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689

The Chernobyl accident 20 years on: an assessment

REVISÃO REVISION
of the health consequences and the international response *

O acidente de Chernobyl 20 anos depois:


avaliação das conseqüências e resposta internacional

Keith Baverstock 1
Dillwyn Williams 2

Abstract Twenty years after the Chernobyl acci- Resumo Vinte anos após o acidente de Chernobyl
dent the WHO and the International Atomic En- ocorrido em 1986, a OMS e a Autoridade Interna-
ergy Authority issued a reassuring statement about cional sobre Energia Atômica lançaram um rela-
the consequences. Our objectives in this study were tório sobre as conseqüências desse desastre. Nosso
to evaluate the health impact of the Chernobyl objetivo neste estudo é avaliar o impacto de tal
accident, assess the international response to the acidente sobre a saúde e a reação internacional
accident, and consider how to improve responses sobre o ocorrido, além de considerar se é possível
to future accidents. So far, radiation to the thy- melhorar as respostas em futuros desastres. Obser-
roid from radioisotopes of iodine has caused sev- vamos que a radiação sobre a tireóide, proveniente
eral thousand cases of thyroid cancer but very few de radioisótopos de iodo, causou milhares de casos
deaths; exposed children were most susceptible. The de câncer, mas poucas mortes; as crianças expostas
focus on thyroid cancer has diverted attention foram as mais suscetíveis. O foco no câncer de tire-
from possible nonthyroid effects. The international óide, porém, distraiu a atenção de especialistas so-
* This article was originally
response to the accident was inadequate and un- bre outros possíveis efeitos. A resposta internacio-
published by Environment
Health Perspectives coordinated, and has been unjustifiably reassur- nal ao acidente foi inadequada, descoordenada e
(114:1312.1317 (2006). ing. Accurate assessment in future health effects is injustificavelmente tranqüilizadora. Acurada ava-
doi:10.1289/ehp.9113
not currently possible in the light of dose uncer- liação sobre efeitos futuros nem sempre é possível
available via http://
dx.doi.org/ [Online 30 May tainties, current debates over radiation actions, por causa de uma certa dose de incertezas frente ao
2006] and is part of the and the lessons from the late consequences of atomic estágio atual dos debates sobre radiação. É essenci-
scientific collaboration
bomb exposure. Because of the uncertainties from al que investigações sobre efeitos e conseqüências
between Rev C S Col and
EHP. The authors declare and the consequences of the accident, it is essential do desastre possam ser socializadas e apoiadas por
they have no competing that investigations of its effects should be broad- um longo período de tempo. Por causa das inade-
financial interests.
1
ened and supported for the long term. The United quadas respostas internacionais ao problema, a
Department of Environ-
mental Sciences, Faculty of Nations should initiate an independent review of ONU deveria iniciar uma revisão independente a
Natural and Environmental the actions and assignments of the agencies con- respeito das ações e responsabilidades das agências,
Sciences, University of
cerned, with recommendations for dealing with com recomendações de como agir em futuros de-
Kuopio, 70211 Kuopio,
Finland. future international-scale accidents. These should sastres. Isso deveria envolver cientistas indepen-
keith.baverstock@uku.fi involve independent scientists and ensure cooper- dentes e não que atuassem em competição.
2
Strangeways Research
ation rather than rivalry. Palavras-chave Acidente de Chernobyl, Radia-
Laboratory, Worts
Causeway, Cambridge, Key words Chernobyl, Disaster response, Nucle- ção, Acidente nuclear, Reposta a desastre ambien-
United Kingdom ar accidents, Radiation, Thyroid cancer tal, Câncer de tireóide
690
Baverstock, K. & Williams, D.

