Solipsismo, Solido e Finitude

Algumas lies de Strawson, Wittgenstein e Cavell sobre metafsica e mtodo filos fico

$niversidade Federal do %io #rande do Sul *nstituto de Filosofia e Ci+ncias ,umanas "rograma de " s-#raduao em Filosofia

Solipsismo, Solido e Finitude

Algumas lies de Strawson, Wittgenstein e Cavell sobre metafsica e mtodo filos fico
!ese apresentada ao "rograma de " s #raduao em Filosofia da $niversidade Federal do %io #rande do Sul como re&uisito parcial ' obteno do grau de (outor em Filosofia)

23nadas !ec4io

5rientador6 (r) "aulo Francisco 7strella Faria Co-5rientador6 (r) Step4en 8ul4all "orto Alegre - %S .ovembro de /001

9 23nadas !ec4io /001

Para Karina

Agradecimentos
$ma alegao &ue ser; recorrente neste estudo &ue seres finitos esto permanentemente su<eitos ' ameaa da solido) Feli=mente, contudo, foram poucos os momentos em &ue tive de enfrentar >no-filosoficamente? essa ameaa durante o tempo em &ue trabal4ei no pro<eto &ue culminou com o presente te@to) (evo isso ao apoio, ' compreenso e ' ami=ade de um imenso nAmero de pessoas, e sou grato a todas elas) 7ntretanto, dadas as limitaes de min4a mem ria, s serei capa= de recordar de um pe&ueno subcon<unto de nomes a&ui, por isso peo 's pessoas mencionadas abai@o &ue representem as demais) Fao &uesto de comear e@pressando min4a gratido pelo inestim;vel apoio do amigo, mestre, e orientador, "aulo Faria, &ue tem sido um e@emplo no apenas de professor e de fil sofo, mas tambm em muitas outras esferas >e@tra-acad+micas? da vida) .o &ue tange mais especificamente ao seu papel fundamental para a reali=ao do presente estudo, gostaria de agradecer pelo di;logo e pelo incentivo contnuos, pela paci+ncia com ideias embrion;rias ou subdesenvolvidasB&ue por muitas ve=es ele foi o primeiro a ler ou ouvir, e &ue <amais teriam florescido sem seu au@lioBpela crtica sempre certeira, aberta e construtiva, pelas preciosas indicaes bibliogr;ficas, liter;rias, culturais e cinematogr;ficas, e pelos numerosos e cuidadosos coment;rios 's v;rias verses do material &ue originou as sees e captulos do presente te@to) !ambm sou muito grato ao professor Step4en 8ul4all, &ue supervisionou meu est;gio de doutorado na $niversidade de 5@ford, e foi e@tremamente solcito desde o incio do processo &ue culminou com a concesso de uma bolsa CA"7S) 5 apoio prestado por ele &uando c4eguei a 5@ford foi imprescindvel, assim como as lies &ue aprendi participando de um semin;rio sobre Wittgenstein presidido por ele, e discutindo verses anteriores dos dois primeiros captulos desta tese, &ue foram gestados em uma forma recon4ecivelmente similar ' presente durante o perodo em &ue l; pes&uisei) Agradeo tambm ao professor 2o4n ,Cman pela gentil acol4ida, e pelo tempo dispendido na leitura e discusso de uma verso anterior de meu primeiro captulo) Aos membros de min4a banca de &ualificao, Andr Dlaudat e %ogrio "assos Severo, agradeo, em primeiro lugar, por terem aceitado o convite >algo repentino? para ler uma verso prvia desta tese, assim como pela an;lise cuidadosaBfeita em um curto espao de

E tempoBe pelas crticas e sugestes apresentadas no dia da pr-defesa) Fi= o possvel para levar seus coment;rios em considerao na reviso final deste te@to, mas, dadas as circunstFncias, tive de dei@ar algumas discordFncias de fundo simplesmente intocadas) 7las permanecero na min4a agenda de refle@es futuras) Aos professores das disciplinas &ue cursei durante o doutorado no curso de " s #raduao em Filosofia da $F%#S, agradeo pelas valiosas lies, cu<os ecos podero ser recon4ecidos em alguns conte@tos) Alm dos supracitados "aulo Faria e Andr Dlaudat, gostaria de registrar min4a gratido para com os professores 2aime "arera %ebello e 2oo Carlos Grum !orres) *gualmente importantes foram as disciplinas &ue cursei em 5@ford, devido ' gentile=a dos>as? professores>as? &ue me aceitaram como aluno ouvinteBdentre eles>as?, alm dos <; citados Step4en 8ul4all e 2o4n ,Cman, tambm A) Avramides, D) 8orris, C) Gesson, %oger Scruton, #) HocI, () Came, 7) ,arcourt, e 2) #aiger) Aos>'s? colegas da lista de discusso (adaseCn, agradeo pelos variados e instrutivos di;logos virtuais, incluindo os muitos em &ue participei apenas como espectador, e tambm pela a<uda com os >no infre&uentes? pedidos de bibliografia) 8eu maior dbito filos fico para com os amigos Ale@andre .oron4a 8ac4ado, Csar Sc4irmer dos Santos, Fabian (omingues, Flavio Williges, #iovani #odoC Felice, e %ogrio "assos Severo, &ue leram e comentaram o material &ue acabou compondo diferentes sees e captulos desta tese) Aos alunos &ue, durante os dois anos em &ue trabal4ei como professor substituto no (epartamento de Filosofia da $F%#S, ouviram pacientemente >ou nem tanto? 's min4as e@posies, e sobretudo aos &ue contriburam >com suas perguntas, acenos de cabea, boce<os, e todo tipo de rico feedback audiovisual disponvel no ambiente de uma sala de aula? sou grato pela preciosa oportunidade de poder e@pressar e discutir aberta e livremente muitos dos problemas, &uestes, 4ip teses e respostas &ue acabaram, por ve=es imprevisivelmente, informando o presente te@to) Agradeo tambm aos professores Alfredo Carlos StorcI e Slvia Altmann pelas dicas e pelo apoio prestado durante esse perodo) Agradeo ' gentil acol4ida dos amigos >e JlandlordsK? (avid DennedC e Dat<a ,orsc4 em 5@ford, bem como aos demais amigos &ue por l; fi=Bem particular C4uanfei C4in >com &uem discuti muitos temas cavellianos e wittgensteinianos? 7lisa Caldarola, e #abriele

L 8eloni) Sou especialmente grato ao amigo Agenor ,ent= da Silva 2r), &ue me recebeu na *nglaterra e me acompan4ou durante alguns dos momentos >e@tra-acad+micos? mais memor;veis &ue por l; passei) Alm deste, agradeo tambm aos vel4os e bons amigos de todos os momentos >particularmente dos momentos no-filos ficos?) (entre esses, agradeo especialmente aos &ue estiveram mais pr @imos durante estes Altimos &uatro anos e meio, e com os &uais pude compartil4arBou es&uecerBum pouco de min4as preocupaes acad+micas6 Art4ur "oc4mann 8ulinari, Fabricio Gordignon, (aniel !ec4io, #ilson #iuriatti, 2ovani Savaris, 8arcelo #iovano da Silva, 8arcio "rovenci, 8arcos Gordignon, 8ic4el 8aCa Aranalde, "riscilla !esc4 Spinelli, %onimar Caron, e !iago %an=an) A meus pais, Adenir e 7lisa, agradeo por terem me apoiado incondicionalmente durante esses anos, e por terem me recebido, sempre de braos abertos, nos v;rios momentos em &ue precisei fa=er um Jretiro intelectualK, dei@ando-me completamente livre de &ual&uer preocupao e@terna para poder trabal4ar concentradamente) "or fim, agradeo ' CA"7S pelas concesso das bolsas de doutorado e de est;gio de doutorando, sem as &uais o presente estudo no teria sido possvel)

I have heard the key Turn in the door once and turn once only We think of the key, each in his prison thinking of the key, each confirms a prison T. S. Eliot

Philosophy!s virtue is responsiveness. What makes it philosophy is not that its response "ill be total, but that it "ill be tireless, a"ake "hen the others have all fallen asleep. Stanley #avell$

Working in philosophy%like "ork in architecture in many respects%is really more a "orking on oneself. &n one!s o"n interpretation. &n one!s "ay of seeing things. '(nd "hat one e)pects of them*. +ud"ig Wittgenstein,

... and everything in philosophy is provisional ... Peter Stra"son-

N / R Q

The Waste +and, sec) ***6 O!4e Fire SermonP) Cavell, N1M1, p) LQ) CS, p) NE) S., p) /Q)

Resumo

5 presente estudo constitudo de cinco ensaios relativamente autossuficientes, mas redigidos tendo em vista um ob<etivo comum, &ue ser; perseguido por v;rias viasBa saber, a e@plorao de um nAcleo de problemas filos ficos relacionados com a possibilidade, e com a pr pria inteligibilidade, do solipsismo) 5s resultados obtidos nesses ensaios, assim como os camin4os &ue levam a eles, pretendem servir como e)emplos para a e@trao de lies mais gerais sobre o mtodo filos fico, e sobre a pr pria nature=a 4umana) 5 procedimento adotado para esse fim consiste na leitura de um con<unto de escritos de fil sofos contemporFneos &ue refletiram profundamente sobre o solipsismoB sobretudo "eter Strawson, Hudwig Wittgenstein, e StanleC Cavell) A tese central ' &ual procuro fornecer suporte por meio dessas leituras &ue o solipsismo uma resposta intelectuali=ada, e radical, a um con<unto de dificuldades pr;ticas ou e@istenciais relacionadas com a finitude da condio 4umana) >7ssas mesmas dificuldades originam respostas menos radicais, &ue so manifestas por meio de outras Jposies filos ficasKB ou, pelo menos, isso &ue tentarei mostrar)? 7star su<eito a essas dificuldades implica estar permanentemente su<eito ' ameaa da solido, da privacidade e da perda de sintonia em relao ao mundo e aos demais su<eitos) %econ4ecer e levar a srio a possibilidade dessa ameaa implica recon4ecer &ue somos, individual e imprevisivelmente, respons;veis por super;-la >um ponto &ue notado, mas superestimado, pelo ctico, &ue interpreta nossos limites como limitaes?, bem como recon4ecer a fora da tentao >demasiado 4umana? de tentar reprimi-la >como fa= o dogm;ticoTrealista metafsico? ou sublim;-la >como fa= o idealistaTsolipsista?) Guscar uma filosofia aberta ao recon4ecimento de &ue nossa e@peri+ncia essencialmente limitada e condicionadaBem especial, pelo fato de &ue temos corpos, e com eles vontades, dese<os, temores, fi@aes e sentimentos .ue n/o escolhemos, e &ue informam nossa racionalidade e moldam nossas atitudes em relao ao mundo e aos demais su<eitosB parte da tarefa contnua de aceitao de nossa finitude, em direo ' &ual o presente estudo pretende ter dado os primeiros passos)

N0

Abstract

!4is studC consists of five essaCs w4ic4 are nearlC self-contained, Cet written wit4 a common goal, w4ic4 will be pursued bC various routesBnamelC, t4e e@ploration of a core of p4ilosop4ical problems 4aving to do wit4 t4e possibilitC, and t4e verC intelligibilitC, of solipsism) !4e results obtained in t4ese essaCs, as well as t4e pat4s leading to t4em, are intended to serve as e)amples from w4ic4 some general lessons about t4e p4ilosop4ical met4od, and about 4uman nature itself, are to be drawn) !4e procedure adopted for t4at end consists in reading a set of writings bC contemporarC p4ilosop4ers w4o 4ave t4oug4t deeplC about solipsismBmost notablC "eter Strawson, Hudwig Wittgenstein and StanleC Cavell) !4e central t4esis to w4ic4 * seeI to provide support t4roug4 t4ose readings is t4at solipsism is an intellectuali=ed response, and a radical one at t4at, to a set of practical or e@istential difficulties related to t4e finitude of t4e 4uman condition) >!4ose same difficulties maC as well promt less radical responses, w4ic4 are e@pressed bC ot4er Jp4ilosop4ical positionsKBor so * s4all trC to s4ow)? Geing sub<ected to t4ose difficulties implies being permanentlC sub<ected to t4e t4reat of loneliness, of privacC, of loosing attunement wit4 t4e world and ot4ers) !o acInowledge and to taIe seriouslC t4e possibilitC of t4at t4reat means to acInowledge t4at we are responsible, individuallC and unpredictablC, for coming to grips wit4 it >a point w4ic4 is noted, but overrated, bC t4e sIeptic, w4o taIes our limits as limitations?, as well as acInowledging t4e strengt4 of t4e >all-too-4uman? temptation of trCing to repress it >as does t4e dogmaticTmetap4Csical realist? or to sublimate it >as does t4e idealist T solipsist?) !o seeI an attitude open to t4e acInowledgement t4at our e@perience is essentiallC limited and conditionedBin particular, bC t4e fact t4at we 4ave bodies, and wit4 t4em wills, desires, fears, fi@ations and feelings that "e do not choose, and w4ic4 inform our rationalitC and s4ape our attitudes toward t4e world and ot4ersBis part of t4e continuous tasI of accepting our finitude, a goal toward w4ic4 * claim to 4ave taIen some preliminarC steps wit4 t4is studC)

NN

Apresentao
A presente tese composta >como faculta a %esoluo nU 01RT/00L, da CFmara " s#raduao da $F%#S? de cinco captulos redigidos em ingl+s, os &uais sero posteriormente submetidos a publicao como artigos separados) 5 ttulo, esta Apresentao e o 7plogo esto redigidos em portugu+s, respeitando as e@ig+ncias para uma tese nesse formato) Apesar de serem relativamente autossuficientes, os captulos &ue compem esta tese foram escritos tendo em vista um ob<etivo comumBa saber, a e@plorao de um nAcleo de problemas filos ficos relacionados com a possibilidade, e com a pr pria inteligibilidade, do solipsismo) 5s resultados obtidos, assim como os camin4os &ue levaram a eles, pretenderam servir como e@emplos para a e@trao de lies mais gerais sobre metodologia filos fica, e sobre metafsicaBcompreendida como uma investigao das condies de possibilidade do ser, seno en.uanto ser, pelo menos en&uanto ser para n0s, isto , para su<eitos finitos capa=es de se tornarem conscientes da pr pria finitude) 5 procedimento adotado para esse fim consistiu na leitura de um con<unto de escritos de fil sofos contemporFneos &ue refletiram profundamente sobre &uestes relacionadas com a possibilidade do solipsismoBsobretudo "eter Strawson, Hudwig Wittgenstein, e StanleC Cavell) A tese central ' &ual procurei fornecer suporte por meio dessas leituras &ue o solipsismo uma resposta intelectuali=ada, e radical, a um con<unto de dificuldades pr;ticas ou e@istenciais relacionadas com a finitude da condio 4umana) $ma tese secund;ria, defendida em alguns conte@tos, foi &ue essas mesmas dificuldades originam respostas intelectuali=adas menos radicais, &ue so manifestas por meio de outras Jposies filos ficasK, tais como o ceticismo, o idealismo, e o anti-individualismo) VVV "eter ,acIer define o solipsismo como Ja doutrina de acordo com a &ual nada e@iste alm de mim mesmo e de meus estados mentaisK:) 7ssa definio parece clara e diretaBmas ser; mesmoW Afinal, o &ue se &uer di=er &uando se di= &ue o solipsismo uma JdoutrinaKW Xual pode ser o prop0sito de se aplicar essa denominao, uma ve= &ueBao contr;rio de outras assim c4amadas Jdoutrinas filos ficasKBno parece ter e@istido nen4um fil sofo
:

,acIer, N1ME, p) /NE)

N/ disposto a defend+-laW $ma ra=o potencial &ue a mera possibilidade l gica ou conceitual dessa posio possa ser de interesse, visando a uma espcie de Jestudo comparativoK com outras doutrinas filos ficas) 8as essa resposta pressupe <ustamente o &ue est; em &uestoBa saber, &ue doutrinas filos ficas se<am essencialmente impessoais, e &ue, como tais, possam ser caracteri=adas e identificadas de maneira puramente abstrata , independentemente de sabermos &uais se<am as motivaes concretas &ue poderiam levar algum a defend+-las) Se abandonarmos esse pressuposto, pode comear a parecer intrigante &ue o solipsismo ten4a essa funo peculiar no imagin;rio filos fico, de servir como uma espcie de an1tema universalBalgo de &ue os autores tentam afastar-se, de maneira mais ou menos consciente, ou &ue eles simplesmente no levam muito a srio) Sisando a investigar &uais poderiam ser as reais motivaes por tr;s dessa atitude, sugeri &ue consider;ssemos algumas dificuldades &ue, se intelectuali=adas, poderiam levar algum a sentir-se pelo menos tentado por uma Jdoutrina solipsistaK) 5 resultado foi a apresentao de um con<unto essencialmente aberto de fatos caractersticos da e@peri+ncia de seres conscientes finitos, e cu<a atestao pode, pelo menos em alguns estados de Fnimo e em algumas circunstFncias, gerar uma sensao de insatisfao em relao ao pr prio car;ter condicionado de nossa e@peri+nciaBem particular, a nossa separao do mundo e dos demais su<eitosBfa=endo-nos ver nossos limites como limita23es, ou se<a, como algo &ue gostaramos de transcender, em ve= de aceitar, testar e e)plorar) (entre esses fatos encontram-se os seguintes6 >i? &ue no podemos ver o mundo como um todo, mas apenas parcialmente e a partir de uma perspectiva particular, de modo &ue somos obrigados a recon4ecer &ue o nosso estatuto como seres corp reos finitos simplesmente e@clui a possibilidade da onipresenaY >ii? &ue no podemos mudar o passado ou prever o futuro, de modo &ue podemos nos sentir simultaneamente impotentes e sobrecarregados ao termos de escol4er um curso >presente? de ao &ue pode resultar desastrosoY >iii? &ue podemos, assim como as pessoas ' nossa volta, dissimular e esconder nossos sentimentos e pensamentos, ou simplesmente sentirmo-nos incapa=es de e@primi-los e compartil4;-los, de modo &ue nossos corpos e nossos comportamentos podem acabar sendo vistos como barreiras separando nossas mentesY ou ainda >iv? &ue podemos observar &ue a&uilo &ue e@pressamos por ve=es escapa ao nosso controle, de modo &ue nossa pr pria identidade, ou auto-concepo, pode parecer estar em risco)

NR $m ser cu<a e@peri+ncia caracteri=ada por condies como essas est; sempre su<eito a sentir-se s , isolado, fora de sintonia com o mundo e com os demaisBse<a por&ue pode sempre acabar fec4ando-se para os outros, ou evitando aceitar o mundo como ele , ou por&ue os outros podem sempre dei@ar de recon4ec+-lo, ou de aceitar &ue o mundo em &ue 4abitam o mesmo &ue ele 4abita) C4amei essa possibilidade de ameaa da solido, e argumentei &ue ela pode estar na origem de pelo menos duas espcies de reaes intelectuali=adas &ue poderiam levar algum a sentir-se tentado por uma Jdoutrina solipsistaK) A primeira reao seria ela pr pria uma vers/o intelectuali=ada da solidoBum deslocamento da dificuldade de aceitarmos nossa separao metafsica do mundo e dos demais su<eitos, &ue pode levar ' concluso de &ue simplesmente impossvel darmos sentido ' ideia de &ue possa e@istir alguma coisa alm de nossas pr prias e@peri+ncias privadas) A segunda reao seria uma tentativa intelectuali=ada de superar a ameaa da solidoBresultando, na verdade, em uma espcie de represso, &ue substituiria a nossa finitude e a nossa separao metafsica por uma fantasia filos fica onde toda a realidade resultaria Jcoordenada com o su<eitoK, de modo &ue a e@peri+ncia desse su<eito abraaria tudo o .ue e)iste, e ele pr prio desapareceria >o solipsismo como a forma mais pura e mais direta de realismo?) "ode-se di=er &ue essas reaes correspondem, respectivamente, ao copo Jmeio-va=ioK e ao copo Jmeio-c4eioK do solipsismo) 5ra, se eu estiver certo ao indicar &ue as dificuldades &ue esto na base dessas reaes so possibilidades permanentes para &ual&uer ser 4umano, o solipsismo >em ambas as interpretaes? pode ser visto como uma tentativa radical de suprimir ou de reprimir a nossa pr pria 4umanidade) Se for assim, o confronto com a tentao solipsista se apresenta como uma estratgia metodol gica privilegiada6 embora a resposta solipsista possa no parecer satisfat ria para a maioria de n s, ela ao menos aponta para o verdadeiro problema &ue suscitado pelo confronto com nossos limites, e &ue pode estar na base de outras reaes filos ficas menos radicais) 7 isso &ue e@plica, pelo menos em parte, o interesse dos autores estudados nesta tese pelas dificuldades relacionadas com a finitude e com a possibilidade do solipsismo)

NQ $ma maneira sucinta de indicar a importFncia dessas dificuldades na filosofia de Strawson c4amando ateno para a seguinte passagem de Individuals, &ue estabelece uma diretri= metodol gica fundamental para seu pro<eto de metafsica descritiva6

.ossos mtodos, ou critrios de re-identificao devem tolerar fatos como estes6 &ue o campo de nossa observao limitadoY &ue dormimosY &ue nos movemos) 5u se<a, eles devem tolerar o fato de &ue no podemos, em nen4um momento, observar a totalidade da estrutura espacial &ue usamos, &ue no 4; nen4uma parte dessa estrutura &ue possamos observar de forma contnua, e &ue n s mesmos no ocupamos uma posio fi@a dentro dela) >*. R/?

A preocupao com a finitude ilustrada nessa passagem perpassa a obra de StrawsonY mas ela por ve=es parece entrar em conflito com o ideal Iantiano de fornecer uma descrio geral da estrutura conceitual &ue usamos para dar ob<etividade ' nossa e@peri+ncia) 7sse conflito e@presso de maneira particularmente perspcua no captulo R de Individuals, onde Strawson analisa a noo de um Jsu<eito de e@peri+nciaK, e as condies para se alcanar uma Jconsci+ncia no-solipsistaK do mundo) Como procurei mostrar em min4a reconstruo dessa an;lise >ver seo N)/?, Strawson acena para a ideia de &ue e@ista um importante papel a ser desempen4ado por uma atitude enga<ada em relao aos outros na constituio de uma consci+ncia no-solipsistaY contudo, dado o nvel de generalidade em &ue essa an;lise perseguida em Individuals%com escassa refer+ncia 's pr1ticas &ue dotam os nossos conceitos de significadoBo resultado mostra-se demasiado es&uem;tico, e fica muito a&um do fornecimento de uma representao realista dos temas centrais da&uele captuloBespecialmente a noo de JpessoaK, e as condies de atribuio de predicados psicol gicos) Strawson fornece alguns elementos para complementarmos esse esboo em seus escritos posteriores, comeando com o ensaio JFreedom and %esentmentK, &ue trata de uma variedade de atitudes reativas &ue caracteri=am nossos relacionamentos interpessoais) 7m comparao com a postura assptica de Individuals, a metodologia ilustrada nesse ensaio certamente representa um avano, na medida em &ue aponta mais claramente para as possveis conse&u+ncias pr1ticas da adoo de uma atitude distanciada em relao aos outros) 8as 4; uma limitao importante nessa abordagem, sinteti=ada na alegao de &ue

N: nossas atitudes de envolvimento e de participao no seriam suprimidas Jnem mesmo se alguma verdade geral fornecesse uma base te rica para issoK >F% N/?) Ao tratar a adoo generali=ada de uma atitude distanciada como uma mera possibilidade l0gica, mas &ue seria humana e praticamente imposs4vel, Strawson mostra-se comprometido com uma concepo limitada das possibilidades acessveis a seres como n s, e das conse&uentes responsabilidades &ue essa situao nos impe, e isso &ue finalmente l4e permite evadir a verdadeira dificuldade colocada pelo Jproblema do solipsismoKBa saber, o fato de &ue cabe somente a n0s recon4ecer a 4umanidade dos outros) .o 4; nada &ue possa garantir &ue esse recon4ecimento estar; sempre dispon4velBem particular, no o garante uma descrio do uso de nossos conceitos, e tampouco um apelo 's nossas crenas e disposies naturais) 7ssa reao otimista de Strawson em relao ao problema do recon4ecimento do outro encontra um estreito paralelo em sua intransigente reao JnaturalistaK ao ceticismo sobre o Jmundo e@teriorK, &ue analisei na parte final do captulo N >seo N)Q?) A principal lio &ue e@tra dessa an;lise &ue, visando a evitar a espcie de evaso &ue essas reaes ilustram, precisamos de uma metodologia alternativa, ou pelo menos mel4orada, &ue leve ainda mais a s5rio as dificuldades colocadas pela atestao de nossa finitude, e &ue, nesse sentido, se<a mais sensvel 's pr;ticas em &ue a nossa Jestrutura conceitualK est; imersaB particularmente ao substrato afetivo da nossa vida cognitiva) 7mbora Strawson ten4a dado alguns passos importantes nessa direo, penso &ue ele ficou a&um do &ue seria o ideal) "ara seu crdito, o pr prio Strawson foi o primeiro a salientar &ue difcil obtermos um &uadro completo da Jverdade em filosofiaK, e <ustamente por isso &ue acredito &ue a sugesto metodol gica apresentada em min4a concluso possa ser vista como uma proposta de continua2/o do pro<eto de metafsica descritiva)

7ssas consideraes me tra=em a WittgensteinBum fil sofo &ue, de maneira um tanto incomum para um membro da >assim c4amada? tradio analtica, estava realmente ciente dessa e@ig+ncia metodol gica, e enga<ou-se de maneira sistem;tica em uma tentativa de recon4ecer e de dar vo= 's insatisfaes &ue esto na base da tentao solipsista) .os captulos / a QB&ue lidam, respectivamente, com o Tractatus, as &bserva23es 6ilos0ficas

NE e o +ivro (7ulEBprocurei fornecer ilustraes e aplicaes da metodologia

wittgensteiniana para lidar com a tentao solipsista) Cada um dos escritos analisados possui importantes peculiaridades, e min4as leituras procuraram manter-se fiis a elas, acompan4ando de perto o seu desenvolvimento te@tual e argumentativo) Como no seria possvel indicar essas peculiaridades a&ui, partirei de uma viso retrospectiva mais abrangente, tentando apenas indicar alguns traos metodol gicos comuns a esses escritos, bem como a&uele &ue me parece ser o mais importante desenvolvimento ocorrido durante o perodo em &ue eles foram redigidos) 5 primeiro desses traos, e@presso de modo um tanto pol+mico, este6 nos escritos &ue analisei, Wittgenstein no esteve enga<ado nem em uma tentativa de refutar o solipsismo, nem em uma tentativa de defend89loY em ve= disso, o &ue ele pretendeu fa=er foi dar vo7 a essa JposioKBbem como a outras, por ve=es antag3nicas, &ue so por ela suscitadasBde modo a represent;-las da maneira mais vvida e realista possvel, visando a e@plorar dialeticamente os limites de sua pr pria inteligibilidade) "or terem sido pensados para funcionar assim, dialeticamente, esses escritos colocam uma responsabilidade incomum nas mos de seus leitores, dos &uais se espera &ue internali=em e &ue deem vida aos di;logos esboados por Wittgenstein) $ma condio para o sucesso desse procedimento a obteno da&uilo &ue por ve=es c4amei de resson:ncia entre o leitor e o te@toB ressonFncia essa &ue pode ocorrer de maneira intermitente, alternada e at mesmo conflitante, variando de acordo com as tend+ncias do leitor, bem como com as aspiraes, tentaes, dAvidas, &uestionamentos, pressuposies e preconceitos filos ficos alternadamente e@pressos no te@to) 5 fim Altimo desse enga<amento dialtico <ustamente uma JcuraK por nossos pr prios meios, passando pela demonstrao sistem;tica de &ue, ao contr;rio do &ue fomos inicialmente tentados a supor, nossas variadas tentativas de fornecer sentido 's JtesesK e 's JposiesK filos ficas e@pressas no te@toBe com as &uais, se tudo tiver corrido bem, teremos por ve=es nos identificadoBacabam produ=indo um de dois resultados igualmente insatisfat rios, do ponto de vista de nossas aspiraes originaisBa saber, >N? proferimentos aparentemente JsubstanciaisK, &ue embora este<am superficialmente de acordo com as
E

A principal ra=o para concentrar-me nesses escritos &ue eles constituem os conte@tos mais importantes onde Wittgenstein trata e@plicitamente de &uestes relacionadas com o solipsismoY no eplogo do captulo Q fornecerei algumas consideraes sobre como a leitura perseguida nesses captulos pode ser estendida ao tratamento da privacidade nas Investiga23es 6ilos0ficas)

NL regras l gico-gramaticais, finalmente se mostram va7ios e sem sentido >engrenagens rodando soltas?Y ou >/? proferimentos significativos mas triviais, isto , &ue e@pressam fatos cotidianos completamente desprovidos de &ual&uer interesse metafsico especial) 5 &ue se mostra, em ambos os casos, &ue as supostas JtesesK e JposiesK &ue somos tentados a e@pressar no constituem, como gostaramos, descries privilegiadas da Jess+ncia da realidadeK >em oposio, digamos, a descries emp4ricas de um con<unto de fatos contingentes?, tratando-se, antes, de reaes evasivas a certas dificuldades pr;ticas &ue surgem em nosso confronto com essa realidade) 8as para &ue esse >auto-?diagn stico e a correspondente >auto-?terapia se<am realmente bem sucedidos, devemos estar preparados para contrariar vel4os 4;bitos filos ficos, &ue podem estar profundamente arraigados) Face a esse desafio, &uase impossvel no retrocedermos, tomando os lembretes gramaticais apresentados por Wittgenstein como novos camin4os, ou desculpas, para evadirmos essas dificuldades, reforando a represso das verdadeiras &uestes &ue esto na origem de nosso embarao filos fico) Como o meu pr prio enga<amento com os escritos de Wittgenstein visou a ilustrar, no 4; instFncias e@ternas e finais 's &uais possamos recorrer com o intuito de encontrar uma resoluo para essa complicada situao >&ue a um s tempo e@egtica, filos fica, e tica?) Assim, cabe a cada um de n s a deciso de tomar as observaes gramaticais de Wittgenstein como e@presses finais e in&uestion;veis de certos limites >metafsicos, l gicos ou gramaticais?, ou como meros degraus em >grandes ou pe&uenas? escadas &ue deveriam ser <ogadas fora, uma ve= &ue o progresso terap+utico estivesse >ainda &ue momentaneamente? terminado) (o modo como eu leio Wittgenstein, simplesmente no 4; resultados definitivos em sua filosofia) *sso e@plica, pelo menos em parte, por &ue seus escritos p s-tractarianos no t+m Be, at onde sei, <amais foram destinados a terBuma concluso propriamente dita, sugerindo &ue a JAltima palavraK JAltimaK apenas contingentemente, e &ue o convite est; sempre aberto para continuarmos o di;logo) Z verdade &ue, como tentei mostrar, Wittgenstein ele pr prio s veio a recon4ecer tardia e gradualmente &ue no e@iste um procedimento geral para evitarmos as Jdoenas do intelectoK 's &uais estamos constitutiva e imprevisivelmente e@postosBum papel &ue ele inicialmente atribuiu ' Jnotao perspcuaK desenvolvida no Tractatus, e depois, durante um curto perodo de tempo, ' verso aprimorada dessa notao, a Jlinguagem fenomenol gicaK das &bserva23es 6ilos0ficas) 7ntretanto, como tambm sugeri, parece &ue Wittgenstein estava ciente, pelo

NM menos desde o Tractatus, de &ue a cura para doenas ;1 e)istentes demanda um procedimento bastante comple@o, &ue deve levar em considerao no apenas as dificuldades intelectuais e as confuses l gicas do interlocutor, mas tambm as dificuldades relativas ' sua vontade) "ara tanto, fa=-se necess;ria uma ferramenta muito mais poderosa do &ue o suposto Jmtodo correto em filosofiaK apresentado na proposio E):R do TractatusBfa=-se necess;rio o domnio de uma certa JarteK, a &ual Wittgenstein buscou incessantemente mel4orar e desenvolver em seus escritos)

.o captulo final procurei p3r em pr;tica algumas das lies metodol gicas descritas acima, e@plorando as possveis motivaes compartil4adas por posies antiindividualistas sobre significado e conteAdo mental >representadas nos escritos de Saul DripIe, ,ilarC "utnam e !Cler Gurge? e pela Jsoluo cticaK para o problema do significado proposta por DripIe no estudo sobre regras e linguagem privada, tomando como pano de fundo a crtica de StanleC Cavell '&uilo &ue c4amei de Jmodelo impessoal da normatividadeK) $ma maneira de tentar resumir o resultado dessa e@plorao di=endo, em primeiro lugar, &ue assim como para Cavell 4averia uma Jverdade no ceticismoKLB tendo em vista &ue muitas ve=es a insatisfao com nossos critrios no estaria e@atamente in<ustificada, posto &ue eles realmente no podem garantir >impessoalmente? o nosso acordo, e, portanto, o significado do &ue di=emosBpenso &ue 4; uma Jverdade no solipsismoKBna medida em &ue, como tentei mostrar nos captulos anteriores, essa posio se apresenta como uma intelectuali=ao de dificuldades reais relativas ' nossa condio finitaY oraBe este meu segundo pontoBo tipo de dificuldade &ue est; na base da insatisfao ctica e da reao solipsista tambm parece motivar os pro<etos dos antiindividualistas e de JDripIensteinK, na medida em &ue os primeiros visam ao restabelecimento de um vnculo direto entre, por um lado, nossos conteAdos mentais e o significado de nossas palavras, e por outro, o nosso JambienteK, e o segundo visa a promover uma an;lise JcomunitaristaK das atribuies de significado em termos de condies de assero <ustificada) 5 &ue 4; de problem;tico em ambas as propostas o compromisso t;cito com uma imagem ou ideal impessoal da normatividade, &ue inverte o 3nus da correo lingustica, atribuindo-o e@clusivamente a algo Je@ternoKBse<a ao
L

Ser, por e@emplo, ODnowing and AcInowledgingP >reimpresso em <ust We <ean What We Say=?, The #laim of >eason e The Senses of Walden, apenas para indicar os pricipais conte@tos onde essa ideia defendida)

N1 JambienteK fsico ou social, se<a 's JconvenesK de uma comunidadeBe dessa forma desconsidera a responsabilidade individual dos usu;rios da linguagem em estabelecer ;u47os compartil4;veis, e, nessa medida, em criar e manter acordos lingusticos) Sisando a esclarecer essas alegaes, vale recordar &ue, para Cavell, nossos critrios baseiam-se tanto nos interesses e nas necessidades 4umanas &uanto na posse de uma J4ist ria naturalK em comumY ora, dado &ue essa base est; em constante mutao, nossos critrios devem estar permanentemente abertos a reviso, e, nesse sentido, devem estar sempre su;eitos ao repAdio favorecido pelo ctico) (ada essa concepo da nature=a dos critrios, Cavell levado a concluir &ue Wittgenstein <amais pretendeu ter negado a possibilidade de uma Jlinguagem privadaKY em ve= disso, seu ob<etivo teria sido mostrar &ue a privacidade uma possibilidade humana permanenteBportanto, &ue a supera2/o da privacidade deve ser sempre uma con.uista, algo pelo &ual cada um de n s tem de assumir pessoalmente a responsabilidade) A implicao &ue, contrariamente ao &ue no poucos wittgensteinianos pensaram, descrever e arrolar nossos critrios no pode ser uma maneira de refutar o ceticismoY na verdade, o resultado mais prov;vel dessa estratgia seria <ustamente o opostoBisto , o reforo da atitude cticaBdada a indicao da real fragilidade dos fundamentos de nosso acordo lingustico) 8as isso no significa &ue o ceticismo deveria ser simplesmente aceito6 o ctico pode ter ra=o em apontar >contra um advers;rio dogm;tico? &ue a e@ist+ncia do Jmundo e@ternoK ou de Joutras mentesK no pode ser con4ecida com inabal;vel certe=aY entretanto, ele erra ao interpretar esse resultado como uma demonstrao de &ue o mundo e as outras pessoas podem no ser reaisY tudo &ue o ceticismo mostra &ue a realidade do mundo e dos demais seres 4umanos no so funes de nosso conhecimento, e sim de nossa aceita2/o e de nosso reconhecimentoB portanto, &ue os verdadeiros custos envolvidos no abandono ctico do consentimento no so >apenas? epist+micos e te ricos, mas sim afetivos e pr;ticos, relacionados com um con<unto muito grande de tarefas e de compromissos, cu<os limites no podem ser previstos por uma especulao a priori) !omando essa viso cavelliana como pano de fundo, procurei oferecer um contraponto ' Jimagem impessoalK do significado &ue parece estar na base tanto do anti-individualismo &uanto da Jsoluo cticaK de DripIenstein, tratando de lanar lu= sobre nossas responsabilidades individuais, permanentes e imprevisveis na busca de significado e de sentidoBum resultado &ue no e@atamente ctico, mas &ue recon4ece e at mesmo

/0 simpati=a com as motivaes &ue esto na base do ceticismo, e &ue t+m a ver com o recon4ecimento de nossos limites, particularmente de nossa real separao e distFncia em relao ao mundo e aos demais su<eitos) .o fosse poss4vel o ceticismo, teramos <ustamente uma situao >solipsista? de total absoro do mundo pelo su<eito, ouBo &ue finalmente d1 na mesma, como notou Wittgenstein <; no Tractatus%do su<eito pelo mundo) $ma forma de resumir os resultados obtidos ao final dessa an;lise consistiria em di=er, portanto, &ue no obstante as >aparentemente colossais? diferenas entre as posies antiindividualistas e a posio de DripIenstein, por um lado, e a doutrina solipsista de imerso total do su<eito no mundo, por outro, 4; um sentido em &ue ambas podem ser vistas como respostas intelectuali=adas a uma dificuldade e@istencial comumBa saber, a ansiedade suscitada pelo fato de &ue somos, individual e pessoalmente, respons;veis por tentar superar a ameaa da solido, ou da privacidade, tentando estabelecer ;u47os compartil4;veis sobre o mundo e sobre os demais su<eitos, e, nessa medida, tentando reivindicar uma comunidade de falantes) .esse sentido, pode-se di=er &ue o captulo final consistiu em uma nova tentativa de e@plorar a ideia de &ue, possivelmente contra as e@pectativas &ue acalentamos >pelo menos em alguns estados de Fnimo? o sentido >do mundo, de nossas e@peri+ncias, de nossas palavras, <u=os e aesBe finalmente de nossas vidas? no impessoal e e@ternamente imposto ou assegurado)

VVV

Como a apresentao precedente indica, o foco de min4as leituras sero as Jfontes prim;riasK, o &ue implica &ue as disputas e@egticas ficaro, pelo menos na maior parte do tempo, relegadas a um segundo plano) "arte da ra=o para isso &ue acredito &ue ainda e@istam novos e importantes insights a serem obtidos atravs de uma reavaliao dos escritos a&ui tratados, ainda &ue eles <; ten4am recebido uma &uantidade enorme de ateno) Sentirei-me mais do &ue satisfeito se min4as pr prias leituras puderem servir como convites para &ue outros leitores refaam camin4os <; familiares >ou talve= nem tanto?, por ve=es a passos bastante lentos, de modo a permitir &ue prestem ateno a uma

/N ou outra caracterstica da paisagem &ue possa ter passado despercebida, ou &ue possa ter sido subestimada em visadas anteriores)

23nadas !ec4io "orto Alegre, %S, Grasil .ovembro de /001

//

List of contents
Agradecimentos %esumo Abstract Hist of Abbreviations *ntroduction N Solipsism and %esentment6 Finding a ,uman Face for StrawsonPs "ersons N)N *ntroduction Q/ N)/ Solipsism and "erson4ood6 t4e argument from *ndividuals)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))Q: N)R %esentment, sIepticism, acInowledgement )))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))):R N)Q (escriptive metap4Csics wit4 4uman face6 a met4odological lesson)))))))))))))))))))ER / !4e HonelC 7Ce6 Solipsism and t4e limits of sense in t4e !ractatus EM : 1 N0 /: /M Q/

/)N "rologue6 on beginingBand ending)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))EM /)/ Act one6 reading t4e !ractatus))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))L0 /)/)N !4e "reface /)/)/ !4e main bodC L0 LQ

/)/)R !4e final instructions)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))L1 /)R *ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))MN /)R)N O!4e limits of mC language mean t4e limits of mC worldP)))))))))))))))))))))))))))MN /)R)/ !4e >ineffable? trut4 in solipsism))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))MM /)R)R !4e >s4rinIing? Ometap4Csical sub<ectP, and t4e waC bacI to realism))))))))))1R /)Q Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[?)))1E /)Q)N !4rowing t4e ladder awaC >taIe one?))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1E /)Q)/ GacI to t4e ladder6 t4e solipsist ><ustlC? dissatisfied)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))11 /)Q)R !4rowing t4e Jpicture t4eorC of meaningK awaC )))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))N0R /)Q)Q !4e >real? trut4 in solipsism )))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))NN0 /)Q): !4rowing t4e ladder awaC >taIe two?)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))NN1

/R /): 7pilogue6 on p4ilosop4ical elucidation, and t4e role of logical analCsis))))))))))))N/R R 7mbracing t4e w4ole world6 solipsism and t4e conditions of e@perience in "4ilosop4ical %emarIs NR/ R)N "rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NR/ R)/ O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))NQ: R)R !ime, memorC, and sublimation)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))NEN R)Q Solipsism of t4e present moment))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))NL/ R): 7pilogue6 on letting oneself be Odragged into t4e mireP)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))NLL Q Solipsism, "rivacC and t4e #rammar of t4e First "erson in !4e Glue GooI Q)N "rologue NM0 NM0

Q)/ 8eaning, $nderstanding, and "ersonal 7@periences))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))NMR Q)R O* canPt feel 4is painP6 a first route to solipsism )))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))N10 Q)Q W4en language goes on 4olidaC6 some furt4er routes to solipsism))))))))))))))))))))N1M Q): O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person)))))))))))))))))))))))))))/0: Q)E 7pilogue6 !4e "at4 to t4e *nvestigations))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))/NM : 8eaning, .ormativitC and %esponsibilitC6 A Cavellian Approac4 :)N *ntroduction //E :)/ Anti-individualism and t4e impersonal model of normativitC))))))))))))))))))))))))))))/RN :)/)N Anti-individualism6 contemporarC roots)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))/RN :)/)/ A s4ared structure /RQ :)R DripIePs Wittgenstein on %ules and "rivate Hanguage6 a Furt4er "arallel )))))))/RM :)R)N Adding, &uadding, and t4e sIeptical parado@ of normativitC)))))))))))))))))))))/R1 :)R)/ !4e sIeptical solution and t4e impersonal model of normativitC)))))))))))))))/QN :)R)R !4e parallel between DripIePs and t4e anti-individualistsPs arguments ))))/QE :)Q DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))/QM :)Q)N %ules, multiple interpretations, and t4e OsIeptical parado@P)))))))))))))))))))))))/Q1 :)Q)/ !4e individual T communitC relation6 two waCs of reading WittgensteinPs Oscene of instructionP /:/ :)Q)R WalIing, &ualIing, and becoming dissatisfied wit4 our criteria)))))))))))))))))/ER :): Final considerations))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))/L0 //E

/Q 7plogo6 Hies aprendidas, e proleg3menos a uma metafsica futura %efer+ncias /LE /MQ

Hist of Abbreviations /:

List of Abbreviations
GG GS G! Wittgenstein, H) The ?lue and ?ro"n ?ooks) 5@ford6 Gasil GlacIwell, N1:M) Strawson, ") F) The ?ounds of Sense. Hondon6 8et4uen, N1EE) Wittgenstein, H) The ?ig Typescript@ TS $ , 'Aerman9English Scholar!s Edition*) C) #rant HucI4ardt and 8a@imilian A) 7) Aue >7ds) And !rs)?) 5@ford6 GlacIwell "ublis4ing, /00:) C,$ Cavell, S) #onditions Bandsome and Cnhandsome@ The #onstitution of Emersonian Perfectionism) 5@ford and Hondon6 !4e $niversitC of C4icago "ress, N110) C% Cavell, S) The #laim of >eason@ Wittgenstein, Skepticism, <orality and Tragedy) 5@ford6 5@ford $) "), N1L1) F% Strawson, ") F) 6reedom and >esentment and other Essays) Hondon6 8et4uen, N1LQ) *. Strawson, ") F) Individuals@ (n Essay in Descriptive <etaphysics) Hondon and .ew \orI6 8et4uen, N1:1 >N1LN reprint?) D DripIe, S) Wittgenstein on >ules and Private +anguage@ (n Elementary E)position) Cambridge and 8assac4usetts6 ,arvard $niversitC "ress, N1M/) 8W8 Cavell, S) <ust We <ean What We Say=) Cambridge6 Cambridge $niversitC "ress, N1LE) .A! Cavell, S) O.otes and aftert4oug4ts on t4e opening of WittgensteinPs *nvestigationsP) *n6 The #ambridge #ompanion to Wittgenstein) Cambridge and .ew \orI6 Cambridge $niversitC "ress, N11E)

Hist of Abbreviations /E .G Wittgenstein, H) Eotebooks F -9 F G) /nd) 7d)) #) ,) Son Wrig4t ] #)7)8 Anscombe >7d)?, #)7)8 Anscombe >!r)?) C4icago6 !4e $niversitC of C4icago "ress, N1MQ) 5C Wittgenstein, H) &n #ertainty, #) 7) 8) Anscombe and #) ,) von Wrig4t >eds)?, #) 7) 8) Anscombe and () "aul >trs)?) 5@ford6 GlacIwell, N1E1) "(A! Cavell, S) Philosophy The Day (fter Tomorro") ,arvard $niversitC "ress, /00:) "# Wittgenstein, H) Philosophical Arammar. %) %4ees >ed)?, A) DennC >tr)?) 5@ford6 GlacIwell, N1LQ) "* Wittgenstein, H) Philosophical Investigations@ The Aerman Te)t, "ith a >evised English Translation) Ra) 7dio) #) 7) 8 Anscombe >7d) ] !r)?) 5@ford6 GlacIwell "ublis4ing, /00N "5 Wittgenstein, H) Philosophical &ccasions, F $9 FH ) Dlagge, 2) C) and

.ordman, A) >eds)?) *ndianapolis and Cambridge6 ,acIet "ub) Co, N11R) "% Wittgenstein, H) Philosophical >emarks. %us4 %4ees >7d)?, %aCmond ,argreaves ] %oger W4ite >!r)?) 5@ford6 Gasil GlacIwell, N1L:) %F8 Wittgenstein, H) >emarks on the 6oundations of <athematics. Rrd) edition, revised and reset) #) ,) von Wrig4t, %) %4ees, and #) 7) 8) Anscombe >eds)?) 5@ford6 GlacIwell, N1LM) %"" * Wittgenstein, H) >emarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Iolume I) #) 7) 8) Anscombe and #) ,) von Wrig4t >eds)?, #) 7) 8) Anscombe >tr)?) 5@ford6 Gasil GlacIwell, N1M0) %"" ** Wittgenstein, H) >emarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Iolume II) HucI4ardt, C) #) and Aue, 8) >eds)?) 5@ford6 Gasil GlacIwell, N1M0) S. Strawson, ") F) Skepticism and Eaturalism@ Some Iarieties) .ew \orI6 Columbia $niversitC "ress, N1M:)

Hist of Abbreviations /L S%HF !H" Wittgenstein, H) OSome %emarIs on Hogical FormP >*n6 "5?) Wittgenstein, H) Tractatus +ogico9Philosophicus. () F) "ears and G) F) 8c#uinness >!r)?, Hondon6 %outledge ] Degan "aul, N1LQ W7 Cavell, S) J!4e Wittgensteinian 7ventP) *n6 CrarC ] S4ie4 >7ds)?, >eading #avell. %outledge6 Hondon and .ew \orI, /00E) WHC Wittgenstein, H) Wittgenstein!s +ectures@ #ambridge Ambrose >7d)?) .ew \orI6 "romet4eus GooIs, /00N) WWD Wittgenstein, H) +ud"ig Wittgenstein and the Iienna #ircle@ #onversations >ecorded by 6riedrich Waismann. G) 8c#uinness >ed)? 5@ford6 GlacIwell, N1L1) ^ Wittgenstein, H) Kettel) #) 7) 8) Anscombe and #) ,) von Wrig4t >eds)?, #) 7) 8) Anscombe >tr)?) 5@ford6 Gasil GlacIwell, N1EL) F,$9 F,H. Alice

*ntroduction /M

Introduction
N)

And now, w4C does man p4ilosop4i=eWB!4at is to saC, w4C does 4e investigate t4e first causes and ultimate ends of t4ingsW W4C does 4e seeI t4e disinterested trut4W For to saC t4at all men 4ave a natural tendencC to Inow is trueY but w4ereforeW

"4ilosop4ers seeI a t4eoretic or ideal starting-point for t4eir 4uman worI, t4e worI of p4ilosop4i=ingY but t4eC are not usuallC concerned to seeI t4e practical and real starting-point, t4e purpose) W4at is t4e ob<ect in maIing p4ilosop4C, in t4inIing it and t4en e@pounding it to onePs fellowsW W4at does t4e p4ilosop4er seeI in it and wit4 itW !4e trut4 for t4e trut4Ps own saIeW !4e trut4, in order t4at we maC sub<ect our conduct to it and determine our spiritual attitude towards life and t4e universe comformablC wit4 itW

"4ilosop4C is a product of t4e 4umanitC of eac4 p4ilosop4er, and eac4 p4ilosop4er is a man of fles4 and bone w4o addresses 4imself to ot4er men of fles4 and bone liIe 4imself) And, let 4im do w4at 4e will, 4e p4ilosop4i=es not wit4 t4e reason onlC, but wit4 t4e will, wit4 t4e feelings, wit4 t4e fles4 and wit4 t4e bones, wit4 t4e w4ole soul and t4e w4ole bodC) *t is t4e man t4at p4ilosop4i=es) >8iguel de $namuno, Tragic Sense &f +ife?

