{you don lke my book, write your own f you don’ think you ‘an write a move, that ought 10 ell you something. Ifyou think {you can, do. No excuses. I ou sll don? like my novel find a ook you do lke. Lifes 100 short 1o be miserable you do like ‘my novels, commend your good ase Rita Mae Brown, Southern Discomfort NATURALISTIC INQUIRY Yvonna S. Lincoln Egon G. Guba SAGE Publications [Pveratinal Educational and Professional Pubisher NewburyPark London New Det1 Postpositivism and the Naturalist Paradigm ‘Sobvarte and Opie, 1979) ‘The history of humankind is replete with instances of attempts to understand the word. Ou caviosity hasbeen dectd atthe same fun ‘damental questions throughout time; our progress as inquires can be ‘hated by noting the various efforts made to deal with those questions ‘What ithe worl? How can we come o know ie? How can we con trol it for our purposes? What iy afterall, he tah about these man? “The concept of truth isan elusive one. Julienne Ford, in her eighty whimsical book, Paradigms and Fairy Tales (192), assets {hat the term irath may have fur diferent meaning, which she ym bolzes as Truth, Truth, Truth, and Truth. Truth. is the fair ‘empirical sath ofthe sles; a cll inthe form of hypothesis ot predicate (an affirmation or denial of something) is Tif is consis tent with “nature” or, in Ford's own ianguage, “preserves the ap Dearances" Truths is fogica ruth; a cain (hypothesis or predicate) is Tits lopiealy or mathemataly consistent wih some other claim nov tobe tue (inthe Ty ent) or ultimately with some base beet taken to be, to which we shall return ina moment). Truth is erica ‘wath lim i, i the person who asserts its ating in conformity with moral or professional standards of conduct.” ‘Trt, with which we are mot concerned here, may be called ‘metaphysical trath, Unite the case ofa cain's being Ty Ty OF Ts claim that i sai to be T, cannot be tested for truthfulness against Some exernal nem suchas cortespondence with nature, lope ede Ibi, or professional standards of conduct, Metaphysical bei must be accepted a ace value; as Avital knew (Reese, 1980, p. 70) and. ord affirms, basi belt can never be proven Tin conformity with S Me Nene Powtgm 15 nature—or False. They represent the ultimate benchmarks against hich everything esis tested, for if there were something more fun- damental against which atest might be made, then th mote fun ‘damental entity would become she base belle? whose truth (T) ant be taken for granted [Now cetin sets of such basc or metaphysical belief are sometines constituted into a sytem of Ideas that “ether give us sme judgment bout the nature of reality, ora reason why me must be content with ‘knowing something les than the natore of realy, along wih & method {or aking hold of whatever canbe known (Retse, 1980, p. 352). We shall call such a systematic set of belies, together with ther aoa ying methods, a parediom.” Paradigms representa distillation of what we shin bout the work (but cannot prove). Out actions inthe worl, including actions tht we take as inguters, cannot occur without reference to those Daradigms: "As we think, s0 do we act.” But, while paradigms are ‘hus enabling, they are also constraining: A paradigm ia wor view, a eel peep, a may of beak down the compen ofthe veal word, Auch, radi ee deep ly embedded in the socaleaon of adherents and practioner: ardipns tell them whats inporat, lite and exon Parndigns are aio normative, tling the practioner what 0 ‘ithout the neesty of lng exten or eptemologal conser. ion But ics this aiest of paradigns that conte bth thes Sergi and ther welts strength ott makes ston pos be that weaker in that she wry fenton fraction iden the ‘nguestoned assumpdons ofthe paradigm, (Paton, 197, p. 303) ts the authors’ posture that inquiry, whether in the physical or social sciences, has passed Uwoush a mumber of “paradigm eras, periods in which certain sets of basic belies guided inquiry In quite Aiferent ways. We hall brief deseribe thee periods ss prepositvs Postvs, and postpostvit, and show that each period had ts own ‘unique sex of “base belief” or metaphysical principle in whichis adherens believed and upon which they acted, We sal take the pos! tion that the postistposture, wile ditreited by vanguard thinkers in every known dicptne, continues to this day to puie the effort ‘of practitioners of inquiry partyin the roca or huma scence. Further, we shall argue that, since these methods are based on ‘metaphyseal principles that are dissonant withthe principles guiding te vanguard development of substantive (isipin) thous, m= erative that inquiry Kel be sifted fom a postivistto «pops1s Narunauisric mquey stance. For, a new paradigm of thought and belie is emersin, it 1s ectsary to construct @ parallel new paradigm of ingry Soe CAVEATS In discussing the eras through which paradigms have passed, it wil tb easy to asume tat there exits somewhere the paradigm that pat tfforte a paradigm formation hae approximated moze and more lose. IF seience could succesfully converge onto that paradigm, hen it con quickly tease out its consequences, test them inthe empltcal world, and come, finaly, to “true” understanding. A study of the Distory of science might be very important if we sre to achieve an understanding of those successive approximations; might be asserted, as Barnes suggests, that “the subjet mate of the historian of scence «am only be demarcated by recognizing what i i athe pas that ex- ibis causal continuity with present science” (ited in Hesse, 1980, 47) But, as Hesse (1980, pp. #5) points out: ‘The preset tin his rade ene the standard of tha estoality for the pas, and ives the induct Ritorian groan forthe Fecostus of pa arguments scoring (oan sepa inductive ‘tractre, and for Jong past tori simpy fle and often Flos. Su induce Ritory of couse, amon ocho dee ‘elfdefeting, bcese al theories ae dangerons and ly Yo be ‘persed, so are tke pron theories nr af ich the inde ‘nudges the past. emphass added) ‘We may draw from thee remarks the fllowing caveat: Since al theories and other leading ideas of scientific history have, 0 fa, been shown tobe fais and unacceptable, so sey wll any theories that wwe expound today. This insight ices a certain degree of humility in claims for the “ulimat truth (7. of anything that i aserted here ‘This book should therefore be regarded not as an attempt to take timaely tre (and modern) pronouncements, buat a effort to mark ‘our place along the path of understanding a path that unfortunately {is neverending. We are not setting forth a new orthodoxy; instead, we aim to make ita lide mare dificult to hod onto the od. 