Christopher Tuplin Achaemenid Studies HISTORIA Einzel- schriften 99) Ni Franz Steiner Verlag StuttgartJ 2 19S lEN Christopher Tuplin The Failings of Empire ‘A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.11-7.5.27 1902. 237 Seiten (Historia-Einzelschritt 76). Kart, ISBN 3-515-05912-1 Current views of Xenophon's account of ‘404-362 BC under-play the fact that itis a chronological report of paltico-miltary fevents which should be taken seriously ‘and not seen merely as arbitrary pegs for didactic utterances. A reading of this idiosyncratic narrative offered which shows how, by interplay of direct stress, allusive ress and telling silence, Xenophon invites. @ largely negative altitude to the major ‘states and thelr leaders as they strive un- ‘successfully for predominance. The record ‘of Spartan aims and achievements Is not- ably gloomy, but Thebes, Athens and Ar- cadia ate algo treated with scant respect. ‘The disorder with which the work ends is the logical conclusion and a real source of discontent, not an excuse for terminating fa narrative in which its author had lost interest. Pressestimmen: “The work is well argued and has a solid introduction dealing with Hellenica cri- ticism, several appendixes, and a rather exhaustive bibliography.” Religious Studies ‘Thomas Clark Loening The Reconciliation Agreement of 404/02 B.D. in Athens {ts Content and Application 10987. 186 Seiten (Hermes-Einzelschiitt 53). Kart, ISBN 3-515-04802-4 In seiner Schrift vor Staat der Athener hhat Aristoteles uns den Vertrag dberl fert, durch den — nach dem ungidcklichen ‘Ausgang des Peloponnesischen Krieges tund den ihn begieltenden inneren Unru- hen in Athen die beiden Parteiungen der Bargerkriegswirren (Demokraten und Oll- garchen) im Jahre 403 zu einem triedll- Shen Ausgleich zu kommen suchten. Der ‘Autor hat diesen wichtigen Vertrag unter Heranziehung auch anderer Quelien, ins- besondere det attischen Redner, erstmals ‘usfahrlich kommentiert. Nicht nur dle po- iitische Geschichte, vor allem auch die athenische Rechtsgeschichte ist durch die Sen Kommentar auBergewohnilich berel- ‘chert worden. Pressestimmen: “This thoughtful and painstaking study will be very useful to scholars interested in ‘Athenian politics. Helpful appendices and indices tell readers where they can find what, so that individuals concerned with paricular issues wil find this a convenient ‘work to consult.” ‘Classical World *Loening hat mit diesem Buch wesentich zur Forderung unseres Wissens Ober dio iatyseis von 403 beigetragen. Seine zahl- Josen Einzelbemerkungen konaten hier nur tungendgend gewardigt werden. Niemand, der Gber diese Zeit arbeitet, wird sich ein ‘Nicht-Nachschlagen leisten konnen.” Zs. d. Savigny-Stiftung f. Fechisgesch. Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart Postfach 101061 — D-70009 Stuttgart a CHRISTOPHER TUPLIN ACHAEMENID STUDIESHISTORIA ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ALTE GESCHICHTE ‘REVUE D’ HISTOIRE ANCIENNE JOURNAL OF ANCIENT HISTORY RIVISTA DISTORIA ANTICA EINZELSCHRIFTEN HERAUSGEGEBEN VON HEINZ HEINEN/TRIER- FRANCOIS PASCHOUDIGENEVE KURT RAAFLAUB/WASHINGTON DC. ‘HILDEGARD TEMPORINUTOBINGEN GEROLD WALSER/BASEL, HEFT 99 @ FRANZ STEINER VERLAG STUTTGART 1996 CHRISTOPHER TUPLIN ACHAEMENID STUDIES @ FRANZ STEINER VERLAG STUTTGART 1996Dice Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufhahme Giistoria Historia: Zeitschrift fr alte Geschichte. Einzelsehriften, ~ ‘Stutigart: Steiner Friher Schriftenreihe Reihe Einzelschriften 2u; Historia istoria-Binzelschriften H. 99. Tuplin, Christopher: Achaemenid studies. ~ 1996 Tuplin, Christopher: ‘Achaemenid studies / Christopher Tuplin, — Stu einer, Acta her Tuplin, ~ Stuttgart: Steiner, (Historia: Einzelschriften ; H.99) ISBN 3-515-06901-1 © 180 5706 Jede Vrnerung des Werks fra der Grezen des Ueber remen des Uebenecsests nt ‘unzulissig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere fur ‘Ubersetzung, Nachdruck, Mikrover- fmung ode verglestbreVertaensove fir deSpechaangn Dace snngen.01936by Fa tines Veg Weshaea Gn Sens Sea Srccenaletngsbesindgem apes Druk Dra fees Pet ea Printed in Germany a CONTENTS Preface. 6 Abbreviations 1 Chapter 1: Cyprus before and under the Achaemenids: Problems in Chronology, Strategy, Assimilation and Ethnicity... 9 A. A Chronological Problem een 9) B. Strategy... : seannanins 1S The eatly Achaemenid and Hellenistic contexts 15 ii) The Neo-Assyrian context. woe 18 (ii) The post-Assyrian context. 32 C. Persian Evaluation and Assimilation 38 D. Ethnicity 65 Chapter 2: The Parks and Gardens of the Achaemenid Empire 80 A, Pre-Achaemenid Material B. Achaemenid Material . (@_ Archaeological or material remains ii) Written sources Chapter 3: The Place of Persia in Athenian Literature. 132 A. Tragedy .- 133 B. Persian Landscape and Geography 136 . Comedy eae 141 153 c. —— D. Orators and Philosophers E. General Observations 178 183, 201 se 201 206 206 1209 213 213 Appendix... Bibliography... Indices ‘A. General Index . B. Index of Name @_ Personal name Gi) Geographical names . €. Index of Sources Greek and Latin literary text Gi). Greek epigraphic documents..... 222 (ii) Greek papyri... 223, iv) Akkadian, Aramaic, Elamite, Hebrew, Persian texts... 224PREFACE Versions of the studies which follow were presented at various dates in 1992— 1994 to seminar audiences in Liverpool, Nottingham, Paris, St Petersburg and Ekaterinburg. I am grateful for comments received on these occasions - to which Thave probably not paid as much attention as they merited. I would like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to the British Academy, the British Council and the Research Development Fund of the University of Liverpool for the financial assistance which made the relevant trips to France and Russia possible, I should also particularly like to thank Dr Andrei Zaikov of the Liberal Arts University, Ekaterinburg for the invitation which took me to Russia in September 1993. The text which follows was substantially complete in the latter part of 1994. ‘The appendix and some material on Ptolemaic and Roman documents from Egypt in chapter 2 were added over the next four months. For further delay since then two causes can be identified. One is relatively straightforward, if mechanically tiresome, viz. the need to transform the text from Amstrad PCW to PC-compa- tible form ~ a process which inter alia led me to conclude that the complete exclusion of Greek characters was the lesser of two evils. The other is more serious (and more subjective) and consists in the pedagogic and administrative culture which now blights the professional existence of British academics — a culture whose malign capacity to depress its victims and distract them from the completion of even the simplest enterprises derives not from the intrinsic scale of the week-to-week tasks it imposes upon them but from the debased ideology by which it is underpinned. To be lectured by a political establishment composed of dysfunctionally competitive attention-seekers on the merits of performance indi- cators, value-for-money and so-called quality assessment is distressing. To find oneself the servant of a system in which education is the delivery of doses of information or material measured according to a scale designed to preclude significant mismatch between teachers’ aspirations for pupils and pupils’ capaci- ty to meet those aspirations is an affront to all reasonable academic values. The slorious wastefulness proper to genuine educational procedures (and intellectual activity in general) has been cast aside in favour of targets and accountability, and those of us with less than wholly resilient temperaments can lapse into private despondency for months at a time. Christopher Tuplin 10 January 1996 ABC ‘ABL. ABV Agora ‘Amathonte ‘ANEP ANET AR ‘ARAB ARF ARI ‘Alas BE BELT BM Sculpture cAD cca eck Chron. as cs cr oy. GE Fax GA com Ics IG LKour. LLabr. LMylas. Ural. Kaibel Kition ABBREVIATIONS ee ere Dittwhcnsls Ancien Resets of Aseria and Babylonia (Chicago 1926-7) Rk Grayton, Babslonlon Historia. Literary Text (Toronto 1975) Siscnan Chronicles ofthe Cheldacen Kings (London1956) ca Lexikon der Agyptologie (Wiesbaden 1972-)8 Abbreviations: LIME Lixo coographiom Myth ¢ cum MhologiaeGracae ich 981 ou ee es nnd 1968) » x8 in Rial, Penpals Foeaon Tele (Chisago PFa texts in Hallock 1978 * ae ms Ferseplis Forint Sa txts mG Cameron, Persepolis Treasury Tales (Chieago 198 a ee der Assyriologie (Berlin 1932~) " J Welles, oy Corepondenc the Mellen Wold (London ee ‘State Archives of Assyria (Helsinki 1987-) meee Sitnine Foe de xtae de Cre are >) is Sard publeains ofthe mecan Solty fr the exe ‘ Si fo the excvatin of Sais EGjentad (ta, Sedoh Cpr Expedtion (Stet Be Textes Cunéiformes du Louvre ee aa MNTodsA Selection of Gree Historica! scription VAB Vorderasiatische Bibliothek a een eee YOs —Yaeorenal’ sen, efecto 168 ae tuple FesesisFertion les, shal be ideo hat nfm hat ti ots divest fh ri! est fey eof RT Halock’s working anscripios These tanscripion a of hgh unin ‘ay bt to fly cleo vote A smlr ees spo upunhed ins orginally ead by Cameron which eos mers in fr Fors, ee CHAPTER 1: CYPRUS BEFORE AND UNDER THE ACHAEMENIDS: PROBLEMS IN CHRONOLOGY, STRATEGY, ASSIMILATION AND ETHNICITY ‘A. ACHRONOLOGICAL PROBLEM In Phoenix 1991 G.S.Shrimpton proposed a new chronology for Artaxerxes II's first invasion of Egypt and for the major events of his war with Evagoras of Cyprus. This chronology may be summarised as follows: 389 Capture of Tyre 387/6 King’s Peace 386 (sp/s) Battle of Citium (Diodorus 15.3, Theopompus 115 F 103.5~7) 386 (aut.) _ Phamabazus invades Egypt (Isocrates 4.140) 386 (late) Evagoras’ disappointing trip to Egypt (Diodorus 15.4.3,8.1) 384 Evagoras has by now lost all Cyprus and is under siege; starts negotiation with Tiribazus and Orontes. Tiribazus denounced by Orontes, cashiered and sent to Artaxerxes for tril. (15.8.3-9.2, ‘Theopompus 115 F 103.9) A truce is negotiated which is effectiv- ly the end of the war, though not formally so. The period of waiting from now tll end of war is one of low morale in Persian forces in Cyprus, mutinous because of arrest of Titibazus (Di- odors 15.9) 384/3 Revolt of Glos, damaging Persian fleet and Pharnabazus’ cam- paign (Diodorus 15.9.3-5). Pharnabazus abandons Egypt after three years fight (inclusive reckoning) 384-383, 383 Cadusian campaign (cf. Shrimpton 1991: 2, 17 for varying state ment of date). 383/382 Acquittal of Tiribazus who is reinstated in Cyprus, while Orontes is demoted. (The date may actually be early 383: Shrimpton 1991: 17-18.) 381/380 End of Cypriot War ‘The more conventional view is that the Cypriot events from the battle of Citium onwards fall in the period 384/3-381/0. 1. Diodorus puts the Cypriot war narrative under 386/5 (15.24) and 385/4 (15.8-9) - two archon years because he knew (cf. 9) that the war contained only two continuous years of fighting. (Everything he has put under the two archon years is certainly part of the “continuous war"; the Tiribazus affair in 15.8.4-5 is10 ‘Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids only an interlude, after which Evagoras is foun resistin, fhtng back) He also knew that te wa sted in sone nce Ber aoe on his own showing (1.98) should have pt the end in 81/0, Why thee ae pick on 3865 and 385/47 Shrimpon’s answers tha Citom atualh negpenetn 586. The alteratve answer is that Diodors has postulted that etleneeeet ‘Corinthian War left Artaxerxes free to pursue Evagoras (14.110.6) and is unaw: % re of any other catern Mediterranean developments (eg. Egypt) which rie need to be fitted in. One may add that in. Panegyricus Isocrates certainly took the view that fghing (pecially siege of Salamis) was gong on a e381 Stvington might seit tas isin eae ares asd oat 7 : conflict seem as long as possible (to make the point that Artaxerxes still had tot won), wheres Dior, knowing how og the se of war nr actly Jasied, chose to minimize the period of actual fighting as a way of makin; Eragon lot imps. ney ak whee tly dst sone such Soe hi es (or Ephorus) was particularly Diodows speaks in 15.21 about Anaxerses' long. prepara forces forthe Cypriot war and ths might seem to eis sone day ar te King's ec. Butimay nnd ote vod septal. Ale ofr se ee lement of the army used came from Phocaea and Cyme and that Sitisenen ‘ot fre aeatee Game eae sre quickly after 387/6. (For ‘western and appointment of cr is due othe contemporaneity ofthe Egyptian campaign, One conventional sew iso doubt dt tefl of te Egypinn cami ommantes and i fees) Mote important ae the contents of 5.1. amin inte Prin frrs in rons diet Ergo” patel tons saint tape si ns Pesian fleet actually went off to bring supplies from Cilicia; Evagoras* fing of ext tees nal and fom Eat Sinton says noting sat ay of i iis. It! belongs between Tiribazus and Orontes’ arrival in Cyprus which is the King's Peace and the battle of Citium. Can it really all fit into a few ‘winter or spring months in 386? It surely takes some time for a large expeditio- nary force to be re “famine” it Tag foree tobe reduced to “famine” and to redeployment of is whole let fr on same passage also mentions Evagoras’ acquisition of extra triremes from Achoris, On hs trp to Egypt after Citium by contrast Evagoras only got {aney from Achoris, and not as much a he wanted at hat. Shrimpion's explana- rosa fat in between two moments the actual Persian invasion of Egypt has begun. Ifsoit follows that Evagoras visit to Egypt took place during the Persian invasion and that Achors originally lent triremes to Evagoras a mater of weeks fore that invasion started when its imminence must have been known, Both strike me as unlikely. ae 4. A prominent feature of Isocrates’ presentation of the w: 4 nine sentation of the war is that as a side~ eel cia and Syria were ravaged (4.161) and most cities in Cilicia iE .161; 9.62). Diodorus refers to control of virtually all of Cyprus and of 'yre and some other Phoenician cities in his description of the initial situation in ‘A. AChronologicat Problem u 15.2.3f .e. the situation before era of battle of Citium). It is implicit in Shrimpton’s scheme that this can only apply before Citium, for if (as he stresses) it is strategically necessary to have Cyprus neutralized before attacking Egypt it will a fortiori be necessary for Phoenicia and Cilicia to be neutralized. But Isocrates ‘writes as though disturbance is continuing at time of Panegyricus. He explicitly says that most Cilician cities are held by rebels. Moreover there is no justification for viewing the perfect tense formulations in case of Phoenicia and Syria (Pho- enicia and Syria have been made anastatoi; Tyre has been taken by king’s enemies) as an evasion of the truth (they have been taken at some time in the past bbut are not now in anti-Persian hands): the perfects are just like perfect tense aphesieke used of the revolt of Egypt and Cyprus, which are definitely events still going on. Items in Diodorus 15.2.2, 3.3, 4.1 both before and after Citium seem to presuppose Persian control of Cilicia, so the Evagoran advances there may have to be located later. This is admittedly somewhat suprising, since Diodorus’ narrative suggests that Evagoras was in fairly restricted circumstances after ium — though able to make a diplomatic trip to Egypt. Perhaps we should conclude that the picture is exaggerated. Or perhaps Evagoras” direct involve- ‘ment in Cilicia was small: Isocrates 9.62 and esp. 4.161 speak more vaguely of his effect there by contrast with direct assertions about the ravaging of Phoenicia. The Cilician defection may simply have been prompted by Evagoras’ model and occurred during the Orontes interlude. It may also have only involved places in Rough Cilicia, in which case, of course, the Diodoran items indicating Persian control in Cilicia (primarily Hollow Cilicia) would not be a terminus post quem in the first place. ‘As for Phoenicia/Syria: on conventional chronology one would place the destabilization of Phoenicia after the Egyptian campaign and in the era immedia- tely prior to the actual Persian campaign in Cyprus. This still seems to me a satisfactory scenario. It will be part of the fall-out from Persia's defeat in the Nile Valley (compare Isocrates’ observation (4.140) that the rebels in Egypt, having repelled attack, are now trying to establish a hegemony over their neighbours) ‘and it is arguably precisely the active cooperation of Evagoras and Achoris which engenders Persian action against Cyprus. The alliance with Achoris in 15.2.3 is part of the starting-conditions of the actual war, but there is no need to assume it is of great antiquity. (Theopompus 115 F 103.1 is certainly no guarantee of this.) '5, One reason for the conventional placing of the Cypriot campaigns after the Egyptian expedition is that Isocrates apparently puts them in that order in 4.140— 141: kai proton men {Egypt}, meta de tauta (Cyprus). Is this passage consistent ‘with Shrimpton’s scenario in which they are contemporary and the battle of Citium actually (and in his view logically for strategic reasons) precedes the invasion of Egypt? Shrimpton justifies it by saying that the order is topical not chronological and that Egypt is mentioned first because the campaign there finished first. This is debatable. The combination kai prOfon men...meta de tauta.... occurs only three other times in Tsocrates, In 12.43-44 and 16.29-31 he certainly intends the relevant episodes to be in chronological order. The case of12 (Chapter 1 Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids 10.61-62 is trickier, since the subject matter is mythological (What the deified Helen did for her brothers and husband), but there is no impediment to our supposing that Isocrates thought of the items as in chronological order. Certainly his normal usage when putting things in logical or topical order is proton ‘men...epeita de (34 times) of occasionally proton men...deuteron de (4 times) and seems natural to assume that when he deliberately opts for meta de tauta itis a sign that temporal order is involved. It remains just possible that the order of termination of the two episodes (Egypt, Cyprus) is the chronological point at issue, but Ido not find it at all likely. 