!4e passage above delineates two verC distinct >self-?images of p4ilosop4CPsBand manPs Bnature) According to one image, p4ilosop4C would be a purelC disinterested and t4eoretical pursuit, seeIing for Inowledge and trut4 for t4eir own saIe, guided onlC >or at least primarilC? bC reasonY moreoverBsince manPs essence is supposed to lie preciselC in rationalitCBt4at &uest would be t4e ultimate aim of man) According to anot4er image, p4ilosop4C would be an ultimatelC interested and practical activitC, w4ose w4erefore would be to satisfC t4e needs of a fles4ed and boned 4uman beingBi)e), not of JmanK >t4is abstract entitC?, let alone of man .ua rational animal >a rat4er narrow conception of w4at can lead one to p4ilosop4i=e?, but of a concrete man or woman, w4ose being involves not onlC >or even primarilC? reason and t4inIing, but also will and feelingsB4ence desires, e@pectations, cravings, an@ieties, fears, passions, and so on) $namuno connects t4e former image wit4 an idealB* taIe 4im to mean6 ideali7edBstarting point soug4t bC p4ilosop4ers, in w4ic4 contemplation would come first, and would ground manPs conduct and attitudes toward t4e world and ot4ers) !4at ideali=ed starting point is contrasted wit4 t4e realBif

*ntroduction /1 denied or repressedBstarting point of all 4uman worI, w4ic4 is again a concrete, fles4ed and boned 4uman being 4imself or 4erself, wit4 4is or 4er various >and often conflicting? needs, desires, aversions and fi@ations) .ow * do not t4inI abstract dic4otomies s4ould ever replace t4e careful e@amination of details and differences of particular cases) ActuallC, t4at seems to be $namunoPs own considered view on t4e matter) !4erefore, * t4inI we s4ould taIe t4e distinction 4e presents as a mere starting point, or frame, to guide suc4 an e@amination of details) !4at said, * would liIe to 4ig4lig4t two interesting implications t4at seem to follow from t4at initial assessment) !4e first is t4at, notwit4standing t4e e@pectations created bC t4e passage, we mig4t be well advised not to take for granted t4at t4ere isBor t4ere must beBan answer to its opening &uestion, in t4at per4aps t4ere simplC is no suc4 a t4ing as a w4C and w4erefore to JmanPsK need to p4ilosop4i=eM) !4e second implication is t4at, given t4e widespread and generallC un&uestioned acceptance of >some version of? t4at first image of p4ilosop4CPs aims, a pervasive self-deception maC be involved in our traditional p4ilosop4ical >self-?assessments) *f t4at is rig4t, t4e &uestion arises of w4C s4ould us p4ilosop4ers prefer to >4ave toW? deceive ourselves t4at waCBto denC or to repress, per4aps to sublimate, t4e fundamental role plaCed bC our wills and feelings, bC our embodied needs, indulging in suc4 a fantasC of a purelC contemplative pursuit of trut4 and InowledgeW And 4ow can we >4ow can IW? 4ope to be able to overcome t4at self-deception in our >mC? own p4ilosop4i=ingW Again, w4at would a p4ilosop4C willing to acInowledge t4at >all-too-4uman? tendencC to denC or repress our own 4umanitC looI liIeW

/) !4ose are important and difficult &uestions, to w4ic4 * 4ave no goodBlet alone finalB answers to offer) \et, as t4eC will remain alwaCs in t4e 4ori=on of mC reflections in w4at follows, * 4ope some fragments of answers s4all emerge 4ere and t4ere) 8C primarC reason for voicing t4ose &uestions in t4is *ntroduction is t4at t4eC s4all prompt me to trC to maIe
M

ActuallC $namuno 4imself argues for an answer to t4at &uestion in t4e booI from w4ic4 * &uoted, identifCing a Opersonal and affective starting-point of all p4ilosop4CP, w4ic4 is preciselC t4e Otragic sense of lifeP alluded in its titleBOt4e longing not to die, t4e 4unger for personal immortalitC, t4e effort w4erebC we tend to persist indefinitelC in our own beingP >see t4e conclusion of c4) **?) Alt4oug4 * find t4at answer rat4er engaging, it suffices for mC limited purposes 4ere to suggest t4at we s4ould t4inI seriouslC about w4et4er it is >stillW? possible to taIe any suc4 answer for grantedBin ot4er words, w4et4er it is possible to p4ilosop4i=e wit4out first calling into &uestion t4e verC meaning, or purpose, of a p4ilosop4ical enterprise, 4ence, wit4out >re?t4inIing onePs own relation to t4e w4ole tradition, in order to >4opefullC? re-in4erit and continue it)

*ntroduction R0 clearBto mCself, and to t4e readerBt4e purpose of t4e following p4ilosop4ical e@ercises) * s4all start at t4e beginning, giving some clues as to w4at * mean bC t4e notions mentioned in t4e title of t4is dissertationBnamelC, solipsism, loneliness, and finitudeBand e@plaining "hy and ho" * t4inI one s4ould care about t4emBas well as w4C * t4inI p4ilosop4ers 4ave often not cared about t4em for t4e rig4t reasons) Starting wit4 solipsism, 4ere is a simple, rat4er unremarIable definition6 OSolipsism is t4e doctrine according to w4ic4 not4ing e@ists save mCself and mental states of mCselfP 1)B* said unremarIable, because t4is is 4ow p4ilosop4ers use to think of solipsismBnot t4at anC of t4em reallC hold t4at positionN0) \et, come to t4inI of it, w4at could be more remarIableW W4o, e@cept a madman, would dare to subscribe to suc4 a JdoctrineKW And if t4ere is no real p4ilosop4erBno concrete 4uman beingBwilling to 4old it, t4en w4at is t4e point of saCing t4at solipsism is a p4ilosop4ical JpositionK to begin wit4W

,acIer, N1ME, p) /NE) A more elaborate definition to t4e same effect is given bC Step4en ") !4ornton in t4e entrC OSolipsism and t4e "roblem of 5t4er 8indsP, in t4e Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy6 Solipsism is sometimes e@pressed as t4e view t4at O* am t4e onlC mind w4ic4 e@ists,P or O8C mental states are t4e onlC mental states)P ,owever, t4e sole survivor of a nuclear 4olocaust mig4t trulC come to believe in eit4er of t4ese propositions wit4out t4erebC being a solipsist) Solipsism is t4erefore more properlC regarded as t4e doctrine t4at, in principle, Oe@istenceP means for me my e@istence and t4at of my mental states) _)))` For t4e solipsist, it is not merelC t4e case t4at 4e believes t4at 4is t4oug4ts, e@periences, and emotions are, as a matter of contingent fact, t4e onlC t4oug4ts, e@periences, and emotions) %at4er, t4e solipsist can attac4 no meaning to t4e supposition t4at t4ere could be t4oug4ts, e@periences, and emotions ot4er t4an 4is own) *n s4ort, t4e true solipsist understands t4e word Opain,P for e@ample, to mean OmC pain)P ,e cannot accordinglC conceive 4ow t4is word is to be applied in anC sense ot4er t4an t4is e@clusivelC egocentric one) >!4ornton _online` a4ttp6TTwww)iep)utm)eduTsTsolipsis)4tmb?

N0

5f course manC p4ilosop4ical attempts to elucidate t4e nature of our e@perience 4ave been accused of, at t4e verC least, tending to conclusions w4ic4 are verC close to t4at e@pressed bC t4e solipsistic doctrineY t4is is particularlC true of t4e modern epistemological tradition) *n order to see t4at, recall 4ow muc4 discussion 4as been >and continues to be? generated bC t4e reception of, saC, (escartesPs polemical proof of t4e e@istence of an Je@ternal worldK in t4e <editations, or HocIePs 4ars4 appeal to t4e Omaterial substanceP to t4e same effect) *n fact, it was partiallC because of t4e problems perceived in t4ose positions t4at GerIeleC ended up claiming t4at all we can Inow to e@ist are t4e ideas immediatelC given to our perception) A similar >epistemologicallC restrictive? position was 4eld bC ,ume, w4ose t4eorC of t4e Obundle of perceptionsP continued to e@ert influence in t4ose empiricist positions entangled wit4 sense9 data, .ualia, and ot4er similar notions connected wit4 Jindirect realismsK of manC sorts) FinallC, let us recall 4ow muc4 of t4e discussions concerning t4e so-called #erman *dealism centred around t4e &uestion of w4et4er Dant could be freed of t4e accusation of solipsism >w4ic4 was voiced bC 2acobi and ot4er critics onlC few mont4s after t4e publication of 4is first #riti.ueBa storC * tell in !ec4io, /00:, c4) N?) .ow, notwit4standing t4e reactions of critics in t4e 4istorC of p4ilosop4C, t4e fact remains t4at no p4ilosop4er seemed willing to reallC dra" w4at t4ose critics describe as t4e inevitable conse&uence of t4eir initial premises) W4C is it soW >* s4all come bacI to t4is &uestion?

*ntroduction RN .ow we maC start to get a better grip on $namunoPs point) For suppose one is convinced Bas t4e self-deceived p4ilosop4er depicted in $namunoPs passage isBt4at p4ilosop4C is an essentiallC disinterested argumentative activitC, w4ic4 aims at obtaining trut4Bor at least claritCBbC means of a dialectical contest of t4eses and counter-t4esesY given t4at general aim, t4e greater t4e diversitC of positions t4e betterY nowBso our p4ilosop4er would continueBit suffices for somet4ing to count as a p4ilosop4ical position in t4at sense t4at it can be c4aracteri=ed bC some clear and distinct t4esis, or a set of t4emBregardless of t4eir being 4eld bC anC real 4uman being) And solipsism, as c4aracteri=ed above, entirelC satisfies t4at re&uirement, in t4at it can be easilC distinguis4ed from, and, conse&uentlC, dialecticallC contrasted wit4, a series of ot4er p4ilosop4ical positions suc4 as, saC, realism, anti-realism, idealism, sIepticism, and so on) And Cet, one can easilC find real p4ilosop4ers supporting anC of t4e ot4er sorts of p4ilosop4ical positions mentioned above) !4en w4C is it ot4erwise wit4 solipsismW >*s it because solipsism is too far removed from our Jpre-p4ilosop4ical intuitionsK even to be >seriouslC? envisaged as an actual conclusion of p4ilosop4ical argumentationW Gut t4en again, pre-p4ilosop4ical intuitiveness alone will not do, since manC p4ilosop4ers are rat4er proud to defend manC sorts of >self-proclaimed? radicallC counter-intuitive views from time to time, no matter 4ow far-fetc4ed and even unlivable t4eC mig4t be)? * must again admit t4at * do not 4ave a simple, uncontentious answer to t4at &uestionBanCwaC none briefer t4an t4is w4ole dissertation itself) ActuallC, it also striIes me as remarIable t4at solipsism 4as t4is peculiar fate among p4ilosop4ers of serving as a mere strawman, an imaginarC adversarC in t4e p4ilosop4ical field to be >sometimes rat4er too &uicIlC? InocIed down, instead of being treated as a position wort4C of serious consideration bC itselfNN)BW4at is so specialBso disturbingWBabout solipsism t4at maIes it be seen as at most a temptation, a disease from w4ose infection p4ilosop4ers trCBmore or less consciouslCBto escapeW *n order to start answering t4ose &uestions, let us supposeBas $namuno asIs us to doB t4at p4ilosop4ical JproblemsK and JpositionsK, as traditionallC understood and presented, are actuallC intellectuali=ed versions of perple@ities and difficulties related to t4e 4uman
NN

5ne 4ere mig4t asI6 O*s t4ere any p4ilosop4ical position w4ic4 is e@empt from Jserving as a mere strawmanK etc)WP !o t4at * would answer6 of course not) \et t4at is not e@actlC mC pointY in saCing t4at solipsism 4as Oa peculiar fate among p4ilosop4ers _etc)`P * want to call attention to t4e fact t4at t4is position, contrarilC to ot4ers, is virtuallC universally despised and not taIen seriouslC in p4ilosop4CBan unanimitC w4ic4 is verC 4ard to find concerning anC ot4er p4ilosop4ical issue)

*ntroduction R/ needs of eac4 concrete p4ilosop4er) Wit4 t4at supposition in place, let us asI ourselves w4et4er we can find a set of suc4 perple@ities and difficulties, w4ic4 mig4t be recogni=ablC linIed to t4e solipsistic JdoctrineK, as defined above) ,ere is mC initial attempt at providing suc4 an >essentiallC open-ended? listBamounting to a set of reminders of discontentments t4at can be caused in our ordinarC e@c4anges, due to suc4 facts as t4ese6 >i? t4at one cannot see t4e world as a w4ole, apart from a particular and partial perspective, so t4at one mig4t reali=e t4at onePs e@perience is not omnipresent, 4ence limitedY >ii? t4at one cannot c4ange t4e past or foresee t4e future, so t4at one mig4t feel simultaneouslC powerless and burdened bC 4aving to c4oose a >present? course of action w4ic4 mig4t well turn out to be t4e wrong oneY >iii? t4at people >including oneself? can >and often do? dissimulate t4eir feelings, or simplC 4ide t4em from ot4ers, so t4at one cannot point to someonePs feelings as one can point to 4er be4aviourY >iv? t4at one mig4t feel unable to e@press >4ence s4are? onePs own feelings and e@periences, t4us finding oneself unInown, and unable to maIe oneself Inown, so t4at onePs 4umanitC is at staIeY or again >v? t4at one mig4t feel t4at w4at one e@presses goes beCond onePs control, so t4at it is onePs identitC, or self-conception, t4at is at staIe) !4ose are all facts related to t4e finite condition of a being w4o >at least in some moods and circumstances? mig4t see its limits as limitations, t4us becoming dissatisfied wit4 its separation from t4e world and ot4ers, wis4ing >or even craving? not to be finiteY now for someoneBsaC meBto be in t4at condition means for me to be alwaCs e@posed to t4e possibilitC of loneliness, of loosing mC attunement wit4 t4e world and ot4ersBbe it because * can alwaCs end up closing mCself to ot4ers, or avoiding to accept t4e world as it is, or because ot4ers can alwaCs fail to acInowledge me, or to accept t4at t4e world t4eC in4abit is t4e same as t4e one * in4abit) .ow, t4ere are at least two waCs of >re?interpreting t4e JdoctrineK of solipsism so as to recover its >possible? e@istential sources, t4us allowing one to see t4at position as an intellectuali=ed response to t4at w4ic4 * s4all refer collectivelC as t4e t4reat of loneliness) !4e first >re?interpretation is t4is6 solipsism itself maC be an intellectuali=ed version of lonelinessBa displaced reaction, saC, to t4e reali=ation t4at one is >metap4CsicallC? separated from t4e world and ot4ersBw4ic4 mig4t lead one to conclude t4at it is simplC impossible to maIe so muc4 as sense of t4e idea of t4ere being anCt4ing outside or beyond onePs own >private? e@periences) ,ere is t4e second possibilitC6 solipsism maC be an

*ntroduction RR intellectuali=ed attempt at overcoming t4at sort of lonelinessBactuallC resulting in a repression of itBreplacing bC it a fantasC in w4ic4 all reality ends up coordinated wit4 t4e self, so t4at onePs e@periences would actuallC embrace all t4ere is to be e@periencedBas if wit4 no restBand t4e sub<ect 4imT4erself would, in a sense, disappear, t4us allowing solipsism to coincide wit4 t4e purest and more direct realismN/) 5ne mig4t see eac4 interpretation of t4at pair as >respectivelC? t4e 4alf-emptC and t4e 4alffull glasses of solipsism) Got4 are rat4er radicallC intellectuali=ed reactions to a set of real >and, at least in some moods, t4reatening? difficulties w4ic4 mig4t be felt bC finite beings liIe us, endowed wit4 suc4 capacities and burdens as we 4ave of taIing up our >limited and conditioned? e@periences of t4e world and ot4ers, endowing t4em wit4 meaning and purposeBor failing to) And since facing t4ose difficulties seems to be a standing possibilitC for anC >finite? 4uman being, solipsism >on bot4 interpretations? mig4t be seen as a radical attempt at deflecting or repressing our verC 4umanitCY as suc4, solipsism contrasts both wit4 t4e ot4er, more commonBpreciselC because less radical, 4ence less conspicuousBp4ilosop4ical attempts at deflectionNR, and wit4 a more resolute attempt at acInowledging and accepting our finitude) And t4at seems to be part of t4e reason w4CB wit4 few e@ceptionsBp4ilosop4ers 4ave often displaCed suc4 uncommon an@ietC in t4eir dismissive attitudes toward solipsism, as if it alone could >s4ouldW? not be allowed t4e benefit of serious consideration)

R) !4at brings me to mC subtitle, and t4us to t4e p4ilosop4ers w4ose proper names * t4erein citeBvi7., Strawson, Wittgenstein and CavellBas well as to mC reasons for going bacI to t4eir writings, seeIing for some lessons about t4e correct waC to tacIle t4e issues of solipsism, loneliness and finitude) As we s4all see in due course, it is a commonBif sometimes insufficientlC acInowledgedBfeature of t4eir worIs t4at t4eC 4ave paid a remarIable amount of attention to t4ose issues >bC anC ot4er names? in t4eir respective attempts at coming to grips wit4 t4e nature of 4uman e@perience) AlsoBand, * taIe it, not
N/

NR

* am in t4is paragrap4 ec4oing passages from Wittgenstein >esp) in section :)E of t4e Tractatus?, as well as from FloCdPs reading of t4ose and ot4er passages >N11M, esp) p) N0Q?) * s4all e@amine t4e original passages from bot4 aut4ors at lengt4 in c4apter /) An implication w4ic4 * s4all e@plore later is t4at t4e remaining JpositionsK mentioned aboveBe)g), realism, anti-realism and sIepticism, in t4eir multiple manifestationsBmig4t also be seen as deflections, alt4oug4 more palatable >because less radical? ones, if compared to solipsism)

*ntroduction RQ bC c4anceBone can find in t4eir approac4es a central met4odological concern wit4 disclosing t4e ultimate sources and conse&uences of t4e p4ilosop4ical problems and positions wit4 w4ic4 t4eC engageBsources and conse&uences w4ic4, as we s4all see, will include preciselC t4ose e@istential, non-cognitive, emotional, affectiveBin a word, embodiedBdifficulties and perple@ities available to beings liIe us) 5f course t4ere are important differences among t4ose aut4orsPs stances, and it is mC 4ope t4at bC contrasting and comparing t4em we maC end up ac4ieving a more perspicuous view of t4e options at our disposal in t4e tasI of understanding and maIing sense of our condition) W4at follows is a brief summarC of a surveC w4ic4 is in itself onlC partial)

Q) "eter StrawsonPs role in t4is dissertation is actuallC t4e most difficult to summari=e) As it s4all become clear in c4apter N, * 4ave an ambivalent attitude toward 4is general stance6 on t4e one 4and, * taIe it t4at t4e met4odological concern mentioned above is an important but relativelC underestimated aspect of 4is p4ilosop4CY Cet, on t4e ot4er 4and, * also believe t4at suc4 an underestimation is partiallC to be credited to StrawsonPs own faultB t4at it is caused bC 4is own conflicting p4ilosop4ical interests, w4ic4 include t4e JordinarC language p4ilosop4CKPs demand for Oa close e@amination of t4e actual use of wordsPNQ wit4 t4e metap4Csical >saC Dantian? ideal of OlaC_ing` bare t4e most general features of our conceptual structurePN:) >* must confess t4at * 4ad verC similarBand, as * no" can see, similarlC conflictingBinterests in view for a w4ileNE) W4at t4at means is t4at mC attempt to offer a diagnosis of t4e s4ortcomings of StrawsonPs stance is actuallCBper4aps even primarilCBan attempt to come to terms wit4 mC own p4ilosop4ical in4eritanceY so it is far from JdisinterestedKBas are, * am afraid, all t4e rest of mC analCses)? !4e conflict between t4ose two trends in StrawsonPs p4ilosop4C becomes particularlC salient w4en it comes to 4is analCsis, as presented in c4apter R of Individuals, of t4e notion of a Osub<ect of e@perienceP, and of t4e conditions for ac4ieving a Onon-solipsistic consciousnessP of t4e worldBi)e), a consciousness capable of distinguis4ing between itself and its e@periences, on t4e one 4and, and t4at w4ic4 is not itself and its e@periences, on t4e ot4er. As we s4all see in due course, Strawson gestures at t4e idea t4at t4ere is an
NQ N: NE

See IndividualsPs *ntroduction >N1:1, p) 1?) Id. ibid. An important record of t4at being mC 8asterPs dissertation >see !ec4io, /00:?)

*ntroduction R: important role to be plaCed bC a non-detac4ed stance towards ot4ers in t4e constitution of a Onon-solipsisticP consciousnessY Cet, given t4e level of abstraction in w4ic4 4is analCsis is pursued in IndividualsBwit4 scant reference to t4e lives w4ic4 endow our concepts wit4 w4atever significance t4eC 4aveBt4e resulting picture is rat4er too sIetc4C, falling seriouslC s4ort >or so, anCwaC, * s4all argue? of providing a realistic representation of t4e main sub<ects of t4at c4apterBin particular of t4e notion of Operson4oodP, and t4e conditions of ascription of psCc4ological predicates) .ow Strawson 4imself provides some elements to improve on t4at picture in 4is later e@aminationBmost notablC as presented in t4e essaC OFreedom and %esentmentPBof t4e varieties of reactive attitudes and feelings toward ot4er 4uman beings w4ic4 are c4aracteristic of our interpersonal relations4ips) Compared to t4e t4oroug4lC aseptic stance taIen in Individuals, t4e analCsis pursued in t4at later essaC is surelC an advancement, in t4at it points out more clearlC to t4e practical conse&uences of adopting a detac4ed attitude toward ot4ersBnamelC, t4e denial of t4eir 4umanitC, and, as a conse&uence, of our own) .evert4eless, t4ere remains an important s4ortcoming in StrawsonPs general approac4, w4ic4 gets e@pressed in 4is unwarranted optimism toward t4e possibilitC <ust indicated, epitomi=ed in 4is claim t4at our attitudes of involvement and participation would not be suppressed Oeven if some general trut4 were a t4eoretical ground for itPNL) * s4all tacIle t4at issue in t4e conclusion of c4apter N, arguing t4at StrawsonPs own detac4ed perspective is w4at ultimatelC allows 4im to evade t4e real issue posed bC t4e Jproblem of solipsismKB* mean t4e fact t4at it is up to us >as a c4allenge w4ic4 maC be resolutelC faced as muc4 as &uietlC denied? to acInowledge t4e 4umanitC of ot4ers, as well as to accept t4e givenness of t4e world and its ob<ects >a Cavellian t4eme, as we will see?) * s4all conclude bC suggesting t4at in order for t4at Iind of evasion to be avoided w4at we need is an alternative >or at least improved? met4odologCBa trulC realistic and non-detac4ed stance in p4ilosop4CBt4at will be more sensitive to t4e practices in w4ic4 our conceptual structure is immersed, and, in particular, to t4e real burdens put upon its practitioners >i)e), us, finite 4uman beings? bC our lives in t4e world and among ot4ers, w4ic4 maC be w4at drives us to p4ilosop4i=e in t4e first place)

NL

See F% N/)

*ntroduction RE :) !4at is mC cue to turn to Hudwig WittgensteinBa p4ilosop4er w4o, somew4at uncommonlC for a member of t4e >so-called? analCtical tradition, was reallC aware of t4at met4odological re&uirement, and 4as made great efforts to uncover t4e ultimate sources of t4e dissatisfactions lCing at t4e basis of t4e solipsistic temptation) As "eter ,acIer 4as pointed out, t4e solipsist is not4ing less t4an Ot4e arc4etCpal flC in t4e original flCbottleP from w4ic4 Wittgenstein wanted to s4ow a OwaC outP wit4 4is p4ilosop4C NM) *n fact, as we s4all see, solipsism features among t4e most recurrent and central topics of WittgensteinPs reflectionsBt4at being a first reason w4C * t4inI we s4ould also agree wit4 ,acIerPs <udgement to t4e effect t4at O_t`4e pu==les surrounding solipsism _)))` became for Wittgenstein t4e paradigm of t4e diseases of t4e intellect to w4ic4 p4ilosop4ers are so pronePN1) \et t4at initial agreement 4ides a deeper disagreement, w4ic4 gets perspicuouslC e@pressed in t4e conflicting answers we will consider to t4e following pair of &uestions6 >i? ,ow e@actlC t4e OwaC outP of solipsismBand, conse&uentlC, of t4e ot4er p4ilosop4ical confusions for w4ic4 it serves as a paradigmBis supposed to be s4own in 4is writingsW And >ii?Bsince t4ere seems to be an issue about t4e verC continuity of t4ose writingsB 4ow are we to understand t4e 4istorical development of WittgensteinPs views about solipsismW/0 Starting wit4 t4e latter &uestion >ii?, * taIe it t4at ,acIerPs answer can be summari=ed as follows6 >a? for t4e OCoung WittgensteinP >bC w4ic4 4e means, basicallC, t4e one w4o wrote t4e Eotebooks and t4e Tractatus?, Ot4ere is a sense in w4ic4 solipsism is trueP/NY >b? because 4e 4eld solipsism to be, in some sense, true, we s4ould conclude t4at O_Coung` Wittgenstein 4imself was not onlC tempted, but succumbedP to it//Y >c? t4e particular sort of solipsism to w4ic4 4e would 4ave succumbed is one of Sc4open4auerian influence, w4ic4
NM N1 /0

/N //

See ,acIer, N1ME, p) /N:) >!4e passage alluded bC ,acIer is in "* cR01)? Id. ibid. !4e main reason for contrasting mC own reading wit4 ,acIerPs at t4is point is t4at * taIe t4e latter as representative of a verC general approac4 to WittgensteinPs p4ilosop4CBw4ic4, for 4istorical reasons, deserves to be called OreceivedP or Oort4odo@P reading) As is well Inown, t4at received reading 4as been stronglC critici=ed in at least one front in t4e last few decades, bC t4e so called Oresolute readersP of t4e TractatusBamong w4om notoriouslC figure Cora (iamond and 2ames Conant >see esp) (iamond N11N ] /000, Conant N1M1, N110, N11R, /000 ] /00N, and Conant ] (iamond /00Q?) Alt4oug4 mC own reading is surelC more aligned to t4e latter approac4Bas t4e analCses below s4all clearlC s4owB* am not willing Band, w4at is more important, do not t4inI it is necessarCBto assume its trut4 in order for mC argument to be put forward) .eedless to saC, * would rat4er 4ave mC own approac4 to be <udged bC its own concrete resultsB4ence, * will not trC to c4aracteri=e anC of t4ose readings in general terms until t4e end of c4apter Q, and s4all instead indicate some differences concerning specific issues as t4e argument advances, aiming at attaining a more perspicuous view on t4e general differences as a result) * mention t4at dispute 4ere onlC in order to indicate t4at it 4as been alwaCs at t4e bacIground of mC own reflections) See ibid), p) MN) See ibid., p) N0Q)

*ntroduction RL ,acIer dubs O!ranscendental SolipsismP/R) >d? Against t4at Coung, sCmpat4etic attitude toward solipsism, t4e Olater WittgensteinP >i)e), t4e one w4o wrote during t4e N1R0Ps, and ended up producing t4e Investigations? would 4ave c4anged 4is mind radicallC, offering w4at ,acIer describes as a Odetailed refutation of solipsismP, w4ic4 was later Oincorporated, in low IeC, in t4e InvestigationsP/Q) >* emp4asi=e t4at OrefutationP is ,acIerPs preferred term of criticism to describe t4e OwaC outP of solipsism intended bC Wittgenstein in 4is mature p4ase, since t4at offers an important clue to understand ,acIerPs own view concerning &uestion >i? aboveY more on t4is point in a moment)? >e? !4at OrefutationP, in turn, 4as its own 4istorical development, w4ic4 ,acIer summari=es in t4e following passage6
_WittgensteinPs` refutation _of solipsism` comes in t4ree p4ases) !4e first stage is to be found in t4e writings and reports of t4e transitional period from N1/1 to t4e academic Cear N1R/TR) !4e Philosophical >emarks is particularlC important 4ere, but t4e notes taIen bC Waismann and 8oore are also significant) !4e second and most revealing p4ase of 4is concern wit4 uncovering t4e errors of solipsism >in particular? and idealism >in general? is between N1RR and N1RE) !4e ?lue ?ook and O.otes for HecturesP contain WittgensteinPs most important arguments in refutation of solipsism) !4e t4ird and final p4ase finds its full e@pression in t4e Investigations, wit4 some additional material in Kettel) ,ere t4e direct and overt interest in solipsism is diminis4ed, and its place taIen bC t4e fullC developed argument against t4e possibilitC of a private language, a brief sIetc4 of w4ic4 4ad alreadC appeared in t4e O.otes for HecturesP) Alt4oug4 solipsism is onlC indirectlC alluded to, most of t4e arguments developed in t4e second p4ase reappear in 4ig4lC condensed form in t4e Investigations and Kettel) >,acIer, N1ME, pp) /N:-/NE?

!4ere is, in fact, muc4 to be learnt from t4e summarC presented above) "articularlC remarIable is t4e waC ,acIer connects WittgensteinPs initial concerns wit4 solipsism to t4e celebrated argument against t4e possibilitC of a private language in t4e Investigations) Again, * totallC agree about t4e importance of t4at connection, e@cept for t4e fact t4at * want to maIe it even tig4ter6 in mC view, and to t4e e@tent in w4ic4, for t4e Coung Wittgenstein, t4ere is some trut4 in solipsism, t4e same 4olds of t4e later WittgensteinPs treatment of privacCY bC t4e same toIen, * cannot agree t4at t4e waC out of solipsism is correctlC construed as a matter of refuting t4at JpositionK, anC more t4an * can agree t4at t4e later Wittgenstein provides a proof of t4e impossibilitC of a private language >i)e), a refutation of it?) >!4is is not to saC t4at t4ere are no important p4ilosop4ical differences between t4e accounts of t4e Coung and t4e later WittgensteinBbut * t4inI t4e most
/R /Q

See ibid., p) 11) See ibid) pp) MN-M/)

*ntroduction RM illuminating waC to understand t4ose differences is bC looIing at t4em against t4e bacIground of t4eir s4ared met4odological assumptions, w4ic4 in turn can onlC be made perspicuous after a careful analCsis of 4is development, w4ic4 is preciselC w4at * s4all trC to offer, if in a limited waC, in c4apters /-Q)? *n effect, differentlC from t4e >rat4er self-indulgent? attitude commonlC adopted bC p4ilosop4ers wit4 respect to suc4 topics as solipsism or privacC, Wittgenstein reallC made t4e pains of t4e solipsist T private linguist 4is own, sCstematicallC engaging in 4is reflections in an attempt to acInowledge and to give full voice to t4ese p4ilosop4ical temptationsY it is not e@actlC surprising, t4en, t4at 4is attitude could be sometimes taIen for a sCmptom of 4is own OsuccumbingP to t4ose temptations) \etBso * s4all argueBt4e trut4 is t4at for Wittgenstein >Coung and later?, t4ere is no effective treatment to Ot4e diseases of t4e intellect to w4ic4 p4ilosop4ers are so proneP e@cept immuni=ation >4owever momentarC and partial? bC means of onePs own defencesBsomet4ing w4ic4 is broug4t about onlC bC being first infected oneself) >Gut notice t4at Oeffective treatmentP is not to be taIen as e&uivalent to somet4ing liIe Ofinal curePY t4is is <ust to point out t4at one of t4e t4ings we 4ave Cet to understand is w4at e@actlC one s4ould e@pect from t4e Iind of t4erapC t4at Wittgenstein purports to offer in 4is writings)? And again, since solipsism, besides being a paradigm of t4ose diseases, mig4t also be seen as one of t4e most intense Ban outburst or paro@Csm, saC, of p4ilosop4ical an@ieties w4ic4 find more subdued e@pressions in ot4er topicsBt4at could account for t4e rat4er careful, aseptic 4andling w4ic4 c4aracteri=es t4e standard attitude toward t4at particular case w4ic4 is found among p4ilosop4ers, few of w4om would 4ave t4e willingness to strictlC follow out t4e implications of t4eir own initial assumptions) As * read WittgensteinBand t4at applies particularlC to t4e writings w4ic4 are dealt wit4 in t4e following analCses, namelC6 t4e Tractatus >c4apter /?, t4e Philosophical >emarks >c4apter R? and t4e ?lue ?ook >c4apter Q?/:B4is is a te@t w4ere solipsism, as one among so manC instances of our all too 4uman attempts to evade t4e Oproblems of lifeP/E, is neit4er refuted nor defendedY rat4er, it is enacted, and it is supposed to be re-enacted bC t4e reader, wit4 t4e ultimate end of being cured bC onePs own means, i)e), bC its being sCstematicallC
/:

/E

!4e reason for focusing on t4ose writings is t4at t4eC are t4e most important conte@ts w4ere Wittgenstein deals e@plicitlC wit4 issues related to solipsismY * s4all nonet4eless provide some considerations e@plaining 4ow * t4inI t4e general reading * will pursue in t4ose c4apters can be applied to WittgensteinPs later treatment of privacCBparticularlC in t4e Philosophical InvestigationsBin mC epilogue to c4apter Q) See !H" :)E/)

*ntroduction R1 s4own t4at, contrarC to w4at one is initiallC tempted to suppose, onePs attempts at formulating t4at Jp4ilosop4ical positionK end up producing one of two e&uallC unsatisfCing resultsBnamelC6 apparently substantial Cet empty and pointless statements >4owever superficiallC in accordance wit4 logico-grammatical rules?, or >b? meaningful Cet trivial ones) W4at t4at s4ows is, in bot4 cases, t4at resorting to solipsism >among manC ot4er suc4 JpositionsK? is not reallC a matter of presenting and defending logical, epistemological and T or metap4Csical Jt4esesK or Jt4eoriesK about Jt4e essenceK of realitC >as opposed, saC, to empirical or scientific t4eses and t4eories about it?Y rat4er, it is a matter of deflecting t4e e@istential difficulties posed bC >our reactions to? t4at realitCBt4at w4ic4 * referred collectivelC as t4e t4reat of loneliness) Gut in order for t4at >self-?diagnosis and t4e corresponding >self-?t4erapC to be successful, one needs to be readC to counteract old p4ilosop4ical 4abits, w4ic4 mig4t be deeplC rootedY faced wit4 t4at c4allenge, it is all but impossible to fall bacI and taIe t4ose verC grammatical reminders presented bC Wittgenstein as furt4er pat4s, or e@cuses, to deflection, t4erebC onlC reinforcing t4e repression of t4e real issues at staIe) As we s4all see, it is ultimatelC up to eac4 of us to find a resolution to t4at situationBto taIe WittgensteinPs reminders as laCing down t4e >logico-grammatical? Haw, or as mere rungs in so manC ladders to be t4rown awaC once t4e w4ole t4erapeutic progress is over)

E) !4e >admittedlC s4ocIing? claim * made about t4ere being some trut4 in solipsism T privacC >see c:? 4as a Cavellian inspiration, w4ic4 s4all be broug4t to t4e fore in t4e final c4apter) StanleC Cavell notoriouslC claims t4at t4ere is some trut4 in sIepticism /LBin t4at one is often not e@actlC un<ustified in becoming disappointed wit4 >w4at Wittgenstein calls? criteria, since t4eC actuallC cannot ensureBas it were impersonallCBt4at agreement >and 4ence meaning? will be fort4coming) #iven t4at view on t4e reac4 of our criteria, Cavell is constantlC driven to emp4asi=e t4at Wittgenstein does not e@actlC want to deny t4e possibilitC of a private language/MY w4at 4e wants to s4ow is rat4er t4at privacC is a standing 4uman possibilitCBin t4at our criteria, being grounded onlC in our 4uman interests and needs >Oall t4e w4irl of organism Wittgenstein calls Jforms of lifeKP?, and in our s4aring of a common Onatural 4istorCP >see "* cQN:?, must be alwaCs open to t4e Iind
/L

/M

See, e)g), ODnowing and AcInowledgingP, in <ust We <ean What We Say=, The #laim of >eason and The Senses of Walden, <ust to indicate t4e main conte@ts w4ere t4is idea is put forward) See, e)g), C%, p) R/1 ] RQQ)

*ntroduction Q0 of repudiation favoured bC t4e sIepticB4ence, t4at t4e overcoming of privacC must be alwaCs an achievement, somet4ing for w4ic4 eac4 of us 4as to taIe responsibilitC) !4e implication is t4atBcontrarilC to w4at more t4an a few Wittgensteinian p4ilosop4ers 4ave t4oug4tBrecounting our criteria simplC cannot be a waC to refute sIepticismY in fact t4at can actuallC reinforce it, bC s4owing 4ow fragile and Jsub<ectiveKBi)e), all-too-4umanB our grounds for agreement reallC are) \et t4at does not mean t4at sIepticism s4ould be simplC accepted6 t4e sIeptic maC be rig4t in pointing out >as against a dogmatic adversarC? t4at t4e e@istence of t4e Je@ternal worldK or of Jot4er mindsK cannot be Inown wit4 unassailable certaintCY Cet >s?4e errs if >s?4e interprets t4at result as amounting to a demonstration t4at t4e world and ot4ers mig4t well not be realY all t4at sIepticism reallC s4ows is t4at t4e givenness of t4e former and t4e 4umanitC of t4e latter are not functions of kno"ing t4em, but rat4er of accepting and ackno"ledging t4emB4ence, t4at t4e true costs involved in t4e >alwaCs possible? sIeptical wit4drawal of consent are not >simplC? epistemic and t4eoretical, but rat4er practical or e@istentialBw4atever mig4t be t4e practical or e@istential costs of denCing or repressing our acceptance of t4e world and our acInowledgement of ot4ers >* assume it is clear t4at t4is maIes for a verC large set of tasIs and commitments, w4ose limits cannot be foreseen bC a priori speculation?) !4e remarIs above are meant to motivate mC strategC in c4apter :, s4owing 4ow it connects to t4e issues presented so far) W4at * will do in t4at c4apter is to illustrate t4e relevance of t4at Cavellian-Wittgensteinian approac4 to criteria and sIepticismBin particular, t4e relevance of acInowledging t4at agreement and meaning are not >as it were? e@ternallC and impersonallC imposed, but are rat4er personal ac4ievementsBfor assessing a somew4at distant debate involving contemporarC anti-individualism about content, as e@posed in t4e writings of Saul DripIe, ,ilarC "utnam and !Cler Gurge) 8C initial aim will be to point out t4e e@istence of a common structure in t4e arguments emploCed bC t4ose p4ilosop4ers in order to support t4eir anti-individualistic views of contentY wit4 t4at structure at 4and, * s4all indicate a s4ared commitment to w4at * will describe as an OimpersonalP view of meaning and normativitC, and t4en trC to present some of t4e problems arising out of t4at commitment) *n order to do t4at * s4all adopt a somew4at comple@ argumentative strategC, w4ose ne@t step will be to reconstruct t4e OsIeptical solutionP for t4e OsIeptical parado@P of linguistic normativitC famouslC presented bC DripIe in 4is Wittgenstein on >ules and Private +anguage, s4owing t4at t4e latter

*ntroduction QN argument can also be seen as fitting t4e previouslC underscored structure >i)e) t4at w4ic4 frames t4e arguments for anti-individualism about content?) ,aving t4us drawn a parallel between t4e anti-individualistsPs and JDripIensteinKPs arguments, * will turn to t4e reconstruction of CavellPs criticisms against t4e resulting position, focusing on 4is diagnosis of t4e problems in4erent to t4e impersonal model of normativitC) !4at criticism s4all eventuallC prompt me to present, in t4e concluding section, a sIetc4 of an alternative picture of 4uman language and normativitC, w4ic4 * t4inI is free from t4e problems of t4e impersonal modelBin particular, from t4e Iind of evasion it impliesBand w4ic4 promises to represent our condition more fait4fullC)

VVV

5ne final note seems in order) As t4e preceding recounting of t4e pat4 * 4ave followed in t4e dissertation indicates, * s4all for most of t4e timeBCet surelC not for all t4e timeBdeal onlC wit4 JprimarC sourcesK, letting e@egetical and ot4er disputes aside >or at best mentioning t4em on parent4etical remarIs or footnotes?) !4e reason for t4at is, in part, t4at * believe t4ere are still new and important insig4ts to be reaped bC fres4lC reconsidering suc4 well-Inown worIs, even if t4eC 4ave alreadC received a 4uge amount of attention) * would feel more t4an satisfied if mC own readings, as presented in t4e c4apters to follow, can serve as invitations to go bacI to t4ose familiar >and per4aps a few not so familiar? pat4sBsometimes at a verC slow paceBso as to attend to one or anot4er feature of t4e landscape w4ic4 mig4t 4ave >as Cet? gone unnoticed or underestimated)

Solipsism and %esentment6 Finding a ,uman Face for StrawsonPs "ersons Q/

Solipsism and Resentment: Finding a Human Face for Strawson s !ersons

LTMruth in philosophy, though not to be despaired of, is so comple) and many9sided, so multi9faced, that any individual philosopher!s "ork, if it is to have any unity and coherence, must at best emphasi7e some aspects of the truth, to the neglect of others "hich may strike another philosopher "ith greater force.

") F) Strawson What I have "ritten, and I suppose the "ay I have "ritten, gro"s from a sense that philosophy is in one of its periodic crises of method, heightened by a "orry I am sure is not mine alone, that method dictates to contentN that, for e)ample, an intellectual commitment to analytical philosophy trains concern a"ay from the "ider, traditional problems of human culture "hich may have brought one to philosophy in the first place. Oet one can find oneself unable to relin.uish either the method or the alien concern. StanleC Cavell

1"1 Introduction
N) "eter StrawsonPs magnum opus, Individuals/1, plaCed a central role in t4e re4abilitation of metap4Csics wit4in t4e analCtic tradition) *n an often-&uoted passage of t4e *ntroduction to t4at booI, Strawson claims t4at metap4Csics can be eit4er OdescriptiveP or OrevisionarCP6 t4e former is Ocontent to describe t4e actual structure of our t4oug4t about t4e worldP, w4ereas t4e latter intends to Oproduce a better structureP >*. 1?) Individuals, as its subtitle maIes clear, is envisaged as an OessaC in descriptive metap4CsicsPY its scope is rat4er restricted, 4owever, in t4at it does not aim to describe every single aspect of our Oconceptual structureP, but onlC its Omost general featuresP >ibid.?) !4at muc4 is well-Inown and sufficientlC acInowledged among IndividualsPs readers and interpreters) \et not everC aspect of StrawsonPs investigation in t4at booI 4as received as muc4 attention as, saC, 4is <ustlC celebrated discussion of t4e conditions for identification and reidentification of p4Csical particulars >ObodiesP or Omaterial ob<ectsP?, presented in
/1

"ublis4ed in N1:1)

*ntroduction QR c4apter N) 5ne relativelC underestimated feature of 4is account is t4e indication, near t4e end of c4apter RPs analCsis of t4e notion of a Osub<ect of e@perienceP, of an important condition for t4e constitution of an ob<ective, Onon-solipsisticP consciousness of t4e world BnamelC, t4e role plaCed bC a Onon-detac4edP attitude toward ot4er 4uman beings >particularlC, but not e@clusivelC, in t4e conte@ts of ascription of psCc4ological predicates?) Alt4oug4, as we s4all see, suc4 an attitude was alreadC at worI >4owever implicitlC? in t4e argument of Individuals, its p4ilosop4ical significance was not fullC broug4t to lig4t until t4e publication of t4e paper OFreedom and %esentmentPR0) "er4aps unsurprisinglCBgiven t4at t4is later essaC seems to 4ave received less attention from interpreters of StrawsonPs Jt4eoretical p4ilosop4CK, and also in part because Strawson 4imself did not maIe muc4 to 4ig4lig4t its importance in IndividualsBlittle or no reference to t4e role of suc4 attitude is to be found in t4e reconstructions of 4is Janti-solipsisticK argument) >.ote t4at * am not suggesting t4at t4e argument of c4apter R is itself underestimated among StrawsonPs readers) Het me recall t4at one of t4e main conclusions drawn in t4at c4apter is t4at personsdbesides Omaterial ob<ectsP, or ObodiesP, as described in c4apter Ndare basic particulars of our conceptual sc4eme) !4at t4esis, in turn, 4as two important conse&uences, namelC6 >i? t4at persons are irreducible to anC ot4er particular or combination of particulars, suc4 as ObodC e mindPY >ii? t4at t4e identification >and t4erefore identitC? of ot4er particulars >among w4ic4, as we s4all see, are mental e@periences and attitudes, as well as actions? is dependent upon a prior identification of persons) .ow of course that argumentBt4e argument, i)e), for t4e basic status of persons in our conceptual sc4emeB4as broug4t about a lot of discussion during t4e decades following t4e publication of Individuals) "eter ,acIer, for one, goes as far as saCing t4at OStrawsonPs investigations _in c4apter R of Individuals` placed t4e unified concept of a personBt4e concept of a living 4uman beingBat centre-stage w4ere it belongsP, t4us conferring to t4is topic Ot4e centralitC it en<oCed in p4ilosop4ical debate for t4e ne@t decadesP >/00/, p) //?) *n fact, * t4inI we s4ould agree wit4 ,acIer) 8oreover, a number of important criticisms were presented in t4at debate against StrawsonPs account of t4e basic status of persons, some of w4ic4 * also t4inI are essentiallC rig4tRN) \et mC >initial? aim in t4is c4apter will be to emp4asi=e anot4er, rat4er positive aspect of StrawsonPs w4ole account of t4e
R0

RN

!4e paper was first delivered as a lecture to t4e Gritis4 AcademC in N1E0, and publis4ed in t4e Proceedings >vol) fHS***? in N1E/) See especiallC 2ones >N1EL?, Williams >N1LRY cap) :?, #locI ] ,Cman >N11Q?, and ,acIer >/00/?)

