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Geoeconomia: a lógica geopolítica no comércio mundial

por Braz Baracuhy em 19/11/2015

O artigo busca definir o campo da Geoeconomia e destacar uma dimensão

contemporânea central da prática geoeconômica entre as grandes potências
internacionais: o comércio mundial. A primeira parte do artigo procura oferecer
uma definição da geoeconomia e do seu âmbito de estudos. A segunda parte
apresenta um esboço da evolução histórica da geoeconomia, dividindo sua
linha evolutiva em quatro gerações, desde o início do século XX até hoje. A
terceira e última parte analisa especificamente duas tendências
geoeconômicas do comércio internacional contemporâneo: o impasse nas
negociações da Rodada Doha da OMC e as negociações dos dois acordos
megarregionais liderados pelos EUA – o TPP e o TTIP. As dinâmicas dessas
tendências e dos atores geoeconômicos envolvidos, como os EUA e a China,
deverão redesenhar o cenário estratégico do comércio global nos próximos
anos.

This article seeks to define the field of the Geoeconomic and highlight a central
contemporary dimension of the Geoeconomics practice among the major
international powers: the World Trade. The first part of the article seeks to
provide a definition of Geoeconomics and its scope of studies. The second part
presents an outline of the historical evolution of the Geoeconomic, by dividing
its evolutionary line into four generations from the early Twentieth Century
until today. The third and final part looks specifically two Geoeconomic trends
of contemporary international trade: the deadlock of the Doha Round
negotiations of the WTO and the negotiations of the two megarregionais
agreements led by the United States – the TPP and the TTIP. The dynamics of
these trends and Geoeconomic players, such as the US and China, should
redraw the strategic landscape of global trade in the coming years.

O estudo e a prática da Geoeconomia, entendida como a lógica competitiva da geopolítica

aplicada às relações econômicas internacionais, ressurgiram em tempos recentes. Como em
outras instâncias do passado, o renascimento da Geoeconomia parece relacionar-se a momentos
de transição no sistema internacional. Não por acaso a atual ascensão de um sistema multipolar
de poder econômico internacional criou as condições propícias para um interesse renovado nas
questões geoeconômicas globais.

Na conformação desse sistema multipolar, potências econômicas tradicionais, como os EUA e a

Europa, em processo de recuperação da crise financeira transatlântica de 2008, passaram a
coexistir com potências econômicas emergentes, como a China, a Índia e o Brasil, entre outras. A
reforma da ordem econômica internacional de Bretton Woods, de suas regras e instituições; o
impasse nas negociações da Rodada Doha na Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC); as
grandes negociações comerciais megarregionais como as Parcerias Transpacífica (TPP) e
Transatlântica (TTIP); as estratégias de inserção das principais potências econômicas, como a
“Nova Rota da Seda” da China; entre tantos outros exemplos, tornaram indispensável repensar o
aspecto geoeconômico das relações internacionais contemporâneas.

Este artigo busca definir o campo da Geoeconomia e destacar uma dimensão contemporânea
central da prática geoeconômica entre as grandes potências internacionais: o Comércio Mundial.
A primeira parte do artigo procura oferecer uma definição da Geoeconomia e do seu âmbito de
estudos. A segunda parte apresenta um esboço da evolução histórica da Geoeconomia, dividindo
sua linha evolutiva em quatro gerações, desde o início do século XX até hoje. A terceira e última
parte analisa especificamente duas tendências geoeconômicas do Comércio Internacional
contemporâneo: o impasse nas negociações da Rodada Doha da OMC e as negociações dos dois
acordos megarregionais liderados pelos EUA – o TPP e o TTIP.

Geoeconomia: uma definição

A Geoeconomia evoluiu da Geopolítica. Em sua concepção moderna, a Geopolítica designa o
estudo da configuração de poder no sistema internacional e suas implicações para a competição
política internacional e para a morfologia estratégica do espaço mundial. Tanto a Geopolítica
quanto a Geoeconomia estão essencialmente associadas à competição geoestratégica por
primazia e poder internacional no mapa-múndi. Mas a Geoeconomia particulariza a lógica
Geopolítica e lhe ressalta a dimensão do poder econômico.

A Geoeconomia trata da configuração do poder econômico

internacional e das interações entre poder econômico e poder político na competição
geoestratégica entre as principais potências econômicas internacionais. Nessa competição, que
vincula fatores econômicos à Geopolítica e cujos resultados trazem consequências de longo prazo
para o equilíbrio de poder global, a Geoeconomia compreende uma dupla acepção para a
estratégia de política exterior: (i) o uso do poder econômico para fins de poder e influência
Geopolítica; e (ii) o uso do poder Geopolítico para objetivos de poder e influência econômica. A
Geoeconomia é, portanto, um tipo especial de competição Geopolítica.

O termo “Geoeconomia” foi cunhado pelo estrategista Edward Luttwak em 1990. Seu artigo “From
Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce” refletia tempos de
ansiedade sobre a competitividade dos EUA face à ameaça econômica e comercial que se
percebia em relação ao Japão no mercado mundial. Transpondo a lógica militar para a esfera do
Comércio Internacional, Luttwak diagnosticava o advento da Geoeconomia e aconselhava aos EUA
sua utilização para a conquista de posições de vantagem na economia mundial. Suas prescrições,
porém, reeditavam um velho receituário mercantilista.

Mas a prática geoeconômica é muito mais antiga do que o termo criado por Luttwak. A
Geopolítica e a Geoeconomia clássicas surgem no início do século XX, e o interesse nesses dois
aspectos da competição geoestratégica global parece sempre ser revivido em contextos de
transformação do equilíbrio de poder mundial. Não admira, pois, o ressurgimento da temática
geoeconômica no atual momento internacional.

A Geoeconomia se dá na confluência entre a Geopolítica e a Economia global. [1] As múltiplas

interações entre estas duas esferas constitui, de modo geral, o âmbito da Geoeconomia. Sanjaya
Baru considera a Geoeconomia como uma via de mão dupla, estudando “as consequências
geopolíticas do fenômeno econômico” e “as consequências econômicas de tendências
geopolíticas”.[2] Na mesma linha, Giovanni Grevi entende que a Geoeconomia “abrange tanto a
conversão de ativos econômicos em influência política, quanto a mobilização do poder político
para atingir objetivos econômicos por meio de instâncias competitivas ou cooperativas”. [3]
Naturalmente, a interação entre Economia e Geopolítica não é nova nas Relações Internacionais.
Do ponto de vista da Política Externa, entre as dimensões do poder nacional, a Economia fornece
o horizonte de possibilidades ao poder Geopolítico. Sem o poder econômico subjacente, o poder
Geopolítico – desde a manutenção da força militar à capacidade de atuação efetiva da máquina
diplomática e de inteligência – não se sustenta. Trata-se de uma literatura que poderia bem
denominar-se “Economia Geopolítica”. O historiador Paul Kennedy, em seu clássicoAscensão e
queda das grandes potências, traçou cinco séculos de História Internacional para demonstrar
que:
There is a causal relationship between the shifts which have occurred over time
in the general economic and production balances and the position occupied by
individual powers in the international system.[4]
Aprofundando essa relação no plano doméstico, Fareed Zakaria estudou a importância da
apropriação orçamentária para a conversão da riqueza em poder geoestratégico efetivo. [5]
Da mesma forma, a interação entre Economia e Geopolítica tampouco é nova do ponto de vista
sistêmico. A estabilidade e funcionalidade das relações econômicas globais de comércio e
investimentos requerem um equilíbrio de poder Geopolítico favorável, que garanta desde a
segurança das principais rotas de comércio até uma estrutura de instituições e regras
internacionais. Como notou Kevin H. O´Rourke, “the pattern of trade can only be understood as
being the outcome of some military or political equilibrium between contending powers”. [6]
A distinção entre os vínculos tradicionais existentes entre a Economia e a Geopolítica e aqueles
que caracterizam a Geoeconomia está em sua integração estratégica. A Geoeconomia trata os
nexos entre a Economia e a Geopolítica no âmbito de um cálculo estratégico integrado, como um
método de condução da lógica competitiva por primazia e poder internacional entre potências
econômicas mundiais. Os interesses e objetivos da estratégia Geoeconômica são políticos por
natureza, embora deles possam advir ganhos e vantagens econômicas.

A Geoeconomia não substitui a Geopolítica tradicional; apenas lhe ressalta a dimensão do poder
econômico.[7] A Geopolítica e a Geoeconomia compartilham a mesma lógica geoestratégica e os
mesmos fins políticos gerais de poder e primazia internacional. Ambas operam no espaço
internacional, com a Geoeconomia incluindo espaços econômicos mundiais. A Geoeconomia
entrecruza meios e fins das esferas econômica e Geopolítica, utilizando instrumentos de poder
econômico para objetivos geopolíticos e mobilizando instrumentos geopolíticos e políticos para
objetivos de poder econômico.
Caberia examinar mais detidamente a relação entre esses meios e fins no cálculo geoeconômico,
ou, mais precisamente, a estratégica cruzada entre os instrumentos de poder econômico ou
poder geopolítico e os seus respectivos objetivos.

Quanto ao uso do poder geopolítico ou político para objetivos de poder e influência econômica, o
cálculo geoeconômico busca, como fim, avanços no equilíbrio de poder econômico internacional –
em uma posição vantajosa na distribuição relativa dos recursos de poder econômico –, condição
necessária para o desenvolvimento de outras formas de poder do Estado, como o militar ou o
diplomático. A estratégia geoeconômica busca manter ou aumentar a parcela de poder
econômico relativo do país; alternativamente, limitar ou diminuir aquela do competidor. Os meios
utilizados para tais fins são geopolíticos, a mobilização da capacidade política internacional do
país – seus recursos diplomáticos, militares, de inteligência, por exemplo – para objetivos de
poder econômico global. São exemplos dessa busca geoestratégica por poder econômico, entre
tantos outros, o controle das rotas marítimas comerciais, exercido com recursos de poder militar
e posicionamento estratégico de alianças e territórios; a capacidade de utilizar instrumentos
políticos internacionais para o acesso a recursos energéticos ou mesmo seu controle territorial; o
uso político da rede diplomática em países específicos para promover e defender o acesso a
mercados e investimentos de empresas nacionais no exterior ou para captar investimentos.

Quanto ao uso do poder econômico para fins de poder e influência geopolítica ou política, a
Geoeconomia utiliza os instrumentos e os relacionamentos econômicos disponíveis para
conformar a posição geoestratégica global ou regional do país e para moldar as regras e as
estruturas político-institucionais que regem o ambiente econômico internacional. Os meios são,
portanto, o uso de recursos econômicos, comerciais, financeiros e tecnológicos à disposição do
país; as negociações comerciais e financeiras; assim como a exploração de vulnerabilidades
decorrentes de assimetrias na relação de interdependência econômica. [8] Trata-se, assim, da
conversão de poder econômico em influência política internacional ou, na elegante definição de
Mikael Wigell, do “uso geoestratégico do poder econômico”.[9] Alguns exemplos desse uso
geoestratégico do poder econômico são as negociações comerciais do TPP pelos EUA para conter
ou limitar geoestrategicamente a centralidade e a capilaridade chinesa na Ásia Pacífico; as
negociações para a reforma do regime multilateral de comércio da OMC, um dos pilares de poder
estrutural da ordem econômica internacional; a conformação pela China de uma “Nova Rota da
Seda” na Eurásia unindo investimentos e comércio; a utilização de fundos soberanos (“sovereign
wealth funds”) em investimentos no exterior. Com isso, não se quer sugerir que os interesses
envolvidos nesses e em tantos outros exemplos sejam exclusivamente geopolíticos. Deles advêm
ganhos econômicos. Mas deles decorrem também, explícita ou implicitamente, vantagens
geopolíticas e políticas importantes.

Da Geopolítica à Geoeconomia
A Geoeconomia está atrelada à Geopolítica em sua origem. Conquanto o termo tenha sido
cunhado na década de 1990, a noção de Geoeconomia não é nova. Em perspectiva histórica, a
preocupação com a Geoeconomia parece sempre ressurgir em momentos de transição de poder,
em que potências estabelecidas se deparam com o desafio de potências emergentes no sistema
internacional. É um diagnóstico compreensível, já que o poder econômico é o primeiro e mais
imediatamente visível sinal da ascensão de novas potências.
A primeira geração de estudos geoeconômicos, que poderia ser considerada como a
“Geoeconomia Clássica”, surgiu justamente com Halford Mackinder e seu discípulo James
Fairgrieve na Inglaterra dos anos anteriores à Primeira Guerra Mundial. A mudança no equilíbrio
de poder europeu e suas repercussões geoestratégicas são o fator determinante. A preocupação
central se voltou para a ascensão de potências continentais, sobretudo a Alemanha e a Rússia, e a
possibilidade de virem a dominar a massa eurasiática, ameaçando o poder marítimo inglês.
Mackinder destacou o papel de fatores econômicos e instrumentos tecnológicos para fins de
poder internacional. A importância estratégica das ferrovias, unindo a Europa Central a porções
importantes da Ásia e proporcionando tanto rotas de comércio e acesso a recursos quanto seu
emprego na logística militar, estava presente em seu artigo clássico de 1904. Mackinder antevia
desenvolvimentos geopolíticos e geoeconômicos capazes de alterar profundamente o equilíbrio
de poder europeu e a posição de poder do Império Britânico nas bordas marítimas da Eurásia. [10]
Considerações geoeconômicas estão também presentes na obra de Fairgrieve, principalmente em
seus livros Geography and World Power (1915) e The Gateways of Commerce (1921). O
primeiro livro é um estudo profundo das condições geográficas que condicionaram diferentes
civilizações, segundo a lógica do “desafio e resposta”. Fairgrieve desenvolveu a concepção
geoestratégica de Mackinder e vislumbrou a possibilidade de a Alemanha, a China ou a Índia
virem a dominar o “heartland” eurasiático.[11] O segundo livro discorre sobre a Geografia
Econômica dos recursos globais, as condições de produção e os contornos geoestratégicos que
garantiriam a posição dominante da Inglaterra no Comércio Mundial. Não fosse sua profunda
consciência geográfica e sua clareza de que o funcionamento do Comércio Mundial pressupõe a
existência de uma estrutura de poder geopolítico, o diagnóstico de Fairgrieve pouco se diferiria
dos arautos da globalização que surgiriam na década de 1990: “commerce is a machine whose
parts encompass the world”.[12]
Essa primeira geração de estudos geoeconômicos abrange ainda Albert O. Hirshman, com seu
estudo clássico sobre a estratégia geoeconômica da Alemanha antes da Segunda Guerra Mundial.
Em seu livro National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945), Hirshman expôs o uso
do Comércio Internacional pela Alemanha como instrumento de poder político. Segundo ele, a
prática alemã precedeu a teoria, uma vez que “a system of international trade can very easily be
exploited for purposes of national power policy”.[13] Ao explorar as relações de interdependência
comercial entre seus parceiros econômicos e, sobretudo, ao se valer da assimetria de poder nessa
interdependência, a Alemanha utilizou o comércio como efetivo instrumento geoestratégico. Não
por acaso, advertia Hirshman:
A textbook for the modern prince should indeed contain, in addition to
Machiavelli’s classic chapters, extensive new sections on the most efficient use
of quotas, exchange controls, capital investment, and other instruments of
economic warfare.[14]
O vínculo entre Geopolítica e Economia não escapou aos arquitetos da ordem econômica do pós-
Segunda Guerra Mundial. O sistema de Bretton Woods, o Plano Marshall e o processo de
integração econômica na Europa revelam o uso de instrumentos econômicos com importantes
repercussões geopolíticas.[15] É revelador que a estratégia geopolítica de “contenção” da URSS e a
estratégia geoeconômica do Plano Marshall foram concebidas pelo fundador do planejamento
diplomático nos EUA: George Kennan, como diretor de Planejamento Político do Departamento de
Estado.[16]
A segunda geração de estudos geoeconômicos se dá na década de 1970 e 1980, nas
circunstâncias econômicas incertas daquele período da Guerra Fria. Os desafios militares dos EUA
na década de 1970 com a aparente vantagem geopolítica da URSS na competição bipolar e o
trauma da guerra do Vietnã combinavam-se a desafios econômicos ligados ao choque do
petróleo, à crise do padrão-ouro do sistema de Bretton Woods e à percepção de declínio relativo
das economias centrais em estagflação. Ao mesmo tempo, transformações importantes na
economia global tomavam forma com a expansão geográfica das empresas transnacionais dos
EUA e da Europa Ocidental pelo mundo; com o processo de integração econômica na Europa; e
com a coordenação da diplomacia econômica do G7.