6. Shrimpton maintains that Isocrates’ claim in 4.140141 that “the King has ‘wasted six years in attempt to conquer Evagoras” must have Citium as its starting point; if Citium was much more recent Isocrates might as well have more impressively said “ten years" (counting from the origin of the conflict in ¢.390); only a battle of Citium dated in 386 is a sufficiently important intermediate reference point to justify this. Several comments suggest themselves, (@) Whenever Citium occurred there was theoretically no impediment to Isocrates’ making the same claim in Panegyricus as he later made in Evagoras (the one reproduced in Ephorus’ history) that the King had been at war with Evagoras since 391/390. On the face of it the reference to the “six” years could be called oddly understated on any chronology. (b) One might, however, ask whether we can be sure that the concept of a ten year war was available to Isocrates in 381? Did he then know about Artaxerxes’ instructions to Hecatomnus in .390 to suppress Evagoras, instructions which ‘were not in fact executed but which are most tangibly what justifies the statement that the Cypriot War lasted ten years? Isocrates refers to Hecatomnus in Panegy- ricus 162 without making any mileage out of his non-cooperation against Evago- ras; instead he claims that he would be helpful to a panhellenic war of liberation and says “in truth he has rebelled long ago”, a speculative assertion about the Carian’s state of mind which probably in practice indicates that he had done no such thing — or at least that Isocrates did not know that he had. It might be that, as of 381, Isocrates reckoned that Evagoras' threats to Cypriot cities around 390 Were a “private” affair and therefore seized upon the King’s Peace’s formal reassertion of Persian suzerainty over Cyprus as the best way of making Evago- ras’ conflict with Persia, actually initiated in c.383, seem as long as possible. (One implication of this view would, of course, be that the clear statement of Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.24 that the Athenian squadron on its way to Cyprus in summer 390 was going to help in a war against Artaxerxes represents hindsight. Nothing in the more closely contemporary Lysias XIX actually confirms that the War was seen as anti-Persian at the time.) (c) The actual phraseology of 4.141, which involves a striking anacolouthon, decidedly avoids any clear statement that the king's campaign against Evagoras had been going on for six years. Indeed I am not even sure that he is even trying falsely to imply as much. It is the King's slowness in getting round to doing things, which is highlighted at least as much as the profound inefficacy of his military forces. If Citium had happened six years earlier Isocrates should ar- uably have exploited that fact more unambivalently. A. A Chronological Problem 13 cother important source requiring comment besides Diodorus and Isocrtee is Theopormpus L15 F 103, summary of Philipica XI. Shvimpton Claims that this isan orderly narrative which establishes an early date for Citium. ind this at all certain. "40 ay ie way that Aco oymmakia withthe Pisiians suddenly pops up at 13, anevent which must precede 380, after the fragment has already caried us in 12 to the death of Evagoras Sometime in he mid 370s, clear demonsatin sment is not strictly chronological. book was Achoris, embracing three distinct areas of activity or indeed liane, (2) with Baa, with Evagoras c) wih Pisidian, cach of which care wiht varying amounts of varying dgresive narrative! Is, although athe epitome stands it sclea that Thespompos was lo intrested in Evagors i i otin right, i des not follow that we should weat the epitome as an orderly, annaistie account of Greck history inthe period At bes its an secount of Evagoras hung onto Achori an it snot necessarily an entirely onder account even of Evagors’ histor: forexampe, Achoris material asistances to Evagoras fare not the object of any comment within 2-11, the Cypriot war narrative, Iistall have stood athe pont conesponing 10 the end of Le (c) Amiel the absence of Persian invasion of Egypt may tel against ay sxaightforward idea that Phiipica XI about Achons. Yet something odd is ping on: if we accept «judgement lke Shrimpton’ that XI began seven or book digression fe, XII-XIX, apparemly] on east mates covering 2 period from the 390s tl Araxerss IT's econqust of Egypt one would assume that eater unsoceesfl econguets eg, Phamabazus’ would have figured 5o- rewhere. One may add that enania praon roi Perse in 103.1 aso suggests clearly that Achors’ disposition towards Araxeresis important ints own Hah tha Bok XI spoke of Chabries and Agesilaus in Egypt and that the digresive section stars aa pointat which main chronologeal framework of Philipica bas teach ate 380s, when an abortive Persian invasion of Egypt was onderaken Suppose that for the purpose of Phos’ prof of reading Book XII any ii explanations in that book of par in a lrgr pattern of essentially Persia: onneced digression might have got omitted, Of cours the absence of explicit reference to Pharsbani’ invasion may seem especial uprising on Shrimp 0, whic them contemporary and inter-related. It was only after the disturbances occasioned by Sargon’s ignominious death in battle in Tabal that things changed. If we must look for a context for the acquisition of Cyprus we must find it elsewhere. ‘Some have believed that Yamani of Ashdod Gust mentioned) was a Cypriot adventurer and, if so, his activities might have drawn attention to the island. But the identification is deeply flawed: “Yamani” should not be construed as “Ioni- an”: and the reading ia-at-na or ia-ad-na found in place of Yamani in some versions (Elayi / Cavaigneaux 1979: 60f; Kapera 1972/3) should be regarded as a simple erroneous writing of ia-ma-ni, not as a sort of Freudian slip inspired by Tadnana and providing constructive evidence that scribes knew the usurper to have been Cypriot. Yamani's external contact is with “Hittites” (North Syrians) who put him in power in Ashdod. Moreover one should not lightly assume that “Tonian” means “Cypriot”, a point relevant not only to Yamani but also and more importantly to the history of conflict with Ionians represented by (a) the report of Qurdi-a8Sur-lamur about what seem to be Tonian military or piratical descents on the Phoenician coast (including Samsimuruna in the territory of Sidon) in the reign of Tiglath-Pileser (the normal view) or Sargon (Katzenstein 1973: 237), (b) the possible appearance of Tonians in Sargon’s annals for 715 as well- established enemies of Que (Cilicia) # and (c) the references in various Sargon texts to Ionians — as distinct from Cypriots ~ being “caught out of the sea like fish”? (b) and (c) surely go together, and all three items may be exclusively connected with Greeks in Cilicia.*® So far as the conquest of Cyprus is concerned, 33 ARAB 2,30 (ANET 286), 62-3 (ANET 286), 79, 194-5 (ANET 287); ANET 285, 286. 34. Elayi / Cavaigneaux 1979: 60; Brinkmann 1989: 56; Tadmor 1958: 80 9.217; Mitchell 1991: 350. 35 Nimeud Letter LXIX 346 = Jrag 1963: 70f; Brinkmann 1989: 55; Qurdi-assur-lamur was an officer based in Phoenicia (perhaps Tyre): Culican 1982: 469: the word for “Tonian’ isthe ‘same unusual writing restored by Parpola in Nimrud Letter XH (ef. 9.24), 36. Lie 1929: 120-21 1118; ef, ARAB 2.16; Elayi/ Cavaigneaux 1979: 74; Braun 1982: 16. 37 ARAB 2.80, 92, 99 (lists of conquests in in all of which there ere also non-adjacent references to Cyprus); and ARAB 2.118, ND 3411 = Gade 1954: 200. 38 Pace Elayi/Cavaigneaux 1979, Kelly 1992. Desider/Jasinck 1990 identify them as Greeks from Cilica Tracheia, Lemaire 1991b: 272 as would-be colonizers. Neither the warning in ‘Mumb.24.24 (9th or Sth e.: Yon 1987: 359: Heltzer 1988; th .z Dion 1992: 92) about ships ‘of Kittim afflicting Assyria and Israel nor the statements in Isaiah 23.1, 12 (which have ‘more in common with the interrelation of Lulli and Cyprus) nor the associations and juxtapositions of Yavan and Kittim in Genesis 10.4 =1 Chron. 1.7 (6th ¢.: Braun; Sth c Dupont Sommer 1974: 80; Sth c. text giving 7th e. conditions: Teixidor 1975: 126) and Exeliel 2761 (c. 600-Heltzer; first quarter 6th c.: Lemaire, Lipinski 1978: 79) suffice to prove that “Tonians” = Kittim = Cypriots. The Ionians were not, unlike Cyprus, important ‘enough to figure in summary conquest lists in ARAB 2.54, 82, 96, 97, 98, 9, 102. This is also true of various details relating to Amutru and Hatti knowa from other text. In theary this could be either because Tonians aze subsumed in Cyprus or in Amurru/Hatt. One is farWN 24 (Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids a north Levantine / Cilician context certainly seems more likely than an Egyptian ‘one when one bears in mind the Cilician campaign of 715,” the north Syrian connections of Yamani in 712, repeated operations in eastern Anatolia in 713-11 and the actions against Mita of MuSki in Cilicia contemporary with the acquisit- on of the island.*? And even if one admitted that some Cypriots might have been involved with “Tonian” activities, it would merely mean that in some measure it was Cyprus which drew Assyrian attention to itself in its own right (cf. Kelly 1992: 12 for whom Cypriot conquest is a pre-emptive strike against the island's pirates), not as a pawn in Egyptocentric calculations. Moreover a conclusion of this sort is certainly not inconsistent with the texts directly connected with the conquest, insofar as they cast any light upon its context and explanation (which admittedly is not very far)! (i) The texts on the commemorative stele at Citium (the so-called Larnake stele of 707 BCE), on the Display Inscription (ARAB 2.70) and on Prism D/E (vii 25-44 = Gadd 1954: 192) provide a succinct account, saying simply that the seven kings of Ya", fearful at what Sargon was doing in Chaldaea and the Hittite land brought gifts of gold, silver and wooden furniture to Babylon and kissed the king's feet. Such purportedly spontaneous submission is, of course, a topos (cf. Eph’al 1984; 33f) — one which does not encourage belief in a really substantial invasion but equally need not preclude the possibility of some direct action. The ‘more detailed report in the annals (ARAB 2.44; Lie 1929: IL457f; Olmstead 1930/1: 278-9) isin line with this, though it casts no further light upon any inter- relation between Cyprus and Hittite events, and might well not have had space to do so even if the text survived in less damaged form. Immediately before @ reference to the seven kings of the island are apparently the remains of three names, Jsilda, [..]qura, [..}-Assur, of which the last at least seems surprising in a ‘more strongly tempted to believe the latter than the former. Rihl 1993: 96 stresses the clement of raiding (for slaves) in early Greck penetration of the eastern Mediterranean (and elsewhere). If her general vision is comect, the “Ionians” of Assyrian records are arguably ‘ore likely to be new or temporary interlopers than members of the long-established Greek population of Cyprus. Burkert 1992: 13 speaks of Euboeans. 39 ARAB 2.16; Lie 1929: 118f, Gadd 1954: 179f, See Lemaire 1991 0 272 ‘ARAB 2.42°3, 71; ND 2769 = Parpola SAA Ll = Saygs 1988: 178f = Postgate 1973: 2If ‘The later is redated to 718-715 by Lanfranchi 1988: 59f. See Lemaire 1991: 273. ‘The only other possible trace of Cyprus in a Sargon text i the information about Papy (? Paphians tthe royal court who eventually caused rouble in N.Assyria: Grayson 1991: 90, Lie 1929: 76-8, Sueck 1916: 3.802, - The Pap(p)a of ARAB 239, $6, 118 are not plausible Praphians (ef. Reyes 1994: 56), 42. ARAB 2.186 = ANET 284; Nikolaou 1976: 315. A new reading of the text (by S Dalley) appears in Reyes 1994: Sif 43, Elayi 1986a: 130 clams thatthe Babylonia/Hiuite events which allegedly upset the Cyprio- &s happened early in the reiga, refering to ARAB 2.2 para. (I think ~ bad printing has thrown the footnotes in this article completely awry). This seems a peculiar view when {ere were near-contemporary events in the appropriate areas. ‘The topos is applied to Mita of Muski in ARAB 2.43, though military action ~ roughly contemporary withthe conquest of Cyprus has just been reported in 242 and is mentioned 4 B. Swategy 25 Cypriot king.** Next there is an allusion first to the witholding of gifts and then {after a break) to their being brought, after which we are told that an official was sent with royal host for the purpose of taking vengeance (a-na tu-ri gi-mil-li-su) and that the opposition gave in more or less as soon as it saw or heard of this force and of the King's name. Gold, silver, wood-products (the same things as in 2,70, 186) are brought by the defeated party to Babylon, and the text ends “and [as “Assyrians (2)] I counted them” — a claim of provincialization which modem authorities tend to ignore.*® Grayson 1991: 90 maintains an extremely low-key interpretation of these events, envisaging simply that the Cypriots sent Sargon gifts and he sent them a stele; this may be an exaggeration (the pattern of gifts given, gifts witheld and vengeance sounds like a more interesting and not entirely stereotyped story ~ and one whose implications are not entirely in conformity with the reference to Cypriot non-payment of sibru which Dalley's new reading finds in the text: nn. 42, 49), but it must be conceded that when we find a series of texts asserting that the King cut down his foes from Yatnana in the sea as far as border of Egypt and the land of Muski we will not assume that “cutting down” requires belief in major military operations.” 45. Professor Millard advises me that Assur need not be part of a PN, “It could be part of a phrase like bel ade A¥Sur ("bound by treaty to Assur") or Sala iknaus ana ASSur ("who did rot submit to Assur”), though the order would be uncommon” (letter, 2.9.92). 46. Lipinski 1986b: 379 does envisage an Assyrian provincial governor in Cum. Conditions in later eighth c. Que and Bit-Buruta (Postgate 1973: 31) show that provincialization need ‘not be disproved by the continued existence of kingdoms (though Lipinski at least adopts an Jntepretation ofthe seventh c. Cypriot king lists which allows there to be no king in Citium inthe Assyrian era) But the claim that sucha situation arose in Cyprus seems stating. On the other hand, although the erucial phrase is parly a restoration, the surviving verb-form for “counted them” (amnusumutt) is the one normally encountered inthe provincialisation formula, not e4. in the formula about counting people ss booty. ~ The reference to ‘Yengeance ealls for comment, Revenge isa surprisingly uncommon concept in neo-Assyti~ an royal texts and is normally something either attempted by Assyria's enemies (ARAB 235, 867) or exacted by the Assyrians on behalf of someone else, characteristicaly a loyal ‘vassal threatened or mistreated by an anti-Assyrian third party (ARAB 2.47, 65, 148: Weidner 1941/4: 46 120), though in certain general statements (ARAB 2,923 [= Streck 1916: 178.11}, 1000 [= Streck 1916: PI 12.17) the King can represent his function, under the aegis ofthe gods, as taking of revenge. (Even so in ARAB 2.923 Assurbanipal avenges “the kings, my fathers, upon all my foes”.) Conceivably, then, ia the Cypriot context the distinction between giving and witholding of gifts is a distinction between different Cypriot {groups and the vengeful intervention is on behalf of those who are submissive to Sargon. 447 This appears at heed of alist of places “cut down” and represents, together with Egypt and Mita of Mushki,the western border (ARAB 2.54; ef 2.82, 96-99 [99 = ANET 284], 102). In ARAB 2.80, 92 and 99, which itemize conquests in various orders, Cyprus is followed by ‘material relating to southern Mesopotamia and preceded either by Egypt and Gaza (2.80, 99) or by eastern Anatolian victims (2.92) Inthe Display Insription (2.70) Cyprus stands between the submission of Dilmun and that of Mita of Mufki; association with Dilmun recurs inthe defintely non-chronological lst in Prism D/E, with the clear intention that the two places represent acquisitions at opposite ends of the earth. So far as motivation / political context goes, nothing particularly useful can be inferred from any of this. — ‘Albenda 1983: 19 n.40 notes that a royal stele such as that at Larnaka would normally invite26 Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids Gi) Various texts say that the island was seven days distant*® and some even claim that it was a place of which Sargon’s ancestors had never heard the name. It would be imprudent, of course, to set any great store by these mendacious topoi.® We cannot safely infer that Cyprus was perceived as seriously discon- nected from the Levant or preclude commercial or politico-military motives for conquest based upon the existence of connections. But we cannot be sure either that there were such motives or that Sargon was not essentially pursuing a goal ‘which went beyond the long established natural bounds of Assyrian interest and entitled him to special credit as an imperial innovator. Bluntly the way that the royal texts speak of the matter simply conceals whatever motives there were behind an ideological smokescreen. If an Egyptian dimension is hard to establish for the original conquest of Cyprus in 709, an alternative would be to postulate a fresh Assyrian intervention in Cyprus in the reign of Sennacherib or Esarhaddon much closer to the actual Egyptian invasions of 674-664 and to suggest that here at least the strategic “rule” had some part to play. More precisely, we could note that (a) between the erection of the Larnaka stele in ¢.707 and Nineveh corvée service in 677°" there is no positive evidence of Cypriot submissiveness to Assyria; (b) Lulli’s flight there 701 (ARAB 2.310; ANET 287, 288) may be a sign of the island’s independen- ce; (c) the growth in number of vassals from 7 in 709 to 10 in 677 and 667 may be a sign of a significant new Assyrian initiative in the island:S? and (d) Cilicia was disturbed or worse through much of same period: Sennacherib's counterblast in £696, involving (if it did) defeat of lonians, was not perhaps entirely successful? and the context of the defeat of Sidon and of Sanduarri of Kundu & Sissu in 675 the inference that Sargon visited Cyprus himself. But the texts scarcely permit this. ~ Oded 1992 does not comment on the annals account of the conquest of Cyprus, but remarks variously that (i) the vengeance (gimillu urru) motif is normally associated with a death (139) and that Sargon was particularly fond of justifying war on the ground of the other side's renunciation of Assyriaalliance (92) 48 Lamaka sel, display inscription, annals, and prism DIE (as cited on p.24); brief references to the Kings of a in ARAB 2.80, 92, 99. 49. ARAB 2.70, .186 (= ANET 284), Prism D/E = Gadd 1954: 192; itis conceivable that one ‘of the gaps in the Annals (ARAB 2.44) conceals a similar statement. In Daley's new reading (cf. n.42), ARAB 2.186 says that previous ignorance of Cyprus mean that the (Cypriots had not payed sibmi ~ a somewhat obscure tax defined by Postgate 1973: 171fas an cexaction on the flocks and herds of private individuals by officals or (? exceptionally) foveros. The elaonhip between sand te rapmentary anal narative any 50 Gjerstad 1979: 238 suggested that the “seven” topos. 51 ARAB 2.690, 697; ANET 291; Heidel 1956: 28 iv S4f ‘52. But this argument becomes specially tricky if “seven” is merely a formulaic number: se n 443. On the names in the vasal lists see recently Lipinski 1992, Masson 1992/3,Neumann 1998, 53. Hawkins 1982: 426; Desideri/Jasnck 1990: 133f put Azatiwatas and the “independent” Karatepe texts between 696 and 677. Contrast Lemaire 1991: 274 (705-636). 54 ABC '83,126; ANET290, 291; ARAB 2.527-8; Heidel 1956: 12-15, 138-56, Sanduarti has lately been variously located at Cyinda and Issus (Bing 1985 [1994]) and NW of Mersin (Desideri & Fasink 1990: 129; Lemaire 1991: 275) gs ~ Tike the “seven days” ~ are also a B. Swategy 2 may be when Cilicia is finally brought to heel, even though a governor of Que does appear in the eponym chronicle for 685 (Culican 1982: 476, Desideri / ‘Jasinck 1990: 127). In the light of this the suggestion that Cyprus defected in late 700s, perhaps after the death of Sargon in Tabal, is clearly not frivolous and we are then left to consider when the Assyrians resumed control (as they had done by 677). There seem to be three possibilities. (a) According to a conventional view Sennacherib’s campaign against Cilicia in 696 involved a (naval) victory over “Ionian” adversaries.‘ If one associated these with Cyprus, one could hypothesize that Cyprus slipped back into place as a consequence ~ even if Cilicia did not. The linkage of Ionians and Cyprus is, of course, questionable,’ but even without it we could note the availability of Cypriot POWs for service in the Gulf in 694%? and the eventual death of Lulli in the period 699/694 (Elayi 1985b, 1986a) and deduce that something had happe- ned in the 690s which changed Cyprus’ relationship back to one of submission. (tis, however, odd if such a scenario is correct that Lulli's death appears to be treated by composers of royal texts as not the result of any direct Assyrian action. (They say variously that he met death before the awe-inspiring splendour of the Weapon of Assur [ARAB 2.326 = ANET 288] or that he fled to the middle of the sea and persished [ARAB 2.239 = ANET 287]. For the phraseology cf. ‘Assurbanipal’s Annals [ARAB 2.775; Piepkorn 1933: 36 ii 7f] on Taharga, who died in Nubia far away from any direct Assyrian action.) Even in the absence of actual invasion of the island one might have expected the royal propagandists to claim a connection between the fugitive’s demise and e.g. fighting off the Cilician or North Syrian coast.) (b) A text of Esarhaddon (ARAB 2.710 = Borger 1956: 57, p.86, As BBE 10- 11) gives a list of conquests which, after mentioning Arza, Bazu, Shupria, Tyre and Egypt, adds that “all the kings of the midst of the sea from the land of Cyprus (and) the land of Ionia to the land of Tar8i8 bowed at my feet. I received their heavy tribute.” No other Esarhaddon text specifically claim the (re)conquest of these regions (and none mentions “Ionians” at all) and it is hard to know how substantive an event is supposed to be involved: compared with other items in the list “submitted at my feet” is rather mild talk, so it is probable that no specific nilitary action is to be postulated — and it seems unlikely anyway that Esarhad- don would have made such action a high priority at the very start of his reign or that, if he had done, it would be missing from the record. On the other hand it is 55 Cilicia: ARAB 2.286. “Tonians”: Berossus 680F7, Abydenus 6855. The naval clement is absent in Berossus; Katzenstein 1973: 257 is certain that this is correct, for no clear reason. Desider/Jasinck 1990: 155 identify the “TIonians” as coming from Cificia Trecheia, Lemai 1991b: 274 wonders about Solo $6 cf. above in relation to period up to Sennacherib. Cyprus and Tonia are distinguished in Esarhaddon’s alabaster tablet (ARAB 2.711: Cyprus, lonia, Tarsis) and may be in asimilar {rio of names in a geographical text from reign of Assurbanipal and Shamashshumukin (Gited in Braun 1982: 19; but “Ionian” is regarded as an uncertain reading by Brinkmann 1989: 68). 