*ntroduction QQ conditions for a Onon-solipsistic consciousnessP w4ic4 does not seem to 4ave received t4e attention it deserves)?

/) !4e tasI of providing a more accurate reconstruction of StrawsonPs position concerning solipsism is tacIled in t4e first two sections below6 section N)/ deals wit4 t4e argument as presented in c4apter R of IndividualsY section N)R starts as an attempt to improve on t4e emerging picture wit4 materials borrowed from OFreedom and %esentmentP >in particular, its analCsis of a varietC of reactive attitudes and feelings toward ot4er 4uman beings?) Wit4 t4e reconstruction t4us finis4ed, * go on to suggest t4at t4ere remains an important met4odological s4ortcoming in StrawsonPs general approac4 to t4e issue of solipsismBa s4ortcoming w4ic4 4as to do wit4 w4at 4e 4imself describes in OFreedom and %esentmentP as Oour cool, contemporarC stCleP w4ic4 maIes us Oforget w4en we are engaged in p4ilosop4C _)))` w4at it is actuallC liIe to be involved in ordinarC interpersonal relations4ips, ranging from t4e most intimate to t4e most casualP >F% L?) GC ac4ieving t4at negative, critical result, * 4ope to maIe an initial case for t4e need of an alternative met4odologCBa more realistic and non-detac4ed stance in p4ilosop4CBw4ose main lines will be sIetc4ed in section N)Q, but w4ose completion will remain an open tasI) !4e basic suggestion will be t4at t4e verC pro<ect of a descriptive metap4Csics, as worIed out in Individuals, suffers from <ust t4e same limitation, w4ic4 is c4aracteristic of manC t4eoretical approac4es insufficientlC sensitive to some particular conditions of use of t4e concepts t4at constitute t4e Omassive central core of 4uman t4inIingP >*. N0? Strawson went about to describeBconditions derived from our involvement in a fabric of practices and relations4ips t4at maIe up t4e bacIground against w4ic4 t4ose concepts ac&uire life and meaning) *n presenting t4e diagnosis sIetc4ed above * 4ope to remain fait4ful to some of StrawsonPs best t4oug4ts on p4ilosop4ical met4odologC6 * am 4appC to grant t4at favouring t4e analCsis of t4e general features of our conceptual structure 4as an important function, w4ic4 is to unveil somet4ing t4at Odoes not readilC displaC itself on t4e surface of language, but lies submergedP >*. N0?Y 4owever, t4e price to be paid bC not complementing t4e analCsis of suc4 structure wit4 a more accurate description of its detailsBwit4 careful enoug4 attention to t4e practices in w4ic4 t4at structure is immersed, and, in particular, to

*ntroduction Q: t4e real threats faced bC its practitioners >i)e), us, finite 4uman beings?Bis to end up wit4 a bare sIeleton, incapable of standing on its own due to t4e lacI of t4e muscles and ot4er tissues t4at can 4old it uprig4t and move it about)

1"# Solipsism and Individuals

R)

!erson$ood:

t$e

argument

from

7ac4 of us distinguis4es between 4imself and states of 4imself on t4e one 4and, and w4at is not 4imself or a state of 4imself on t4e ot4er) W4at are t4e conditions of our maIing t4is distinction, and 4ow are t4eC fulfilledW *n w4at waC do we maIe it, and w4C do we maIe it in t4e waC we doW >*. ML?

!4ose are t4e &uestions wit4 w4ic4 Strawson opens c4apter R Individuals, titled O"ersonsP) Strawson refers to t4at group of &uestions collectivelC as Ot4e issue of solipsismP >*. ML?) *n order to understand 4is approac4 to t4at issue we 4ave to step bacI and looI at some of t4e results of t4e previous c4apter, titled OSoundsP) *n t4at c4apter, Strawson asIs us to conceive a O.o-Space worldPR/ in w4ic4 all t4e possible ob<ects of sensible e@perience are soundsBw4ic4, in turn, are to be identified essentiallC bC means of t4e temporal relations t4eC maintain wit4 eac4 ot4er and t4eir variation of volume, pitc4, and timbre RR) ,aving presented t4e basic conditions for t4e identification and reidentification of particulars in t4is auditorC world >among w4ic4 are t4e e@istence of publiclC observable sounds, and an analogue of t4e structure of space-time coordinatesBt4e Omaster-soundP >*. LE?? Strawson goes on wit4 4is t4oug4t-e@periment, e@amining w4at t4e conditions for a Onon-solipsistic consciousnessP would amount to in suc4 a scenarioRQ)
R/

,ere is t4e passage w4ere Strawson introduces 4is proposal, inspired >as elsew4ere? bC a Dantian t4esis6 Dant 4eld t4at all representations were in inner sense, of w4ic4 !ime was t4e formY but onlC some representations were representations of outer sense, of w4ic4 Space was t4e form) * suggest t4at we in&uire w4et4er t4ere could be a sc4eme w4ic4 provided for ob<ective particulars, w4ile dispensing wit4 outer sense and all its representations) * suggest we e@plore t4e .o-Space world) *t will at least be a world wit4out bodies) >*. ER?

RR

RQ

See >*. E:?) *t is of t4e nature of t4e case presented bC Strawson t4at t4ese ob<ects >i)e), sounds? do not possess anC intrinsic spatial c4aracteristic) ,e offers some observations in support to t4is point in >*. E:EE?) .otice t4at t4e mere fact t4at an in4abitant of t4e auditorC world can identifC and reidentifC Jsounds-ase@periencedKBprovided, i)e), t4at s4e is capable of emploCing t4e Omaster-soundP in order to recogni=e t4e volume, pitc4, and timbre of t4e sounds s4e 4ears, as well as of s4aring and comparing 4er

Solipsism and "erson4ood6 t4e argument from *ndividuals QE We can easilC imagine a waC in w4ic4 an in4abitant of t4e auditorC world could Jdistinguis4 4erselfK from ot4er items s4e e@periencesBs4e mig4t, for instance, graduallC learn to recogni=e t4e timber and ot4er peculiar c4aracteristics of 4er own JvoiceK ><ust liIe we actuallC do?, t4us becoming capable of distinguis4ing t4ose particular sounds w4ic4 s4e originates from t4e Je@ternalK sounds s4e <ust 4appen to perceive, wit4out anC active effort) Gut notice t4at t4e problem wit4 t4is Iind of Jself-identificationK is t4at it would be made on t4e basis of data w4ic4 are t4emselves internal to onePs e@perience, and, as suc4, would not >Cet? 4ave proven to 4ave anC ob<ectivitCBafter all, t4e JdataK t4emselves could be made up6 to adapt from a verC well Inown p4ilosop4C-cum-science-fiction illustration, t4eC could be implants made bC an Jevil scientistK, w4o uses some special apparatus >similar to our 4eadp4ones? connected to a matri), causing t4e sub<ect to think t4at s4e perceives and distinguis4es 4erself >i)e), 4er JvoiceK? among t4e ot4er sounds from t4e >auditorC? Je@ternal worldK, w4en s4e is in fact onlC Je@periencingK an >auditorC? simulation, created bC a computer) !4e main point of pursuing t4is imaginarC e@ercise is t4at it 4elps to raise a problem w4ic4 is absolutelC general, and w4ic4, according to Strawson, Oapplies as muc4 to t4e ordinarC as to t4e auditorC worldP >*. M1?Bt4e problem, namelC, of 4ow could a sub<ect w4o perceives 4erself as an item "ithin t4e field of e@perience possiblC come to conceive 4erself also as somet4ing w4ic4 has e@periences, i)e), as an observer, somet4ing distinct from t4e ot4er items w4ic4 s4e e@periencesR:) *n spite of s4owing itself Jtoo meagreK
e@periences wit4 t4ose of >supposed? ot4ersBis not bC anC means a sufficient condition for ascribing 4er a non-solipsistic consciousnessY in fact, ascribing t4at Iind of consciousness to someone on t4is reduced basis would simplC beg t4e &uestion) !o put it brieflC6 processes of identification and reidentification of particulars re&uire, as a condition of ob<ectivitC, t4e idea of a non-observed e@istence of t4ose particularsY t4at idea, in turn, implies a distinction between being observed and not being observed, w4ic4, finallC, presupposes a distinction between an observer >a sub<ect? and somet4ing observed >an ob<ect?) GutBas we s4all see more clearlC in a momentBnone of t4ose conditions can be granted on t4e mere basis of Jintra-e@perientialK distinctions made bC a sub<ect) Strawson presents t4e difficultC in more detail in t4e following passage6 Would it not seem utterlC strange to suggest t4at 4e _i)e), t4e sub<ect of t4e auditorC world` mig4t distinguis4 4imself as one item among ot4ers _)))`, t4at is, as a sound or se&uence of soundsW For 4ow could suc4 a t4ingBa soundBbe also w4at 4ad all t4ose e@periencesW \et to 4ave t4e idea of 4imself, must 4e not 4ave t4e idea of t4e sub<ect of t4e e@periences, of t4at w4ic4 4as t4emW So it mig4t begin to looI impossible t4at 4e s4ould 4ave t4e idea of 4imselfBor at anC rate t4e rig4t idea) For to 4ave t4e idea at all, it seems t4at it must be an idea of some particular t4ing of w4ic4 4e 4as e@perience, and w4ic4 is set over against or contrasted wit4 ot4er t4ings of w4ic4 4e 4as e@perience, but w4ic4 are not 4imself) Gut if it is <ust an item wit4in 4is e@perience of w4ic4 4e 4as t4is idea, 4ow can it be t4e idea of t4at w4ic4 4as all of 4is e@periencesW >*. MM-M1?

R:

Solipsism and "erson4ood6 t4e argument from *ndividuals QL >feature-wise? to provide a solution for t4is problem in t4e auditorC world scenarioRE, t4e t4oug4t e@periment proposed bC Strawson would 4ave, according to 4im, Oa certain advantageP, w4ic4 is to give us Oa continuing sense of t4e strangeness of w4at we in fact do _in our o"n conceptual sc4eme, i)e)`Y and t4is sense of strangeness we want to Ieep alive in order to see t4at we reallC meet it and remove it, and do not <ust lose or smot4er itP >*. MM?RL)

Q) Strawson elaborates on t4at difficultC >and also provides a solution to it? in relation to our own conceptual sc4eme in c4apter R of Individuals) ,e begins bC drawing a distinction between two categories of predicates t4at we ordinarilC ascribe to ourselves and to ot4ers6 on t4e one 4and, t4e categorC of predicates t4at Owe also ascribe to material bodiesP >e)g), locali=ation, colour, si=e, s4ape, weig4t, etc)?, and, on t4e ot4er 4and, t4e categorC of predicates t4at Owe s4ould not dream of ascribingP to material bodies >e)g), actions, intentions, sensations, t4oug4ts, feelings, perceptions, memories, etc)? >see *. M1?) "redicates of t4e first categorC are called O8-predicatesP, predicates of t4e latter categorC are called O"-predicatesP) .ow, since our own bodies are material things, t4e >self-?ascription of 8-predicates to ourselves >i)e), to our bodies? apparentlC do not raise anC particular issueBafter all, t4eir
RE

RL

!4ere is a furt4er step toward a solution for t4is problem still in c4apter /BnamelC, t4e indication of a necessary but not sufficient condition for t4e possibilitC of a non-solipsistic consciousness in t4e auditorC world6 t4e sub<ectPs capacitC to >voluntarilC? initiate an action, suc4 as t4at of modifCing a sound s4e is 4earing >see *. MR-M:?) !4e suggestion is engaging, in t4at it indicates t4at our notion of a Osub<ect of e@perienceP >endowed wit4 a Onon-solipsistic consciousnessP? involves essentiallC a conception of t4e sub<ect as an agent, and 4ence >* taIe it? as an embodied being >if in some e@tended sense?, endowed wit4 spontaneitC and t4us >supposedlC? able to acInowledge 4er own decisions, intentions, and actions) Strawson 4imself goes >onlC? as far as to suggest t4at in order to maIe t4e conception of a sub<ect acting in t4e auditorC world minimallC intelligible, we would need to paC attention to Odifferences in t4e waC 4e anticipates w4at 4e is going to do and w4at is going to 4appen to 4imBdifferences in t4e Iinds of Inowledge 4e 4as of t4ese two t4ingsP >*. MR?) $nfortunatelC 4e does not elaborate on t4e reac4 and importance of t4ese observations in c4apter /, and, as we s4all see, 4e goes over t4em rat4er &uicIlC w4en t4eC are resumed at t4e verC end of c4apter R) !4e same Osense of strangenessP is also evoIed bC Wittgenstein in manC >if not all? of 4is c4aracteristic emploCments of language-gamesY incidentallC, evoIing t4at sense seems to be preciselC t4e role of t4e following &uestions, raised in t4e conte@t of t4e so-called Jprivate language argumentK6 OW4at gives us so muc4 as t4e idea t4at living beings, t4ings, can feelW T *s it t4at mC education 4as led me to it bC drawing mC attention to feelings in mCself, and now * transfer t4e idea to ob<ects outside mCselfWP >"*, c /MR?) >"er4aps it is not too muc4 to recall t4at t4at Osense of strangenessPBif onlC bC ot4er names, e)g), OwonderPBwas alreadC acInowledged bC t4e ancients as t4e origin of p4ilosop4C) *n t4is, as in ot4er t4ings, StrawsonBand even Wittgenstein >of all people[?Bare clearlC 4eirs of a long tradition)? >!4anIs to "aulo Faria for reminding me of t4is point in t4e first place)?

Solipsism and "erson4ood6 t4e argument from *ndividuals QM conditions of ascription were alreadC dealt wit4 in c4apter N of Individuals, w4ic4 was concerned wit4 t4e conditions for identification and reidentification of material bodies in general) OGutP, saCs Strawson, Oso long as we Ieep t4at for t4e present indispensable sense of strangeness, it can and must seem to need e@planation t4at onePs states of consciousness, onePs t4oug4ts and sensations, are ascribed to the very same thing to w4ic4 t4ese p4Csical c4aracteristics, t4is p4Csical situation, is ascribedP >*. M1?) And t4at is t4e reason w4C, according to Strawson, if we want to clarifC t4e notion of a sub<ect of e@perience in our conceptual sc4eme, we must find answers to t4e following pair of &uestions6 >i? OWhy are one!s states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all=PY and >ii? OWhy they are ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, etc.=P >*. 10?)

:) "eople not moved bC t4e Oindispensable sense of strangenessP mentioned bC Strawson mig4t ob<ect t4at &uestions >i? and >ii? above are <ust pointlessBafter all, it seems simplC obvious t4at t4is is t4e waC our practices of ascription of "-predicates worIY 4ence, to asI for a <ustification in t4is case would maIe as muc4 sense as to asI w4C we call suc4 and suc4 tones of colour OredP instead of ObluePRM) ,owever, if we looI at t4e multiplicitC of 4istorical treatments given to t4e notion of a sub<ect of e@perience, or self, we will find manC p4ilosop4ers content to denC t4ose >allegedlC? JobviousK t4eses) !4us, for t4e tradition Strawson calls O(ualistP, &uestion >ii? would not even arise, since it would be simplC false to saC t4at we ascribe "-predicates to the very same thing to w4ic4 we ascribe 8-predicates) 5n t4e ot4er 4and, for t4e tradition Strawson calls Ono-owners4ip t4eorCP R1, &uestion >i? would not arise, since it would be simplC nonsensical to saC t4at e@periences e@pressed bC "-predicates are O4adP bC somebodC >or somet4ing?, and, t4erefore, it would be e&uallC nonsensical to saC t4at we OascribeP t4em to any Iind of entitC)
RM

R1

* am 4ere ec4oing a Iind of JWittgensteinian reminderK to t4e effect t4at Oe@planations come to an end somew4ereP >see "* cN?BnamelC, w4en t4e p4ilosop4erPs spade reac4es >and is turned bC? t4e ObedrocIP of our practices >see "* c/NL?) Strawson 4imself resorts to Iindred >naturalistic? reminders in some conte@ts >more on t4is below?) Confronted wit4 t4em, one would surelC liIe to asI6 but "hen e@actlC 4ave we reac4ed t4e bedrocI, and ho" do we tell itW * t4inI t4ese &uestions are legitimate and indeed verC important) Alt4oug4 * will 4ave somet4ing >critical? to saC about t4e efficacC of t4is Iind of naturalistic move still in t4e present c4apter, * s4all postpone a more detailed criticism of it to t4e ne@t onesB particularlC to t4e final oneBw4ere * will 4ave t4e opportunitC to &uestion w4at e@actlC is t4e role of suc4 reminders in WittgensteinPs own writings) Strawson ascribes t4is view >rat4er 4esitantlC? to Wittgenstein and >rat4er straig4tforwardlC? to Sc4licI >see *. 1:, n)N?) * s4all present mC reasons against ascribing it to t4e former in c4apter Q)

Solipsism and "erson4ood6 t4e argument from *ndividuals Q1 StrawsonPs well-Inown diagnosis is t4at bot4 views >O(ualismP and Ono-owners4ip t4eorCP? stem from t4e same mistaIe, w4ic4 is t4e lacI of attention to an essential c4aracteristic of our ordinarC practices of ascription of "-predicates to people, vi7., t4at O_s`tates, or e@periences _)))` o"e t4eir identitC as particulars to t4e identitC of t4e person w4ose states or e@periences t4eC areP >*. 1L?Q0) *n ot4er words, t4e failure of bot4 positions is not to paC attention to t4e primitiveness of t4e concept of person in our conceptual sc4eme6 it is a condition for t4e self-ascription of states of consciousness t4at we can ascribe t4em to others, and in order to do t4is we 4ave to identifC t4ose ot4ers as persons, rat4er t4an as Odisembodied selvesP or as Osoulless bodiesP) >OFrom t4is it follows immediatelCP, Strawson writes, t4at if t4ose states and e@periences Ocan be identified as particular states or e@periences at all, t4eC must be possessed or ascribable in <ust t4at waC w4ic4 t4e no-owners4ip t4eorist ridiculesY i)e) in suc4 a waC t4at it is logicallC impossible t4at a particular state or e@perience in fact possessed bC someone s4ould 4ave been possessed bC anCone else) !4e re&uirements of identitC rule out logical transferabilitC of owners4ipP >*. 1L-1M?) *n ot4er words, t4e verC sense >or content? of t4e predicates emploCed to ascribe states of consciousness would onlC be properlC understood provided t4at we paC attention to both t4eir first and t4ird person uses)?

E) !4e problem wit4 t4e analCsis presented above, as Strawson 4imself &uicIlC acInowledges, is t4at normallC we do not need to observe our own be4aviour in order to saC of ourselves t4at we 4ave >or are in? a certain mental state, contrarC to w4at 4appens w4en we ascribe suc4 a state to someone elseY w4at would >apparentlC? follow from t4is consideration is t4at t4e sense of a predicate e@pressing a mental state would not be t4e same in >t4e predicate would be e.uivocal between? first and t4ird person ascriptions)
Q0

Strawson taIes no great pains to <ustifC 4is diagnosis concerning O(ualismP, suggesting t4at in t4is case t4e lacI of attention would be manifest >see *. 1Q-1:?) Concerning t4e Ono-owners4ip t4eorCP, t4e suggestion is t4at it would also be a Iind of O(ualismPBa degenerate Iind, one mig4t saCBw4ic4 does not distinguis4 between Otwo sub<ectsP >as in t4e case of OCartesianismP?, but rat4er between Oone sub<ectB t4e bodCBand one non-sub<ectP >*. 1M?) *n bot4 cases >i)e), Ono-owners4ip t4eorCP and OCartesianismP?, t4e O(ualismP 4as to do wit4 t4e attempt to establis4 distinct and independent criteria for t4e attribution of "- and 8-predicates, respectivelC, to sub<ects) .ow supporters of OCartesianismP would be rat4er confident of 4aving establis4ed t4ose criteria for bot4 Iinds of predicate >since t4eC would be confident of 4aving proved t4e e@istence of two completelC distinct substances to w4ic4 t4ose predicates would refer, namely, t4e Ores cogitansP and t4e Ores e)tensaP?, w4ile t4e Ono-owners4ipP t4eorists would be rat4er convinced t4at t4e onlC bona fide, determinate criteria one can possiblC establis4 must refer to physical properties >t4e denotata of 8-predicates?, t4us concluding t4at t4e verC idea of mental states, taIen as particulars capable of being OownedP or OascribedP to sub<ects, is simplC nonsensical)

Solipsism and "erson4ood6 t4e argument from *ndividuals :0 O,ow could t4e sense be t4e sameP, asIs Strawson, Ow4en t4e met4od of verification was so different in t4e two cases _)))`PW >*. 11?) !4e answer to t4at &uestion depends on t4e understanding of t4e peculiar logic of "predicates, w4ic4 is presented in t4e following passage6
_)))` it is essential to t4e c4aracter of _"-`predicates t4at t4eC 4ave bot4 first- and t4ird-person ascriptive uses, t4at t4eC are bot4 self-ascribable ot4erwise t4an on t4e basis of observation of t4e be4aviour of t4e sub<ect of t4em, and ot4erascribable on t4e basis of be4aviour criteria) !o learn t4eir use is to learn bot4 aspects of t4eir use) *n order to have t4is tCpe of concept, one must be bot4 a self-ascriber and an ot4er-ascriber of suc4 predicates, and must see everC ot4er as a self-ascriber) *n order to understand t4is tCpe of concept, one must acInowledge t4at t4ere is a Iind of predicate w4ic4 is unambiguouslC and ade&uatelC ascribable both on t4e basis of observation of t4e sub<ect of t4e predicate and not on t4is basis, i)e) independentlC of observation of t4e sub<ect6 t4e second case is t4e case w4ere t4e ascriber is also t4e sub<ect) *f t4ere were no concepts answering to t4e c4aracteri=ation * 4ave <ust given, we s4ould indeed 4ave no p4ilosop4ical problem about t4e soulY but e&uallC we s4ould not 4ave our concept of a person) >*. N0M?

.ow, given t4at logical peculiaritC of "-predicatesBt4e fact t4at understanding t4eir use implies understanding both aspects of t4eir useBt4e preceding &uestionBconcerning t4e possibilitC of a univocal sense and a univocal ascriptionBamounts to t4e &uestion O,ow are "-predicates possibleWP, or O,ow is t4e concept of a person possibleWP >*. NN0?) At t4is point, Strawson admits t4at even Ow4en we 4ave acInowledged t4e primitiveness of t4e concept of a person, and, wit4 it, t4e uni&ue c4aracter of "-predicates, we maC still want to asI w4at it is in t4e natural facts t4at maIes it intelligible t4at we s4ould 4ave t4is conceptP >*. NNN?Y and that &uestion, still according to 4im, demands a Onon-trivial answerP, i)e), Oan answer w4ic4 does not merely saC6 JWell, t4ere are people in t4e worldKP >ibid.?)

L) *n t4e final part of c4apter R Strawson purports to offer >w4at 4e 4imself describes as? t4e Obeginnings or fragments of an answerP to t4e latter &uestion >*. NNN?) !4e basic idea is t4at in order to understand t4e role of t4e concept of a person >and of "-predicates? in our conceptual sc4eme we need to taIe into account a verC general fact about t4is sc4eme as a w4oleBnamelC, t4at we live in a communitC of 4uman beings w4om, as suc4, s4are a certain nature) *n order to 4ig4lig4t and furt4er articulate t4at fact, Strawson will Omov_e` a certain class of "-predicates to a central position in t4e picturePBnamelC, predicates,

Solipsism and "erson4ood6 t4e argument from *ndividuals :N w4ic4 Oroug4lC _)))` involve doing somet4ing, w4ic4 clearlC implC intention or a state of mind or at least consciousness in general, and w4ic4 indicate a c4aracteristic pattern, or range of patterns, of bodilC movement, w4ile not indicating at all preciselC anC verC definite sensation or e@perienceP >*. NNN?) 7@amples of suc4 predicates are Ogoing for a walIP, Ocoiling a ropeP, OplaCing ballP, Owriting a letterP >ibid.?) We can maIe up a special name for t4at sub-categorC of predicatesBsaC, O"A-predicatesP >t4e inde@ OAP indicating t4at t4ese are action predicates?) !4e advantage of analCsing "A-predicates is t4at >i? t4eC O4ave t4e interesting c4aracteristic of manC "-predicatesPBvi7., Ot4at one does not, in general, ascribe t4em to oneself on t4e strengt4 of observation, w4ereas one does ascribe t4em to ot4ers on t4e strengt4 of observationP >ibid)?Bbut, >ii? contrarilC to t4e "-predicates, w4ic4 concern OinnerP mental states, relative to "A-predicates Oone feels minimal reluctance to concede t4at w4at is ascribed in t4ese two different waCs _i)e), based on observation and wit4out observation` is t4e sameP >ibid)?) Since bot4 self- and hetero-ascriptions of "A-predicates are made wit4out appeal to anC Iind of Jdistinctive e@perienceKQN, Ot4eC release us from t4e idea t4at t4e onlC t4ings we can Inow about wit4out observation or inference, or bot4, are private e@periencesP >ibid)?) We can, Strawson argues, 4ave Inowledge Oabout t4e present and future movements of a bodCPBvi7., our ownBwit4out appeal to observation or inferenceY Cet, 4e continues, ObodilC movements are certainlC also t4ings we can Inow about bC observation and inferenceP >ibid.?B<ust as it 4appens w4en we ascribe "A-predicates to ot4er sub<ects >and sometimes to ourselvesBt4inI, for e@ample, of t4e case of a locallC anaest4eti=ed patient noticing t4atBw4at a relief[B4is toes are moving after t4e surgerC?) Strawson concludes t4e analCsis of t4ose predicates wit4 t4e following considerations6
*t is important t4at we s4ould understand suc4 movements _i)e), t4e Omovements of bodies similar to t4at about w4ic4 we 4ave Inowledge not based on observationP, i)e), our own`, for t4eC bear on and condition our own _movements`Y and in fact we understand t4em, we interpret t4em, onlC bC seeing t4em as elements in <ust suc4 plans or sc4emes of action as t4ose of w4ic4 we Inow t4e present course and future development wit4out observation of t4e relevant present movements) Gut t4is is to saC t4at we see suc4 movements as
QN

*n t4is conte@t Strawson seems to be assuming as obvious a t4esis w4ic4 surelC would deserve a more forceful defenceY after all, not4ing would be more natural for a O(ualistP t4an to t4inI of t4e selfascription of "A-"redicates t4at it is based on a Iind of Jdistinctive e@perienceK, suc4 as a desire, an intention, or a Jpure willingK, accessible bC introspection, w4ic4 would worI as a cause of t4e action) >Wittgenstein indicated some of t4e problems of t4is Iind of causal e@planation of action in manC conte@ts, an important instance being "* cc ENN-EE0)?

Solipsism and "erson4ood6 t4e argument from *ndividuals :/

actions, t4at we interpret t4em in terms of intention, t4at we see t4em as movements of individuals of a tCpe to w4ic4 also belongs t4at individual w4ose present and future movements we Inow about wit4out observationY it is to saC t4at we see ot4ers as self-ascribers, not on t4e basis of observation, of w4at we ascribe to t4em on t4is basis) >*. NN/?

!4e passage above condenses w4at Strawson 4as to saC in Individuals about t4at JfactK w4ic4 would constitute t4e JbedrocIK of our conceptual sc4eme, amounting to a fundamental condition for our practice of >first- and t4ird-person? ascriptions of "predicates) GrieflC, t4e idea at worI 4ere is t4at we see >or, to use a p4rase loaded wit4 p4ilosop4ical implications t4at s4ould be looIed at from closer up, we react to? ot4er sub<ects as persons, i)e), as >ot4er? human beings, w4o are capable of voluntarC movements, i)e), actions, among countless ot4er t4ingsY 4owever, as Strawson 4imself emp4asi=es, O Jto see eac4 ot4er as personsK is a lot of t4ings, but not a lot of separate and unconnected t4ingsP >ibid)?Y moreover, and in t4e same vein, 4e also urges t4at it would be a mistaIe to separate t4e Otopic of t4e mindP into a collection of Ounconnected sub<ectsP >ibid.?) W4at t4ese claims are suggesting, * taIe it, is t4at t4e logic of "A-predicates >i)e), t4eir conditions of use or sense or ascription? cannot be correctlC described and understood unless we analCse more carefullC t4e role of t4ose predicates wit4in t4e fabric of 4uman practices in w4ic4 t4eC are embedded) .ow * t4inI it is wort4 asIing w4et4er t4e same s4ould not 4old for t4e analCsis of t4e >remaining? "-predicates, and e&uallC for t4e analCsis of 8-predicates, and, ultimatelC, if t4at is not a sound met4odological advice to follow in t4e analCsis of our conceptual structure as a "hole) !4at &uestion s4all serve as a warning about t4e >possible? need forBor, in a more sCmpat4etic reading, about StrawsonPs invitation to proceed inBa more inclusive and 4umanlC engaged looI at our conceptual sc4eme, w4ic4 up to 4is point 4as been described abstractlC and as it were Jfrom t4e insideK, wit4 scant reference to t4e lives w4ic4 endow t4ose concepts wit4 w4atever significance t4eC 4ave) !4is, * submit, is indeed a crucial step to taIe if we want to ac4ieve a more satisfactorC analCsis of t4e logic of our concepts) ,owever, Strawson does not seem to follow up on 4is own >somew4at understated? advice, since 4e immediatelC moves on to ot4er &uestionsQ/) !o be sure, one can argue t4at t4is attitude is co4erent wit4 w4at t4e aut4or set out to do in 4is booIBnamelC, to outline t4e general conditions for an ob<ective e@perience) .evert4eless, t4ere is a price to be paid for t4e simplicitC of t4e resulting modelBt4at of becoming a target for critics w4o insist
Q/

Suc4 as t4e possibilitC of a Ogroup mindP >see *. NN/-NNE?)

Solipsism and "erson4ood6 t4e argument from *ndividuals :R preciselC on t4e need for a more detailed picture of Operson4oodP, and, w4at is more important, of 4uman nature as suc4) Again, a more sCmpat4etic attitude >w4ic4 * t4inI is also more fait4ful to StrawsonPs p4ilosop4ical stance as a w4ole? would be to accept 4is invitation and to trC to fill in t4e blanIs left in t4e analCsis pursued in Individuals) 5ne waC to do t4is is bC bringing into plaC some of t4e important points made in 4is later essaC OFreedom and %esentmentP, as * proceed to s4ow)

1"% Resentment& s'epticism& ac'nowledgement

M) !4e argument presented in t4e essaC OFreedom and %esentmentP is framed bC t4e dispute between (eterminists and Hibertarians on t4e issue of free-will) *t mig4t, accordinglC, seem verC distant from t4e topics e@amined above) We s4ould not forget, 4owever, t4at we are dealing wit4 a sCstematic p4ilosop4er, in w4ose t4inIing connections between suc4 apparentlC distant te@ts and topics s4ould come as no surprise at all) Gut in order to see t4e connections w4ic4 are relevant for t4e present case, we 4ave better set t4e JframeK of t4e argument aside, and looI directlC at t4e centre of t4e picture) W4at we t4en find is an investigationBor rat4er a description, in t4e spirit of descriptive metap4CsicsBof t4e conditions of 4uman action, w4ic4 is in turn grounded on t4e analCsis of some particular instances of interpersonal relations and attitudesBmost notablC t4ose of gratitude, resentment, and forgivenness) 5ne of t4e central features Strawson 4ig4lig4ts about suc4 attitudes is t4at t4eC are apt to be radicallC modified according to t4e waC t4e actions w4ic4 bring t4em about are &ualified) !4e following case illustrates t4is point6
*f someone treads on mC 4and accidentallC, w4ile trCing to 4elp me, t4e pain maC be no less acute t4an if 4e treads on it in contemptuous disregard of mC e@istence or wit4 a malevolent wis4 to in<ure me) Gut * s4all generallC feel in t4e second case a Iind and degree of resentment t4at * s4all not feel in t4e first) *f someonePs actions 4elp me to some benefit * desire, t4en * am benefited in anC caseY but if 4e intended t4em so to benefit me because of 4is general goodwill toward me, * s4all reasonablC feel a gratitude w4ic4 * s4ould not feel at all if t4e benefit was an incidental conse&uence, unintended or even regretted bC 4im, of some plan of action wit4 a different aim) >F% E?

%eactions similar to t4ose illustrated above >i)e), t4ose of gratitude, resentment, and forgivenness? can be broug4t about in a large number of >verC common? situations in our

%esentment, sIepticism, acInowledgement :Q 4uman relations4ips, and t4e degree in w4ic4 we feel t4em can also varC according to a vast set of conditions 4aving to do wit4 4ow t4e original actions provoIing t4em are &ualified) Gut t4ere are also some less common situations in t4ose relations4ips w4ere our reactions would not onlC be modified but rat4er altoget4er suppressed, given t4e rig4t conditions) !4is would 4appen, for instance, in t4ose cases w4ere one mig4t be willing to describe an agent w4o performed an action t4at 4armed 4er bC using p4rases suc4 as6 O,e wasnPt 4imselfP, O,e 4as been under verC great strain recentlCP, O,e was acting under post4Cpnotic suggestionP, O,ePs onlC a c4ildP, O,ePs a 4opeless sc4i=op4renicP, O,is mind 4as been sCstematicallC pervertedP, O!4atPs purelC compulsive be4aviour on 4is partP, etc) >F% M?) GC drawing our attention to t4e sort of e@cuses e@pressed bC t4ose p4rases, Strawson wants to maIe us aware of situations in w4ic4 someonePs actions would invite us Oto suspend our ordinarC reactive attitudes toward t4e agentP, seeing 4im Oin a different lig4t from t4e lig4t in w4ic4 we s4ould normallC view one w4o 4as acted as 4e 4as actedP >F% 1?)

1) Wit4 a view to simplifCing t4e analCsis of suc4 cases, Strawson presents >w4at 4e 4imself describes as? Ocrude dic4otomiesP >F% 1? separating t4e Iinds of attitudes t4at we can 4ave in relation to ot4er 4uman beings) For t4e interests of t4is section, t4e most important suc4 dic4otomC is t4at w4ic4 distinguis4es Ot4e attitude >or range of attitudes? of involvement or participation in a 4uman relations4ipP, on t4e one 4and, and t4e Oob<ectiveP or Odetac4edP attitude >or range of attitudes?, on t4e ot4er 4and >see ibid)?) About t4e latter sort of attitude Strawson 4as t4e following to saC6
!o adopt t4e ob<ective attitude to anot4er 4uman being is to see 4im, per4aps, as an ob<ect of social policCY as a sub<ect for w4at, in a wide range of sense, mig4t be called treatmentY as somet4ing certainlC to be taIen account, per4aps precautionarC account, ofY to be managed or 4andled or cured or trainedY per4aps simplC to be avoided _)))`) *f Cour attitude toward someone is w4ollC ob<ective, t4en t4oug4 Cou maC fig4t 4im, Cou cannot &uarrel wit4 4im, and t4oug4 Cou maC talI to 4im, even negotiate wit4 4im, Cou cannot reason wit4 4im) \ou can at most pretend to &uarrel, or to reason, wit4 4im) >F% 1-N0?

.ow, <ust as it is possible >and sometimes even re&uired? to adopt an ob<ective attitude in relation to ot4ers, we also can >and sometimes are even re&uired to? adopt it toward ourselves) $suallC, t4ere is no problem involved in reacting liIe t4atBon t4e contrarC, in

%esentment, sIepticism, acInowledgement :: some cases it can be sound and effective to detac4 oneself t4at waCY as Strawson 4imself acInowledges, we can sometimes use t4at attitude Oas a resourceP, e)g), Oas a refuge _)))` from t4e strains of involvementY or as an aid to policCY or simplC out of intellectual curiositCP >F% N0?) A problem would appear, 4owever, if t4at attitude tooI complete precedence relative to t4at of involvement or participation in 4uman relations4ipsBif, i)e), we sCstematicallC stopped seeing ot4ers >and ourselves? as persons, as human beings, and started seeing t4em >ourselves? as mere Oob<ects of social policCP, or Omec4anismsP) !4e problem posed bC suc4 an e@treme c4ange is, in s4ort, t4at it would re&uire a radical c4ange in our verC 4uman natureBa c4ange w4ic4, according to Strawson, Odoes not seem to be somet4ing of w4ic4 4uman beings would be capable, even if some general trut4 were a t4eoretical ground for itP >F% N/?QR) Strawson concedes t4at it is not logically impossible for t4e ob<ective or detac4ed attitude to become t4e rule, instead of t4e e@ception) ,owever, 4e claims, suc4 a c4ange would be OpracticallC inconceivableP, since6
!4e 4uman commitment to participation in ordinarC inter-personal relations4ips is _)))` too t4oroug4going and deeplC rooted for us to taIe seriouslC t4e t4oug4t t4at a general t4eoretical conviction mig4t so c4ange our world t4at, in it, t4ere were no longer anC suc4 t4ings as inter-personal relations4ips as we normallC understand t4emY and being involved in inter-personal relations4ips as we normallC understand t4em preciselC is being e@posed to t4e range of reactive attitudes and feelings t4at is in &uestion) >F% N/?

Heaving aside t4e optimism e@pressed in t4e passage above for a momentQQ, we can summari=e StrawsonPs position concerning t4e Opractical impossibilitCP 4e describes in t4e form of a conditional6 if >bC w4atever reason? t4e ob<ective or detac4ed attitude became t4e standard, our normal inter-personal relations4ips would be severelC modified, and wit4 t4em our verC 4uman natureY and t4e price of suc4 c4ange, as Strawson 4as it in anot4er conte@t, Owould be 4ig4er t4an we are willing, or able, to paCP >S. RQ?)

N0) "ursuing t4is issue in more detail would lead us far beCond t4e centre of t4e picture, toward its frame, so * will step bacI to our main topic) !4e first t4ing * would liIe to do is to 4ig4lig4t a structural similaritC between t4e argument sIetc4ed above >about t4e
QR

QQ

!4e main candidate to suc4 a ground e@amined >and dismissed? bC Strawson in t4is paper is, of course, t4e Ot4eoretical conviction of t4e trut4 of determinismP >see F% NQ?) For a cogent criticism of t4is Ooptimistic attitudeP bC Strawson, see Sommers >/00E?) * return to t4is point brieflC in n) Q1 below)

%esentment, sIepticism, acInowledgement :E conse&uences of generali=ing t4e ob<ective or detac4ed attitude? and t4e anti-solipsistic argument presented in Individuals, in t4at bot4 can be seen as instances of a peculiar form of reductio, w4ic4 brings to t4e fore a peculiarlC untenable >even if it is not a strictlC absurd or irrational or self-contradictorC? conse&uence t4at one would 4ave to accept s4ould a particular set of conditions of our conceptual sc4eme be left out, or suppressed, from t4e analCsis) .otice, 4owever, t4at preciselC because no contradiction is involved in t4at possibilitC, not4ing prevents one of rationally consider itBper4aps as a reason for suspending a >supposedlC? naive or un&uestioned ad4esion to a set of beliefsBor even to defend itB per4aps bC waC of proposing an alternative conceptual sc4eme, rearranged so as to fit aspects of realitC t4at one deems important Cet unacInowledged or underestimated in t4e ordinarC one, w4ile remaining internallC consistent) .ow t4ose are preciselC t4e Iinds of p4ilosop4ical moves t4at * suppose a sIeptic or a solipsist >respectivelC? would liIe to propose, driven bC a number of reasons, w4ic4 mig4t well 4ave to do wit4 dissatisfactions concerning t4at verC conceptual sc4eme t4at >* suppose? t4eC too could agree 4as t4e structure t4at Strawson is at pains to disclose, and notwit4standing t4e logical conse&uences of t4eir c4oices) !4e Iind of consideration sIetc4ed above brings to t4e fore a crucial difficultC t4at * t4inI StrawsonPs pro<ect of descriptive metap4Csics 4as to face) *n order to articulate t4at difficultC more clearlC, let us assume, for t4e saIe of t4e argument, t4at a sIeptical or solipsistic p4ilosop4er could in fact grant Strawson all t4e conceptual connections 4e presented t4us far >i)e), bot4 t4ose indicated in Individuals and in OFreedom and %esentmentP?Y now let us asI w4at would prevent suc4 a p4ilosop4er of >nonet4eless? wis4ing to suspend or even to denCBper4aps bC finding nagve or inappropriate or simplC nonsensicalBsuc4 ordinarC beliefs as t4at >e)g)? t4ere are >ot4er? minds >instead of, saC, <ust bodies plus be4aviour?, or t4at t4ere reallC are >ot4er? persons >instead of automatons or =ombies?, or again t4at t4ere reallC are anC >e@ternal? ob;ects >instead of mere appearances, contents of onePs consciousness, computer-generated inputs, and so on?) 5f course, assuming t4at s4e is rational, our sIeptic T solipsist would be >logicallC? forced to concede t4at 4er suspensions T denials would 4ave <ust t4e Jproblematic conse&uencesK indicated in StrawsonPs argumentsBe)g), t4at one could not >anCmore? ob<ectivelC and co4erentlC ascribe "-predicates to ot4ers and hence to oneself, or t4at non-detac4ed

%esentment, sIepticism, acInowledgement :L attitudes toward ot4ers would appear >at best? optional, because unwarranted or ungrounded in anC firmerBi)e), more rational or ob<ectiveBfoundation, or t4at one could not >anCmore? identifC and reidentifC e@ternal ob<ects, t4us becoming unable to publiclC s4are t4e contents of onePs e@periences)BGut again, w4at e@actlC would prevent our p4ilosop4er of biting those bulletsW And if not4ing would prevent it, w4at e@actlC would be t4e problem>s? involved in 4er suspensions T denials, and 4ow could StrawsonPs argument 4ope to cope wit4 t4emW

NN) At least part of w4at is at staIe in t4e &uestions presented above is t4e verC nature of Strawsonian regressive or JtranscendentalK arguments) Strawson 4imself seems to 4ave c4anged 4is mind about w4at one could 4ope to ac4ieve bC means of t4ose arguments, initiallC t4inIing t4at t4eC could provide a refutation of sIepticism and >4ence? a proof of realismQ:, but t4en coming to believe t4at t4eir role was simplC to draw conceptual connections "ithin a pre-e@istent >i)e), taIen for granted? anti-sIeptical conceptual sc4emeQE) .ow, according to t4e latter, more modest construal, a transcendental argument would not be aimed to prove >as against a sIeptic or a solipsist? t4at our conceptual sc4eme accuratelC depicts anC Iind of Je@ternalK or independent realitC >e)g), t4e Dantian Ot4ings in t4emselvesP?Y as far as a Opro<ect of w4olesale validationP of our conceptual sc4eme is concerned, Strawson t4inIs one is better advised to give it up >see S. //?, resorting instead to a version of ,umean naturalism, w4ic4 4e describes as follows6
According to ,ume t4e naturalist, sIeptical doubts are not to be met bC argument) !4eC are simplC to be neglected >e@cept, per4aps, in so far as t4eC supplC a 4armless amusement, a mild diversion to t4e intellect?) !4eC are to be neglected because t4eC are idleY powerless against t4e force of nature, of our naturallC implanted disposition to belief) !4is does not mean t4at %eason 4as no part to plaC in relation to our beliefs concerning matters of fact and e@istence) *t 4as a part to plaC, t4oug4 a subordinate one6 as .aturePs lieutenant rat4er t4an .aturePs commander) >S. NR-NQ?

!4us, according to Strawson t4e ,umean naturalist, t4ere is no legitimate >or even intelligible? need for refuting sIepticism, since Oin order for t4e intelligible formulation of sIeptical doubts to be possible or, more generallC, in or order for self-conscious t4oug4t
Q:

QE

!4at at least was t4e aim of StrawsonPs influential OanalCtical reconstructionP of DantPs position, as presented in GS) See S., esp) c4) N)

%esentment, sIepticism, acInowledgement :M and e@perience to be possible, we must taIe it, or believe, t4at we 4ave Inowledge of e@ternal p4Csical ob<ects or ot4er mindsP >S. /N?) Strawson 4imself acInowledges t4at a Otranscendental arguerP liIe t4e one 4e depicts will be OalwaCs e@posed to t4e c4arge t4at even if he cannot conceive of alternative waCs in w4ic4 conditions of t4e possibilitC of a certain Iind of e@perience or e@ercise of conceptual capacitC mig4t be fulfilled, t4is inabilitC maC simplC be due to lacI of imagination on 4is partP >S. /R?) \et to t4at c4arge 4e responds bC claiming t4at Ow4et4er or not t4eC are strictlC valid, t4ese arguments, or weaIened versions of t4em, will continue to be of interest to our naturalist p4ilosop4erP, for
to establis4 t4e connections between t4e ma<or structural features or elements of our conceptual sc4emeBto e@4ibit it, not as a rigidlC deductive sCstem, but as a co4erent w4ole w4ose parts are mutuallC supportive and mutuallC dependent, interlocIing in an intelligible waCBto do t4is maC well seem to our naturalist t4e proper, or at least t4e ma<or, tasI of analCtical p4ilosop4C) As indeed it does to me) >W4ence t4e p4rase, Jdescriptive _as opposed to validatorC or revisionarC` metap4Csics)K? >S. /R?QL

"er4apsBbut w4at about t4e rest of usW Are we convincedWBAnd if we are not, t4en w4at do "e e@pect from >analCtical? p4ilosop4CW Gefore answering t4ose &uestionsBor better6 in order to start answering t4emBlet me 4ig4lig4t anot4er aspect of StrawsonPs position) At a climatic moment in S., Strawson claims t4at 4is proposal O_v`is-'-vis traditional sIepticismP is t4at we adopt naturalism Oat least provisionallCPBOandP, 4e immediatelC adds, OeverCt4ing in p4ilosop4C is provisionalP >see S. /Q?) .ow * t4inI we s4ould 4appilC grant t4at muc4) ,e t4en goes on illustrating t4e breaI t4at adoption of naturalism constitutes wit4 ot4er attitudes wit4 a series of &uotations, t4e last of w4ic4 OneatlC sums t4ings up from t4e naturalist _)))` point of viewP >ibid)?) !4at &uotation is WittgensteinPs, and goes as follows6 O*t is so difficult to find t4e beginning) 5r better6 it is difficult to begin at t4e beginning) And not to trC to go furt4er bacI)P >5C, QLN?QM) .ow t4e precise moral Strawson wants to draw from t4at &uotation sounds anCt4ing but provisional to meY it goes liIe t4is6 O_t`o trC to meet t4e sIepticPs
QL QM

!4e insertion in s&uare bracIets is StrawsonPs) !4e first &uotation comes from DantBOt4e first from t4e greatest of modern p4ilosop4ersP >see ibid)?B and presents t4e Oscandal of p4ilosop4CP in not being able to prove t4e Oe@istence of t4ings outside usP >C%", G @i?) !4e second comes from ,eideggerBOa p4ilosop4er w4ose title to respect is less considerable, but w4o nevert4eless seems to _Strawson` to be on t4e rig4t side on t4is pointPBw4o claims t4at t4e real scandal is Ot4at such proofs are e)pected and attempted again and again)P >?eing and Time, *) cE?