É nesse contexto que autores, como Robert Keohane e Joseph Nye, voltam a explorar a
interdependência econômica e as assimetrias como fontes de poder, assim como a destacar a
importância da arquitetura dos regimes internacionais de comércio e finanças para o próprio
exercício do poder internacional.[17] Richard N. Cooper notou o retorno de temas geoeconômicos
na década de 1970 ao perceber “the intrusion of trade problems into ‘high foreign policy’”.
[18] Para Cooper, o sucesso do sistema de Bretton Woods fora “suprimir”, até então, os elementos
de política externa nas negociações comerciais e financeiras, tornando-as discussões técnicas e
encapsulando-as em seu próprio domínio institucional (o GATT e o FMI). A crise desse sistema
seria sua hipótese de ressurgimento das práticas que poderiam ser consideradas geoeconômicas.
A importância dos instrumentos e das relações econômicas para objetivos políticos e geopolíticos
ganharia destaque ainda na década de 1980 com os estudos sobre “economic statecraft” e
sanções econômicas realizados por Baldwin (1985), como alternativa ao contexto de paridade
nuclear entre as duas grandes potências. Richard Rosecrance anteciparia o debate sobre a
competição comercial na esfera internacional em seuThe Rise of the Trading State (1986).
A terceira geração de estudos geoeconômicos aparece na década de 1990 com a transição de
poder ocasionada pelo fim da Guerra Fria. Esta geração buscava subsidiar os EUA em sua
estratégia geoeconômica diante de dois grandes desafios: lidar com a “competição econômica”
imposta pela ascensão do Japão ainda na década de 1980 e navegar pelo processo de globalização
econômica que se desenhava agora segundo seu poder unipolar. São temas recorrentes do
período a importância do poder econômico como fundamento do poder geopolítico; a competição
comercial com o Japão, com tons mercantilistas; a expansão da “democracia de mercado” da era
Clinton; o regionalismo econômico.[19] Nessa conjuntura, Edward Luttwak cria o termo
“Geoeconomia”, que teria ecos poucos anos depois com Pascal Lorot e a introdução do conceito
na França.[20] Segundo eles, predominariam então interesses econômicos nas relações de poder
internacional, e os antagonismos assumiriam feição econômica no pós-Guerra Fria.
Os artigos de Luttwak e Lorot são também úteis para compreender e exemplificar o que não é a
Geoeconomia. Luttwak define a Geoeconomia como “the admixture of the logic of conflict with the
methods of commerce”; Lorot vai mais além dos instrumentos comerciais e define a Geoeconomia
como:
L’analyse des stratégies d’ordre économique – notamment commercial –
décidées par les États dans le cadre de politiques visant à protéger leur
économie nationale [et] à aider leurs ‘entreprises nationales’. [21]
Uma leitura atenta de ambos revelará que seus argumentos identificam a Geoeconomia àPolítica
Econômica – ou, mais precisamente, a um tipo de política econômica, comercial e industrial de
viés mercantilista, que mais tarde ficaria conhecida na literatura como “Capitalismo de Estado”.
[22]
A Geoeconomia naturalmente não é sinônimo de Mercantilismo. Mas as concepções de Luttwak e
de Lorot acabaram aproximando suas ideias da crítica formulada pelo economista Paul Krugman
à literatura da “competitividade econômica”. Segundo Krugman:

The major nations of the world are not in any significant degree in economic
competition with each other”, embora admitisse que “of course, there is always
a rivalry for status and power – countries that grow faster will see their political
rank rise.[23]
A quarta geração da Geoeconomia poderia ser considerada como a “Geoeconomia Neoclássica”.
Surge no contexto da crise financeira de 2008, a subsequente crise na zona do euro e seus
impactos sobre as potências estabelecidas da Europa e dos EUA. O tema de fundo é o reequilíbrio
do poder econômico e geopolítico mundial com a consolidação da notável ascensão econômica da
China e o surgimento de outros polos de poder entre países emergentes, como o Brasil e a Índia.
O redesenho do G20 como gestor político da crise financeira global em 2008 e a articulação do
BRICS como coalizão diplomática em 2009 destacam-se como importantes traços desta
transformação geoeconômica.[24] Nesse ambiente, os estudos geoeconômicos ressurgem com
ímpeto, com autores como Mark Thirlwell, Baru, Grevi, Hans Kundnani, Wigell, Simon X. Zhao,
entre outros.[25]
Elementos da Geoeconomia clássica de Mackinder, Fairgrieve e Hirshmann podem ser detectados
em novo contexto de transformações do equilíbrio de poder mundial. A temática principal desses
estudos, com importantes repercussões para a política externa das principais potências, é a
competição entre os EUA e a China; a possibilidade de uma ação geoeconômica da União
Europeia; a estratégia geoeconômica chinesa de “Um Cinturão, Uma Rota”; a reforma dos regimes
e das instituições econômicas mundiais, como o FMI e o Banco Mundial; a formação de novos
bancos de desenvolvimento (BRICS, AIIB); a importância geoeconômica do desenho das regras de
Comércio Mundial; o impasse nas negociações comerciais da Rodada Doha da OMC; as
negociações comerciais megarregionais como o TTP e o TTIP; as repercussões comercias dos
desalinhamentos cambiais; as sanções econômicas; as cadeias globais de valor entrelaçando
comércio, investimentos e riscos geopolíticos para as empresas e países envolvidos em sua
estrutura.

As quatro gerações de estudos geoeconômicos têm, em comum, os processos de transição do

poder econômico internacional. Os reflexos geoeconômicos da atual transição de poder podem
ser observados nas negociações comerciais internacionais em curso.

A Geoeconomia das negociações comerciais

Um dos campos mais fascinantes da Geoeconomia contemporânea é o Comércio Internacional.
[26] Em recente artigo na revista Foreign Affairs, o USTR Michael Froman tratou do papel do
comércio nas relações internacionais. Embora destacando que os acordos comerciais em
negociação pelos EUA devam principalmente avaliar seus benefícios econômicos como
promotores do crescimento e do emprego, Froman salientou a importância geoestratégica do
Comércio Internacional. Segundo sua perspectiva, acordos como o TPP e o TTIP dariam um “sinal”
sobre a postura geopolítica dos EUA na Ásia Pacífico e na Europa. No caso do TPP, a dimensão
geopolítica seria reforçada, pois indicaria que os benefícios econômicos serão também
acompanhados de uma presença mais “embedded” dos EUA na Ásia em um momento em que o
equilíbrio de poder regional está “in flux”. No mesmo sentido, a assinatura do TTIP sinalizaria um
maior envolvimento dos EUA na Europa no contexto de renovadas tensões regionais, como a crise
na Ucrânia.[27]
A mesma lógica geoeconômica já surgira em artigo do vice-presidente dos EUA, Joseph Biden,
publicado em 2014 no Financial Times: “a ascensão de novas potências econômicas significa que
enfrentaremos uma competição acirrada”; em vista disso, as grandes negociações comerciais,
como o TPP e o TTIP, seriam “uma forma de moldar a Economia global de maneira a fortalecer a
liderança dos EUA”. E conclui que:
Os benefícios não são apenas econômicos. Conforme a América reafirma seu
papel como potência do Pacífico (…) o TPP torna-se símbolo do poder
americano.[28]
Essas perspectivas geoeconômicas – aplicando a lógica Geopolítica às negociações comerciais
internacionais – são reveladoras de duas tendências geoeconômicas centrais na arquitetura do
Comércio Internacional contemporâneo. A primeira é o impasse nas negociações da Rodada Doha
da OMC desde 2008, quando se consolidou um novo equilíbrio de poder econômico internacional.
O objetivo geoeconômico de reformar o regime multilateral e universal de comércio, estruturando
o futuro das relações comerciais, encontrou seus limites no momento de transformação do poder
mundial. A segunda tendência, e talvez em parte consequência do impasse e da ascensão de
novos polos de poder econômico, é o esforço dos EUA de liderar negociações megarregionais,
como o TPP e o TTIP, que buscam consolidar um espaço econômico centrado naquele país e,
geoeconomicamente, conter a capilaridade e a centralidade da China na Ásia Pacífico. Essa
tendência tem sido contraposta pela China com iniciativas como a “Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership” (RCEP), a “Área de Livre Comércio da Ásia Pacífico” (FTAAP) e ainda a “Nova
Rota da Seda”.

Subjacente a estas tendências está a desconcentração do poder geoeconômico global, que alterou
o grau de simetria de poder entre as principais potências nas negociações comerciais multilaterais
e regionais.[29]
Na OMC, o atual impasse negociador na Rodada Doha ilustra o quadro multilateral. A Rodada
iniciou-se em 2001 com uma configuração geoeconômica de forças, que mudou ao longo da
década e trouxe impactos decisivos para a negociação.

O desenho das regras multilaterais que regem o Comércio Internacional é um jogo geoeconômico
de fundamental importância. Requer potencial de poder – peso econômico, participação no
Comércio Internacional, vantagem competitiva em setores ou produtos da Economia, como
agricultura, bens industriais e serviços –, mas esse potencial somente é realizado pela ação
negociadora do país, por meio da mobilização política de sua diplomacia econômica, que traduz o
potencial geoeconômico em poder negociador efetivo de “rule making”. No cálculo geoeconômico,
portanto, trata-se da utilização das negociações comerciais pela diplomacia econômica para
moldar o quadro político-institucional e normativo das relações econômicas internacionais.

A configuração do poder geoeconômico no estabelecimento do Acordo Geral sobre Comércio e

Tarifas (GATT) em 1948 e ao longo de suas várias Rodadas mostrava-se clara: os EUA e a Europa
eram as grandes potências comerciais e os polos centrais de decisão do regime multilateral de
comércio.[30] Basta recordar que a conclusão da Rodada Uruguai (1986-1994) somente se deu
depois que os EUA e a Europa chegaram a um acordo (“Blair House”) que acomodava seus
interesses e preocupações recíprocas na área agrícola, apresentando-o aos demais membros do
GATT como fait accompli. Revelador de assimetrias negociadoras, um acordo entre os “dois
grandes”, como conhecidos no jargão do GATT, era condição necessária e suficiente para a
conclusão de negociações multilaterais.
Durante a Rodada Doha, porém, mudanças na estrutura geoeconômica mundial mostraram seus
reflexos na correlação de forças dentro da negociação comercial multilateral e modificaram seu
quadro decisório. Potências tradicionais, como os EUA e a UE, passaram a coexistir com potências
emergentes, como o Brasil, a China e a Índia, com peso na Economia mundial e em setores
importantes do Comércio Internacional, como agricultura, bens industriais e serviços
respectivamente. Trata-se de uma nova Geoeconomia do multilateralismo. [31]
Nas negociações pela reforma do sistema multilateral da OMC, assistiu-se a transição de um
“momento unipolar”,[32] que promoveu a conclusão da Rodada Uruguai (1994) e o lançamento da
Rodada Doha (2001), para um momento geoeconômico multipolar. Beneficiando-se das
assimetrias de poder dentro do processo negociador, as atualizações anteriores do regime
multilateral de comércio, como na Rodada Uruguai, deram aos EUA e aos demais membros
doQuad a capacidade de apropriação de privilégios e exceções normativas (“rule making, privilege
taking”), como ficara evidente nas regras do Comércio Agrícola.[33] Uma crescente
multipolaridade geoeconômica nos anos da Rodada Doha gerou maior simetria nas negociações
multilaterais, limitou essa capacidade de “rule making, privilege taking” e criou condições para as
potências emergentes reformarem o regime multilateral segundo seus interesses e prioridades.
Nesse contexto de impasse multilateral, o TPP e o TTIP buscam um duplo objetivo geoeconômico
para os EUA: (i) restaurar a capacidade de “rule-making” do país e promover o processo de
liberalização seletiva do comércio e dos investimentos em setores competitivos da economia
estadunidense;[34] e (ii) estabelecer uma firme presença geoeconômica dos EUA nas bordas do
Pacífico e do Atlântico Norte eurasiático para lidar com a ascensão da China em duas frentes
integradas.[35]
As negociações do TTIP entre os EUA e a União Europeia poderão resultar em um acordo entre
duas grandes potências econômicas, abrangendo 45% do PIB e 30% do Comércio Mundial. Como
as tarifas médias entre ambos se encontram em patamares baixos (à exceção do Comércio
Agrícola), o TTIP busca fundamentalmente avançar em regras e na convergência regulatória, assim
como na facilitação de investimentos.

O TPP poderá conformar um acordo megarregional de comércio e investimento entre os EUA e 11

países: Austrália, Brunei, Canadá, Chile, Cingapura, Japão, Malásia, México, Nova Zelândia, Peru e
Vietnã. O TPP é a expressão geoeconômica da estratégia dos EUA de “rebalanceamento para a
Ásia”. Não por acaso, foi lançado durante a Cúpula da APEC em 2011, no Havaí, no contexto de
várias outras iniciativas diplomáticas e militares para a Ásia Pacífico.