'A second caveat i that theories, whether scientific or other ive, ae remarkably immune to change: hence one cannot expest an es) time of it when proposing something as radical asa paradigm revi son. Theories are, te borrow a term from moder organization theory, “loosely coupled” (Weick, 1976.) There iy as Hese (1980) suggests, 1 “'many-to-one” relation between theoretical and practical Ft; Te Nani Pram 17 is possible ft many different idealizations (theoretic facts) to a single practical fet: Many conficting etorks may more or ss the same fas, and ‘hich one i adopted man depend on erteria oer than the fact: ‘er ivaving Simpy, obtence with te pars of sence, and to on. Quin, a wel Laowa, has drawn ths condsionexply in the song sens of elsiing that snyvsement can be mained trae in the face of any evidences Any statement can be eld tat ame what may, we make asic enough adjntmentschewhere In ‘he sytem.” Hesse, 190, p16) “Thus the loosely coupled nature of theories makes it possible for ‘ciemsts osquim mighty before giving up a theory (ora paradigm), ‘Any conflicting fact can be accommodated by making adjustments ‘lrewbere in the este, “Along the same ines, Wimsatt (1981, p. 134) has noted what be terms te “robustness of prevaling theories, a robustness, he cain that derives rom the fac tat portions of theory ae “walled off from ‘oosely coupled to) one anctber: “The thing hats emarkable sou cleave i ta the non: sens are walled off and de ot appear to affect the theory other ‘han very ley. When an nconitency ea, eat which de [en on one of ae ofthe contador sumption ae nim ‘This infection i wanstive: passes To things that depnd on thee ‘esl and to thet lope! dexeadans, ke a sring of dominos ‘et me reach something tat as indepedent oppor The Inde ‘Penden soppert ef an asunpton sustains i andthe comps prop outer no farther fal dedtctve or infec pate lending 106 enaccio pass uh rob ress, the calla bounded witha ‘ham, and the icone re wale off rom there ofthe et ‘rork. For each robust ‘Thus the failure of a paradigm to be flly coherent, thats entre ly internally consistent,” can als be one ofits chief defenses agaast, challenge. As paradigms are assaulted by acs” that do not fit, the facts can be walled ofa posbility only because the paradigin i loosely coupled. Further, even thote elements of the paradigm tha are most afeced by the conficing Face may be supported in inde- Pendent ways—a fact that could not obeaa ithe letely coherent, The result of this sate of aa possible for adherens ofthe paradigm to rei stout, een if at ines [rratinaly, the efforts of others to replace it. Making it even a ilebs warvnauisric moun ‘more difficult 0 hold onto the old paradigm may isHf tur out to ‘bean enormously difficult task, not one to be taken on by the faintearedt ‘THE pREPOSITIVIST ERA OF the three “paradigm eras, the preposive is both the longest and the least ineresting from @ modern perspective; indeed i lack Of provocative acts and ideas Is best illustrated by its very title Dreposivis. This era is simply a precursor to the more exciting Peiod that followed. It ranges over a period of more than {vo millenia, roughly speaking, from the tine of Aristotle (34-322 B.C) to that of (but not inclding) David Hume (171-1776), One might ‘expect that “Science” would have made enormous strides over such ‘lon period, bu it aid no, larly because Aistode(and many other ‘reposviss) took the stance of “pasive observer” (Wall, 198), ‘What there was in “phiyss," Adstotle argued occurred “natal.” temps by human (0 leen about nature were interventionist and ‘unnatural, and 50 distorted what wa learned. Wolt (1981, p. 22) Aristo elev in water motion. Human interference produced continous and uaatual movements And to Aa, such ‘movements were not God's way. For example, Aristo enioned the iden of "force" The beay cart beg nen alone the road by the Ire ian unataral movement. That ir why te ores i sading 10. That is why the motion eb jerky anderen The hove us ‘er a "Tree" to get the eat moving. The hose mst comin 10 ‘era force” to ep the cart moving A soon the hos baling, it tps exerting 4 "ree" onthe care Consent the et fomes to its natural pice, Wich Sra ret‘ the Fond Aristotle’ mind was broad ranging enough to touch virtually every conceptual problem imaginable at his ime. Not che least of thee pro ‘lem areas was that of lope. Aristotle contributed tw paces, com: ‘monly know as the Law of Contradiction (which stats that no po. Postion can be both true and false atthe same time) andthe Lav ofthe Excluded Middle which hols that every proposition must be citer true or fal), which, when applied to nonintrvenionst or passive observations, seemed sufficient to generate the entire gamet of scenic understandings that were needed (MitrofT and Kilnana, 1978) Wolf further observes Within he wor of the mind, thee thoughts over thowsands of ears ag. Scents were pave ten would take a whl before ‘When stents dd begin to reach out and touch, to ty ideas and seeif they worked in short, when they became ative observers, eles passed into the posivst period. The movement wat slow; Ise [Newton (1642-1727) ssa to have commented that "if Ihave sen further, itis because Ihave stood on the shoulders of giants,” But ‘the numberof giants was exceedingly small Only afew workers had ‘emerged who went beyond Arslan science, and ir seful fo ‘observe that they also came fom essentially nonnte ventions ik: {hee astronomer (Copernicus, 173-1843; Gallen, 1568-1682; Kepler, 1571-1630) and alogilan/mathematician (Descartes, 1596-1650) Fur ther, thei work dd litle to challenge the prevailing paradigan of Inquiry, however much itmay have exercised established religion, It Ai, however, pave the way for that challenge, Postvsm may be defined as “a fly of philosophies character by an extremely postive evaluation of scence and scenic method” ‘Reese, 1980, p. 480. Indeed, its early adherens saw in this move ment the potential fr the refoen of such diverse atets at eth, religion, and pois, in adlton to philosophy, to which fet it finally ‘became confined. Asa philosophy, the movement began eatly inthe nineteenth century, primarily in France and Germany; is nox power: ful advocates inthe twentieth century were fered into eroup know 1s the Viena Circe of LogialPostvss, wich includ philosophers nd stents suchas Gustav Bergman, Rudalf Carnap, Piipp Frank, “ans Hahn, Oxto Neuath, and Moritz Schick, the lat having founded the group, Schick held an endowed chair tthe Unversity of Vienna ‘hat had Been established inthe memory of Ernest Mach, an extreme advocate of operationaism,’ whose ideas the group proposed to Promleate ‘But postivism had its major impact not n reforming eis, religion, and pois, or even philosophy, but scenic method. The concepts of posivism provided a new atonal for the dog of science tht amounted to literal paradigm revolution, although that revolution took pace so slowly and was so imperfectly perceived by even the major actors caught up init that its revolutionary character was never Appreciated. IF i is difficult fora ish to understand water becasse thas spent all of is life in it 2 i edifice