%esentment, sIepticism, acInowledgement :1 c4allenge, in w4atever waC, bC w4atever stCle of argument, is to trC to go furt4er bacI) *f one is to begin at t4e beginning, one must refuse t4e c4allenge as our naturalist refuses itP >S. /:-/:?) ActuallC, * taIe t4e refusal e@pressed in t4e last claim to be completelC at odds wit4 t4e general spirit and letter of WittgensteinPs worIBnot least wit4 t4e spirit and letter of t4e particular warning, or confession, t4at Strawson 4as c4osen to &uoteY per4aps * can e@press our difference bC saCing t4at w4ile Strawson 4as found onlC >or primarilC? resoluteness in t4at &uote, * cannot 4elp but sensing a 4umble recognition t4at in p4ilosop4C >as elsew4ere? one s4ould never be so sure about w4ere to stop &uestioning onePs own resultsBanCwaC, t4at if one decides to stop at a particular point >as one surelC 4as to?, one is better advised to remain open to reconsider t4at decision at anC moment) So * taIe it t4at at least part of w4at Wittgenstein means in t4at &uote is t4at t4e tasI of deciding w4ere p4ilosop4C s4all beginBand endBis reallC a difficult one) And since * do s4are t4at recognition, * t4inI it is fair to formulate mC dissatisfaction wit4 StrawsonPs reading bC saCing t4at 4e does not seem willing to taIe WittgensteinPs warning seriouslC enoug4) >"4ilosop4C, * would liIe to saC, s4ould be al"ays provisional)?

N/) So t4at is a firstBcall it a met4odologicalBreason for being less t4an completelC satisfied wit4 StrawsonPs naturalistic stanceQ1) \et t4ere are ot4er, more specific reasons for t4at) !o begin wit4, * taIe 4is allegiance to ,ume on t4e particular issue we 4ave been
Q1

Anot4er verC general reason for dissatisfaction 4as to do wit4 mC e@istentialist &ualms about StrawsonPs repeated >and again apparentlC unwarranted? appeals to certain >supposedlC? inescapable >essentialW? facts about our J4uman natureKY 4ere is a representative claim6 Oit is not open to us, it is simplC not in our nature, to maIe a total surrender of t4ose personal and moral reactive attitudes _)))` w4ic4 t4e reductive naturalist declares to be irrationalP >S. QN?) ActuallC, * taIe it t4at t4ese appeals betraC a commitment wit4 a deeper assumption w4ic4 is intimatelC connected wit4 StrawsonPs JoptimismK concerning t4e issue of freedom versus determinism6 for t4ere is an alternative waC of t4inIing about J4uman natureKBone w4ic4, as far as * Inow, Strawson 4as done not4ing to denCBaccording to w4ic4 4uman beings are even more radicallC free t4an 4e seems willing to acInowledgeBfree to t4e point of being able to >c4oose to? c4ange t4eir >supposedBor rat4er unaut4enticallC assumed? JnaturesKBin particular, bC being able to c4oose to become completelC Job<ectiveK and Jdetac4edK in t4eir inter-personal relations4ips) >Are not SartrePs >earlC? %o&uentin in Eausea and CamusPs 8eursault in The Stranger perfect >fictional? instances of preciselC t4at attitudeW? .ow of course wit4 suc4 a radical freedom come big>ger? responsibilitiesB 4eavier burdens concerning onePs stance toward t4e world and ot4ers >not onlC human ot4ers? and oneself Bbut again * find no room left for t4ose burdens to be acInowledged in StrawsonPs worI) >.ote t4at * am not saCing, or implCing, t4at to be JcompletelC detac4edK P la %o&uentin and 8ersault would amount to be more radicallC freeY t4e idea of radical freedom * am pointing to 4as to do wit4 t4e radical choice t4at * Bbut apparentlC not StrawsonBfind available to beings liIe us, provided t4at we t4inI 4ardlC enoug4 about t4e >lacI of? impersonal >categorical or absolute? constraints for defining t4e limits of w4at it means to be human) Again, aut4enticitC lies not in "hich c4oice one maIes, but in t4e resolute attitude of taking responsibility for onePs c4oiceY w4et4er t4at c4oice is morallC sound is a furt4er &uestionB needless to saC, t4at are lots of immoral human beings)?

%esentment, sIepticism, acInowledgement E0 pursuingBt4at of t4e sIeptical c4allenge for a Ow4olesale validationP of our conceptual sc4emeBto be rat4er unwarrantedBafter all, t4ere seems to be a crucial difference between t4e Iind of >sIeptical? problem t4at ,ume intends to repudiate or dismiss wit4 his brand of naturalism and t4e difficultC t4at * 4ave been trCing to articulate) !4e difference * 4ave in mind is presented verC clearlC in t4e following passage, w4ic4 * taIe from Ant4onC %uddPs analCsis6
_)))` ,umePs sIepticismBw4ic4 ,ume 4ad to dismiss as unlivable and unt4inIable outside t4e p4ilosop4erPs studCBwas an empiricist sIepticism t4at dissolved realitC into contingentlC connected sensorC ideas) !4at realitC would be unlivable) Gut sIepticism about w4et4er our 4appilC substantial conceptual sc4eme reallC describes realitC in itself is not a sIepticism t4at would seem to impact directlC on everCdaC life at all, and would t4erefore not be unlivable) And so a J,umean s4rugK is not an appropriate response to this sIepticism) >%udd, /00R, p) :N?

*ndeed) ActuallC, * would liIe to go furt4erBfollowing StanleC CavellPs stepsBand contend t4at, concerning our Inowledge of t4e Je@ternal worldK, it is all but impossible to become JaccommodatedK wit4 our lacI of final <ustificationB4ence, wit4 >t4e possibilitC of? sIepticismY as Cavell e@presses t4is point6 O* 4ave to JforgetK, or ignore, close mC eCes to, some4ow bCpass, t4e presence of doubts t4at are not mine, of JpossibilitiesK t4at * 4ave not ruled outY * 4ave to permit mCself distraction from mC Inowledge t4at we do not Inow w4at we all imagine t4ere is to Inow, vi=), material ob<ectsP >C% QRL-QRM?) >"er4aps it goes wit4out saCing, but * s4all nonet4eless stress t4at Opermitting oneself distractionP from t4e kno"ledge of our epistemic limitations is a verC different t4ing from refusing a sIeptical c4allenge, as Strawson t4e naturalist urges us to do)? !4e situation gets even worseB* mean for Strawson, and 4is naturalistic dismissal of sIepticismBw4ere Inowledge of Jot4er mindsK is concerned) W4at 4appens in t4is case is t4at * cannot but Olive mC sIepticismP >C% QRL?Bi)e), t4at, similarlC to t4e situation concerning Inowledge of t4e Je@ternal worldK, * simplC cannot "ait for >absolute? certaintC or >complete? <ustification in order to act:0, Cet unliIe t4e former case * also cannot resort to suc4 an JeasCK option as to JforgetK and become JaccommodatedK wit4 mC doubts, since Ot4e surmise t4at * 4ave not acInowledged about ot4ers, 4ence about mCself, t4e t4ing t4ere is to acInowledge, t4at eac4 of us is 4uman, is not, first of all, t4e recognition of a universal 4uman conditionPBas it "as concerning t4e limitations of our Inowledge of t4e Je@ternal
:0

*n fact, to "ait for t4at Iind of <ustification is a possible cause of tragedyBt4at is preciselC 5t4elloPs problem6 no JevidenceK of (esdemonaPs fait4fulness is reallC lacIing, Cet acInowledgement is not fort4comingY t4at is t4e 4orror of 4is situation)

%esentment, sIepticism, acInowledgement EN worldKBObut first of all a surmise about mCselfP >C% QRM?) As a conse&uence, becoming OaccommodateP or Opermitting mCself distractionP from mC limitations concerning ackno"ledgement would be to compromise mC own integritC as 4uman being >see ibid)?) Gut w4at is preciselC t4e alternative >to accommodation, i)e)? concerning >sIeptical? doubts about Jot4er mindsKW W4at does it mean to Olive mC sIepticismP in t4is caseW *t means, first and foremost, to recogni=eBand, if one is to avoid tragedC, to acceptBmC real separateness from ot4ersBt4e fact, i)e), t4at t4ere is no Jmetap4Csical s4ortcutK to ot4erPs minds, or souls, or Jinner livesKBt4us reali=ing t4at it is alwaCs up to me to acInowledge t4e 4umanitC in t4e ot4er, and >t4us? in mCself) 5f course acInowledgement mig4t not be fort4coming, and that mig4t incline one to t4inI >or to fantasi=e? t4at t4is is because Jt4e innerK is somew4at hidden%per4aps 4idden bC t4e 4uman bodC) As * 4ope t4e considerations above s4all suffice to suggest, Cavell would not e@actlC denC t4at in t4ose cases t4e inner is 4iddenBsurelC (esdemonaPs fait4fulness is 4idden from 5t4ello, in a limited but verC real senseY Cet, following WittgensteinBfor w4om O_t`4e 4uman bodC is t4e best picture of t4e 4uman soulP >"* **, iv?BCavell would disagree as to t4e source of onePs blindness6
!4e blocI to mC vision of t4e ot4er is not t4e ot4erPs bodC but mC incapacitC or unwillingness to interpret or to <udge it accuratelC, to draw t4e rig4t connections) !4e suggestion is6 * suffer a Iind of blindness, but * avoid t4e issue bC pro<ecting t4is darIness upon t4e ot4er) _)))` !4e mCt4ologC according to w4ic4 t4e bodC is a picture implies t4at t4e soul maC be 4idden not because t4e bodC essentiallC conceals it but because it essentiallC reveals it) !4e soul maC be invisible to us t4e waC somet4ing absolutelC present maC be invisible to us) _)))` So we mig4t saC6 W4at 4ides t4e mind is not t4e bodC but t4e mind itselfB4is 4is, or mine 4is, and contrariwise) >C% REM-1?

NR) !4ese considerations s4all 4elp me to state and assess some important s4ortcomings involved in StrawsonPs stance) Het me start trCing to be verC clear about one point6 * reallC t4inI we s4ould grant Strawson t4at t4ere would be somet4ing rat4er unwelcome or even untenable involved in t4e generali=ed adoption an ob<ective attitude toward ot4ersBmanC of us would certainlC prefer not to live in a world w4ere t4at attitude became standard:NY Cet t4at is verC different from saCing t4at suc4 c4ange would be OpracticallC impossibleP, or unnatural, or in4uman)BAnd let us not go astraC about t4e latter &ualification6 granted, we often do describe attitudes t4at we would rat4er not see ot4er 4uman beings taIing as
:N

* cannot avoid recalling at t4is point WittgensteinPs vivid description >as in "* cQ/0? of t4e OuncannC feelingP t4at would be caused if * were to Oimagine t4at t4e people around me are automataP)

%esentment, sIepticism, acInowledgement E/ Jin4umanKY Cet, as Cavell correctlC reminds us, OonlC a 4uman being can be4ave in4umanlCP >C% QRM?) *n ot4er words, we cannot but acInowledge t4at suc4 >outrageous? acts and attitudes are as 4uman as anC ot4erBif, i)e), we are sincere in our assessment, and do not trC to repress our Inowledge about w4ic4 possibilities are open to beings liIe us) ActuallC, * t4inI t4at repressing t4at Inowledge is reallC a dangerous t4ing to do) \et Strawson seems to be doing <ust t4at w4en 4e saCs, e)g), t4at our attitudes of involvement and participation would not be suppressed Oeven if some general trut4 were a t4eoretical ground for itP >F% N/?) As * see t4ese t4ings, t4e real problem involved in t4e fact t4at we cannot but Olive our sIepticismP concerning ot4er minds is t4at it becomes an all too easC t4ing to do to find all Iinds of Jt4eoretical groundsK for J<ustifCingK >in fact rationali=ing? some >verC practical and verC detac4ed? attitudes toward >some? ot4ers) >!o go beCond S4aIespearePs fiction, t4inI about t4e Jt4eoretical groundsK offered bC 7uropean con&uerors in order to enslave >JsoullessK? American natives, or again t4e Jt4eoretical groundsK offered bC .a=i officers in order to <ustifC massive deat4 of >JinferiorK? 2ews at concentration camps)? So part of w4at * am trCing to get at 4ere is t4at, pace StrawsonBfor w4om, * recall, Oin order for self-conscious t4oug4t and e@perience to be possible, we must taIe it, or believe, t4at we 4ave Inowledge of e@ternal p4Csical ob<ects or ot4er mindsP >S. p) /N?Bit is not, or not simply, Inowledge or >ordinarC? belief or >natural? inclination t4at really matters w4ere t4e JascriptionK of J4uman statusK is concerned) As Cavell saCs6 Ot4e alternative to mC acInowledgement of t4e ot4er is not mC ignorance of 4im but mC avoidance of 4im, call it mC denial of 4imP >C% RM1?) >And as Wittgenstein said before 4im6 O8C attitude towards _t4e ot4er` is an attitude towards a soul) * am not of t4e opinion t4at 4e 4as a soulP >"* **, iv?)? W4at mig4t be lacIing w4en acInowledgement is not fort4coming is attunementBand again t4is is not, or not simplC, a matter of belief or natural inclination, but rat4er somet4ing t4at, as %udd saCs, OmaC depend on onePs willingness to be attunedY or to acInowledge onePs attunement or to acInowledge t4e ot4erP >%udd, /00R, p) N::?)B 5ne mig4t saC6 w4ere acInowledgement >or its denial? is concerned, Inowledge or belief come alwaCs too lateBnotwit4standing our self-indulgent rationali=ations to t4e contrarC) ,aving stated t4ose s4ortcomings in StrawsonPs position, * can trC to e@plain w4at * taIe to be wrong wit4 4is response to sIepticismBi)e), 4is &uicI dispensation, and 4is refusal to

%esentment, sIepticism, acInowledgement ER paC attention to t4e force of t4at position >w4at StanleC Cavell would call its trut4:/?) SticIing wit4 t4e case of sIepticism about Jot4er mindsK6 does not t4e fact t4at it is possible to abandon completelC t4e non-detac4ed attitude toward >some? ot4ers s4ow t4at t4e ground for acInowledgement is as weaI >or as strong? as our our capacities to taIe >or relin&uis4? interest on ot4ers and on ourselvesBon t4at w4ic4 is s4ared bC usB4ence, t4at it is >onlC? 4uman after allW And does not t4at reali=ation s4ow t4at some instabilitC, 4ence some doubt, 4ence t4e possibilitC of sIepticism, are so to speaI internal or intrinsic to our >finite? epistemic conditionW \et if our attitudesBbot4 detac4ed and non-detac4edB toward ot4ers are not grounded in anCt4ing beCond ourselves, t4en t4e burden and t4e responsibilitC for creating and maintaining inter-personal relations4ips, 4ence a communitC, is at least partiallC upon me, upon eac4 of us:R) .ow that Iind of burden can understandablC maIe one an@ious, and t4at an@ietC mig4t well incline one to avoid t4e real issue, bC denCing or repressing itBas Strawson t4e ,umean naturalist seems inclined to do Bor else bC sublimating or rationali=ing itBprefering, as Cavell would saC, to transform Oa metap4Csical finitude into an intellectual lacIP >8W8 /ER?, w4ic4 is preciselC w4at * taIe >some versions of? sIepticism and solipsism as doing) >And Cet notice t4at, as * see t4is dispute, a sIeptic or a solipsist would 4ave a clear advantage against t4eir dismissive opponents, in t4at t4e former would at least recogni=e t4at t4ere is a real difficultC, and one t4at simplC cannot be solved bC ac&uiring more kno"ledgeBsince t4ere is no reason to suppose t4at we Inow somet4ing t4at t4e sIeptic or t4e solipsist ignoreBlet alone bC simplC adducing our ordinarC beliefs, or natural facts about us, or bC describing our conceptual sc4eme)?

1"( )escriptive metap$*sics met$odological lesson

wit$

$uman

face:

NQ) * 4ope t4e analCsis pursued in t4e last section will suffice to indicate w4at awaits for supplementation or correction >or at t4e verC least reinterpretation? in t4e argument of Individuals%and, bC e@tension, in t4e verC pro<ect of descriptive metap4Csics, as
:/

:R

7pitomi=ed in t4e claim t4at Ot4e 4uman creaturePs basis in t4e world as a w4ole, its relation to t4e world as suc4, is not t4at of Inowing, anCwaC not w4at we t4inI of as InowingP >C%, p) /QN?) * s4all e@plore t4is point furt4er in c4apter :)

(escriptive metap4Csics wit4 4uman face6 a met4odological lesson EQ introduced and e@emplified in t4at booI) *n order to s4ow t4at, let me start bC drawing attention to a fundamental differenceBone w4ic4, wit4 4indsig4t, mig4t well appear primarilC as a difference of emp4asisBbetween t4e JreductionsK presented in eac4 of t4e te@ts analCsed >i)e), respectivelC, c4apter R of Individuals and OFreedom and %esentmentP?) %ecall t4at in t4e Individuals! argument, w4at Strawson presented as a problematic conse&uence of suppressing a set of conceptual connections from t4e analCsis was solipsism, i)e), a theoretical >epistemological or metap4Csical? impossibilitC of distinguis4ing >ob<ectivelC? between t4e sub<ect and 4er e@periences) !4at conse&uence, we mig4t also recall, was first and foremost a result of t4e lacI of attention to t4e primitiveness of t4e concept of a person in our conceptual sc4emeY and t4at lacI of attention, in turn, would be intimatelC connected to t4e neglecting of a certain Onatural factP w4ic4 would be at t4e bedrocI of our practices of ascription of psCc4ological predicates% namelC, t4e conception of ot4er sub<ects as 4uman beings, as persons wit4 w4om we s4are a common nature) .ow, given t4e verC terms in w4ic4 t4is last step of t4e Janti-solipsisticK argument was delivered in Individuals, one mig4t be left wit4 t4e impression t4at t4e Iind of neglecting it picIs out would be >again? of merelC theoretical interest, and it is preciselC in order to counteract t4at impression t4at * t4inI t4e analCsis of OFreedom and %esentmentP is welcomeBafter all, w4at t4e argument presented in t4e latter essaC s4ows is t4at, contrarC to w4at Strawson seems to implC in Individuals, t4e real >or ultimate? Jproblematic conse&uenceK of not acInowledging t4e 4umanitC of ot4ers would not be onlC a modification of t4e JunderlCing logicK of our practices of ascription of "-predicatesBt4e c4ange or per4aps t4e suppression of t4e concept of a personY t4e problem would also not be <ust t4e theoretical impossibilitC of ac4ieving a Onon-solipsistic consciousnessP of t4e worldY t4e real loss or c4ange would be t4e suppression of feelings and reactions w4ic4 are fundamental >given t4e waC our life isBand not ;ust t4e waC our Oconceptual sc4emeP is? for t4e establis4ment of a varietC of interpersonal relations4ipsBinvolving affective, communicative and cognitive e@c4anges) So t4at seems a good first step toward a better understanding of w4at is at staIe w4en we describe t4e conditions of use of our concepts, or evaluate alternative ones) \et * t4inI we can do better) StrawsonPs >unwarranted? JoptimismK in OFreedom and %esentmentP prevents 4im of noticing a still more important pointBnamelC, t4at w4ic4 seemed to be a

(escriptive metap4Csics wit4 4uman face6 a met4odological lesson E: mere Jt4oug4t-e@perimentK >indicating t4e logical possibilitC of not paCing attention to or suppressing t4e concept of a person? maC well taIe t4e form of a practical realitCBt4e denial of t4e 4umanitC of ot4ers, and, as a conse.uence, of ourselves) Pace w4at Strawson seems to suggest in Individuals, person4ood and 4umanitC are not <ust JpredicatesK t4at one JascribesK or refrain to JascribeK to somebodC else, but rat4er somet4ing t4at one ackno"ledges or refuses to ackno"ledge) And as Step4en 8ul4all saCs6 t4e 4umanitC Oof all 4uman beings is in t4e 4ands of t4eir fellowsY t4eir accession to 4uman status involves t4eir being acInowledged as 4uman bC ot4ers) !4eC can fulfil all t4e criteria, but t4eC cannot force an acInowledgement from t4ose around t4emP >8ul4all _online:Q`?) !4e argument of c4apter R of Individuals is still one of t4e most lucid e@aminations of t4e criteria for person4ood in twentiet4-centurC analCtic p4ilosop4C) \et if t4e JpersonsK described bC Strawson are to be reallC recogni=ed as human beingsBand not <ust as things >4owever special? to w4ic4 we can ascribe >special? predicates >t4ose w4ic4 Owe would not dreamP to ascribe to p4Csical ob<ects?Bit is necessarC to go beCond t4e bare sIeleton Strawson presents in Individuals, finding >or providing? a 4uman face in >or for? t4em) >*n point of fact, t4e general feeling * get w4en reading t4e argument of Individuals in t4e lig4t of t4ese concerns is t4at t4e Obasic particularsP w4ic4 t4roug4out t4e are called OpersonsP fall completelC s4ort of displaCing enoug4 traits of full-fledged person4ood, looIing more liIe faceless automatons t4an as genuine human beings)? .ow t4e argument of OFreedom and %esentmentP goes some of t4e waC toward t4at aim, bC s4owing t4at, beside being t4e loci of mind and actionBw4ic4 was essentiallC t4e c4aracteri=ation of persons in Individuals%persons are also t4e proper ob<ects of resentment, gratitude, forgivenness, love, 4atred, and a number of ot4er feelings w4ic4 are cruciallC important in our livesBin a word, t4eC are t4e proper ob<ects of ackno"ledgement >as well as its denial?) .ow t4e more we trC to fles4 out t4e notion of a person from t4at point onward, t4e more we see t4at problems w4ic4 at first seemed to be OsolvableP from t4e t4oroug4lC aseptic and abstract perspective of descriptive metap4Csics ac&uire a practical dimension w4ic4 not even Strawson tooI seriouslC enoug4)

:Q

* &uote from a paper originallC publis4ed on t4e internet >see %eferences?) !4e paper underwent important c4anges and was publis4ed as a section of t4e booI &n 6ilm >8ul4all, /00/?) !4e revised version of t4e passage &uoted above is on p) R: of t4at booI)

(escriptive metap4Csics wit4 4uman face6 a met4odological lesson EE N:) !4e analCsis above provides t4e elements for a more general met4odological lesson) Strawson claims in t4e *ntroduction of Individuals t4at O_u`p to a point, t4e reliance upon a close e@amination of t4e actual use of words is t4e best, and indeed t4e onlC sure, waC in p4ilosop4CP >*. 1?) Alt4oug4 t4e formulation of t4at t4esis is not w4ollC satisfactorCBas it suggests t4at p4ilosop4C s4ould deal Jwit4 words onlCKBit mig4t, wit4 a different emp4asisBt4e emp4asis in t4e practices in w4ic4 our use of words is embedded, in our life "ith "ords%stand for a good guiding principle for t4e p4ilosop4ical tasI of ac4ieving a better and clearer understanding of our condition) ,owever, 4aving stated t4at principle, Strawson goes on to saC t4at Ot4e discriminations we can maIe, and t4e conne@ions we can establis4, in t4is waC, are not general enoug4 and not far-reac4ing enoug4 to meet t4e full metap4Csical demand for understandingP >*. 1-N0?) !4e first &uestion to asI 4ere is w4at e@actlC is t4e nature of that demand, and t4en w4et4er it is legitimate as it stands) For if it is of t4e nature of t4at demand to re&uire a simplified model, an ideali7ation, t4en w4C s4ould we prefer it instead of a fullerBmore realistic, even more descriptiveBdescription of our Oconceptual sc4emePW::BAs * see t4ings, if one wants to in4erit and continue wit4 t4e pro<ect of a descriptive metap4CsicsBturning it into a >still? wort4w4ile enterpriseB one is better advised to maIe a conscious effort not to sweep unsolved e@istential difficulties under some intellectuali=ed p4ilosop4ical carpet >e)g), a naturalistic one?, t4erebC relin&uis4ing anC e@cuse for evading t4e real demands and pressures put upon us bC our lives in t4e world and among ot4ers, w4ic4 mig4t be w4at drive us to p4ilosop4i=e in t4e first place) >*t s4ould be noticed t4at, if StrawsonPs diagnosis is correctBif) i)e), t4e acInowledgement of ot4er 4uman beings is a condition for t4e possibilitC of a Ononsolipsistic consciousnessP, and t4is, in its turn, is a basic presupposition of t4e ob<ectivitC of our e@perience as a "hole%t4e revision asIed for 4ere 4as wider conse&uences for 4is own p4ilosop4ical pro<ect t4an would appear at first sig4t)? * conclude wit4 a general and still more speculative suggestion, w4ic4 * do not claim to 4ave establis4ed in anC definitive waC, and w4ic4 * s4all continue pursuing and illustrating in t4e ne@t c4apters) !4e suggestion is t4at we s4ould alwaCs suspect t4at t4e >supposedlC?
::

"er4aps Strawson would be willing to argue t4at t4e Iind of simplified model we get as t4e outcome of worI in descriptive metap4Csics would be <ustified in an analogous waC to t4at of scientific models, i)e), bC t4e philosophical or theoretical or methodological advantages it 4as for t4e tasI of elucidating concepts >e)g), sub;ect of e)perience, person, consciousness, and so on? and >t4us? getting rid of conceptual confusions >suc4 as t4ose supposedlC underlCing sIepticism about ot4er minds and solipsism?) And if t4at is t4e case, t4en of course StrawsonPs <ustification can onlC be assessed according to t4e success of t4e argument presented in t4e booI as a w4oleY Cet, as * 4ave been trCing to s4ow in relation to to a set of central issues, * do not t4inI 4e 4as ac4ieved t4at Iind of clarification in a satisfactorC waC)

(escriptive metap4Csics wit4 4uman face6 a met4odological lesson EL JpurelC p4ilosop4ical problemsKBsuc4 as t4at of solipsismBare intellectuali=ed manifestations of perple@ities and difficulties w4ic4 are related to our 4uman conditionB t4e Odifficulties of realitCP:E, to borrow Cora (iamondPs p4rase) A number of t4ose difficultiesBw4ic4 w4en intellectuali=ed mig4t get e@pressed as reasons for becoming dissatisfied wit4 our ordinarC Jconceptual sc4emeKBwill be presented in t4e following c4apters) \et for t4e time being * s4all onlC 4ig4lig4t t4at bC claiming t4at p4ilosop4ical problems are intellectuali=ed e@pressions of e@istential difficulties * am not suggesting t4at t4eC are in anC waC less importantBrat4er t4e contrarC) Gut w4at * am suggesting is t4at t4e proper waC to deal wit4 t4ese problemsBw4ic4 is not e@actlC a waC to Oremove t4emP, since t4at would demand muc4 more t4an conceptual elucidationBmust involve a deeper diagnosis of t4eir sources, and in order for t4at diagnosis to be possible we need to engage not onlC our intellects, but also >per4aps even primarilC? our sensibilities) .ow t4at is t4e Iind of pursuit of understanding t4at * t4inI would be a proper, or at least a ma<or, tasI of p4ilosop4CBanCwaC of a certain 4eir of t4at familC w4ic4 we use to call OanalCtical p4ilosop4CPBone w4ic4 would per4aps deserve t4e title Odescriptive metap4Csics wit4 a 4uman faceP:L)

:E

:L

(iamond, /00E, p) 11) (iamond attributes t4e p4rase to 2o4n $pdiIe >ibid), p) NNQ, n) N?, w4o would 4ave used it Oin a Ee" Oorker essaC of 4is in t4e N1M0sP, w4ic4 s4e cannot trace) * am greatlC indebted to "aulo Faria, w4o read a couple of preliminarC versions of t4e present te@t and made important suggestions of corrections, as well as to (rs) 2o4n ,Cman and Step4en 8ul4all, w4o read and commented a previous draft, and to %ogerio "assos Severo, w4o 4elped me wit4 t4e translation of t4at draft to 7nglis4)

!4e HonelC 7Ce6 Solipsism and t4e limits of sense in t4e !ractatus EM

+$e Lonel* ,*e: Solipsism and t$e limits of sense in t$e Tractatus
In philosophi7ing "e may not terminate a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and slow cure is all important. >Wittgenstein, ^ cRM/?

#"1 !rologue: on begining-and ending

N) !4e Tractatus +ogico9Philosophicus was t4e first >and actuallC t4e onlC? p4ilosop4ical booI Wittgenstein publis4ed during 4is lifetime) !4e first e@plicit reference to solipsism in t4at worI occurs in a rat4er late conte@tBnamelC, section :)EY 4owever, given t4e peculiar 4ierarc4ic ordering of propositions emploCed bC its aut4or:M, t4at verC placing indicates t4at solipsism is a rat4er overreac4ing concernBin fact, * s4all argue t4at t4ere is a sense in w4ic4 solipsism is present from t4e verC beginning of t4e booI)BGut w4ere e@actlC does t4e booI beginW *s it in t4e first numbered propositionW *n t4e first line of t4e "refaceW *n t4e <otto from DhrnbergerW 5r is t4e real beginning somet4ing t4at transcends t4e >p4Csical? limits of t4e booI itselfBper4aps going bacI to WittgensteinPs first recorded p4ilosop4ical reflections in 4is notebooIs, or even furt4er, to t4e p4ilosop4ical te@ts 4e read and w4ic4 influenced 4is own view in t4e TractatusWBWell, does answering t4ese &uestions reallC matterW After all, t4eC can be asIed in relation to any >anC p4ilosop4icalW? booIY and Cet, as we s4all see, t4eC are especiallC pressing w4en one is dealing wit4 t4e Tractatus, since muc4 of w4at one taIes to be t4e results of t4is particular booI will depend on 4ow and w4ere one decides to start reading itBas well as on 4ow and w4ere one taIes t4e reading to end) !4e last statement is admittedlC opa&ueY in part, t4is is due to t4e difficulties * 4ave to cope wit4 in getting mC own reading of t4e Tractatus started >* mean, to start it anew, to recount it in t4is verC te@t?6 on t4e one 4and, * would liIe to saC enoug4 about 4ow * t4inI t4e booI s4ould be read in order to account for mC strategC in w4at followsY on t4e ot4er 4and, too muc4 information about t4is maC cause t4e most important lesson of t4e w4ole enterprise
:M

8ore on t4is point below >see esp) n) :L?)

"rologue6 on beginingBand ending E1 to be lostBas w4en a film trailer gives awaC most of its plot, t4us completelC spoiling our e@perience) Het me put t4e situation t4is waC6 * taIe it t4at because of t4e peculiar waC in w4ic4 t4e w4ole argument >if t4at is t4e rig4t word? of t4e Tractatus is organi=edBcall it t4e booIPs peculiar dialecticBt4ere is a real risI of e@tracting conclusions too soonB before its ideas are ripe, so to speaI. .ow of course t4e process of JripeningK cannot possiblC taIe place wit4 dead formulations in a te@tbooIBit must taIe place somew4ere elseY and t4is is preciselC 4ow * am inclined to describe my e)perience as a reader6 it is as if t4e booI worIed as a mirror, w4ose reflected image c4anges according to t4e c4anges it produces in t4e perceiver) 8oreover, t4ese c4anges are not merelC in details, but sometimes amount rat4er to >somet4ing aIin to? Aestalt switc4es, w4ose alternating results are t4e impression t4at not4ing maIes sense anCmoreBt4at all t4e pieces of t4e pu==le are out of placeBfollowed bC t4e impression t4at everCt4ing is finallC fitting toget4er) At t4is point one mig4t asI6 OAnd 4ow do Cou Inow w4at is t4e rig4t time to stop t4e readingW ,ow can Cou be sure t4at some particular configuration of t4e pieces is not Cet anot4er illusionWPBWell, * reallC cannot ensure Cou about t4isBnot more t4an * can ensure mCself) *n fact, one of t4e greatest difficulties generated in t4e process of reading t4e Tractatus as * t4inI it s4ould be readBone w4ic4 * 4ad to learn 4ow to live wit4Bis preciselC t4e increasing level of p4ilosop4ical self-consciousness it produces, wit4 w4ic4 comes an e&uallC increasing suspicion about t4e results one getsBor taIes oneself as getting) !4is, in turn, is t4e reason w4C it becomes so difficult to write about t4e Tractatus after finding Cour waC t4roug4 it:1Bafter all, 4ow to combine t4e all but unavoidable selfsubversiveness of t4e processBt4e awareness, ac&uired after eac4 round, t4at t4e previous approac4 was in some important respect wrongBwit4 t4e need to present a linear reconstruction of itW !4e answer * came up wit4 after some reflection was t4at * s4ould present mC own development, including its p4ases of Aestalt reorgani=ation, its self&uestioning and self-suspicious moments, wit4 some detail, so t4at it could be taIen bC ot4ers as an e@ampleBto follow, or to avoid) !4e idea, t4en, is not to record everC single step in mC <ourneCBafter all, it is not a diarC t4at * e@pect Cou to readY rat4er, * 4ad to picI out some of t4e points w4ere t4e most important c4anges occurred, in order to maIe t4at gradual and evolving process some4ow discrete) Some level of artificialitC is implied bC t4is c4oice, w4ic4, 4owever ultimatelC unsatisfactorC, seemed inevitable)
:1

A verC telling enactment of t4at difficultC can be found in Conant >N1M1?)

"rologue6 on beginingBand ending L0

/) #oing bacI to t4e &uestion of w4ere to start reading t4e Tractatus6 * said above t4at one of t4e central lessons * learnt from mC e@perience as a reader was t4at one s4ould taIe seriouslC t4e dialectic c4aracter of t4e booIY and t4at means, among ot4er t4ings, t4at one s4ould never lose sig4t of WittgensteinPs own p4ilosop4ical self-consciousness, w4ic4 is reflected in t4e waC 4e structured 4is worI) And t4is, in turn, means t4at one is well advised >at least provisionallC? to follow t4e pat4 devised bC Wittgenstein 4imselfBi)e), start reading t4e "reface, go t4roug4 t4e main bodC of t4e booI, and t4en))) well, t4en follow its own Jself-undoingK last instructions, i)e), trC to recogni=e its propositions as nonsensical, in order to overcome t4em, and see t4e world arig4t)BOGut w4at does t4at e@actlC meanWPB!4at is preciselC t4e &uestion w4ose answer, or attempt to answer, will 4ave to be postponed until t4e end of t4is reading) W4at * can advance 4ereBwit4 minimal amounts of spoilerBis t4at onlC after following t4is w4ole pattern can we find ourselves in a position to evaluate w4at t4e Otrut4 in solipsismP is >to t4e e@tent t4at t4ere is one?Y * can also advance t4at t4e result w4ic4 we will ac4ieve is probablC not t4e one ort4odo@ readers of t4at booI would e@pect)

#"# Act one: reading t$e Tractatus

#"#"1 +$e !reface

R) !4e "reface%and, conse&uentlC, t4e Tractatus itselfBopens wit4 t4e following words6
"er4aps t4is booI will be understood onlC bC someone w4o 4as 4imself 4ad t4e t4oug4ts e@pressed in itBor at least similar t4oug4ts)BSo it is not a te@tbooI)B *ts purpose would be ac4ieved if it gave pleasure to one person w4o read and understood it) >p) R?E0

E0

$nless stated ot4erwise, all t4e &uotations and page numbers in t4is c4apter are from t4e revised edition of t4e 7nglis4 translation of t4e Tractatus, bC () F) "ears and G) F) 8c#uinness >Hondon6 %outledge ] Degan "aul, N1LQ?)

Act one6 reading t4e !ractatus LN !4ese words, it seems to be, give us a particular picture of t4e e@perience of reading t4e booI t4eC introduceBabout t4e Iind of attitude w4ic4 is e@pected from its readers, and t4e aims it is designed to ac4ieve) For let us taIe its first sentence at face value >4ow else s4ould we taIe itW?6 if it is true, t4en w4at could be t4e interest of reading suc4 a booIW *s not t4e reason for reading booIs to learn new t4ingsW Furt4ermore, w4at could be t4e reason to write it, if not to convince at least some readersBparticularlC, t4ose w4o did not alreadC 4ad t4ose t4oug4tsBof t4e rig4tness or trut4 of its t4esesW ConsistentlC enoug4, t4e second and t4ird sentences <ust seem to testifC t4at t4ere is not4ing to be learnt from t4is booIBw4at else could we e@pect from reading >and understanding? t4oug4ts we alreadC 4ad, e@cept a Iind of >narcissisticW? pleasure, i)e), somet4ing verC distant from t4e Iind of intellectual ac4ievement we strive for w4en reading a tec4nical booI >or even a te@tbooI?W .eedless to saC, t4is is not an auspicious beginning for a booI) *n fact, so inauspicious and pu==ling it is, t4at it 4as almost wit4out e@ception elicited from t4e readers an attitude of &uicI dismissal, as if it was obviousBagainst t4e parent4etical suggestion * made aboveB t4at we s4ould not taIe t4ose introductorC sentences at face value) !4is s4ould remind us t4at, notwit4standing t4e attempts of an aut4or to guide 4is readers t4roug4 a well defined pat4, it is alwaCs our prerogative to accept or to re<ect t4e options at our disposal)B.ow was Wittgenstein unaware of t4is factW 5r was 4e rat4er willing to elicit <ust t4at Iind of dismissive attitude from 4is readersW And, if t4e latter, w4at is t4e use of itWB%egardless of 4ow we end up answering t4ese &uestions, t4ere remains t4e fact t4at it is up to usBas an 4euristic strategC, saCBto decide to let t4is apparent difficultC aside, treating t4e introductorC sentences of t4e "reface as some Iind of r4etoric device) 5f course suc4 decision 4as a price, to t4e e@tent in w4ic4 we are to taIe t4is reading seriouslC6 it commits us to come bacI later, so as to maIe sure t4at t4e decision was sound) >Again, t4is is arguablC a burden presented to any reading of any booI w4atsoeverY nevert4eless, booIs liIe t4e TractatusBbC w4ic4 * mean, booIs written in suc4 an ostensiblC self-conscious mannerBare peculiar, in t4at it is alwaCs an open possibilitC in suc4 cases t4at t4is Iind of >initiallC? dismissive attitudeBw4ic4 can in due course c4ange into a more self-suspicious moveBis <ust w4at t4eC intend to elicit from t4eir readersBor at least from some of t4em, i)e), t4e ones w4o 4ave Oread and understoodP it, i)e), t4e ones w4o, w4en are reading t4ese

Act one6 reading t4e !ractatus L/ sentences from t4e first time, are not yet readC to become suspicious about t4eir contentB or wit4 w4at t4eC maC taIe as t4eir Jr4etoric c4aracterK)EN? Q) Assuming t4at we >provisionallC? decided to let t4ose difficulties aside, letPs move to t4e second paragrap4) WittgensteinPs tone at t4is point is slig4tlC different6 O!4e booI deals wit4 t4e problems of p4ilosop4C and s4ows, * believe, t4at t4e reason w4C t4ese problems are posed is t4at t4e logic of our language is misunderstoodP >p) R?) .ow * taIe it t4at onePs first reaction to t4is claim mig4t be verC sIeptical6 are we really supposed to believe, first, t4at all t4e problems of p4ilosop4C ><ust stop to t4inI of some[? 4ave one and only source, or reason, and, second, t4at t4is source is purely and simply t4is6 misunderstandings about t4e Ot4e logic of our languagePW 7ven if we >rat4er radicallC? restrict our attention to t4e Iinds of p4ilosop4ies w4ose met4ods can in some sense be described as JlinguisticK, is not t4e opposite view more plausibleBi)e), t4e view according to w4ic4 OposingP >and, 4opefullC, solving? p4ilosop4ical problems leads us to a better understanding of t4e logic of our languageW After all, 4owever differentlC professed among its e@ponents, p4ilosop4CPs self-understanding of its own goals 4as alwaCs included, at t4e verC least, t4e pursuit of clarity)B5r are we supposed to believe t4at it is e@actlC t4e impulse to attain claritCBtraditionallC bC means of OposingP >and 4oping to solve? Op4ilosop4ical problemsPBw4ic4 actuallC leads us astraCW Gut t4en again, it is up to us at t4is point to give t4e aut4or t4e benefit of doubtBsince, arguablC, we are <ust being presented wit4 a t4esis t4at t4e booI as a w4ole is supposed to prove) Gesides, t4e opinion according to w4ic4 p4ilosop4ers create t4eir own problemsBwit4 t4e implication t4at t4ose problems do not e@ist in our Jpre-p4ilosop4icalK lifeBis widespread enoug4, at least to provide some initial support to t4is view) >.otice, t4oug4, t4at before proving it, t4e booI 4as Cet

EN

Commenting on an earlC sentence of 7mersonPs OSelf-%eliancePBCet anot4er 4ig4lC self-conscious te@t BCavell presents some considerations about t4e relation te@t T reader w4ic4 are also applicable to our >difficult? situation facing WittgensteinPs opening remarIs in t4e Tractatus) 7mersonPs sentence is6 O*n everC worI of genius we recogni=e our own re<ected t4oug4ts) !4eC come bacI to us wit4 a certain alienated ma<estC)P ,ere are CavellPs comments on t4ose words6 *f t4e t4oug4ts of a te@t suc4 as 7mersonPs >saC, t4e brief te@t on re<ected t4oug4ts? are Cours, t4en Cou do not need t4em) *f its t4oug4ts are not Cours, t4eC will do Cou no good) !4e problem is t4at t4e te@tPs t4oug4ts are neit4er e@actlC mine nor not mine) *n t4eir sublimitC as mC re<ectedBsaC repressedB t4oug4ts, t4eC represent mC furt4er, ne@t, unattained but attainable, self) !o t4inI ot4erwise, to attribute t4e origin of mC t4oug4ts simplC to t4e ot4er, t4oug4ts w4ic4 are t4en, as it were, implanted in meBsome would saC causedBbC let us saC some 7merson, is idolatrC) >C,$ :L?

Act one6 reading t4e !ractatus LR to clarifC w4at is e@actlC t4e nature of t4ose Ological misunderstandingsP, and 4ow t4eC can be responsible for >allW? t4e Oproblems of p4ilosop4CP)? .ow t4e ne@t sentence of t4is paragrap4 can be so construed as to result verC co4erent wit4 t4e general view formulated above6 O!4e w4ole sense of t4e booI mig4t be summed up in t4e following words6 w4at can be said at all can be said clearlC, and w4at we cannot talI about we must pass over in silenceP) .otice t4at t4is is onlC to be e@pectedBafter all, if t4e first sentence is true, t4en of course its positive counterpart s4all be somet4ing liIe a good or sound understanding of t4e Ologic of our languageP, w4ic4 >arguablC? would be reflected in our talIing clearlC) !4e obvious &uestion to be made at t4is point is 4ow e@actlC can suc4 a claritC be attainedW *n particular, 4ow can it be ac4ieved philosophically, given t4at we are supposed to dismiss p4ilosop4CPs traditional met4ods as being t4emselves born from logical misunderstandingsW *s Wittgenstein implCing t4at t4ose met4ods s4ould radicallC c4ange, or rat4er t4at p4ilosop4C is simplC a 4opeless confused enterprise, w4ic4 s4ould be <ust abandoned after we understand its true origins and fateWB*s it because of t4ese reasons t4at t4e booI we are reading is not >Cet anot4er? p4ilosop4ical te@tbooIW

:) !4e following two paragrap4s seem designed to answer >at least some of? t4e &uestions made above6
!4us t4e aim of t4e booI is to draw a limit to t4oug4t, or rat4erBnot to t4oug4t, but to t4e e@pression of t4oug4ts6 for in order to be able to draw a limit to t4oug4t, we s4ould 4ave to find bot4 sides of t4is limit t4inIable >i)e), we s4ould 4ave to be able to t4inI w4at cannot be t4oug4t?)

*t will t4erefore onlC be in language t4at t4e limit can be drawn, and w4at lies on t4e ot4er side of t4e limit will simplC be nonsense) >p) R?

So, we are told, in order to attain claritC, it is necessarC to Odraw limitsP separating sense from nonsense) !4is of course is again consistent wit4 t4e idea e@pressed above >about t4e Ow4ole sense of t4e booIP?) Gut it is important to taIe notice of t4e modalities involved 4ereE/Bt4e idea is not t4at our onlC options are completely clear sense or no talk at allY our 4uman language is not tailored for suc4 a clear, binarC distinctionBt4ere are manC JgreC areasK between >absolutelC clear? sense and >plain? nonsense) Wittgenstein 4imself testifies
E/

* owe t4is indication to (r) Step4en 8ul4all)

Act one6 reading t4e !ractatus LQ t4is bC confessing, in t4e penultimate paragrap4 of t4e "reface, 4is own limitations concerning t4e e)pression of t4e t4oug4ts w4ic4 are contained in t4e rest of t4e booI) ,ere is t4e passage in w4ic4 4e maIes suc4 a confession6
*f t4is worI 4as anC value, it consists in two t4ings6 t4e first is t4at t4oug4ts are e@pressed in it, and on t4is score t4e better t4e t4oug4ts are e@pressedBt4e more t4e nail 4as been 4it on t4e 4eadBt4e greater will be its value)B,ere * am conscious of 4aven fallen a long waC s4ort of w4at is possible) SimplC because mC powers are too slig4t for t4e accomplis4ment of t4e tasI)B8aC ot4ers come and do it better) >pp) R-Q?