O nível inicial de ambição do TPP prevê a eliminação de barreiras tarifárias e não tarifárias a
investimentos e ao comércio de bens e serviços, além da negociação de regras para o comércio
intrazona mais profundas do que os acordos da OMC (chamadas “OMC-plus”, como propriedade
intelectual, medidas sanitárias e fitossanitárias, por exemplo) e regras para temas ausentes dos
acordos multilaterais (chamadas “OMC extra”, como empresas estatais, competitividade para
cadeias globais de valor, coerência regulatória, por exemplo).

De uma perspectiva geoeconômica, o TPP e o TTIP envolvem questões substantivas e negociações

complexas em contexto de diferentes graus de simetria entre os atores envolvidos. O TTIP
abrange duas grandes potências comerciais, os EUA e a UE, em uma relação econômica
relativamente simétrica e com elevados padrões regulatórios preexistentes, cuja convergência
não seria tarefa simples. O TTP envolve várias economias da Ásia em relação assimétrica de poder
econômico face os EUA, cujos padrões regulatórios servirão de parâmetro e meta. [36]
Um acordo do TPP e do TTIP nos níveis originais de ambição vislumbrados por seus idealizadores
teria impacto significativo no panorama geoeconômico do Comércio Internacional, com
repercussões no sistema multilateral da OMC. O impasse na OMC e as grandes negociações
megarregionais oferecem respostas distintas à questão contemporânea central da Geoeconomia
do Comércio Mundial: “as regras de que potência(s) se tornarão as normas universais do
comércio?”.

A exclusão da China das negociações comerciais megarregionais representa claramente um

problema geoeconômico e econômico, dada a posição central do país nas cadeias regionais
asiáticas, sua importância nas cadeias globais e a relação de interdependência comercial e de
investimentos entre a China e diversos países envolvidos no TPP e no TTIP, como o Japão e a
Alemanha, por exemplo.

Em relação às negociações megarregionais, a estratégia chinesa deixou pragmaticamente em

aberto a opção de futuramente se unir a um eventual acordo, ao mesmo tempo em que apoiou o
lançamento, em 2012, de um “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership” (RCEP) a ser
negociado entre a ASEAN e a Austrália, China, Índia, Japão, Coreia do Sul e Nova Zelândia. Em
2014, a China sugeriu a criação de uma “Área de Livre Comércio da Ásia Pacífico” (FTAAP) sob os
auspícios da APEC – que incluiria todos os membros do TPP mais a própria China.[37] Mais
importante, a China do presidente Xi Jinping lançou a iniciativa geoeconômica da “Rota Marítima e
Cinturão da Seda”, cujos avanços têm o potencial de moldar a Eurásia nas próximas décadas.
As dinâmicas geoeconômicas entre, de um lado, o impasse das negociações multilaterais de
comércio da OMC e, de outro, as negociações megarregionais lideradas pelos EUA e as reações
estratégicas regionais e globais da China deverão redesenhar o cenário do Comércio Global nos
próximos anos.

Conclusão
A Geopolítica e a Geoeconomia são dimensões integrais e complementares da Política Exterior de
toda grande potência. A importância renovada da Geoeconomia – a interseção entre a Geopolítica
e a Economia Global – reflete a conformação de um sistema multipolar de poder econômico e
sinaliza um processo de transição do poder mundial.

Para a Geoeconomia do Comércio Global, entre o impasse nas negociações da Rodada Doha e as
negociações megarregionais, duas hipóteses de riscos para o sistema multilateral podem ser
destacadas: (i) a hipótese do deslocamento normativo, com novas regras megarregionais “WTO-
plus” e “WTO-extra” potencialmente abrangendo fatia crescente do Comércio Internacional,
gerando o provável enfraquecimento das normas multilaterais existentes ou mesmo o interesse
de futura tentativa de “multilateralização” daquelas regras na OMC; e (ii) a hipótese de
fragmentação, com a conformação de “megarregiões geoeconômicas”, em vez do fortalecimento
de um regime multilateral de Comércio Universal e reformado, com a participação de potências
estabelecidas e emergentes.

Como lembrou o embaixador Clodoaldo Hugueney, em um de seus últimos artigos, sempre

atento às grandes transformações globais:

Sem a âncora da OMC e do Sistema Multilateral de Comércio um mundo mais

multipolar, como que ora se desenha, com potências e cadeias produtivas
regionais, poderia evoluir para um mundo de blocos com modelos excludentes
de regulação.[38]
Nos momentos de transição do sistema internacional, nunca escapou ao embaixador Hugueney,
durante as várias décadas que prestou inestimável serviço à diplomacia brasileira e aos interesses
da nação, a necessidade de agregar à análise do mapa geopolítico do mundo os fatores
geoeconômicos.

Setembro de 2015

The Return of Europe’s Nation-States

The Upside to the EU’s Crisis

By Jakub Grygiel
Europe currently finds itself in the throes of its worst political crisis since World
War II. Across the continent, traditional political parties have lost their appeal
as populist, Euroskeptical movements have attracted widespread support.
Hopes for European unity seem to grow dimmer by the day. The euro crisis has
exposed deep fault lines between Germany and debt-ridden southern European
states, including Greece and Portugal. Germany and Italy have clashed on
issues such as border controls and banking regulations. And on June 23, the
United Kingdom became the first country in history to vote to leave the EU—a
stunning blow to the bloc.

At the same time as its internal politics have gone off the rails, Europe now
faces new external dangers. In the east, a revanchist Russia—having invaded
Ukraine and annexed Crimea—looms ominously. To Europe’s south, the collapse
of numerous states has driven millions of migrants northward and created a
breeding ground for Islamist terrorists. Recent attacks in Paris and Brussels
have shown that these extremists can strike at the continent’s heart.
Such mayhem has underscored the price of ignoring the geopolitical struggles that surround Europe.
Yet the EU, crippled by the euro crisis and divisions over how to apportion refugees, no longer
seems strong or united enough to address its domestic turmoil or the security threats on its borders.
National leaders across the continent are already turning inward, concluding that the best way to
protect their countries is through more sovereignty, not less. Many voters seem to agree.
As Europe’s history makes painfully clear, a return to aggressive nationalism
could be dangerous, not just for the continent but also for the world. Yet a
Europe of newly assertive nation-states would be preferable to the disjointed,
ineffectual, and unpopular EU of today. There’s good reason to believe that
European countries would do a better job of checking Russia, managing the
migrant crisis, and combating terrorism on their own than they have done
under the auspices of the EU.
EVER-FARTHER UNION

In the years after World War II, numerous European leaders made a convincing
argument that only through unity could the continent escape its bloody past
and guarantee prosperity. Accordingly, in 1951, Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany created the European Coal
and Steel Community. Over the next several decades, that organization
morphed into the European Economic Community and, eventually, the
European Union, and its membership grew from six countries to 28. Along the
way, as the fear of war receded, European leaders began to talk about
integration not merely as a force for peace but also as a way to allow Europe to
stand alongside China, Russia, and the United States as a great power.
The EU’s boosters argued that the benefits of membership—an integrated
market, shared borders, and a transnational legal system—were self-evident.
By this logic, expanding the union eastward wouldn’t require force or political
coercion; it would simply take patience, since nonmember states would soon
recognize the upsides of membership and join as soon as they could. And for
many years, this logic held, as central and eastern European countries raced to
join the union after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Eight countries—the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia—
became members in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007.
Then came the Ukraine crisis. In 2014, the Ukrainian people took to the streets
and overthrew their corrupt president, Viktor Yanukovych, after he abruptly
canceled a new economic deal with the EU. Immediately afterward, Russia
invaded and annexed Crimea, and it soon sent soldiers and artillery into
eastern Ukraine, too. The EU’s leaders had hoped that economic inducements
would inevitably increase the union’s membership and bring peace and
prosperity to an ever-larger public. But that dream proved no match for
Russia’s tanks and so-called little green men.
Moscow’s gambit was not, on its own, enough to cripple the EU. But soon,
another crisis hit, and this one nearly pushed the union to its breaking point. In
2015, more than a million refugees—nearly half of them fleeing the civil war in
Syria—entered Europe, and since then, many more have followed. Early on,
several countries, especially Germany and Sweden, proved especially
welcoming, and leaders in those states angrily criticized those of their
neighbors that tried to keep the migrants out. Last year, after Hungary built a
razor-wire fence along its border with Croatia, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel condemned the move as reminiscent of the Cold War, and French
Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said it did “not respect Europe’s common
values.” But early this year, many of these same leaders changed their tune
and began pressuring Europe’s border countries to increase their security
measures. In January, several European governments warned Greece that if it
did not find a way to stanch the flow of refugees, they would expel it from the
Schengen area, a passport-free zone within the EU.
Consciously or not, the European politicians advocating open borders have
failed to prioritize their own citizens over foreigners. These leaders’ intentions
may be noble, but if a state fails to limit its protection to a particular group of
people—its nationals—its government risks losing legitimacy. Indeed, the main
measure of a country’s success is how well it can secure its people and borders
from external threats, be they hostile neighbors, terrorism, or mass migration.
On this score, the EU and its proponents are failing. And voters have noticed.
The British people issued a strong rebuke to the bloc in June when they voted
to leave the EU by a margin of 52 percent to 48 percent, ignoring warnings
from the International Monetary Fund, the Bank of England, and the United
Kingdom’s Treasury that doing so would wreak economic disaster. In France,
according to a recent Pew survey, 61 percent of the population holds
unfavorable views of the EU; in Greece, 71 percent of the population shares
these views.

Back when Europe faced no pressing security threats—as was the case for most
of the last two decades—EU members could afford to pursue more high-minded
objectives, such as dissolving borders within the union. Now that dangers have
returned, however, and the EU has shown that it is incapable of dealing with
them, Europe’s national leaders must fulfill their most basic duty: defending
their own.
BACK TO BASICS

The EU’s architects created a head without a body: they built a unified political
and administrative bureaucracy but not a united European nation. The EU
aspired to transcend nation-states, but its fatal flaw has been its consistent
failure to recognize the persistence of national differences and the importance
of addressing threats on its frontiers.
One consequence of this oversight has been the rise of political parties that
aim to restore national autonomy, often by appealing to far-right, populist, and
sometimes xenophobic sentiments. In 2014, the UK Independence Party won
the popular vote in an election for the European Parliament—the first time
since 1906 that any party in the United Kingdom had bested Labour and the
Conservatives in a nationwide vote. Last December in France, Marine Le Pen’s
far-right National Front won the first round of the country’s regional elections;
then, in March in Germany, a right-wing Euroskeptical party, Alternative for
Germany, won almost 25 percent of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt. And in May,
Norbert Hofer, a candidate from the far-right Freedom Party, narrowly lost
Austria’s presidential election. (Austria’s Constitutional Court later annulled
that result, forcing a rerun of the election that will be held in October.)
Some of these parties have benefited from the enthusiastic support of Russia,
as part of its campaign to buy influence in Europe. Until recently, Moscow could
rely on European leaders who were friendly to Russia, including former German
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.
But now, as new parties take the place of established ones, the Kremlin needs
fresh partners. It has given money to the National Front, and the U.S. Congress
has asked James Clapper, the U.S. director of national intelligence, to
investigate the Kremlin’s ties to other fringe parties, including Greece’s Golden
Dawn and Hungary’s Jobbik. Yet such parties would be surging even without
Russian backing. Many Europeans are disenchanted with politicians who have
supported EU integration, open borders, and the gradual dissolution of national
sovereignty; they have a deep and lasting desire to reassert the supremacy of
their nation-state.Of course, most of Europe’s Euroskeptical politicians don’t
seek to disband the union entirely; in fact, many of them continue to see its
creation as a historic victory for the West. They do, however, want greater
national autonomy on social, economic, and foreign policy, especially in
response to overreaching EU mandates on migration and the demand for
controversial continent-wide laws on issues such as abortion and marriage.
Many in the United Kingdom, for example, pushed for a British exit from the EU,
or Brexit, out of frustration with the number of British laws that have come
from Brussels rather than Westminster.
The bet against sovereignty has failed. But sovereignty’s resurgence has
conjured up many dark memories of the nationalism that twice brought the
continent to the brink of annihilation. Many observers now worry that European
politics are coming to resemble those of the 1930s, when populist leaders
spewed hate to whip up support. Such fears are not wholly unfounded. The
strident xenophobia of Austria’s Freedom Party recalls the early days of
fascism. Anti-Semitism has risen across Europe, sprouting up in parties that
span the ideological spectrum, from the United Kingdom’s Labour Party to
Hungary’s Jobbik. And in Greece, some members of the radical left-wing party
Syriza have advocated Greek withdrawal from NATO, a prime example of a
growing anti-Americanism that could undermine the foundation of European
security.
Yet affirming national sovereignty does not require virulent nationalism. The
support for Brexit in the United Kingdom, for instance, was less an expression
of hostility toward other European countries than it was an assertion of the
United Kingdom’s right to self-govern. A return to nation-states entails not
nationalism but patriotism, or what George Orwell called “devotion to a
particular place and a particular way of life.” It’s also worth noting that one of
the greatest threats Europe faced in the twentieth century was transnational in
nature: communism, which divided the continent for 45 years and led to the
deaths of millions.

BEYOND THE EU
A renationalization of Europe may be the continent’s best hope for security. The
EU’s founders believed that the body would guarantee a stable and prosperous
Europe—and for a while, it seemed to. But today, although the EU has
generated wealth through its common market, it is increasingly a source of
instability. The euro crisis has exposed the union’s inability to resolve conflicts
among its members: German leaders have had little incentive to address Greek
concerns, and vice versa. The EU also suffers from what the German Federal
Constitutional Court has called a “structural democratic deficit.” Of its seven
institutions, just one—the European Parliament—is directly elected by the
people, and it cannot initiate legislation. Finally, the recent dominance of
Germany within the EU has alienated smaller states, including Greece and Italy.
Meanwhile, the EU has failed to keep Europe safe. Since 1949, Europe has
relied on NATO—and, in particular, the United States—to secure its borders.
The anemic defense spending of most European countries has only increased
their dependence on the United States’ physical presence in Europe. The EU is
unlikely to create its own army, at least in the near future, as its members have
different strategic priorities and little desire to cede military sovereignty to
Brussels.