57 ARAB 2319, of, 329, 356, The reading Yamanai in ARAB 2.319 is incorrect; Brinkmann 1989: St .15 gives it as a-ad-na-na-a, ke. Cypriots.28 Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids perhaps possible that (rather in the manner of Sargon’ claims in relation to 709) the mere spectacle of Esarhaddon’s resumption of activity in the Levant (cf. the sack of Arza in 679 and the campaign against Sidon in 677) induced the Cypriots to resume submissiveness more or less voluntarily ~ i.e. in practical terms to say ‘yes when Esarhaddon demanded military help against Sidon (which he may have ddone: but see p.29 below) and corvée assistance in Nineveh (which he certainly did), (©) Between the two extremes of 696 (option [a]) and c. 677 (option [b) lies the blank space (atleast so far as western events go) ofthe latter decade and a half of Sennacherib's reign. A second Palestinian expedition has on occasion been postulated for the period after the sack of Babylon in 689;5 if such a thing existed ‘a reacquiescence in Assyrian suzerainty by the Kings of Cyprus is evidently a possibility. Of these options (a) does not get us much closer to an Egyptian dimension, since it puts the recovery of Cyprus after the Eltekeh campaign and still far removed from the eventual Egyptian invasions and gives it a primarily Cilician and north Levantine dimension. Options (b) and (c) are another matter. A reco- very in the (later) 680s or in 677 might be seen against the background of Egyptian pushiness in Levant (cf. Spalinger 1978) and of the consequent resump- tion of §.Palestine/Egypt activities which was the prelude to invasions of the Nile Valley. There are grounds for hesitation however. (1) In general terms it appears to have been Taharga, not the Assyrians, who was the aggressor. Since there is not the remotest reason to think he had the desire cr (crucially) the naval capability to capture or otherwise pressure Cyprus into ‘becoming a base for attack upon the Levant® and since there are no proven cases of Cypriot attack (whether independent or not) on Assyrian interests in the Levant, there is no cogent reason to sce Assyrian acquisition of the island as pre- cempting such a strategy on Taharga’s part. (2) Assyrian control of Cyprus did not deter Taharga from aggression in 674 and there is no evidence of Cypriot resources being used in the Assyrian respon- ses to that aggression. So far as the events of 674 itself are concerned this is mot surprising, since there are no Assyrian sources. But the invasion of 671 is well- enough attested to admit of comment and what one observes is that there is no explicit hint of the use of ships, that the invaders may have adopted a land- approach other than the direct sea-coast one through Pelusium (Epha’al 1984: 137-42), and that the Assyrians evidently lacked substantial naval force in the '58_ cf variously Grayson 1991: 111 (in favour), Elayi 198Sb: 26, Kitchen 1983: 383ff (agains 539. Atza: ABC 125, ANET 290, Borger 1956: 21, .33, Klch.A. 16f, 27, p50, Ep. 7.398. 57, .86, ASBBE. 3,71, .110, f.B. 1, Heidel 1956: 141 57f, Sidon: ABC 83,126, ANET 290 (Assur barre, 290 (Prism A= ARAB 2.527-8), 291 (Prism B = ARAB 2.651), Heidel 1986: 12-15 1 38-56. Contrast e.g. the explicit recognition of Taharqa’s connection with Ba’al of Tyre: ARAB 2.556; ANEP 447. Pace Katzensiein 1973: 279 and Spalinger 1974 the fragmentary conch sion of the Nahr eL-Kalb stele (Borger 67, p.102, Man. 34) is dubitable evidence of ‘Taharga's involvement with the 22 kings. B. Strategy 29 associated attack on Tyre.S! These circumstances make it hard to believe that the military capabilities of Cyprus were being exploited. {G) In fact the record of such exploitation is thin throughout. (i Deployment of Cypriot ships against Tyre in 709-705 is theoretically possible, but entirely speculative.‘ (i) In 677 the Sidonian King relied upon the sea but was “caught like a fish” (ANET 291, ARAB 2.651). In the light of the imposition of corvée work upon the Cypriots in the immediate aftermath it may be tempting to think that Esarhaddon had mobilized a serious fleet to deal with Sidon and that the Cypriots contributed to it, But itis not an inescapable conclusion. Winkling Abdi-Milkutti out of the harbour-island of Sidon (cf. Forst 1973, Elayi 1987a) was quite a different matter from capturing the island-city of Tyre; and one might fee! that the non-deploy- iment of Cypriots in the Kar Esarhaddon corvée reflects their non-involvement in the campaign. (To find a context for Cypriot naval deployment one might do better to look to the contemporary suppression of Abdi-Milkuti’s ally Sanduarri— ARAB 2.528, ANET 290 — though there is no hint of it in the texts, and Sanduarri took refuge in the mountains.) (iii) The third invasion of Egypt in 664/3 apparently made no significant use cof warship, Cypriot or otherwise. (iv) The attack on Tyre in 662 did deploy sufficient maritime force to cut off ‘Tyre’s sea-communications (ARAB 2.779 = ANET 295; ARAB 2.847, 970), but the only conceivable reference to Cyprus thereabouts is the statement in ARAB 2.847 that the surrender of Tyre made the princes of the midst of the sea and the kkings dwelling in high mountains fear Assurbanipal ~ which does not sound like a way of describing princes whose resources had just helped secure that surren- der. (») An oracle text from late in Esarhaddon’s reign or the reign of Assurbani- pal (Knudtzon 1893: 64 = SAA iv: 92) starts by referring to an individual who has made a treaty (ade) with Esarhaddon and the crew of a boat accompanying him and then a couple of lines later mentions [...Ze]u-iddina from Cyprus (ia-da-na- ni). It would be optimistic, to say the least, to infer anything about Cypriot military shipping. ‘61 The texts make clear that Esarhaddon was unable to capture the island city (ef. Moseati 1973: 43; Elayi 1978; Grayson 1991: 126), for which naval superiority would have been necessary. Of course the Assyrians may have fel that mounting the invasion of Egypt took ‘riority over inflicting total defeat upon Tyre, but if soit shows that, eventhough Ba'al was ‘explicitly seen as an ally of Taharga, the fact was in Assyrian eyes pf small practical importance. They were not adhering to any strategic principle that assault on Egypt is {impossible unless all sources of hostility in the Levant have been thoroughly rooted out 62. Elay/Cevaigneaux 1979 argue that in the events recorded in Menander ap Joseph. AT 9.284, it Tyre had only 12 ships, the 60 Phoenician ships ranged with the Assyrians against them ‘must come from a wide range of places, and inclusion of Citium would help. But Josephus thought the reference was to a date in Shalmaneser’s reign and the inference is insecure anyway, since we have no way of knowing if twelve represented a full Tyran complement,ee 30 ‘Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids (vi) Any subsequent assistance from Gyges to Psammetichus that reelly existed (ARAB 2.784) must have been sea-born and was unimpeded by Assyrian naval action (Kelly 1992: 17). One is left in fact just with (a) the despatch of Sidonian, Tyrian and Cypri POW in “itt” ships wo patelpat inthe campaign againt Elam in 6340 od (b) the circumstances of the second Assyrian invasion of Egypt in 667. One can say little more about the former, though itis relevant to note that the Gulf fleet of (694 does not reappear explicitly in subsequent campaigns in the same vicinity (Rely inference ~ 192: 14 that it continued to exist because Assyrian Kings ‘ontinued to claim suzerainty over Dilmun perhaps be i event of 667 cal for futher comment, ~¥* Me aueston) Bate On the point of interest here there are actually two versions. In editions A (771) and C (876) 22 kings of the seacoast, of the midst of the sea and of the ‘mainland (specified by name in C and including the ten Cypriots) bring gifts, Assurbanipal’s feet and join their ships and forces to those of the Assyrians. This happens while Assurbanipal is marching towards Egypt and before the decisive (land) battle at Memphis. In 900-01 (Harran) and edition E (Piepkorn), on the other hand, after the battle of Memphis, the seizure of Taharqa's war-ships® and the flight of Taharga southwards we are told that “they sent me the good tidings through a messenger who also reported to me orally. Then I ordered to add to my former (battle-)forces (in Egypt) the rabsaq officer, all the governors (and) kings of (the region) beyond the river (Euphrates), servants who belong to me, together with their forces and their ships, and (also) the kings of Egypt, servants who belong to me, together with their forces and their ships, to chase Tithakah out of Egypt and Nubia. They marched towards Thebes, the fortress-town of Tirhakah” (ANET translation), Since this latter version appears in what are earlier editions of the historical record itis likely to be closer to the truth than what appears in editions A-D (cf. Elayi 1983) versions which perpetrate a major misrepresenta- tion of the truth in claiming that the campaign was led by Assurbanipal himself rather than by a subordinate. Various comments may be made. (1) The proposition that any Cypriot forces were involved at all depends on the assumption that the description and listing of Levantine and Cypriot vassals jn A and Cis arelible indication of what the author of E meant by “kings of Ebit ‘Rarl This might be questioned on (atleast) two counts. i) It seems surprising atthe author of E would not have taken the trouble to pick out the Cypriots if he 63. Above n.57. Note the interesting reflection of this sort of thing in Diod 2.16.6 (Semiramis use of Cyprios, Phoenicians and Syrians on ships); and contrast the Cypriots” not-3ppe ‘Sassi. Somewhat similar contest n 650 (ABL. 195 + Dietrich 196970: 1800, whete $idonlan arto prepare ships onthe Tass (The Sidoniansat Nineveh under Sargon (ABL 53] are not apparently of maritime function.) Some hundred years later We ave Ionian cagentr (wth Antolin names ee (wih Anatolian names) in Mesopotamian naval yrds osnach 64 Ineditions B and D, omitted. «lip qarabi~ a hybrid specially invented term: Ephaal 1989: 198 ‘otherwise close to A and C, the east Mediteranean vassals are entirely 65 B. Strategy 31 had believed them to be relevant, instead of contenting himself with a term which without further qualification would be likely to suggest that he had only the syro- levantine mainland in mind. But is not (I suppose) demonstrably impossible. (ii) The in extenso list in edition C is in some sense derived from that in Esarhaddon's account of the Nineveh corvée of 676. These are the only occasions in the neo- Assyrian texts in which such lists occur; and all the Cypriot names and all but two of the mainland ones are the same in both lists. Historians have long wondered ‘whether the Cypriot section at least is purely tralatician and represents what was by 667 once again a false claim to sovereignty; indeed in some hands the text has (paradoxically) become a proof of loss of Assyrian control. This view has been less fashionable in recent times; but the fact that the mainland kings of Arvad and Beth-Amon in 667 are different from those in 676 does not necessarily prove that the Cypriot part of the list is reliable; and the fact that the list turns up precisely in a context of textual and conceivably factual manipulation is not particularly encouraging.® On the other hand since we cannot be independently sure of the degree of that manipulation we cannot be certain that we are entitled to scep- ticism. (2) Ifany Cypriot forces were involved their role was limited to participation in what was actually an ineffectual follow-up to the capture of the,Delta and of Memphis. Moreover the narrative in edition E seems to imply that the East Mediterranean forces were not even mobilized for the Egyptian campaign until after (and indeed some time after) the capture of Memphis ~ this was certainly necessarily true of the Egyptian ships mentioned in the same context ~ and the fact that some later editions present things otherwise cannot prove that it was not so. Assurbanipal could perfectly well initially have planned a purely terrestrial response to Taharqa’s invasion of north Egypt (just as his predecessor had carried cout a purely terrestrial conquest in 671) and only changed plans when Taharqa had inconsiderately escaped with the loss of his own warships. On the other hand the text's formulation might also be consistent with a scenario in which the East Mediterranean vassals had been in attendance all along, but had performed no significant military function until the king ordered them in pursuit of his fugitive adversary. A third possibility is that their mobilization was ordered at the same time as that of the land forces which carried out the invasion but was only completed later with the result that they arrived on the scene at the apex of the delta after the decisive battle had been fought. However one looks at it, though, it seems clear that Cypriot and Levantine ships were not considered by the Assyri- ans to be of any particular importance. Successful invasion of Egypt was not dependent upon them. (3) Later versions do introduce a reference to the East Mediterranean vassals earlier in the story, but they also suppress reference to their naval pursuit of ‘Taharga. The purpose of this double alteration is debatable. (i) At least part of it 66. Thealleged rebellious association between the 22 kings and Taharga in 671 might provide a ‘context for loss of Cyprus (Esarhaddon apparently had no ships with which the capture Tyre in 671: but ef 2.60.32 Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids was certainly not of erucial importance, since editions B and D, though deleting the East Mediterranean vassals in its account of what followed the battle of ‘Memphis, do not bother to insert them in the earlier one (compare the conclusion ‘of [3] above); and the change was certainly not made to enable some alternative military function or service to be attributed to the East Mediterranean vassals. No uch fanction is described and the decisive defeat of Taharga remains clearly Something achieved in a land-batle. Infact the function of the notice (especially in the in extenso listing in edition C) is largely to give general expression to ‘Assurbanipal’s power in the eastern Mediterranean. (ii) The new version invol- ‘ved the vassals bringing gifts to and kissing the feet of Assurbanipal, so what is Said about them is certainly caught up in the imposture of Assurbanipal’s perso- nal command of the expedition. But although ARAB 2,901 by contrast explicitly asserts that Assurbanipal received a messenger’s reports of the capture of Mem- phis before he ordered the ships of Ebir Nari and those of the Assyrian puppet rulers of the Delta to make for Thebes, this could have been reconciled with the Tater claim that Assurbanipal was leading the campaign in person by a relatively simple deletion: no wholesale relocation of East Mediterranean vassals was required, (iii) On the premiss that the East Mediterranean ships only actually centered into the picture after the battle of Memphis the later version would be & positive misrepresentation, and one which might be regarded as an attempt to frase what was arguably the logistical or strategic error of not having ships to hand for an immediate pursuit of Taharga. Since there is uncertainty about the ‘premiss (cf. 3) the conclusion is unreliable, But it may in any case be relevant that by the date of composition of the later editions it was clear that the “capture” of ‘Thebes in 677 (and indeed the whole settlement of Egypt on that occasion) had been less than effective (a new invasion being needed in 674); any direction of attention towards naval incursions into upper Egypt may therefore have seemed best avoided.” ‘Whatever the precise truth about all of this, it seems clear that the campaign (which is the latest certainly dated reference to Cyprus in neo-Assyrian sources‘) provides no evidence for the strategic or tactical indispensability of the Cypriots. (Gii) The post-Assyrian context ‘The latter part of the Neo-Assyrian era sees a realisation of the fears of Esarhad- don and Assurbanipal in the shape of some Egyptian penetration into the Levant significant pointers in this respect are Psammetichus I's capture of Ashdod 67 In A and BID the statement that Taharga abandoned Memphis and fled to Thebes is followed by the statement that Assurbanipal “conquered that city”. Opinions differ as © ‘whether this refers to Thebes (ANET 294 (A); Streck 1916: (A)) or Memphis (Piepkore 1933 (B, D)). Its unfortunate thatthe Egyptian scene on BM 124928 (Brunner 1952) ‘which includes no ships lacks a proper context. (68 Thereference in a geographical txt from Assurbanipal's reign ~ef. Brinkmann 1989: $8 is of unknown date, though it doubuless has a greater statistical chance of being post-667. B. Strategy 33 (Herodotus 2.157) before 616 (? in 635: Tadmor 1966: 102), his pretensions to control in Lebanon evinced by his Year 52 stela (612), the claim of Necho to ‘Sidon supposedly demonstrated by a fragmentary basalt table with royal figure ‘and cartouche and the eventual fruitless cooperation between Egypt and the ‘Assyrians against neo-Babylonian expansion in 616-605 (ABC 91, 95, 96, 98, 99). Carchemish and its aftermath largely destroyed Egyptian control in Asia,” but Necho managed to fight off threat to Egypt itself in 601/00 and the assertion in Il Kings 24.7 that upon the death of Jehoiakin the King of Egypt did not come ‘out of his land since the King of Babylon had stripped him of all his possessions from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates is @ little overstated since Psammeti- chus TI was showing the Egyptian flag again in Palestine in 592 or 591 in areas, which were (still?) in Egyptian control.7! Inall ofthis there is no hint of naval activity.”2 Which is rather odd given that itis Necho who is credited with turning Egypt into a maritime power by building a trireme fleet for use in Red Sea and Mediterranean theatres ~ a revolutionary piece of technological up-grading, especially for a state whose ancestral naval concerns had been almost entirely Nilotic (cf. Van t’Dack & Hauben 1978: 68) and whose history had apparently included no example of sea-fighting since the conflict with the Sea Peoples in c.1170 BCE. The fact that a “commander of royal ‘war ships in the Mediterranean” is already attested under Psammetichus II (for the first time since Ramesside texts) makes it likely that the association with ‘Necho is sound, but no native source confirms it”? and no source reports when the trireme programme started. One’s natural inclination would be to place it early in Necho’s reign, not least because it can be said that Egyptian fleet-building was dependent on supplies of 's-wood from the Lebanon (cf. Elayi 1988a: 16) and itis in his early years that Necho can most readily be imagined as in a position to secure these supplies, though Arcari 1989 would have it that Necho was at work destabilizing the Lebanon in 598. Perhaps however this is an over-restrictive line of argument. After all, given the absolute lack of ship building timber of any kind in the Nile valley, the maintenance (never mind creation) of any sort of Egyptian fleet through the later Saite era must show either that sources of timber were more varied or that access to timber sources was not as dependent upon stable political suzerainty as one might imagine. Certainly to regard the creation of a Mediterra- rnean war-fleet as a response to loss of the Levant to the neo-Babylonian offensive 69 Griffith 1894: 90; Yoyotte 1960: 382; Leclant 1967: 17; Areari 1989: 165. 70 Berossus (680 F & [135]) oddly saw the process as one in which Nebuchadnezzar suppres sed a rebellious satrap of Egypt, Coele Syria and Palestine ~ @ perspective apparently ‘assuming that Egyptian contol ofthe area was almost too unnatural to admit ‘TL PRylands ix 14,16f; Lloyd 1988: 168; Freedy & Redford 1970: 476, 479; Spalinget 1977: 238f; 1978; Yoyotte 1951: 140; Sauneron/Yoyotte 1952: 135. Is disputed how deliberate- ly anti-Assyrian this was. Herodotus 2.159 actually distinguished the Magdolus and Gaza operations (609 or 601; and 601) from use of the feet ‘The only Egyptian material about (military) ships of Necho date, that from Elephantine, is about Nile shipping (Kaiser etal. 1975: 83f; Jansen-Winkeln 1989: 31). n B34. Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids would help explain the failure of such a fleet to have any impact upon that offensive. (The only altemative would seem to be to assume that the Egyptians already had their fleet but were strategically incompetent in their use of it when faced with an enemy who was not using a fleet of his own).”* Talk of other possible ship-timber sources makes one think of Cyprus, of ‘course, but Cyprus is also elusive at this era. Jeremiah’s reference (2.10) to Kittim in c,630 or 620 shows no more than that these people (who do not have to be Cypriots anyway) were familiar enough to Jews to serve as a paradigm of alien religious culture and (to go slightly forward) Ezekiel’s prophecy (26.15) that the fall of Tyre to Nebuchadnezzar will shake the coasts and islands (which latter will include Cyprus, if only as part of the text's picture of the trading world of the ‘Tyrians) is fairly unilluminating. The same is true of references in Isaiah’s elegy for Tyre and Sidon (23.1, 12), should this be assigned to a sixth century redaction (Lemaire 1987: 54; Lipinski 1978: #79) rather than dated to the neo-Assyrian era, ‘The Kittim in transit at Arad around 600 are positively tantalizing. Again they might only be generically “Greeks”, which is what historians are apt to assume, ‘but even if Heltzer 1988 is right to come out and call them Cypriot (essentially for no more reason than an assumptiont at all OT Kittim are from the island) itis hard to know what to make of it given that (a) we do not know that they were not mere mercenaries and (b) we do not know whether their local ally/employer was Jewish or Egyptian. Still they are actors of some sort in the politico-military drama, and in the anti-Babylonian camp at that, so if they are Cypriots at all they serve as a reminder that the island was not hermetically sealed from develop- ‘ments in the Levant. Itis also worth stressing that the distinctive general associa~ tion of the Saite dynasty with the greco-anatolian world (going right back to Psammetichus 1's alliance with Gyges and his use of greco-carian mercenaries) ‘means that Egypt in the neo-Babylonian era naturally had a perspective on the ouside world which included Cyprus and was not jus focussed upon the Le vant? ‘The first specific evidence of Egyptian naval warfare in the Mediterranean ‘comes in the reign of Apries. Herodotus (2.161) reports that Apries captured Sidon and fought a naval battle with “the Tyrian” (king?). This is a controversial event on two counts. First, should it be dated before the Babylonian sack of Jerusalem in 587-586 in the same general context as Egyptian operations in ‘support of Judah” or during the last few years of Apries” rule after the Babyloni- 14 cf. Ezekiel’s prophecy against Tyre in 26f, esp. 26. 