So, to summari=e, w4at can be said at all can >ideallC, i)e)? be said clearlC, but it does not need to be so, and, as a matter of fact, it is far from being soB4ence t4e p4ilosop4ical problems) !4is is t4e reason w4C, notwit4standing 4is confession of 4aving failed to attain perfectlC clear e@pression, Wittgenstein still s4ows 4imself verC confident about Ot4e truth of t4e t4oug4ts t4at are 4ere communicatedP, claiming, in t4e last paragrap4 of t4e "reface, t4at it Oseems to _4im` unassailable and definitiveP >p) Q?) !4e paragrap4 Ieeps t4is selfconfident tone in its second sentence, w4ere Wittgenstein avows to taIe 4imself Oto 4ave found, on all essential points, t4e final solution of t4e problemsP) !4is is not t4e firstBand of course neit4er t4e lastBtime t4at a p4ilosop4er taIes 4is own ac4ievements in suc4 a 4ig4 account, so maCbe that is not to be une@pected) W4at seems reallC surprising is t4e ne@t sentence >t4e last of t4e "reface?6 OAnd if * am not mistaIen in t4is belief, t4en t4e second t4ing in w4ic4 t4e value of t4is worI consists is t4at it s4ows 4ow little is ac4ieved w4en t4ese problems are solvedP) Again, are we reallC supposed to believe t4at t4e Ofinal solutionP to t4e problems of p4ilosop4C >if found? would be a small achievementW And even if t4is was true, t4en 4ow could suc4 a Osmall ac4ievementP be one of t4e most importantBmost valuableBresults of t4e w4ole booIW !4ese are again difficulties t4at we can decide to put aside, waiting to see if t4e reading of t4e booI can 4elp to maIe t4ings clearer)

#"#"#

+$e main bod*

E) #oing to t4e main bodC of t4e booI, t4e first remarIable aspect is t4e numbering sCstem emploCed to organi=e its propositions) !4e impression a reader gets from t4is sCstemBas

Act one6 reading t4e !ractatus L: far as * am entitled to speaI for ot4er readersBis t4at of a perfectlC well arranged logical orderBso t4at again t4ere seems to be no alternative e@cept to follow t4e pat4 c4osen before4and bC t4e aut4or) >* t4rust Cou s4all bC now be suspicious enoug4 of t4is Iind of moveER)? !4e second remarIable aspect is t4e verC content of t4e propositions) !4e booI begins wit4 a simple >simple, indeed, to t4e point of raising more suspicions? ontological t4esis about t4e constitution of Ot4e worldPBvi7., t4at it is t4e totalitC of facts >i)e), combinations of ob<ects? instead of things >cf) N)nPs?) !4ose facts, in turn, are said to be represented bC propositions, w4ic4, conse&uentlC, would amount to Iinds of pictures of t4e facts >cf) /)nPs?) !4e relation of propositions and facts is said to be >at bottom? a one-one relation between t4e constituents of atomic facts and t4e constituents of elementarC propositions
ER

2ust as an additional reason for suspicion, 4ave Cou ever asIed Courself w4C, if t4at decimal sCstem was to be so perfect and clean and ordered, w4en we go to t4e / nPs, w4at immediatelC follows proposition / is not /) , but /)QNW W4at does t4at O=eroP meanW .otice t4at t4e initial footnote, w4ic4 describes t4e numbering sCstem, offers no word at all about propositions liIe n)QNBw4at it saCs is t4at Opropositions n)N, n)/, n)R, etc) are comments on proposition no) nP, and t4at On.mN, n.m/, etc) are comments on proposition no) n.mY and so onP) 5f course Wittgenstein also states t4at Ot4e decimal numbers _)))` indicate t4e logical importance of t4e propositionsPY is it, t4en, t4at t4e use of O=eroP serves to indicate t4e >relative? logical unimportance of some propositionsW Gut if t4at is true, w4C would it be necessarC to write t4ose propositions in t4e first placeW "er4aps t4e reason was e@actlC to s4ow to t4e reader t4at t4ose propositions were, possiblC against 4er own e@pectations, >relativelC? unimportantBCet anot4er attempt to guide our reading in a well defined direction) .ow if we trC to applC t4at 4Cpot4esis to t4e case of t4e /)0nPs >trCing to understand w4at could be unimportant about t4ose propositions?, we get indeed a promising result6 let us recall t4at proposition / is about facts, and its w4ole point is to indicate t4at w4at e@ists by its o"nBin an ontologicallC irreducible waC, so to speaIBare Ostates of affairsP and not >as alreadC noticed in N)N? t4eir OatomicP constituents, things, or ob;ects) So, even if it is t4e case, as /)0N tells us, t4at Oa state of affairs >a state of t4ings? is a combination of ob<ects >t4ings?P, t4is is not reallC importantBit does not, not reallC, matter for t4e purposes of t4e ontologC being presented in t4e booIY w4at really matters is t4e combination itself, t4e OfactP, and because of t4at t4e ne@t important propositions, i)e), /)NnPs, will resume <ust from t4at point) .ow t4is 4Cpot4esis also seems to 4old of t4e R)0nPs, Q)0nPs, :)0nPs, and E)0nPsB<ust trC it[ And if * am rig4t in t4inIing t4at t4is is Cet anot4er selfconscious attempt to guide t4e readers in a well defined directionBt4at of putting t4ese propositions aside as unimportantBand, t4erefore, also an invitation for transgression, anot4er interesting &uestion arises6 w4at if we decide t4at t4ose propositions s4ould be taIen as reallC importantW !aIe, for e@ample, t4e propositions of section QBw4ic4 in fact contains muc4 more unimportant propositions t4an t4e preceding ones, and, furt4ermore, also seems to contain some very unimportant ones >as indicated bC t4e use of more consecutive O=erosP in t4eir numeration?) ,ere are some of t4e claims w4ic4 * found verC interesting, and, t4erefore, w4ose insertion on t4e categorC of Ounimportant propositionsP pu==led me6 >i? t4at O!4e totalitC of propositions is languageP >Q)00N?Y >ii? t4at O7verCdaC language is a part of t4e 4uman organism and is not less complicated t4an itP, and Olanguage disguises t4e t4oug4tP >Q)00/?Y >iii? t4at O8ost of t4e propositions and &uestions to be found in p4ilosop4ical worI are not false but nonsensicalP >Q)00R?Y >iv? t4at OAt first sig4t a proposition _)))` does not seem to be a picture of t4e realitC wit4 w4ic4 it is connectedP >Q)0NN?Y >v? t4at O*t belongs to t4e essence of a proposition t4at it s4ould be able to communicate a ne" sense to usP >Q)0/L?, and in order to do so OA proposition must use old e@pressions to communicate a new sense) A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected wit4 t4e situationP >Q)0R?Y >vi? t4at OJlogical constantsK are not representativesP >Q)0RN/?) >!4e suggestion to be at least pu==led about t4e O=eroP in t4ese propositions was made bC (r) Step4en 8ul4all, during a seminar on Wittgenstein) 8C w4ole attempt to read t4e Tractatus owes muc4 to t4e instigating remarIs 4e made on t4at booI during t4at seminar)?

Act one6 reading t4e !ractatus LE >i)e), simple ob<ects and names?) A proposition Oapplied and t4oug4t outP is a thoughtN t4oug4ts t4emselves represent facts, and so t4eC also can be described as >special? Iinds of OpicturesPBlogical ones) !4is OapplicationP >or Ot4inIing ofP? of a proposition is its sense >cf) R)nPs and Q)nPs?) Comple@ propositions are t4e results of t4e combinations among trut4-functions e@pressed bC elementarC ones >elementarC propositions are trut4-functions of t4emselvesBcf) :)nPs?Y since t4ere is a general form of trut4 functions >namelC, p , R , E R ?, t4ere is also a general form of propositions >proposition E?) !4e reason w4C t4e results summed up above s4ould be seen as remarkable is t4at, after reading t4e "reface, we s4ould be waiting for anCt4ing but t4is Iind of traditional p4ilosop4ical enterpriseBafter all, t4e booI was not supposed to be a Ote@tbooIP[ AnCwaC, we can per4aps speculate t4at t4is is t4e onlC waC to fulfil t4e tasI presented in t4e "reface Bt4at of clarifCing t4e Ologic of our languageP, bC Odrawing limitsP separating sense from nonsense) So letPs trC to put t4is 4Cpot4esis to worI)

L) !o begin wit4, it is wort4 remembering t4at t4e "reface raises, but does not e@actlC answer, two &uestions w4ic4 are fundamental to understand 4ow suc4 a tasI was supposed to be accomplis4ed bC t4e booI, vi7., >i? ho" t4e limits separating sense from nonsense were supposed to be drawn, and >ii? ho" t4e drawing of suc4 limits could solve t4e Oproblems of p4ilosop4CP) As to t4e first &uestion, t4e onlC additional clue offered in t4e "reface itself was t4e >somew4at opa&ue? claim t4at t4e limits s4ould be drawn Oin languageP) .ow t4is is e@actlC t4e role of t4e presentation of a general form of proposition6 provided t4at we 4ave found suc4 a form >w4ic4, .)G), was obtained solelC bC reflection of t4e Oinner worIingsP of language itselfBsee cE?, we can understand 4ow anC bona fide proposition maC be generated from t4e elementarC ones, and, conse&uentlC, we can e@clude from t4e categorC of OpropositionP all t4e strings of signs w4ic4 do not satisfC t4at condition >cf) t4e e@amples of t4e pseudo-propositions of mat4ematics, science, and et4ics, dealt wit4, respectivelC, in E)/, E)R and E)Q?) 5nce we 4ave understood t4e nature of t4e procedure >presented in a programmatic waC in t4e "reface? for Odrawing limitsP to sense from "ithin language, we 4ave t4e IeC to answer &uestion >ii?, about ho" t4e p4ilosop4ical problems are supposed to be solved bC t4e booI6

Act one6 reading t4e !ractatus LL as illustrated bC t4e cases of OscepticismP >E):N? and t4e Oproblem of lifeP >E):/N?, we can use t4e procedure <ust mentioned to s4ow t4at suc4 >alleged? problems are in fact <ust pseudo-problems, w4ic4 strictlC speaIing cannot even be OposedP >t4e word used in t4e "reface?, since t4e Iind of O&uestionP we trC to formulate to e@press t4em, as far as it is supposed to 4ave a definite sense, is simplC made impossible bC t4e rules of logical sCnta@ >particularlC t4e general rule of generation of propositions presented in E?, so t4at of course t4ere are no possible OanswersP to t4em eit4er >t4e general lesson of E):?) !4ese considerations allow us to understand two furt4er >pu==ling? programmatic claims made in t4e "reface6 >i? t4at all t4e >pseudo-?problems of p4ilosop4C are <ust conse&uences of Omisunderstandings of t4e logic of our languageP, and >ii? t4at Olittle is ac4ieved w4en t4ese problems are solvedP) After all, w4at we are left wit4 upon applCing t4e abovedescribed procedure is not, strictlC speaIing, a OsolutionP to anC problem w4atsoever, but rat4er a demonstration t4at t4ere were no problems at all to solve, <ust products of logical confusion6 O5f course t4ere are no &uestions left, and t4is itself is t4e answerP >E):/?)

M) !4is general reading receives furt4er support w4en applied to t4e two penultimate propositions of section E):, w4ic4 are t4e following6
E):// !4ere are, indeed, t4ings t4at cannot be put into words) !4eC make themselves manifest) !4eC are w4at is mCstical)

E):R

!4e correct met4od in p4ilosop4C would reallC be t4e following6 to saC not4ing e@cept w4at can be said, i)e), propositions of natural scienceBi)e), somet4ing t4at 4as not4ing to do wit4 p4ilosop4CBand t4en, w4enever someone else wanted to saC somet4ing metap4Csical, to demonstrate to 4im t4at 4e 4ad failed to give a meaning to certain signs in 4is propositions) Alt4oug4 it would not be satisfCing to t4e ot4er personB4e would not 4ave t4e feeling t4at we were teac4ing 4im p4ilosop4CBthis met4od would be t4e onlC strictlC correct one)

%emember t4at t4e two propositions above are meant as clarifications of E):Ps t4esisB according to w4ic4, basicallC, we s4ould not searc4 for answers w4en a >supposed? &uestion Ocannot be put into wordsP) *t maC taIe some worI to understand 4ow proposition E):// could be said to plaC t4at roleY as * am inclined to read it at t4is point, * would saC t4at it does so in a rat4er peculiar and negative waC6 w4at it OclarifiesP is t4at t4e idea e@pressed in E): is not >per4aps against our e@pectationsBor were t4eC <ust mineW? t4at

Act one6 reading t4e !ractatus LM beCond t4e Olimits of languageP >and sense? t4ere is nothingY rat4er, t4ere is Osomet4ingP >or some Ot4ingsP?, about w4ic4 we simplC cannot talk) .ow t4ese Ot4ingsP are furt4er said to be >i? ineffable >alt4oug4 OmanifestableP?, and >ii? Ow4at is mCsticalP) So let us trC to get a little bit clearer about t4ose &ualifications before we proceed reading t4e propositions in t4e list) * will start wit4 t4e later &ualificationBOmCsticalP) *ts first te@tual occurrence is on E)QQ, w4ere it is said t4at O*t is not ho" t4ings are in t4e world t4at is mCstical, but that it e@istsP) E)Q: furt4er elaborates t4is view, identifCing t4e OmCsticalP wit4 a Iind of OfeelingPBt4e feeling of Ot4e world as a limited w4oleP) !rCing to sum up t4e view being presented at t4is <uncture, it seems t4at we can distinguis4 at least two claims6 >ii)i? t4at t4e fact t4at t4e world e@ists is w4at is mCstical, and >ii)ii? t4at we are a"are of t4is fact w4en we OviewP t4e world Osub specie aeterniPBor, w4at amounts to t4e same, w4en we OfeelP it Oas a limited w4oleP) !4is t4rows us immediatelC bacI to t4e talI about limits >of t4oug4t, language and world? presented in t4e "reface, and furt4er clarified in section EBa section of w4ic4 t4e role, to repeat, is to indicate ho" suc4 limits are supposed to be OdrawnP, or Oe@pressedP, in language) .ow, two different waCs of drawing suc4 limits are presented in t4at section6 one is positiveBt4e unveiling of limit cases of propositions >tautologies?, w4ic4 >directlC? displaC t4ose verC limits in t4emselvesBand anot4er is negativeBt4e unveiling of pseudo-propositions >suc4 as t4ose of mat4ematics, science and et4ics? w4ic4 arise from t4e >4opeless? attempts to e@press somet4ing necessarC about t4e world, and, to t4is e@tent >i)e), bC trCing to go beyond t4e limits of sense, and t4us producing nonsense? maIe us aware of t4ose same limits t4at tautologies >directlC? maIe manifest) #iven t4at we Inow 4ow t4ese limits are supposed to be Omade manifestP, and assuming t4at t4e e&uation between >t4e awareness of? Ot4e mCsticalP and >t4e awareness of? t4ose limits is correct, we 4ave an answer to t4e &uestion of 4ow t4e OmCsticalP can be Omade manifestPBi)e), we can understand &ualification >i?) .otice, 4owever, t4at t4is conclusion depends on a particularlC Jc4aritableK reading of proposition E)://Bw4ic4, taIen at face value, is talIing about there being Ot4ingsP >4owever ineffable? outside or beyond t4e limits of w4at can be said, or t4oug4t) .ow t4is, bC t4e verC standards of t4e booI, s4ould not be said at allBafter all, remember once again t4e "refacePs programmatic claims about t4e need to trace t4e limits to t4e e@pression of t4oug4ts Oin languageP, i)e), from "ithin, and,

Act one6 reading t4e !ractatus L1 conse&uentlC, wit4out 4aving to Ofind bot4 sides of t4is limit t4inIableP, to Ot4inI w4at cannot be t4oug4tP) >Gut w4C in t4e world is Wittgenstein 4ere going against 4is own advice of remaining silent about w4at is beyond suc4 limitsWB!o be absolutelC fair, 4e is not >in t4is or anC ot4er conte@t? e@actlC saying t4at we can e)press, think or talk about w4at is beCond t4e limits of t4oug4t and language >w4ic4 would indeed amount to a straig4tforward contradiction?Y t4e problem is, of course t4at 4e does not e@actlC remain silent eit4er)BSo, w4at is 4e doing after allWBWell, * 4ave to admit t4at * do not 4ave an answer to t4is &uestion CetY it is a fair and important &uestion, to be sure, in t4at it points to an important tension in t4is part of t4e booI, to w4ic4 we s4all return) !4e best * can do rig4t now is to marI it off for later treatment) ,aving done t4at, * suggest we continue wit4 t4e reading)? So let us turn our attention to proposition E):R) Again, t4e first &uestion we s4ould asI about t4is proposition is 4ow it can be said to OclarifCP E):) !4e answer seems more straig4tforward in t4is case6 it does so bC maIing e@plicit an >ot4erwise implicit? met4odological conse.uence of E): for t4e p4ilosop4ical tasI itselfBfor t4e treatment of t4e >pseudo-?&uestions w4ic4 originate p4ilosop4ical problems) !o t4is e@tent, E):R is clearlC co4erent wit4 t4e programmatic claims made in t4e "reface, as well as wit4 t4e illustrations of 4ow t4at met4od was supposed to be applied >* refer to t4e analCses of OscepticismP and t4e Oproblem of lifeP?) .ow t4e >e@egetical? trouble arises w4en we stop t4inIing about t4ese circumscribed cases, and start to t4inI about t4e general procedure followed in t4e booI as a w4oleBafter all, <ust asI Courself6 4as Wittgenstein followed 4is own advice in t4e preceding sections of t4e booIW ,as 4e in t4ose conte@ts presented onlC Opropositions of natural sciencePW 5f course t4e answer seems to be6 not at allY as we saw, 4e voices metaphysical >ontological? t4eses from t4e verC beginning in order to ac4ieve t4e results indicated in t4e "reface) !4is provides a clue as to w4C, for t4e saIe of co4erence, t4e ne@t message presented in t4e booI would 4ave to be Jself-undoingK)

#"#"%

+$e final instructions

Act one6 reading t4e !ractatus M0 1) !4is message of self-destruction occurs in t4e last proposition of section E, and goes as follows6
E):Q 8C propositions serve as elucidations in t4e following waC6 anCone w4o understands me eventuallC recogni=es t4em as nonsensical, w4en 4e 4as used t4emBas stepsBto climb up beCond t4em) >,e must, so to speaI, t4row awaC t4e ladder after 4e 4as climbed up it)

,e must overcome t4ese propositions, and t4en 4e will see t4e world arig4t)EQ

*n acInowledging t4at 4is own previous propositions >all of t4emW? were OnonsensicalP, and s4ould be used as OstepsP in a OladderP to be Ot4rown awaCP, Wittgenstein at least maIes some room for accommodating t4e difficultC indicated aboveBafter all, in acInowledging t4at 4e is also conceding, 4owever implicitlC, t4at suc4 propositions >but w4ic4 onesW? were indeed Ometap4CsicalP)B*s t4is t4e reason w4C, in t4e preceding proposition >E):R?, 4e spoIe of w4at "ould be t4e Ocorrect met4od in p4ilosop4CPBinstead of <ust saCing w4at it isW Gut t4en again, w4C not follow t4e Ocorrect met4odP since t4e beginning, instead of going bC suc4 sidewaCsW *s it because going bC sidewaCs can be in some sense more OsatisfCing to t4e ot4er personPWB*n anC event, to saC t4at t4e difficulties above can be OaccommodatedP in t4is waC is not to saC t4at t4eC cease to be difficulties) !4e c4allenge remains t4at we 4ave Cet to understand6 >i? ho" we are >were weW? supposed to use >to 4ave usedW? t4ose propositions >w4ic4 onesW? as OstepsP in suc4 OladderPY >ii? 4ow it is supposed to be Ot4rown awaCPY and >iii? w4at e@actlC is t4e result of all t4atBw4at it means to Osee t4e world arig4tP) .ow, before trCing to understand 4ow t4e ladder worIsBor, better, if we reallC want to understand t4is pointB* t4inI we s4ould trC to s4arpen our general reading bC applCing it to specific problems posed in t4e booI, in between t4e pat4 t4roug4 w4ic4 we 4ave been walIing in large steps up to t4is point) !4is is mC cue to introduce t4e problem wit4 w4ic4 * s4all be mainlC concerned in t4e rest of t4e te@tBvi=), t4at posed bC t4e propositions dealing wit4 solipsism and t4e limits of language >:)EnPs?) GC analCsing t4ese propositions, we s4all
EQ

!4e translation of t4e last sentence was amended, following a suggestion from FloCd, w4o in turn owes it to #oldfarb >see FloCd, /00L, pp) NML-M ] n) /1?) Got4 >FloCd and #oldfarb? see "ears and 8c#inness translation of OSber"indenP as Oto transcendP as tendentiousY alt4oug4 t4is <udgement depends on t4eir particular interpretations, * t4inI is uncontroversial t4at t4e verb Oto transcendP is less vague, and, t4erefore, less amenable to different interpretations, t4an t4e #erman one, and t4is is enoug4 reason >at least bC nowBbut see c/N below? to prefer t4e more literal rendition Oto overcomeP) >5gden uses Oto surmountP, w4ic4 * t4inI would e&uallC do)?

Act one6 reading t4e !ractatus MN meet once again t4e tension indicated above, w4en we compared t4e reference to t4e Ot4ingsP w4ic4 are said to be outside or beyond t4e limits spoIen about in t4e "reface, wit4 t4e programmatic claims made in t4at verC same conte@tY onlC t4is time we will see t4at t4e tension is also internal to t4e analCsis presented in section :)E) >!4e same goes to t4e analCsis presented in section E)Q, w4ic4 is concerned wit4 Ot4e mCsticalP and t4e Oabsolute valueP, alt4oug4 * will not attempt to drawn t4e parallel 4ereE:)?

#"% Intermission: from realism to solipsism& and bac' again

#"%"1 +$e limits of m* language mean the limits of my world

N0) As we saw above, t4e general idea of Odrawing limitsP >to t4e world, language and t4oug4ts? is alwaCs in t4e bacIground of t4e booIPs argument) ,owever, after its introduction in t4e "reface, it is onlC in section :)E t4at it will be broug4t to t4e foreground again) !4is occurs alreadC in t4e first proposition of t4at section, w4ic4 reads6 OThe limits of my language mean t4e limits of mC worldP) Gefore reading t4e sub-propositions offered to elucidate t4is one, let us pause and t4inI about 4ow we 4ave arrived at itBi)e), 4ow t4e general analCsis of t4e conditions for representation can 4ave t4is seeminglC solipsistic conclusion as its conse&uence) Wit4 t4at aim in mind, let us recall t4at section : as a w4ole is intended as a Iind of tec4nical e@position of a general idea presented before in t4e booI6 t4e account of 4ow comple@ propositions can be generated from elementarC onesBor, to be more specific, t4e account of 4ow t4e truth9values of elementarC propositions can be combined bC means of Otrut4-operationsP in order to generate t4e comple@ ones) Hetting t4e tec4nical details of t4at analCsis aside, t4is reminder must give us a better sense of 4ow difficult it is, indeed, to understand t4e role of proposition :)E as a sub-proposition of t4is w4ole sectionBafter all, 4ow can t4e idea of limits of >mC? language be possiblC related to t4e idea of propositions >in general? being trut4-functions of elementarC onesW
E:

8ul4all >/00Lb? presents an analCsis of section E)Q w4ic4 * see as verC congenial to mC own approac4 in w4at followsY alt4oug4 * do not claim complete fait4fulness to 4is reading strategC, * 4appilC acInowledge t4at it was one of t4e main sources of inspiration for t4e subse&uent analCsisBa good illustration of 4ow to produce a clarifCing Oresolute readingP of particular stretc4es of t4e Tractatus)

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again M/ *n order to answer t4at &uestion let us notice, first, t4at proposition : itself is alreadC worIing >4owever implicitlCBgiven t4e account previouslC presented in t4e booI? wit4 a relation between language and "orld6 if all t4e propositions of our language are Otrut4function_s` of elementarC propositionsP >:?, and if O_t`rut4-possibilities of elementarC propositions mean possibilities of e@istence and non-e@istence of states of affairsP >Q)R?EE, t4en of course t4e totalitC of our language must correspond to t4e totalitC of possibilities of e@istence and non-e@istence of states of affairsBi)e), to all t4e possible facts in t4e world) And bC means of t4is reasoning we can at least understand in w4at sense t4e limits of language can be said to OmeanP t4e limits of t4e "orld6 t4e idea is not, .)G), t4at of e&uating two JindependentlC e@istingK limits >w4ic4, so to speaI, J<ust 4appenK to be e&ual, or congruent?, but rat4er t4at of calling our attention to an internal relation%if Cou want, a necessary congruence of t4ese limitsBin t4at t4eC are Jbot4K grounded on t4e very same operation, bC means of w4ic4 some JelementsK >atomic facts T elementarC propositions? are combined in order to generate new Jcomple@esK >factual T propositional?)

EE

GC presenting Q)RPs t4esis alone 4ere * intend to cut across a muc4 longer pat4 w4ic4 was built up to t4is point since proposition N, connecting t4e limits of language and world) *t maC be of some 4elp to indicate some of t4e most important stops in t4is pat4, as follows6 section N establis4ed t4at t4e world is t4e totalitC of facts >instead of things? in logical spaceY section / goes from t4is brief and verC condensed ontologC to an e@amination of t4e conditions for t4e representation of t4ose facts w4ic4 constitutes realitC) !4e basic idea is well Inown6 OWe picture facts to ourselvesP >/)N?Y pictures are Omodels of realitCP >/)N/?, t4eC are t4emselves OfactsP >/)NQN?, w4ose >pictorial? elements Ocorrespond toP >/)NR? or OrepresentP >/)NRN? t4e ob<ects w4ic4 constitute t4e >ot4er? facts w4ic4 we want to depict) !4is form w4ic4 is s4ared between t4e fact depicted and t4e depicting fact is t4e Opictorial formP >/)NL?) W4en we abstract from t4e particular medium in w4ic4 t4ese pictures are conveCed >i)e), w4et4er it is a Ospatial pictureP, or a Ocoloured onePBsee /)NLN?, and paC attention onlC to its logical aspect, we can also call t4is form a Ologico-pictorial formP >/)/?) !4e ne@t stop, section R, deals wit4 thought@ OA logical picture of facts is a t4oug4tP >R?) !4oug4ts must be made manifest in some perceptible waC >R)N?, and t4at is e@actlC t4e role of propositionsBmore specificallC >cf) R)NN-N/?, of t4e Operceptible sign of a proposition >as spoIen or written, etc)?P) R)/ furt4er specifies t4e conditions under w4ic4 t4e e@pression of t4oug4ts is made possible bC propositions6 since t4e >pictorial? relation between propositions and facts is ultimatelC dependent on a one-one relation between constituents of propositions >Osimple signsP or OnamesP, cf) R)/0N-R)/0/? and constituents of facts >ob<ects?, t4ere must be some Oob<ects of t4e t4oug4tP corresponding to t4e elements of t4e Opropositional signP) R)R testifies t4at w4at reallC matters in t4is w4ole account is t4e combinationBof ob<ects to generate facts, and of names to generate >articulated? propositions) *n ot4er words, R)R is t4e mirror image, at t4e level of language, of t4e ontological t4esis e@pressed in section N) >R)Q resumes t4e idea of a Oplace in logical spaceP, and clarifies it bC providing an analogC wit4 geometrCBt4e idea being t4at, as in >analCtical? geometrC we can use mat4ematical e@pressions >e)g), Cartesian coordinates? to represent points in space, so in logic we can use propositions to represent OpointsP in Ological spaceP)? Section Q, in turn, maIes more e@plicit and elaborates t4e account of 4ow t4is connection between language and world ultimatelC obtains) !4e basic idea is t4is6 OelementarC propositionsP are comprised of names, and, names, in turn, refer to t4e constituents of factsY if t4ere is an agreement between t4e waC names are related in a particular elementarC proposition and t4e waC simple ob<ects relate in t4e world, t4en t4e trut4-value >t4e actuali=ed Otrut4-possibilitCP? of t4at elementarC proposition will be OtruePY ot4erwise it will be OfalsePY now, to e@press t4is Iind of JagreementK or JdisagreementK is furt4er identified >see Q)Q? as t4e role of propositions tout court >i)e), regardless of being comple@ or elementarC?)

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again MR StrictlC speaIing, t4en, w4at we 4ave are not t"o limits at allBt4e limits of language and t4e limits of worldBbut rat4er two aspects, saC, of t4e same limitsEL)

NN) .otice, t4oug4, t4at t4is analCsis 4as an important s4ortcoming, in t4at it does not e@plain t4e appearance of t4e first personal singular pronoun >in its possessive formBi)e), OmCP? in :)EPs original formulation) Gut w4C is t4at pronoun necessarC in t4e first placeW After all, if we paC attention to t4e e@amination of t4e conditions for language to represent t4e world pursued since t4e beginning of t4e booI, t4e ma@imum we will find in t4e direction of a Jsub<ectivitCK is t4e use of t4e first personal plural pronoun >OweP T OourP?B its first occurrence being in /)N, w4ere it is stated t4at OWe picture facts to ourselvesP >/)N?EM) .ow, if are not to accept t4at t4e OmCP simplC comes out JmagicallCK into t4e scene, it would be reasonable to e@pect t4at it s4ould be some4ow alreadC implicit in t4e analCsis of t4e conditions of representation presented before) A case can be made for t4at 4Cpot4esis if we t4inI about t4e conditions for applCing t4e met4od of pro<ection, w4ic4 is introduced in R)NN, and furt4er worIed out in t4e remaining parts of section R) For our

EL

As Cora (iamond >/000? 4as s4own, one of t4e primarC targets of t4is Jsolipsistic moveKBi)e), t4at of e&uating t4e limits of >mC? language and >mC? world, 4ence s4owing t4at, in an important sense, t4ere is onlC one limit instead of t"o%is preciselC a %ussellian Otwo limits viewP, according to w4ic4, roug4lC, t4e limits of mC e@perienceBand so t4e limits of t4e ob<ects w4ic4 * can directlC name, and be directlC ac.uainted "ith%are narrower t4an t4e limits of t4e worldBof all t4e ob<ects t4at t4ere are Jout t4ereKB so t4at, in order for me to reac4 out toward t4ose >Je@ternalK? ob<ects, * would 4ave to resort to descriptions >&uantifiers?, w4ic4 refer to t4em onlC indirectly) According to (iamond6 WittgensteinPs remarIs about t4e limits of language and t4e world _)))` are concerned wit4 t4e difference between a %ussellian two-limits view _)))` and a one-limit view) _)))` !4e world is my world in t4e sense t4at t4ere is not4ing _)))` w4ic4 is in the world and w4ic4 I cannot name) !4e idea t4at t4e use of &uantifiers enables me to reac4 beCond t4e limits of mC e@perience to ob<ects OoutsideP e@perience is inco4erent) >(iamond, /000, n) R, p) /M/? Gut (iamond 4as more to saC about w4ere e@actlC WittgensteinPs solipsistic move ends up leading usB and so do * >see section /)Q below?) !rulC speaIing, it is alreadC notewort4C t4at suc4 OweP s4ould appear at t4at point, given t4e overimpersonal, over-ob<ective waC in w4ic4 t4e opening propositions of t4e booI are formulatedBt4e talI about Ot4e worldP in t4e N)nPs seeming to be completelC perspectiveless and sub<ectless) 5f course t4ere is a good prima facie reason for t4is first c4ange, w4ic4 4as to do wit4 t4e transition from t4e analCsis of t4e ontological conditions for t4e world Oto be t4e caseP, to t4e analCsis of t4e logical conditions for representing itBand t4ere is not4ing more natural t4an e@pecting t4at t4e first analCsis s4ould not include t4e representing sub<ect as one of its conditions, if, i)e), t4e world is to e)ist independentlC of our representation of it) !4e &uestion arises, 4owever, w4et4er after reading t4e rest of t4e booI we can still 4ave anC confidence in t4e obtaining of t4e antecedent of t4is conditional)

EM

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again MQ present purposes, t4e list of propositions below s4all be enoug4 to summari=e WittgensteinPs view about t4at point6 N) OWe use t4e perceptible sign of a proposition >spoIen or written, etc)? as a pro<ection of a possible situation) T !4e met4od of pro<ection is to t4inI t4e sense of a proposition)P >R)NN? /) OA proposition _)))` does not actuallC contain its sense, but does contain t4e possibilitC of e@pressing it)P >R)NR? R) OW4at a proposition e@presses it e@presses in a determinate manner, w4ic4 can be set out clearlC _)))`P >R)/:N? Q) :) OA proposition 4as one and onlC one complete analCsis)P >R)/:? O* call anC part of a proposition t4at c4aracteri=es its sense an e@pression >or a sCmbol?)P >R)RN? E) L) OA sign is w4at can be perceived of a sCmbol)P >R)R/? OSo one and t4e same sign >written or spoIen, etc)? can be common to two different sCmbolsBin w4ic4 case t4eC will signifC in different waCs)P >R)R/N? M) O*n everCdaC language it verC fre&uentlC 4appens t4at t4e same word 4as different modes of significationBand so belongs to different sCmbolsBor t4at two words t4at 4ave different modes of signification are emploCed in propositions in w4at is superficiallC t4e same waC)P >R)R/R? 1) O*n t4is waC t4e most fundamental confusions are easilC produced >t4e w4ole of p4ilosop4C is full of t4em?)P >R)R/Q? N0) O*n order to avoid suc4 errors we must maIe use of a sign-language t4at e@cludes t4em bC not using t4e same sign for different sCmbols and bC not using in a superficiallC similar waC signs t4at 4ave different modes of signification6 t4at is to saC, a sign-language t4at is governed bC logical grammar BbC logical sCnta@)P >R)R/:? NN) O*n order to recogni=e a sCmbol bC its sign we must observe 4ow it is used wit4 a sense)P >R)R/E? N/) OA propositional sign, applied and t4oug4t out, is a t4oug4t)P >R):?

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again M:

* t4inI t4e list above presents in a sufficientlC clear waC t4e distinction between sign and symbol, as well as its role in generating t4e Iind of Ological misunderstandingsP >to use t4e "refacePs e@pression? of w4ic4 Op4ilosop4C is fullPY so, * will add no furt4er comments about t4ese points now, e@cept to 4ig4lig4t t4at t4eC are of fundamental importance, given t4e general tasI of t4e booI) !4e immediate purpose of t4e list is to 4elp us see 4ow t4e idea of a representing sub<ect is at least impliedBsince it is not e@plicitlC mentionedBbC t4e analCsis of t4e conditions for t4e met4od of pro<ection) !o put it brieflC, t4e idea is t4at if we are to 4ave propositions wit4 a determinate sense >i)e), propositions, simpliciter?, we need a representing sub<ect w4o can think t4eir sense, and, t4erefore, w4o can pro;ect t4eir perceptible signs in a particular "ay, in order to signifC a particular situation) .otice, 4owever, t4at it is not being said >and not even implied? bC t4e list above t4at t4is sub<ect s4ould himself proceed to a Ocomplete analCsisP >supposedlC maIing use of t4e OsignlanguageP mentioned in N0? in order to give a determinate sense to 4is own propositionsY suc4 a Ocomplete analCsisP 4as at most an instrumental role into clarifCing possible misunderstandings >to an interlocutor, let us saC?, but w4at reallC marIs off t4e sense intended bC a particular sub<ect, in a particular conte@t, is t4e waC t4e proposition is pro;ectedBi)e), used, applied and thought outBbC 4im >NN-N/?) !4is general analCsis is nicelC illustrated later in t4e booI, in a proposition w4ic4 is often presented bC commentators as providing t4e main reason for introducing t4e idea of a Jrepresenting sub<ectK in t4e Tractatus) * refer to proposition :):Q/R, w4ere we are presented wit4 t4e following figure6

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again ME !4ere are, saCs Wittgenstein, Otwo possible waCs to see t4e figure _above` as a cubeP, depending on t4e order in w4ic4 we looI at its corners6 O*f * looI in t4e first place at t4e corners marIed a and onlC glance at t4e bPs, t4en t4e aPs appear to be in front, and vice versaP) !4at is because, as t4e preceding comment maIes clear, O_t`o perceive a comple@ means to perceive t4at its constituents are related to one anot4er in suc4 and suc4 a waCPB in ot4er words, t4e combination of t4e constituents in a perceived comple@ is a matter of 4ow t4e perceiving sub<ect arranges t4ose constituents, a matter, i)e), of t4e method of pro;ection emploCed bC 4im) #enerali=ing t4is case, we can see 4ow t4e idea of a Jrepresenting sub<ectK ends up being presented as a general condition of representationE1)

N/) !4e considerations above s4all 4elp us understand w4C it is t4at t4e pronoun OmCP is introduced in proposition :)E, bC s4owing t4at it was alreadC implicated bC WittgensteinPs account of t4e met4od of pro<ection in t4e preceding parts of t4e booI) !4is of course is not t4e same as e@plaining w4at e@actlC is t4e meaning of t4e resulting t4esisBa tasI w4ic4 re&uires t4at we read t4e sub-propositions of t4is section) .otice, 4owever, t4at t4is analCsis alreadC gives us an important clue to understand w4C solipsism becomes suc4 an important issue at t4is pointBafter all, given t4e >necessarC? JcongruenceK between t4e limits of my language and t4e limits of my world >w4ic4, .) G), is presented as an inevitable conse&uence of t4e general account of 4ow language worIs, of 4ow propositions can represent t4e world?, it is onlC natural to asI 4ow * can be sure t4at my language T world is t4e same as everCbodC elsePs)
E1

* taIe t4e following &uotation from "eter ,acIer as illustrative of t4e traditional view on t4is respect6 AnCt4ing w4ic4 * can understand as a language must 4ave a content w4ic4 is assigned to it bC mC pro<ecting logico-sCntactical forms on to realitC) O!4ings ac&uire J?edeutungK onlC in relation to mC willP is not onlC an et4ical principle, but a semantic one) "ropositional signs are merelC OinscriptionsPY onlC in relation to my "ill do t4eC constitute sCmbols) _)))` From t4is point of view language is my language) *n order for propositional signs to 4ave sense * 4ave to t4inI t4e met4od of pro<ection) W4at * cannot pro<ect is not language) Wit4out t4e accompaniment of mC consciousness language is not4ing but a 4usI) >,acIer, N1ME, p) N00? >An important alternative reading of t4e role of t4e sub<ect is advanced bC %us4 %4ees >N11E?) According to 4im, t4e w4ole set of psychological concepts emploCed in t4e Tractatus >e)g), Ot4inIing sub<ectP, Oto t4inI t4e sense of t4e propositionP? are to be e@plained >awaC? bC t4e logical ones >e)g), Opro<ectionP, Omet4od of pro<ectionP, etc)?) Alt4oug4 * s4all not analCse %4eesPs reading in w4at follows, * taIe it to be congenial to t4e results of mC own reading below) >!4anIs to (r) Step4en 8ul4all for calling mC attention to t4at reading, to "aulo Faria for furt4er references)??

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again ML Gut we are moving forward too fast) So, let us turn bacI to t4e main sub-propositions offered to clarifC :)E, starting wit4 :)EN, w4ic4 reads as follows6
:)EN Hogic pervades t4e world6 t4e limits of t4e world are also its limits)

So we cannot saC in logic, O!4e world 4as t4is in it, and t4is, but not t4at)P

For t4at would appear to presuppose t4at we were e@cluding certain possibilities, and t4is cannot be t4e case, since it would re&uire t4at logic s4ould go beCond t4e limits of t4e worldY for onlC in t4at waC could it view t4ose limits from t4e ot4er side as well)

We cannot t4inI w4at we cannot t4inIY so w4at we cannot t4inI we cannot say eit4er)

NR) !4e idea presented in t4e first sentence >:)ENa? is bC now familiarBto s4ow t4at Ologic pervades t4e worldP, and t4at t4e limits of world and t4e limits of logic are one, were t4e essential tasIs set alreadC in t4e "reface, and pursued bC t4e booI as a w4ole) !4e second sentence >:)ENb? presents a conse&uence of t4is general idea6 t4at logic cannot say w4at t4ere is and w4at t4ere is not in t4e world) !4e ne@t sentence >:)ENc? furt4er elucidates t4e nature of t4e limitation to Ow4at can be saidP >in logic?6 t4e idea is not t4at we cannot talI about w4at contingently constitutes t4e world, i)e), a set of facts w4ic4 are, but could well not be, t4e caseY rat4er, we cannot talI about w4at 4olds >or doesnPt 4old? necessarily of t4e worldBw4at necessarily is >or isnPt? t4e case) !4e >ontological, e@istential? possibilities we cannot e@clude >and, conse&uentlC, include? in logic are t4ose w4ic4 would depend on Ogo_ing` beCond t4e limits of t4e worldP, Oview_ing` t4ose limits from t4e ot4er sidePBagain, a move alreadC indicated >and e@cluded? bC t4e programmatic claims of t4e "reface) !4ese considerations s4all 4elp us see t4e point of t4e >ot4erwise verC innocuous? final sentence of t4e section >:)ENd?) W4at maIes t4e tautologC presented in its first part >OWe cannot t4inI w4at we cannot t4inIP? relevant to t4e understanding of its second part >Ow4at we cannot t4inI we cannot say eit4erP? is t4e implicit assumption >w4ic4 was made e@plicit above, in t4e analCsis of proposition :)E? of t4ere being a necessarC congruence, an internal relation, between language and thoughtBt4e complete lesson being t4at to >reallC? think is to t4inI somet4ing determinate and contingent about t4e world, and if we are not doing

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again MM t4at, t4en it is of no use to trC to use language to e@press w4at we >wronglC? supposed we were t4inIing) #iven t4e limiting conditions imposed bC logic to t4e e@pression of t4oug4ts, we are alwaCs faced wit4 onlC two options6 eit4er we say somet4ing >ultimatelC? determinate and >contingentlC? true or false about t4e world, or else we are <ust babbling, in w4ic4 case we were better advised to remain silentL0) After t4ese considerations, t4e role of :)EN as an OelucidationP of :)E s4ould also be clear6 basicallC, w4at it does is to present a >negative or limiting? conse&uence of t4e congruence establis4ed before for t4e e@pressive capabilities of our language6 since t4e limits of >my? language and >my? world are one, we >*? cannot use language >logic? to speaI of w4at would presuppose our >mC? going beCond t4ose limits)

#"%"#

+$e .ineffable/ trut$ in solipsism

NQ) Wit4 t4at analCsis in mind, letPs move to proposition :)E/, w4ic4 reads6
:)E/ !4is remarI provides a IeC to t4e problem, 4ow muc4 trut4 t4ere is in solipsism)

For w4at t4e solipsist means is &uite correctY onlC it cannot be said, but maIes itself manifest)

!4e world is my world6 t4is is manifest in t4e fact t4at t4e limits of language >of t4at language w4ic4 alone * understand? mean t4e limits of my world)

!4is time t4e relation of t4e proposition above wit4 :)E is made clear from t4e verC outset, since it is e@plicitlC presented as devoted to t4e tasI of investigating a conse.uence of t4at former remarI to t4e problem of O4ow muc4 trut4 t4ere is in solipsismP) As * said above, it s4ould come as no surprise t4at t4is problem is broug4t to view in t4is conte@tBafter all, it presents itself in a verC natural waC w4en we start t4inIing criticallC about t4e congruence between t4e limits of my language and t4e limits of my world) W4at, on t4e ot4er 4and, seems verC surprising is t4e content of t4e ne@t sentence >:)E/b?, w4ic4 starts bC saCing
L0

!4is point, besides being alreadC made in t4e "reface, is presented clearlC in proposition Q)NNE, w4ere we read t4at6 O7verCt4ing t4at can be t4oug4t at all can be t4oug4t clearlC) 7verCt4ing t4at can be put into words can be put clearlC)P

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again M1 t4at Ow4at t4e solipsist means is &uite correctP) .ow, before trCing to understand 4ow it can be OcorrectP, let us trC to be clear about "hat it is t4at Ot4e solipsist meansP in t4e first place) !4e >rat4er crCptic? answer to t4at &uestion is given in t4e first part of t4e ne@t sentence >:)E/c?6 O!4e world is my worldP) *n order to JunpacIK t4e Jsolipsistic t4esisK presented in t4e latter sentence, it will be useful to repeat once again t4e main steps of t4e argument presented up to t4is point in t4e booI6 first, let us recall t4at t4e OworldP spoIen of in t4e booI was since its verC beginning identified wit4 Ot4e totalitC of factsPY t4ose facts, in turn, were said to be representable bC propositionsN a proposition Oapplied and t4oug4t outP was identified wit4 a thoughtN t4at application, in turn, was said to amount to t4e operation of combining t4e trut4-functions of elementarC propositionsY and t4at operation, as we <ust saw, presupposes a sub;ect w4o can put it at worI in order to generate a particular pro<ection, 4ence providing a determinate sense to 4is propositionsY now, since all representation is based on t4at sort of operation, room is made for a solipsistic t4reat, in t4e sense t4at t4e possibilitC remains open t4at eac4 sub<ect could, at least in principle, generate pro<ections w4ic4 are private, and, in t4at sense, could live in a world w4ic4 is made up of facts w4ic4 4e alone can graspB4is >mC? own private world) !4e analCsis above go some waC toward e@plaining >i? Ow4at t4e solipsist meansP, i)e), t4e content of t4e solipsistic t4esis t4at Ot4e world is my worldP, and also >ii? t4e sense in w4ic4 t4at t4esis is said to be O&uite correctPBit is, at t4e verC least, co4erent wit4 t4e general analCsis of t4e conditions of representation establis4ed bC t4e booIPs argument so far) Gut t4is of course is not t4e w4ole storC told in :)E/bBin fact, it is >at best? 4alf of it) !4e remaining 4alf is presented in t4e last part of :)E/b, w4ic4 states t4at t4e solipsistic t4esis, 4owever inevitable, >iii? Ocannot be saidP, but >iv? OmaIes itself manifestP) So, let us turn our attention to t4ose furt4er &ualifications) As to >iii?, again some worI of interpretation is needed if we are to go beCond t4e absurd >and rat4er comic? idea t4at we cannot say w4at we have ;ust saidBvi7., t4at O!4e world is my worldP) .ow t4e analCsis of :)ENb-c provides a model w4ic4 can be smootl4C applied to t4e case in view6 if t4e JunpacIingK of t4e t4esis t4at O!4e world is my worldP, as presented above, is correct, t4en w4at t4e solipsist is attempting to e@press is a general and necessary feature of language, and also of t4e "orld t4at can be represented bC t4at

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again 10 language >Ow4ic4 alone * understandP?Y being a necessarC feature of t4e world, it cannot be e@pressed bC >bona fide, bipolar? propositionsBw4ic4, bC t4eir own essential trut4functional nature, must alwaCs present situations for a test, as being true or false, and, t4erefore, contingently one or anot4er) !4erefore, w4at we >as well as t4e solipsist? imagined to 4ave said >or t4oug4t? w4en looIing at t4e string of signs w4ic4 comprises t4e Jsolipsistic t4esisK >O!4e world is my worldP?, was not really said >or t4oug4t? at allLN) Gefore continuing wit4 t4e analCsis of :)E/, let us pause to reflect about an important >and possiblC une@pected? subversive conse&uence t4at t4e results obtained so far 4ave for our understanding of proposition :)EBw4ic4, .)G), s4ould 4ave been OelucidatedP bC t4at analCsis) (etails aside, remember t4at one t4ing we >and t4e solipsist? imagined to 4ave e@pressed bC emploCing t4e signs O!4e world is my worldP was e@actlC t4e necessary congruence of limits presented in :)E >t4ose of t4e T mC world, and t4ose of t4e T mC language?) .ow, if t4e analCsis presented above is correct, we s4ould conclude, ec4oing :)EN, t4at suc4 a JnecessarC congruenceK itself cannot be said, because w4en we trC to e@press it t4e >pseudo-?propositions we generate seem to be Oe@cluding certain possibilities, and t4is cannot be t4e case, since it would re&uire t4at logic s4ould go beCond t4e limits of t4e worldY for onlC in t4at waC could it view t4ose limits from t4e ot4er side as wellP) W4at is parado@ical about t4is conclusion is t4at proposition :)E was a necessarC step in t4e argument leading to t4e limiting conse&uence presented in :)EN) *n ot4er words, c4ances are t4at we readers 4ave been somew4at tricIed, in t4at we were first made to sticI to t4e appearance of sense of proposition :)E, t4en to e@tract an >apparent? limiting conse&uence >:)EN?, onlC in order to conclude, finallC, t4at after all JpropositionK :)E 4as no sense at all Bis not a proposition at all) Gut t4e storC, as * said, does not end 4ereBwe are still left wit4 t4e fourt4 and final point made in E):/b, according to w4ic4 Ow4at t4e solipsist means _)))` maIes itself manifestP) ActuallC, it is on t4is last claim t4at we s4ould put our 4opes of finding a waC out of t4is w4ole parado@ical situation, since it allows us to t4inI t4at, even if it proves true t4at we were being JtricIedK up to t4is pointBi)e), bC being impelled to taIe t4e pseudopropositions above as e@pressing some necessarC trut4s about language and t4e world, w4en t4eC were in fact <ust nonsensical strings of signs%we were not <ust "asting our
LN

.otice also t4e parallel between t4is analCsis and t4at presented in t4e concluding part of t4e booI >E): ss)?, w4ere somet4ing >apparently? OsaidP >or e@pressed? bC a string of signs >t4e sIeptical O&uestionP and t4e Oproblem of lifeP? is s4own not to be really said >or even saCable? at all)

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again 1N time, since >4opefullC? somet4ing was Omade manifestP all along, or after, t4is w4ole selfsubverting process) .ow, w4at e@actlC was Omade manifestPBor, to put t4e same &uestion in ot4er words, 4ow muc4 Otrut4P is t4ere Oin solipsismP after allW .otice, first, t4at t4e sentence above >Ow4at t4e solipsist means _)))` maIes itself manifestP? is not saCing, nor implCing >as it could appear in a first reading? t4at t4e pseudo-proposition O!4e world is my worldPBt4e >supposed? e@pression of solipsismBw4ic4 >admittedlC? says nothing, can by itself OmaIe somet4ing manifestP) *f suc4 an string of signs says nothing, it also cannot say >as we imagined it did? Ow4at t4e solipsist meansP) W4at t4e solipsist means%w4at 4e tries to saC bC emploCing t4e signs presented in t4e first part of E):/cBis w4at >supposedlC? OmaIes itself manifestP bC t4e fact presented in its second 4alfBt4e fact, i)e), t4at w4en trCing to go beyond Ot4e limits of languageP, t4e solipsist says nothingB4e <ust ends up producing plainlC nonsensical combinations of signs) *n t4e face of t4ese considerations, it seems t4at we can sum up t4e w4ole content of :)E/ as t4e trivialitC t4at t4ere is not4ing >and no t4ing eit4er? to understand, to t4inI, or to talI about, beCond t4e limits of w4at I understand, t4inI and talI about) .ow if t4ere is nothing beCond t4ose limits, it follows t4at t4e verC opposition between w4at is JmineK >be it my e@perience, my language, or my world? and somet4ing else is itself nonsensical, and, conse&uentlC, must be abandoned) !o t4e e@tent, t4en, t4at t4ere is some Otrut4 in solipsismP, its trut4 would be simplC t4e inescapable fact wit4 w4ic4 * am faced w4en * unsuccessfullC trC to e@press t4e Jsolipsistic t4esisK, i)e), t4at * am fated to e@press onlC w4at mC language can e@pressY and t4is Otrut4P is not somet4ing t4at * discover because * can Oview t4ose limits from t4e ot4er side as wellPBon t4e contrarC, it is e@actlC t4e failure in mC 4opeless attempt to do so t4at s4ows t4at t4is is impossibleL/) >GC t4e same toIen,
L/

,) 5) 8ounce, in 4is introductorC commentarC to t4e Tractatus, reac4es a verC similar conclusion) ,aving argued t4at it is an error to t4inI, as some commentators >,acIer included? do, t4at Oalt4oug4 it is a confusion to e@press solipsism, nevert4eless it is reallC trueP >8ounce, N1MN, p) 1N?, 4e claims t4at t4ere is, in fact, Oa trut4 be4ind solipsismPBsolipsism itself being <ust t4e Oconfused resultP of trCing to state suc4 >ineffable? trut4) !4e trut4, according to 8ounce, Ois not t4at * alone am real but t4at * 4ave a point of view on t4e world w4ic4 is wit4out neig4boursP >ibid)?) ,e adds t4e following considerations in order to clarifC t4e content of t4at claim6

_)))` WittgensteinPs point, * t4inI, is as follows) W4at * conceive of as t4e world is given to me in language) !4is conception is t4e onlC one t4ere is) * Inow t4is not because * 4ave considered ot4er possibilities and re<ected t4em) %at4er, * Inow t4is preciselC because it s4ows itself in t4ere being no ot4er possibilities) For t4ere is no language but language and t4erefore no conception of t4e world ot4er t4an t4e one language gives) !4is conception is mC conception) 8C conception of t4e world, t4erefore, liIe mC visual field, is wit4out neig4bours)

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again 1/ t4is triviali=ing or deflationarC reading must also 4old of :)E/N, w4ic4 states t4at O!4e world and life are onePBso t4at its w4ole point will turn out to be simplC t4at * cannot live e@cept in t4e world t4at * live)?