Many of the EU’s backers still insist that in its absence, anarchy will engulf the
continent. In 2011, the French minister for European affairs, Jean Leonetti,
warned that the failure of the euro could lead Europe to “unravel.” In May,
British Prime Minister David Cameron claimed that a British exit from the EU
would raise the risk of war. But as the American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr
wrote in the 1940s, “the fear of anarchy is less potent than the fear of a
concrete foe.” Today, the identifiable enemies that have arisen around Europe,
from Russia to the self-proclaimed Islamic State (also known as ISIS), seem far
more worrying to most people than the potential chaos arising from the
dissolution of the EU. Their hope is that individual countries will provide the
kind of safety that Brussels can’t.
The return of nation-states need not lead Europe to revert to an anarchic
jumble of quarreling governments. Increased autonomy won’t stop Europe’s
states from trading or negotiating with one another. Just as supranationalism
does not guarantee harmony, sovereignty does not require hostility among
nations.
In a Europe of revived nation-states, countries will continue to form alliances
based on common interests and security concerns. Recognizing the weakness
of the EU, some states have already done so. The Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovakia, for example—normally a disjointed group—have joined
forces to oppose EU plans that would force them to accept thousands of
refugees.
The United States, for its part, needs a better partner in Europe than the EU. As
the union dissolves, NATO’s function in maintaining stability and deterring
external threats will increase—strengthening Washington’s role on the
continent. Without the EU, many European countries, threatened by Russia and
overwhelmed by mass migration, will likely invest more heavily in NATO, the
only security alliance backed up by force and thus capable of protecting its
members.
It’s time for U.S. leaders and Europe’s political class to recognize that a return
to nation-states in Europe does not have to end in tragedy. On the contrary,
Europe will be able to meet its most pressing security challenges only when it
abandons the fantasy of continental unity and embraces its geopolitical
pluralism.

The G20 and the world economy

Agreeing to disagree

The global economy has many ailments and few easy remedies

| HANGZHOU
AT ITS FIRST LEADERS’ SUMMIT, THE GROUP OF 20’S RAISON D’ÊTRE WAS
CLEAR. HELD SHORTLY AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS IN LATE
2008, THE FORUM OF BIG ECONOMIES REASSURED A WORRIED WORLD SIMPLY
BY PUTTING ON A SHOW OF UNITY. BUT AS THE WORST RAVAGES OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS HAVE FADED, THE G20 HAS STRUGGLED TO FIND THE SAME
SENSE OF PURPOSE. THIS YEAR’S SUMMIT IN HANGZHOU, IN EASTERN CHINA,
WHICH ENDED ON SEPTEMBER 5TH, PULLED LEADERS’ ATTENTION IN MANY
DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS.
It was preceded by another display of co-operation: America and China ratified the Paris

climate-change agreement. Then work began on a long list of problems, including

simmering trade disputes, overstretched central banks, corporate tax avoidance and a

populist backlash in several countries against globalisation. The final communiqué ran to

more 7,000 words, not counting several lengthy appendices.

THIS SPRAWL FRUSTRATED SOME PARTICIPANTS, WHO WANTED A SHARPER FOCUS

ON GROWTH. THE IMF NOTED THAT 2016 WILL BE THE FIFTH STRAIGHT YEAR OF
GLOBAL GROWTH BELOW 3.7%, ITS AVERAGE FOR NEARLY TWO DECADES BEFORE
THE CRISIS. THE G20 ECONOMIES ARE LIKELY TO MISS A TARGET THEY SET
THEMSELVES IN 2014, OF LIFTING THEIR COMBINED OUTPUT BY 2% OVER THE IMF’S
THEN FORECAST FOR 2018.
JUDGING THE G20’S SUCCESS BY GROWTH OUTCOMES IS UNFAIR, THOUGH, WHEN
MOST OF ITS BIG MEMBERS ARE HOLDING BACK. AMERICA IS CONTEMPLATING A
SECOND INTEREST-RATE RISE. GERMANY REMAINS SCEPTICAL OF STIMULUS. CHINA
IS AT PRESENT MORE INTENT ON DEFUSING FINANCIAL RISKS THAN ON GINNING UP
GDP.
AND THERE IS A MORE POSITIVE READING OF THE G20’S SPREAD: THAT IT IS
EVOLVING TO TACKLE, IF NOT QUITE SOLVE, THE RANGE OF PROBLEMS THAT BEDEVIL
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. ALTHOUGH THE G20 SEEMS UNWIELDY, IT ALSO HAS AN
ADVANTAGE: FLEXIBILITY. LACKING A PERMANENT BUREAUCRACY, IT CAN SWITCH
EMPHASIS ANNUALLY, DEPENDING ON WHICH COUNTRY IS IN THE CHAIR.
CHINA PUT “INNOVATION” AT THE HEART OF ITS G20 AGENDA. VAGUE AS THAT
SOUNDS, IT WAS SENSIBLE. FIRST, DEBATING WHETHER TO RELY MORE ON FISCAL OR
ON MONETARY POLICY TO PROMOTE GROWTH ONLY GETS YOU SO FAR. IN THE
LONGER TERM, PROGRESS DEPENDS ON IMPROVED PRODUCTIVITY—GETTING MORE
OUT OF EXISTING RESOURCES. SECOND, AT LEAST SOME OF THE ANGER DIRECTED
AT GLOBALISATION STEMS FROM ANXIETY ABOUT NEW TECHNOLOGIES, SUCH AS
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, THAT THREATEN ESTABLISHED PATTERNS OF
EMPLOYMENT. THERE IS NO SIMPLE ANSWER: THE G20 PROMISED TO SHARE
TECHNOLOGY WITH POOR COUNTRIES AND TO DEVELOP TRAINING FOR WORKERS.
BUT GETTING THE WORLD’S LEADING ECONOMIES TO THINK COLLECTIVELY ABOUT
THE DOWNSIDE OF INNOVATION WAS BETTER THAN NOTHING.
ON SPECIFIC DISPUTES, ALAS, LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE IN HANGZHOU. BOTH
AMERICA AND EUROPE PUSHED CHINA TO DO MORE TO CURB ITS INDUSTRIAL
OVERCAPACITY, ESPECIALLY IN STEEL. CHINA COUNTERED THAT WEAK GLOBAL
DEMAND WAS AS MUCH THE PROBLEM AS OVERSUPPLY. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION—
TO ESTABLISH A FORUM TO MONITOR GLOBAL EXCESS STEEL CAPACITY—WAS A
CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF AGREEING TO DISAGREE.
YET THE SUMMIT WAS ALSO A TIMELY REMINDER OF WHY THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE
FOR SUCH GATHERINGS. DAYS BEFORE IT BEGAN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
RULED THAT APPLE HAD UNDERPAID TAXES IN IRELAND, BY UP TO €13 BILLION ($14.7
BILLION). THAT HAS RAISED THE PROSPECT OF A TRANSATLANTIC TAX WAR, WITH
AMERICA HINTING AT RETALIATION. SUCH A CONFLICT WOULD UNDERMINE ONE OF
THE G20’S MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS: IT WAS A REQUEST FROM THE GROUP IN 2012 THAT
LED THE OECD, A CLUB OF RICH COUNTRIES, TO DRAFT GUIDELINES THAT MAKE IT
HARDER FOR COMPANIES TO SHIFT PROFITS TO THEIR FAVOURED TAX REGIMES. THE
APPLE CASE WILL ROLL ON, BUT IN THE MEANTIME THE G20 COMMITTED ITSELF TO
MORE CO-ORDINATION ON TAXES. WITHIN TWO YEARS, MOST COUNTRIES WILL
AUTOMATICALLY SHARE INFORMATION ABOUT TAXES LEVIED ON NON-RESIDENTS,
NARROWING THE SCOPE FOR EVASION.
To those visiting for the summit, China sought to present an image of strength. The

government shut down factories, near and far, to ensure the air was clean. It blanketed

Hangzhou with security. And it put on a grand evening gala, featuring a dazzling light show

and ballerinas dancing on water. The substance of the meetings was much duller. But the

summits will, indeed must, go on.

Britain and the European Union

So what will Brexit really mean?

Theresa May’s ministers are carefully avoiding specific answers. But she is systematically disowning many

of the Brexiteers’ promises

SOME 77 days have passed since Britain voted on June 23rd to leave the European

Union. Yet this period has been strangely reminiscent of 77 years ago, after Neville

Chamberlain declared war on Nazi Germany: a phoney war. Theresa May, the prime

minister, has created a new Department for Exiting the EU and put three leading

Brexiteers (pictured) in charge of the process. But little else has happened. Article 50 of

the EU treaty, which would kick off negotiations, has not been invoked. And Mrs May’s

mantra, “Brexit means Brexit”, has become a tired cliché.

David Davis, secretary of state for the new department, had another go in Parliament on

September 5th. Brexit, he explained helpfully, meant leaving the EU. He added that this

implied taking back control of borders, laws and taxpayers’ money. He brimmed with cheer

about the opportunities it would bring. Yet when asked specific questions—Would Britain

quit the EU’s single market? What migration controls would it seek? Would it stay in

Europol? When would negotiations start?—he gave only vague answers.

That may be quite sensible, for a reason he also offered: that it is more important to get Brexit

right than to do it quickly. His department is a work in progress. He has 180 officials and a further
120 in Brussels, but he needs more. As he spoke, he was flanked by his two Brexiteer

colleagues, Boris Johnson as foreign secretary and Liam Fox at the Department for International

Trade. The three men have been having the usual turf wars and squabbles over exactly what

Brexit should entail.

Tellingly, two hints at answers emerged this week in Asia, not Westminster. In China for the G20

summit, Mrs May disavowed several pledges made by Brexiteers before the referendum. She

said she was against an Australian-style “points” system for EU migrants (though mainly

because it might let in too many, not too few). She refused to back Leavers’ promises to transfer

saved EU budget payments to the National Health Service or scrap VAT on fuel bills. The not-so-

subtle message was that, though the three Brexiteers may be nominally in charge, the real

decisions will be taken by her and by Philip Hammond, her chancellor, both of them Remainers.

A tip from Tokyo

These two may have welcomed a second Asian intervention: the unusual publication by

Japan’s foreign ministry of a Brexit paper. Japanese companies, it said, were huge

employers in Britain, which took almost half of Japan’s investment in the EU last year.

Most of that came because Britain is a gateway to Europe. The paper advised Mrs May to

try to retain full access to the single market, to avoid customs controls on exports, to

preserve the “passport” that allows banks based in London to trade across Europe and to

let employers freely hire EU nationals.

These interventions worry Tory Brexiteers, who fret that having won a famous victory in

June, they could lose the war. Their fear is that, given the choice, Mrs May and Mr

Hammond will lean more to staying in the single market than to taking back full control of

migration, money and laws. Mr Davis said this week that having access to the single

market was not the same as being a member of it, and added that giving up border control

to secure membership was an “improbable” outcome. But he was slapped down when Mrs

May’s spokeswoman said the remark was only Mr Davis’s personal opinion. He also talked
of retaining as much of the status quo as possible, not least in areas like security and

foreign-policy co-operation.

The case for staying in the single market is simple: economists say this will minimise the

economic damage from Brexit. A “hard” Brexit that involves leaving the single market

without comprehensive free-trade deals with the EU and third countries would mean a

bigger drop in investment and output. Brexiteers claim that many countries want free-trade

deals and the economy is proving more robust than Remainers forecast. Michael Gove, a

leading Brexiteer and former justice secretary, scoffed that soi-disant experts predicting

economic doom had “oeuf on their face”.

Yet Mrs May is less complacent, acknowledging that it will not be “plain sailing” for the

economy. Domestic business and financial lobbies are pressing to stay in the single

market. As for trade deals, although she won warm words at the G20 summit from

Australia’s prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, she was told firmly by Barack Obama and

others that bilateral deals with Britain would not be a priority. The climate for free-trade

deals is not propitious these days, and Mr Fox’s department is bereft of experienced trade

negotiators.

Mrs May has ruled out an early election and a second referendum. She refuses to provide a

“running commentary” on her Brexit plans. And she insists she can invoke Article 50 without a

parliamentary vote. Yet she is being urged by some to delay, since it would set a two-year

deadline for Brexit that can be extended only by unanimity among EU leaders. In a thoughtful

paper for the think-tank Open Europe, Andrew Tyrie, chairman of the Treasury committee, says

the government should first decide what sort of Brexit it wants, adding that its leverage is greater

before it pulls the trigger. He suggests waiting until the French election in the spring or even the

German one in September.

Yet Mrs May might not be allowed to wait by her own party, let alone by fellow EU leaders

eager to get Brexit out of the way before the European elections in mid-2019. The phoney
war may soon turn hotter.

Ce compromis fut laborieux et rien ne dit, même s’il sera respecté les

premiers jours pour les fêtes de l’Aïd qui débutent lundi 12 septembre, qu’il

pourra tenir plus de quelques semaines et permettre derelancer le processus

de paix en Syrie. Aprés une dizaine d’heures de négociations à l’arraché, le

secrétaire d’Etat américain John Kerry et son homologue russe Sergueï

Lavrov ont réussi à conclure un accord dans la nuit du vendredi 9 au samedi

10 septembre à Genève, qu’ils présentent comme « majeur », discuté dans

une demi-douzaine de rencontres depuis la mi-juillet et le voyage du chef de

ladiplomatie américaine à Moscou.

Le texte prévoit notamment une trêve nationale à compter de lundi et, si cet arrêt des combats tient
pendant sept jours, des corridors sûrs pour les opérations humanitaires ainsi que des actions
coordonnées contre des groupes islamistes au travers d’un « centre de commandement commun »,
consacré notamment au partage d’informations permettant de délimiter les territoires de l’ex-Front
Al-Nosra et ceux de l’opposition.

« Nous appelons tous les acteurs syriens à soutenir le plan auxquels sont parvenus les
Etats-Unis et la Russie, pour (…) mettre un terme le plus vite possible à ce conflit
catastrophique par un processus politique », a lancé John Kerry. Son homologue russe a
déclaré qu’en dépit d’une méfiance persistante, les deux camps ont mis au point cinq
documents permettant un combat coordonné contre le terrorisme et une reprise de la
trêve de février sous une forme améliorée. Ces textes d’un commun accord resteront
confidentiels. « Cela crée les conditions nécessaires pour la reprise du
processus politique qui est à l’arrêt depuis longtemps », a précisé M. Lavrov, tout en
reconnaissant qu’il n’est pas en mesure de garantir « à 100 % » la réussite de ce nouveau
plan.

Difficile, sans en connaître tous les détails, d’évaluer la teneur des engagements pris par les deux
pays coparrains du processus de paix lancé à l’automne 2015, et soutenant des camps adverses dans
le conflit. Il y a notamment la question cruciale du mécanisme de contrôle de l’arrêt des combats.
« Le risque est que cet accord reste seulement sur le papier », mettait en garde Paris avant même la
conclusions des discussions.