April 26, 2006, was the 20th anniversary of the specific doses due to isotope concentration and
Chernobyl accident, the second major single ex- whole-body doses. The most prominent tissue-
posure to radiation of a substantial population. specific dose is that to the thyroid, largely from
It is relevant to the current view of the conse- 131I, with a smaller contribution from short-lived
quences of Chernobyl to reflect on the under- isotopes of iodine. For many in the 30-km zone
standing in 1965 of the health consequences of (135,000), there were relatively high absorbed
the first major event, radiation from the atomic doses to other organs as well as the thyroid until
bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in evacuation8, and for those living in the contami-
1945. The only significant consequences observed nated areas around the 30-km zone (5 million),
in survivors 20 years after the atomic bombs were relatively high dose rate exposure (days to weeks)
increases in leukemia and thyroid cancer, and the was followed by prolonged (years) exposure to a
general view of the future was reassuring. In 1974, low dose rate. This exposure was a complex mix-
a significant increase in solid cancers was detect- ture of external radiation and internal emitters.
ed, and nearly 50 years after the event, an unex- For others living farther from the accident, in
pected increase was found in noncancer diseas- Western Europe, for example, their average ex-
es1. Today, leukemia and thyroid cancer form only posure was equivalent to an additional ¡Â 50% of
a small fraction of the accepted total radiation- average annual natural background level of radi-
related health detriment. ation. About 600,000 liquidators assisted with the
In 1990, four years after the Chernobyl acci- cleanup. Those working at the site shortly after
dent, an increase in thyroid cancer was found in the accident (200,000) received substantial doses.
children exposed to fallout from the accident2. For all of these groups, estimates of numbers of
Two years later, the first reports in the Western fatal cancers can be derived from the collective
literature of an increase in childhood thyroid can- doses. However, such estimates depend on the
cer (CTC) in Belarus were published3. In 2000, assumed risk coefficient, but of the order of
about 2,000 cases of thyroid cancer had been re- 60,000 such fatalities in total can be estimated,
ported in those exposed as children in the former based on the collective dose estimated by the
Soviet Socialist Union, and in 2005, the number United Nations Scientific Committee on the Ef-
was estimated at 4,0004; the latest estimate for fects of Atomic Radiation9, less than half of which
the year 2056 ranges from 3,400 to 72,0005. The would derive from the declared contaminated
effects are not limited by national borders; Po- areas. A more recent estimate of the numbers of
land has recorded cases6 in spite of a rapid pre- fatal cancers based on a collective dose of less
cautionary distribution of stable iodine7. The than half the UNSCEAR estimate gives a central
causative agent, 131I, was detected in many Eu- value of 16,000 (95% confidence interval,
ropean countries with as yet unknown effects. 7,000.38,000)5.
Interestingly, a significant increase in leukemia has In this commentary, we will assess the estab-
not been reliably reported in the three most af- lished health consequences of the accident; iden-
fected countries. tify some of the unanswered health issues; assess
This dramatic contrast between the two inci- whether there are effects yet to be realized; evalu-
dents is in part due to the different types of radi- ate the international response; and consider how
ation exposure, but both show that the effects of to improve the response to future accidents.
massive exposures to radiation are immensely
complex. In comparing the health effects after
Chernobyl with those after the atomic bombs, it Health consequences
must be remembered that apart from workers in
or close to the power plant, the Chernobyl acci- Firmly established. Thyroid carcinoma. By far,
dent involved mainly exposure to radioactive iso- the most prominent health consequence of the
topes, and the atomic bombs primarily involved accident is the increase in thyroid cancer among
direct exposure to ¥ã-rays and neutrons. Because those exposed as children. The medical authori-
of the prominence given to thyroid carcinoma ties in Belarus and Ukraine were aware in 1990
after Chernobyl, less attention has been given to that the incidence of the rare (typically about 1/
whole-body exposure from the ingestion and in- 106children/year) CTC was increasing, particu-
halation of all isotopes, together with the shine larly in children living close to the reactor2. Ini-
from the radioactive cloud and deposited radio- tially, various non–Chernobyl-related causes were
activity. Consideration of the health effects of suggested for the increase in thyroid carcinoma.
Chernobyl must take into account both tissue- In terms of radiation dose, the most likely culprit
691

Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 12(3):689-698, 2007


was 131I, a copious product of nuclear fission Acute radiation sickness. A small group of
with an 8.1-day half-life. 131I is rapidly taken up liquidators and plant workers received very high
by the thyroid but was widely regarded as carry- whole-body doses. Among these, about 150 in-
ing little risk of thyroid neoplasia. Swedish epide- dividuals were treated for acute radiation sick-
miologic studies of the widespread use of 131I in ness; 28 of these died within a relatively short
diagnosis and treatment of thyroid disease found time4. Approximately 20 more have since died
no significant risk of thyroid cancer10. Other iso- from probable radiationrelated diseases.
topes of iodine and tellurium-132 were also re- Psychological consequences. Psychological
leased in very large amounts, but because of their effects are of considerable importance17. They
much shorter half-lives, their most significant arise from an understandable fear of exposure
contribution to the thyroid dose occurred only to an unknown amount of an intangible but po-
in those living near the reactor. tentially dangerous agent, fear for exposed chil-
The first reports of the increase in Belarus3,11 dren, mistrust of reassurances from the author-
were received with skepticism by the scientific ities, and for hundreds of thousands of people,
community, but the risks were shown to be real12. the consequences of forced evacuation from
Analysis of thyroid carcinogenesis after X-ray home and land. For some, the stress from these
exposure also showed clearly that the younger experiences has precipitated psychological illness;
the subject at exposure, the higher the risk13. The for others, an increased consumption of alcohol
almost complete lack of children in the Swedish and cigarettes; and for still others, dietary chang-
studies thus accounted for the apparent lack of a es to avoid perceived contamination. Some deaths
carcinogenic risk from 131I. It has since become from suicide, cirrhosis, or lung cancer could be
increasingly clear that 131I is as carcinogenic in regarded as indirect consequences of the accident
children as X rays14. The child’s thyroid is one of and the subsequent measures taken. Whatever
the most sensitive human tissues to cancer in- the view the nuclear industry may have about the
duction by radiation. Because iodine is a volatile irrationality of these consequences, they are real
element, its release from fractured fuel rods is and have an important impact on public health,
inevitable. and so deserve greater attention.
Much has been made of the fact that differ- Genetic consequences. Another conse-
entiated thyroid cancer is an eminently curable quence, not as firmly established as thyroid can-
disease. Only a very small number of deaths from cer, is mini-satellite instability (MSI) in children
Chernobyl-related thyroid carcinoma have oc- born to exposed fathers after Chernobyl18,19,20.
curred so far. However, the preferred treatment MSI is not a classical genetic effect, and its impli-
regime, total thyroidectomy followed by 131I cations for health are far from clear. A similar
treatment to destroy metastases, is not always effect has been seen in the children and grand-
fully effective. Death from papillary carcinoma children of men exposed to weapons testing in
of the thyroid is rare, usually of the order of 5– Semipalatinsk21 and a parallel phenomenon, tan-
10%. Because of the slow growth of the tumor, it dem repeat instability, occurs in laboratory mice22.
is premature to assume that the even lower death MSI has not been observed in the survivors of
rate for current Chernobyl-related cases will be the atomic bombings23, in studies of Chernobyl
maintained, particularly for cases yet to occur. cleanup workers24, or in radiotherapy patients25.
An older age at onset can be associated with a less MSI is considerably more frequent in relation to
favorable prognosis. Currently, those exposed as radiation dose than classical genetic effects and
small children are now adolescents or young apparently does not become diluted in subsequent
adults but continue to carry an increased risk of generations. Although its clinical significance is
developing thyroid carcinoma. The incidence of uncertain26, it is of some concern, certainly more
thyroid cancer in those who were adults at the than the Chernobyl Forum4 gave it credit for.
time of exposure is reported to have increased in These issues are particularly relevant in view
the many exposed populations15, although the of developments in radiobiological research over
relationship to radiation is not clear. Screening the past 15 years. The apparently simple rela-
has become more sophisticated, and increased tionship between radiation dose and its effects
ascertainment may be a major factor16. The con- are being reappraised. In the early 1990s, two
centration of effort on the major increase in those previously unacknowledged effects of radiation
exposed as children has meant that the possible were reported, genomic instability and the by-
much smaller risk to adults has not been ade- stander effect (Appendix). These effects are not
quately investigated. accommodated by the current theoretical frame-
692
Baverstock, K. & Williams, D.