N:) ,owever, t4is deflationarC rendition of t4e Otrut4 in solipsismP faces some immediate problems) First, are we reallC supposed to believe, wit4out more ado, t4at suc4 a triviality is Ow4at t4e solipsist meansPBi)e), w4at t4e solipsist alwaCs "anted >4owever 4opelesslC? to saCW ,ow can we >or Wittgenstein? be sure about t4atW Second, and more importantlC, are we really clear about t4e content of t4is Otrut4PW As mC own attempt at clarifCing it testifies, w4en we trC to spell it out we inevitablC end up producing more and more strings of signs w4ic4, bC t4e TractatusP own standards, are simplC nonsense, since t4eC are t4emselves intended as e@pressions of a necessarC feature of our language) .otice t4at even if we trC to neutrali=e t4is problem, as * mCself attempted above, bC repeating WittgensteinPs strategC of Jpointing toK >supposedlC wit4out 4aving to speak about? some Iind of fact, we cannot avoid 4elping ourselves of some linguistic description >e)g), bC describing it as Ot4e fact t4at * am fated to e@press onlC w4at mC language can e@pressP?) !4erefore, t4ere seems to be an infinite regress latent in t4is strategCBa regress w4ic4 can onlC be stopped if we entirelC give up t4e attempt to e)plain w4at t4e trut4 in solipsism is) *f t4is trut4 is ineffable, t4en we s4ould stop babbling about itBin fact, we s4ould follow t4e advice given in t4e verC last proposition of t4e booI >L?, and Opass over _it` in silenceP) !4is, of course, maC not be OsatisfCing to t4e ot4er personP >i)e), t4e solipsist?, but it seems to be t4e onlC strictlC correct attitude to taIe in t4is case) *s itW Gut t4enBand t4is is t4e t4ird problemBw4C does Wittgenstein continue to invite us to t4inI >or to imagine t4at we are t4inIing? about it in t4e rest of t4e sectionW W4C doesnPt 4e remain silent about t4is sub<ect from now onW *s it because to really learn to remain silent we need a greater e@position to t4e effects of trCing to go beCond t4e limits of
>8ounce, N1MN, p) 1/? !4e main problem * 4ave wit4 8ouncePs analCsis is t4at it does not reallC e)plain 4ow OWittgensteinPs pointP >i)e), t4at OW4at * conceive of as t4e world is given to me in languageP and t4at O!4is conception is t4e onlC one t4ere isP?, w4ic4 is supposed to be a necessary feature of language, can Os4ow itselfP, wit4out mC 4aving to Oconsider_)))` ot4er possibilities and re<ect_)))` t4emP) *n ot4er words, t4e &uestion 8ounce s4ould trC to answer is6 4ow can * Inow t4at Ot4ere _are` no ot4er possibilitiesP, if * donPt at least consider t4e possibility of t4ere being some, if onlC to e)clude t4emW

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again 1R languageWB,ow muc4 4ave we to flutter in t4e flCbottle before we can get our restWBHet us see if we can get a little bit clearer about t4ese &uestions bC reading t4e remaining propositions of section :)E)

#"%"%

+$e .s$rin'ing/ 0metap$*sical sub1ect & and t$e wa* bac' to realism

NE) !4e ne@t proposition in our list is :)ER6 O* am mC world) >!4e microcosm)?P) !aIen bC itself, t4is proposition seems again smoot4lC amenable to t4e Iind of deflationarC rendition presented aboveBso t4at its w4ole point could be rep4rased >if onlC it could really be e@pressed in a proposition[? as saCing t4at t4e onlC world * can live in is t4e world in w4ic4 * am, t4e world w4ic4 alone mC language can represent) As if t4e nonsensical and ineffable c4aracter of w4at * <ust said was not pu==ling enoug4 >are we alreadC used to t4isW?, matters become even worst w4en we read t4e sub-propositions w4ic4 are intended to clarifC :)ER) Het us 4ave a list6
:)ERN !4ere is no suc4 t4ing as t4e sub<ect t4at t4inIs or entertains ideas)

*f * wrote a booI called The World as I found it, * s4ould 4ave to include a report on mC bodC, and s4ould 4ave to saC w4ic4 parts were subordinate to mC will, and w4ic4 were not, etc), t4is being a met4od of isolating t4e sub<ect, or rat4er of s4owing t4at in an important sense t4ere is no sub<ectY for it alone could not be mentioned in t4at booI) B

:)ER/

!4e sub<ect does not belong to t4e world6 rat4er, it is a limit of t4e world)

:)ERR

W4ere in t4e world is a metap4Csical sub<ect to be foundW

\ou will saC t4at t4is is e@actlC liIe t4e case of t4e eCe and t4e visual field) Gut reallC Cou do not see t4e eCe)

And not4ing in the visual field allows Cou to infer t4at it is seen bC an eCe)

:)ERQ

!4is is connected wit4 t4e fact t4at no part of our e@perience is at t4e same time a priori)

W4atever we see could be ot4er t4an it is)

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again 1Q

W4atever we can describe at all could be ot4er t4an it is)

!4ere is no a priori order of t4ings)

NL) !4e first remarIable t4ing about proposition :)ERN is t4at its first partBi)e), :)ERNa, saCing t4at there is no t4inIing sub<ectBif taIen at face value, directlC contradicts :)ENB saCing t4at we cannot say in logic w4at there is and w4at there is not in t4e worldY furt4ermore, it also contradicts >4owever less manifestlC? t4e last proposition of t4e listB i)e), :)ERQ, about t4ere being no a priori Opart of our e@perienceP, Ono a priori order of t4ingsP) *n fact, t4e contradiction is so striIing t4at it cries for some Iind of reinterpretation) Following t4e met4od applied in similar cases above, t4e first step would be to notice t4at, contrarC to t4e appearances, :)ERNa is not a proposition at all, but rat4er a nonsensical string of signs, a pseudo-propositionBafter all, if, per impossibile, it 4ad a sense, it could not be falseBit s4ould be necessaryY 4ence, it would not satisfC t4e booIPs own standards for somet4ing to count as a bona fide proposition >i)e), its capabilitC of being true or false, of allowing us to think the opposite of w4at it saCs, etc)?) Conse&uentlC, t4is sentence also 4as a self-subversive c4aracter, in t4at it first impels us to imagine t4at we understood its senseBand, t4erefore, t4at bC saCing T t4inIing it we are Oe@cluding certain possibilitiesP, and t4us presenting an a priori part of our e@perienceBw4en in fact t4at is made impossible bC t4e verC conditions of representationBsince, in order to be done, Oit would re&uire t4at logic s4ould go beCond t4e limits of t4e worldP, viewing t4ose limits Ofrom t4e ot4er side as wellP >:)EN?) ,aving noticed t4at, * suppose one would liIe to asI w4at is t4e point of presenting t4at proposition in t4e first place) *f t4e comparison wit4 t4e cases analCsed before is in order, its point must lie preciselC in its self-subversive c4aracter, in t4at somet4ing s4ould be Omade manifestP after t4e process triggered bC it) W4at, t4en, is made manifest bC t4at pseudo-propositionW !o answer t4at &uestion we s4all paC attention to t4e ne@t sentence, :)ERNb) Again, t4ere is somet4ing verC remarIable about t4at sentence, in t4at it enacts a Omet4od of isolating t4e sub<ectP, <ust in order to s4ow t4at, w4en we trC to do t4at, our inevitable failure in t4is tasI will s4ow t4at Oin an important sense t4ere is no sub<ectP) .otice, t4oug4, t4at t4is last p4rase is <ust as nonsensical as t4e former one >:)ERNa?6 it also

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again 1: appears to Oe@clude certain possibilitiesP, to describe a contingent feature of our world, w4en in fact it s4ould be presenting t4e onlC actuality t4ere is, and t4ere can beBt4e Oa priori order of t4ingsP) So its w4ole point cannot lie in w4at it says >since it saCs not4ing?, but rat4er in w4at is made manifest bC itBi)e), t4e impossibilitC of finding an O*P w4o could be in anC sense separated from t4e OworldPLR) GasicallC t4e same analCsis goes for :)ERR, w4ere we are presented wit4 t4e verC same Iind of enactmentBt4e searc4 for t4e Ometap4Csical sub<ectPBonlC t4is time wit4 anot4er simileBso, instead of somet4ing t4at * am incapable of mentioning in t4e Jgreat booI of beingsK, t4e idea now is of somet4ing t4at * cannot find, and not even infer, from w4at * OseeP in mC Ovisual fieldP) !4is analCsis s4all 4elp us to understand 4ow :)ERN and :)ERR can be seen as elucidations of :)ER, i)e), t4e >pseudo-?t4esis t4at O* am mC worldP6 to repeat, w4at bot4 propositions Omade manifestP >even if t4eC were not capable of saying it? was t4at we cannot separate sub<ect and world) And t4is conclusion, in turn, would provide a furt4er confirmationBa furt4er elucidationBof :)EPs general view of a necessarC congruence between >mC? language and >mC? world) !4e problem for t4is reading emerges w4en we trC to applC it to t4e proposition w4ic4 lies in between t4e former ones, :)ER/) 8ore specificallC, t4e problem arises from t4e idea e@pressed in its second 4alf6 O!4e sub<ect _)))` is a limit of t4e worldPY notice t4at, if t4is sentence is true, t4en we s4ould conclude t4at t4e sub<ect is not e@actlC a nothing, as t4e former propositions could 4ave made us t4inI it was) !4e IeC to solve t4is apparent problem is to taIe proposition :)ER/ not as being in direct opposition to its neig4bours, but rat4er as an attempt to JsoftenK or to JbalanceK t4e radical view t4eC >seeminglC? put forward) Conse&uentlC, even if it is true t4at Oin an important sense t4ere is no sub<ectP >it is not a Jsomet4ingK?, maCbe it is also true t4at, in another important sense, t4ere is one >it is not a Jnot4ingK eit4er?) !4at t4e sub<ect cannot be separated from t4e world does not implC t4at it cannot be at least distinguished in some waC >i)e), as a limit?) *n fact, t4e case 4ere is not liIe t4at of Ot4e eCe and t4e visual fieldP, w4ere t4e former is reallC separated from t4e later, but rat4er liIe t4e case of t4e point in geometrC, w4ic4 does
LR

*t is 4ardlC necessarC to indicate t4e parallel between t4is enactment of a searc4 for t4e Ot4inIing sub<ectP and ,umePs notorious >self-aware? failure in attempting to find an Oimpression of t4e sub<ectP) !4e same point is made in still more clearlC ,umean fas4ion in t4e Eotebooks, e)g), w4en Wittgenstein saCs t4at O!4e * is not an ob<ect) * ob<ectivelC confront everC ob<ect) Gut not t4e *)P >.G, p) M0?) !4e parallel is also often noticed bC commentatorsY ,acIer again provides an illustrative opinion on t4is parallel, 4is conclusion being t4at6 OWittgenstein was willing to adopt a neo-,umean analCsis of t4e empirical self) !4ere is no empirical soul-substance t4inIing t4oug4ts, t4ere are onlC t4oug4ts) !4e self of psCc4ologC is a manifold, a series of e@periences, a bundle of perceptions in perpetual flu@)P >,acIer, N1ME, p) ME?

*ntermission6 from realism to solipsism, and bacI again 1E not Je@istK in anC ot4er waC e@cept as a limit of lines, figures, and, ultimatelC, t4reedimensional ob<ects)

NM) .ow t4e analogC wit4 geometrC is presented bC Wittgenstein 4imself, in t4e second 4alf of t4e ne@t first-level sub-proposition >:)EQ?, w4ic4 reads6 O!4e self of solipsism s4rinIs to a point wit4out e@tension, and t4ere remains t4e realitC co-ordinated wit4 itP) *t is interesting t4at Wittgenstein 4ere >re-?dubs t4e Ometap4Csical sub<ectP bC means of t4e description Ot4e self of solipsismPY t4is gives a furt4er reason to taIe seriouslC t4e idea t4at t4ere is some Otrut4 in solipsismP, somet4ing correct in w4at t4e solipsist means, but is incapable of sayingY in fact, t4is muc4 is repeated, wit4 somet4ing of a twist, in t4e first 4alf of t4e proposition under analCsis, w4ere we read6 O,ere it can be seen t4at solipsism, w4en its implications are followed out strictlC, coincides wit4 pure realism)P *t maC well seem far-fetc4ed to e&uate solipsism and >pure? realism, but <ust t4inI about t4is6 w4at else can a OrealistP e@pect t4an a complete suppression of t4e OselfPBtaIen as t4e Osub<ect t4at t4inIs or entertains ideasPBto give room for a direct appre4ension >i)e), wit4out anC Iind of intermediarC? of t4e "hole realityW *n fact, if we c4aracteri=e OrealismP bC somet4ing liIe t4e t4esis t4at w4at we perceive or e@perience directlC is reality itself >as opposed to ideas w4ic4 Ostand forP t4at realitC?, we can see t4at solipsism, as presented so far, is t4e ot4er side of t4at same >realistic? coinBanot4er waC of satisfCing t4e craving for a direct contact wit4 Ot4e w4ole realitCP, t4erefore avoiding our metap4Csical and epistemological loneliness)

#"( Act two: t$rowing t$e ladder awa* .but not as 2uic'l* as one would wis$ to3/
#"("1 +$rowing t$e ladder awa* .ta'e one/

N1) !4e analCsis of solipsism presented in t4e last section >/)R? can be seen as a concrete illustration of t4e procedure prescribed bC t4e Tractatus to solve p4ilosop4ical problems, and, to t4at e@tent, it s4ould 4elp us clarifC t4e issues we were left wit4 at t4e conclusion of

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? 1L t4e preceding one >/)/?) *n order to see t4is, let us first 4ave a summarC of t4e most important results obtained up to t4is point) As we saw in ccR-:, t4e met4od to deal wit4 p4ilosop4ical problems was alreadC presented, 4owever programmaticallC, in t4e "reface to t4e Tractatus) GasicallC, t4e view stated t4ere was t4at, in order to clarifC t4e Omisunderstandings of t4e logic of our languagePBt4e source of p4ilosop4ical problemsBone would need to draw limits separating sense from nonsense, and t4is s4ould be done Oin languageP, i)e), wit4out 4aving to go >or even to t4inI about? Ot4e ot4er side of t4e limitP >see !H", p) R?) !4is, as we saw in ccE-L, was e@actlC t4e role plaCed bC t4e presentation of t4e Ogeneral form of propositionP, w4ic4 allows one to e@clude from t4e categorC of OpropositionPBand, conse&uentlC, to include in t4e categorC of Opure nonsensePBall t4e strings of signs w4ic4 are not generated in accordance to t4e rules of logical sCnta@ >t4is being t4e case of t4e pseudo-propositions of mat4ematics >E)/?, science >E)R?, and et4ics >E)Q??) 5nce in possession of t4is general form, one can emploC it to JsolveK t4e Jp4ilosop4ical problemsK, bC s4owing t4at t4eC were in fact <ust pseudo-problems, w4ic4 strictlC speaIing could not even be JposedK, since t4e Iind of J&uestionK one tries to formulate to e@press t4em is simplC made impossible bC t4e rules of logical sCnta@, so t4at of course t4ere are no possible JanswersK to t4em eit4er >t4e general lesson of E):, w4ic4 is illustrated bC t4e cases of scepticism >E):N? and of t4e Oproblem of lifeP >E):/N??) !4e reading sIetc4ed above was furt4er borne out bC proposition E):R >see cM?, w4ere Wittgenstein presented t4e Ocorrect met4od in p4ilosop4CPBi)e), Oto saC not4ing e@cept w4at can be said, i)e), propositions of natural science _)))` and t4en, w4enever someone else wanted to saC somet4ing metap4Csical, to demonstrate to 4im t4at 4e 4ad failed to give a meaning to certain signs in 4is propositionsP) !4e problem w4ic4 came out at t4at point of t4e analCsis was t4at Wittgenstein 4imself did not seem to 4ave been following 4is own advice in E):R, in t4at 4e said manC Jmetap4Csical t4ingsK in order to ac4ieve t4e results indicated in t4e "reface) 8otivated bC t4e appearance of t4at problem, we were in a position to at least understand t4e rationale for t4e presentation, in proposition E):Q, of t4e Jself-undoingK concluding remarIs of t4e booIBt4e problem of t4e ladder, wit4 w4ic4 we >problematicallC? concluded section N >see c1?) !4e &uestions w4ic4 we left unanswered at t4at point were basicallC t4e following6 >i? Which propositions of t4e booI are we supposed to use as OrungsP in t4e OladderP w4ic4 we s4ould Ot4row awaCPW >ii? Bo" e@actlC are we

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? 1M supposed to t4row it awaCW >iii? W4at is e@actlC t4e result of t4is w4ole processBw4at does it mean to Osee t4e world arig4tPW

/0) .ow, bC focusing our attention in t4e set of propositions dealing wit4 solipsism >!H" :)E?, we notice t4at t4e main steps of t4e self-subversive procedure presented at t4e end of t4e booI were alreadC at worI in t4at particular stretc4) *n order to maIe t4is clear, t4e first t4ing we s4ould observe is t4at t4e dialectical situation presented in E):R is reproduced in :)E6 on t4e one 4and, we 4ave someoneBt4e solipsist, saCBwanting to OsaC somet4ing metap4CsicalPBvi7), t4at Ot4e world is my worldPY on t4e ot4er 4and we 4ave someoneB call 4im WittgensteinBtrCing to demonstrate to 4is solipsistic interlocutor t4at O4e 4ad failed to give a meaning to certain signs in 4is propositionsP) ,aving noticed t4at fact, t4e &uestion arises w4et4er Wittgenstein 4as OdemonstratedP t4is problem of t4e solipsistPs position bC OsaCing not4ing e@cept w4at can be said, i)e), propositions of natural scienceP) And t4e answer to t4at &uestion is6 of course notY as we saw above, in order to s4ow t4at t4e solipsist was producing nonsense Wittgenstein clearlC emploCed some Ometap4Csical t4esesPBe)g), t4at Othe limits of my language are t4e limits of mC worldP >:)E?, t4at O!4e sub<ect does not belong to t4e worldY rat4er, it is a limit of t4e worldP >:)ER/?, and so on) \et t4ose Ometap4Csical t4esesP, as we also observed, are t4emselves self-subversive, in t4at t4eC amount to attempts to e@press somet4ing necessary about t4e world and language Bsomet4ing w4ic4, according to t4e general analCsis presented before in t4e booI, simplC cannot be said bC anC bona fide proposition) W4at is more remarIable, 4owever, is t4at t4e self-subversive c4aracter of t4ose Ometap4Csical t4esesP is also made manifest bC t4e internal tension generated w4en we closelC compare t4eir >alleged? JcontentK wit4 t4e >alleged? JcontentK of ot4er claims made in t4e verC same section >i)e), :)E?Be)g), t4at Owe cannot saC in logic, J!4e world 4as t4is in it, and t4is, but not t4atKP >:)EN?, or t4at Ono part of our e@perience is at t4e same time a prioriP >:)ERQ?) #iven t4e notorious self-subversive c4aracter of t4e Ometap4Csical t4esesP emploCed in section :)E in order to point out t4e s4ortcomings of solipsism, we must conclude t4at Wittgenstein was 4imself maIing a >self-conscious? use of nonsenseYBbC forcing us >t4e readers? to flutter in t4e walls of our language in t4is waC, 4e produces an awareness of t4e limits of sense, and, conse&uentlC, disavows us >and t4e solipsistic interlocutor? of tacitlC,

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? 11 un-self-consciouslC, producing nonsenseBin ot4er words, 4e maIes latent nonsensicalitC patent)

/N) .ow t4at conclusion can be used as a starting point, or as a test case, to answer t4e &uestions made above >cN1?) Xuestion >i? was about "hich propositions we s4ould use as rungsY given t4e analCsis above, t4e answer seems to be6 onlC WittgensteinPs own selfconscious, self-subversive metap4Csical claimsBt4ose w4ic4 trC to state, or to e)press >as opposed to make manifest? necessary trut4s about t4e world, language and t4oug4tY as to ho" we s4all use t4ose propositions as rungsB&uestion >ii?Bt4e answer is6 we can use t4em as tools w4ic4 maIe us aware of t4e >ot4erwise 4idden, or latent? failure of our >or t4e interlocutorPs? own attempts to talI about t4ings w4ic4 are beCond t4e limits of w4at can be saidY as to t4e result of t4is w4ole processB&uestion >iii?Bt4e answer is6 freedom from t4e impulse to trC to e@press t4ose t4ings, and, ultimatelC, t4e lesson presented in proposition L6 OW4at we cannot speaI we must pass over in silenceP) !o Oovercome t4ese propositionsP, and to Osee t4e world arig4tP, is to become aware of t4e limits of our language, and, t4erefore, to Ot4row awaC t4e ladderP is to give up t4e 4opeless attempt to pose problems w4ere &uestions cannot be asIedBin ot4er words, to give up metap4Csics, as traditionallC pursued) >.otice t4at, according to t4is reading, t4ere is an important sense in w4ic4 no OtranscendenceP is involved 4ere at allBt4e idea is not to go to Ot4e ot4er side of t4e limitP, but rat4er t4e verC opposite, i)e), to give up t4e attempt to do soY 4ence t4e problem wit4 "ears and 8c#uinnessPs translation >see n) M0?)?

#"("#

4ac' to t$e ladder: t$e solipsist .1ustl*/ dissatisfied

//) * taIe t4e conclusions e@tracted above >c/N? as co4erent wit4 t4e ort4odo@ reading of t4e Tractatus) ,owever, * do not t4inI t4e storC s4ould end at t4at point, for t4e simple reason t4at we would t4en be still firmlC on t4e ladder) *n order to s4ow t4is, * will again taIe t4e analCsis of solipsism as mC test case, onlC t4is time * will focus on a different aspect of t4at analCsis w4ic4 was left out in t4e brief reconstruction presented in c/0) %ecall t4at a result of t4e reading offered in t4e O*ntermissionP above was t4at t4e Otrut4 in

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N00 solipsismPB4owever strictlC ineffableBwas alreadC implicit from t4e beginning of t4e booIPs e@amination of t4e conditions for representation6 if we are to 4ave propositions wit4 a determinate sense, w4ic4 represent particular and determinate facts, t4ere must be a determinate pro<ection, w4ic4 in turn re&uires a sub<ect w4o can maIe itBw4o can think t4e sense of t4e proposition in suc4 a determinate waC) .ow t4is view seems to commit one to t4e >at first sig4t? problematic conse&uence of 4aving to accept some form of solipsismBand 4ence, t4e possibilitC of >representational? privacy. ,owever, as we saw, Wittgenstein apparentlC doesnPt find 4imself in need of being too concerned wit4 t4is general and abstract possibilitC, since 4e 4as also provided a tool for dissolving practical and circumscribed representational disagreementsBt4is being t4e role of 4is met4od of logical analCsis) "rovided t4at t4ere is onlC one possible analCsis of a >determinatelC pro<ected? proposition, guarantC of intersub<ectivitC is <ust a matter of logical calculation) Gesides, remember t4at Wittgenstein also readilC reassures us, at t4e end of t4e argument of section :)E, t4at t4is peculiar form of solipsism w4ic4 comes out OtrueP is actuallC t4e purest form of realism t4ere can be, since it implies t4at no realitC can possibly fall s4ort of direct and determinate representation in t4is sc4emeB* mean, t4e one in w4ic4 t4e limits of world and language coincide) * taIe it t4at t4e general picture w4ic4 results from t4at analCsisBbC JmaIing manifestK t4e JnecessarC congruenceK between t4e limits of my world >i)e), t4e e@tent of possible e@perience? and t4e limits of my languageBis designed to satisfC two deep-rooted p4ilosop4ical needsBto calm down two intimatelC connected p4ilosop4ical fears6 t4e fear of metaphysical loneliness%i)e), of t4ere being an unbriedgeable gulf separating oneself from t4e realitC aroundBand t4e fear of >for lacI of a better term? ine)pressiveness%i)e), of not being capable to represent >4ence to e)press? t4at realitC in a determinate, trustwort4C manner) .otice, 4owever, t4at since t4e JwaC outK of t4ose p4ilosop4ical JproblemsK re&uires t4at, in an important sense, t4e world itself becomes part of t4e sub<ectPs >private? e@perience, no matter 4ow ultimatelC bacIed our intersub<ective agreement maC beBbC t4e availabilitC of a logical met4od of analCsis w4ic4 can resolve our disputesBt4is is not reallC t4at reassuringBor is itW *t is in order to put some pressure on t4is point t4at * suggest we taIe again as a test case t4e dispute enacted in section :)E, between Wittgenstein >let us continue calling 4im Wittgenstein? and t4e solipsist)

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N0N !o begin wit4, remember t4at t4e solipsist was trCing to e)press somet4ingBmore specificallC, 4e was trCing to formulate 4is own p4ilosop4ical position, bC means of a single and determinate t4esisBw4en 4e emploCed t4e signs O!4e world is my worldP) Wittgenstein, on t4e ot4er side, was trCing to convince us t4at t4e solipsist did not saC anything wit4 t4ose signsB4e onlC produced nonsense)B.ow, obviouslC enoug4, t4e dispute enacted at t4is point between Wittgenstein and t4e solipsist is also an instance of a >possible? dialogue, or conversation%it is, at t4e verC least, an e@c4ange supposed to be >possiblC? occurring in languageY t4erefore, t4e set of claims t4at t4e aut4or of t4e Tractatus 4as been busC to establis4 >about t4e nature of language and its connection to realitCBcall it 4is t4eorC of meaning? ought to applC to t4is instance as well as to anC ot4er communicative e@c4ange) Gut if t4is is t4e caseBif, i)e), t4e t4eorC of meaning presented in t4e booI is to 4ave suc4 a reflective application, informing or conditioning t4e nature of t4is particular dialogueBt4ere arises a problem) %emember t4at, according to t4at t4eorC, no string of signs s4ould be taIen as intrinsically e@pressing a determinate propositionBa determinate sCmbol, wit4 a determinate senseY in order to do so, t4e signs must 4ave been pro;ected >i)e), applied? in a determinate waC, bC a particular sub<ect) .otice, t4oug4, t4at if t4is is true, it also implies t4at a string of signs does notBand cannotBbe intrinsicallC nonsensical. Conse&uentlC, t4e target of WittgensteinPs criticisms w4en arguing against t4e solipsist cannot be t4e mere string of signs emploCed bC 4imBit must be rat4er somet4ing liIe 4is intended pro;ection) And if t4is is t4e case, t4e &uestion arises of 4ow could Wittgenstein be so sure t4at 4e got t4e solipsistPs intended pro<ection rig4t) CouldnPt t4e solipsist be ><ustlC? dissatisfied wit4 t4is dogmatic attitude of WittgensteinPs, w4o claims t4at 4e cannot saC w4at 4e wants to saCW .otice t4at it will not do as a waC out of t4is difficultC <ust to saC t4at t4is >i)e), t4e solipsist versus Wittgenstein? is a peculiar instance of linguistic dispute, or disagreementBone in w4ic4 Wittgenstein could be particularlC confident about 4is attitude, since 4e Inows e@actlC well w4at 4is interlocutor "ould like to saC in t4is occasionBvi7), t4at t4e limits of 4is language are t4e limits of 4is world) !o saC t4is would be <ust to pus4 t4e problem a little bit furt4er, in t4at we could now asI t4e same &uestion once again6 and 4ow could Wittgenstein be so sure about t4e particular sense t4at t4e solipsist wants to give to t4e signs Jt4e limits of mC language are t4e limits of mC worldPW 5ne could also trC to avoid t4is problem emploCing a different strategCBbC pointing out t4at t4e case of solipsism is

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N0/ peculiar for anot4er reasonBnamelC, t4at no string of signs "hatsoever could possibly plaC t4e role intended bC t4e solipsist) *n ot4er words >so t4e replC would go?, t4ere are some Jt4ingsK w4ic4 simplC cannot be grasped bC our signs, w4ic4 4ave no corresponding sCmbol in our languageBt4is being t4e case of Ow4at t4e solipsist meansP)BGut if t4is is true, t4en we must conclude t4at t4e limits of language and t4e limits of realitC >of w4at t4ere is? are not completelC congruent after all) And if t4is is t4e case it will be of no 4elp to saC t4at t4e OworldP >as t4is word is tec4nicallC emploCed in t4e booI? is <ust a part of t4is greater realitCBt4e part about w4ic4 we can talI and t4inI) !4e moment we arrive at t4is Iind of claimBare 4eld captive bC t4is Iind of pictureBwe are again forced to face t4at t4reatening possibilitC of ine@pressiveness, of t4ere being invincible obstaclesB impassable limitationsBto w4at can be represented in our language and t4oug4t) *n ot4er words, we are bacI to our metap4Csical bottle, still fluttering against its walls)

/R) .ow * t4inI t4is is e@actlC t4e result t4at Wittgenstein planned to ac4ieve wit4 4is enactment of a dispute wit4 4is solipsistic interlocutorBin fact, alt4oug4 t4e <ustification of t4is claim goes beCond t4e scope of t4is studC, * am inclined to t4inI t4at t4is would applC not onlC to t4is particular case, but e&uallC to anC ot4er conte@t in w4ic4 a tension is >intentionallC? created bC t4e enactment of a >particular? conflict between t4e imposition of limits w4ic4 t4e booI is trCing to establis4 t4oroug4lC >limits to w4at can be said, t4oug4t, e@perienced, represented? and t4e invitation to transgress t4ose limits, w4ic4 is in turn triggered bC t4e >self-subversive? categorical denials of some possibilities >e)g), t4at t4e metap4Csical sub<ect, or absolute value, or #od, could be found in t4e world?Bdenials w4ic4 automaticallC prompt one to affirm t4eir contrarC >e)g), bC conceiving t4at t4e metap4Csical sub<ect, or absolute value, or #od, could be found outside t4e world?) *n conte@ts liIe t4ese, t4e furt4er move of saCing t4at t4e Jt4ingsK in &uestion are neit4er inside nor outside t4e world, amounting rat4er to its limits, is <ust anot4er waC of plaCing wit4 our imagination, since we cannot really >can weW? conceive anC limit w4ic4 does not separate an inside from an outside, t4e result being again a feelingBin t4e bacI of our minds, so to speaIBt4at t4ere is Jsomet4ingK beyond t4ose limits, onlC we cannot reach JitK)

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N0R So, am * suggesting t4at t4ere is no waC out of t4is vertiginous situationWBWell, * t4inI t4ere is one, but in order to see it we 4ave to understand 4ow t4is w4ole storC of pro<ection Bt4e entire Jpicture t4eorC of meaningK presented bC t4e booIBis itself intended as a rung in t4e ladder t4at we are supposed to t4row awaC) * s4all trC to clarifC and <ustifC t4is claim is t4e ne@t sub-section)

#"("%

+$rowing t$e 5picture t$eor* of meaning6 awa*

/Q) %ecall t4at WittgensteinPs contention against t4e solipsist is, basicallC, t4at t4e latter is incapable of e@pressing 4is own p4ilosop4ical positionB4is own central t4esisBsince w4en 4e tries to do so 4e sCstematicallC ends up producing mere nonsenseBmere strings of signs w4ic4 do not amount to anC symbol w4atsoever) .ow a problem arises w4en we asI 4ow e@actlC t4at Iind of claim is supposed to be groundedBin particular, w4at e@actlC are t4e data from w4ic4 it is supposed to depart) As we saw, it cannot be merelC t4e signs offered bC t4e solipsist, since, as Wittgenstein 4imself 4as warned, Ot4e sign, of course, is arbitrarCP >R)R//?, in t4at it can be used to signifC "hatever one "ants6 OWe cannot give a sign t4e wrong senseP >:)QLR/?LQ) !4e onlC alternative seems to be t4at t4e problemBt4e nonsensical c4aracter of t4e solipsistPs Jt4esisKBwould rat4er lie in t4e symbol's* emploCed bC 4imY but t4is, in turn, will not do, since sCmbols are, by definition, strings of signs >e)g), words? w4ic4 were alreadC given a particular sense, w4ic4 were emploCed >pro<ected? to represent a particular >possible? fact) !4e problem we <ust faced is one w4ic4, according to Cora (iamond, would affect anC reading w4ic4 taIes t4e Tractatus as providing >w4at s4e describes as? a Ow4olesale met4od for critici=ing p4ilosop4ical propositionsP >/00Q, p) /0/?) ,ere is 4ow s4e articulates t4at problem6
AnC propositional sign can be used in various waCsY t4ere is no reason to doubt, of anCt4ing t4at looIs liIe a propositional sign, t4at it can be used to e@press a t4oug4t, or to name a cat, or in ot4er waCs) So, if t4ere is a Ow4olesaleP approac4 to demonstrating of anC p4ilosop4ical or metap4Csical proposition t4at it is
LQ

*t would be important to notice, at t4is point of t4e analCsis, t4at t4e JarbitrarinessK involved 4ere onlC 4olds at t4e elementary levelBonce we 4ave c4osen particular signs to refer to particular ob<ects, t4e possibilities of combination are governed bC logical sCnta@, and, in t4at sense, are not arbitrarC anC more) ,owever, as we s4all see in a moment, t4is is actuallC anot4er rung in t4e ladder)

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N0Q
nonsense, t4ere must first be some waC of maIing clear 4ow t4e proposition is to be taIen, since it can be used to saC somet4ing perfectlC intelligible) *t isnPt to be taIen in anC of t4e waCs in w4ic4 it wouldnPt be nonsense) ,ow, t4en, is t4e intended nonsensical use to be made clearW For onlC if t4at can be done could t4e w4olesale approac4 catc4 4old of t4e proposition in &uestion) So some Iind of clarification, or attempt at clarification, is going to be involved if t4e w4olesale approac4 is even to 4ave a c4ance to connect wit4 some purportedlC nonsensical proposition) !4e devastating problem for a reading of t4at general tCpe is t4is6 to attempt to specifC w4ic4 waC of taIing t4e propositional sign maIes it nonsensical, Cou 4ave to maIe clear w4at use of t4e sign Cou 4ave in mind) AnC suc4 clarification deals wit4 t4e detail of t4e individual sentenceY it is an essentiallC retail proceeding) Gut, in t4e case of a nonsensical proposition, t4e attempt at clarification will reveal t4at it is nonsense bC maIing plain t4at t4ere is no particular use of t4e propositional sign t4at is clearlC in focusY t4ere is no waC in w4ic4 t4e sign is being meant) !4e Ow4olesaleP approac4 re&uires t4at t4ere be some waC of taIing t4e propositional sign, suc4 t4at t4e sign, taIen t4at waC, can be recogni=ed to be an attempt to e@press somet4ing w4ic4 propositions allegedlC canPt be used to e@press, or in some ot4er waC to violate some or ot4er rule) Gut t4en t4at use must be specifiable, and distinguis4able from ot4er uses) Gut t4is attempt to specifC a use proceeds bC attempting p4ilosop4ical clarification) *n t4e course of t4at attempt t4e propositionPs c4aracter will be revealed, wit4out anC appeal to supposed general Tractatus doctrines) >(iamond, /00Q, p) /0R?

Het me trC to clarifC (iamondPs analCsisBin particular, t4e conclusion e@tracted in t4e last sentence of t4e passage aboveBbC taIing an indirect route, 4elping mCself of some elements from (enis 8c8anusP analCsis of t4e same point) According to 8c8anus, t4e main lesson to be e@tracted from t4e e@amination of t4e Iind of difficultC we 4ave at 4and is t4at t4ere is Ono e)ternal determination of 4ow _our` words ought to be usedP in order to represent a particular, possible fact, since Owe are onlC consideringBare onlC led toBt4ose particular possible facts because we 4ave taIen for granted 4ow t4ese words are actuallC usedP >8c8anus, /00E, p) Q0?) GC imagining t4e contrarCBi)e), bC >tacitlC? taIing our words as 4aving an independent life of t4eir own, as Wittgenstein tempted us to doBwe were victims of an illusion, w4ic4 amounts to Otreat t4ese words simultaneouslC as signs and as sCmbolsP >ibid)?Ba conflation w4ic4, as we saw above, Wittgenstein taIes as being not4ing less t4an t4e origin of Ot4e most fundamental confusionsP of w4ic4 Op4ilosop4C is fullP >R)R/Q?) At t4is <uncture, 8c8anus arguesBand 4ere comes t4e main reason for bringing 4is analCsis into plaC in t4e present conte@tBt4at t4e analogC wit4 pictures provided in t4e Tractatus is preciselC intended to maIe us aware of suc4 a conflation6 according to 4im, Ot4ere is muc4 to be learntP bC following WittgensteinPs advice in proposition R)NQRNY in particular, it can teac4 us t4at O_t`4e essential nature of t4e propositional sign becomes verC clear w4en we imagine it made up of spatial ob<ects >suc4 as tables, c4airs, booIs? instead of written signsP >ibid, p) EE?)

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N0:

/:) *n order to 4elp us follow WittgensteinPs advice, 8c8anus presents an interesting e@ample, w4ic4 * t4inI is wort4 &uoting at full lengt4, in order to furt4er a better understanding of t4e rest of 4is argument >t4e reconstruction of w4ic4 will be t4e main tasI of t4e remainder of t4is sub-section?) !4e e@ample is introduced as follows6
Het us consider 4ow one mig4t represent a road accident on a Iitc4en table, wit4 cups, napIins, and a pepper-pot) Het us imagine t4e roads are represented bC folded napIins, t4e cars involved bC cups, and t4e unfortunate pedestrian, w4o * will call OFranIP, bC t4e pepper-pot) Consider first w4at we must 4ave understood to 4ave grasped w4at eac4 element represents) !o grasp 4ow t4e pepper-pot can represent a person is to grasp 4ow moving it 4ere and t4ere upon t4e table, into different places relative to t4e napIins and t4e cups, is to describe different t4ings t4at can 4ave 4appened to t4at person6 for e@ample, to see 4ow t4e pepper-potPs movement across t4is napIin is t4e personPs crossing a road)

.ote w4at is involved in t4is ac4ievement6 to grasp 4ow t4is particular OnameP represents is to see 4ow ot4er OnamesP represent) !o understand w4at t4e pepperpot represents is to see 4ow it can be used in telling stories in w4ic4 cups represent cars and napIins represent roads) .ote also 4ow t4e analogC presents t4e pro<ect of Oconstructing a propositionP) *n particular, note t4at we do not construct t4e proposition out of alreadC understood elementsY rat4er, we understand t4e elements w4en we understand 4ow t4eC can be used to construct propositions) !o see t4is pepper-pot as t4is person is to see it as used in a conte@t t4at will itself 4ave meaning and will be populated bC ot4er entities 4aving meaningBa conte@t w4ic4 is 4ere a particular range of spatial locations and t4e ot4er entities being cars and roads) We maC saC, OHetPs saC t4at t4is is FranI, t4at cup is GertPs car, t4is cup is ))) P) Gut we do not first grasp t4at t4e pepper-pot is FranI, t4en t4at t4e cup is a car, etc), and t4en finallC grasp 4ow t4eC can be used to tell stories about FranI, a car, etc) We do not understand 4ow indeed Ot4isP Ois FranIP until we see 4ow Ot4isP and Ot4atP will be used to tell stories about FranI and GertPs car, 4ow t4is combination of Iitc4enalia can be t4e car, t4e road, t4e traffic lig4ts, etc), 4ow t4e movement of t4e pepper-pot across t4e napIin can be FranI crossing t4e road >as opposed to t4e rise of a stocI price or a gasPs densitC increasing, saC, w4ic4 t4at same movement of t4at same pepper-pot could represent in a different sCstem of representation?)

*magine w4at it would be liIe to be told, 4aving been presented wit4 t4e pepperpot, t4at O!4is is FranIP, followed bC ))) not4ing) !4ere is no furt4er O!4is is GertPs car, t4is is t4e red car, and ))) P *nstead we are simplC told O!4is is FranIP) .ow w4at are we in a position to doW We canPt place FranI anCwaC, because no sCstem for representing location 4as been e@plained to us) Gut neit4er 4as anC sCstem for e@plaining anC Ological spaceP >age, star sign, favourite 4olidaC venue, etc), etc)?) *n ot4er words, t4ere is not4ing for us to saC about FranI) We find ourselves wondering not so muc4 w4at to do wit4 our new OsignP, but more w4at it was t4at t4e person we tooI to be e@plaining a new sign was trCing to do) >8c8anus, pp) EE-EL?

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N0E !4e case presented above is meant as an illustration of t4e general >e@egetical? t4esis according to w4ic4 Ot4e picture analogC maIes clear t4at grasping 4ow one particular name Bone particular element of suc4 a pictureTmodelBrepresents involves grasping 4ow ot4er names represent, along wit4 t4e propositions wit4in w4ic4 t4eC figureP >ibid., p) EE?) !4at t4esis is in its turn t4e IeC to understand 4ow t4e picture analogC can be used as a rung in t4e ladder t4at is intended to be Ot4rown awaCP w4en we come to understand Wittgenstein Bit does so preciselC bC e@posing w4at 8canus dubs Ot4e mCt4 of t4e independent life of namesP >ibid., p) E1?Ba OmCt4P, .)G), t4at so far t4e Tractatus 4as been tricIing us to accept >4owever tacitlC? as a truth about language) *n order to s4ow t4is, 8c8anus asIs us to imagine 4ow would nonsenseBan Oillogical combination of signsPBarise in a situation liIe t4e one <ust depicted) ,ere is 4ow 4e presents t4e point6
Consider w4at we would saC if, for e@ample, t4e pepper-pot were picIed up and put bacI in t4e cupboard) W4at, one mig4t asI, would t4is saC of FranI nowW 5nlC if we understand w4at t4e cupboard and t4e pepper-potPs being placed inside t4e cupboard are to represent, do we 4ave anC sense of w4at would t4en be being said about FranI, and indeed w4et4er t4is pepper-pot is still representing FranI, instead of representing somet4ing else or not4ing at all) 5r suppose someone said OW4at if this 4appensWP and placed two napIins on top of eac4 ot4er) W4at is t4e force of our saCing now O!4at cannot 4appenPW !4e answer t4at t4e picture analogC suggests is not t4at t4e presented state of affairs is p4CsicallC or logicallC impossible >or indeed unt4inIable or indescribable?) %at4er, t4e response t4at comes to mind is6 OWell, w4at is t4at meant to representWP We do not <udge Ot4isPBOt4isP referring to Ot4e depicted situationPB to be p4CsicallC or logicallC impossibleY rat4er, we wonder w4at Ot4isPBOt4isP referring to t4is combination of signsBis meant to mean, w4at situation t4is arrangement is meant to depict) "rior to t4e envisaged &uestion, O*s t4is logicallC possibleWP, is t4e &uestion, OW4at is this meant to beWP "rior to our p4ilosop4ical O,owWP &uestion is a sobering OW4atWP &uestion) >8c8anus, p) E1?