« Cela devrait mettre fin aux bombes-barils »

La « cessation des hostilités » entrée en vigueur le 27 février, qui avait permis le démarrage des
discussions à Genève, n’avait pas tenu plus d’un mois. L’opposition réunie dans le Haut Conseil des
Négociations (HCN) avait décidé de quitter la table en dénonçant la poursuite du carnage :
l’aviation du régime avait en effet continué ses bombardements sur les civils des zones rebelles et
les Russes leurs frappes massives contre toutes les formations de l’opposition, y compris celles
soutenues par les Occidentaux et les capitales arabes.
« Le gouvernement Obama, les Etats-Unis, font un pas en avant car nous pensons que la Russie et
mon collègue [Sergueï Lavrov] ont la capacité de faire pression sur le régime d’Assad pour mettre
fin au conflit et venir à la table des négociations pour faire la paix », veut croire M. Kerry,
précisant que le « fondement » de l’accord résidait dans la promesse du régime de s’abstenir de
frappes aériennes sur les zones rebelles, même sous le prétexte de viser les djihadistes de l’ancien
Front Al-Nosra. « Cela devrait mettre fin aux bombes-barils, fin aux bombardements sans
discernement, et cela peut potentiellement changer la nature du conflit », espère le chef de la
diplomatie américaine, qui invite les combattants de l’opposition modérée à se séparer des groupes
djihadistes, faute de quoi ils pourront être la cible de frappes ultérieures.

De nombreux doutes demeurent alors que Paris et la plupart des pays du groupe dit des
« affinitaires » – Etats occidentaux, dont les Etats-Unis, et capitales arabo-musulmanes engagées
dès le début dans le soutien à la révolution syrienne –, qui était réuni à Londres le 7 septembre,
insistent sur la nécessité d’un « accord robuste ».
Pour des raisons différentes, Washington autant que Moscou voulaient arriver à des résultats
rapidement. L’administration Obama, dont le bilan sur la Syrie s’avère pour le moins modeste,
voulait pouvoir brandir ce plan à l’assemblée générale des Nations unies, à New York, qui
commence le 20 septembre. Le Kremlin, qui avait lancé en septembre 2015 son intervention
militaire en Syrie, a ainsi réussi ainsi à retrouver un rôle majeur au Moyen-Orient. La région sert de
point focal pour un retour en grand de la Russie sur la scène internationale, et le pays redevient
ainsi, comme avant l’effondrement de l’URSS, l’interlocuteur direct des Etats-Unis. Vladimir
Poutine semble néanmoins également conscient des risques de s’enliser dans le bourbier syrien.

« La Russie assume son rôle de belligérant »

Mais s’il cherche une sortie de crise, il n’a pas la même urgence que M. Obama. D’où le caractère
déséquilibré de ces négociations. « La Russie assume pleinement son rôle de belligérant soutenant
militairement le régime contre tous ses opposants, alors que les Etats-Unis veulent être des
médiateurs centrant tout sur la lutte contre l’organisation Etat islamique et Al-Qaida », souligne un
diplomate occidental. Pour Washington, en outre, le dossier crucial est celui de l’Irak plus que la
Syrie. Et nombre de capitales comme l’opposition syrienne s’irritent d’une certaine ingénuité de
John Kerry, trop souvent enclin à accepter des compromis bancals. « On n’arrive pas à une
négociation en disant : “je veux un accord à tout prix”, même si on le pense », soupire un
diplomate français. Un point de vue que partage nombre de diplomates du département d’Etat,
agacés de ces incessants face-à-face avec M. Lavrov, qui jusqu’ici n’avaient donné aucun résultat.
S’ils saluent l’accord, avec ses inconnues, tous restent prudents, à commencer par l’envoyé spécial
de l’ONU pour la Syrie, Staffan De Mistura, qui espère que « la volonté politique qui a mené à cet
accord sera durable ». Même s’il tient, le plus dur commence : relancer à Genève les négociations
de paix alors même que Moscou tient à garantir la survie du régime, et, faute d’alternative crédible
au maintien de Bachar Al-Assad au pouvoir, que l’opposition syrienne exige son départ immédiat et
que les Occidentaux continuent de rappeler « qu’il ne peut en aucun cas incarner l’avenir de la
Syrie » même s’ils sont désormais résignés à ce qu’il reste en fonction au début du processus.

The Wold Trade Organization CFA - set 2016

Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the principal forum for
setting the rules of international trade. Consisting of 164 member
countries, which together account for over 97 percent of world
trade, the WTO has expanded steadily over the past two decades,
helping to reduce barriers to trade in both goods and services and
boosting global economic output.
However, the WTO’s efforts to advance its trade liberalization agenda
have been beset by controversy. Since the launch of the so-called
“Doha Development Agenda” in 2001, advanced and developing
economies have disagreed on topics ranging from agricultural
subsidies to intellectual property rights. As negotiations stalled,
countries turned to signing dozens of separate bilateral and regional
free trade agreements (FTAs), raising questions about the relevance of
the WTO. While the WTO’s leadership billed the agreements reached
at WTO meetings in Bali in 2013 and Nairobi in 2015 as
breakthroughs for the Doha agenda, experts remain divided over the
WTO’s role in advancing trade liberalization, regulatory cooperation,
and deepening economic integration.

How does the WTO deal with conflicts?

Perhaps the WTO’s most successful attribute has been its trade
dispute mechanism, a forum that has been used extensively over the
past two decades, helping to avoid unilateral responses to disputes
and potential trade wars. Since 1995, members have filed more
than five hundred disputes (PDF) with the WTO. Most of these are
settled by consultations or mutual agreement before advancing to
litigation.
Upon joining, all members agree to a Dispute Settlement Mechanism
(DSM) in which WTO-appointed trade experts can render a binding
judgment. When one member files a complaint against another, the
countries must first attempt to resolve the issue through consultation,
 and only if that fails is a panel chosen by the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Body (PDF) to hear the case. A panel ruling’s
recommendations, if not overturned on appeal, must be implemented
by the offending country. If a country fails to respond, the plaintiff can
then take targeted retaliatory measures such as blocking imports or
raising tariffs.
The United States is the most active participant in the system, having filed 110
complaints and served as defendant in 126 cases. (See map.) Since 2009, the Obama
administration has filed twenty disputes, eleven of them against China, which quickly
became a target for disputes after it joined the WTO in 2001. China has drawn thirty-six
complaints, more than any other developing country. The United States, in particular, has
used the WTO process to challenge Chinese government support for domestic
industries, restrictions on imports, and other state-led trade policies. Eleven of the
eighteen total U.S. complaints against China have been settled.

Despite the success of the DSM, there are also signs that the system is
under pressure. The United States drew criticism from many members
for a May 2016 decision to block the reappointment of a South
Korean judge to the WTO’s Appellate Body, the first time any country
blocked the appointment of a judge from another country. For some
experts, this pressure hasexemplified a worrisome
politicization of the system.

What is the Doha Development Agenda?

The 1999 meeting of the WTO in Seattle—convened with the goal of
launching a new round of trade negotiations—fell apart without
agreement after developing countries accused the more powerful
developed countries of marginalizing their concerns. Some developing
countriesthreatened to withdraw (PDF) from any future talks that
didn’t include a focus on developing-country interests.
At the next ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar, in 2001, WTO
members agreed to a new round of negotiations that promised to put
developing countries at the center. This became known as theDoha
Development Agenda, or the Doha Round.
Liberalizing global agricultural trade was the linchpin of the
agenda. Many of the world’s poorest nations depend on exporting
basic agricultural products, but struggle to compete against richer
nations that support their farmers with subsidies. The Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that
these subsidies total nearly $300 billion annually. Agricultural lobbies
 in the United States, Europe, and Japan have consistently exercised
their considerable political clout to convince lawmakers to maintain
such subsidies, says Center for Global Development
economist Kimberly Elliott. “The United States is very reluctant to
negotiate anything that would require a change to the farm bill. That
would be very unpopular in Congress,” she says.
Developing countries argue that without a reduction in developed-
country subsidies, they must maintain tariffs and engage in their own
domestic support. A major sticking point has been the terms of a
proposed “special safeguard mechanism,” or SSM, that would
allow developing countries to temporarily raise tariffs to protect their
farmers from sudden price drops or import surges. Developing-
country subsidies for agriculture producers have climbed from
under $20 billion in 2001 to nearly $200 billion by 2012, the OECD
reports.
In addition to agriculture, the Doha agenda sought to further reduce
barriers to trade in services, such as business and financial services,
and non-agricultural goods. The Doha talks operated on the principle
of “special and differential treatment,” promising to give
developing countries more time to implement changes and the
financial and technical support to help them do so.
However, the talks got off to a bad start at the 2003 ministerial in
Cancún, Mexico, which ended without agreement. Over the next
decade, negotiators missed deadline after deadline for concluding the
round. In 2008, negotiations collapsed over disagreement on
reducing agriculture subsides and the special safeguard mechanism.

What is the status of the Doha Round?

Negotiations continued after 2008 with low expectations following the
global financial crisis. But the 2013 ministerial in Bali, Indonesia,
delivered a significant achievement with the first multilateral
agreement since the creation of the WTO. This was the Trade
Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which aims to speed up customs
procedures and make trade easier, faster, and cheaper. The
WTO estimates (PDF) this could increase global trade by some $1
trillion. The talks also reached an interim agreement on “public
stockholding,” continuing exceptions that allow developing countries
to stockpile agricultural products to protect against food shortages.
The TFA was only a small slice of the larger Doha agenda, but the
successful deal was a cause for optimism: Director-General Ricardo
Azevêdo proclaimed that the WTO was “back in business.” Bali also
underscored the extent to which developing countries acted as a single
bloc, with many, including Brazil, Russia, and China opposing
India’s efforts to stall the talks to get better terms on food security.

The latest ministerial conference, held in Nairobi in 2015, made

progress on a number of issues, including the phasing out of
agriculture export subsidies and an agreement among some members
to cut tariffs on IT products. However, for many members, Nairobi
signaled the end of the Doha talks. U.S. Trade Representative Michael
Froman argued that Nairobi was the “end of the line” and that the
world needed to “free itself from the strictures” of Doha. Peterson
Institute trade expert Gary Clyde Hufbauer has argued, that the round
is a “zombie” since completing fully multilateral talks based on
consensus agreements is no longer possible.
For the CGD’s Elliott, the goal of a comprehensive package is likely out
of reach. “Nairobi is probably the model for how trade talks move
forward: incrementally, and on an issue-by-issue basis,” she says.
What are the criticisms of the WTO?
Critics persistently allege that wealthy country interests are
overrepresented at the WTO. Many unions, developing world farmers,
and grassroots activists accuse the WTO of abandoning the original
development-oriented vision of the Doha round in favor of more
narrowly focused corporate interests.
The WTO’s intellectual property provisions, the agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), also draw
criticism. The WTO says that enforcing patent protections is central to
expanding global trade, but some experts have argued that WTO
rules on drug patents have limited access to medicines in poorer
countries. Other studies, however, have found little to no effect to
date.
Other critics say WTO rules overrule national sovereignty, and in
doing so erode environmental and labor protections. Environmental
groups have criticized WTO decisions on genetically modified food, as
well as recent WTO rulings against what it considers discriminatory
environmental labeling, as in the case of U.S. dolphin-safe labeling.
Labor unions in the United States argue that the WTO is inadequate
 for protecting U.S. wages from being undercut by unfair labor
practices abroad (PDF), alleging for instance that China violates basic
workers’ rights that lower the cost of its exports. Developing
countries counter that attempts to include labor standards in the WTO
are a form of protectionism in disguise.
The WTO has come under increased fire in the 2016 U.S. political
season, with Republican presidential nominee Donald
Trump threatening to pull out of the organization. Trump and
other critics of U.S. trade deals allege that by promoting imports and
encouraging firms to move operations abroad, WTO-led tariff
reductions hurt U.S. jobs and wages. Some economists on the left,
such as the Economic Policy Institute’s Robert E. Scott and Will
Kimball, estimate that China’s entrance into the WTO in 2001 led to
the loss of over three million U.S. jobs, as U.S. firms were forced to
compete with China’s much cheaper imports. Some estimates find
(PDF) a smaller, but still substantial, loss of around two million jobs,
while other experts contend that technological changes, not China,
were responsible for these losses.
However, trade proponents like Dartmouth College economist
Douglas Irwin say that increased trade with China also benefited the
U.S. economy by lowering prices, increasing productivity, and
expanding exports. U.S. exports to China increased rapidly
(PDF) after 2001, rising from 2 percent to over 10 percent of the
country’s total exports. Experts also say this “China shock” was a one-
time effect as China went through the industrialization process, and
that returning to high tariffs would only harm the economy and thus
U.S. workers and consumers. Some pro-trade analysts, like the
Peterson Institute’s C. Fred Bergsten, believe that the WTO
should better address currency manipulation, which many
experts say China carried out in the 2000s. China has also drawn
criticism for continuing to claim “developing country” status, and the
privileges that come with it, despite its rapid rise to become the
world’s second largest economy.

Finally, some experts criticize the WTO for being too consensus-driven, allowing for small
groups of countries to veto progress. “There’s always going to be someone to block a deal,”
says Dartmouth’s Irwin.
 What are the alternatives to the WTO
system?
Even as Doha stalls, WTO talks continue on what are known as
“plurilateral” negotiations, or agreements between smaller subsets of
WTO members. Plurilateral deals are easier to negotiate, as they
focus on narrower issues and not all members need to be bound by
their terms.
At the 2015 Nairobi talks, for instance, fifty-three WTO
members concluded an expansion of the Information Technology
Agreement, or ITA, which reduces trade tariffs on a raft of IT
products. The agreement means that over 97 percent of all global IT
trade is now covered by WTO rules. Another major potential
plurilateral currently in progress is the Trade in Services Agreement
(TISA), under negotiation since 2013 (PDF) by twenty-three
members, including the EU but not including China. Backers of TISA
hope to use the talks to further the WTO’s liberalization of theglobal
services trade, the rules for which haven’t been updated since the
WTO’s 1995 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
In 2012, nineteen members agreed to update the Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA), which seeks to further open government procurement markets. And
in 2014, fourteen members, including the United States, China, the EU, and Japan, opened
negotiations on a proposedEnvironmental Goods Agreement (EGA), which would liberalize
trade in environmental products such as wind turbines and solar technology.

Many countries have also turned to bilateral free trade agreements

(FTAs), or larger regional agreements. The United States has pushed
for so-called “mega-regional” deals, such as the twelve-
member Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the U.S.-
EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). But
while regional deals once appeared easier to complete, the TPP may
be faltering in the U.S. Congress, and the TTIP is facing growing
opposition in Europe, raising serious doubts about the future of the
trade liberalization agenda.

En Syrie, la trêve est prolongée de deux jours

LE MONDE 15/09/2016

Le cessez-le-feu en Syrie a passé le test préliminaire mais le plus

difficile reste à venir. Les deux premiers jours de cet accord, entré en
vigueur lundi 12 septembre, à 19 heures heure locale, ont été marqués
par une réduction spectaculaire du niveau de violences. Selon
l’Observatoire syrien des droits de l’homme, les combats ont quasiment
cessé, à l’exception de quelques incidents sporadiques, qui n’ont pas fait
de morts. Parrains de la trêve, qu’ils avaient négociée à Genève, les
Etats-Unis et la Russie ont convenu de la prolonger, pour une nouvelle
période de quarante-huit heures.
Si la cessation des hostilités tient pendant une semaine, elle pourrait déboucher sur des frappes
conjointes de Moscou et de Washington contre les groupes djihadistes présents en Syrie, à savoir le
groupe Etat islamique et le Front Fatah Al-Cham – l’ex-Front Al-Nosra, qui affirme avoir coupé ses
liens avec Al-Qaida. Dans cette optique, les groupes rebelles dits modérés sont sommés de
se dissocier de cette faction, avec laquelle ils partagent, pour des raisons tactiques plus
qu’idéologiques, de nombreuses lignes de confrontation.