work. Also in 1986, the risk per unit dose accrued of 0.03.2 Sv31,32, well within the range that led to a
from Chernobyl would have been assumed to be significant rise in cancer incidence after the atomic
half that estimated from the atomic bombs in bombs. As well as the thyroid, other organs show
Japan. A recent detailed analysis of the Japanese some concentration of iodine. One particularly
experience suggested that the risk for those ex- important tissue is breast epithelium, which can
posed to the lower doses27 could even be supra- concentrate iodine and receive y- radiation from
linear28,29. Furthermore, the accuracy of the stan- isotopes in the lung or thyroid. Some particular
dard models for inferring doses from internal groups at exposure may show an excess incidence
exposure have been questioned by the U.K. Com- of breast cancer now or in the future33. A signifi-
mittee Examining Radiation Risk of Internal cant rise in incidence of a range of malignancies
Emitters30. There is, therefore, considerable un- in the population exposed to high levels of fall-
certainty in translating collective dose to health out, particularly those exposed as children, is
detriment and fatalities. clearly possible. All too often the phrase “no in-
Unanswered issues. Birth defects. There have crease has been observed” conceals the lack of an
been many claims of an increased incidence of adequate study.
congenital anomalies in children born shortly The full complexity of the exposure regime
after the accident. Some cases reported in the press has not been adequately explored, and the esti-
show abnormalities similar to those following mation of whole-body and many tissue-specific
the use of thalidomide in pregnancy, and thali- doses is imprecise or unknown. The radiation
domide was apparently available in the Soviet dose received from the atomic bombs was still
Union. It is not possible to separate Chernobyl- being revised 50 years after the event. Taking into
related abnormalities from those due to other account the results of new research and the CER-
causes or from the effects of increased ascertain- RIE report30, it is very difficult to derive with any
ment. Although a slight increase in minor condi- confidence the likely levels of health detriment
tions has been observed, there does not appear from the estimated dose levels. It is also too soon
to have been a major increase in serious condi- to make an accurate assessment of longer-term
tions such as limb deformities. effects from those already observed.
Leukemia. Intensive efforts have been made In the light of this level of uncertainty, the
to detect an increase in leukemia, which is strong- case is compelling for international research sur-
ly associated with radiation. No statistically sig- veillance of the millions of people exposed to fall-
nificant increases of those forms associated with out from Chernobyl and selective follow-up of
radiation have been reported, but increases in those exposed to high levels similar to that fol-
chronic lymphatic leukemia, a non–radiation- lowing the atomic bombings in Japan34,35,36.
related disease of older age, may testify to in-
creased case ascertainment4. However, the level
of increase expected, given the received doses, The international response
anticipated risk factor, and the rarity of the con-
dition, would only be detected by large analytical An accident on the scale of Chernobyl would be a
- as opposed to ecological-epidemiology studies. challenge to most countries. However, the Union
In the future. Experience from Japan shows of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) felt able to
that many effects of whole-body radiation expo- deal with the consequences, at least up until 1989,
sure may not be apparent for decades. While the when it sought assistance from the WHO and
short initial latent period associated with the thy- the IAEA to evaluate the consequences of the ac-
roid carcinoma after Chernobyl, together with cident in environmental and health terms. In re-
the very large amounts of radioactive isotopes of sponse, the IAEA created the International Cher-
iodine released, have led to a huge effort to re- nobyl Project, which oversaw a visit to the affect-
construct thyroid doses, much less attention has ed areas and made a comprehensive report on
been paid to wholebody doses. Measurements of radiological consequences and protective mea-
the initial exposure phase for those in the 30-km sures2. The team seems then to have been dis-
zone, while 1313 confused, point to absorbed banded. Public concern was widespread, and the
doses to the whole body of many individuals that questions posed by the public to IAEA expert
were > 1 Gy, with average doses to some 25,000 panels at public meetings show the extent of this
Belarusian evacuees of a substantial fraction of a concern2. Following the breakup of the USSR,
Gray8. Doses received by infants evacuated from the consequences became the responsibility of
the 30-km zone are estimated to be in the range three newly independent states: Ukraine, Russian
693

Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 12(3):689-698, 2007


Federation, and Belarus, the poorest and most Studies were carried out to understand the mo-
heavily affected. Other UN organizations then lecular basis of the carcinogenesis and to look for
became more involved. In May of 1991, the WHO a marker for radiation etiology that would aid
headquarters (WHO/HQ) set up the Internation- the resolution of claims for compensation from
al Project on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl nuclear industry workers and atomic test veter-
Accident (IPHECA) with > $20 million in fund- ans. The U.S. research was carried out with the
ing, primarily from Japan. By that time, the Eu- knowledge that Congress had ordered a reassess-
ropean Regional Office of the WHO (WHO/ ment of the thyroid doses from 131I from the
EURO) had a strong program in place, follow- Nevada atomic weapons test series.
ing its initial response to the accident, to assist its In 1992, when the increase in CTC in Belarus
member states other than the USSR in their re- was first reported, that reassessment was com-
sponses to the accident. In October 1991, WHO/ plete, although not yet made public. It showed
EURO opened an office in Rome with an assign- that earlier assessments had significantly under-
ment including the effects of ionizing radiation estimated the doses. Before Chernobyl, this in-
on health; this office quickly became involved with formation would not have caused great concern
the affected countries. Over the following year or in the United States because of the belief that,
two, the UN Office for the Coordination of Hu- despite its radioactivity, 131I was not carcino-
manitarian Affairs (OCHA) undertook fundrais- genic. It happened that the same National Can-
ing and provided humanitarian assistance for the cer Institute (NCI) division was responsible for
three now very economically disadvantaged coun- both the national dosimetric reassessment and
tries, as did the UN Educational Scientific and the post-Chernobyl research. The former38 was
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (in recogni- not published until after a newspaper leak in 1997;
tion of the psychosocial consequences), the Eu- the latter was a well-designed, long-term cohort
ropean Commission (EC), the Red Cross, the study of a population of children with assigned
Sasakawa Foundation from Japan, the United thyroid doses, which was not expected to yield
States, Netherlands, Germany, and several other results for several decades. Many epidemiologic
countries, nongovernmental organizations, and studies (mainly ecologic) built a strong circum-
charities. Many of these organizations, the EC, stantial case for a link between exposure to 131I
United States, and Japan, among others, also sup- and thyroid cancer, definitively established by a
ported research. case.control study in 200514. What the research
Quite early on, attempts were made by the has not so far yielded is a marker for radiation
United States, WHO/HQ, and OCHA to coordi- etiology. Chernobyl-related cancers have so far
nate both the humanitarian and research initia- been predominantly papillary cancers and ini-
tives. One problem was a lack of clarity over the tially showed a high incidence of RET gene rear-
leadership of the newly independent states: the rangements, also found in spontaneous cancers39.
Russian Federation regarded itself as senior to the Papillary carcinoma has been increasing in inci-
others, the accident occurred in Ukraine, and Be- dence over the last half-century. Although partly
larus was the most affected country. The United due to ascertainment, a contribution of radia-
States and WHO/HQ each claimed to have made tion from atomic weapons testing, medical, and
exclusive agreements with the affected dental sources cannot be excluded.
states.IPHECA to the effect that it was to be an The accident at Chernobyl tested the capaci-
umbrella under which all research and humani- ties of the relevant international organizations,
tarian activities would be coordinated, and the and their responses left much to be desired. Ini-
United States to the effect that it had priority where tially they were faced with the problem that, al-
the conduct of research was concerned. OCHA though many countries were exposed to radio-
claimed that its mandate overrode other human- active fallout, it was regarded as an internal mat-
itarian-linked agreements. The result was a seri- ter by the country in which it occurred. The next
ous lack of coordination and a fair measure of difficulty came with the breakup of that country,
chaos on both humanitarian and research fronts. resulting in three separate countries containing
The realization that there was a real radia- heavily exposed populations. When outside as-
tion-related increase in the rare CTC dominated sistance was eventually welcomed, there were
the research. By 1995, excess relative risks for many separate initiatives, and the level of coordi-
some areas of Belarus were of the order of 20037. nation left a great deal to be desired.
This meant that almost every case of CTC was The response of the WHO was hampered by
related to the accident and to radiation exposure. internal disagreements. The $20 million used by
694
Baverstock, K. & Williams, D.