for scensts—and20 naTunaustic mquiRY repost scientists were no excepion—t0 understand what their bse axioms or asumptions might be and what impact those axioms and assumptions have upon everyday thinking and Hest. ‘Given this slow and litlewndertood change, isnot surprising that diferent scientists and philosophers would have somewhat dif- ferent views of jst what positivism implied, and on what ground it ‘stood. That confusion continues today, as ca be sen from a reading ‘of some representative authors on the topic. For example, David Hamilton, n-a paper prepared for an informal workshop at the University of tins in 1976, suggests that posivsm began with the publication of John Stuart Mil’ System of Logi in 1843. Hamilton (1926, p- 2) comments on this work iozaty, A Stem of Logie was a power inerpretaton, for ‘alzaton and defers ofthe seus claps which had emerge ‘Monge the poli, economic, ad soca elton ofthe ne ‘Senet and url increta, teat centr fp anc, however, rather diferent Mis Lope fered a eobeen set ‘of princes of procedure for se in he Sot ad naa! sence. ‘Akoogh subjected wo consderale ee, Mis original fo. ‘lations fave sured il he present day ate dominant metho eloalparscion Hamiton summarizes Mis assumptions a5 folows: (0) The social and natural sleces have Wnts sins, samely the incovery of general Iw that serve for explanation and pecton (0) The soil and satura scenes te ethology dente (0) The soil slences are merely more complet than the aaa sence, (4) Concepts conte defined by dec reference to ep xpos bjs inthe concrete” (6) Thee ualformiy of aarure in time and space. Hamiton com ‘ets that this stumplon elf an induction enabled Milo over ‘ome Hume's objections to loi inference and thereby invested ‘Stn with the same procedural certany as slog lope We ‘may noe that such an argument har been found to be iva by modern philosophers sete Scan below about the problem of the undedetermnation of theo. (6) Lsvs of autre cam be mtarahy (ndtv) deived rom dat ‘Human comments that MI had Ble os abot theory Beene eed to be homeephie wih “empl uiormies.” (2) Large samples suppress iosyeraies ("paral extses") and reveal "ener aes” ie inate lows of ate) Pre Nanas Pentgn 2) ‘A second example: Wolf (1981, p. 56) dscuses positivism in the {guise of Newtonian mechanics, which he sys rested upon the follow: Jing assumpcions regarding the “physical and therefore mechasica world” (0) Tings move ina cootiuous manne. All motion, both inthe hg nd the sal, exhibit conti. (2) Thing move for festns Tee renons wee Bed Up ey cates for medion. Therefore ll motion was dermined and everything at predeabe () All motion could be aniracd or broker down int component ‘bars Ech pt pled aren the rent machine cle te ue, nd te complesty of thi machine cold be undesod ase sno ‘movement of is vaious pr, even thaw pars Beyond ou pep, (@) The observer obverved, never iturbed. Eve the te of cama) obverer coud be ascoustd for by simply analysing the oben ‘movement of whatever he touche, A third example: Schwartz and Ogilvy, whose work will occupy considerable portion of our atenton in Chapter 2, dexribe the Nev: tonian "world view” ab holding that matter consist of very sal Daticles that are asembled into larger and larger complexes. The ‘sential ideas ae capeured by the metaphor ofthe ilar table * The metaphor supports & deterministic physicrif we knew the mas Positions, and velocities ofall te particles we cul petit the futre From the lnws of physic. But Schwartz nd Ogilvy (1979, p. 32) point out, Enbeded within the mechani view of the world ae dee base sump The et tat hes mos fame le trey (Ges the bai biling bets) composed a the sales pares and ‘he complete sto forces that govern them, Once me fin ha fu mental level andthe as tht govern he world aw fat govers ‘mater and ‘energy on the very seal scale mate very sla ad hope idem, to thot that apply on the very lag cle’ The sovernng las thas Would be unlveral, 20 tht we oaeht o be ale {0 bull's plctre of planets moving abou he su oat of a unde Sanding of the putes of whch mater i composed Fly, thre [the astumpion that we, a5 observers, can Bese from ex rimems andthe world Weare udhing to produce an “objetne™ ection A fourth example: Mary Hesse (1980, p. vi, a Bish epste ‘molopst and historian of since, suggests that what she cal the "stan:} 22 warunauisric nguIRY dard account” of scientific explanation within an “empiial phi- lovophy” depends upon sels of assumptions “The met important of thse ae the assumptions of nave raion, ‘ta univer snc lmeuae, tnd ofthe corespondence tory rah These three assumptions between them conse a pitre af ence {nd the world stent at follows: there an extra wold which ff i pinciplebe exh descent language The ‘Seat as Doth cbserver and language ser, can capture the eel fae othe word in propotions that ae ef they correspond to the fcis and fae they do ot. Scence Weal guste syste Ia wich re propo are fn caetoone enon wo fa icacing ‘ate that are not ety obeeed Renae thy involve Hen em ties or popes, or pst events o far stant events. Tes den vent ate devil a theo, and theories canbe nfred from ‘eran hat, the hideneaplentory mechanism ofthe world fa be discovered fom what open o oberon. Mana cet ie eoaded at nding apart from te wold tad abetoexperient snd Therze abou abel and dspasonaty A filth example: Hese (1980, pp. 170-171) also presents state ‘ment of what are taken tobe the characterises of empirical method eseribed by Habermas, who was presumably himelf drawing upon the work of Diltey: 1. in antral since experience taken 10 Be objective, tenable, and Independent of theoretical explanation 2 Intalio heres are rial contracons or model, ying ‘tolanatin nthe ase of lope of hypothe deduction exe. fre find them 2, in patra sens the tke relaons ated of expense are rca oth fhe objets coneced and tothe Investor, ice they ate merely orton 44 The lng of tral ence enc, formaizabl, and Her treo mens ae univocal, and «probe of meaning ws oly Inthe sppition of ushers categories to particule 5, Meanings i natural sence ae separate (rom fs ‘A sixth example: Harte (1981, 3) provides yet another formulation: “The post raion nsec methodology has ben based upon ‘he pine that he ol lable Hnowiede of ay i of phenome ‘he Nana Prato 2) reduces know of parla instances of pater of enttoe {ns ae treated os probable generataans of description of sich paters The aoe rol flav faite he pein of fare ‘sry experience, Theis ae lgilly ore st of ne. In com. Sequence there ate reduced toa Tis apparats neces to the anne of preision It flows that fr post, the tsk of thdestanding theory ehausted by two prover Anal of theo! dcoure amed at evealing is og stracare The em- Dinca content ofthe they supposed ta be brought foley ening thos lope conseguences of the et of ws Wich pr bt to debe overdo Thee te theoe, wo sides of movers Prvsm one lope! and one empial- Mtn pours ‘ometimes ced “lois emp Harre goes om to raise the question of how it ever happens tht positivism gains 2 foothold. He describe positivism ae a Kind of {allack postion, a posits retreat” that occurs whenever there i a serious loss of confidence in curren theory in some fl. Scientits, he speculates, tend to take thir theories and models very seriou, representations of reality, as factual desrptios of what actualy ‘curs. But, he goes on I we ste to take an imagined mechani seriouly at & possible representation of rely thetecugt tobe some way of ding be teen sal ends forthe ole of bes explanation, Sometimes he Ingenuly of thers predies » multe of seminly poste mechanisms, al apabl of feng imagined to prodoce cle anloguet ‘fhe empirical observed ptened reguue. But Ie other ex treme sometimes happens tat the mot alee nd magnate thinkers cam make no headway a all inapining any mechanion ‘apable of simulating the beara ofthe el word in the eld th) ‘riveting. The former stanton bought on spot ration ‘mong asrononers inthe seenth entry, the ler among #0 ‘tome physic Inthe tenth, At the hat of the pens te ‘on ia denial hat theory ead epee! Hidden ree, Actor. Ing to postvi aslence sould be taken 8 no more than wel siested td of les for preiing the future our of observa. But hese "interna hora bans ate no sucesso forthe eet fo postin. Hisorkal tle cleat tees! an od {nit to this reteat At skit abaden the sath for a deo nowege of nature they tnd to adopts milan, een aa ergs ture, somenes pesca these who ope to contin on the pth {rset radon A Mind of glorying i enornce i dplayed, lke the Pacuan professors who Tete to Look throgh Gal's telescope, Posi retreats edo ast beyond a sige pensation of Senin, hough the damaging effect of widespread sbandonment 3Me arunauisric gun reals can someting be at for on ne afer te donna Ses Ive departed. (Hare, 181, pp. 78) 's very clear fom this sample of statements about posi that tere is no clear agreement about what ether the philosophy or the method encompasses. Postivism canbe reshaped, apparently, to sit the define’ purpose, and while there is certainly remarkable overap in these statements there are alo some inconstencies and some idiosyncrasies. One might venture to say thatthe particular form of Aefnition offered by any commentator depends heavily upon the ‘eounterponts he or she wishes to make. (The significance of that ‘observation forthe ways in which postvism wil be iterreted later inthis book should not be overlooked; we ae ui” of the same "erime.") But it does seem 1 be the ese that these authors do agree ‘on one point: Posvism Is pass. Hare's scathing comments noted 8 Tew paragraphs ago leave no doubt that he not only dsarecs with {he posit postion but belevesit tobe the product of smal, con- sed minds who reteat ot Because they lack any other viable ae natives. Such arsh judgment is undoubtedly a strong overeaction, but ear some more temperate eis! 1 Mary Hesse(1980,p vid hvinggivenicaser opiion hat the tre most ‘important asumponsunderingpsitvism ae nae reais, bee in a ‘sehr sent lingunge, and correspondace hry o ah geet fn 0 comment "Almost evry svumptonunderiying ti Son ha ‘een subject daring ets" «© Schwarts and Opry (17 p. 3), having decribed what they take tobe thet basic assumptions ofthe Newtonian worl iw, a that“ these Bsc etumptiom sre ow being changed by theoretical 4nd ‘perimental nding" 1 Woi (981, pp S56), after describing his view f the asumtions| “concerning the pyc won of the Newton, ent Bat sould ake neal ity ye forthe tre] sry tobe toa with he ‘snexplinable in oss ems) phenomena: he inabity of physicists ‘of eter, that necessary component of wave theories oi and thei inabitytodeal withthe etsrope,"he area pet Aoexphin the cle of heated (wing) cet CHALLENGES TO AND CRITIQUES OF POSITIVISM What isthe nature of the challenges to and eriques of posivimn ‘that have brought it to Ks metaphoric knees? Space precludes the level of treatment that {0 the following sss: ‘Te Nanas Pram 28 ich a question deerves, but one may point (1) Positivism leads to an inadequate conceptuatization of what ccionce et + Hesse (980, pp. 4647) ches the work of Rarry Bares, who ‘ssn that al tempts oid demarcate, dha necesary {dsc ondsons ora beet system to be ie, have fled, ‘These flues incloe al yer and asaya and Allee appeal fo experimentation andor to pata tnd of Induce or tort inference, At bt he sec, the cont ilnce”™ most be reuded a Toes ansociaion of tary resenfbance characterises involving, among tbe higs, eran tonal forms of anthvopomarpiom and tology, tn congue tends o sealrem, personality, statin, ed ane ‘While would be inappropriate tht this fare is eatisy produced by adherence to psvic penis, cet that te Paradigm has fered no way out of the diem, Posi thoroughly cone wo arent of ingly that Rave fen ben cal the “eontent of dicovery” andthe one of Joti. tin." The forme eae wth the genes or origin of vei theories ‘nd the ater with testing the. Poss extudes the former tn Toews on the inter The proces of theory conceptuleation tsa ‘noncoeitve or nosratines and ence oud the ple Betsy theory, a0 mater Bow bare Ke ony, admissible 0 long a8 is coherent (T) and testable 7) In terms of tere contain, sh ‘oF Eines work, for example, would be considered nnscletiic y ‘oss, who would tardy be persuaded by or inetd la Ele Sin's thought edenten experiment, lemay be the ce, as Cronbach (1982) sens to sgge tht vero ‘Nn ht iahenpecelence ovr dsovery within pois Deshi i ‘ones ofthat fomulation could not deve # means for soming 0 ‘ips wih i aytenataly He comments ‘Design of experiments as been a standard element in aig for secll sent Ths Walning hab concentrated on formal tents of Iypaeee conta sie Sethe fc that RA, ihr, ‘he pine test of experimental desig, demonstrated oer and vet ‘gain is apical vestigations th eee ogy Works bak th Yoh between the horse andthe cotiatay Bat since he ‘Soul fer formal theory ony for contort, ha part ‘amet be tana he whole (p. es ephasn ae2s narunauasric nguiRY + Posivn severly consti the pou tet or purpose of cence to preiction and control. Indo, what often eld the “pragmatic ‘sition of secs uclence i that shoal led to ieeaig ‘css! preition and control. Sich dln fess ou of con fenton oer lepinate purpose, at, for example, when or Undead, despon, problem responses, sats detimination, and ‘9 on. I foetss on what might be ealled Konnenchf to he ral ‘laion of mssenchaf ‘Of course, none of these reasons are sufficient to lead to die «ardingpostivsm, but they are suficent to lad to an extreme degree of discomfort among practicing scientists who would prefer to have 1 more slid conceptuaiztion to use a8 touchstone, (2) Positiviom is unable 10 deal adequately with two crucial and Imteracing aspects of the theorfact relationship + The underdetrmination of theory, sometimes ao cae the robin ‘af induction In deduction, gen teva ofthe