7, 10-11, where the Babylonian attackers, though metaphorically compared with waves of the sea, are actually ascribed only land-forees (horses, chariots, “a great army") and ~ concomitantly ~ took thirteen years t0 ‘capture the city Philostratus ap, Joseph. AJ 10.228; Joseph, Ap.1.156). 75. See for example ARAB 2.785, Streck 1916: 22 ii 114 (Gyges): Hét.2.178, Strab.17.1.18 (Naucratis); Hdt.2.20, 147f, Polyaen.7.3, ML 7, Ampolo & Bresciani 1988, material on ‘Arad intext immediately above and on h3w nbwif in 9.82 (Greek/Carian mercenaries), 16 Freedy & Redford 1970. ANET 322 = KAT 193 (Lachish ostrID; allegedly reflected in Jeremiah 315-11, Ezekiel 17.1-21, 29-31. See Freedy & Redford Le, Mitchell 1991: 1403, James 1991: 718. B. Strategy 35 ‘an capture of Tyre in 573.7” Second, how much attention should we pay to Diodorus’ version (1.68) in which the pharaoh’s naval victory is against a combined Tyrian, Sidonian and Cypriot fleet? And should we, in accepting this, follow those historians who take it that Apries was the architect of Egyptian suzerainty over the island? The latter step does seem excessive in the light of Herodotus’ blunt (if very succinctly reported) perception that Amasis was the man who reduced Cyprus to tributary status and the notable absence of a clear statement of the opposite even in Diodorus.”® But the mere involvement of Cypriots in the conflict is another matter. ‘This may not be the only occasion on which Diodorus differs from Herodotus in introducing Cyprus. 1.68.6 is normally read as saying that Amasis made dedications in Cypriot sanctuaries (though South 1987 denies the necessity of this reading) whereas Herodotus, despite interest in other Amasis dedications in Greek cities and despite his knowledge of Egyptian suzerainty over the island, says nothing of Cyprus.” A casual extension of the range of dedications to include Cyprus is, of course, very easy to imagine (in the light of political suzerainty) and this may make one wary of Diodorus’ authority here ~ especially since the view could be taken that Amasis’ ostentatious dedicatory gestures were meant precisely for those places he did not control. The motive for falsely intruding Cyprus into the Apries campaign story is less clear. Whoever Apries’ adversaries were, they arc states inimical to Egyptian aspirations in the Levant. Before 586 they would be states also presumably hostile to Babylon, whereas after $74/3 they would effectively be acting in the Babylonian interest, but (since there is no evidence of Babylonian suzerainty over Cyprus at any date) Cypriot involvement at whichever date would have to result from what one might call private Phoenician-Cypriot links. These may have been more in the nature of mercenary service than political alliance or for that matter colonial dependence (and we should certainly hardly have to suppose that anything like all Cypriot cities were involved) but in any case one might assume that they had been activated because of the peculiar and novel threat represented by the advent of an Egyptian war fleet into east Mediterranean politics. At any rate, the general background to the events is, of course, the Egypto-Babylonian clash over the Levant (either a consequence of Psammetichus I's Palestinian activities and a prelude to the Babylonian assault on Tyre or a follow-up to that assault); the suggestion in Spalinger 1978: 20,24 altering his Position as stated in Spalinger 1977: 232-4 — that Apries and the Phoenicians 77 Loyd 1983: 339, 1988: 171; Leahy 1988. Either way Exek. 28.20 (agsinst Sidon) is ‘presumably connected, 78 Diodorus is actually careful not to say that Cyprus was captured; the contrast between his «aim that Sidon and other Phoenicians were made submissive and his silence about Cyprus is pointed Herodotus’ knowledge of Cyprus is not extensive (under twenty passages in the whole Histories), but iis even less extensive about e.g. Rhodes, where he nonetheless records a ‘Amasis dedication (2.182, 3.47), ” oes wousrorreyres36 (Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids ‘were actually fighting about possession of Cyprus for commercial reasons seems ‘gratuitous — though, of course, if the objects of commercial interest could be strategic commodoties like timber, the two views are not entirely distinct.® But ‘we should stress two things. First, the Cypriot element is in the first instance tangential to the calculations of the major protagonists. The Cypriots thrust themselves into the argument, so that it is at least possible that subsequent Egyptian rule in the island is so to speak self-inflicted. The Cypriots may have been responding to their perception of the logic of the situation, but their percep- tion could have been wrong. Second, even if the chronological horizon is the carly 580s then it has still taken some two decades for the logic of Egypto- Babylonian conflict over the Levant to suck Cyprus in; with a date in the late 570s we are talking of over three decades. And if we reject Diodorus’ testimony we have at the end of Apries’ reign still to reach a moment at which a Cypriot ‘component is properly attested. Things barely improve even then. ‘Apries? fall from power began with the revolt of Amasis in 571; by early $70 ‘Amasis had been formally crowned, though it required two further battles in the course of the year before Apries fled to take refuge with Nebuchadnezzar, whose armies may have moved as far as the eastern Delta at around this time.*! In the second battle of 570 Apries was supported by Greek soldiers (H3w nbw) on kbnt- ships (a term used for triremes) “from the island (iw)” and Edel 1978 suggested that these were Cypriots, further implicitly claiming that Amasis attacked the island in the course of 570 in response to Cypriot support of his adversary.)? A ‘more recent treatment of the subject (Leahy 1988) rejects this claim with argu- ments of uncertain weight. In the absence of contemporary parallel material itis hard (o tell whether it is more odd that the Elephantine stela should refer to Cyprus as “the island” than that it should so denominate the Memphis fortress! palace (which is Leahy’s view); and judgements about the likelihood of Apries or ‘Amasis having time/opportunity to go to Cyprus in the course of 570 would really depend on a better conception of the precise circumstances of the civil war than we can claim to have. (In particular, the argument that if Apries had left Egypt for Cyprus to get reinforcements he would have terminally ceded any claims to be king and texts in Thebes could not have gone on treating him as such begs alot of questions, especially since by October 570 — when BM 10113 uses Apries’ name ~ Apries had returned and fought again for his throne. Moreover the ostentatious- ly proper burial of Apries by his successor shows that there were sentiments 80 Itis, of course, true that Cypriots may have been moved not only by connections with mai Phoenician cities but by the impingement of the Babylonians upon north Phoenicia inthe shape ofthe destruction of Tell Sukas dated c. $88 by Ris and the hitus at AI Mina during the whole neo-Babylonian era (end of level V [600/580] until $30/20:ef. Perreault 1986: 146, 148) 81 Wiseman 1966: 155; and the historical background of the Coptic Cambyses Romance, hich appears io presuppose a NB atack on Apis a tine fom the on on Ama 8 82. On haw nbwt sce Vercouter 1949 (esp. texts LXX-LXXI and XCVII-C), Vandersleyen 1971: 154f, id. LAA is.v. Haunebo, Uphill 1967: 410. Vandrsleyen's denial thatthe erm ever meant “Greek” seems forced Sa SS Noone B. Swategy 37 favourable to Apries which required to be assuaged,) Still the more that Cyprus 's already as of 571/0 part of the Egyptian political horizon, the easier such things would be to understand, and the strongest ground for doubting Edel's view remains the complete absence of any cogent reason to ascribe acquisition of Cyprus to Apries. To say this is no doubt to privilege the firm assertion of a Greek historian who could nonetheless be wrong over the unclear assertion of the Egyptian composer of the Elephantine stela who certainly knew what he meant by “island” and was probably perfectly accurate in what he said about it. But itis hard to see what else we can do for the moment. The situation is different when we come to the amphibious Babylonian invasion of 567 which attempted inter alia to restore Apries to the throne. The Babylonian source (CCK 94f = BM 33041 = ANET 308) describes Amasis as having mobilized troops from Putuiaman (i.e. Libya/Cyrene), “the lands far off in the midst of the sea” and Egypt. The phrase in inverted commas is not necesarily in apposition to Putuiaman (cf. Brinkmann 1989: 60 n.35) and might perfectly well be a reference to Cyprus. Indeed one’s only immediate reservation about such an identification would be to wonder whether the chronicler could not have used a more precise proper name for the island if Cyprus alone was in question. But to say that isto say implicitly that the phrase might embrace several islands including Cyprus; and to speak of a precise proper name is to beg the question of ‘whether a sixth century Babylonian chronicler actually had a proper name for the island available to him. So there is nothing inherently impossible about a referen- ce to Cyprus, and the fact that Amasis is on record as the man who reduced Cyprus to tributary status certainly entitles us to formulate a scenario in which he achieved this in the first couple of years of his reign or maybe achieved a more equal relationship (like that with Cyrene?) which formed the basis for a later assertion of greater power. (We could even say that the Salamis-Cyrene link attested in the later sixth century ~ below p.40 - was simply an inheritance from Saite political arrangements.) Either way the acquisition of Cyprus would con- form to the strategic principles for the defense of Egypt also exemplified in Ptolemaic history ~ though Amasis’ use of it in 567 does not seem to have involved its deployment as a base for behind the line threat in the Levant and no later “use” of it of any sort is on record, in the absence of subsequent Neo- Babylonian threats to Egypt itself, an absence which we are liberty to ascribe precisely to Egyptian control of Cyprus. But this scenario, though possible, is not ineluctable. Reyes 1994: 71f, 77 indeed displays an inclination to deconstruct an Egyptian domination altogether ~ 4nextreme position for which he produces rather shaky grounds. (The discussion 3077 in particular seems unduly neglectful of the issue of tribute in Herodotus’ formulation.) More to the point, the “lands far off in the sea” of the Babylonian Chronicle could be a reference to Amasis’ greco-carian forces (perhaps even including some Cypriots ~ but not officially) and the date of Cypriot conquest could quite well be later. The motivation might still be the same (indeed after '510-S67 the pharaoh was bound in all contexts to think in terms of possible Babylonian threats to Egypt), but we could also at least add another dimension in leunouoIsi Sep MeBOnaT38 (Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids the Babylonian interest in Cilicia (pethaps acquired between $85 and 562, if nt inherited immediately upon the fall of the neo-Assyrian empire: ef. Lemaite 1991: 275) which spread into Rough Cilicia in the early 550s and included some use of naval forces, for example by Neriglssar aguinst “the city of Pitusuin the middle of the sea” alias the island of Piytussa (cf. Desideri & Jasink 1990: 1661). There is no reason why the perspective in which Cyprus is “approached” from Cilicia, already detected in our discussion of neo-Assyrian conditions (above p.21), should not remain relevant; and the fact that available source ‘material tends to privilege Egypt and the Levant should not be permitted excess. ve influence. A further observation - that if Wallinga 1991 is right to postulate a ‘major permanent naval military installation in Persian Cilicia the Cilician per spective will not have been lacking then either ~ brings us back to the subject of Cyprus" position in the Achaemenid era, C. PERSIAN EVALUATION AND ASSIMILATION The matters discussed in Sections A and B have highlighted the issue of the strategic roe of Cyprus; more generally they pose forthe Achaemenid historian the question of the island’s value to its Persian overlords and invite us to think about the attitude of Persians to Cyprus and Cypriots to Persia. The remainder of this chapter will deal with various aspects ofthese questions. How important a part of their state did Achaemenid kings actually think Cyprus? There are few direct sources. It is atleast doubtful thatthe presence of Cypriot coins in the Persepolis foundation deposit represents a distinctive stae- ment on the subject. (On one view ~ Calmeyer 1985 — it merely shows that the Cypriots, unlike other western coin-producers, were loyal at the time,) Herodotus represents the Milesian Aristagoras seeking to persuade Artaphemes of the merits of conquering Euboea by comparing its size with Cyprus (5.31). One's first reaction isto object that Euboes is not the same size as Cyprus and did not Contain as many substantial city-states. On that basis one might then argue that the comparison is actually deliberately misleading and that Herodotus’ attributi- on of to Aristagoras isa reflection of the historian's conviction that the Persians considered Cyprus a specially valuable possession. Part of this argument is on reflection vulnerable: the difference in size ofthe two islands may not have been absolutely obvious on fifth century maps ~ and a conventional list of Mediterra- nean islands in descending order of magnitude (one already extant by the mid fourth century) certainly put Euboea and Cyprus in adjacent positions. But it 83. Essential tems are: (a) joint Babylonian-Cilician mediation between Lydia and Media in S85 (id. 174), () Nebuchadnezzar's undated operations in Hume and Piriddu (Lambert, DiKS) © Nerilisar's campaign against Piiddy revolt (ABC 103f, CCK 39, 74, 86, with Davesne, Lemaire & Lormacheu 1987), (4) Nabonidus’ Cillian operations in $56/5 and 5/4 (ABC, 105, Beaulieu 1989: 20 #1), texts on Cilician iron from reigns of Nabopo= lassar and Nabonidus (Joannes 1991: 2631), 84 Ps-Scyl. praeh, 114, Alexis f:268 = 270 KA, Aristo.de mundo 393a 13, Stab. 142.10. i . Persian Evaluation and Assimilation 39 does seem hard to deny that an island containing Salamis, Citium, Amathus, Paphos, Marium and Soloi ought to have seemed more impressive than one whose largest entities were Chalcis, Eretria, Hestiaea and Geraestus. So the initial inference may after all hold good. But whether Herodotus” conviction was based ‘on anything more than his knowledge of Cypriot contributions to the Persian war- fleet is another matter. Leaving aside any strategic considerations Cyprus had two things to offer Persia, tribute and military forces. (Xenophon Cyropaedia 7.4.2 summarizes Cyprus’ situations as rule by local kings combined with liability to dasmos and nilitary service.) About the former we have no special information: Herodotus? tribute-list (3.89f1) does not even profess to provide a figure for Cyprus alone. A fragment of Ctesias (688F30) refers to the phoros of Evagoras (possibly tempora~ rily withheld), confirming if this were needed that it was the individual kingdoms which owed tribute separately to the Great King. There is no relevant documen- tary evidence: the donations of royal land in the Idalion Tablet (ICS 217) to be held “without tax” refer to local taxes payable to the King and the same will be tre of the notations on the base of certain jars from Amathus (Petit 1988: 4881), if indeed itis right to connect these with taxation at all. (A fourth century pithos from Vouni marked Imlk may also belong here.) Such local taxation was pre- sumably part of the means by which the king amassed the wherewithal to pay his, Persian tribute, but that is the most that we can say; and I fear that T am not convinced that Helzer 1991a adds much that is reliable and novel. As for military resources, Cypriot ships appear as a significant element in Persian fleets on various occasions. (An indirect reflection of the Cypriots’ status, among components of Achaemenid naval power is perhaps provided by the unknown, presumably fifth century, mythistorian who insinuated successive Cypriot, Phoenician and Egyptian thalassocracies into the early history of east Mediterranean sea-power: Forrest 1969). It is notable that such attestations become rare after the Cypriot contribution to the fleet defeated by Cimon’s forces at Salamis in 450; indeed thereafter we only specifically hear of Cypriot ships in Persian service in the fleet which fought at Cnidus in 394 — a fleet in whose creation Evagoras had played a specially prominent role perhaps for reasons of his own. There is a danger that this prolonged silence is merely an accident: the sources on the fourth century are simply less good about explaining the constitu- tion of Persian naval forces, and it is possible that the rather vague remarks in Tsocrates 3.31f about Nicocles’ assistance to the King refer to naval service. Cypriot warships were certainly not lacking (cf. the fourth century shipsheds at CCitium and the evidence of the Alexander historians). But it may be significant that the Persian fleets mentioned by Thucydides, Diodorus, Plutarch and others in connection with the 440 Samian revolt and the supposed mobilization in 411 are "epeately designated simply as Phoenician or on one oecsion Phoenician and cian, 85 Shipsheds: Chron, 1988: 827f, 1989: 825f, 1990: 965, 1991: B12f, 1994: 672. There was increased “militarization” in Byblos and elsewhere in later fifth century (Elayi 1984b, 1992), which might be relevant. -I am unsure what to make of Theophrastus’ statement (Hist Plant.5.8.1) about kings (Cypriot or Persian?) preferring not to cu trees.40 (Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenid Cyprus never had a satrap under the Achaemenids (any more than in the various early provincial divisions of the Successor period: Arrian 156 FF 1, 9), neither one imposed from outside (i. an Iranian) nor a native king elevated to that role, (The man who authorizes travel by Cypriots ~ cf. below p.43 ~does not hhave to be a satrap of Cyprus.) In this respect it differs from some other dynastic areas of the empire, for example Cilicia, Lycia, Caria, which were eventually embraced within the satrapal system — or it does so unless one accepts Petts ‘view (1988) that description of non-Persian dynasts such as Mausollus as satraps is improper and cannot have been official. The safest comparison is with the Levantine Phoenician cities, since nobody is ever said to have been satrap of Phoenicia or the like either. That comparison shows, of course, that the lack of satrapal office does not in itself mean that Cyprus was thought unimportant, Indeed it principally reflects the realization that the two areas with their long established city-states had a satisfactorily defined internal organisation and one which, being monarchic, was not conceptually alien. Evagoras’ success in 381/0 in negotiating a treaty under which he submitted to Artaxerxes “as a king to a ‘king” (most likely a reinstatement of the status quo ante) strikingly symbolizes this bias towards monarchy. A cynical interpreter might, of course, observe that Artaxerxes would only have conceded so much to a rebel if he thought him essentially harmless, at least after the ravages inflicted in the fighting. Certainly the situation is one which, given other considerations such as the insularity of Cyprus, is consistent with a certain attitude of detachment, At Some point in (roughly) the last third of the sixth century Arcesilas IIT of Cyrene and his mother Pheretime were forced by stasis to flee into exile. He went to Samos, she to the court of King Euelthon of Salamis, both in search of military forces to help effect their restoration, Euelthon refused, but Arcesilas was more fortunate and after his return he despatched some captured political enemies to Euelthon to be dis sposed of (though they escaped when a storm carried them to Caidus) ~ a move which shows that Euelthon’'s refusal of military support was Rot counted by Arcesilas or intended by Eulethon as a sign of political hostility. The date of these events is controversial, and it is sometimes argued that they ‘must predate Arcesilas’ submission to Persia in 525, otherwise he would have appealed to Persia for help. This, of course, is what his mother did later