem ; 1933 Germany—Fifty Years Later mi-Religious Roots of Modern init. Dogmain Search of 2828 (1984) Pever Paret The Enemy WithinMax Liebermann as President of the Prussian Academy of Ants 29. (1985) Jakob J. Petuchowski On the Falidiy of Definitions 129 Bast Td Stivet New York, N.Y, 10021 AC$8.00 pet copy. 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