L’accalmie doit aussi permettre l’acheminement d’aide humanitaire dans une vingtaine
de villes assiégées en grande majorité par les troupes loyalistes, notamment la partie
orientale d’Alep, aux mains de la rébellion. Ce double processus est censé favoriser une
reprise des négociations de paix, au point mort depuis le mois de mars.
Or jeudi 15 septembre au matin, les convois d’aide, prépositionnés par les Nations unies sur la
frontière turque depuis lundi, n’avaient pas bougé d’un millimètre. Les chauffeurs de ces quarante
camions remplis de nourriture n’avaient toujours pas reçu l’ordre de faire route vers Alep, située
60 km plus à l’est. Un blocage principalement dû au refus du gouvernement syrien de garantir leur
passage sans entraves.

« Arrangements de sécurité »
Selon une source onusienne contactée par Le Monde, des « clarifications » sont également
attendues de la part de l’opposition armée. Mercredi, le secrétaire général des Nations unies, Ban
Ki-moon, a appelé les Etats-Unis et la Russie à obtenir des belligérants « les arrangements de
sécurité nécessaires » pour que ces convois puissent avancer.
L’accord de Genève ne donne au gouvernement syrien aucun droit de regard sur la délivrance d’aide
dans les quartiers rebelles d’Alep. La seule procédure exigée des Nations unies consiste à
« notifier » à Damas leur intention d’envoyer de l’assistance, conformément à la résolution 2165 du
Conseil de sécurité, en juillet 2014. Ce texte autorise la distribution d’aide en Syrie à partir de ses
pays voisins, comme la Turquie, sans requérir l’aval du gouvernement syrien. C’est ainsi que sont
ravitaillées depuis deux ans les zones tenues par l’insurrection, au nord d’Alep, le long de la
frontière turque.
Mais mardi 13 septembre, les autorités syriennes ont fait savoir qu’elles refouleraient tout convoi
dont le passage n’aurait pas été coordonné avec elles. Le trajet que les camions onusiens
doivent emprunter pour rejoindre les secteurs contrôlés par les insurgés passe par la route du
Castello, où la Russie avait installé un « poste d’observation mobile ». Jeudi aux aurores, elle était
encore sous le contrôle de combattants loyalistes. Une violation de l’accord de Genève, qui prévoit
sa « démilitarisation ».
Selon le chef du Centre russe de coordination en Syrie, le général Vladimir Savtchenko, le retrait
des troupes syriennes de cet axe était prévu jeudi à 6 heures GMT (9 heures heure locale).
A supposer que ce redéploiement soit effectif, ces forces devraient être remplacées par des
militaires russes. Moscou a dépêché des soldats sur cette route stratégique, avant même la
conclusion des négociations qui se déroulaient à Genève.
Dans un communiqué publié le 5 septembre, le ministre adjoint de la défense, Anatoli Antonov,
avait annoncé travailler « depuis un mois » à l’ouverture de « sept corridors » pour acheminer de
l’eau et de la nourriture à la population des quartiers assiégés d’Alep. Un enjeu majeur en termes
d’image pour l’armée russe, qui s’est davantage distinguée, jusque-là, par ses bombardements
massifs, dévastateurs pour les civils syriens. Au mois de juin, des soldats russes s’étaient déployés à
l’entrée de Daraya, une banlieue de Damas, pour faciliter le passage d’un convoi de nourriture, le
premier à atteindre ce bastion de l’opposition en quatre ans.
« L’identité des soldats déployés sur Castello ne nous importe pas du moment qu’ils respectent
l’indépendance des convois, réagit une source onusienne. Nos chauffeurs sont syriens. Nous devons
être certains qu’ils ne seront pas inquiétés. » L’idée de voir les soldats russes jouer aux casques
bleus fait en revanche grimacerMohamed Fadila, responsable du gouvernorat d’Alep au sein de
l’opposition : « Nous préférerions que l’ONU soit présente sur les barrages de Castello. Il ne faut
pas oublier que ce sont les Russes qui nous bombardent. »

Syria’s ceasefire - The Economist

A risky bargain

A pause to the fighting is welcome. But America may be playing into the hands of Russia and

the jihadists

AS The Economist went to press a big consignment of aid was poised to arrive in eastern Aleppo, a

Syrian city that has been under siege, off and on, for four years. It contained food, medicines, clothes—

even toys for toddlers who have lived their whole lives under the shadow of a war that is estimated to

have killed more than 400,000 people. This respite is the fruit of a deal between Russia and America on

September 10th that imposed a ceasefire across much of the country.

It appears to be holding, for now. But as with the previous cessation of hostilities in

February, this agreement may be short-lived. And by appearing to tie America to Russia’s

game plan, it may even make things worse.

After months of negotiation, John Kerry, the American secretary of state, and his Russian

counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, have put together a deal that is remarkable for what is not in it. None
of the combatants on the ground signed the pact. It falls instead to Russia to try to restrain its

ally, Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s brutal ruler, and to America to corral a multitude of rebel groups

into acquiescence. Nor, crucially, does the agreement say anything about the next steps.

All attempts to bring peace to Syria have foundered on the question of what will happen to Mr

Assad. Russia, Iran and Mr Assad himself view it as non-negotiable that he will remain in office

throughout any transitional period leading to an election, in which he intends to be a candidate.

For America, Sunni Arab states and the rebels, Mr Assad’s departure is an essential precondition

for peace. They cannot abide the prospect of a man who gases civilians and deliberately bombs

hospitals clinging to power. Stuck, Mr Kerry has fallen back on counter-terrorism: if the ceasefire

holds for a week, then America and Russia will jointly fight the jihadists of Islamic State (IS).

Anything that will hasten the end of the jihadists’ vile “caliphate” is welcome. IS is well on

the way to defeat in Syria: it has lost most of the territory it once controlled there, and its

last big stronghold, Raqqa, could fall in the next few months. In Iraq, Kurdish forces and

the Iraqi army are closing on IS’s other “capital”, Mosul. The sooner the caliphate is

destroyed, the easier it will be to deal with Islamic radicalism across the world.

A second part of the deal is riskier, however. America and Russia are also to join forces to

destroy the jihadist group that until recently called itself Jabhat al-Nusra, an offshoot of al-

Qaeda. Quite right, American voters will doubtless say: al-Qaeda was the group that felled the

twin towers. But labels can mislead. In Syria Jabhat al-Nusra has shown striking pragmatism, as

well as prowess in fighting Mr Assad (see article). In July it renamed itself “Jabhat Fatah al-

Sham” (JFS) and said it was severing its “external” links with al-Qaeda. It now hopes to merge

with other, more nationalist Syrian rebel groups. It says it has no intention of attacking the West.

Indeed, some think the West should put out feelers to JFS.

Yet al-Qaeda poses a real danger. Some of its most senior figures are gathering in Syria,

and counter-terrorism officials rightly worry that they are creating another base for jihadist

attacks on the West. But dealing with that threat requires more than just bombing JFS. The

West should give more support to moderate rebels and help establish safe zones. It needs
a credible plan to get rid of Mr Assad. Without one, it will be playing into Vladimir Putin’s

skilful hands. JFS fighters are hard to separate from other rebel groups, who will stick with

the jihadists as long as they fear Mr Assad may come back. Attacking JFS would thus be

seen as defending Syria’s dictatorship. And that would surely inspire yet more jihadism

around the world.

Russia Wants to be a Contender – Foreign Affairs

The South China Sea might be one of the most contested places on earth, but until last week, at
least, one regional player had been conspicuously absent from the fray. Russia had staked out a
precarious neutrality, maintaining a longstanding friendship with Vietnam while providing general
support for China’s regional positions. On September 12, however, the balance came into question
when Russia joined China for eight days of joint naval exercises in Chinese waters near Zhanjiang
in the south of Guangdong province, which is the headquarters for China’s South China Sea fleet.

China and Russia have held joint naval drills annually since 2012, but the Joint Sea-

2016 is the first to take place in the South China Sea. Although Russian diplomats

reportedly negotiated with their counterparts to ensure that the drills would be held in

waters that are indisputably Chinese, the eight-day exercises involved island and reef

seizure maneuvers, as well as anti-submarine operations, air defense, and naval and

air operations. Wang Hai, deputy commander of the Chinese Navy, who is directing the

Chinese fleet during these exercises, said that they were designed to enhance Sino-

Russian cooperation in countering “common security threats.”

Adding to regional worries about Russia’s motivations was the fact that Joint Sea-2016
came just after the July 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in favor of
the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea. Immediately after the ruling, the
Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement asserting Russia’s neutrality. At the
September G-20 meeting in Hangzhou, China, however, Russian President Vladimir
Putin stated that Russia stood “in solidarity with China’s position” of not recognizing
the court’s decision and opposing the interference of third parties in the South China
Sea dispute.
All the while, Russia has sought to deepen its influence in the region generally. On May
19-20, 2016, it hosted the conference marking the twentieth anniversary of Russia-
ASEAN dialogue in Sochi. The resulting declaration called for exploring cooperation
between ASEAN, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Russia also plans to institute a new eight-day visa-free regime in
its far eastern city of Vladivostok later on this year. A cosmopolitan city in the
nineteenth century, Vladivostok became the base for the Pacific fleet in the Soviet era
and was closed to foreign visitors until the early 1990s. According to Prime Minister
Dmitry Medvedev, the hope is that, by removing the visa requirement, Vladivostok will
be able to compete with other open ports in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Hong Kong
and Singapore.

To be sure, Russia’s poor business climate has limited its options for economic

influence in the region. Indeed, compared to China, Russia’s economic role in

Southeast Asia is minuscule. China is ASEAN’s largest trade partner, recording more

than $345 billion in trade with the region in 2015. Russia’s trade turnover with ASEAN

during the same period amounted to just $13 billion, declining from $22 billion in

2014. Despite hopes for achieving $100 billion in bilateral trade by 2020, Sino-Russian

trade also declined from $95 billion in 2014 to $64.2 billion in 2015, reflecting reduced

Russian purchasing power, as well as the low price of oil and China’s slowing economy.

The Sino-Russian naval drills must anger Vietnam, which top officials of both countries

claim to be Russia’s bridge to ASEAN. Although Russian trade with Vietnam remains

modest, it is the first Asian country to sign a free trade agreement with Russia’s

Eurasian Economic Union. The Russian gas monopoly Gazprom and Vietnam’s

Petrovietnam likewise have several cooperative projects, including in the Arctic.

Meanwhile, despite backing away from projects with Vietnam in areas of the South
China Sea claimed by China and refraining from overt support for the country, Russia
continues to be Vietnam’s top weapons supplier. Some of the systems Russia sells to
Vietnam are important for its effort to defend its claims in the South China Sea, and
include Kilo-class submarines, Gepard-class frigates, and Molniya fast attack crafts.
Russia’s Zelenodolsk shipyard is expected to deliver two more Gepard-class frigates to
Vietnam by the end of September, which will support Russia’s effort to maintain its
neutrality between its two Asian partners after the South China Sea exercises.

Of course, both China and Russia continue to deny that the exercises were directed at

any third parties. A spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry asserted that the drills

“were not connected with any changes in the military-political situation in the

particular region.” A Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman also described the exercises

as routine and not directed against particular states, although Wang Hai, the director

of Chinese forces in the drills, highlighted their “strategic” nature.

Even after the drills, Russia is unlikely to jettison its historically close relationship with
Vietnam for a closer alignment with China on the South China Sea. Russia has been
unable to become a full-fledged player in Asia by building on its ties with China alone,
and seeks to diversify its energy and defense partners in the region. China may not
like Russia’s relationship with Vietnam, especially their military cooperation, but with
little support in the region for China’s position on the South China Sea, the joint drills
with Russia provide at least the appearance of agreement with Chinese positions in
the South China Sea. Recent statements by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte that
his country would explore purchasing Russian and Chinese weapons and abandon joint
patrols with the U.S. in the South China Sea only make Russia’s two-track strategy
more plausible.

China’s uncannily stable growth versus the price of reform

BY S.R. | SHANGHAI

N THE pantheon of economic clichés, the concept of “short-term pain for long-term gain” is surely

a contender for top spot. It is trotted out again and again when discussing why Country X must

undertake such and such difficult reforms to reap untold benefits down the road. For those

analysing or reporting on the Chinese economy, it has become a familiar refrain. This does not

mean it is wrong; China’s old growth model of credit-fuelled investment has led to a vast

accumulation of debt and a big drop in productivity. Change is needed, even though there will be

costs. But being a cliché, it can obscure details. What exactly is this short-term pain?

To start, one thing that should be clear: China has so far felt little in the way of pain.

Although some regions, especially the north-east, have endured a tough few years, China

has kept defaults to a minimum and held its credit spigot wide open. Thanks in large part

to that, the economy grew 6.7% in the third quarter from a year earlier, according to data

published today. This marks the first time in China’s modern economic history (ie, since

detailed quarterly records began in 1992) that it has turned in identical year-on-year

growth rates for three consecutive quarters. That is uncanny tranquillity for a $10 trillion

economy which is supposed to be going through a wrenching transition from heavy

industries to modern services.

In nominal terms, the trend looks even better. Annual growth actually rebounded, from a

shade less than 6% in third quarter last year to 7.8% over the past three months. The

precise size of the rebound is open to debate, but there is enough in the way of alternative

indicators to lend credence to the picture of a rebound. Property sales are booming;

corporate earnings have strengthened; prices of goods as they leave the factory gate have

started rising after more than four years of deflation. Little wonder that investors’ concerns
about China have subsided since the start of the year.

Yet beneath the surface, risks from the debt build-up continue to mount. Total credit has

grown roughly 16% this year, twice as fast as nominal growth, meaning that the economy

is still leveraging up at a rapid pace. The rise in China’s debt-to-GDP level—from roughly

150% before the 2008 global financial crisis to more than 250% today—puts it in the same

league as countries such as Spain and Japan that went on to suffer serious slowdowns or

financial turmoil.

Hence the calls for short-term pain to avoid long-term pain. What that means in general

terms might seem evident: China should trade lower economic growth today for slower

debt accumulation, reducing the chances of a crisis. But that general statement does not

take the analysis very far. Done hastily or heavy-handedly, a slowdown in debt

accumulation could bring about the very crisis it is meant to defuse. Clichés can be

dangerous, not just dull.