WHO/HQ to fund the IPHECA program seems The IAEA meeting in Vienna in 1996 provid-
to have been largely spent on unproductive pilot ed a major opportunity for policy development
projects and on providing training and labora- for the coming years. The final statement by the
tory and medical diagnostic equipment for the conference president, Angela Merkel, then Ger-
three countries. The largestshare went to Russia, man Minister of the Environment, could have
despite the fact that it had the least exposure40. A laid the foundations for a properly funded long-
separate initiative was taken by WHO/EURO, term study of all the potential health effects, but
which set up the International Thyroid Project. the statement, presumably prepared for her by
The project suffered from inadequate funding but IAEA officials, failed to provide any support or
tried to achieve coordination of patient care and direction for this42.
related research on consequences of iodine defi- The EC was concerned about the consequenc-
ciency in the three affected countries. The WHO/ es of Chernobyl, which took place in Europe and
HQ conference, held in November 1995 in Gene- led to fallout across the European Union. It sup-
va, focused primarily on health issues. It was ported work on the incidence, scientific back-
poorly prepared and attracted a significant num- ground and appropriate therapy of the thyroid
ber of dubious reports; the proceedings were not cancers, and on the psychological consequences.
published in an accessible form. The lack of co- The EC also provided extensive support for hu-
ordination between WHO/HQ and WHO/EURO, manitarian aspects and to remedy the environ-
the political nature of some decisions of WHO/ mental consequences. It maintained close con-
HQ, and the uncertainty over the division of its tact with the United States, but after one joint
responsibility with the IAEA all contributed to its meeting with WHO/EURO in 1992, the EC very
problems. In addition, other international orga- strongly discouraged any collaborative studies
nizations regarded the IPHECA program as such with the WHO for the next 5 years. Some collab-
a failure that they were reluctant to collaborate oration was finally established after an indepen-
with the WHO and would not accept its leader- dent group of scientists proposed creating a Cher-
ship as envisaged by the umbrella concept. nobyl tumor bank to save unique material for
The IAEA was invited in 1989 to provide an future study. The EC provided core funding, and
assessment by international experts of the mea- a collaborative project involving the three affect-
sures taken by the USSR. A team visited some of ed countries, the EC, United States (NCI), WHO/
the affected areas in 1990, and a detailed report2 HQ, and Japan was created43.
assessed the environmental contamination, ra- From 1991, UNESCO operated a very effec-
diation exposure, and health effects. Cases of thy- tive psychosocial rehabilitation program open-
roid cancer occurring in exposed children in both ing nine rehabilitation centers for adults and chil-
Belarus and Ukraine in 1990 were reported to the dren, especially in areas where relocated people
team but were apparently not followed up2; the were housed. In particular these centers acted to
general tenor of the report suggests that they were promulgate reliable information about the risks
largely discounted because of the belief that 131I entailed in living in contaminated areas.
had a low carcinogenic risk and that the latent In 2001, the United Nations Development Pro-
period was too short. gram mounted a needs assessment mission,
The report concluded that “there may be a which identified exposed populations relocated
statistically detectable increase in the incidence of or continuing to live in contaminated regions that
thyroid carcinoma in the future.” The attitude of “continue to face disproportionate suffering in
senior IAEA officials in the next few years was terms of health, social conditions, and economic
antagonistic toward reports of a radiation-relat- opportunity”44. The report44 described the most
ed increase in thyroid carcinoma incidence. The vulnerable groups as facing a “progressive down-
mandate of the IAEA enjoins it to promote the ward spiral of living conditions induced by the
peaceful use of nuclear technology, and this, to- consequences of the accident” and outlined a 10-
gether with its close links to the nuclear industry, year strategy for tackling and reversing this spi-
would not make evidence of carcinogenic risks ral. A key element of that strategy for recovery
following a nuclear accident welcome news. The was to be a body called the International Cher-
WHO seems to accept that the IAEA has the dom- nobyl Research Board (ICRB), with a broad as-
inant role in the investigation of health effects of signment including making recommendations for
nuclear accidents, as clearly indicated in a recent research. As noted above, the theoretical basis
report41. This situation needs to be reassessed to for understanding the effects of radiation on
avoid possible con- flicts of interest. health have been in a state of flux since the early
695

Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 12(3):689-698, 2007


1990s; the earlier concepts (Appendix) are still What can we learn
adhered to because they underpin the present from the Chernobyl experience?
radiation protection framework. Chernobyl has
proved fertile ground for views that dissent from Chernobyl was the first major accident to a civil
those of the establishment, with claims of much nuclear power plant that released huge amounts
greater health impact based on observations or of radioactive isotopes into the environment. It
unsubstantiated risk coefficients; mistrust of came as no surprise that there was worldwide
many of the major international bodies has led public concern, even where doses to the public
to the perverse equation that dismissal by the were tiny (although because of the large popula-
establishment necessarily testifies to correctness. tion involved, the collective dose was higher than
The ICRB was therefore envisaged as broader in the immediately affected areas). There have
and The Chernobyl accident 20 years on more been many smaller incidents involving accidental
inclusive than established bodies such as UN- public exposure to radiation, most notably the
SCEAR, the International Committee for Radia- Three Mile Island accident (Pennsylvania), argu-
tion Protection (ICRP), and the IAEA, and as a ably as severe as Chernobyl but with secondary
forum where all views could be debated in a ra- containment (not present in the Chernobyl reac-
tional way and mistrust lessened. Rather than tor), which largely prevented release of radioac-
creating an ICRB, the Chernobyl Forum, lacking tivity to the environment49. This public concern
the broader representation originally envisaged, results to some degree from a lack of understand-
was instigated on the initiative of the IAEA to ing of the effects of ionizing radiation, and it might
evaluate the health and environmental conse- be assumed that the international scientific com-
quences of the accident. The health section, led munity would be well equipped to allay at least
by the WHO/HQ, reported recently4; this highly some of these fears. Although this was attempt-
technical document4 builds on an earlier review45. ed, initially with the International Chernobyl
The report was launched as a landmark di- Project and later with three conferences around
gest report, with a press release from WHO/HQ the 10th anniversary, it had not succeeded in 2001
headed, “Chernobyl: The True Scale of the Acci- when the UN needs assessment mission visited
dent”46. It states, “A total of up to 4000 people the affected regions 15 years after the accident.
could eventually die of radiation exposure from As stated above, the lack of scientific consen-
… Chernobyl.” The emphasis is on reassurance, sus is at least in part due to the state of flux con-
but it is notable that the headline estimate of cerning the understanding of the ways in which
deaths is less than half the number that can be radiation affects health, and it is understandable
derived from the body of the report. Neither is it that bodies such as the ICRP are reluctant to
safe to assume that the very low death rate from change radiation protection standards. The IAEA
thyroid cancer to date will apply to future cases, is bound by a mandate to follow the ICRP dog-
let alone assume that no further deaths from can- ma. The WHO should be freer to express alter-
cer will occur in the present cases. There is no native views. It is regrettable that the WHO played
previous experience of an accident such as this, only a minor role in the International Chernobyl
and the long-term risks cannot be predicted with Project, which failed to recognize the importance
any certainty either in the heavily exposed areas of the CTCs reported to them.
or in the much wider areas with low-level expo- The WHO and IAEA have both made major
sures. Certainly there is a clear indication that contributions, but their failures had a number of
there is a risk for low dose and low dose rate implications. The delay in the acceptance of the
exposure47,48, but there are also large uncertain- increase in CTC delayed assistance to the affect-
ties regarding its magnitude. The least that could ed countries. The 1995/1996 conferences were to
have been expected from bodies such as the WHO a degree mismanaged and missed a major op-
and IAEA would have been support for long- portunity to create a framework for the future.
term studies of such a unique event. Without these The major problems with IPHECA contributed
studies, society will not be able to assess the fu- greatly to the lack of international coordination
ture risks associated with nuclear accidents, judge and also meant that the International Thyroid
what precautions need to be taken, or plan the Project was never adequately supported. Perhaps
proper provision for health care. the biggest failure resulted from the widespread
belief that the IAEA, and in its wake the WHO,
wished to disbelieve or minimize the health con-
696
Baverstock, K. & Williams, D.