when she called in the Egyptian satrap Aryandes to avenge Arcesilas’ murder, an episode Which Herodotus synchronizes with the Scythian expedition, around a decade later than the conquest of Egypt. To me it seems clear that Arcesilas’ Samian Contact must post-date the removal of Polycrates (otherwise I find it hard to believe that the story would come to us unadomed with Polycrates’ name), and this effectively dates it a or after the end of the 520s, Euelthon and Arcesilas are both (nominally at least) Persian subjects and the episode may serve to warn US that such dynasts, rightly or wrongly, did not necessarily suppose that Persian Suzerainty lost them the right to behave as quasi-free agents when defending theit own internal interests as rulers oftheir states. Of course the precise circumstances nay have encouraged this approach. We might for example postulate that Arcesi- |as’ expulsion occurred during the period of disturbed Persian control of Egypt . Persian Evaluation and Assimilation 41 sme time in 520 (itself an aspect of wider chaos engendered by ‘would have to look to Greek states which (perhaps) had a history of friendship ‘with Cyrene, and their responses might naturally be unaffected either way by consideration of their obligations to an empire under serous thet of disintgra ton Butt would be unwise to rey excessively on this cena, both because th dating i quite speculative and beease it open to question bow widely the threat of disintegration was appreciated in the Oreck world. The behaviour cess, Euethon andthe rlers of Samos may have besa zegaded by them as being in any case consistent with their submission to the Persian King. Euelthon's response to Peretime = that an army was no sort of gift fo give to woman —may lok ike an excuse, but it was acepted as being in good faith and should not sumed to hea cover forthe Cypriots eling that a the King's subject he was ot allowed to interfere in Cyrenean affairs. . : his eign to facilitate Athenian access to certain desirable commodities (com; timber, bronze). Scholars not unnaturally are tempted to speculate about his “real” motives, But given Athens circumstances at the time itis hard to see that te can have entertained very serious hopes (at least in the shor tem) of substantial quld pro quo in the shape of gp in commun Cypras ling against Persia. If anything it is margis t rscipd political undercurrent was an Athenian desire for co-operation wih a pre-Pesan power (ef. Zoumatzi 1992) Bu the ral determinants were probably sfeent and simpler. The second half ofthe filth century hed seen a revival i Atbenian-Levantne trade (at leat as measured by finds of Athenian pottery). This cenaily impinged upon Cyprus, which lay on the route east and Athenians or Athens-based traders were probably quite commonplace inthe island. (Andoci- des gravitated towards Cyprus in 415 ~ and ended up in prison in Ciiom = because it was a familianif somewhat outof-he-way place the husband of a woman at Thesmophoriazousae 446 is imagined as dying in Cyprus not ~ as is Sometimes claimed: Collombier 1975: 108 ~ because he had been involved Civil conflict in Salamis but because it was the sort of foreign place where Athenian citizens went in the ordinary course of events.) When Athens came 19 have a pressing need for certain strategic materials tis hardly surprising that Athenians should have looked for them in Cyprus or that Evagora was prepared to smooth the way for their provision ~ viewing the mater simply as a busines transaction. The fact that Athens was at war with Persia (albeit intermittently imerested in negotiating a deal) was something tobe regarded a quits irrelevant Athens’ subsequent award of citizenship to Evagoras™ shows indeed that his help was very important and may, as one component, reflect the existence Of 8 ‘tongly philhellenic tone in Evagoras' intercourse wit individual represent vesof the iy: it perhaps sited Evagoras tobe seen as helping his quasi mother city. But we cannot infer that he was consciously embarking on a political ag 85 167113, Dem.12.10, s00.9.54, Paus.1.32. sumouorin GOP MOONrN, 42 ‘Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids ‘which was hostile to Persia: for him it was none of Persia’s business, and there is ro evidence that Darius II saw the matter differently. In the neo-Assyrian period the kings of Cyprus could, despite their insular position, be included amongst those of Ebir Nari or Abarnahara, ic. the land across the River Euphrates*? — logically enough, since in Assyrian terms both Cyprus and Tyre or Arados (cities on islands immediately adjacent to the coast) could be described as “in the midst of the sea”, and Tyre and Arados would naturally be reckoned by anyone as part of the continent. The concept of Ebir Nari continued in use in the Persian period and indeed designated an area which had a satrap, though until comparatively late that satrap was also satrap of Babylonia and thus a rather distant functionary (Stolper 1989). It is not crystal clear how, for example, the kings of Phoenicia stood administratively in relation to this transeuphratene satrapy; but one assumes that in general geo-political terms Phoenicia was regarded as in Ebir Nari. Is the same true of Cyprus? One will naturally suppose so, and there is an outside chance that an unpublished Persepolis Fortification text, L1-2409, refers to Cypriot workers “from (As)syria”, from Athura = Ebir Nari (Hinz & Koch 1987: 643; but cf. n.89). But this throws up a problem of identity. Its likely that the Persians essentially perceived Ebir Nari as a region inhabited by speakers of NW Semitic languages (Aramai Hebrew and Phoenician) and the iconography of the constituents of the empire on Persian Royal Monuments duly represents the area by figures in N.Syrian (Ara- maic) dress (Calmeyer 1990). The dilemma is this: Cyprus certainly has no independent existence in these Lists of Peoples, so is it (i) regarded as part of Ebir Nari (in which case tacitly as entirely Phoenician), (ii) regarded as contai- ning both semites who are part of Ebir Nari (alias Athura) and Greeks who are covered by the category Yauna also found in the Lists, or (ii) simply ignored? ‘The fact that whatever source lies behind Herodotus” tribute list counts Cyprus along with Syria-Palestine in the fifth nomos does not prove the first possibility since anything else (except perhaps assigning Cyprus a whole nomos to itself) would have been geographically unreasonable. But in the light of certain indicat- cons that entry into the empire was accompanied by greater exposure to Phoenic ‘an cultural signals (more on this later) and of the fact that the shifting descriptions of categories of Lonians in the lists can all be understood in relation to western ‘Anatolia, the eastern Aegean and Thrace I do think that there may be something to be said for it. Against it may have to be set the tantalising reference to “the famous city Samine of the land Kupru” and “the lamuniammu (? Tonians]" in Sachs & Hunger 1988 no, ~ 440 (redated to the fourth century by van Speck 1993: 87 cf the Nineveh comvé tents: Borger 1956 27, p.60, ep. 21.54-82, ANET 291, ARAB 2.690 hough sometimes we find "coasts and islands" ‘88 ‘This assumes thatthe view that yaiy drayaha ate or include Cyprus (e.g. Herrenschmidt 1976: 3, Wallinga 1991) isnot accepted: DB arguably recognised the existence of “people in the sea” who shouldbe islanders and, judging by DPe, were “lonians”, but these can be Sought in the Aegean, Wallinga's argument that Cilicia contained the empire'schief naval ‘base doesnot require postulation of asingleadministrative entity embracing Cilicia, Cyprus and the Levant or indentifcaton ofthis area with ryaly drayaha. . Persian Evaluation and Assimilation 43 196). Whatever the decision, of course, no particular conclusion can be inferred about the Persian valuation of Cyprus as a possession. And the same probably goes for the fact that ~ unless the kupirriya who appear as kurta¥ in PT 49.5, 545, 55.5 (all 466/5 BCE), L1-1612: 5 and L1-2409 (both 498/7 BCE) and as travellers to Persepolis under authorization from Dattana in Q-1888 (495/4 BCE) ‘are Cypriots (rather than the “copperers” which Cameron took them to be)® — ‘Cyprus does not appear as such either in other Persian or near-eastern sources. (There are regrettably no Cypriots in the newly revealed maritime tax document from Egypt: Yardeni 1994.) Cyprus did on several occasions rebel against the central authority of the Great King. We have already spoken about one, in some respects rather special case, that of King Evagoras. The behaviour of both sides in the other cases is, worth a few moments’ consideration. “The rebellions tend to be in some measure prompted by outsiders. The revolt ‘0f498 arose from a conjunction of the separatist inclinations of the brother of the king of Salamis and the incitement of emissaries from the rebels in Tonia. A century and a half later another rebellion is said by Diodorus to have been a case of imitating the already rebellious Egyptians and Phocnicians (16.42). There was also a revolt in 478, though it is not always so categorised. The conquest of Cyprus ascribed to regent Pausanias by Thucydides (1.94) and Diodorus (11.44) and achieved with astonishing rapidity (since later within the same campaigning season the Hellenic League forces were busy besieging Byzantium) must be seen in these terms: the arrival of Pausanias’ fleet on top of the secession of western Anatolian Greeks from Xerxes in 479/8 provoked a revolt in a fashion parallel to 498, perhaps all the more encouraged by the fact that many Cypriots had been participant specatators of the Persian defeats at Salamis and Mycale. (Stylianow 1985 notes that Penthylus of Paphos and Philaon of Salamis were among the prisoners taken in Greece and may have had some influence on subsequent events in Cyprus; but the inference from Aeschylus Persians 891f that Salamis, Paphos and Soloi were the ringleaders of revolt in 478 seems quite unwarranted.) On the other hand, Cypriots did not always rebel when, one might say, chances offered themselves. Cimon’s expedition in ¢.450 does not seem to have provoked enthusiastic support in all quarters: according to Thucydides 1.112 there were Cypriots fighting in the Persian fleet at Salamis, and the dream-omen incorporated into the account of the campaign preserved in Plutarch’s Cimon makes a point of the fact that Persian armies contain Greek elements. There is also no clear sign of a Cypriot component to the various disturbances around the end of the 360s which parts ofthe historical tradition sewed together into a Great ‘Satraps’ Revolt. Near-contemporary sources liked to note the parallel between the fates of Nicocles and Strato of Sidon, who in their heyday engaged in a 89 The suggestion comes from Lewis (unpublished) and Koch 1994. Lewis’ notes quote & suggestion from M.W.Stolper that Dattana (who also appears in PF 1527 and L1-349) might be Tattenai.~ Hinz & Koch 1987 deal with kuppirriyaip differently again, taking itin PT 49, L1-1012, L1-2409 as a derivative from the toponym Kaupiris (a place NW Persepolis) and in PT 54,55 a the elamite version of kufriva,ranslated as “pitch-workers uno UoIwin SOP NORONTT44 ‘Chapter 1, Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids competition of conspicuous consumption but then both met a violent death after being put in chains (Nicocles) or falling into poverty (Strato).°” Strato died (atthe hands of his wife) after making an alliance with the Egyptians; but it does not follow that Nicocles’ death (at an unknown date before 354/3: cf. Isocrates 15.67) ‘was similarly the result of anti-Persian action. We simply do not know enough about the internal affairs of the Salaminian court to rule out another episode of internal instability of the sort which had claimed Evagoras’ life in 374/3. Of ‘course, if scepticism turns out not to be justified, this is likely to be another ‘occasion where external influence played a part. Moreover revolts when they happened did not maintain solidarity or persist ‘The operations of Phocion and Idrieus in the 340s rapidly confined themselves only to Salamis, the other cities having apparently given in more or less immedia- tely. Successful resistance in 498 was compromised by a switch of sides on the part of Curium and of an important element in Salamis (Hat, 5.113), though admittedly Paphos and Soloi held out and had to be reduced by siege, and there are additional signs of destruction which might date to 498/7 at Tamassos (the ‘Aphrodite temple) and Marion (the Peristeries sanctuary and elsewhere).”! There is, we may observe in passing, a curiously tolerant or gentlemanly attitude in Salamis about the issue of defection in 498, which may (or may not) be consistent with Stylianou’s analysis in terms of “progressives” and “moderates”, Onesilos, the ring-leader, did not raise the standard of rebellion by killing his brother, King Gorgos, who opposed defection, he merely in effect exiled him. ‘And when Onesilos was in turn killed in battle, his corpse, exposed to contumely in the city of Amathus, was then declared to have been the subject of a miraculous infestation by bees with the result that he was tumed into a hero — an arrangement which, I would like to think, was prompted by pressure from Gorgos, now restored as King of Salamis and disinclined to look on while the Amathusians treated his brother as a common criminal. The circumstances of the disputes between Pnytagoras and Evagoras Il in the mid-fourth century are less clearly reported; but here too the original ousting of Evagoras had not been accompanied by his death ‘What happened in 478 is less clear. The Persians tended to take measures to contain disturbances in Cyprus fairly rapidly, making use of relatively local resources either from Cilicia/Levant (498, 450) or Caria (390 [abortive], 340s) - a tendency which no doubt discloses a fair degree of concern about stability in the island. In 478, within 9 months or 50 of Plataea and Mycale, their capacity for 90 Theop. 115 F114, Anaxim. 72 F 18; ef. Max.Tyr.14.2. 91 Tamassos: Stylianou 1985; 53/427; Buchholz 1985: 247. Marion: Chroniques 1990: 9826, 1991: 829, 1992: 819, Herodotus failure 1o mention the Paphos siege seems odd in view of the massive archaeological remains of the siege ramp (e.g. Maier 1984) ~ even if as Professor Maier suggests the ramp could have been constructed in as litle as six weeks ~ bbut he was atthe mercy of his sources, and the amount of detail on Soloi ~ which had ‘Athenian connections ~ suggests thir priorities were different (For archaeological evidence cf. Styianou I<.) Lavelle 1984 detect in the apparently casval annotation that Curium was an Argive colony a subtext criticizing Argive neutrality in 480, . Persian Evaluation and Assimilation 45 rapid response may have been somewhat impaired. Some historians (Meiggs 1972; 477; Stylianou 1985: 441f) affirm that the (Greek) Cypriots entered the Delian League in 478 and remained there until after 449, This seems unlikely, since by the time of the Eurymedon campaign in the early-middle 460s Cypriot Ships were again serving in the Persian fleet. Order had clearly been restored by then, but how, quickly or easily is obscure. The complete silence of the sources probably does not prove that it was achieved without any notable difficulty; for that silence is arguably overwhelmingly due to obsessive interest in the later developments of Pausanias’ career and their repercussions in the Aegean. Moreo- ‘ver we know from the Idalion tablet (ICS 217) that at some time in the first half of the fifth century the “Medes” cooperated with Citium in a war against Idalion; a date immediately after 478 would be consistent with relevant archaeological and numismatic evidence (which, as normally stated, places ICS 217 prior to a destruction level on the Idalion west acropolis in the second part of CA IIB ~ ic. ‘on the Swedish Expedition's chronological system the very end of 600/475 — and demonstrates the absorption of the city into the Citian kingdom after 450)? and ‘would allow us to see in the “Medes” the Persian troops forces drafted in from outside which we should expect by analogy with other occasions. (Contrast e.g. Petit 1991a: 163 who places the events in ICS 217 in 498/7.) But how long a time elapsed before the island was entirely pacified? The general view is that the particular siege mentioned in the Idation tablet was actually unsuccessful and this, ‘may seem to leave open the possibility of a lengthy period before trouble was entirely over. There are, however, objections to this inference. On the one hand, if the west acropolis destruction-level of late CA IIB represents the eventual Persi- an capture, it cannot in any case be very long after 478 (itis already arguably pushing the evidence very hard to make it that late at all - unless, of course, the limits of Gjerstad’s site-periodization are substantially altered). On the other hand, the view that ICS 217 precedes Persian repossession of Idalion assumes that, since Stasikypros was still king at the date of composition of the tablet he had not yet been defeated by the Persians, and this in turn makes certain assump- tions about Persian treatment of rebels which might be false ~ though, to be sure, concluding that they are false will pose interesting questions about the subse quent destruction level (see further p.78). 92 West Acropolis: SCE 4.2.473 n.S with Petit 1991a: 163. The single report of more recent “American investigations on the W.Acropolis (Chronique 1988: 831) describes the destucti~ ‘on level as that ofthe Ctian capture in "450". Its unclear whether tis i being proposed as «radical re-dating on strictly archaeological grounds ~ though to have described things in ‘tat fashion for any other reason (e.g. that 450 is, on numismati evidence, the horizon of Citian absorption of dation) would be a stunningly improper pettioprincipil. Sentt 1993: 174.630 questions the connection between W. Acropolis destruction and Citian conquest on the ground tha the Apollo sanctuary (in a more exposed postion) survived the period intact (as for that matter did the East Acropolis “Aphrodite” sanctuary): and Maier 1994: 310 ‘quotes new investigations by M.Hadjicost as indicating thatthe acropolis was not so much ‘destroyed as gradually abandoned. (There i a classical zone artisanal, and fourth century syllabary/Pboenician bilingual ostraca have been found. See BCH 1992: 816f, 1994: 6776.) ‘The archaeological situation seems increasingly to be too much in need of clarification for it to cast any cogent light upon the historical one. euunojoiei Gop 4OHRONGIS46 ‘Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids Certainly, there do seem to be signs of Persian complaisance towards trouble- some Cypriot kings. We have already contemplated the case of Evagoras’ suc- Cessful retention of his throne, and there is no clear countervailing evidence elsewhere. 1. After 498 the Persians were prepared to trust Cypriots military forces ‘within 4 years, deploying them against the Tonians at Lade. But itis hard to prove that this is the result of wholesale, or any, dynasty changes. (a) Kagan 1994 draws attention to a number of coin issues (unassignable with any certainty to any particular city) which cease atthe turn of the sixth and fifth centuries. There are two possible inferences. One is that a number of mints ceased to operate after the Tonian Revolt. But, if so, it leaves one in the dark about the stability or otherwise ‘of Cypriot dynasties ~ for a new dynasty in a given city might just as well issue ‘coins a its displaced predecessor. The other inference is that several mints changed their types radically enough to conceal continuity of operation. This would, of course, be more consonant with the hypothesis of dynastic change. At the moment, however, it is unclear how one should choose between the two inferences. (b) Paphos suffered and succumbed to siege but there seems to be no actual interruption in coining. Kagan 1994 does note some unusual details in what may be immediately post-Ionian Revolt issues ~ including the appearance of a Phoenician aleph — but it is doubtful how much one should make of this. Regal names in the post-siege period seem to be consistently Greek ~ though this does not prove there was not some change of personnel. We simply do not know.2? (c) At Lapethos the two earliest preserved king-names are Demonicus and Sidqmelek. They come in that order, though not necessarily in immediate succesion. It is naturally tempting to postulate Greek and Phoenician dynasties, the change from one to another being a result of the Ionian Revolt. But all Lapethos coins are inscribed in Phoenician until the Alexander era, irrespective of the kings’ names, and when one considers Sasmas son of Doxandros at Marion (both reigned in the period after 498) or Eiromos son of Euelthon at Salamis (some time before 498), it seems clear that Sidgemelek and Demonikos do not have to represent different families. On the other hand Kagan 1994: 48 reckons that “the changes in type... first to that used by Sidgmelek and then to the coins of ‘Andr- and Demonicus Il is quite extraordinary from a numismatic perpective and indicative of some sort of change”. The strongest element is perhaps the decided- ly unhellenic appearance of some aspects of Sidqmelek’s coin-reverses (rather than the various overlapping shifts of type in the century from c.500 to ¢.400) — but Sidqmelek does not have to be a direct successor to the events of 498. 