pny, te eo ‘cusion mast We tve andthe ony eoocaion pole ut Inne Slcin, thre are always many contin that cn testo be ‘ele fo erain premise Deditons ae owed but ndetons ae ‘pen. Ths there ava 2 larger amber of there tat can ‘sbseratons more of lst adequately. Hence there cent be cot ersece, no timate conclsons, no cram or "ve" (theory. ‘ori sation beled byte fc tat here 0 aereament sb what theory (a paler, network, nomolaial net, hype educlon stan) or what for Go suena, uncover, Pec, lan +The theordensss of fats, thats he apparent imponsbiliy of ‘having “Jat” that reno thomstves hry determine I ety ‘sry imposible to tave an observational langage that isnot ls of popotions (acts on Wa can ‘ot be determined except i elation ta te theory. at t we have St sen, tre theories cannot be dered Because ofthe problem of Uunderetcrminaion Hence the reatoning ently cca (2) Positivism i overly dependent on operatonalsm, which hat Iiself been increasingly Judged to be inadequate, + Operaontsm simply not meaningful o sting; csaling the ‘quotation fom Ford ee note), ont poop a mote ire fear han inthe umber of Teal bluse mtd every hou, * Operon too shallow, depending a doe nosey on sematons for ks Tas” and reising to. deal with meanings OF ‘mpcatons. ‘he None Prom 27 + Operationally define fats te jst theory a ate any ote. * Despite the food intentions and the ts efforts of the Vienne Chel ‘of Logeal Pots, nee they nor ano thud hare eh She fo Fd cece of te metaphyl dndespioning + The ssc pate of operational ses in 8 meaningless ent of the worl. Since nothing exist Tor the operational eet throug the struments tht mesure t enrich eet cose ‘ites a5 two IQ saves messed by tro sfferent 1 tests mt fe ‘ted to te different dete high creation Between the, (4) Positivism has at least ro consequences that are Both re: ‘pugnant and unfounded: + Determinism, repapant bce of ts impctons or han fre wl ‘tnd afounded case of receat findings in many ell ha eve ‘eoogly agin for xp the Hescaberg Uncerainy Pringle (Chap) ‘+ Reiiconism, repugnant because it would make all phenomens n= ‘luting hua pesomenaulimatty eject fon single of Lv, ‘and unfounded ‘because of recent fading in many ils incng Imuhematcs od piss rule oat the post In thse Nel, for example, Ge! Theorem (Chapter (©) Postvism has produced research with human respondents hat ‘gnores their humanness a fct that has nt only ethical but alo va Iii implications. bas emphasized exoroou reterch—that i ritch in which a ‘uta calleion and nai, and ef figs, have ten reece demi the vita exon of endogenous fresh tha, reverh in which the rapondents have eal gh of etre +h emphasise esearch, reach cid ot with an ot side ble) peepee the vial eckson ef em ea ‘hat research eared out Wi an ine pepsin eset, (6) Postvism falls shor of being able 10 dea! with emergent ‘onceptual/empiricl formulations from a variety of feds: thre cecamples: ‘+ bets incompleteness Teo, which ates tat no xomatic syste of mathematics is able to provide information abou Both the So ices and comsiteney ofthat somatic ste or, pt enter a) ‘asters that oteary of matbemats aed to be comple be ieraly cowie2) xaruanismic mquIRY + Hesenber' Uncersny Prince, which ass that the poston and ‘omentum of an tron cannot bth be determine, bec he ln of the observer mang eer measurement neva aes te ‘Bas Theorem, which apr hat 0 theory compas with quantum ‘theory can equ spill separated events to Be independen The consequences of these three formulations, as well as others, for the basic premises of positivism, including ontology, objectivity, and causality, ave devastating (2) Posivism rests upon at est fv assumptions that ae increas: ingly cfcun fo maintain. These five assumptions capture the Most salient aspects included in the various defiaitios of posi that have aeady been reviewed" and wil form the Bois forthe counter ‘proposals that are the backbone of this ook: + Anonologcal sumption of sing, tangible realty “owt thee ha ‘an Be broken spar ito ples capabi of Being sted independent ‘+ An epizemolopal assumption abot the posit of separation ofthe ‘burr fom the aber the knoer from the known + An astumption of te tepoal and contextual independence of abe “ato s0 hat wht treo tie and place may nde appropriate ‘Seunstanees Gc s samp also bette at ater ue and place ‘An amumption of linear eu; tere are no effets without ass Sn no cases without sect, +A ato smn of ate reso tht hat he metodoony| aan tat th esas ofan inayat seal ree rom the foe of any value system (i) “The consequences ofthese several exitiques of positivism ae suff clenly telling and widely appeeciated that a significant number of ‘vanguard scents have sbandoned that paradin and moved into the osipoiivst era. We sball describe ext what are sll clomey and ‘emergent efforts to carry ut that move. THE POSTPOSITIVIST ERA? Posiivism hasbeen remarkably pervasive. We have noted tha ts precursor era does not havea name of Is own but i clled, simply the prepostvist era. Similasy, the new era has not yet gale sult ent credibility o selPassurance to have assumed «name of is own; it to is called bya simple name: posiostvsm. The grip of is pre ‘cursor i ill on if it is ust as ifiult forthe modert-day scent fof whatever stipe to thiow off the shackles imposed on thinking by ‘eMart Pron 29 ‘the postvists a it was for Gaeo'singuistors to take his telescope, and what i revealed, seriously; or for Lavoisier’ fellow chemists 19 ‘be able to accept oxygen without simultaneously wondering where all the phlogiston had gone. "The reader who has never contemplated postpoivet eas may be infor rurrite; Indeed, a rude shock, AAs the aphorism goes “Expect the unexpected.” Pethaps the mes! unexpected aspect of posiposivim that is basic tenets ate vetualy the reverse of those that characterized positivism Derhaps not 80 surpeising, afterall, when one contemplate that, postpostvis is as much a reation tothe flings of positivism a Ieis proactive set of new formulations; reaction, to. i 8 form of "standing on the shoulders of giants. "An example: it wil be recalled thai Habermas, expanding on the ‘ideas of Dilthey, outlined what he took to be the erual axiomatic diferences between hermeneutics and empiricism. In oppoition 10 What he saw to beth five cetral aspects of postvim objectivity, Inypohetico deductive theory, external lawlke relations, exact and fo smal language, and separation of fact from meaning Habermas pro posed fivecounterponts, which Hesse (1980) declares hve now come fo characterize the natural sciences as wel. Indeed, she anerts, the positions ascribed by Habermas othe empirical sciences, while valid atthe time that he wrote, have ben almost universally diereited” (ese, 1960, p. 172). She goes on: Paring he Se point ofthe [Haber] dichotomy [of tural nd ham sslenes), we can sommarie ths postempiit account of 1. tral cece data detachable rom theory, for nh count 1 data