A new working paper by the International Monetary Fund is particularly good in outlining

what “short-term pain” might involve. The IMF has been among the loudest of voices in

warning about China’s debt risks. But it also takes a very measured tone in assessing

what can be done.

Let's be realistic

The IMF contrasts a purist market approach with a government-led solution. The virtue of

a market approach is that it would be transparent, laying the foundations for better

allocation of credit in the future. But it is also susceptible to extreme volatility, even in the

most sophisticated of economies. In China’s case, the IMF argues that it is just not

realistic. The biggest creditors are state-owned banks and the biggest debtors are state-

owned companies. They are too cosy with one another and cannot shift to market rules

overnight.

Instead, the IMF says that a high-level decision is needed to address debt problems, and
quickly. Rather than leaving creditors and debtors to sort out their mess by themselves,

financial regulators should participate alongside them. This is more likely to produce a

disciplined, consistent solution across different sectors of the economy. To that end, China

also needs standards for triage in determining which companies are viable. The IMF

argues that, for one thing, banks need to come clean about their true bad-loan levels

(officially, less than 2% of loans are non-performing; the IMF estimates that about 15% of

corporate loans are at risk).

But it is not just bitter medicine. Removing implicit guarantees on the debts of state-owned

companies is, for instance, bound to hurt. Rather that doing it all at once, the IMF suggests

that China start from newly issued products rather than bonds that are already trading. It

also sees plenty of scope for the central government to step up support for laid-off

workers. Municipalities manage unemployment insurance, providing little, if any, coverage

for the 200m migrants who work in places where they are not registered to live. And by

opening up sectors such as telecommunications and energy to private investors, China

should be able to generate more productivity growth.

China is already moving on some of these fronts. Notably, regulators have started co-

ordinating debt-for-equity swaps to trim the liabilities of state firms. However, judging by

the continued drift upward in debt levels, it is still moving far from fast enough.

What is perhaps most striking of all is the price that the IMF puts on “short-term pain”. It

reckons that, if implemented, the array of reforms would cut growth to about 6% next year,

followed by a long stretch of annual growth of 6.5%. Inaction, by contrast, would allow for

stronger growth next year but then lead to a steady decline to as low as 3% by 2020.

These are of course just estimates. But the message ought to embolden China’s

reformers: short-term pain need not be unbearably painful.

El Acordo de París
Reglamentos

Al margen de estas incertidumbres políticas en EE UU, el pacto de París

está aún por desarrollarse. "El acuerdo solo establece los parámetros
generales", explica Giannina Santiago, asesora del Grupo de Trabajo
Especial sobre el Acuerdo de París de la ONU. "El acuerdo es una ley
general y ahora falta el reglamento que la desarrolle", añade.
Y el desarrollo de ese reglamento marcará si finalmente el acuerdo es un
éxito o un fracaso. "Ahora falta determinar cómo se presenta la
información sobre los recortes de emisiones, las características, el año que
se toma como base, los sectores que se incluyen. Eso está todavía en
discusión y son unas 30 tareas pendientes", subraya Santiago. En la
cumbre del clima que el próximo lunes se abre en Marrakech se empezará
a abordar este asunto, que se espera que pueda estar cerrado en un plazo
de dos años.
Esfuerzos insuficientes
El Acuerdo de París se fija como meta que, en 2100, el aumento medio de
la temperatura del planeta se quede por muy por debajo de los dos grados
centígrados respecto a los niveles preindustriales (siglo XIX). Para ello, se
apuesta por los recortes de las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero
de todos los firmantes del pacto, que empezarán a aplicarse a partir de
2020. Pero es cada país el que voluntariamente se pone su meta de
reducción. No hay sanciones en caso de incumplimiento.
El Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente (PNUMA) ha
recordado este jueves que los esfuerzos que los Estados han puesto sobre
la mesa en sus contribuciones nacionales no son suficientes. Para 2030, si
se quiere cumplir con la meta de los dos grados, sería necesario que las
emisiones mundiales de estos gases fueran de unas 42 gigatoneladas
anuales. Sin embargo, con la aplicación de los planes nacionales
presentados hasta ahora en 2030 el mundo emitiría entre 54 y 56
gigatoneladas. Por eso el PNUMA señala que "hace falta recortar un 25%
adicional". Si no, el aumento de la temperatura a final de siglo estará
entre los 2,9 y los 3,4 grados, lejos de la meta fijada en el Acuerdo de
París.
Los países firmantes del pacto son conscientes de esta brecha. En el
acuerdo se reconoce que en 2030 se emitirán 15 gigatoneladas de
más (una gigatonelada equivale a las emisiones de todo el transporte de
la Unión Europea, incluido el sector aéreo, durante un año). Por eso, el
pacto fija revisionesperiódicas de los compromisos nacionales hasta
alcanzar la reducción necesaria. Si se consigue limitar el incremento de la
temperatura por debajo de los dos grados "se reducirá la probabilidad de
que se registren tormentas más intensas, sequías más prolongadas, el
aumento del nivel del mar y otros efectos climáticos", recuerda el PNUMA.

Impasse nas negociações sobre

mudança climática

A análise dos resultados obtidos nas sucessivas Conferências das Partes, a partir da COP-1,

realizada em Berlim, em 1995, demonstra bem as dificuldades. Há três fases que podem ser

notadas:[26]

a) A primeira, mais ativa, representou a busca de ações mais enérgicas e efetivas para a mitigação
do efeito estufa.
Na COP-1 foi definido que seria elaborado um protocolo ou instrumento com comprometimento
legal entre as partes que tornasse oficial a questão, sendo fixado prazo até 1997. Mas nessa
mesma COP foi definido o “princípio da responsabilidade comum, mas diferenciada”, segundo
o qual os países desenvolvidos deveriam tomar as iniciativas de reduzir suas emissões, excluindo
os demais dos compromissos em função da necessidade do desenvolvimento e redução da
pobreza.
A COP-2, em Genebra, não trouxe grandes novidades, enquanto na
COP-3, em Kyoto, foi adotado o Protocolo que estabelecia o compromisso dos países
desenvolvidos (listados no Anexo I) de reduzirem, até 2012, 5,2% das suas emissões de gases de
efeito estufa em relação aos níveis de 1990;
b) A segunda, marcada pela preparação da entrada em vigor do Protocolo de Kyoto (que só
aconteceria em 2005, sendo exigida a adesão de 55 países, englobando as partes incluídas no
Anexo I responsáveis por 55% das emissões em 1990), desenvolveu-se nas COPs 3, 4, 5 e 6, sendo
necessário convocar uma segunda rodada da COP-6 (a chamada COP-6,5, realizada em Bonn em
julho de 2001) para fazer concessões em relação ao Protocolo de Kyoto e evitar o seu fracasso
total, após a renúncia dos Estados Unidos. A COP-7, realizada em Marrakesh, em
outubro/novembro de 2001, adotou novos acordos, aceitando mecanismos de flexibilização
para garantir que o Protocolo pudesse entrar em vigor. Embora tenha crescido a participação das
partes e de organizações não governamentais (167 países e 213 ONGs e organizações
intergovernamentais, com 4.352 pessoas, estiveram na COP-8, e 180 países na COP-9), não houve
grandes avanços. A COP-10, ocorrida em Buenos Aires, em 2004, com 200 países presentes e 6 mil
participantes, foi marcada pela adesão russa ao Protocolo de Kyoto, e a certeza de que ele
entraria em vigor em fevereiro de 2005;
c) A terceira, já com o Protocolo de Kyoto em vigor, arrasta-se ao longo de quase dez anos,
enquanto as metas e mecanismos ali estabelecidos não são cumpridos e desenvolvidos. Na COP-
11 começa-se a discutir o que deveria acontecer após o final da primeira fase de Kyoto, a expirar
em 2012, tema que continua em debate nas COP-12 e COP-13. Nesta última conferência, realizada
em Bali, em 2007, não foram estabelecidas metas de redução de gases de efeito estufa, mas foi
definido um Plano de Ação visando à COP-15, em Copenhague, na qual havia a esperança de um
acordo. A COP-14 foi apenas a transição e consolidação das expectativas, que acabaram
frustradas em dezembro de 2009, quando ocorreu a COP-15. Ela atraiu a atenção mundial,
reunindo 115 líderes mundiais e um público sem precedentes de 40 mil pessoas, mas não
produziu nenhum tratado legalmente vinculante, e o Acordo de Copenhague, documento
resultante do encontro, sequer foi adotado, em função do veto de um pequeno grupo de países
liderado por Bolívia, Sudão e Venezuela. A COP-16 foi marcada pelo anúncio de que Japão,
Canadá e Rússia não participariam da segunda etapa do Protocolo de Kyoto, fato confirmado
na COP-17, quando estes países anunciaram que não apresentariam metas de redução para o
próximo período, isentando-se de quaisquer compromissos. O ponto positivo foi a aprovação de
um roteiro, proposto pela União Europeia, para um novo acordo global legalmente vinculante
para a redução de emissões de gases de efeito estufa, e aplicável aos países desenvolvidos e
em desenvolvimento. O problema foi o prazo estabelecido: o tratado somente será assinado em
2015, entrando em vigor em 2020. A COP-18 prorrogou o Protocolo de Kyoto até 2020,
garantindo sua sobrevivência como o único instrumento legal internacional que obriga a limitação
das emissões, mas bastante enfraquecido, sem contar com Japão, Rússia, Canadá e Nova
Zelândia (além dos EUA, que nunca o ratificaram), e implicando que os países que se
comprometeram a reduzir emissões nesse segundo período – 2013-2020 – representam apenas
15% do total. A COP-19, realizada em Varsóvia, em 2013, foi marcada por conflitos entre os
países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento quanto à redução das emissões de gases de efeito
estufa, ocasião em que os países emergentes, notadamente a China e Índia, responsabilizaram os
países industrializados pelos problemas climáticos e reivindicaram o seu direito ao
desenvolvimento. Em função do impasse generalizado na Conferência, houve um fato inusitado:
as ONGs presentes se retiraram no penúltimo dia do encontro em protesto contra a lentidão e a
falta de progresso nas negociações.
A Conferência das Partes de Lima, em 2014, COP-20, terminou com um acordo fraco, no qual
quase tudo com que os países se comprometem é vago, desarrumado e voluntário, segundo a
jornalista Daniela Chiaretti, que cobriu o encontro.[27] O documento que resultou do encontro,
“Chamado de Lima para a Ação sobre o Clima”, aponta para quatro pontos principais: 1) os países
industrializados concordam que sua responsabilidade pelos cortes de CO2 é maior, mas isso
não significa que os países em desenvolvimento não devem fazer nada: pela primeira vez
todos terão que apresentar metas de cortes de emissões; 2) tais promessas devem ser
informadas até março de 2015, com o compromisso de apresentar planos e ações para conter
o aquecimento após 2030, mas não foram estabelecidos parâmetros e padrões para tais metas; 3)
além do corte de CO2, os países deverão ter metas de adaptação ao aquecimento global; 4) a
pedido dos países africanos, foi mencionada a questão das “perdas e danos”, que significa que os
países ricos devem oferecer compensações a países que sofrem impactos do aquecimento global,
como tempestades e secas mais frequentes.[28]
Continuou, entretanto, aberta a questão mais importante relativa ao documento a ser firmado na
COP-21. Será ele um mero acordo de intenções ou constituirá um tratado internacional com força
de lei, obrigando as partes a cumpri-lo? Enquanto isso, prosseguiu o impasse em torno dos
compromissos do corte das emissões. O secretário de Estado dos EUA, John Kerry, deixou claro
em seu pronunciamento no encontro que as nações desenvolvidas precisam liderar o processo de
redução, mas isso não significa que os países em desenvolvimento, que são responsáveis por
metade das emissões de carbono no planeta, possam produzir CO2 à vontade.[29] Na mesma
linha, o comissário europeu para mudança climática e energia na Conferência, Miguel Arias
Cañete, deixou claro que a Europa também não aceita a divisão do mundo que originou o
Protocolo de Kyoto, no qual só os países ricos tinham metas de corte de gases de efeito estufa.
[30]
Permaneceram dois pontos fundamentais de divergência, sem nenhuma perspectiva de solução:
como diferenciar os países no próximo acordo, e como as contribuições devem ser organizadas,
definindo se devem incluir objetivos de redução das emissões ou se também devem listar metas
de adaptação ao aquecimento global, passando ainda pelas contribuições financeiras.

Reuters:

The United States has joined China to formally ratify the Paris agreement to curb climate-warming emissions, the world's two

biggest economies said on Saturday, which could help put the pact into force before the end of the year.

U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping

submitted their plan to join the agreement to U.N. Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon, who is in China to witness the announcement.

Senior Obama adviser Brian Deese said the joint declaration should
push other countries to formally join the agreement.

Latin America and China

A golden opportunity

China’s president ventures into Donald Trump’s backyard

GEOPOLITICS waits for no man, not even the United States’ president-elect. Little more
than a week after Donald Trump’s victory, Xi Jinping, president of the world’s
second-largest economy, set off for Latin America—his third trip there since
 2013—clutching a sheaf of trade deals. They were proposed long before the
change of government in Washington. But at a time when the image of the big,
bad yanqui seems to be making a comeback, Mr Xi may find himself with an
opportunity to boost Chinese influence in the American backyard.

China’s aims in the region are expansive. In 2015 it signed a slew of agreements with

Latin American countries promising to double bilateral trade to $500bn within ten years

and to increase the total stock of investment between them from $85bn-100bn to $250bn.

China also wants good relations in order to diversify its sources of energy, to find new

markets for its infrastructure companies and to project power, both soft and military, in the

western hemisphere.

But Mr Xi, whose itinerary takes him to Ecuador, Peru and Chile, will have to work hard for

these gains. After a long period of rising trade and closer relations, many Latin American

countries are having second thoughts about their embrace of China. Exports from the

region (plus the Caribbean) shrank last year, largely because Chinese economic growth

slowed. China’s exports fell by less, so Latin America’s trade deficit with the country

increased (see chart).

Four raw materials—copper, iron, oil and soyabeans—

account for three-quarters of the region’s exports
to China, a greater share than they do of trade
with the rest of the world. But the impact on
employment is slight. A study by Boston University
found that trade with China generated 17% fewer
jobs per dollar’s-worth of exports than did trade
with other countries.

Almost all imports from China are cheap manufactures. Some Latin American
economists argue that Chinese subsidies to their producers undermine domestic
industries. A new study published by the Atlantic Council, a think-tank in Washington,
concludes that Chinese exports “have had an effect on the region’s
 deindustrialisation”. As for China’s push to invest in infrastructure and natural
resources, “that won’t give us the quality jobs we need,” said Rebecca Grynspan, the
secretary-general of the Ibero-American Community, which comprises Spain,
Portugal and Latin America, at a seminar in Santiago last week.