2. A change from Greek to Phoenician rulers certainly did happen in Salamis after the mid-century, but, although Isocrates does speak of the Phoenician usurper barbarizing the city and making the island subject to the Great King, he avoids claiming that the episode represented Persian reaction to Salaminian 93. Other signals about post-497 Paphos are conflicting. Numbers of tombs are held to indicate 1 prosperous fifth century polity, but the city-walls were not rebuilt until €.350 and the anadian Palaepaphos survey indicates some economic setback inthe first half of the fifth century (Sorensen: communcation at April 1994 Transeuphraténe conference). . Persian Evaluation and Assimilation a rebellion. It is, of course, tempting to locate the shift in the aftermath of Cimon’s expedition. But as we have already seen itis far from clear how much rebellion happened on that occasion, and despite the differences between Thucydides and other sources there is no suggestion that Salamis actually came into Athenian hands though this may, of course, be very much due to the presence of a Persian garrison. Moreover, it is not obvious that Phoenician usurpation could not be dated before 450; and Stylianou 1985 has floated the idea thatthe original usurper may even have been a Phoenician relative-by-marriage of the Teucrid clan ~ it is certainly clear that there is a contrast between him and the outsider (whether TTyrian or Citian) Abdemon from whom Evagoras had to flee. 3, The rebellion in the 340s was not apparently followed by wholesale displacement of Cypriot kings. Even Paytagoras, who held out after others had submitted, eventually made willing submission to the King and continued as ruler ‘of Salamis. (There had been a period in the meanwhile in which the King could be said to be “helping” Pnytagoras — to the disadvantage of his brother, predecessor and rival Evagoras II. The circumstances are not clear, but Evagoras is said to have been falsely accused (diabléthéntos} though he later repelled the charges ‘and perhaps became a king in Phoenicia.) If Pnytagoras survived all the other kings must surely have done so. ‘Al things considered, the history of Cypriot revolts seems to disclose a rather laid-back attitude by all parties. Cypriot cities seem prone to jump on band- ‘waggons and then jump off them again and the Persians, though concerned to suppress disorder, seem inclined to regard this behaviour tolerantly. I have sometimes wondered whether those late fourth century kings who, after siding with Ptolemy in or around 321, also entered into communication with Antigonus, eventually provoking Ptolemy into ruthless suppression of all the monarchies, were not trading on traditional assumptions about the latitude extended to their predecessors by the Achaemenids and appalled and affronted when the new men ofthe region proved to play according to different and more brutal rules. The “hands off” attitude exemplified by the lack of a Cypriot satrap is, reflected in other ways. Persian garrisons are only spoken of in Cyprus on two ‘cecasions, 478 (when Diodorus says they existed in all cities and Nepos Pausa- nias 2.1 speaks of them in the plural) and 450 (when Diodorus envisages one in Salamis but not apparently elsewhere). They clearly did not represent a military occupation able to stem rebellion or resist Athenian aggression (at least on the earlier occasion) and can hardly be regarded as a sigificant element of Persian rule 35 94 Stylianow 1985 thinks Diodorus inverted Salamis and Citium and should have said that Salamis was captured; but the expedient does not resolve all the sources’ inconsistencies, and so is of doubtful value. Closest to an epigraphically attested garrison commander is Param (son of Gerastart 1) the commandant of Lapethos in Larnax 3 (Snyczer 1988: 59), a text conceivably of pre-330 date. But Param (perhaps a relative of the later rb’rs in Larnax 2) is seaeely a Persian: appointed official. Tere is no reason to extend the period of office of Gerastart the rb in Larnax 2, before 330. (The office is variously understood by Seibert 1976, Parmentier 1987, Teixidor 1988.) None of the administrative officials known at Citium (ef. n.152) can be related specifically o Persian rule, though two are called PRSY. 9s48 ‘Chapter 1. Cypras Before and Under the Achaemenids ‘A survey of archaeological and onomastic evidence points in a similar direction: atleast, the sort of Iranian settlement which characterized Anatolia was ‘evidently not practised in Cyprus, for there is only a very small Iranian clement in the onomastic heritage of the island (six names shared amongst eight individuals can be cited)®® and no importation of Iranian deities at all.” The “cist” tombs which have been thought diagnostic of Iranian military / official presence in the Levant (Stem 1982, Tuplin 1987: 204f) are absent. At least six neo-Babylonian seals have been found in Cyprus,%® but there is (as yet) no sign of genuine Persian seal-stones there and only isolated examples of court-style pyramid seals or ‘greco-persian gems with Cypriot provenance (Boardman 1970a: no.168; 1970b: fig.891). Yet (at least in the archaic period) Cyprus scems to have been not ‘without importance in the field of gem-cutting and in the spread of the art-form to the Greek world (Boardman 1968, 1989b: 44f), so the silence suggests that there ‘were no customers for such cultural hybrids. More generally the sort of “greco-persian” monuments which are a feature of, ‘Achaemenid Anatolia and may be deemed an indirect sign of the presence of high-status Persians scem to be largely missing in Cyprus: it is symbolic that Borchhardt 1968 included the Amathus and Golgoi sarcophagi in alist of epicho- ric monuments drawn up in the context of greco-persian art, but then found nothing to say about them.'°! Some comment might have been in order at least on the Golgoi hunt-scene: hunting is a characteristic icon of “greco-persian” art and 96 1, zo-pu-ro-se (ICS 128 {Marion}; necropolis text, dated 6th-tth cc.). 2. Orontas, sof Grontas (Hadjiioannow 1980: n0.195: imperial period). 3. Agathokles Makronos Perses (Nikolaou 1984 Ad; ptolemaic) 4-5. Two PRSY in the genealogy of 'RS of Citium (Guzzo ‘Amadasi 1978, KAI 34 = Kition II'B45), a dynasty of holders of the title RB SRS M, of, ‘which first PRSY is “founder”. PRSY should be regarded as Persaios, Bonnet 1990: 145.6 PRSY (CIS 1.15 = Kition III B20 {text lost save for copy by Pocockel.). 7. Persaeus of Citium (toie philosopher). 8. Satrapas (ICS 3 [Nea Paphos}, as interpreted by Mitford 1960: If; but Masson ICS p.394 is unimpressed). 9. Satrapas ho arkhos (Masson 1988:63-8: Chronique 1989: 793), dedicat of a text at Tala (north Paphian teritory) under King [Nicocles. He might be a religious minister of Nicocles. (Text resembles type of ICS 23 {rom Apollo Hylates at Paphos) 10. Mi-ti-ri-wo-se (ICS 149 {amphora graffito)), interpe- ted by Munro 1891: 309 as genitive of Mithris (Mithriwos). “Peu plavsible” according t0 Masson ad Toc, But Lecoq 1974: 43 0.58 has a similar views and cf. Mayrhofer 1973: 8.1167. 11. Onesandros Artabatou honours S Sulpicius Pancles Veranianus (Mitford 1950, ‘5(b); second half frst. CE). 97 Despite occasional deployment of Bes in Achaemenid contexts (Graziani 1978) there is n0 specific cause to see Achaemenid overtones in that figures Cypriot manifestations. 98 ef. ICS pLLX 1-2, Boardman 1970a: 21f, Buchanan & Moorey 1988: no.564; Chronique 1988: 80s, 99 The sealing from a presumed archive at Amathus shows a figure of Kore: Petit 1992: 485 11, ~ The Cypriots used diphiherai (ICS 143; Baurain 1992: 410) ~ which makes a> entirely accidental parallel with a famous Persian archive, published in Driver 1957. 100 There are about ten Cypriot provenances for clasical gems in Boardman 1970b, proporto nally fewer provenances than for archaic. The reputation of Cypriot gems is noted in ‘Theoph.de lap4.5, 6.35, Athen.689B, Plin.NH37.8. 101 Elayi 1988 regards them as essentially Phoenician, albeit with a Greek artistic imprint ~ but mainland Phoenician analogues ae all later, C. Persian Evaluation and Assimilation 49 layi 1987a: 69 regards hunt-scenes on Levantine Phoenician architectural sarco- phagi as showing that Phoenician princes resembled neo-Assyrian and Persian fnonarchs in ascribing the activity an ideological importance. Perhaps the same does not apply at Golgoi: there is little other evidence about Cypriot hunting!”? ‘and the Golgoi hunt appears to be a rather mundane affair. But I suspect Borchhardt’s silence about monuments which also include such characteristic greco-persian subjects as banquets and processions is partly an implicit stylistic judgment and partly due to the absence of any recognisably “Iranian” figure. In ine sense, of course, if there is no Persian figure there cannot be greco-persian at, But (i) in Elayi's view the two sarcophagi (like such things in Levantine Phoenicia) are essentially unhellenic objects, (ii) they are presumably princely, if not royal, objects, as such a thing would have been in mainland Phoenicia and (ii) the issue is not solely one of art if given icons, representing given activities and appearing on a given class of object (relief-carved funerary monuments), are significant when they involve men in Persian dress, how are we to be sure that they cease to be significant when there are no Iranian clothes but everything else stays the same? It may be that we can dispense with the postulated Iranian patron (what we have seen so far would encourage that anyway) but architectural sarcophagoi are a rare novelty in Achaemenid Cypris and we can legitimately assume that those who ordered or designed the decoration, even if non-lIranian, had something in mind. Nor can we entirely forget that, if there is no Persian dress, there is at least a parasol on the Amathus sarcophagus. ‘Material evidence will not, of course, necessarily tell the whole story about all forms of Persian impact; and the stories that it does tell may reveal various reflections of the ruling power. Mainland Phoenicia saw its fair share of Persian functionaries and armies over the two hundred years or so it was part of the empire, but there is not that much sign of it on or in the ground (cf. n.134) — even When there was in principle something to show: consider, for example, the fact that a large Levantine Persian royal estate — something representing considerable Persian intrusion/interference postulated in the region of the R.Eleutheros leaves no material traces at all (Sapin 1989, 1990). There is, of course, no particular reason to postulate such things in Cyprus. Even the slight onomastic 4nd historical evidence available in the Eleutheros region is lacking in Cyprus. ‘The nearest approach is the gloss ganos: hupo de tn Kyprion paradeisos (EM sw), The glossographers must have had some reason to use the Iranian word rather than just e.g. képos to explain the semitic original and so-called paradeisoi occur overwhelmingly within the bounds of Persian imperial occupation, so itis tempting o infer some Persian impact upon the Cypriot landscape. An estate and 8 paradeisos are not, however, the same thing (though the latter may be one clement within the former) and a paradeisos does not have to be more than a well-ordered orchard. The nature and extent of the impact therefore remain arguable, as does the extent of direct Persian involvement. If there could be a "02 Stags were hunted around Curium (AeLNA 11.7); and there is a unique fragmentary statuete from Kythrea of a horseman hunting a lion (Crouwel & Tation-Brown 1991: Ba plaxvi), Universitat Manche Bibllothek aes Historicums 1p MOURA eunsporsisa are Sy 50 ‘Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids ‘paradeisos in early fourth century Rhegium (Theophrastus HP 4.5.6), then there Could doubtless be purely Cypriot imitation ones in Cyprus." Still even such a phenomenon is scarcely without significance, and the principle that impact need hot be in the form of direct Iranian military or administrative settlement is important. It is, for example, just as interesting to speculate, if inconclusively, about what the special association of Curium and Perseus meant to Curians and the extent to which they promoted it in the light of Greek etymological con- nections between Persia and the rescuer of Andromeda. Borchhardt claims that the Perseus figures on the Limyra mausoleum say something about Pericles’ attitude to Persia. Does the inclusion of Perseus on one end of the Golgoi Sarcophagus deserve similar consideration?!°5 (A world in which the persuasive assimilation of Persians and Greek myth postulated in Gauer 1990 is possible is certainly one in which a Perseus figure cannot fail to have overtones.) In a slightly similar way, one could wonder what were the overtones in classical Cyprus of the amazonomachies which in Greece could connote the conflict with Pers Nor in any case does the archaeological evidence from the Persian period entirely lack a Persian imprint. Some of this may be related to the attitudes of Cypriot rulers to their own position as subject-kings within an Achaemenid ‘empire, though other items do not immediately lend themselves to that use. 1. Saddle blankets. (i) The Amathus Sarcophagus horse riders have an (una- domed) saddle cloth tied with two straps across horse's chest, which resembles those shown on certain Persian period monuments in Lycia.!°7(ii) A fair number of free standing terracotta and stone horse-and-rider figures show plain or (more often) serrated-edged saddle-cloths.!° Serrated cloths are also encountered ot 103 Other evidence about Cypriot gardens: (i) ICS 217 (dation) and 316 (Salamis) mention apoi. (ICS 217 describes a garden “which Diwethemis used as (a) alwos”. The force of this is elusive, especially given disagreements about translation of alwos ~ "verger” (Ms son), "Saatland” (Egetmeyer) ~ but pace Masson it hardly follows that in Cyprus pat ‘meant simply “pot of land” or even “unworked plot of land”). (i) Sacred installations Hierokepeia (near Paphos) and evidence of temple gardens at Citiam (Chronique 1973 648 {11th cJ) and Amathus (Chronique 1976: 916, Aupert 1986: 376). See also Wright 1991: 282. 104 Note (i cult of Persevtes (.Kour. 25 [4h c. BCE], 65 and 66 [31d c. BCE) of ety as “city of Perseus” ( Kour. 89 [secondthrd c. CE} or “blood of Perseus” (LKou, 10s (seconde. CE), The city was clsimed as Argive foundation (Hal 5.113; Stabo 14.63) 105 Myres 1914: 1292 shows Perseus and the Gorgon watched over by Athena on one ofthe shields of a three-bodied Geryon. There are vague echoes of Achaemenid royal ieonogr phy in the pose of Heracles on onc ofthe other shields (kneeling to shoot a centaur) and the hero-versus-lion combat on Geryon's skirt. But no doubt this is coincidental; and Myrcs date the object to the fist half of the 6th c. 106 Solo: Dikaios 1953: 111 (mid Ath .), Vermeule 1976: fig.1L3, Fugger sarcophagus. 107 Xanthus B31! and Xanthus G new fragment (ied with a single strap); FAX i S2f, pL.37-9 Mellinck 1971: 283, pS, ig22; Mellin 1974: S45f, The sarcophagus” parasols similarly have Lycian analogues: Mellinck 1971: 248, 1976: 27 108 Plain; Young & Young 1955: nos. St 307,212, 230, 303, 313 (from votive deposit dated "350", Serrated: ibid, ns.1480 (p.216, p25), 1145 (dated “625/575°), 1239 (°S501800"s ~ 3025 (ig. on p.164;“550/500"),3057,3058, stone St 211, 210, 272,305, 306,213 all fom votive deposit, presumed "5501500"; Myres 1013, 1015, 2686, 2776; Louvre AM 819. . Persian Evaluation and Assimilation st Greek or Greco-Persian representations in or after the later sixth century." In Cyprus horse- and chariot arrangements are apt to have a general quasi-Assyrian character (Crouwel/Tatton-Brown 1988), but Assyrian saddle-cloths are either plain animal skins or quilted objects with tassels along the lower edge (Bamett & Forman 1960: 83, 85, 87), and there is a case for postulating an Achaemenid source for the Cypriot and Anatolian items just listed.!"° Occasionally the Achae- menid saddle blanket coexists with a “Persian” horseman (Louvre AM 3463; Buchholz 1978: fig.63a), but for the most part it may be simply an equestrian fashion which might have been adopted without a strong sense of ideological statement. (It is worth noting that I know of no hint of adoption of other distinctively Iranian/Achaemenid features of horse-trapping [cf. Calmeyer 1985].) ‘Asapiece of decorated cloth, the Achaemenid saddle-blanket may have appealed to people in island noted for embroidery and parapetasmata'"! — unless indeed this was itself a taste engendered by Persian contact. (After all multi-coloured ‘ress and carpetting became fashionable even in mainland Greece under Persian influence.) 2. Harmamaxai. A small number of models of covered waggons have been found in Cyprus, as well as the remains of a real example (preserved in a Salamis tomb). There is no suggestion that the female or male occupants of the models or any other associated figures are shown in oriental dress, but the suggestion has been made that the vehicle is a harmamaxa, such as were used by high-ranking £63; Buchholz 1978: 222 fig 63a (a wheeled push-long toy consisting of a now headless Tider (whose dress could be construed as belted knee-lngthchiton with trousers) on ahorse wih seated Blanket, fom the deposit by the Tamassos Astate altar; Tatton-Brown & ‘Crouvel 1991 (on a rather elaborate terracotta representation ofa horse-acher implicitly dated sevenhsnthe.);Senff 1993: p.62 = BM Sculpture CB] (Tamassos; BCH 1989: 500 (fg 8); BCH 1993: 102 fig.46 (Amathus); BCH 1994: 494 (g.22). 109 CVA GB xii 6062 (Rhodes, 525) = Anderson 1961 pl. 26a; CVA GB rmenae, 3/4 6h .) = Anderson 1961 pl.17a; Poti 1892: 244 fig2 (Clazomenaesarcopha- sus: Asiatic horseman in combat with Grecks); Diver (AR 1964); Slike block I Borch- tart 1968); Alexander Mosaic (dying horse). 10 CrouweV/Tatton Brown 1988: 78, citing Goldman 1984 (who ignores Cyprus). Goldman isles a distinctive Achaemenid design with “half merons on the traling edge and a comma-and-dot fringe along the bottom” (8). The evidence shows phenomena rather more varied than this. Sometimes the “serrated” decoration is of roughly similar size (wot secesarily shape) on rear and bottom edge, though any hint of size-difference favours 2 laser trailing edge (tems from Achaemenid Village, Persepolis, Maku, Pazyryk, Erevan, Bh Museum). Elewhere only the ailing edge may be sermated (Onas Treasure, Susa vores, gem stones (to which add Moorigat 1966: no.769, Boardman 1970b: fig. 292,293, 1843). On Cypriot, Greek and Greco-Persian items, however, Blankets ae (where one an tll only rarely serrated on oth edges (BM Sculpture C 81; Young & Young 1955 3025; CVA GB sii 606.2: Alexander Mosaic (a special case being explicil the epresen- lation ofa Persian horse), and some are not really square (e.g. Young and Young 1955: 3025 (semicircular, Duver (ef. m.109: angular). The match is therefore imperfect Berhaps westerners found inspiration inthe Achaemenid model rather than simply acquiting Achaemenid blankets. ph 611 K'= 624 KA, Athen 48C. i585 (Clazo- _ Sea eer aee LT 2 ‘Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenid Persian women.!!? If so, this is another Persian fashion adopted by Cypriots which ends up being reflected in rather mundane artisan products. But itis hard not to feel some sympathy for Gjerstad’s comparison of them with 1930's Cypriot farm traffic. 3. Coinage. All mints initially use a Persian standard. Deviations to Rhodian (Amathus, Lapethus, Citium) or Attic (Salamis) standards do not occur until the late fifth (Amathus) of fourth century. (The former is politically / ideologically insignificant, given the general spread of Rhodian standards in fourth century East Greek contexts. Nicocles’ move to Attic may seem a more interesting phenomenon, but this could be an illusion.) Although sigloi (unlike darics) are apparently not found in Cypriot hoards, they appear as a monetary unit in ICS 309 (Lefioniko) and a weight siglos double the size of the coin-siglos standard is attested twice!!3 — assuming in both cases that si does stand for siglos, The only indisputable Persian images on Cypriot coins are (a) the Persian-king-versus-lion on the (Sidonian) obverse of a hybrid Amathus-Sidon issue attributed to King Rhoikos!!# and (b) the “satrap head” issues of Evagoras II.!'§ It is not entirely certain that the latter were issued in Cyprus and the former is certainly a special case, which shows that Rhoikos was not shy of specifically Persian colour but tends to point up its general lack. Some issues bear images susceptible of Persian interpretation: perhaps not the Salaminian ram whose external associations, if any, are Egypto-Cyrenaean rather than Achaemenid (Chaumont 1972: 1836 Porada 1989), but certain Paphian coins have a flying spread-cagle design which might recall the Persian royal standard, and Citian issues standardly use a lion- ‘and-prey (stag) device, which in this context as others the viewer could probably “read” as Achaemenid or not according to choice.!!