#iven t4e analCsis presented in t4e passage above, and t4e conclusion it supportsBabout t4e confusion be4ind t4e idea of nonsense as prior to, independent of, and even conditioning upon, a particular met4od of pro<ection >a particular assignment of meaning T use to a set of signs?Bt4e ne@t step in 8c8anusP argument is a generali=ation, to t4e effect t4at Ow4at t4e picture analogC serves to remind us of 4ere is t4at our signs 4ave as muc4 life as our use of t4em gives t4emP >ibid)?) !4e reason w4C t4e picture analogC can be usefullC emploCed to t4at end is t4at
w4en t4e elements of our representation are familiar words or elements w4ic4, as in conventional, non-abstract pictures, 4ave some visual similaritC to w4at t4eC represent, it is easier to fall into t4inIing of suc4 elements as possessing lives of t4eir own, as it were) We maC t4en arrange t4em in waCs t4at are e@pressive wit4in ot4er, but superficiallC similar, actual or possible modes of representation,

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N0L
and t4en asI O*s t4is logicallC possibleWP, untroubled bC t4e prior &uestion of w4et4er Ot4isP 4as been assigned a sense) !4e p4ilosop4erPs OpossibilitCP &uestion need not t4en be e@pressive of an unusual but admirable rigour or imagination) %at4er, to come to understand t4e signs is to understand w4ic4 aspects of t4em and t4eir combinations represent, and w4ic4 do not, w4ic4 are, to use WittgensteinPs terms, t4eir OessentialP features and t4eir OaccidentalP features >R)RQ?) !o understand t4is is not to be tempted bC t4e p4ilosop4erPs &uestion) >8c8anus, p) E1?L:

/E) *f we taIe t4e p4rase Opicture theoryP as referring to t4e Ot4eorC of meaningP w4ic4 is presented in t4e TractatusBi)e), t4e t4eorC about t4e conditions for our propositions to represent t4e facts in t4e worldBt4en we can saC t4at t4e picture analogyBi)e), t4e device emploCed in order to s4ow t4e problem of Ot4e p4ilosop4erPs &uestionP mentioned aboveB s4ows us w4C and 4ow t4e picture t4eorC must be t4rown awaC) *t does so e@actlC in t4e waC described bC Wittgenstein in t4e R)R/nPs >see cNN?, namelC, as a Osign-languageP
L:

*n order to clarifC t4e mec4anism w4ic4 >mis?leads Ot4e p4ilosop4erP to asI t4e Iind of &uestion alluded aboveBvi7), O*s t4is logicallC possibleWP, w4ere no Ot4isP 4as been assigned a senseB8c8anus draws an interesting parallel wit4 t4e mec4anism w4ic4 >mis?leads us into >maIes us being Ocaug4tP bC? t4e 4umour of Hewis CarrollPs OnonsensicalP uses of language6 according to 4im, w4at >mis?leads us in bot4 cases is a Iind of Ononsense wit4 a logicP, i)e), Oa nonsense w4ic4 one can, in a recogni=able sense, understand and w4ic4, in a recogni=able sense, is capable of being inferred from ot4er items of nonsenseP6 Suc4 items of nonsense possess t4ese features bC virtue of borrowing sense from elsew4ere) "art of w4at t4at borrowing is is t4eir standing in pseudo-logical relations wit4 ot4er nonsensical OpropositionsP t4at borrow t4eir sense from corresponding sources) An aspect of w4at it would be for someone not to get CarrollPs 4umour would be t4eir failure to see 4ow conclusions t4at 4is c4aracters draw OfollowP from t4eir premisses, despite t4e fact t4at t4e arguments in &uestion are also nonsensicalBpatentlC so to t4ose w4o do understand) As a result, one can offer reasons w4C certain nonsensical claims s4ould naturallC OfollowP from ot4ers) >8c8anus, p) :R? ,ere is a 4andC illustration of t4e Iind of OinferenceP w4ic4 we are supposed to maIe >4owever tacitlC? in order to OunderstandP Carrollinian nonsenseBin order to OgetP one of 4is <oIes >t4ere is a lot more suc4 illustrations in 8c8anusP booI, especiallC in section Q)Q?6 W4en Alice passes t4roug4 t4e looIing-glass, s4e is surprised to find t4at t4e flowers t4ere talI) Gut t4e Oe@planationP is simple6 O*n most gardens,P t4e !igerlilC said, Ot4eC maIe t4e beds so softBso t4at t4e flowers are alwaCs asleep)P _)))` .ow in one sense t4is is a simple plaC on words, a pun on ObedsP) Gut w4at is funnC about t4is, w4at maIes it a <oIe t4at one can OgetP, is t4at we can understand CarrollPs e@trapolation6 if we imagine >if t4at is t4e word? flowers in t4eir beds as liIe people in t4eirs, t4e reason t4at t4e flowers donPt talI must be because t4eC are asleep) *n one sense, Carroll presents us wit4 nonsense) Gut it is nonsense wit4 a logic in t4e sense t4at it can be followedBsomeone w4o 4as understood t4e preceding few sentences 4as done <ust t4atBand indeed elaborated upon6 for e@ample, bed-wetting is clearlC applauded among plants ) ) ) !o understand suc4 nonsenseBto get t4e <oIeBis to be able to follow t4e pseudo-logic of suc4 nonsense) >8c8anus, p) :N?

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N0M w4ic4 allows us to avoid t4e conflation of signs T sCmbols, w4ic4 in turn gives rise to t4e Omost fundamental confusionsP of w4ic4 Op4ilosop4C is fullP) Again, t4is is a point w4ic4 8c8anus e@plains verC clearlC in t4e conclusion of 4is analCsis6
!4oug4 it 4as often been remarIed t4at t4e construction of a new notation does not seem to be t4e p4ilosop4ical met4od t4at t4e Tractatus itself emploCs, t4e picture analogC itself worIs _)))` in a remarIablC similar waC to t4at in w4ic4 t4e envisaged notation oug4t to worI6 it undermines p4ilosop4ical illusions bC Odisenc4antingP words) GC asIing us to t4inI about models t4at are Omade up of spatial ob<ects >suc4 as tables, c4airs, booIs? instead of written signsP, Wittgenstein introduces a >s4ort-lived? Onotational reformP t4at breaIs up t4e familiar signTsCmbol associations upon w4ic4 our p4ilosop4ical confusions feed6 t4e Oe@pressionsP used no longer even seem to carrC t4eir meanings outside t4e uses in w4ic4 t4eC represent in t4e particular sCstems of representation in w4ic4 t4eC figure, and t4e temptation to see confusing illusions of meaning in nonrepresenting combinationsBin Oillogical combinationsPBis dissipated) We no longer seeI to understand t4e difference between Ological impossibilitiesP >suc4 as OSeven is darIer t4an Cour 4atP? and sentences wit4 sense >liIe O8C coat is darIer t4an Cour 4atP? as t4at between OimpermissibleP and OpermissibleP combinations of ob<ects or ideas) >8c8anus, p) L/?

/L) An important aspect of w4at is involved in Ot4rowing awaCP t4e picture t4eorC, in t4e waC suggested above, 4as to do wit4 t4e role of bipolaritC as a criterion for OpropositionalitCP >i)e), for some string of signs to count as a proposition, a symbol capable of trut4 and falsitC?) As it s4all be clear at t4is point, * taIe it t4at insofar as bipolaritC is offered as an e)ternal criterion for a string of signs to sCmboli=e, it constitutes part of t4e OmCt4P >of an independent life of signs? w4ic4 8c8anus >and (iamond before 4im? 4as been trCing to unveil, and accordinglC must be Ot4rown awaCP toget4er wit4 it) *n order to see t4is, let us pause to t4inI about w4at e@actlC could lack bipolaritCBand, t4erefore, senseBaccording to t4e standards presented in t4e Tractatus6 is it a string of signs, or a comple@ of sCmbolsW ,ere is Step4en 8ul4allPs concise answer to t4at &uestion6
.o mere string of signs could possiblC eit4er possess or lacI bipolaritCY but if we are in a position to treat some given string of signs as sCmboli=ing, t4en we must 4ave parsed it as sCmboli=ing in a particular waC, and 4ence assigned specific logical roles to its components) *f so, t4en t4e &uestion of w4et4er or not it possesses bipolaritC comes too lateY and if notBif, t4at is, we 4avenPt Cet settled on a particular parsing of itBt4en t4at &uestion simplC doesnPt arise) >8ul4all, /00La, p) E?LE
LE

Again, an illustration can 4elp to understand t4is general point) Alt4oug4 emploCed for a slig4tlC different purpose >vi7), to s4ow t4e mistaIe involved in taIing a sentence as intrinsicallC nonsensical, i)e), independentlC of t4e meaning w4ic4 is assigned to its components?, t4e following case s4all do) !aIe t4e sentence OC4airman 8ao is rareP, w4ic4, according to 8ul4all, was originallC presented bC 8ic4ael (ummett as a piece of Osubstantial nonsenseP, since it would >supposedlC? con<oin a proper name, w4ic4 can be used onlC as an argument for first9level functions, wit4 a second9level function) !4e problem wit4 (ummettPs rat4er &uicI categori=ation is t4at6

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N01 .otice t4e close parallel between 8ul4allPs move in t4e &uotation aboveBaiming to s4ow t4at t4ere is no bipolaritCTsense >since t4ere is no no-bipolaritCTnonsense? prior to and independent of our assignment of a determinate use to our signsBand (iamondPs T 8c8anusP general contention, as presented above, to t4e effect t4at it is an illusion to t4inI t4at our signs 4ave an Oindependent lifeP of t4eir own, prior to t4e applications to w4ic4 we put t4em) !4e conclusion 8ul4all e@tracts from t4is analCsis is also verC congenial to t4eirs, and serves to bring 4ome a lesson w4ic4 will be valuable w4en we go bacI to WittgensteinPs dialogue wit4 t4e solipsist) *t runs as follows6
_G`efore anC general doctrine about non-bipolar propositions can be broug4t to bear on a particular candidate, before we are even in a position to t4inI of ourselves as 4aving a candidate t4at mig4t meet t4is proposed criterion for nonsensicalitC, we must alreadC 4ave made clear t4e particular use we are inclined to maIe of it suc4 t4at we want to saC of it t4at it e@presses somet4ing non-bipolar >and t4at it is not a tautologC, and so on?) *n ot4er words, all t4e worI is being done bC t4at process of clarification of meaning, not bC t4e attempted application of a general doctrine to w4atever is t4erebC clarifiedY and if t4e proposition-liIe t4ing is p4ilosop4icallC problematic, t4en _)))` t4at will come out in t4e attempted process of clarification as a Iind of failure to mean anCt4ing in particular bC it, or a 4overing between various waCs of meaning somet4ing bC it, rat4er t4an bC its violating logical sCnta@) >8ul4all, /00La, p) E?

*n ot4er >and more general? words, t4e lesson 4ere is t4at, contrarilC to w4at its readers 4ave been made >provisionallC? to assume, t4e Tractatus >ultimatelC? does not offer a p4ilosop4ical Ot4eorC of meaningPBin particular >to borrow once again from (iamondPs analCsis?, t4ere is Ono special Tractatus sense of OnonsensicalP, onlC t4e ordinarC idea of not meaning anCt4ing at allP >(iamond, /00Q, p) /0:?Y conse&uentlC, t4e onlC strategC available for a p4ilosop4er >or anCone else, for t4at matter? in order to clarifC a given sentenceBor to s4ow its confusion and emptiness t4erebCBt4us identifCing and

if it is essential to a sCmbolPs being a proper name t4at it _is used as an argument to first-level functions`, t4en we can treat OC4airman 8aoP as a proper name in t4is conte@t onlC if we treat Ois rareP as a first-level function rat4er t4an a secondlevel function >saC, as meaning OtenderP or OsensitiveP?) And bC t4e same toIen, if it is essential to a sCmbolPs being a second-level function t4at it taIe first-level functions as arguments, t4en we can treat Ois rareP as a second-level function in t4is conte@t onlC if we treat OC4airman 8aoP as a first-level function rat4er t4an a proper name >per4aps on t4e model of Oa brutal politicianP?) 7it4er waC of parsing t4e string of signs is perfectlC feasibleBwe need onlC to determine a suitable meaning for t4e complementarC component in eac4 caseY but eac4 waC presupposes an interpretation of t4e string as a w4ole w4ic4 e@cludes t4e ot4er) So treating it as substantial nonsense involves 4overing between two feasible but incompatible waCs of treating t4e string, wit4out ever settling on eit4er) >8ul4all, /00La, p) QB* modified t4e &uotation in order to fi@ w4at seems to be a slip in t4e original)?

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? NN0 overcoming certain p4ilosop4ical illusions, is t4e mobili=ation of >in 8ul4allPs p4rase? Oa certain Iind of practical Inowledge, a Inow-4ow possessed bC anCone capable of speec4P >/00La, p) L?) And t4is means t4at instead of a top-down, dogmatic insistence t4at some signs are simplC >intrinsicallC? nonsensicalBas t4e one enacted bC Wittgenstein in 4is purported criticism of t4e solipsistBp4ilosop4ical >logical? claritC re&uires a rat4er more patient and sCmpat4etic stance, an effort to specifC t4e use one maC 4ave in mind w4en emploCing certain signsY t4at, in turn, will involve imaginativelC distinguis4ing t4e >supposed? emptC use >t4e Ouse-as-nonsenseP? from ot4er possible waCs of using t4e same signs, w4ic4 mig4t be legitimate, and >recogni=ablC? meaningful) As (iamond concludes6
_"`4ilosop4ical clarification is an activitC w4ic4 we can and, indeed, must attempt to carrC t4roug4 if we want to critici=e a t4ing t4at looIs liIe a proposition, and claim t4at it is nonsense) *t is, essentiallC, in t4e failure of t4e attempt at clarification of t4e particular proposition wit4 w4ic4 we are concerned t4at we are able to come to recogni=e t4at t4ere was not4ing t4ere to clarifC) !4ere is no p4ilosop4ical criti&ue of propositions available on t4e basis of t4e Tractatus, separate from t4e Tractatus conception of clarification of genuine propositions) >(iamond, /00Q, pp) /0R-/0Q?

Wit4 t4at conclusion in mind, let us go bacI to t4e enacted dispute between Wittgenstein and 4is solipsistic interlocutor, in order to see if we can find a better end for t4at storCB one w4ic4 could be a little more satisfCing to t4e solipsist 4imself, w4o was so 4ars4lC critici=ed in t4e former round of t4e argument)

#"("(

+$e .real/ trut$ in solipsism

/M) As * said above >see c//b?, t4e picture presented in !H" :)E as an inevitable conclusion of t4e booIPs argumentBt4e JcongruenceK w4ic4 is t4ere Jmade manifestK between t4e limits of >my? world and t4e limits of >my? languageBseems designed to satisfC two deeprooted p4ilosop4ical needs6 t4ose of overcoming metap4Csical loneliness >or separateness from realitC?, and ine@pressiveness >in t4e sense of a JlacI of fitK between onePs language and t4e facts one wants toBfait4fullCBrepresent?) !4e reason w4C t4ese needs seem to be satisfied bC t4e discoverC of t4e Otrut4 in solipsismP is e@actlC t4at Ow4en its implications are followed out strictlCP, t4e result of solipsism is Opure realismPBi)e), t4e view according to w4ic4 w4at we e@perience directly is t4e w4ole realitC itself >as opposed to, saC, ideas

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? NNN w4ic4 Ostand forP t4at realitC? >see cNM?) ,aving reac4ed t4at conclusion, * 4ig4lig4ted a problem about itBnamelC, t4at in order to obtain it, Wittgenstein 4imself 4ad to resort to an ultimatelC self-subverting strategC, based on t4e idea of drawing limits to t4e e@pressive capabilities of our languageBand, t4erefore, to t4e realitC >t4e set of possible facts? w4ic4 can be e@pressed T t4oug4t bC means of t4at language) We arrive at a Iind of JrealismK in t4is waC, but onlC at t4e e@pense of maIing t4e world itself tailored for our cognitive capacitiesBto become part of t4e sub<ectPs >private? e@perience) .ow, contrarC to w4at Wittgenstein wants us to >momentarilC? assume, no logical met4od of analCsis can ever allow us to escape t4at Iind of metap4Csical isolationBif, i)e), we accept t4at t4e onlC waC to solve t4e >logical? disputes about t4e sense our signs >or purported pro<ections? would amount to find some Oe@ternal determinationP >to borrow 8c8anusP p4rase? as to 4ow our words T sentences can or must be used) * t4en submitted t4at t4e waC out of t4is problem depends on our seeing t4e w4ole idea of a met4od of pro<ection, insofar as it is part of t4e Jpicture t4eorC of meaningK presented in t4e Tractatus, as an illusion, a rung in t4e ladder w4ic4 we were supposed to Ot4row awaCP >see c/Rb?) !o s4ow 4ow to do t4is was, in turn, t4e tasI of t4e last sub-section) *ts conclusion was t4at, ultimatelC, t4ere is no suc4 an e@ternal determinationBin particular, no philosophical e@ternal determination, in t4e guise, most notablC, of a Jt4eorC of meaningKBto w4ic4 we could appeal as a guarantC t4at our signs do sCmboli=e >or fail to?Y our signs 4ave no life of t4eir own, apart from t4e uses to w4ic4 we put t4em in particular conte@ts, and t4e onlC waC to determine if a particular >purported? use is legitimate or not is bC mobili=ing our Opractical InowledgeP or linguistic OInow-4owP >more on t4is in a moment?)

/1) .ow, supposing we 4ave freed ourselves of t4e OmCt4 of t4e independent life of signsP, w4at about t4ose deep-rooted p4ilosop4ical needs w4ic4 * mentioned aboveW *n t4e answer to t4is &uestion * 4ope to s4ow w4at t4e real Otrut4 in solipsismP isBt4e trut4, i)e), w4ic4 is at t4e verC basis of our searc4 for some Iind of p4ilosop4ical guarantC against metap4Csical loneliness and ine@pressiveness)

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? NN/ .otice, first, t4at a conse&uence of t4ere being no e@ternal determination to 4ow our words s4ould be used is t4at we also lacI anC Iind of Je@ternal guarantCK t4at we are JmirroringK t4e world wit4 our language, and, t4erefore, t4at we are maIing our e@perience >of t4at world? understood >or even understandable? bC ot4ers, and 4ence s4ared) !4e onlC ground we are left wit4 is our contingent agreement itselfBt4e fact t4at our words are, more often t4an not, pro<ected in similar waCs) Geing contingentBand, as suc4, not metap4CsicallC bacIed up bC anC Iind of a priori t4eorC of meaningBt4e possibilitC will alwaCs be open t4at t4is agreement s4ould be lost, for one reason or anot4erBwe can alwaCs avoid, e)g), to accept t4e world as it is, or denC t4at we in4abit t4e same world >some particular? ot4ers in4abitY we also can >all too easClC? close ourselves to ot4ers, and t4em to us) For an enormous number of reasonsBw4ic4 are t4emselves not to be reduced to a definite set bC anC a priori t4eorCBwe, or our fellow interlocutors, can alwaCs start to pro<ect ourTt4eir words in strange, une@pected, eccentric waCsLL) * taIe it t4at t4is was part of t4e lesson t4at Wittgenstein wanted to teac4 usBbut w4ic4 onlC now, after t4rowing t4e Jpicture t4eorCK awaC, can be reallC learntBbC means of t4e >supposedlC? JunimportantK >i)e), below =eroBsee n) :L? propositions of !H" Q, suc4 as t4e following6 O7verCdaC language is a part of t4e 4uman organism and is not less complicated t4an itP >Q)00/?Y O!4e tacit conventions on w4ic4 t4e understanding of everCdaC language depends are enormouslC complicatedP >ibid)?Y O*t belongs to t4e essence of a proposition t4at it s4ould be able to communicate a ne" sense to usP >Q)0/L?, and in order to do so OA proposition must use old e@pressions to communicate a new sense) A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected wit4 t4e situationP >Q)0R?) As t4ings stand, t4is is preciselC t4e lesson w4ic4 StanleC Cavell wants us to learn from 4is own >professedlC Wittgensteinian? view on t4e nature of criteria, w4ic4 notoriouslC lead 4im to t4e signature claim t4at t4ere is a Otrut4 in sIepticismP) !4e following pair of &uotations >w4ic4 are e@tracted from different conte@ts? s4all present t4is lesson in a sufficientlC perspicuous waC6

LL

Alt4oug4 t4e topics * am 4ere announcingBt4ose of t4e contingent nature of our linguistic agreement, and its conse&uences for our responsibilities to create and sustain a linguistic communitCBwill be tacIled in t4e ne@t paragrap4s >w4ere * s4all sIetc4 StanleC CavellPs view on t4e nature of our criteria?, a more detailed treatment can be found in c4apters N and :Bt4e former 4aving >more? to do wit4 t4e burden of acInowledging ot4er 4uman beings, and t4e latter 4aving >more? to do wit4 t4e burden of acceptance of t4e world)

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? NNR
We learn and teac4 words in certain conte@ts, and t4en we are e@pected, and e@pect ot4ers, to be able to pro<ect t4em into furt4er conte@ts) .ot4ing insures t4at t4is pro<ection will taIe place >in particular, not t4e grasping of universals nor t4e grasping of booIs of rules?, <ust as not4ing insures t4at we will maIe, and understand, t4e same pro<ections) !4at on t4e w4ole we do is a matter of our s4aring routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of 4umour and of significance and of fulfilment, of w4at is outrageous, of w4at is similar to w4at else, w4at a rebuIe, w4at forgivenness, of w4en an utterance is an assertion, w4en an appeal, w4en an e@planationBall t4e w4irl of organism Wittgenstein calls Oforms of life)P ,uman speec4 and activitC, sanitC and communitC, rest upon not4ing more, but not4ing less, t4an t4is) *t is a vision as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is >and because it is? terrifCing) >Cavell, N1LE, p) :/?

_)))` * taIe WittgensteinPs idea of a criterion as meant to account bot4 for t4e dept4 of our s4aring of language and at t4e same time for our power to refuse t4is legacC, to account for, as * put it, bot4 t4e possibilitC and t4e recurrent t4reat or co4erence of sIepticism) !o possess criteria is also to possess t4e demonic power to strip t4em from ourselves, to turn language upon itself, to find t4at its criteria are, in relation to ot4ers, merelC outerY in relation to certaintC, simplC blindY in relation to being able to go on wit4 our concepts into new conte@ts, w4ollC ungrounded) >Cavell, /00E, p) /0?

,aving read t4ese &uotations, somebodC can ob<ectBfairlC enoug4, as t4e claim goesB t4at in t4e Tractatus Wittgenstein never mention OcriteriaP, or talIs of Oforms of lifePY 4owever, as * indicated above, 4e speaIs of a O4uman organismP, and of t4e comple@itC t4at suc4 an organism 4as, and of t4e waC t4is comple@itC is mirrored in t4e OcomplicationP of 4uman languageY 4e also speaIs elsew4ere >see section N? of logical rules for t4e use of signs, andBif mC reading so far 4as been on t4e rig4t tracIsB4e does t4at wit4 t4e ultimate aim of indicating t4e limits of t4ose rules w4en it comes to JguaranteeK our agreement in particular pro<ections) !4ese, in mC view, are important cluesBw4ic4, w4en seen against t4e bacIground of t4e general analCsis * 4ave been trCing to articulate, 4opefullC will appear as good reasonsBto conclude t4at, if t4ere is some >realBnot ineffable? trut4 in solipsism, it amounts rat4er to t4e Iind of OterrifCingP vision about t4e 4uman condition w4ic4 Cavell is concerned to describe in t4e &uotations above BOterrifCingP, .)G), for somebodC w4o >liIe ourselves, in some p4ilosop4ical moods? would e@pect some Iind of stronger metap4Csical ground to bacI up our use of language, and, in particular, our agreement in t4e waC we use our words) According to t4is view, w4at would be OcorrectP about solipsismBw4at a >possible? fles4-and-blood solipsist would liIe to conveC, somet4ing >s?4e would be >reallC? concerned aboutBis t4at t4is fragile basis for our linguistic agreementBt4e lacI of anC Oe@ternal determinationP for 4ow to use our wordsBposes a >real? t4reat to e@pressiveness) !o accept t4at fact is part of w4at it means to accept our finitudeBand it is preciselC because of t4e difficultC of accepting it

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? NNQ t4at a solipsist >and not onlC 4imT4er[? mig4t seeI for some consolation in a metap4Csical storC >wit4 w4ic4 comes also a Jt4eorC of meaningK?)

R0) *n Cet anot4er conte@t, Cavell claims t4at Wittgenstein portraits sIepticism Oas t4e site in w4ic4 we abdicate suc4 responsibilitC as we 4ave over words, unleas4ing t4em from our criteria, as if toward t4e worldBunleas4ing our voices from t4emBcoming to feel t4at our criteria limit rat4er t4an constitute our access to t4e worldP >C,$ //?) *n t4e same vein, * t4inI we can saC t4at t4e portrait of solipsism t4at Wittgenstein offers in t4e TractatusBas well as 4is portrait of t4e Opure realismP, wit4 w4ic4 t4e former is said to coincideBis t4at of a site w4ere we >self-?deceive ourselves, bC assuming >rat4er self-indulgentlC? t4at t4e meaning of our words can be at t4e same time Oe@ternallC determinedPBi)e), can derive from t4e constitution of >saC? t4e JrealitC itselfKBand also be fullC and easilC and directlC wit4in our graspBsince we made t4at realitC itself a part of our own e@perience) !4e solipsism w4ic4 Wittgenstein >provisionallC? tempts us to accept w4en we read t4e Tractatus is one among manC p4ilosop4ical garbs t4at weBto t4e e@tent in w4ic4 we trulC engage in our role as readers of 4is booIBmig4t feel naturallC inclined to don on t4e real difficulties w4ic4 come wit4 t4e responsibilities we in4erit bC entering in a linguistic communitC) We sublimate or rationali=e t4ese difficulties bC transforming t4em into general theoretical problemsBabout, saC, t4e Jground of agreementK between language >or t4oug4t? and realitCBso t4at we can esc4ew from t4e real pressures w4ic4 are put upon us in our dailC interactions wit4 ot4ers, in our life wit4 words) *n t4is waC manC of t4e traditional p4ilosop4ical &uestions ariseB&uestions suc4 as6 4ow can * Inow w4et4er mC concepts T propositions >reallC? refer to ob<ects T facts in the "orld, instead of referring onlC to >mC? ideasW And 4ow can * Inow w4et4er t4eC refer to mental e@periences T states T events w4ic4 occur inside t4e ot4er, instead of being >at best? indirectly connected wit4 t4emBe)g), via t4eir bodies or be4avioursW Solipsism, in t4is conte@tBas well as its twin, t4e Opure realismP of t4e Tractatus%can be seen as an intellectuali=ed attempt at re-establis4ing t4e linI between t4e sub<ect and t4e world >and ot4er sub<ects, to t4e e@tent in w4ic4 t4eC are supposed to be part of t4at world?, so as to escape metap4Csical loneliness and ine@pressiveness) !o free us from t4is Iind of evasive attitudeBw4ic4, to repeat, is not an e@clusive c4aracteristic of OsolipsismP

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? NN: or Opure realismP, but is also constitutive of a number of p4ilosop4ical OismsP purporting to give us an easC OwaC outP of our practical and e@istential problemsBt4us leading us to accept our finitude and its burdens >in particular, t4at of maIing sense of ourselves, t4e world and ot4ers? is part of w4at * taIe to be t4e Oet4ical pointP of t4e TractatusLM)

RN) Gefore elaborating t4e last claimBor, rat4er, in order to start doing itBlet me notice t4at, if * am rig4t in mC contention t4at t4e Iind of >evasive? t4eoretical attitude w4ic4 t4e booI as a w4ole is trCing to free us from is somet4ing w4ic4 can assume manC formsB w4ic4 can be embodied in manC p4ilosop4ical OismsPBt4en t4is favouring of >fi@ation inW? solipsism maC appear somew4at recalcitrant) !4is is w4ere * would liIe to recall and furt4er articulate a claim t4at * made in t4e general *ntroductionBnamelC, t4at solipsism is not onlC >in ,acIerPs p4rase? a OparadigmP of t4e Odiseases of t4e intellect to w4ic4 p4ilosop4ers are so proneP, but also a Iind of ultimate outburst, a paro@Csm, a limit to w4ic4 p4ilosop4ers in general are not willing to go wit4 t4eir analCses, but w4ic4 is alwaCs in t4e 4ori=on, as a possible conse&uence of t4eir initial attitude to problems liIe t4e ones indicated above >cR0?, <ust waiting for t4e Iind of Ostrict following outP w4ic4 t4e Tractatus enacts in its propositions) *n an essaC to w4ic4 * am muc4 indebted, 2uliet FloCd describes solipsism in a waC w4ic4 seems verC congenial to t4e view * <ust presented) OSolipsismP, s4e saCs, Ois one of t4e most persistent refuges of t4e a priori, a limiting attempt to impose a limit upon t4inIing and livingP >N11M, p) M/?) .otwit4standing mC agreement wit4 t4at description, * t4inI 4er
LM

* am 4ere alluding, as it s4all be clear, to WittgensteinPs famous claim t4at Ot4e point of t4e _ Tractatus` is et4icalP) !4at claim was made in a letter to Hudwig von FicIer, w4o was a prospective publis4er of t4e Tractatus) Wittgenstein furt4er elaborated t4e point as follows6 * once wanted to give a few words in t4e foreword _of t4e Tractatus` w4ic4 now actuallC are not in it, w4ic4, 4owever, *Pll write to Cou now because t4eC mig4t be a IeC for Cou6 * wanted to write t4at mC worI consists of two parts6 of t4e one w4ic4 is 4ere, and of everCt4ing w4ic4 * 4ave not written) And preciselC t4is second part is t4e important one) For t4e t4e 7t4ical is delimited from wit4in, as it were, bC mC booIY and *Pm convinced t4at, strictly speaIing, it can 5.H\ be delimited in t4is waC) *n brief, * t4inI6 All of t4at w4ic4 many are babbling todaC, * 4ave defined in mC booI bC remaining silent about it) >Xuoted in 8onI, N110, p) NLM? * will 4ave more to saC about w4at * t4inI is t4e Oet4ical pointP of t4e booI at t4e conclusion of t4is c4apter)

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? NNE account of t4e impulse w4ic4 leads to solipsism, t4us understood, is somew4at misleading B4ence a comparison can be useful to clarifC and furt4er develop t4e analCsis pursued so far) !4e following &uotation summari=es 4er view on t4is point >* enumerate t4e sentences in order to analCse t4em below?6
_N` !4e impulse to metap4Csical solipsism arises naturallC from t4e surrender of traditional ideas of necessitC and reason, including traditional ideas of logic as a necessarC frameworI governing t4oug4t and realitC) _/` *f logic and grammar cannot 4old forms of t4inIing and speaIing in place, if analCsis cannot uncover definiteness of sense bC specifCing forms of ob<ects in t4e world, and if et4ics does not consist of true propositions or principles, t4en my consciousness, my e@perience, maC seem to be all t4at is left in t4e waC of an underlCing bulwarI for t4oug4t and realitC) _R` !4e Tractatus depicts t4is as one route into solipsism, and _Q` t4en s4ows 4ow t4is idea of a mental limit is <ust anot4er waC to see wit4 a captive eCe) _:` ,ere too is an et4ical dimension of 4is worI) >FloCd, N11M, p) M/?

* am in complete agreement wit4 sentences >N?, >Q? and >:?) ,owever, w4at * 4ave been saCing so far amounts preciselC to t4e opposite of w4at is stated in t4e central sentence >/?6 w4ereas FloCd t4ere seems to be saCing t4at solipsism is a Iind of Jsecond bestKBin this sense, a OrefugePBw4ic4 is available w4en Cou lose Cour fait4 in t4e idea of an ob<ective connection between language and worldBone w4ic4 would be guaranteed bC reason, or logicBw4at * 4ave been trCing to s4ow is t4at, for Wittgenstein, solipsism is >at least prima facie? t4e best p4ilosop4ical candidate to secure suc4 a direct, ob<ective and impersonal relation between sub<ect >or 4isT4er language? and t4e world) >!4at t4is is onlC prima facie true must bC now be clearBafter all, according to t4e general reading * 4ave been presenting, ultimatelC suc4 a view is to be seen as anot4er rung in t4e ladder w4ic4 must be t4rown awaC at t4e end of t4e booIBand 4ere lies mC agreement wit4 FloCd on >Q? and >:?)? *t is somew4at perple@ing, to mC mind, t4at FloCd s4ould saC w4at s4e saCs in >/?, given t4e overall view presented in 4er essaCBin relation to w4ic4, as * said, * am in general verC sCmpat4etic) !4e apparent conflict * see as internal to 4er view can be made perspicuous bC comparing t4e &uotation above wit4 anot4er set of remarIs presented at t4e end of 4er essaC, wit4 w4ic4 * also entirelC agree, and w4ic4 * taIe as indeed verC 4elpful to clarifC mC own position) !4ese are t4e relevant remarIs6
_5`ne Odeep needP Wittgenstein saw wronglC gratified in idealism and in solipsism was a wis4 for total absorption in t4e world and in life, in t4e feeling of

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? NNL
t4ere being no space, no gap, between the language * understand, the world * contemplate, and the life w4ic4 * live) _)))` Solipsism is a metap4Csical version of lonelinessBor, per4aps better, a metap4Csical attempt to overcome t4e possibilitC of loneliness) *f solipsism were true, mC all-embracing e@perience and mC all-embracing world would be one) * would find mCself reflected in all t4ings) >FloCd, N11M, pp) N0R-N0Q?

*t is, * t4inI, preciselC because of t4ese apparent p4ilosop4ical merits t4at solipsism ends up being t4e main focus of WittgensteinPs reflections at t4e time 4e wrote t4e Tractatus. >#iven t4at solipsism can also be seen as t4e most radical version of a more general mCt4 Bcall it t4e logico-metap4Csical mCt4 of privacCBt4ese considerations maC give us a 4int about w4C t4e interest in solipsism would be graduallC replaced, in WittgensteinPs later writings, bC a wider concern wit4 a number of different issues steming from t4at general mCt4Bsee c4apters R ] Q)?

R/) Gut solipsism, to t4e e@tent in w4ic4 it can be taIen as a Ometap4Csical attempt to overcome t4e possibilitC of lonelinessP, is preciselC w4at is untrueBor at anC rate t4is is w4at * 4ave been trCing to s4ow)BGut in saCing t4is, am * not being as dogmatic and unfair to t4e solipsist as * accused Wittgenstein >in 4is dogmatic persona? of beingW *n w4at sense is t4e view <ust stated supposed to be more OsatisfCing to t4e ot4er personPB i)e), Ot4e solipsistPL1W Well, to begin wit4, * am not commited to t4e view t4at t4e solipsist cannot saC w4atever s4e wants to saC wit4 4er wordsBs4e 4as all t4e room to use 4er words as s4e wants, provided t4at s4e >tries to? maIe 4erself understood) >5f course s4e 4as no obligation to do t4isBafter all, it as c4aracteristic of our 4uman condition, of our life wit4 words, t4at we can simplC decide to give up our responsibilitC to maIe ourselves understood, w4enever we want, provided t4at we assume t4e conse&uences of t4at decision?) .ow, assuming t4at s4e wants to maIe 4erself understood, t4e onlC possible waC of continuing wit4 our dialogueBi)e), after t4rowing awaC anC p4ilosop4ical temptation to appeal to a t4eorC of meaning, suc4 as t4e TractatusP Jpicture t4eorCK and t4e mac4inerC
L1

Gut "ho is t4is person w4ic4 * am calling Ot4e solipsistP 4encefort4W * am assuming 4e or s4e is a real human being, someone reallC interested in defending a claim liIe t4at Ot4e world is mC worldP, for w4atever reason) As we s4all see, in 4is later writings >starting wit4 t4e Philosophical >emarks? Wittgenstein graduallC reformulates 4is own reflectionsBc4anging 4is w4ole stCleBaiming to ac4ieve increasinglC more concreteness in 4is analCses, paCing more attention to t4e >variouslC nuanced? different claims w4ic4 can be made in different conte@ts, bC different 4uman beings >particularlC oneself? inflicted bC p4ilosop4ical problems) *n order to 4ig4lig4t t4is c4ange toward concretenessBt4us indicating t4at mC intended reference is to particular interlocutors >including oneself?B* s4all 4encefort4 emploC t4e pronoun Os4eP in its >purported? gender-neutral useY alt4oug4 * am aware of t4e problems surrounding t4is Bor anC similarBartificial attempt at neutralitC >stClisticallC and ot4erwise?, * 4ope t4e effect will be wort4 t4e price)

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? NNM w4ic4 goes wit4 itBis as we normallC do w4en we 4ave a disagreement6 we ;ust talk, mobili=ing our practical masterC, or Inow-4ow, of language, seeIing to find a >set of? s4ared <udgment>s? to use as a starting point) *n t4is process, it maC well turn out t4at t4e solipsist >t4is particular, fles4ed and blooded, interlocutor? reallC 4ad somet4ing interesting, important >or rat4er completelC uninteresting and unimportant? to saC) 5r it maC occur t4at * simplC find mCself unable to understand w4at s4e wants to saCBw4at maC in turn maIe me adopt a w4ole range of different attitudes, from feeling mCself guiltC Bunprepared, unsop4isticated, stupid, differentBto blaming mC interlocutor insteadB treating 4er as strange, eccentric, mad, unintelligible, and so on) Gut notice t4at even if * adopt one of t4e latter attitudes, mC reason, w4et4er good or bad >* can be <ust tired, saC, and trC to pass mC problem to t4e ot4er? will not derive from anC metap4Csical storC T t4eorC of meaning t4is timeBif, .)G), * am not to fall bacI to t4e evasive p4ilosop4ical attitude described above) Gut * would liIe to taIe anot4er step6 it is not t4at * <ust want to maIe room for a >possiblC productive, possiblC barren? dialogue wit4 a >possiblC real? solipsistBa room for 4er words to 4ave a >or manC? legitimate use>s?) 8C sCmpat4C toward t4e solipsist goes furt4er, in t4e sense t4at, as * said above, * also find mCself, at least in some moods, t4inIing t4at t4ere are manC Jgood reasonsKBw4ic4 mig4t actuallC amount to rationali7ations of so manC concrete dissatisfactions wit4 t4e 4uman conditionBw4ic4 can lead one >mCself included? to be tempted to taIe refuge in some Iind of solipsistic >t4eoretical? storC, suc4 as t4at one Wittgenstein presents in t4e Tractatus) *f * see an error or misunderstanding in t4e solipsistPs attitude, it is rat4er a failure in 4er self-Inowledge, in 4er self-interpretation of 4er own stance) !o t4e e@tent t4at * taIe t4e t4eoretical recasting of t4ose concrete dissatisfactions as a sCmptom of p4ilosop4ical sublimationBand, t4erefore, as a Iind of self-deceptionB* also t4inI t4at to present t4em as effects of Ological misunderstandingsP, and to treat t4em accordinglC, would be <ust anot4er sCmptom of t4e same sort of attitude) *f we give up t4is sublimating attitude, w4at remains are t4e real an@ieties, or dissatisfactions, t4at we >or Ot4e solipsistP? encounter in our life wit4 words and ot4er peopleBdissatisfactions wit4 t4e trulC fragile basis of t4e agreement between our language and t4at of w4ic4 we speaI, i)e), t4e world and ot4ers) !4is, as * alreadC suggested, mig4t turn out to be t4e real trut4 in solipsismBa trut4 t4at 4as not4ing

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? NN1 ineffable about itself, but w4ic4 is difficult to taIe at face value, wit4out p4ilosop4ical >re?interpretation)

#"("7

+$rowing t$e ladder awa* .ta'e two/

RR) !4e Wittgenstein w4o arises from t4e reading pursued so far is neit4er a JmCsticK, nor t4e dogmatic p4ilosop4er w4o simplC follows t4e would-be OonlC strictlC correctP met4od presented in E):RBi)e), one w4o would >simplC? saC, in a rat4er Carnapian tone, and in complete accordance wit4 an idea presented in t4e "reface, t4at all t4e p4ilosop4ical >pseudo-?problems arise from Omisunderstandings of t4e logic of our languageP, so t4at t4eC could onlC be OsolvedP w4en t4is OlogicP is well understood) As E):R alreadC warned usBand as t4e enacted dispute wit4 t4e solipsist illustratesBt4at Iind of p4ilosop4ical treatment Owould not be satisfCing to t4e ot4er personP) *t will not do as a therapy <ust to s4ow to Ot4e ot4er personP >e)g), t4e solipsist? t4at s4e cannot >reallC? say w4at s4e >t4oug4t s4e? 4ad been saCing w4en s4e was trCing to e@press 4er JproblemsK) Gut w4at else, t4en, is needed, bC t4e lig4ts of t4e Tractatus, in order for a t4erapC to be successfulW 8C suggestion is t4at w4at we need is, first and foremost, to reassess t4e verC aims of t4e w4ole enterprise pursued in t4e booIBso t4at instead of trCing to understand 4ow it could 4elp us to JsolveK >or, for t4at matter, JdissolveK? t4e p4ilosop4ical >pseudo-?problems, we s4ould trC to understand 4ow it can 4elp us see >maCbe for t4e first time, or at least for t4e first time in full light? t4e real facts be4ind t4ose JproblemsKBbe4ind, i)e), t4e p4ilosop4ical masIs we 4ave put on t4em) .ow, since it is not e@actlC against a thesis or an opinion t4at one 4as to fig4t w4en dealing wit4 suc4 JproblemsK, but rat4er against a Iind of fantasy or illusion w4ic4 s4apes t4e >overt? t4eses and opinions of someone in t4eir grip >liIe t4e solipsist of t4e Tractatus?, t4e best strategC is not direct opposition, or contradictionBin fact, t4at would onlC generate resistance, and, conse&uentlC, reinforce t4e grip of t4e underlCing illusion) W4at one need is, rat4erBand 4ere * borrow from 8ul4allPs analCsis of a different caseBOa waC of loosening t4at grip, of freeing us from our captivation, of bringing about a Iind of disillusionmentPY and in order to ac4ieve t4at aim one needs to accept t4e terms set bC t4e underlCing illusion, OworIing t4roug4 t4em from wit4in and 4oping t4erebC to worI

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N/0 beCond t4emPY t4is, as 8ul4all indicates, is w4at in psCc4oanalCsis would be called OtransferenceP6 Ot4e analCst suffers t4e analCsandPs pro<ection of 4er fantasies, but does so preciselC in order to put its mec4anisms and motivations in &uestion, to worI wit4 and upon t4e material rat4er t4an simplC reiterating itP >/00N, p) NRL?) * taIe it t4at at least part of w4at it means to worI beCond t4e terms of a p4ilosop4ical illusion, bC means of a >successful? t4erapeutic use of transference, is to maIe manifest to Jt4e analCsandK t4e self-deception involved in t4e >initial? t4eoretical recasting of 4er JproblemsKY t4at, in turn, can trigger a c4ange of attitude on t4e part of Jt4e analCsandK6 once s4e is able to see t4at 4er JproblemsK 4ave an irreduciblC practicalBcall it e@istential Bdimension, s4e will stop looIing for >purelC? t4eoretical >dis?solutions) 5ne can indeed saCBas Wittgenstein 4imself doesBt4at after t4is w4ole t4erapeutic process our >pseudo-?problems will disappearBmeaning t4at our philosophically sublimated J&uestionsK will be s4own not to be .uestions at all >see E):/?Y Cet one could also saCBas Wittgenstein preciselC does notM0Bt4at, in anot4er important sense, our real problems 4ave onlC <ust began to s4ow up at t4is point) And t4is is mC primarC reason to t4inI, regarding t4e conclusions we reac4ed at t4e end of t4e last section, t4at alt4oug4 t4eC are legitimate, given t4e TractatusPs self-understanding of its own t4erapeutic aims, t4eC are ultimatelC unsatisfactorC, or incomplete, because t4eC do not go all t4e waC to t4e envisaged change of attitude t4at t4e booI as a w4oleBand, in particular, its self-subversive enactment of a solipsistic positionBis encouraging us to taIe) *n ot4er words, * t4inI we still need to get clear about t4e full et4ical significance of t4e Tractatus)

RQ) Het me start dealing wit4 t4is issue bC ec4oing some of t4e conclusions reac4ed in 8ic4ael DremerPs analCsis of t4e Otrut4 in solipsismP, in a paper to w4ic4 * am muc4 indebted >Dremer, /00Q?) 5ne of DremerPs main contentions is t4at solipsism is, at least in part, true, because w4en it is strictlC followed t4roug4, it not onlC leads one to abandon >w4at * would &ualifC as? t4e p4ilosop4ical or t4eoretical illusion of Odrawing limits to language and t4oug4tPBan illusion w4ic4, .)G), t4e Tractatus 4as tempted its readers to indulge in from its verC beginningBbut, more importantlC, it also s4ould lead one to e@plode t4eBnot onlC p4ilosop4ical, but also et4icalBOillusion of t4e god4ead of t4e
M0

See above, n) LM)

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N/N independent J*KP >p) EE?Y 4ence t4e main lesson e@tracted bC Dremer, according to w4ic4 solipsism, if strictlC followed t4roug4, amounts to Ot4e self-4umbling of prideP >ibid)?) .ow, * t4inI t4at suc4 a lesson is closelC related to t4e Iind of solutionBor, in WittgensteinPs own words, t4e Ovanis4ingPBof t4e Oproblem of lifeP alluded to in E):/N, w4ic4, in turn, connects to t4e idea of Oseeing t4e world arig4tP after 4aving OovercomeP t4e propositions of t4e Tractatus >t4rowing awaC t4e ladder?, t4us coming to understand its aut4or) ,ere is 4ow * see t4ese connections6 to Osee t4e world arig4tPBto 4ave a clear, nonp4ilosop4icallC sublimated, realistic perspective on t4at worldBis, as * said above, to see >among manC ot4er t4ings? t4e facts it presents to us as w4at t4eC reallC are, namelC, as absolutelC contingent 4appenings, w4ic4, as suc4, 4ave not4ing of >intrinsicallC? good or bad, fortunate or regrettable about t4em) !o t4inI >or to assume? t4e contrarCBe)g), t4at >at least some? facts in t4e world are so to speaI JintrinsicallC connectedK to our >i)e), t4e metap4Csical sub<ectPs? willBis to fall preC of t4e most seductive, and 4ence most dangerous aspect of t4e solipsistic fantasC) !4is is because, as Wittgenstein would later putMN, t4e issue at 4and w4en one deals wit4 solipsism >as wit4 so manC ot4er p4ilosop4ical fantasies? 4as more to do wit4 our "ill t4an wit4 our intellectB4ence it s4ould come as no surprise t4at even t4e most engaged intellectual efforts to dissipate it end up onlC deflecting t4e real difficultC be4ind t4e temptation of solipsism) W4at one needs in order to be freed from t4at temptation is preciselC not more argumentB4ence WittgensteinPs decision of remaining silent about itY rat4er, w4at one needs is to >graduallC? engage in an active effort to come to terms wit4Bto become conscious of, and ultimatelC counteract, 4ence taIe control ofBonePs own will, so as to become capable of taIing a different stand toward t4e world) !4at, it seems to me, is at least part of w4at it means to confront >and to accept? our finitudeBin particular, our real separateness from t4e world and its 4appenings) And * taIe it t4at t4is is e@actlC t4e Iind of >practical, e@istential? c4ange w4ic4 is envisaged as t4e terminus of t4e w4ole t4erapeutic process of Ot4rowing awaC t4e ladderPBt4us leading one to abandon, maCbe against onePs deepest e@pectations >p4ilosop4ical and ot4er? t4e searc4 for Jlimits of senseK, for a Jt4eorC of meaningK, or for anC >ot4er? Iind of metap4Csical guarantC of Jdirect connectionK wit4 t4e >w4ole? world)

MN

See, e)g), CS p) NL)

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N// >!4e conclusion above is admittedlC opa&ueY alt4oug4 * s4all trC to graduallC clarifC its content in t4e remainder c4apters, for t4e time being * would liIe to avoid a possible misunderstanding, w4ic4 can be formulated bC means of t4e following &uestion6 am *, bC calling attention to t4at Iind of separateness, trCing to saC, or to implC, t4at one s4ould, bC t4e TractatusPs lig4ts, taIe a detached perspective wit4 respect to t4e >w4ole? worldW !4e >brief? answer to t4at &uestion is6 .o) And Cet, t4e verC fact t4at it maC appear so overw4elming at t4is <unctureBas it does to me >in some moods? anCwaCBs4ows somet4ing important about t4e nature of t4is particular p4ilosop4ical temptationB* mean solipsism) For let us recall FloCdPs words6 Oone Jdeep needK Wittgenstein saw wronglC gratified in _)))` solipsism was a wis4 for total absorption in t4e world and in life, in t4e feeling of t4ere being no space, no gap, between the language * understand, the world * contemplate, and the life w4ic4 * liveP >N11M, pp) N0R-N0Q?Y now of course, if that were t4e Iind of JabsorptionK t4at one 4ad in mind >4owever tacitlC? w4en one t4inIs about a nondetac4ed relation to t4e world, t4ere would be no doubt t4at, bC affirming separatenessB t4erebC denCing solipsismBone would be forced to accept t4e implication referred above) Gut given t4at * am not willing to bite t4at bullet, w4at is t4e alternative model * am proposingW And w4at e@actlC is t4e problem wit4 t4e solipsistic model of Jattac4ment to t4e worldKW Starting wit4 t4e last &uestion, * taIe it t4at one of t4e main problems wit4 t4e solipsistic modelBw4ic4 is also supposed to be one of its main merits, if one is tempted to accept itBlies in t4e suppression it would promote of anC Iind of >not onlC epistemic but? e@istential risks. And Cet, to feel t4reatenedBor rat4er e@cited, or soberlC unperturbed, or ot4erwise burdenedBin t4e face of suc4 risIs seems to be a precondition of anC realistic >non-detac4ed? stance toward t4e worldM/Y now t4at seems to be e@actlC t4e opposite of t4e Opure realismP depicted in t4e Tractatus, w4ere a relation is promised in w4ic4 t4e w4ole of OrealitCP would be Oco-ordinatedPBwit4 no restBwit4 t4e Oself of solipsismP >see !H" :)EQ?) Conse&uentlC, * taIe it t4at an alternative, bona fide realistic model for a >or rat4er a number of? non-detac4ed relation>s? to t4e world must involve t4e notion of a sub<ect as being rat4er open to be challenged in 4er beliefs, convictions, or preconceptionsBpractical as well as t4eoreticalBOin t4e teet4 of t4e factsPMR) As it 4appens in so manC >difficult? situations of our ordinarC lives, separation can be initiallC traumaticBit can even be a case for grief or mourning, as 7merson, followed bC Cavell, would be willing to saCMQBbut
M/ MR MQ

For an interesting and illuminating discussion of t4is point, see (reCfus /001, esp) c4) /) See (iamond, N11:, p) R1) 7merson presents t4at point most notablC in 4is essaC O7@perienceP, w4ic4 Cavell resumes and analCses in manC of 4is writings, t4e main conte@t per4aps being t4e first c4apter of #onditions Bandsome and

Act two6 t4rowing t4e ladder awaC >but not as &uicIlC as one would wis4 to[? N/R preciselC because of t4at it can also serve as a catalCst for a renewed, affirmative and more engaged >realistic? attitude toward life and worldBone in w4ic4, in CavellPs terms, we would not trC to Obecome nearP t4e world ObC grasping it, getting to it, but bC letting its distance, its separateness, impress usP >see "(A!, p) :/?)? !4e conclusion to w4ic4 we 4ave <ust arrived is also verC congenial toBand, 4ence, amenable to be furt4er clarified and enric4ed bCBt4e view w4ic4 Step4en 8ul4all offers w4en summing up WittgensteinPs OearlC conception of et4icsP) ,ere is t4e passage w4ere t4at view is presented6
_!`4e 4appC man of t4e Tractatus +ogico9Philosophicus is not 4e w4o finds answers to t4e problems of life, but 4e w4o finds life unproblematic) ,e is t4e one for w4om t4e solution to t4e problem of life is seen in t4e vanis4ing of t4e problem, in coming to see w4at 4appens as w4at 4appens, as opposed to somet4ing t4at opposes or resists our conception of w4at s4ould or must 4appen) _)))` _!4is is a` variation_)))` on t4e IeC spiritual idea of accepting t4e worldPs independence of our will, and 4ence acInowledging t4is aspect of our own finitude) 5ne mig4t e@press it as a conception of t4e self as dCing to a conception of itself as being at t4e centre of t4e universe, and accepting t4erebC t4e utter non-necessitC of t4ings going well for itBat least as it <udges flouris4ing) For if life is a gift to be accepted beCond wis4, will, and craving, t4en we cannot t4inI of anCone or anCt4ing, and t4us of t4e world, as owing us a living) >8ul4all, /00:, p) N0M?