ae determined in the it of some terete iteration, ‘nd the fact themes have tobe ronnie lathe gh of inepreation 2. aatual scence theories ae nt mode eternally compared in ‘atte oa hypothetcodeducve sem, they are he Way Te ace ‘heme are oe 3. tn matral sien the aw erations amet of experince ae ‘ermal, bast what we count a ce are cota y hat the theory Sys atout the interrdnions with one another 4 The langage of natural sciences rede metaphorical and i ‘ac, andformaliabe ona the coat of atortion of the store “manic of eee developmen’ and ofthe Inapnave eons ‘nein erm of which nate letrpeed by senceyo warunauisric nquiny 5 Meanings im marl scence are determined by theory they ate ndestod by thereat coerence rate han by responce wih fac. (p. 27) ‘Objective reality has become very relative indeed! ‘Another instance: Roen Harve (981), whose scathing dismissal of| positviem was quoted above, alo contrasts positivism withthe “new paradigm.” Where positivism is concerned with surface events ot ap pearance, the new paradigm takes deeper look, Where posvism [s atomistic, the new paradig is structural. Where postvism estab- lshes meaning operationally, the new paradigm exabishes meaning inferenilly. Where postivism ses is central purpose to be preic= ‘on the ne paradigm x concerned with understanding Finals, where positvim is deterministic and bent on certainy, the new paradigm {s probabilistic and speculative. Most of the distinguishing features ofthe postpsitvst paradigm have emerged from feds such as physics and chemistry, customary denoted a the "hard sciences.” But the argument forthe new paradigm can be made even more persuasively when the eats being ‘died are human belags" For such research, Heron (1981) advances Sx arguments in favor ofthe postpostvs paradigm: (1) The argument from the nature of research behavior. Heron ves that researchers cannot define one model of Behavior foe {hemseves and a different one for ther respondents. I the asic model for research Behavior i that of %ntlligentslf-diection,” then, (0 bbe consistent, the same model must be applied tothe respondents. (2) The argument from intentionality. Heron (1981, p. 2) argues for the necessity of checking with the repondents to Be sre that their intentionality and the researcher's interpretation of it colncde: "When Tam interpreting sich tase ations (as walking, talking, lookin, pointing} a terms of thee more complex intentions and purposes, than Tad to chek agaist he fresponden’s] version of what he was about, fora person may walk alk, of lok of pont to fll many diferent higher order intentions (8) The argument from longuage. Language formation sintered bby Heron as an archetype of ingulty ise. When human beings con stuneate they muse agree on the rules of language they wil follow. Hence the use of language contains within iself the model of cooperative Ingulry. Heron (I981, pp. 2627) asses ‘onto sented othe formation of tone ttm [Ba] ‘he Naas tem 31 ote angaage in hs way eo ct i of rom validating base ‘The entie a etofsenatd ements hanging in an nterpessonal ‘ol: thements stat persons nt autre y tore eras My ‘omieed ew of our eat wiboatcosaling You tra ery feet ‘mater from our cosred view of 06 rey. (4) The argument from an extended epistemology Heron notes that while scence as produ takes the form of a Set of propositional Statements, the proces of scenic inguiry involves not only propos Wonal knowledge but also practical knowledge (the sk, profcien- ‘es, of “nacks” of doing researc) and experiential knowledge (now ing person or thing through sustained encounters), He notes: ‘What 1 am arguing. i hat empirical resech on persons involves ‘bu, developing itrdopendeee between propocionl nowedg, ctl knowledge, and expert knowledge The rentch coc jon ecaniy rst on the eearcers egret owes of the [esponden. Tis Knowledge of persons fs mos adequate a 2 mpl tase when researcher and respondent) ae fly preent {occ oer ina ebtionsip of reirocl and open lagu, od when ‘chr open to contre how the cher manifest preseceapece fn ie. (p30). (5) The argument from axology. Heron argues thatthe tuth of 1 proposition depends on shared values, The data that researchert {generate he suggests, depend upon thelr procedural norms, which it {urn depend upon diet shared values. I the facts are about persone othe han the researcher, “they have indeterminate vai, no secure ‘atu a truths, ual we know whether those other pertons asent fo and regard as their own the norms and values of the tesearchers” ©. 3. (6) The moral and poltica argument, Reseach inthe conventional sense usally expleits people, Heron asserts, or knowledge is power that can be used aginst the people from whom the knowiedge wat seneraed. The "new paradigm’ avoids some of these difcules bevause (2) hoobars he ulin of he respondent for autonomously ‘scguredteowege (2) pros them from tecoming etn 3- ‘sores to Knowdgeclams that may be fae and may be ip ‘ropily or harflly appl to others) protects then frm being eroded from he formation of knowee that purprts to be ‘tout them ands fom belag managed and maniplted in aye22 arupaussric NouIRY they do not understand and 40 cannot assent 19 oF dent from, (op. 2439) But jst what is this new postpostvst paradigm? IF we accept tat is enioms or assumptions are vitally the inverse of those of positivism, we are not defintely helped because as we have sen. Sifernt writers have cast the posvst assumptions In diferent {ermsy_ hence, pontpositvis’s efiition depends upon whose postvisie description is followed. : ‘OF cours, some scholars ins that postpostvsm is nothing more than an ovettecton, and that it time for @rappeoachement that fealigns, positivism with the relativism that characterizes posiponvism. One such witer & Donald T. Campbell, who sug fats that iis time to move into a post-posiposivst era, in which posits and postpesiviem are married off and live happily ever ier In his Willa ames Lectre 5, delivered in 1977, for exam ple, he describes scence as social soem, with all the usual at Irbutes of sich a syrem: aorms, jobs, communication channels, ‘odes of rcriting and rewarding members and Keeping them loyal, find #0 08. He says ‘ut wana ase saan al he bet peeserig mata a ion keen sof which sae tt cmno homens, Sete fet here spect alum ay ‘S'Shamundocns ad the co oes ete what rcome orcs oprah) te mprvig val) of he neon psu wach ee Inape a ee Semen dno f coed eapermetl evar, ou pe ‘Sema ure of dpb rine Te xen ‘icin sons pat const re el mach 8 ‘ate scare usin nr claps arth pero: Ta UiRinctaner sr temie olan of boreal SRoen'n ourcontmal das th sera ase nbs, Sec now reat for pneps posi they a ee wh image epee evi ey shed ih 2 Ter and move spl edentandng Of he Te of enpeinenal Tite ant pees confntn 0 mince ed in Bower Sons nop 1) [Now this whole statement moves from hidden assumptions rooted in the positivist radon, "Theory ladenness” and the “nolsinessof| ‘unedited experimental evidence” are treated as minor technical in- ‘conveniences, The pace of rales Ia ingury i ignored and the dev Te Nara Pom 33 sion of objectivity is maintained in claims such as tat experiments ‘an be designed meticulously enough 30 that no one can influence the outcoie, only Nature Isl.” But what thie perspective misses completely isthe fact that posipostvism isnot merely a perturba tion, wrinkle, a ew angle that simply needs to be accommodated to make everything all right, Postpostvam san entirely new paradigm, nor reconcllable with the old, Reporoachements, accom ‘modations, compromises are no more possible here than between the ‘ld astronomy and Galileo's new astronomy, betwen phogiston ahd ‘oxygen, between Newionian and quantum sechanies. We ate deal ing with an emily new system of ides bated on fundamentally dffereninded, sharply contrasting assumptions, a the quota: tions trom Mary Hesse, Rom Hare, and Jobin Heron so vividly i Tusa What is needed isa transformation, not an add-on. That the world is round cannot be added to the idea thatthe word fat. Nor is che notion of @ paradigm transformation simply an i telletual fashion, at Pole (1983) sugges. To make this point crys lear, itis worth making a brief digression into the nature of 8 Tomatie systems FEATURES OF AXIOMATIC SYSTEMS" Axioms may be defined as the se of undemonsrated (end undemonstrable) “basi beliefs" aceptd by convention or established by practice asthe building blocks of some concep or theoretical acture o system. They are the statement that wil be taken 4s ‘Truth. inthe sense proposed by Julienne Ford. Probably the best ‘known and most widly experienced system of axioms i that under sirding Euclidean geometry. Euclid set himself the task of formal. faing what was known about geomety (Iter, the measurement of earth or surveying) at hi ime; etenily, that meant syeematzing the rules of thumb used by land surveyors, which had ever been “proved” bt which everyone knew had val. It was Eacd's power: ‘ul insight tha these rules could be “proved” by showing them to be logical derivatives from some simple set of “self-evident” truths of, to use Ford's terminology, tht they could be shown to be T, by ‘demonstrating their consistency wih the base belets~ihe self-evident truths—taken tobe. Bui began with four soc basic bebe, which have since come fo be known asthe axioms of Euclidean geometry (otstadter, 1979): (0) A sit tine segment can be drawn jing any exo pois, (2) Any ol espn canbe ented indefinitely natalie,M4 Rarurauisric noURY (0) Ginen any sriht ln egrent, a Sil can be awe having the Iron as rain tod one snd point 8 cet (Al mgn anges ae cone. ‘With hese four axioms, Bucid wat able Lo derive (“prove”) the firs 28 ofthe eventually much larger st of theorems atement shown tobe T), bat the twenty-ninth proof he attempted turned out be i tracuable, In despale, and driven by the need to go on to other theorems, Buc finaly simpy assumed ic asa fith axiom: (6) few ine are drawn tat tre hein ach away hat the sa ol the ene anges 08 one ie es than two pt angles, then he ‘ro tier ievtaly mat Intersect each oer on that side (tod far enough, “The more modern way to sae this axiom i follows: Given line ‘anda poit not on that ine, its possible to construt only oe line ‘through the point that is parallel. the given ine 'AS compared tothe fist four axioms, the fifth seems strained and inelegant; Euclid was sure that eventually he would be able to find 4 way of proving it in terms ofthe fir fur. But his hope was not to be realized in his lee or, indeed, ever; two millenia of effort by mathematicians have falled to provide a prof. tis now known that a proof in Eucid’s Sense is imposible, but that fact was hidden from mathematicians” minds during many cen tries when assiduous efforts were made to find it. Early attempts at proof were of the form that mathematicians would call direct, But, these having filed, indirect proof was sovsht, one variant of which {sto assume the direct opposte of what one wishes to show and then to demonstrate that this opposite assumption leads to absurd conch sions (heorems) In that ase, the orignal formulation rather han its ‘oppose canbe assumed to be covrect. It was exactly this approach, however, that elminsted in so-called non Bucidean geometries, for not only were the consequences of non-Euclidean (opposite to Eucl- ean) axioms not absurd they were i fact of great uilty. One such ‘eometry is called Lobachevskian: this form takes a its fith axiom, "Given ine and a point not on that Ine, iis posible to draw a bundle of ines through the pint all of which are parallel othe given line.” Now thi axiom fies inthe face ofall human experience: yet ites resus of grat intere, for example, to astronomers ‘One ofthe theorems “provable” (inthe sense of T) fom te Buc dean fh axiom is thatthe sum of angles in a angle i 180°. But The Nanas Rendon 35 the sum of angles ofa Lobechesklan triangle snot aways 180° bet approaches 180° as the triangle becomes “small.” An itive under- Standing of this point can te had from examining the impossible a either geometry but useful fr pedagogical purposes) langle shown in Figure 1.1. Assuming we havea tangle With three angles of #0" ‘summing fo 120°, iis clear that a8 the triangle i bisected from is 40° superior angle by a perpendicular bisector, each of the smaller wiangles now has a sum of angles of 150", Now ofcourse all human experience argues that triangles do havea sum equal to 180", but that is simply evidence forthe fact that, within Lobachevekian geometry, al earthsie triangles are small Bu astronomical sized tangles a ‘very much larger, and astronomers fd that Lobachevkian geomcty provides a beter" tothe phenomena that they investigate than doe Euclidean. ZA ABC-120° TA ABD-150" c D vii gor hve ms fe pa36 naTunauistic quia From this digression we may deduce several crucial points: (0) Alors (base belts) ae arbitrary and may ‘eas, even only forthe "sae ofthe sme (2) Axioms are nosis ue, or Reed they pesto be 0: a ‘ee, Some aoms appear to be tery Barre on fit expos. () Ditereat axiom systems have diferent ules depending on pesamen o which they are applied. These elie re not eter by the atte of the aim sytem self but by the eration be ‘een the anos ad the characte ofthese of apition. Ts clean gromeaty i fine for teeta pcr, bur Lbecbesan fomety be preterel for nerstlat space. (4) & decison aboot wich of eral aernative anim sytem ow i five ais best made by ttn the” beeen ech ete 38 fe ease, a ross aaogous fo etag data fort to sumptions beore deciding on which stati owen aaaysing them. sume for any We are ready now to deal with the axioms of the particular postposilvist paradigm we advocate inthis book, which we wil erm the “naturalistic paradigm.” The assumptions ofthat paradigm are brety outlined inthe next section and are conrased