® However long-established an icon is, once an imperial power is known to use it (Bivar 1975 even suggested lion-and-prey was the badge of the Syrian satrapy), other people should arguably be wary of using it unless they are willing to accept the inference of association with the imperial power. In the present case, of course, we are locked in a vicious circle, for the whole question is whether lion-and-prey was seen to be an image ideologically exploited by the Achaemenid King and (more generally) how strong a sense of being part of an Achaemenid world most Cypriots had. 112 Amathoate I: La Sculpture (1981) nos.43, 44; BCH 1993: 703 fig 48; SCE iti pl.116.1-3 (Mersinaki); Lorimer 1903: 140 fg.7 (unknown Cypriot provenance). Lorimer adduced the hharmamaxa, and Heemary accepts this. 113 ICS 224 (dation: “2 si" = 22.83 g; ICS 368 (with Seyrig 1932: 189): “4 si" latter bears the name of King Ni". 114 Destrooper-Georgiades 1987: 349, SNG Burion y Berry 1317, Amathonte 1.61, 63f 115 Hill 1904: xxiv, 18, 19, Babelon 1893: 624-6, pi, xvii nos. 17-18. 116 Paphos: Hill 1904: pl.viii 1-5, xxi 12-17, xxii 1-2, Ctium: Hill 1904: plli-v, xix. ~O the royal standard ef, Nylander 1983. Eagles are highlighted in this context in XenAnab.1.10.2, Cyr 7.14, Philoste.imag 2.31. For additional iconographic material &f Ghiestoman 1964: 370 fig 478, Bothmer 1984; no.18, Cahn & Gerin 1988: pl.2.1~2, Cahn & “Mannsperger 1991: pl44.2-3. AeL.NA 1221 knew that Achaemenes was nurtured by 2% cape ~ sory pte ald » mils le in Fra = Taplin (omhoms 2g. The ee . Persian Evaluation and Assimilation 53 4, Jewellery and Containers. A few items of Achaemenid or imitation Achae- menid jewellery are known'!? and occasional Iranian-style bronze or silver vyessels,!!8 as well as Cypriot ceramic imitations of phialai, rhyta and cups." 5. Architecture. Two architectural elements recall Persepolis. (i) A bull- protome capital from Salamis (Hill 1940: pl.vii) ~ the only true capital with pposed protomes in Greek architecture (Roux 1978: 272) ~ awakens the idea of 1 “Persian” palace, like the one postulated on similar grounds at Sidon, but both date and context are unclear: Roux 1978: 256f made it post-Achaemenid; and it could be an isolated votive column. (ii) Torus column bases are known from Evreti-Palaipaphos, Amathus and Vouni.'2 But such bases do not have to be of Persian inspiration: in one context at Amathus the torus is conjoined wit rmultihedral column"?! and it surely likely that in this case the torus is as un- ‘Achaemenid as the column, especially considering that the two elements separa- tely have Egyptian ancestry and that an un-Egyptian combination of them is just the sort of thing that might occur in Cyprus ot Phoenicia.'2? Where this leaves the other torus bases is very hard to say. Claims have been made about the presence ‘of more extensive Achaemenid palace design features at Vouni and Paphos (though not ~ so far - Amathus). But it is currently not fashionable to endorse these claims (partly admittedly because of dubitable historical conclusions drawn from them), except in the case of a different building at Paphos (that at Hadji Abdullah). 6. Persian figures. Pethaps the richest category of interest is formed by items which represent, or could be held to represent, persons dressed wholly or partly in Persian dress. The presence of two fragments of Attic painted pottery with Persian figures at Paphos and Vouni quite possibly disclose an Athenian entrepreneur's calculation that such images would appeal in Cyprus, though it does not prove that it was a correct calculation.!2 On the other hand the nu- 117 Amathus: Amandry 1958: 13 9.44, Amathonte Testii no.117. Vouni: SCE HL 238 n0.292 eg, phi, xci-xeii, Amandry 1958: 13-14,20 (pl.11,12). Unknown: Pierides Collection xxiv 3-4. BM Cat, Jewell paxvi (SCE 42.391). 18 ef. Chavane 1982: 39f; Mytes 1914: 4562, 4580. Malion: SCE Mf plcluxx. = 1V.2.151 fig 28 no.2b (bronze); IV 2,160 fig.33 no.7 = Cesnala Atlas il pl.37.3 = Myres 1914: 4579. Vouni: SCE It pl. Ixxxviii 11 (424) = IV 2.151 fig.28 no.7c (bronze); SCE 1V 2.160 {1233.9 & 10=1 plc 4& 6-7 (silver), Old Paphos: Chronique 1970: 224 fig. 70. Larnake fegion: Chronique 1979: 683, fig. 36, This material is not generally found in contexts which ‘ould otherwise be called irano-persi 19 See SCE 1V.2.399 no.13,figivii 17, 18 [Salaminia xx 13}; Salamine IV 88 n.3: Buchholz 1985: 253 (on “treue Abbilde achimenidischer Metalformen” from Tamassos). 120 Paaipaphos: Maier 1986: 177 abb.S4, 175 abb.51; Maier 1989b: 17, fig.6-8. Amathus: Shoigse 1990 1006-7 fg28, 1018 fig: Pat 19916. Vouni: Auper 1986: 379 SCE 1 "21 ‘eolonne a pans coupés": Chronique 1978: 959, 320 ded i 12 Petit 1991a speculates about abit hilani prototype, while Aupert 1986: 380f stresses the Etyptian background (ef. Wright 1992: 535), The two are not inconsistent 123 See Maier 1989, 124 (1) Vouni: de Vries 1977: $46 (¢-430) (enthroned king). (2) Paphos: Maier 1986: 159 fig.29 (ate fourth cent.) ~ a fragment showing a head in along lappetted “tiara* 40 = AM 485 = Vandenabeele 1986: o guns OI COP 4eUTCH4 ‘Chapter 1. Cypras Before and Under the Achaemenids merous statues with rosette-adomned crowns rather reminiscent of Darius’ Be- hhistun diadem cannot owe their existence solely to Persian inspiration, since the ‘motif (also found on the steps of the Golgoi throne: cf Myres 1914: 1379) is attested before the Achaemenid era; at best this is another case (cf. above on coinage) where one asks whether continued use of the form can have ignored the ‘Achaemenid parallel which had supervened.!?5 Probably one should not even say that much about the fifth century examples of “oriental mantle men” (a form of eighth or seventh century origin), since it is perhaps only the first impression which ascribes them a Persian allure." In the same way one should doubtless resist the feeling that a Golgoi relief (MMA 74.51.2310 = Myres 1914: 1869 ICS 264) has a vague look of the Great King enthroned beneath a winged figure. (tis actually a figure of Apollo = ReSef, according to Yon 1986.) But when we come to the rather numerous figures with oriental hats (“tiarai", “kurbasiai”, “Phrygian bonnets” etc.), there often seems little good reason (even when the figures otherwise wear non-oriental clothing!” or survive without bodies and other clothing) to dismiss them as illusion or as simply part of a long-established substratum of oriental garb. ‘Among bodyless heads, the small limestone head with tiara from the Amat- hnus palace in Petit 1991b: 16 = Chronique 1990 1006, 1008 fig.31 is fairly convincingly “Persian” — granted that here, as elsewhere, the comparanda are not (only) Persepolitans but the Persians of western Anatolian epichoric monuments, of Greek and Hellenized coin and gem cutters and of Attic vase painters. The same goes for Louvre AM 2978 and CCA iv no.48, heads of bearded men with varieties of eastern hat (and sub-Achaemenid hair-styling: ef. n.144), which Hiermary is happy to regard as a reflection of Achaemenid suzerainty'® and for Myres 1914: 1475, a 15 cm. high head which is compared (ad loc.) and clearly belongs with better preserved stone (1231, 1350) and terracotta (2299-2301) items which display other features of Iranian clothing. Mauch more copious is the votive terracotta material from Curium dealt with by Young & Young 1955. From the later sixth century onwards (and beyond the end of the Achaemenid era) this is characterised by the presence of figures 125 See Maier 1989: 387 n.13, 389 230. Add Myres 1914: 1045, 1046ab, 1047, 1251-2, 1254 6 CCA 4 nos.15-17, 20, 34; CCA 6 no.29; Dikaios 1953: 83; Hermary 1989b: nos.5#-60 (B44 aM 192, 0 16092; MN B314; AM 2953; AM 2956, AM 1188) Nos 19687¥- 126 Monloup 1984: 173; Crouwel 1991: 121ff; SCE If cei 4,5; I ccxxxiii 2440, Cesnota Atlas Tix 66,10, xvi 23, xvi 96, xxi 174. Montloup 174 notes atime range 750-550. Such figues fare found widely in East Mediteranean (including Rhodes: cf. Sorensen 1991, pl. xvii (Lindos) pl. Ixixd-f (Lindos, 3 figures from chariot group) is stylistically comparable with ‘mantle men), but specially Cyprus. 127 AM 3463 = Hermary 1989: no. 581 had an oriental hat and a serated saddle-cloth (cf 1.110), bu otherwise non-eastern garments. 128 Hermary 1989b: ad loc. His guess (1989: 181) that an unidentified bearded head in “bonnet “orientale” in Rome copies an Athenian agora staue of Evagoras is piquant because Evae0- as was being celebrated fr standing for hellenism — and perhaps optimistic. CCA 448 s 19.5 em. high, implying a total figure of perhaps 110-120 em. Pe Evaluation and Assimilation 55 (oormally riders or charioteers) who wear either a stiff “tiara” (of high or low varity) or a soft “kurbasia"!® and whose costume (where discernible) involves trousers.!° This is a highly distinctive product. In this precise form it is, peculiar not only to Cyprus but very largely to Curium (although there is certainly some evidence for a less intensive presence elsewhere of other ~ and better modelled — sorts of small terracotta “Persian” votives),!2? and it would be absurd not to connect the phenomenon with the Achaemenid empire. Petit (with reason) holds they are dedications not by Persians, but by locals. If so, it scarcely diminishes their significance. Quite the contrary. Young & Young 1955: 196f contend that the dedicators of these figures were ordinary Cypriots who wanted 129 Tiara Young & Young 1955: passim. CCA 8 #14 (Ny Carlsberg) also belongs here (cf. ‘Young and Young 1955: 203, category D: note a parallel figure inthe parabates of Young and Young 10.1582), The “cloak” over the figure’s head variously recalls women at Dascylium, a least one Attic vase picture and the hood of Myres 1914: 1846. Kurbasiai. ‘Young & Young 1955: nos. 1592 (p1.26), 1642-4,1767, 1918-9, 2044, 2112, 2128 [pl.31), 12209, 2878 — and (not made at Curium) 3027, 3028, 3031 (all p66). Only 2878 is post- ‘Alexandrian, The terms “tiara” and “kurbasia” are used by Young & Young. There is a ‘efinite Persian allure to some other items, e.g. 1419 ("helmet A") ~ef. Petit 1990, 1006¢— 2039 ("helmet with cheekpieces”). 130 Young & Young 1955 remark thatthe trousers are tight, lke those of Scythians on Attic vases and unlike the baggy trousers of Anatolian representations of Persians. But Attic Persians have pretty tight-fitting teousers too (as indeed do “Medians” at Persepolis), so there are no grounds for dissociating the Curium figures from Persia. The upper part ofthe body has a tight long-sleeved shit, sometimes wit short-sleeved jacket and occasionally a heavy chlamys. ~ A bronze figurine with “Persian” hat, belted chiton and trousers from the Walion Apollo temenos (Masson 1968: 394 (h) fg.23: undated ) is deseribed by Masson (without further comment) as “Seythian”. “Persian” would do as well, but in any case its surely an object which would not have joined the other orientalising oF egyptianising ‘material inthe temenos except forthe existence ofthe Achaemenid empire. should be distinguished from the so-called “Persian riders” found in Phoenicia/Paestine and in NSyria (on which of, Stern 1982: 158f, Elayi 1991 (distinguishing N. Syrian workshops). For such things in Cyprus ef. Monloup 1984: 37-54, Decaudia: vii 28, xxii 3, Init 135, bexiv 27, xe 3 (cited in Elayi 1992 198 n.64) 132 (1) Trousered riders appear on (eracotta thrones ofthe seated goddess at KitionSalines, and figures with “Phrygian bonnet” or Persian costume are reported from the same depos @) The possibly tcousered rider in Buchholz 1978: 222 fig.63a (above 1.108) is also associated with Astarte. (3) Myres 1914: 2299-2301 Persian figures with oriental hat, belted chiton, cloak and trousers (ef. Zournatzi 1989 and CCA v.44, where they are adduced along with 1231 and 1350), 1299 has shat might be Jtended as an akinakds, ~ Many entries in Mytes evoke oriental hats with side lapels: 2101 (explicitly @ kyrbasia), 1452-3 (soft peaked cap with side flaps), 2170 (pointed cap with long lapels; fringed cloak), 1257-60 (hat with chin strap knotted over forehead or behind ‘eak) = the last a format resembling a Lefkoniko item whose side flaps are secured in front Of the peak (Myzes 1940/5: 62) and which is compared in turn with Mytes 1914: 1004, 1257, 1284, 1352. Such material needs tobe reworked; not nearly as much of it may be pre- ‘Achaemenid as Myres’ dating implies, For further Lefkoniko items ef, Myres 1940V5: 631, ‘8 154-6 (stone statues ~ archaic cypriot, with Greek influence — with long tunics and knee= length cloaks, but wearing hats like those of Persians on Greck vases), and ## 375-81 (Gelleisic items with Phrygian peaked caps resembling that on Myres 1231). No details tre available about Myres 1914: 4859 (an ornamental bronze “oriental heed"). 0 ronaa euunouoIei 6p >A ” 56 Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achaemenids their votive offerings to be pleasing to Apollo Hylates and therefore had them ‘given an appearance derived from that of their own social superiors. The preva- Tence of Iranian headgear therefore argues that (at least at Curium) a strikingly - even strangely ~ high valuation was put upon the imperial power, even in the context of private worship at a Hellenized native cult. A similar phenomenon has, been discemed in a series of limestone statues of (mostly) children wearing oriental hats (Hermary 1989b: nos.444-475), which Hermary sees as inter alia expressions of loyalty by Achaemenid subjects, and at least eight other stone figures with oriental hats can be adduced, representing a statuary tradition which would assuredly not have existed without the fact of Achaemenid suzerainty.! ‘What does, perhaps, remain uncertain is how far it demonstrates that some clements of the social elite actually affected Persian dress. The way that Young & ‘Young state and argue their general proposition implies that such a conclusion should be drawn, But the highly stereotyped, not to say mass-produced, nature of the Curium material could raise the possibility that the dress-choice is an icono- ‘graphic metaphor not a statement about contemporary fashion. The same might also be said about Hermary’s statues, insofar as they involve children. In the end, though, the material as a whole seems a bit too copious and too varied in style, material and origin for a merely symbolic explanation to be plausible. One therefore has a choice. One could, after all, postulate Persian dedicators. But, although the mere fact that the material under review here is more ot less unique to Cyprus might only prove that Persian outsiders are conforming to a strong local tradition, it hardly seems plausible that the Curium sanctuary came to be almost entirely patronized by foreigners (or even so much patronized by them as to create an Iranian fashion among local dedicators!).Itis better to conclude that Cypriots did sometimes adopt the appearance of their Iranian masters. 133 (1) Limestone, unknown provenance: Zournatzi 1989. Three-flapped hat (with laurel leaf), trousers, kendys. The dagger hanging on the right side (in Persian fashion) is perhaps an akinakes, hough attachment and shape are incorrect and the belt from which it hangs is plain and fat, not tied with loose ends. Figure once held a spear or long scepte. (2) Limestone, Curium (MM 74.51.2339 = Myres 1914: 1846) with obscure 4th e. syllabic inscription, viz, welip(p)a = re.RU.TA.i, (LKourion $4 #22; ef. ICS 187). 33 em. Hoods short chiton, trousers, candys. (3-4) Limestone (7), Pyla (Masson 1966: 18 fig. 13-14 = Cesnola Atlas I xxiv 915, 916). Identified as mageiroi by Masson, but surely Persians (cf. ‘Zournatzi 1989: 128 n.9). Fig. 13 (headless: 1.65 m.)has candys, a dagger (2akinaks) Worn ‘on right and perhaps traces of ends of “Phrygian” bonnet at back. Fig. 14 (headless: 95 em) is similar, though the dagger is less clear. (5) Limestone (2) Golgoi (AM 3375 = Hermary 1989b: #547). 31 em. Head missing (races of bonnet oriental) Sleeved chiton, t0usetS, short scale pattern chiton, ceinture a rabats, cloak with arms. Like many Greek-attired figures, holds a bird by wings in the left hand and box or coupelte in the right hand. (6) Limestone (?), provenance unknown (CCA 4 #44). 63 em. Original head missing. Knee length tunic with belt and long hanging ends, trousers, ape from shoulders. A knife hangs from right side. Compared ad loc. to Myres 1914: 1231, 1350, 2299-2301 and one ofthe Pyla items. The object is dated 3 or early 2nd c (ef. pose with SCE 3 plexlii 6-7, 4.3 pL @) Atlas 1 exx 876 = Myres 1914: 1231, Curium. 20 em. Sleeved belted chiton, cloak, Persian hat, wousers. Classified by Myres as hellenistic style. (8) Atlas I cil 675 = Myres 1914: 1380. Curium. 77 cm. Sleeved belted chiton, cloak, Persian hat trousers, Classified bby Myres as hellenistic style . Persian Evaluation and Assimilation 7 ‘The range of material surveyed here isin general terms rather similar to that from mainland Phoenicia (cf. Elayi 1991a: 78f,80,81n.32): the onomastic eviden- ceis slightly better (though the numbers are perhaps altogether too small for this tobe statistically significant) and there is certainly a richer showing of “oriental” figures." It would be optimistic, but not entirely irrational, to infer that the ruling classes in Cyprus very intermittently toyed with the idea of assimilating hints of the suzerain foreign power into their style of status-expression. It must, however, be conceded ~ indeed stressed ~ that the behaviour of kings in this matter remains obscure. Most of the Iranian-dressed statues are small objects and there is certainly no demonstrably royal evidence for even the slight adoption of Persian fashion visible in the image of Yehaumilk of Byblos (Jidejian 1968: 97, 14) nor any association of prince and satrapal image as clear as that on the Satrap Sarcophagus. Moreover, if foreign traits were used to “colour” Cypriot kingship in the Achaemenid era, they were as likely to be Egyptian or Phoenician (or both) as Persian. [I] A decided fashion for Hathoric iconography sets in froma little before the riddle of the sixth century and lasts through much of the Achaemenid period. ‘The appearance of Hathorie capitals in the Amathus palace suggests that, quite apart from a general assimilation with Aphrodite/Astarte, there was a connection With royal ideology (something consonant with Egyptian values (cf. RLA 4.149) and pethaps parallelled in Levantine Phoenicia by Yehaumilk’s worship of a Hathoric form of his patron deity B’LT GBL) and one may therefore be justified ininfesring that similar associations applied elsewhere, even where the remaining items are not so directly connected with kings.!°5 But if so, of course, the phenomenon is probably a piece of Saite influence! which remained unaffected by the island’s transfer from Saite to Achaemenid suzerainty - a scenario which shows that Cypriot material culture was not intrinsically impervious to the effects ofexternal political control (justified criticism of some of Gjerstad’s associations of politics and art-styles - Vermeule 1974a, Watkins 1987 ~ should not be 154 Recent observations on Phoenician architectural material appear in Yon & Cavbet 1993: Of Alleged religious survivals - which would distinguish Phoenicia from Cyprus ~ ack cogeney. A 4th c. A.D. Mithracum proves litle; and the items in Will 1952: 72 all lie ‘ouside Phoenicia proper. Any (Mithraic) religious content inthe lion-and-prey icon (Bivar 1975: 2750) would apply to Citian as well as Byblite coinage. ~ Phoenicia and Cyprus seem "mote comparable in display of Achaemenid than of Assyrian features (cf. Reyes 1994: 619, 135 Provenanees beside Amathus: Paphos, Vouni, Tamassos,Citium, Kdalion, Golgoi, Kalavas- 40s, Curium. For the material (exceptionally abundant compared with any other areas ‘ouside Egypt) see items mentioned and/or illustrated in Hermary 1985, The following may be added. Capitals. CaubeuPic 1982: figda (Louvre 93), fig.4b (Beslin = VA 2715 ‘Taton-Brown 1986: 441). Other items. Chronique 1987: 722-3 fig.198 (Amathus); BM Sculpture C 427 (Curium); Buccholz 1978: 227 (fig.67a) (Tamassos): Dikaios 1953: 123 10.19 (unstated provenance); Chronique 1993: 715 (fig.67) (Amathus) 136 So Hemary 1985: 681, 1989: 49, LIMC 457, CaubeUPic 1982: 286, Karageorghis 1991: 959f, Petit 1991b: 15, Wright 1992: 535 entertains the hypothesis of Sait influence inthe ‘38 of (a) Hathor heads, (b)facetied columns (SCE 2.523 [234], 4.2.6; RDAC 1974: 145, 1819), © the Salamis “lotus” tomb (ef. n.149).38 Chapter 1. Cypras Before and Under the Achaemenids allowed to obscure this), but does not guarantee that such effects would be very Strong outside the cultural horizons (Egyptian or Levantine) to which Cypriots had long been exposed and accustomed. The inclination to maintain Hathor colour despite political change matches the fact that genuine Egyptian material found its way to Cyprus more than to Syria-Palestine in the sixth to fourth centuries,!57 and was probably also fostered by the continued indirect impact of Egyptianising cultural influence from Levantine Phoenicia. But, since Cypro- Phoenician art was traditionally less Egyptianising than Levantine Phoenician, wwe should be ware of regarding the phenomenon simply as a cultural banality. [2] A number of statues dating from the years either side of 500 show what are presumably ruler-figures wearing simple or elaborate versions of the Egypti- an double-crown. Some exemplify a larger class of Achaemenid era stone Egyp- tianising statuary described by Markoe 1990, and ascribed by him to Phoenician cultural influence (acting as source for what was in many ways not a contempor- ary Egyptian imagery).1"® But others (including the famous Paphian “priest-king” head in Liverpool) clearly stand apart from this group.'