sequences of Chernobyl, leaving the suspicion velopment, although any new reactors must have
that health detriment was being covered up. secondary containment. We have stressed the
With globalization comes the increasing like- uncertainties involved in predicting the long-term
lihood that accidents, including nuclear accidents, consequences of Chernobyl and believe this ap-
will occur, with impacts crossing national bound- proach to be far preferable to either downplay-
aries or presenting challenges beyond the capac- ing or exaggerating the risks. We do believe that
ity of individual states. Natural disasters such as the responses of the major international organi-
hurricanes and earthquakes remind us of the high zations to the Chernobyl accident were inade-
level of coordination and commitment required quate and show the need for a review by the Unit-
to respond effectively to such events. One can ed Nations of their assignments and coordina-
hardly celebrate the success of the international tion and for the development of a new strategy
community in responding to the Chernobyl ac- for dealing with future disasters. Above all, we
cident 20 years after the event. believe that it would be a dereliction of duty by
Declining resources of gas and oil, the recog- the world community if it did not ensure con-
nition of global climate change induced by burn- tinuing study of the consequences of a tragic ac-
ing of fossil fuels, and the threat of deliberate cident that we hope will never recur.
cessation of energy supply are forcing many coun-
tries to rethink the role of nuclear power in ener-
gy supply. As a salutary example of nuclear tech- Appendix
nology failure, the Chernobyl accident should give
pause for thought. Clearly, rational decisions on Ionizing radiation is capable of bringing about
future energy policy need to be made in light of chemical modification of genomic DNA, that is,
the risks that alternative strategies incur. It is im- mutating the base sequence of genes; it is this
portant to recognize that the accident happened feature that has traditionally been assumed to be
in a reactor lacking secondary containment and the basis of the health-damaging effects of radia-
that adequate precautions to protect public health tion. Where the appearance of health detriment
were not always taken after the accident. is delayed by months to years, as in the case of
Action is needed to ensure adequate under- cancer, it was assumed that specific genes became
standing of the health problems following Cher- mutated in ways that either promoted inappro-
nobyl; this requires creating and funding a struc- priate growth of cells in the affected tissue or failed
ture to allow studies to continue for the lifetime to suppress such growth. Thus, the extent, in
of those exposed to the accident. The creation of terms of dose, to which radiation was able to
the Atomic Bomb Commission (now renamed initiate cancer, for example, was related to the
the Radiation Effects Research Foundation) was chances of damaging a specific gene. Radiation-
critical to understanding the health consequenc- induced events are randomly distributed in the
es of atomic bomb exposure. A similar organiza- exposed cells and can be viewed as bullets fired
tion could still provide an appropriate frame- from a scattergun: the smaller the target gene
work for Chernobyl studies. The rivalry and lack sequence that has to be damaged, the larger the
of coordination between many organizations, dose (number of bullets) required. Thus, effect
UN agencies, countries and others that followed and dose were intimately related through the dis-
Chernobyl must be avoided in future interna- tribution of radiation damage in the DNA of the
tional-scale accidents. The UN should initiate an cells of the irradiated tissue.
independent review of the response to Cherno- In 1991, a new radiation-induced phenome-
byl, including the actions and assignments of the non was reported from laboratory experiments,
UN agencies involved. It should also advise on namely, genomic instability50. This phenomenon
the organization necessary for future accidents. comprises the delayed induction of changes by
The Radiation Effects Research Foundation pro- radiation (e.g., mini-satellite DNA mutations,
vides a model of international cooperation with chromosomal damage, sequence mutations, mi-
independent scientists involved. Chernobyl is cronucleus formation), which cannot be due di-
undoubtedly a more complicated situation, but rectly to damage to specific DNA sequences be-
the principles of cooperation rather than rivalry cause the radiation doses at which they are insti-
and independence remain essential. gated are too small. Subsequently, a second effect
We do not believe that the Chernobyl acci- - termed the bystander effect- occurs when cells
dent should necessarily be regarded as an insur- not irradiated themselves, but in the vicinity of
mountable obstacle to future nuclear power de- cells that are irradiated, also exhibit these effects.
697

Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 12(3):689-698, 2007


These two effects cannot be subsumed into a the- It has been proposed that genomic instability
oretical framework that has as its basis the dis- is a generic response of the genome to damage to
tribution and location of specific damage caused its genomic DNA52 and that it is intimately con-
by ionizing events. nected with the processes that endow the genome
Many of the effects characteristic of instabil- with stability. Whatever the fundamental basis,
ity and the bystander effect are present in malig- genomic instability challenges the existing dog-
nant cells. This has led to the proposal that ge- ma53, particularly with respect to what happens
nomic instability may be a precursor to malig- at low doses and low dose rates, a domain that is
nancy51. difficult to explore with epidemiologic techniques.

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