As Latin American expectations are changing, so too is the pattern of Chinese investment. In
2010-13, 90% of it went to natural resources. Recent investments have branched
out. In September this year China’s State Grid bought a 23% stake in CPFL, a
Brazilian energy utility, for $1.8bn. WTorre, a Brazilian construction company, signed
a deal with China Communications and Construction Company International to build
a port in Maranhão, a north-eastern state. Chinese financial firms are getting
involved. Fosun, an investment company, recently bought a controlling stake in Rio
Bravo, an asset manager in São Paulo. Last year Bank of Communications bought
80% of BBM, a Brazilian lender, for 525m reais ($174m).

China has its own reasons for wanting change. Many of its biggest trade deals have been

with left-wing governments, which initially saw China as an anti-imperialist sugar daddy.

Chinese loans over the past decade have fed that expectation. They went mainly to four

countries that had left-leaning governments for most of the period: Venezuela, Brazil,

Argentina and Ecuador. Now China worries that bankrupt Venezuela, which hews

doggedly to self-destructive populism, may not repay its debts. And it wants to improve its

standing with new, business-friendly governments in Argentina and Brazil.

To dispel the notion that it is mainly a friend of the left, China is offering free-trade

agreements (FTAs) with more open economies. It already has such deals with Peru, Chile

and Costa Rica. Last year China’s prime minister, Li Keqiang, went to Colombia to talk

about one. On his trip this month Mr Xi wants to expand the FTA that China signed with

Chile in 2005. In October Uruguay’s president, Tabaré Vázquez, went to China to talk

about an FTA. That prompted the other members of Mercosur, a four-nation trading block

led by Brazil, to consider joint efforts to reach a group-wide trade agreement with China.

The death of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), from which Mr Trump has said he will

withdraw, may also prove an opportunity. China is hoping to use a meeting in Peru of 21
Pacific Rim economies to boost the prospects of its TPP-alternative, the Regional

Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which includes India and Japan, but not the United

States.

Luckily for China, Latin America’s recent turn to the political centre implies greater

pragmatism rather than hostility to the People’s Republic. It has made Brazil and Argentina

more open to trade and investment, reckons Alicia Bárcena, the head of the UN’s

Economic Commission for Latin America. “So if the Chinese are ready to invest, it should

be easier for them.”

Mr Xi is not just interested in commerce. In his speech to Brazil’s congress in 2014 he

talked about a new “strategic partnership”. This time, says Oliver Stuenkel of Fundação

Getulio Vargas, a Brazilian university, Mr Xi “will project himself as a stabiliser”, which will

do no harm when many leaders are fearful about what a Trump presidency might bring.

Chinese experts on Latin America scoff at the notion that China has geopolitical interests

there. But it is hard to believe that it does not welcome the idea of having friends in the

United States’ historical sphere of influence to match America’s allies in East and South-

East Asia. A bonus is that 12 of Taiwan’s 22 allies are in Latin America and the Caribbean.

So good relations between China and the region could chip away at Taiwan’s claim to

some form of independent status.

In 2015, the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, then president of Argentina,

signed a $1bn agreement to buy Chinese fighter jets and ocean-going patrol vessels. The

agreement took China’s arms sales on the continent into a new league (until then, except

in Venezuela, they had been mostly small scale). She also approved a deal giving the

Chinese the right to build a satellite-tracking station in Argentina. After criticising the

arrangement before his election in November 2015, the new president, Mauricio Macri,

has given it the go-ahead.

The base is in Neuquén province in Patagonia. Yu Xueming, the project’s manager, says

the site has no military purpose and is designed as part of a lunar mission to be launched

in 2017. But satellite experts say its parabolic antennae could have military uses, too. The

facility’s operator is a unit of the People’s Liberation Army, the name for all of China’s

military services. The site is due to become operational next March.

China, it seems, is in Latin America for the long haul. And while it is there, it can keep one

eye on the neighbouring giant to the north.

Défense : Merkel envoie un signal aux Etats-Unis

La chancelière veut consacrer 2 % du PIB au budget de la défense. Après l’élection de Donald

Trump, Berlin s’oblige à jouer un plus grand rôle international.

LE MONDE

Deux fois plus d’argent pour la Bundeswehr. Mercredi 23 novembre, trois jours après avoir
annoncé qu’elle briguerait un quatrième mandat à l’occasion des élections
législatives de septembre 2017, Angela Merkel a déclaré que l’Allemagne devait
augmenter ses dépenses en matière de défense afin qu’elles atteignent 2 % de son
PIB, conformément aux objectifs assignés aux Etats membres de l’OTAN. « Notre
budget de défense montre que nous ne sommes pas parvenus au niveau où nous
devrions être du point de vue des attentes de nos partenaires de l’OTAN », a affirmé
la chancelière devant le Bundestag.

L’Allemagne consacre aujourd’hui 34 milliards d’euros par an à sa défense. Cela représente 1,2 %
de son PIB. Un pourcentage qui la place au 16e rang parmi les 28 Etats membres de l’OTAN. A titre
de comparaison, la France et le Royaume-Uni consacrent respectivement 1,8 % et 2,2 % de leur PIB
à leur budget militaire. Les Etats-Unis, eux, lui consacrent 3,6 % de leur PIB.

Au Bundestag, Mme Merkel a reconnu que porter de 34 à 60 milliards d’euros le budget annuel de
l’armée allemande était un objectif peu réaliste à court terme.« Je sais qu’il reste du chemin à
parcourir pour parvenir [aux 2 %], et je ne peux pas faire la promesse que nous y parviendrons
dans un avenir proche », a-t-elle admis. « Mais nous devons clairement montrer que nous visons cet
objectif et que nous voulons l’atteindre », a-t-elle poursuivi.
What to Watch at the Climate Conference in Marrakech

Global climate diplomacy has advanced swiftly over the past year. In December 2015, 195
countries signed the Paris Agreement on climate change, and for the first time, nearly every
single country in the world announced a plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Now that
countries accounting for a majority of the world’s emissions have ratified it, the Paris agreement
is set to become international law on November 4, which would make it one of the fastest
entries into force of any global agreement. Diplomats scored a third success in October,
agreeing to amend the Montreal Protocol to phase out hydrofluorocarbons, greenhouse gases
commonly used in air conditioners and refrigerators, over the next decade.

Negotiators will now try to extend their momentum in Marrakech, Morocco, the site of the
twenty-second Conference of the Parties (COP22) to the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change. The stakes for the November conference are high: negotiators in Marrakech
will need to build on the broad vision established in Paris by hashing out the unresolved nitty
gritty. That could prove difficult. Negotiators in Paris forged consensus around the abstract idea
of each country doing its best to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. As countries try to turn
abstract principles into concrete steps in Marrakech, old tensions between developed and
developing countries could reemerge.

Negotiators will likely clash over how to implement two particular goals set by the Paris
Agreement. First, although in Paris developed countries reaffirmed a previous pledge to set up a
fund of at least $100 billion a year to help developing countries reduce their emissions and adapt
to climate change, countries still disagree over where the climate finance should come from and
how it should be counted. Second, there are major differences over how to ensure that countries
live up to, and ultimately exceed, their pledges in Paris to curb emissions. Developed countries
want a strict system of standardized procedures for reporting and verifying emissions reductions,
as well as rigorous periodic reviews in which every country sets ever more ambitious goals.
Developing countries prefer a less standardized framework based on the principle of
differentiated responsibility.

The best outcome for the climate would be for developing countries to prevail on the first issue—
by securing tangible financial commitments from the rest of the world—while conceding to a
standardized process that ensures that countries meet and exceed their emissions targets. But
barring a diplomatic breakthrough, such an outcome is unlikely.

Still, whatever the substance of the Marrakech talks, countries are likely to claim success, as they
did in Paris. And they wouldn’t necessarily be wrong. Outside of formal negotiations,
conventions like Marrakech also advance climate action by facilitating informal diplomacy and
convening nongovernmental actors. This feeds the groundswell of popular concern over climate
change and makes it more likely that governments will make increasingly ambitious investments
in confronting climate change.
From Top-Down to Bottom-Up

Diplomats in Paris broke through longstanding gridlock by abandoning the traditional top-down
approach in international climate negotiations. Previous talks had focused on how to fairly divide
the burden of reducing emissions among countries. But with countries unable to agree on an
equitable way to share responsibilities, this approach doomed the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the
overhyped 2009 Copenhagen summit. Developing countries like China and India insisted that
they were neither historically responsible for climate change nor capable of deploying expensive
clean energy sources without slowing their economic development. Conversely, developed
countries like the United States balked at shouldering the entire burden alone.

Recognizing that no top-down allocation of responsibility would break the logjam, negotiators in
Paris adopted a bottom-up approach. In the run-up to the summit, countries submitted
voluntary plans to curb emissions known as “intended nationally determined
contributions,” or INDCs. At the summit, all negotiators had to do was conclude an
agreement enjoining countries to accomplish the targets they had already pledged. Yet the
voluntary nature of the process resulted in INDCs that, taken together, will not limit global
warming to the 2 degrees Celsius threshold enshrined in the Paris Agreement. The hope is that
the first round of INDCs set a precedent for countries to periodically ratchet up their ambitions
so that the bottom-up approach eventually yields commitments in line with what the top-down
approach had hoped to achieve.

The bottom-up approach made it much easier to forge consensus. A group of countries calling
themselves the High-Ambition Coalition—developed countries including Canada, Norway, and
the United States, as well as some developing countries in the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa,
Latin America, and the Pacific—brought the historically separate camps of developed and
developing countries closer together. And even though the world’s largest emitter, China, was
unsympatheticto the coalition’s rhetoric, it played a crucial role in brokering the Paris
Agreement: its joint pledge with the United States in 2014 broke the tradition of developing
countries refusing to commit to their own emissions reductions.

Still, the historical friction between developed and developing countries has not dissolved
completely. Throughout the Paris summit, countries including China and India pushed to
include references in the final agreement to “common but differentiated responsibility” between
the two camps, sometimes successfully. Meanwhile, some disagreements were only resolved by
resorting to ambiguous language, which negotiators in Marrakech will need to turn into concrete
rules.

The $100 Billion Question

One agenda item is agreeing on the details of a provision in the Paris Agreement for developed
countries to mobilize at least $100 billion per year in climate finance for developing countries by
2020. What exactly that means is far from clear. Developed countries first promised to mobilize
“climate finance to help developing countries tackle climate change” to jumpstart the floundering
2009 summit in Copenhagen and later codified it in the Paris Agreement. Negotiators in
Marrakech will have to grapple with disagreements over who should pay into these funds, how to
tally them, and how they should be used.

he United States and European Union contend that the distinction between developed and
developing countries has blurred since climate negotiations began decades ago. In particular,
U.S. and EU negotiators have called for rapidly developing countries like Brazil, China, and
India to contribute more to climate finance, in line with their growing prosperity. While some of
these countries, most notably China, have made pledges, most in the group believe that
they should not be obligated to provide climate finance.

The two camps must also reach a consensus on how to count the funds. Developed countries
were careful to insist that the provision refer to “mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety
of sources, instruments, and channels” so that they could count private-sector financing, such as
loans made by an American company to develop a solar project in India, toward the $100 billion
total. Using this methodology, Australia and the United Kingdom last month released a
report projecting that the developed world is broadly on track to meet that $100 billion target.
Developing countries counter that the target should primarily be met with government grants
and other development assistance. They argue that it would be difficult to ascertain whether
market-rate loans would still flow without public sector support. Under the developing countries’
accounting method, the developed world is only on track to achieve 15 percent of its 2020 goal. If
it misses that goal, all bets are off, because many developing countries made their INDCs
contingent on receiving climate finance.

Finally, countries are likely to contest the proper use of these funds. Developing countries would
prefer financial assistance to flow through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), an organization set up
in 2010 to disburse climate finance, because of its commitment to equal financing for adaptation
and mitigation efforts. (Mitigation refers to steps to avoid or reduce climate change; adaptation
refers to preparations for withstanding the potential effects of climate change.) The developing
countries that are most vulnerable to the immediate effects of climate change criticize the lack of
funding for adaptation projects like the construction of storm-resistant infrastructure. However,
developed countries have committed mostly to financing mitigation—most often the
deployment of clean energy to displace fossil fuels and reduce emissions—because such projects
are easier for the private sector to finance and more effective, per dollar, at reducing the fallout
from climate change. Though developed countries have contributed $10 billion to the GCF, the
fund only accounts for a small fraction of climate finance flows.

It is unlikely that negotiators in Marrakech will close the gap between these positions, so expect
developing countries to decry the developed world for failing to pony up public cash to make
good on its climate finance pledge.

The Paris Agreement in Review

Whereas financial flows are the issue that will most animate developing countries, a bevy of
arcane details about the review processes written into the agreement will preoccupy negotiators
from developed countries. These include measures for reporting emissions, “global stocktaking”
of climate plans, and compliance oversight. Unsurprisingly, the specifics will expose another gulf
between the two camps.

First, developed countries want all countries to report their emissions each year in a
standardized and detailed format that is available for the world to see. To ensure that these
reports are accurate, countries like the United States prefer to entrust a third-party watchdog
agency with verifying that all countries are making good on their INDC pledges. Moreover,
transparent emissions reporting would allow a variety of third-party groups to evaluate a
country’s progress. By contrast, developing countries, concerned about their technical and
financial limitations, prefer to be subject to less stringent reporting requirements and want no
external reviewers double-checking their reports.

Second, countries will differ over the particulars of the global “stocktake” process, in which
countries conduct a comprehensive review of their climate action plan every five years and
determine whether they ought to raise the ambition of their individual INDC. Developing
countries contend that they may not have the technical capacity to conduct rigorous emissions
reviews every five years to identify opportunities to do even more. Developed countries insist
that ratcheting up efforts to curb emissions every five years is the only way to close the gap
between today’s insufficient INDCs and the strong ones that will be needed to limit climate
change. Though developing countries are comfortable with the current voluntary framework of
INDCs, they may chafe at future pressure from developed countries to offer increasingly
ambitious plans.

An ‘Unmitigated’ Success
Even if negotiators at Marrakech make limited progress hashing out the details of the Paris
Agreement, the summit could succeed in other ways. Summits like these offer informal venues
for countries to make bilateral agreements, like the China-U.S. climate announcement made on
the sidelines of the 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. They also bring together
civil society and the private sector from around the world, energizing them to return home and
galvanize popular support for climate action.

That means that so long as countries keep coming to the table to negotiate, it will become
increasingly difficult for leaders to pass the buck on climate action. A remarkable outcome from
last year’s Paris summit was the emergence of a new international norm that every country
should participate in the climate process. In Marrakech, countries will try to maintain the
momentum generated in Paris. As a result, they’re likely to report back a mission accomplished,
leaving the door open for more tangible breakthroughs at future summits.