* The Egyptian royal headgear is therefore not simply part of a single stylistic package; and this increases the likelihood that what we have here is an ideological sidelight upon the construction which Cypriot monarchs might put upon their own positions. It is less a question of whether such monarchs ever actually wore Egyptian crowns than whether (as seems likely to me) their idea of themselves was one to which Egyptian crowns would (they thought) be appropriate. The same thought is prompted by e.g. the occasional appearance at Amathus and Citium of anthropoid sarcophagi ~ borrowed from what was itself a post-Saite borrowing in Phoenicia = or by the blatantly ot potentially oriental motifs which appear on some coinage: the ankh used on pre-Evagoran Salamis coins and not infrequently elsewhere in Cypriot numismatics is an Egyptianizing royal symbol (perhaps not mediated through Phoenicia in this case);!*? and the bull and winged disk of Paphos, the tion-and-prey of Citium and the lotus and sphinx of Idalion are images which cought to have been avoided by any dynasty which thought it important to distance itself from the east. 137 Salles 1991: 210; Blayi (comment atthe 1993 Transeuphraténe table ronde). 138 Markoe 1990 adduces over 20 (reasonably complete, hough often headless items. At east four (Myres 1914; 1266, 1363, KA 248 = Markoe 1990: fig.3 = Maier 1989 fig.40.5 and ‘Cesnola Atlas Ixxxii 212) have Egyptian double crowns, but Markoe 1990: 115 says tate “substantial number" have the pschent crown, so there may be more, Senff 1993: $2 regards Egyptanizing statuary as reflecting the dress habits of ruling houses. (Note that Reyes 1992 finds Egyptian clothing traits in some small bronze statues which probably date from before Saite political domination.) 139 Kazaphani (RDAC 1978: pL41.15), Aloa (Markoe 1987: pl.lii.2-3), Louvre AM 2946 (Golgoi), KA 730 (Paphos), Clerq 67-8, no.21-22, Maier 1989: p.40.6-7 = Diksios 1952! 125.1. — The haicfoeard styling also appears on one of Markoe's egyptiansing states (Myres 1914: 1363), though in a rather understated form. 140 ef, Stieglitz 1985; Collombier (comment at 1993 Transeuphraténe table ronde). 141 This cals to mind certain greco-persian gems as well as the image on a monument fr" Tayma Dalley 19860: 87). . Persian Evaluation and Assimilation 59 ‘What is hard to say is what connection there is between any of this and the fact of Achaemenid overlordship. Historians have sometimes postulated that tighth and seventh century Cypriots rulers not only used Phoenician cultural markers as expressions of their style of kingship (Rupp 1988) but were indirectly prompted into doing so by the existence of the neo-Assyrian empire." Did sixth ind fifth century Cypriots behave similarly, mirroring Persian suzerainty by creating images which were largely or entirely non-Achaemenid but nonetheless set apart by their exoticism or pretentiousness? Hermary 1989a: 181 has claimed that a whole category of sculpted figures, including the crown-wearers detailed above, but extending to a statue (Louvre AM 2950 = Hermary 1989b: 229) with ‘vegetation crown, un-achaemenid beard and no visually apparent Iranian overto- ne, are an “echo hellenisé de l'image du Roi ou des hautes personnages de Trempire achémenide” or show the Cypriot obeying the conservative principle of ‘Achaemenid civilisation by means of creations in a style impregnated with Greek novelty — and this despite the fact that he regards the proximate source of inspiration for hathoric heads and double crowns as Saite domination of the island. Other historians content themselves with the observation that Phoenician “jnfluence” becomes more visible during the Persian era (generally, not just in relation to potentially royal images).'* Since the same can be said of Egypt (cf. Bresciani 1987, Bondi 1990: 265, 269), this may be a fact about (Levantine) Phoenicians as well as about Cyprus and the explanation may turn on the fact that Cyprus and Egypt were once again included in the same political framework as the Levant, But whereas in Egypt what is involved is simply increased evidence for Phoenician presence in what was essentially a foreign country, in Cyprus things are complicated by the island’s being partly Phoenician to start with. To postulate that the phenomenon is a reflection of Persian rule does amount to saying that such rule for some reason encouraged Phoenician self-assertion and ‘one may be willing to accept that. But that non-Phoenician Cypriot rulers positiv- ely accommodated themselves to Phoenician-inspired iconographies because Uhey saw the Phoenicians as e.g. favoured subjects of the Great King seems implausible, A better line would be that Persian rule stimulated local royal self ‘expression and that it was simply natural - indeed traditional — for Cypriot rulers, including non-Phoenician ones, to look eastwards for the means of such self- expression. This brings one back to a position like that of Hermary; the only «question is whether, although the bulk of the relevant evidence is of Persian date, the original stimulus may not go back to the preceding period ~ i.e. whether Persian suzerainty merely exacerbated tendencies already awoken by Saite au ‘ocracy. One thing is certain ~ the question is only complicated, not resolved, by the fact that a few of the “royal” statues display a treatment of beard and hair ‘which resembles that of Assyrian or Achaemenid kings. For this is also true of ‘many (apparently) non-royal statues and ~ more importantly ~ of non-Cypriot Greek kouro of the later sixth and early fifth centuries. The fact of the empire's 12 Franken 1979; Nicalaoy 1976: 315, SCE iv 2.462 Linh 1992 Karageorghis 1976: 111; Maier 1984: 182; Shefton 1989: 98f; Markoe 1990.60 Chapter 1. Cypras Before and Under the Achaemenids existence doubtless stimulates spread of this stylistic feature, but the ideological overtones of its adoption are arguable. ‘These matters aside the impression one gets of Cypriot royal style from other sources is variable. Isocrates’ Nicocles (oration 3) lays great stress on being a moderate and just ruler and Isocrates’ advice to him on deportment is thoroughly “Greek” (Isocrates 2; 15.69). (The fact that some older copies in antiquity bore the title Symmaki- os is a neat reflection of the speaker's tone.) Evagoras is said to have been “populist in his courting of the masses” (démotikos..téi tou pléthous therapeiai 9.46), though other descriptions were possible (below 61). In Herodotus the word 144 Atleast the following items display a treatment of beard and hair which has been compared ‘with Achaemenid models. (1) Golgoi. Myres 1914: 1352 = Cesnola, Cyprus pl. 143 =Mar koe 1987 plat 1. Pointed hat (2) Lefkoniko head =Markoe 1987: pl.s1. Pointed hat. (3) Myres 1914; 1283 = SCE4.2 plxiv.. Pointed hat. ($) CCA $ no.72 ({mid 6th c)}. Pointed hat (3) CCA 4 n0.34, Rosette Crown, (6) Kouklia KA 730 (Liverpool head). Eayptisn double crown, (7) Aloa statue (Markoe 1987: plxli.2~3). Egyptian double crown. (8) ‘Vermeule 1976: 7a= Ashmolean Summary Guide 76, pl Ixixb, Fillet. (9) BM Sculpt. C76= Senff 1993: pl.7d-f. Pointed hat, (10) BM Sculpt. C99. Beardless, but with snailcurl forchead hai-line. Rosette crown, (11) BM Sculpt. C100 = Senff 1993: pl. j-e, Narow diadem with narcissus-like decoration. (12) BM Sculpt. C150 = Senff 1993: p.17 e-h Heedband of uncertain character, (13) BM Sculpt. C151 (Pyla). Foliage crown. (14) BM Sculpt. C152 (Pyla). Foliage crown. (15) BM Sculpt. C153 (Achna). Hat missing. (16) BM Sculpt. C154 = Senff 1993: p.182-g. Foliage erovn, (17) BM Sculpt, C155 = Senff 1993: pL.t9e-g, Foliage crown, (18) BM Sculpt, C158 = Senff 1993: 19a-d. Narrow diadem with Tosettes. (19) Myres 1914: 1284, Helmet with ? uracus. (20) Mytes 1914: 1363 = Markoe 1990 fig.2. Double crown, (21) CCA 4 no. 48 (cf p.54 above), Persian at. (22)Louvie AM 1189, Rosette Crown. (23) Louvre AM 2784 (late 6th c.) Heracles figure. (24) Louvre 2789 (econd half 6th). (25) Louvre AM 2793 (early Sthc.. Pointed hat. (26) Louvre AM 2915. Pointed hat. (27) Louvre 2916 (second half 6th.c). (28) Louvre AM 2917 (525-500 Foliage crown. (29) Louvre AM 2939 (c, $00), Foliage crown. (30) Louvre AM 2944 (St 4th c.). Foliage crown, (31) AM 2946 (Golgoi) = Hermary 1989: fig.22.1,2. Egyptian {double crown, (32) Louvre AM 2961 (second half 6th.<). Pointed hat. (33) Louvre AM 2972 (late 6th c). Foliage crown. (34) Hermary 1989b: 219ff. (35) Louvre MNB 354 (cay Sih ¢.). Foliage crown. (36) Cesnola Atlas I Ixxii 469. Foliage crown. (37) Cesnola Atlas Tea £470 (Golgoi. Foliage crown, (38) Cesnola Atlas I Ixxii 471 (Golgoi). Foliage crown. (39) CCesnola Alls Elxxi $74 (Lapithos), Foliage crown. (40) Cesnola AMlas I lix 406 (Vermesle 1974a: pl.61, 62). Pointed hat. (41) Pyla: Masson 1966: 13 (fg.17). Hai in tesses and ‘wearing a short tunic covering half the body crossing the lft shoulder only. Foliage Crow". (42) Lefkoniko 160 (Myres 1940/45: pl.13) Foliage crown. (43) RDAC 1978: pl.xxxix 10 (Kezaphani). (44) Paris S208 (mid-Sthc.). Foliage crown, (45) Michaelides Coll. 1968°7- 30/696 (BCH 1969: 452 [4], 456 [36ab]). Rosette crown. — OF these only #05 '5,6,7,10,18,20,22,31,45 as far as I know, wear regal hats (rosette crowns (5,10.2245] double crowns) ~ perhaps also no.19 which appears to have a pseudo-uraeus on its hat 30d be related tothe double crown category. The phenomenon should perhaps rather be $28 ‘more in terms of a general artistic style than ideological borrowing ~ aftr all the snail cul hairbeard treatment is found in Greek art at end of 6th c. and in earlier Sth c.Rowrod and relief sculpture (Markoe 1987: 121 n.14). Only 21) apparently has a Persian hat. Of ours, taal become ropeadity commen ayany Ge a th Sent 1993: 73 . Persian Evaluation and Assimilation 6 basileus is not always attached to Cypriot leaders (only in 7.90 and 8.11); and there is a certain justice in claims that Idalion practised “democratic kingship” {(CS 217 insistently pairs King and Ptolis and is dated by an eponymous magist- rate" and the royal name and city-name alternate on some issues of coinage). A fragmentary early fifth century text from Curium (ICS 180b; LKourion 218; Karageorghis & Mitford 1964) has also been thought sigificant by virtue of its reference to demios and use of the word themizein (seen, presumably, asa hint that the king operated within a framework of law):!6 and the new Year One text of Milkyaton of Citium provides an association of King and “all the people” (alon- aside a more striking piece of hellenic assimilation in the shape of a Phoeni trophy) - though it, is at least possible that the context ~ celebration of military victory atthe start of a new reign (and perhaps of a new dynasty) ~ favours this anyway and casts less light on general political contexts.” The island's coinage circulated almost exclusively within the island and in practice its function, besides the purely economic one, was to assert each kingdom's identity within a rather modest area. Superscriptions including royal names are the order of the day, but some issues are anepigraphic and therefore a fortiori not ostentatiously royal or autocratic; and when the Greek alphabet starts tobe used on coinage, itis insome cases confined to the inscription of the city as opposed to the king’s name (though actually the reverse happens at Salamis, the first place to use Greek alphabetic coin inscriptions). This may disclose an interestingly unegotistical acceptance that in outsiders’ eyes it was the city-attribution, not the royal name, which was important and needed to be comprehensible. (The total absence of coins in some places may not, however, have any cleat message about the nature ofthe local kingship)."48 But such signs of modesty have to be set against various countervailing indications. (a) Evagoras, for all his populist tendencies, is also politikos, strategikos and ‘yrannikos; and Isocrates is prepared to describe his position as tyranny ~ “the atest, most august and most sought-after good among gods and men” ~ and compare it with that of Cyrus the Elder. The same goes for Nicocles, cheerfully classified as tyrannos (9.76) and despotés (15.40). The survival of the word anax isofa piece with this — if contemporaries agreed with the modern perception that 145 Theexstence ofa discernible palace at Lalion is disputed (Maier 1989: 161.9; Set 1993: 4n31),~Ieis sometimes said that ICS 327 + Mitford 1961: 38-45 shows an eponymous ragisrae ona ten from (2) Chytoi Bu the relevant reference is apparently t someone in charg of religious festival 146 The are use of stoichedon is additionally claimed a Athenian influence, wth an implicit ‘stgestion that stone-cltng sie is acompanied by ideological influence, 1 By Jar ikyatn apes lone in ating formal 1CS 20), But ilandPoesician kingship has also in any case been claimed to display non-autocratic features. "48 () the earliest Cian coins ae uninscibed (i here are unnamed Lapethos issues running feel an pears ‘earlier than the named ones, and (iii) the CS eee on some issues (ICS p.300; BMC Cyprus xliv-vii) may stand for Golgion — though there is no certain evieae otherwise for Golgin coinage a ll indeed for Golgo being an independent ‘kingdom in this period.62 (Chapter 1. Cyprus Before and Under the Achoemenids in Homer anax (as distinct from basileus) connotes effective power (Levy 1987) The special status of the princes and princesses of the Cypriot states (see below) by itself confirms that we are not dealing with an “empty” monarchic show conferred on the city’s chief executive, and Isocrates revealingly praises Evago- ras for having caused his whole family (genos) to resume enjoyment of the honours approriate to it (9.66). There are still certain or possible “Royal Tombs" to be encountered at Paphos, Curium (a massive construction) and Tamassos. At Salamis, however, there is little comparable to the archaic funerary splendours, at least until the last king Nicocreon’s funeral pyre and cenotaph ~ and even thats, pethaps somewhat tawdry, since the pyramid base was of mud-brick and the surrounding life-size statues of clay.' Fifth and fourth century Salamis was in ‘general a smaller and less prosperous place than the archaic city, but (so far) there appears to no physical evidence that this is because the royal family had siphoned off all the wealth for itsef.!50 (b) The rulers of Paphos could claim to be priest kings; and, in view of the association of this phenomenon with the figure of the Us-king Cinyras, itis pechaps conceivable that something of the same applied at Amathus which rivalled Paphos in laying claim to Cinyras.'31 But attempts to extend the range further are questionable. At Citium Yon 1989: 373 perceives a theocracy, with the protection of Melart assuring the king quasi-divine status and (one may add) a tradition of royal medicine and magic in 149 Paphos. Splaion tis Rkégainas, tomb of Echetimos and Timocharis (Chronique 1991: 821 1992: 820). Three principal chambers of which two have four secondary chambers ech ‘The main chambers and dromos are on slighty different axes. Curium. A pillaged tomb used thrice betwen 00/475 and 350 (Chronique 1991: 819). There are gold jewels. & dliadem, necklaces and bracelets, materials much like the Cesnola Curium treasure In Metropolitan Museum, which may have come from a royal burial (ef, Masson 1984: 77-83: {weasure material apparently from necropolis area at Ag Hermogenis). This tomb is huge 24 1m. long, 6.5 m, wide and up to 4 m, high dromos, chamber 6.2 by 2.75 by max. 4.00), the largest such thing in Greece or Cypros. Tamassos. Two late archaic “royal” tombs — stepped ‘roms, aeolic-capital pilasters at stomion, wo chambers, relief decoration of lotus inside (Raragcorghis 1978: 367; Buchholz 1973: 322, 1974: $78). Salamis. Tomb 79, secondary use with horse bucal and remains of hearse and chariot and Tomb 80 (early Sth c), wil painted chamber in Egyptian style (Karageorghis 1967/78: iii 127) may be noted. But Nicoereon's monument (Tomb 77) is more striking. An amphora from the tomulUs has the saffito (tu hier}ou alsous (Karageorghis 1967/78: ii 231), but the restoration and referet- ce are uncertain. Possibly also relevant are (i) 8 Lamaka-Phaneromini megalithic tomb recalling Salamis royal tombs (Karageorghis 1976: 142) and (i) late archaic stepped felamon ~ nothing is said here about Cyprus but ‘surely ned. See also ‘Marm Par. (when yc scholrate ea ae i vhen Demophon ruled Athens), Lycophron 4S0f (scholiasts say T. married seg Ett EME: oF yon an fared Atay Seb a 1 ee toe ier of in an te alee and ope a trea /: at least this was the story from Sth c, on, as found in Sophocles Tess (sp f79Hb, ja 438,113, 12621299 i wich poy Teves sit stance ia uit ihe pi), Xen Cyn 9, Lopes He ve ow, eh mark i frig. Compare ARV 392 (i) = Cott T9638 = London 1981 101, as by lamas Pine 70/60 BCE) showing Aj ade deans washed by Telanon snd Telanon's wf. Teace tefl bythe at hat ee essed fot solr with haplon ad ata bow case (Homer seems nt fae Bs Beceton except in. 82802 is gnitcam tat () Teakos conesond 0 Oe cane fs lof oo Gergithes are the remnants according to Hat,5.122, 7.43 ané Cec ons fete with Gries fn the eno of St ne of whom, a descendant of the orignal Teoer-ed list of Sami fund erga in Trad). Chavane 1978 property esas Teucersambiguos sate = Bi 1991: 245 speculates about the eventual evelopment of Phonic founda 30 seg malaga of Cypriots mie Howat 640.30 Anh Ly. .176 Diol describe Paps at peliophoro ie ot opie ~N a D. Ethnicity n type continued throughout to be the (open) temenos ~ often rural (Weight 1991) — stocked with hordes of terracotta and limestone votary statues of a generally non- Greek appearance in terms e.g. of dress and perhaps having something of the character of family cult-places (Senff 1993: 81). Although there are sanctuaries ‘on the acropolis of Soloi and a temple in the Paradisotissa valley 1.5 km. west of Vouni which can be seen as Cypriot variants on the temple in antis (but cf. Reyes 1994: 1339), the Athena temple on Vouni’s acropolis had Greek roof antefixes (Collombier 1975: 165) and there are possible hints in Tonic capitals from Citium and Paphos (Maier 1994: 304), the “Greek temple” really made litle headway as ‘acult place of an architectural language. (One may contrast the developing taste for such language among non-Greek dynastic areas of Anatolia.) (c) The divinities worshipped in (Greek) Cypriot cult places, even when assimilated to “standard” Greek deities, could take on odd forms: the aniconic Paphian Aphrodite / Astarte is a familiar example, but there were other less exotic, but still distinctive pieces of Cypriot divine representation. However ‘much one might “simplify” the background of the so-called Ba'al Hammon figures (for which ef. Buchholz 1991), they are an iconographic peculiarity of Cyprus. More generally “Cypriot deities of the classical period are not exactly identified with Greek equivalents, even when written evidence provides us with [Greek] names” for them (Yon 1991b: 302). It is, of course, true that artistic influence tended to soften the alien effect as the classical period progressed (cf. Senff 1993: 79 on “Heracles” figures). But the inter-relation between this and the state of mind of the Cypriot worshipper is hard to discern. (¢) There is surprisingly little sign of contact between Cypriots (even Cypriot rulers) and the great sanctuaries and festivals of the metropolitan Greek world. Although (cultural) funeral games were held in fourth century Cyprus for Evago- ras and one might wonder about the contexts in which Cypriots sang the praises of Cinyras (Pindar Pythian 2.25)!5? — I can find no evidence of Cypriot participa: tion in the Great Games of Greece in classical period or indeed during any part of the era of independent kingdoms. Nicocreon did donate prizes to Argos (Kaibel 446), and the Nemean festival heralds did visit late fourth century Cyprus. But the catliest Cypriot victors in the Olympic Games are of third century date (Moretti 1953; 86; Moretti 1957: 594, 611, 922-3, 925-6, 928). Similarly we do not know of any interaction with Delos until the gifts of Paytagoras and Nicocreon of Salamis (numerous references) and of Androcles of Amathus (gold crown for Delos in 313: IG xi.2.135, 161, 203, 205, 209); and in the case of Delphi all one ‘ean quote from the Persian era is Euelthon’s incense burner (Herodotus 4.162 ~ Was it, incidentally, “remarkable” because of notably oriental design?) and Ni- cocles'four-antlered stag (Aelian NA 11.40).'# 167 Molyneux 1985 merely postulates skolia. Woodbury 1978 denied that songs / poems were involved at al. 168 Other Cypriot items in Delphi are cary: two seventh. “dalion” shields Heresprns\e): Lerat 1980 (comparable with examples of similar date from Idalion and Kouklia esp, Per- "ot Chipiez 1885: 869 fg.626 and Karageorghis 1963:265), Amandry 1944/5 56 (18) (th 6.) Rolley & Masson 1971: 295 (7th. with syllabic inscribed dedication of Hermalos). SUINDUOISIH GOB HSGOH SUSTSSUSSETNSN St a