with those of| ‘he positivist paradigm: the question of testing thet “it,” partic. lary for use in human inguiry, is delayed for extended treatment in Chapters 3 through 7. The ext setion will also provide a preview ‘of some of the methodological implications ofthe selected ps or actually doing research these implications willbe explored in deta In Chapter 8, ‘THE AXIOMS OF ‘THE NATURALISTIC PARADIGM ‘We have made the point several tines thatthe particular formu ion ofthe posi paradigm that one adopts depends as much upon "he counerese that one will propose as upon anything els; the selec tion of points is essentially aeitear. This presentation is ot ifferent in tha respec; we hope, However, tha the reader will gre that, fst, we have selected to emphasize more sllent rater than more barre "aspects of positivism, and, second, that we have not mistated the pos! tion that a committed postvist would take on these pins, whatever might be said about other points. The points of contrast that we have chosen are, we believe, crv o an understanding ofthe naturalistic paradigm and the ways in which it difers, contrasts, and even con: Fits withthe posiviic (Axons Abel Pest ede “Naat oi Tremecfmaiy Rayan, eet ean wt, ‘heretomip of Kgowend nm art Knows and none rower esoawn depen aon, ere, pre Toeponibiy of ‘Time adceateniee Only i and coment rewnla {eminaton (eome. bound weg hype Sesesstemensy we Gahpapestmeat| ro Spent et tae seen meee terete enon stom Immediately following i a formal statement of the five axiom a both their naturalistic and posse versions; these ste alo sum ‘marized in Table 1.1 fo convenience. The eaer should here acquit, hime or herself withthe aioms and delay concen about whether thee ‘atoms provide a better fit to the phenomena of soiobehaviorli- ‘Qiry uni this mater comes under close scrutiny inate chapter. Axiom 1 The nature of reality (ontology (expanded in Chapter 3) + Posiv version: Ther a ingle angle ceality “owt there fe ‘mentale into independent varale and proces, of which ‘Sted independent ofthe thers guy ca converge ceo ta ay ‘nif, an be peditd and oer. + Natura wesion: Tere ae maine eomscted reales that canbe ‘ed ony hoa nyt thse mp ees il nevi ‘Gveg ach inure more querton ha sneer) 2 that pee tin and contol are unfey outcomes athough some lee of de Standing (vestehn) canbe scieved Axiom 2: The relationship of knomer to known feplstemology)(s- panded in Chapter 4) * Poss version: The igus and the obit of ing ae indepen den the Snover and the known eonsine» cre Sui, * Narra version: Te inter andthe objet of nue nea 0 Infonce one another; Awower and bow ae inseparablebe arurauisric NoUIRY Axiom 3: The posiiy of generalization expanded in Chapter 5) + Postini version: The sm of ington s noma body fof knowledge in the for of generalizations that are rath statemente fic rom Boh neal conten he wil bold anywhere and 8 time ion boay ‘of Knowledge inthe form of “working ypohees” that deci the insvdal case ‘Axiom 4: The possibly of causa linkages (expanded in Chapter 6). + Ponti voron: Every sion can be explained a he ren ect) fof veal cae that peosed the elect temporal (or lest Simotancous wit 1). + Naturalist vero Al eae ae in tate of mutual smtanous shaping that KI posible o Sings causes from ee. Axiom $: The role of values in inquiry (axiology) expanded ia chapter. + Post version: agi i values an be evaraneed 0 be so by vine ofthe obese methodology employed ‘Norra version Ing value bound noes five ways cgtred {nthe corals that foto ‘Coo: lngus te nflencel by ingie values a expres in thechoit of probe, eratand ply opin, andi the fang, ‘Sounding, and focusing of hat problem, eralutd, or policy opin Corot 2: Ing i nfience by the hae of he Pood ta ‘ies the investigation ino the problem Caroary 3 yi ineced by he hice of he usin hey led to gle the cllection and ana of data an in the inter breton of findings. ‘Cooay 4 Ing nace by the vals tht nee he conte ‘Corry 5: Wh pct corre I through shove, ng ‘ler sue rsonant Fanforing or congruent) oF Yale dona co ‘iting Protiem, etaluan, or poy option, peradigm, thor, and lent must erie eongrcnce aloe-tesonanc) if he aga io rodee measingfl resus Following the naturalistic rather than the postive version of there key axioms has, as one might expect, enormous implications forthe dling of research; there implications are very tify sketched inthe following section and willbe pursued in more detail subsequently. The Nana Pent 39 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOING OF RESEARCH ‘An ingirr doing research in the style mode ofthe naturalist, paradigm needs more than just the five exioms listed above as guides, In this section we shall describe very briely sone ofthe more fmpor- ‘ant implications ofthe paradigm for actual esearch operations. The Importance ofthese modes wil be more fly appreciated a we eueh {0 them in more depth in Chapter 8 ‘We shall esrb fourteen characersis of operational natura Inquiry. These characteristics canbe Justified la two ways: (1) by thei Tosi! dependence on the axioms that undertid the paradigm, and @) by ther coherence and interdependence. These fourteen char- teristics display a synergism sock that, once one is slectd, the ober ‘more or les follow. Some atm willbe made inthe paragraphs tht follow to support these claims. Loplel Dependenceapon the Asioms Characteristic 1: Natura setting. N (lhe tural) lets to cary fut researc inthe natural sting or context of the entity for which ‘dy is proposed because naturalistic ontology suggests that reales fre wholes that cannot be understood in isolation from thei contexts, nor ean they be fragmented for separate study ofthe parts the wha |S more than the sum of the par) because ofthe bei that the very ac of observation influences what s seen, and s the esearch intrae- tion should take place withthe entty-i-conent for fullest unde standing; because of the bel that context i crucial in deciding whether or not a finding may ave meaning in some other content 5 ‘el becuse ofthe bbe in complex mtu shaping rather than ner ‘causation, which suggests that te phenomenon must be studied in is full-scale influence (Tore) fll; and because context valve struc tures are atleast partly determinative of what will be found (Characteristic 2: Human intrument.N lcs to ut iso herself aswell as other humans asthe primary dat-gthering instruments (at ‘opposed to paperand-pencil or brass instruments) Because it would bevztually imposible to devise a pioe noahuman insrument wth ‘scien adaptabiity to encompass and adjust the variety of eats ‘that will be encountered: because of the understanding that all in struments interact with respondents and objects but that only the ‘human instruments capable of grasping and evaluating the meaning (of that diferent interaction; because the intrusion of instruments imtervnes inthe mutual shaping of other elements and (hat shaping