And if, following 8ul4all, * am rig4t in finding a view liIe t4e one summari=ed above at worI in t4e Tractatus, t4en t4e ne@t step would be to conclude t4at t4e OsilenceP recommend at its last proposition s4all not to be seen >as so manC 4ave? as an invitation to a passive contemplationBof Jt4e mCsticalK, saCBbut rat4er as a call to stop talkingBstop t4eori=ing about w4at should or must be t4e caseBand to start acting in t4is contingentB and >sometimes? difficult to acceptBreal world)

VVV

#"7 ,pilogue: on p$ilosop$ical elucidation& and t$e role of logical anal*sis

Cnhandsome >N110?)

7pilogue6 on p4ilosop4ical elucidation, and t4e role of logical analCsis N/Q R:) GC bringing t4is c4apter to a close * want to address a worrC, or &uestion, w4ic4, alt4oug4 not directlC related to t4e central topic of t4e te@tBsolipsism and its overcoming BmaC nonet4eless naturallC arise in relation to t4e general reading of t4e Tractatus presented so far) !4e &uestion 4as to do wit4 t4e role of logical analCsis, and, in particular, t4e ideal of a logicallC perspicuous notation, as t4eC are presented in booI) !o put it brieflC, t4e &uestion is6 s4ould t4e idea of logical analCsis be t4rown awaC toget4er wit4 t4e Jpicture t4eorC of meaningKWB!4e >s4ort? answer is6 not at all)BGut t4en, w4at is its purposeW After all, according to t4e reading presented so far, w4at >ultimatelC? does all t4e worI in t4e tasI of p4ilosop4ical elucidation >as t4e one illustrated above, bC t4e dialogue between Wittgenstein and t4e solipsist? is not logical analCsisBunderstood as a sort of logical calculationBbut rat4er t4e use of our ordinarC linguistic masterCBour practical capacitC to distinguis4, in concrete conte@ts, legitimate from illegitimate >i)e), meaningful from nonsensical, or rat4er emptC? pro<ections of signsY now, alt4oug4 t4e Inowledge of logical sCnta@ >i)e), t4e rules governing logical relations among propositions? surelC can be >part of w4at is? appealed to in suc4 concrete situations in order to clarifC t4e meaning >or lacI t4ereof? of some sentences, it would be preposterous to suppose t4at it must be >e@plicitlC? involved in our ordinarC linguistic masterC) So 4ere comes an e@tended answer, t4e first step of w4ic4 will be to trC to get clear about t4e nature of analCsis, as well as of its companion notion of a perspicuous logical notation, or ?egriffsschrift, as t4eC are actually emploCed in t4e Tractatus) !4ere is a verC widespread assumption to t4e effect t4at, bC t4e time 4e wrote t4e Tractatus, Wittgenstein would 4ave espoused some sort of logical atomismM:) #iven t4at opinion, and given t4at 4e later came to re<ect >rat4er e@plicitlC? anC form of atomism, as well as to critici=e 4is earlier commitment to t4e idea of a final or complete analCsis >as being dogmatic and mistaIen?ME, it is onlC natural to suppose t4at t4ose two t4ings >i)e), atomism and logical analCsis? would go 4and in 4and in t4e Tractatus) \et, an important case was recentlC made bC 2uliet FloCd against <ust suc4 a conflation) FloCd arguesBto mC mind, verC compellinglCBt4at t4e opinion t4at Wittgenstein was a logical atomist is a Ogreat mCt4 of twentiet4 centurCP >FloCd, /00L, p) N1/?Y s4e also claims t4at instead of assuming t4at 4is view of logical analCsis was simplC in4erited >in a more or less definitive format? from
M:

ME

For a verC clear presentation of t4at opinion, see DennC >N1LR, esp) c4s) Q ] :? and 8ounce >N1M1, esp) c4s) N ] /?) See esp) "#, p) /N0)

7pilogue6 on p4ilosop4ical elucidation, and t4e role of logical analCsis N/: Frege and %ussell, we s4ould rat4er see t4e movement alreadC attempted >4owever ultimatelC unsatisfactorilC? in t4e Tractatus as Osomet4ing more aIin to a p4ilosop4ical transformation of t4e idea of analCsis itselfP >ibid)?Bas a first step in t4e continuous development toward 4is later views on logical clarification) FloCdPs argument for t4ese conclusions is verC comple@ and filled wit4 e@egetical and 4istorical details, offering a vast number of >different but related? reasons for debunIing t4at Ogreat mCt4P) *n w4at follows * s4all provide onlC a brief and verC selective reconstruction of 4er position, focusing on t4e central contention t4at t4e OFrege-%ussell idealP of a Ocanonical, correct concept-script reflective of the logical order of t4inIingPML is somet4ing t4at not onlC OWittgenstein was trCing to overcome in t4e TractatusP >p) N1:?, but was indeed one of its OprimarC p4ilosop4ical target_s`P >p) N1E?) FloCd starts 4er defense of t4is contention bC reminding us t4at WittgensteinBunliIe Frege or %ussell BOrepeatedlC e@pressed worries about uncritical idolatrC of ?egriffsschrift notationP >p) N1:?Y s4e illustrates t4at claim bC indicating WittgensteinPs critical stance against Oconfusing t4e structure of an e&uation wit4 t4e 4olding of a relation, confusing t4e sign for generalitC wit4 a functional element of a sentence contributing separatelC to its sense or content, _and` confusing two distinct uses of t4e same sign t4oug4 t4eC e@press different sCmbols, as in %ussellPs parado@P >ibid)?) *n t4is <uncture, s4e also reminds us t4at, in contrast to %ussellPs and %amseCPs Opositive program of researc4 in analCsisPBw4ic4 was aimed at suc4 ac4ievements as Ot4e proving of t4eorems, causal accounts of belief, and so onPBOt4e most striIing applications t4at _Wittgenstein` maIes of t4e various analCses 4e proposes in t4e Tractatus are negativeP, in t4at t4eir main aims would be Oto cut off certain pat4s and routes into certain p4ilosop4ical &uestions and problems, to s4ow t4at t4e 6ragestellungen of certain purported a priori analCses are illusorC, _or` in some waC not genuineP, and so on >see p) N1E?) !4ose initial reminders are meant to go some of t4e waC toward s4owing, as FloCd puts later on, t4e e@tent to w4ic4 WittgensteinPs view of t4e role of a ?egriffsschrift Odiffer_s` in spirit, commitment, and aim from t4e attitudes to be found in Frege and in %ussellP >p) /0/?MM) ,aving presented t4ose reminders, FloCd goes on to &uote a passage from an earlier
ML

MM

* 4ave been warned bC a friend t4at to ascribe t4e view t4at t4ere is suc4 a t4ing as the logical order of t4inIing to Frege is contentious, given t4e latterPs principle of multiple anali=ablitC of propositions) For t4e present purposes * s4all simplC suspend mC <udgment on t4at issue, following FloCdPs reading in order to get a clearer view on WittgensteinPs position) 8anC ot4er suc4 differences are indicated t4roug4out FloCdPs essaC) 5ne w4ic4 * t4inI is wort4

7pilogue6 on p4ilosop4ical elucidation, and t4e role of logical analCsis N/E essaC of 4ers, w4ic4 states some of t4e central tenets of 4er general interpretative stance on t4is issue) !4e passage goes as follows6
_*n /00N * wrote t4at` bC e@amining t4e details of w4at Wittgenstein actuallC did wit4 t4e ?egriffsschriften of Frege and %ussell in t4e Tractatus, we can see t4at 4e is re<ecting _t4eir` ideal of claritC of e@pression) According to t4is ideal _)))` we imagine ourselves to be depicting the inferential order among t4oug4ts >or sentences of our language? w4en we worI wit4 a logical notation) Gut on mC reading, one aim of t4e Tractatus is to depict suc4 notions as Jthe inferential orderK, Jthe logical grammar of our language,K and Jthe logical form of a propositionK as c4imeras) _)))` Frege and %ussell write as if, at least ideallC, t4ere is a single conte@t of e@pression wit4in w4ic4 we maC discern t4e structure of t4oug4t, a sCstematicallC presented ?egriffsschrift wit4in w4ic4 we can use logical notation to maIe perspicuous the logical order) *n contrast, * 4ave emp4asi=ed WittgensteinPs insistence in t4e Tractatus t4at no single imposition of a logico-sCntatic order on w4at we saC is or can be t4e final word, t4e final waC of e@pressing or depicting t4oug4t) _)))` For WittgensteinBeven in t4e Tractatus%ho"ever useful t4e formali=ed languages of Frege and %ussell maC be for warding off certain grammatical and metap4Csical confusions, t4ese languages must simultaneouslC be seen as sources of new forms of p4ilosop4ical illusionBindeed t4e deepest Iind of illusion of all, t4e illusion of 4aving found ultimate claritC) >FloCd, /00N, p) NL1? _&uoted in FloCd, /00L, pp) N1E-N1L`

,aving read t4at passage, one maC wonder6 but 4ow would logical analCsis 4elp us Owarding off certain grammatical and metap4Csical confusionsP, given t4at Ono single imposition of a logico-sCntatic order on w4at we saC is or can be t4e final wordPW FloCd 4erself provides t4e elements for answering t4at &uestion in a later conte@t, starting wit4 t4e claim t4at t4e verC usefulness of a logical analCsis depends on its being related Oto a particular speaIerPs language at a particular timeP >p) /0Q?) S4e elaborates on t4at claim in t4e following passage, bC drawing an interesting parallel wit4 XuinePs view of parap4rase6
We can t4inI of _t4e TractatusP analCsis`, in fact, as a Iind of e@tensionali=ed, Xuinean view, 4owever nascent and unclearlC articulated) W4en we formali=e language, we parap4rase, for purposes local to w4atever conte@t we are in) "arap4rase is conte@t- and purpose-relative) "arap4rase 4as no commitment to meaning- or content-preservation, and t4ere is probablC no general met4od or sCstematic routine for ac4ieving it) !4is is partlC because parap4rase involves an e@ercise in t4e 4ome language as muc4 as in t4e ob<ect of assessment) For Xuine, t4ere is in t4is sense not4ing to be correct or incorrect about in formali=ing >applCing logic to? our language) J"arap4raseK is 4is p4rase for avoiding space for t4e Iind of worries about meaning t4at 4e saw %ussell and Carnap generating) We applC logic and formulate its structure) We need no general >Iind of? <ustification to do so)

mentioningBsince it seems verC congenial to some ideas t4at surfaced before in mC own analCsisBis e@pressed bC t4e claim t4at Wittgenstein, unliIe Frege, %ussell et al., would 4ave Onever insisted on, but instead resisted t4e idea t4at t4oug4ts must be imagined to be e@pressible, in principle, in a single universallC applicable, logicallC perspicuous JidealK languageP >FloCd, /00L, pp) N11-/00?)

7pilogue6 on p4ilosop4ical elucidation, and t4e role of logical analCsis N/L

From t4is perspective, &uestions suc4 as6 W4at strategies and tec4ni&ues do we need to emploC in order to stopW (oes analCsis depend upon certain empirical trut4sW Certain meaning-t4eoretic principlesW ,ow will we recogni=e w4en we 4ave made a complete catalog of t4e comple@itC in an e@pressionW W4at is our rig4t to t4e JmustK in t4e idea t4at analCsis JmustK end at t4e elementarC propositionsW ,ow can we be sure, for anC given analCsis of an argument, t4at an invalidating e@planation of its deeper logical structure will not be foundWB7ac4 of t4ese is a &uestion asIing for somet4ing we cannot 4ave and do not need) So long as trut4-functional orientation >sense in t4e sense of t4e Tractatus? is preserved t4roug4 t4e entire conte@t relevant for reasoning, replacement >i)e), e@pressive rearrangement? can proceed as it proceeds) And t4at is all) >FloCd, /00L, pp) /0:-/0E?

,aving reac4ed t4is point in FloCdPs analCsis, * t4inI we are in a better position to >re?articulate t4e &uestions wit4 w4ic4 t4is section started) For, if t4e view presented above is soundBif, i)e), t4e ultimate purpose of >!ractarian? logical analCsis is >onlC? to provide a >Xuinean? sort of parap4raseBone would liIe to Inow w4at 4appens, first, wit4 t4e TractatusPs ideal of a complete analCsis >of a particular, determinatelC pro<ected, proposition?, and, second, wit4 its >related? re&uirement of simple signs lCing somew4ere at t4e end of t4e process of clarificationBa re&uirement w4ic4, at least in t4e Tractatus, seems to be e&uivalent to t4e re&uirement of determinacy of sense. According to FloCd 4erself, t4e general reading s4e 4as being proposing does not go all t4e waC toward answering t4ose difficult &uestionsY Cet, it maC at least go some waC, bC suggesting t4at
t4ere were materials wit4in t4e Tractatus leading Wittgenstein to suppose t4at t4e re&uirement of determinacC of sense was innocent sounding enoug4 to 4ave accomplis4ed w4at 4e wanted wit4out 4aving committed 4im eit4er to ruling out or ruling in anC particular analCsis of p4enomena involving subsentential comple@itC) And it _also` suggest_s` t4at we can taIe t4e Tractatus to be recasting our understanding of t4e formal use of t4e notion of analCsis itself, awaC from an image of a &uest for the logicallC correct notation >logical sCnta@ conceived as a correct sCnta@? and toward a more complicated, piecemeal conception of t4e role t4at translation into formali=ed languages maC plaC in t4e activitC of p4ilosop4ical clarification) Wit4 t4is comes a more complicated conception of t4e relations4ip between ordinarC language, wit4 its varietC of e@pressive powers, and t4e Iinds of translations ordinarC language maC or maC not be capable of receiving in a formali=ed language designed to maIe logical form perspicuous) >FloCd, /00L, p) /0E?

,ow are we to understand t4e claim t4at Wittgenstein would 4ave t4oug4t t4at Ot4e re&uirement of determinacC of sense was innocent soundingPW FloCd t4inIs, interestinglC, t4at bC t4e time 4e wrote t4e Tractatus, Wittgenstein Ot4oug4t 4e 4ad a general sc4eme or modelP of analCsis w4ic4 Owould be able to accommodate future developmentsPB4owever, as s4e emp4aticallC warns, t4at Ogeneral sc4emeP s4ould not be confused wit4 Oa met4od or a substantive independent re&uirement or an a priori condition or a semanticsP >p) /NR?)

7pilogue6 on p4ilosop4ical elucidation, and t4e role of logical analCsis N/M W4at is Oinnocent soundingP about t4at Ogeneral sc4emeP is t4at it Oseems at times to amount to no more t4an t4e idea t4at analCsis is analCsis of propositions, and insofar as it is, it must begin and end in e@pressions t4at are determinatelC true or falseBe@pressions sub<ect, t4at is, to logicP >pp) /0Q-/0:?) \et t4at was e@actlC t4e point w4ere Wittgenstein 4imself came to see t4at too dangerous a concession was made in t4e TractatusY as FloCd puts t4e point6 O_4`e did come to t4inI, and rig4tlC, t4at 4e 4ad been mCopic, vague, and naiveBif Cou liIe, metap4CsicalBabout t4e image of a JfinalK or JcompleteK analCsis t4at would displaC t4e logical as logical and prevent misunderstandings for all possible conte@tsP >p) /N/?) As 4is views about logical analCsis and clarification evolved, 4e became able to see O4ow misleading and partial t4at general sc4eme was6 4ow little it allowed in t4e waC of coming to an understanding of t4e essence of t4e logicalP >ibid)?) From t4ese considerations FloCd concludes t4at6
W4at was in error bC _WittgensteinPs own` later lig4ts were 4is nebulous gestures involving t4e notion of analysis, coupled wit4 t4e insistence t4at it must end somew4ere, even if t4e termination point lies infinitelC in t4e comple@ distance, and 4is sIetc4 of t4e sort of e@pressive structures it would terminate in) _)))` !4at t4e Tractatus created new forms of confusion of its own, preciselC in t4e effort to unmasI older ones, is per4aps in t4e end not surprising) _)))` !4e aut4or of t4e Tractatus came to see t4at p4ilosop4ical problems do not 4ave as unified a source, or as unified a means of escape, as 4e 4ad once suggestedB indeed 4is suggestion of t4is generated Cet more problems and difficulties) >FloCd, /00L, p) /NR?

RE) !4e results summari=ed above give us an important clue to understand t4e c4ange t4at would taIe place after t4e publication of t4e Tractatus) We will come bacI to t4is issue soon enoug4 >see ne@t c4apter?) \et, in order to pave t4e waC for its analCsis, * would liIe to go bacI >once again? to our initial &uestion) For, alt4oug4 * t4inI FloCdPs view s4eds some >muc4 needed? lig4t on t4e nature of logical analCsis, it does not e@actlC e@plain t4e reason w4C t4at sort of analCsis ends up not being emploCed bC Wittgenstein 4imself at t4ose climatic stages w4ere 4e faces 4is Jmetap4Csical interlocutorsK >e)g), t4e solipsist? in t4e te@t of t4e Tractatus. *n order, t4en, to attain claritC about t4is issue, * will 4elp mCself once again of an important element taIen from 8c8anusPs analCsisBnamelC, 4is proposal of distinguis4ing two waCs of dealing wit4 Ological misunderstandingsP >4ence, wit4 p4ilosop4ical confusions?Y to put t4e distinction verC crudelC6 it is one t4ing to trC to avoid t4ose misunderstanding and confusionsY but it is anot4er, verC different one to trC to fi@, or overcome, misunderstandings and confusions w4ic4 are already widespread) *n 8c8anusPs own words, we s4ould distinguis4 >logico-p4ilosop4ical? cure from >logico-

7pilogue6 on p4ilosop4ical elucidation, and t4e role of logical analCsis N/1 p4ilosop4ical? prevention) *n so doing, we are in a better position to understand t4e rationale for WittgensteinPs statement t4at Ological analCsisP >i)e), Oparap4raseP, in XuinePs and FloCdPs sense? "ould be t4e Ocorrect met4od in p4ilosop4CPBit would, i)e), if onlC t4ings were different t4an t4eC reallC are, and prevention was our >main? aim) 8c8anus formulates t4e last point verC aptlC in 4is claim t4at O_t`4e pro<ect of developing a ?egriffsschrift is, for t4e earlC Wittgenstein, t4e IeC measure in our efforts at preventive medicinePY t4is is because O_i`n our e@isting notations, one can substitute for one anot4er similar-looIing signs t4at e@press different sCmbols, producing strings of signs t4at 4ave no sense but w4ic4 look or sound as if t4eC doP Cet, t4at Iind of replacement would be Oimpossible wit4in t4e ?egriffsschriftPBa claim t4at 8c8anus illustrates bC saCing t4at, e)g), Ot4e (lice booIs couldnPt 4ave been written in suc4 a notation, and t4e p4ilosop4er would find t4at not4ing corresponds to 4is propositions in t4at notation eit4erP >8c8anus, /00E, p) NR0?) .ow, given t4at O_t`4e world is alreadC populated bC plentC of t4e alreadC infected, and it is t4eC w4o discuss, and claim an understanding of, t4e problems of p4ilosop4CP >ibid)?, w4at we are most in need of is not prevention, but some sort of remedy, a strategC for p4ilosop4ical cure) ,ow, t4en, is one to proceed in order to treat an e@isting suffererW *n answering t4is &uestion, 8c8anus presents a view w4ic4 is again verC congenial to t4e one presented at t4e conclusion of our last section >see c RR?) !4e answer goes as follows6
First of all, one needs to reac4 _t4e sufferer`, and t4is re&uires t4at we enter into 4is >nonsensical? conversationY if one wants to talI to suc4 a person, one needs to address 4is issues) Suc4 a person mig4t well 4ave no interest in t4e ?egriffsschrift pro<ect, because 4e maC not feel as if t4at will teac4 4im anC p4ilosop4CY 4e maC, as a matter of contingent fact, be interested in Cour observations about different uses of words, <ust as 4e maC be interested in Cour observations about stamp collectingY but 4e wonPt t4inI t4at t4is 4as anCt4ing to do wit4 p4ilosop4C, wit4 4is &uestions, wit4 4im as a philosopher) ,e is not interested in 4ow meaning 4as been assigned to a varietC of wordsY 4e is interested in maIing progress wit4 t4e &uestionsBw4ic4 4e t4inIs are real and pressingBof metap4Csics and t4e p4ilosop4C of language, mind, and logic) >8c8anus, /00E, p) NR0-NRN?

!4e analogC wit4 psCc4oanalCsis is once again manifest6 it will not do as a cure <ust to saC to t4e JanalCsandK t4at s4e 4as a particular problem, w4ose causes are suc4-and-suc4Bas * said above, t4at would onlC cause resistance) W4at we need is a different, more engaged and sCmpat4etic, Iind of involvement) 8c8anus presents t4is point bC indicating t4at t4e psCc4oanalCst would 4ave to Obe able to maintain a Iind of double vision6 as well as 4is

7pilogue6 on p4ilosop4ical elucidation, and t4e role of logical analCsis NR0 own diagnostic vision, 4e needs to be able to maIe 4is own t4e patientPs distorted visionPY bC seeing 4ow t4ings looI from t4e latterPs perspective, 4e will >4opefullC? be able to find a waC to Obegin to nudge t4e patient toward t4e point from w4ic4 4e will be able to see w4at t4e diagnostic perspective seesP >p) NR/?) .ow t4e same would applC to t4e p4ilosop4er, as far as WittgensteinPs view of 4er tasI is concerned6

!o 4elp ot4ers out of nonsense, one needs to t4inI t4roug4 it, to uncover 4ow t4at vulnerabilitC OworIsP) !4is re&uires a certain sCmpat4C wit4 t4e confusions in &uestionBw4at mig4t seem to some Wittgensteinians a perverse or nostalgic love of t4e problems of p4ilosop4C) 5ne needs to be able to see t4ings as t4e confused see t4em, but also to be able to escape t4at addled perspective) !o maintain t4at double vision is to be able to enter and t4en escapeBw4ic4 is to saC, trulC understandBt4is Oc4aosP) *f one loses t4is double vision, one maC eit4er become captured bC t4e confusionsBlosing onePs appreciation of 4ow our talI 4ere is mere nonsenseBor lose onePs appreciation of t4eir powerBlosing onePs grasp of 4ow t4eC can appear utterlC real to t4ose in t4eir grip) >8c8anus, p) NR/?M1

!4e reason w4C * t4inI it is important to go t4roug4 t4ese considerations >even at t4e cost of repeating previous results? is t4at t4eC will allow us to 4ave a better understanding of t4e continuities and discontinuities in WittgensteinPs view concerning t4e nature of p4ilosop4ical elucidation) As we s4all see in t4e ne@t c4apter, an important c4ange in 4is t4inIingBundergone bC t4e time 4e resumed p4ilosop4ical worI, around N1/1Bwas preciselC t4e reali=ation t4at even as preventive medicine, Ological sCnta@P was not as efficient as 4e 4ad initiallC supposedBafter all, it could not be used to prevent t4e Iind of
M1

5ne of t4e interesting results of emploCing t4is analogC wit4 psCc4oanalCsis is t4at, as 8c8anus points out, it maC O4elp us to see w4C it is &uite natural for t4e Tractatus to mi@ nonsensical elucidations wit4 OsensicalP observations, and, t4us, w4C a reading t4at presents it so need not be guiltC of an ad hoc c4errCpicIingP6 *n conversation wit4 a patient wit4 delusions, some of t4e psCc4oanalCstPs remarIs will be elaborations of t4e patientis delusionsY but ot4ers will be verC obviouslC and straig4tforwardlC OsensicalP) !4e psCc4oanalCst maC suggest 4ow t4ings would looI to t4e patient were certain t4ings to 4appen6 for e@ample, O*f A was to do @, Cou would saC it was because A would be seeIing to bring about C, wouldnPt CouWP Gut t4e patient does not live on anot4er planet, and in e@ploring t4eir viewpoint on life, t4ere is no reason w4C everC suc4 elucidatorC remarI need be e@pressive of delusionY some will be, and in t4e dept4s of t4eir delusion t4e patient maC react to t4ese suggestions wit4 an O7@actlC[P or wit4 a OSo Cou see it too[PY but t4e patient will 4ave understood w4at t4e analCstPs point was in maIing t4ese suggestions w4en 4e also comes to see t4at t4eC were e@pressive of delusion) !4e patient maC t4en looI bacI over t4e conversation and recogni=e t4at partsBbut only parts Bof it were s4aped in waCs 4e 4adnPt reali=ed at t4e time bC certain distorting confusions, including t4e analCstPs foraCs into, and elaborations on, t4e patientPs delusions) >8c8anus, pp) NRR-NRQ?

7pilogue6 on p4ilosop4ical elucidation, and t4e role of logical analCsis NRN nonsense involved in >pseudo-?propositions liIe Ow4ite is darIer t4an blacIP >i)e), a Iind of nonsense w4ic4 does not arise simplC from disobedience to logical synta), understood as a bodC of rules governing logical relations among non9analysedBand indeed unanalCsable %elementarC propositions?) 5n t4e ot4er 4andBconcerning p4ilosop4ical cureBalt4oug4 Wittgenstein will continue to maintainBin fact, will increasinglC emp4asi=eBt4e need to engage wit4 t4e interlocutor in a waC similar to t4e relation between psCc4oanalCst and patient, 4e will also come to see t4at t4e origins of p4ilosop4ical confusions >including t4ose grouped under t4e title OsolipsismP? are waC more various and entangled t4an 4e initiallC supposed, and, conse&uentlC, t4at t4e respective Jt4erapiesK would 4ave to be administered waC more locally, so muc4 so as to s4atter anC 4ope of solving >even Oin essenceP? all t4e problems once and for all)

7mbracing t4e w4ole world6 solipsism and t4e conditions of e@perience in "4ilosop4ical %emarIs NR/

,mbracing t$e w$ole world: solipsism and t$e conditions of e8perience in Philosophical Remarks
. . . solipsism teaches us a lesson@ It is that thought "hich is on t4e waC to destroy this error. 6or if the world is idea it isn!t any person!s idea. 'Solipsism stops short of saying this and says that it is my idea.* ?ut then ho" could I say "hat the "orld is if the realm of ideas has no neighbour= >Wittgenstein, "5, p) /::?

%"1 !rologue: anal*sis& p$enomenolog*& understanding 9ittgenstein s c$ange

grammar-

N) Wittgenstein opens t4e Philosophical >emarks10 wit4 t4e following, rat4er remarIable pair of entries6
A proposition is completelC logicallC analCsed if its grammar is made completelC clear6 no matter w4at idiom it maC be written or e@pressed in)

* do not now 4ave p4enomenological language, or JprimarC languageK as * used to call it, in mind as mC goal) * no longer 4old it to be necessarC) All t4at is possible and necessarC is to separate w4at is essential from w4at is inessential in our language) >"% cN, p) :N?)

5ne of t4e reasons w4C t4ose entries are remarIable is t4at t4eC e@press an important c4ange of mind in WittgensteinPs t4inIingBa c4ange w4ic4, one can speculate, 4e must 4ave deemed rat4er important, so as to decide to open 4is report bC avowing it) Faced wit4 t4at avowal, a number of &uestions arise, among w4ic4 are t4e following6 (id Wittgenstein
10

According to %us4 %4ees, t4e original te@t emploCed in t4e edition of t4e Philosophical >emarks was Oa tCpescript t4at #) 7) 8oore gave _)))` soon after WittgensteinPs deat46 evidentlC t4e one w4ic4 Wittgenstein left wit4 Gertrand %ussell in 8aC, N1R0, and w4ic4 %ussell sent to t4e Council of !rinitC College, Cambridge, wit4 4is report in favour of a renewal of WittgensteinPs researc4 grant) All t4e passages in it were written in manuscript volumes between FebruarC /nd, N1/1, and t4e last weeI of April, N1R0P >information taIen from t4e O7ditorPs .oteP%see "%, p) RQL?)

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NRR Band if so, w4en did 4eB4ad a Op4enomenological languageP or OprimarC languageP as 4is goalW (id 4eBand if so, w4en did 4eB4eld t4at language to be necessarCW .ecessarC for w4atW Again, w4en did 4e c4ange 4is mind about t4at, and w4CW FinallC, 4ow does t4at c4ange relate to t4e claim made in t4e first entrCBnamelC, t4at it does not matter, for purposes of clarification, w4at OidiomP _(usdrucks"eise` is used to e@press a >OcompletelC logicallC analCsedP? propositionW Answering t4e &uestions presented above would be a crucial step to understand t4e c4anges occurred in WittgensteinPs t4inIing around t4e Cears of N1/1-R0, marIing 4is return to Cambridge and to p4ilosop4ical researc4) Alt4oug4 it is beCond t4e scope of t4is studC to trC to offer final and detailed answers to t4ose &uestions, * s4all go some waC toward t4at aim in t4e remainder of t4is prologue, trCing to offer a minimallC detailed picture of t4e &uicIlC developing new met4odologC emploCed bC Wittgenstein at t4at timeY t4at result will in turn be useful in latter sections, w4ere we s4all see 4is met4od>s? at worI in t4e service of trCing to unveil, and 4ence >4opefullC? cure, 4is interlocutors >and readers? from some temptations related to solipsism)

/) * suggest we approac4 t4ose issues bC taIing a detour, e@amining anot4er important record of WittgensteinPs post-!ractarian reflectionsBnamelC, t4e paper OSome %emarIs on Hogical FormP >4ereafter S%HF?, written in 2ulC, N1/11N) *n t4e first paragrap4 of t4at paper, Wittgenstein defines OsCnta@P as Ot4e rules w4ic4 tell us in w4ic4 connection onlC a word give _sic)` sense, t4us e@cluding nonsensical structuresP, and claims t4at t4e OsCnta@ of ordinarC language _)))` is not &uite ade&uate for t4is purposeP, since O_i`t does not in all cases prevent t4e construction of nonsensical pseudopropositionsP >p) /1?1/) ,e t4en offers as e@amples of suc4 pseudopropositions6 Ored is 4ig4er t4an greenP and Ot4e %eal, t4oug4 it is an in itself, must also be able to become a for myselfP >ibid)?) #iven t4e inade&uateness
1N

1/

!4e paper was originallC invited for t4e 2oint Session of t4e Aristotelian SocietC and t4e 8ind Association of t4at CearY t4oug4 publis4ed in t4e proceedings, it was not delivered at t4e occasion, apparentlC because of WittgensteinPs dissatisfactions wit4 it >see t4e O7ditorPs .oteP to Philosophical >emarks, p) RQ1?) .otwit4standing 4is reasons to dismiss itBor even to consider it O&uite wort4lessP >see "5, p) /M?Bt4at paper stands as an important record >if onlC because of t4e lacI of anC ot4er? to understand t4is transitional period in WittgensteinPs t4inIing) !4e suggestion to paC attention to t4at paper in order to get clear about WittgensteinPs c4ange of mind was made in Alva .ojPs illuminating studC of t4e Philosophical >emarks >.oj, N11Q?, to w4ic4 mC analCsis in t4is section is muc4 indebted) * &uote from t4e reprinted version of t4e paper in Philosophical &ccasions >"5?, and t4e page numbers refer to t4at collection)

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NRQ of t4e sCnta@ of ordinarC language to prevent suc4 nonsense, Wittgenstein argues for t4e usefulness of emploCing logical analysis, and, in particular, a logical symbolism w4ic4 would reflect sCnta@ >more? perspicuouslC6
*f we trC to analC=e anC given propositions we s4all find in general t4at t4eC are logical sums, products or ot4er trut4functions of simpler propositions) Gut our analCsis, if carried far enoug4, must come to t4e point w4ere it reac4es propositional forms w4ic4 are not t4emselves composed of simpler propositional forms) We must eventuallC reac4 t4e ultimate connection of t4e terms, t4e immediate connection w4ic4 cannot be broIen wit4out destroCing t4e propositional form as suc4) !4e propositions w4ic4 represent t4is ultimate conne@ion of terms * call, after G) %ussell, atomic propositions) !4eC t4en, are t4e Iernels of everC proposition, they contain t4e material, and all t4e rest is onlC a development of t4is material) *t is to t4em we 4ave to looI for t4e sub<ect matter of propositions) *t is t4e tasI of t4e t4eorC of Inowledge to find t4em and to understand t4eir construction out of t4e words or sCmbols) !4is tasI is verC difficult, and p4ilosop4C 4as 4ardlC Cet begun to tacIle it at some points) W4at met4od 4ave we for tacIling itW !4e idea is to e@press in an appropriate sCmbolism w4at in ordinarC language leads to endless misunderstandings) !4at is to saC, w4ere ordinarC language disguises logical structure, w4ere it allows t4e formation of pseudopropositions, w4ere it uses one term in an infinitC of different meanings, we must replace it bC a sCmbolism w4ic4 gives a clear picture of t4e logical structure, e@cludes pseudopropositions, and uses its terms unambiguouslC) >S%HF, pp) /1-R0?

.ot4ing said in t4e passage above seems to implC anC remarIable c4ange in relation to WittgensteinPs earlier conception of t4e p4ilosop4ical tasI of clarification, and, in particular, of t4e role of a Orichtige ?egriffsschriftP for t4at end) ,owever, a departure seems to be gestured at in t4e passage w4ic4 immediatelC follows t4e one above6
.ow we can onlC substitute a clear sCmbolism for t4e unprecise one bC inspecting t4e p4enomena w4ic4 we want to describe, t4us trCing to understand t4eir logical multiplicitC) !4at is to saC, we can onlC arrive at a correct analCsis bC, w4at mig4t be called, t4e logical investigation of t4e p4enomena t4emselves, i.e), in a certain sense a posteriori, and not bC con<ecturing about a priori possibilities) 5ne is often tempted to asI from an a priori standpoint6 W4at, after all, can be t4e onlC forms of atomic propositions, and to answer, e.g), sub<ectpredicate and relational propositions wit4 two or more terms furt4er, per4aps, propositions relating predicates and relations to one anot4er, and so on) Gut t4is, * believe, is mere plaCing wit4 words) An atomic form cannot be foreseen) And it would be surprising if t4e actual p4enomena 4ad not4ing more to teac4 us about t4eir structure) !o suc4 con<ectures about t4e structure of atomic propositions, we are led bC our ordinarC language, w4ic4 uses t4e sub<ect-predicate and t4e relational form) Gut in t4is our language is misleading _)))` >S%HF, p) R0?

ClearlC, t4e verC idea of pursuing a Ological investigation of t4e p4enomena t4emselvesPB somet4ing Oin a certain sense a posterioriPBis a noveltC wit4 respect to t4e staunc4lC aprioristic stance c4aracteristic of t4e Tractatus >in fact, it is arguablC due to that noveltC

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NR: t4at Wittgenstein 4ad come to be less dismissive about t4e tasI of t4e Ot4eorC of InowledgeP bC t4e time 4e wrote t4at paper?) W4at triggered t4at c4angeBif onlC partiallC Bwas of course t4e so-called Oproblem of sCnt4etic incompatibilitiesP1R) !4at problem maC be illustrated wit4 t4e analCsis of propositions stating colour-e@clusion) !aIe, e)g), t4e proposition stating t4at Oif A is red t4en A is not greenP >w4ere OAP stands for a point in mC visual space?Y if true, t4at proposition implies t4at OA is red and A is greenP must >bC necessitC? be falseY now, if one assumesBas t4e aut4or of t4e Tractatus didBt4at all necessitC is logical, t4en, given t4e necessarC false4ood of t4e latter proposition, one s4ould conclude t4at it amounts to a logical >i)e), purelC formal? contradictionY Cet t4at is not t4e case, as one can clearlC see bC parap4rasing t4at proposition bC means of t4e verC notational devices laid down in !H"Bi)e), t4e O!-F notationP) !4e critical result is t4at t4ere are logical relations among propositions t4at t4e TractatusPs Ogeneral propositional formP is simplC unable to capture, because t4eC are not formal relations6 not4ing t4at accounts >onlC? for t4e be4aviour of t4e logical constants will be enoug4 as an account of t4e relations of >sCnt4etic? e@clusion 4olding between >e)g)? two propositions ascribing different colours to a point1Q) !4at result also leads Wittgenstein to abandon t4e t4esis of t4e logical independence of elementarC propositions, t4us coming to acInowledge an important failure of 4is original, trut4-functional analCsis of t4e proposition) And t4at is t4e reason w4C an Oinvestigation of t4e p4enomena t4emselvesP seems to be necessarCBin particular, it is onlC upon pursuing suc4 an investigation t4at one mig4t become able to Inow w4at form t4e JelementarC propositionsK actuallC 4ave) .ow, in order to correctlC mirror t4e logical multiplicitC of t4ose p4enomena, a sCmbolism more powerful t4an t4e TractatusPs ?egriffsschrift would be neededBand t4at is preciselC t4e role of w4at Wittgenstein would come to call a Op4enomenologicalP or OprimarCP language) ,ence, t4e pro<ect of constructing suc4 a sCmbolism can be seen as, in an important respect, continuous "ith t4e !ractarian ideal of offering a OlogicallC perspicuous
1R

1Q

!4is is %ussellPs >not WittgensteinPs? p4rase) "aulo Faria deals wit4 t4at storC at lengt4 in 4is 8asterPs t4esis6 6orma +0gica e Interpreta2/o@ Wittgenstein e o Problema das Incompatibilidades Sint5ticas, F$F9,Q >N1M1?) 8ore specificallC, w4at t4e aut4or of t4e Philosophical >emarks came to believe t4at w4at was wrong wit4 t4e !-F met4od was preciselC t4at O!4e met4ods for JandK, JorK, JnotK etc), w4ic4 * represented bC means of t4e !-F notation, are a part of t4e grammar of t4ese words, but not the "hole)P >"% cMR, p) NNN?) O8aterial validitiesP of inference, in ot4er words, are not <ust a matter of t4e meanings of e@tra-logical vocabularC >Oif itPs green all over, t4en itPs not redP?6 t4e verC understanding of logical constants >4ence of logical form? stands to be affected bC t4e recognition t4at Ot4ese remarIs _e)g) about colour incompatibilities` do not e@press an e@perience but are in some sense tautologiesP >S%HF, p) R/?)

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NRE notationP) *n fact, WittgensteinPs first attempts to laC bare Ot4e logical structure of p4enomenaPBbC means of an investigation w4ic4 is Oin a sense a posterioriP, Cet not e@actlC or fullC empirical or scientificBcan be seen as an effort to rescue w4at remains of t4e !ractarian edifice after one of its foundationsBnamelC, t4e t4esis of t4e logical independence among elementarC propositionsBis relin&uis4ed)

R) !4ere is, 4owever, an important discontinuitC folded wit4in t4e continuitC indicated above) As is well Inown, Wittgenstein alreadC 4eld in t4e Tractatus t4at ordinarC language, 4owever misleading it maC be, is nevert4eless in Operfect logical orderPB4ence, t4at t4e usefulness of logical analCsis and logicallC perspicuous notation>s? is to bring t4at >alreadC e@isting? order to full lig4t, so as to prevent logical and p4ilosop4ical confusions) And t4e same goes, of course, for p4enomenological language, as Wittgenstein came to t4inI of it) \et, in t4e meantime, an important c4ange occurred in 4is view of t4e relations4ip between logicallC perspicuous notation>s? and ordinarC language) *n t4e Tractatus, as we saw in t4e last c4apter, t4at relation was conceived as, basicallC, 4olding between OmolecularP and OelementarCP propositions) !4ings become muc4 more comple@ in t4e >emarks) For one t4ing, Wittgenstein now distinguis4es two Iinds of Odescriptions of realitCP, namelC6 >i? propositions >properlC so-called?, w4ic4 are t4e descriptions emploCed in w4at 4e dubs t4e OprimarC sCstemPBt4e bearers of trut4 and falsitC, w4ic4 are verified or falsified bC immediate e@perienceBand >ii? 4Cpot4eses, w4ic4 are emploCed in t4e OsecondarC sCstemP, also dubbed Op4CsicsP >corresponding, roug4lC, to t4e ordinarC talI about spatio-temporal ob<ects supplemented bC scientific language? and are not >properlC speaIing? descriptions of states of affairsBw4ic4 would be eit4er true or falseBbut rat4er rules or laws for t4e formation of genuine propositions) !4us, according to t4e view w4ic4 was emerging bC t4e time Wittgenstein proposes t4e distinction above, 4Cpot4eses would relate onlC indirectly to t4e ob<ects of immediate e@perienceBt4erebC 4iding an enormouslC comple@ sCmbolical structure under t4eir >apparentlC? simple signsY now, since 4Cpot4eses, in t4e sense <ust defined, would be t4e means of description c4aracteristicallC emploCed in ordinarC language, t4at fact s4ould account for its Omisleading c4aracterP) GC t4e same toIen, t4e emerging view would also account for t4e need of a logicallC perspicuous notation, free of 4Cpot4eses6 t4e

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NRL >p4enomenological? language w4ic4 would embodC in its verC form >in t4e structure of its signs? all t4e >ot4erwise? 4idden comple@itC of t4e underlCing symbols, t4us mirroring t4e comple@itC of t4e p4enomena represented bC it)

Q) !4at, at least, "as WittgensteinPs >emerging? view about t4e role of p4enomenological language, for a >rat4er s4ort? period of timeBafter 4aving abandoned t4e >now seen as? oversimplified picture of t4e relation between ordinarC descriptions and t4e Oimmediate ob<ects of e@perienceP presented in t4e Tractatus) \et, as we alreadC saw, at some point 4e c4anged 4is mind in an even more radical waC, giving up t4e w4ole idea t4at logicallC perspicuous notations >of any sort? were reallC necessarC for 4is tasI of clarificationBt4us coming to >fullC? acInowledge for t4e first time t4at t4e original !ractarian pro<ect of emploCing a ?egriffsschrift in order to avoid p4ilosop4ical confusions was completelC misguided, and s4ould accordinglC be re<ected) >%ecall t4at Wittgenstein was initially willing to amend t4at pro<ect and pus4 it forward, even in t4e face of t4e c4allenge created bC t4e problem of sCnt4etic incompatibilities)? !4e &uestion now arises6 w4at does Wittgenstein propose to replace for t4at pro<ectW !4e first element for answering t4at &uestion was presented in t4e last sentence of t4e opening section of t4e >emarks &uoted aboveBnamelC, t4at O_a`ll t4at is possible and necessarC is to separate w4at is essential from w4at is inessential in our languageP) Wittgenstein elaborates t4at pointBt4us providing a description of t4e new met4od envisaged after 4is radical c4ange of mindBin t4e ne@t entries of t4at opening section, w4ic4 go as follows6
!4at is, if we so to speaI describe t4e class of languages w4ic4 serve t4eir purpose, t4en in so doing we 4ave s4own w4at is essential to t4em and given an immediate representation of immediate e@perience)

7ac4 time * saC t4at, instead of suc4 and suc4 a representation, Cou could also use t4is ot4er one, we taIe a furt4er step towards t4e goal of grasping t4e essence of w4at is represented)

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NRM

A recognition of w4at is essential and w4at inessential in our language if it is to represent, a recognition of w4ic4 parts of our language are w4eels turning idlC, amounts to t4e construction of a p4enomenological language)1: >"%, cN, p) :N?1E

As we are now in a position to acInowledge, t4e remarIs above e@press WittgensteinPs >reallC? new met4odologCBi)e), t4e one adopted after 4is 4aving finallC abandoned t4e >essentiallC !ractarian? view t4at OlogicallC perspicuous notationsP >including t4e s4ortlived device of a Op4enomenological languageP? were necessary in order to clarifC our propositions) Alva .oj >N11Q? offers an illuminating assessment of t4at met4odological c4ange, w4ic4 gets summari=ed in t4e following passage6
"4ilosop4C must proceed bC careful e@amination and comparison of different met4ods of representation >not onlC of our ordinarC ones?) !4is investigation of notations enables us to give Jan immediate representation of immediate e@perience)K W4ereas before Wittgenstein 4ad believed t4at t4e surface forms of ordinarC language conceal w4at is essential to t4e met4od of representation, and t4at conse&uentlC it is necessarC to construct a notation w4ic4 perspicuouslC mirrors t4e form of e@perience, 4e now casts aside t4is enterprise as misguided) Since our ordinarC language sCmboli=es <ust fine, we need onlC get clear about 4ow it sCmboli=es) !4is, as stated, is accomplis4ed not bC constructing improved notations, nor bC simplC attending to t4e waC we use our ordinarC one) %at4er, t4e correct met4od is t4at of careful comparison of different met4ods of representation) >.oj, N11Q, pp) NM-N1?

1:

1E

!4e original wording of t4e last sentence reads as follows6 O_)))` kommt auf die Konstruction einer phTenomenologischen Sprache hinausPY t4at could well be translated as Ocomes down to t4e same t4ing asP >cf) .oj, N11Q, n) :1?) * will come bacI to t4e importance of t4is point below) Wittgenstein maIes preciselC t4e same point to Waismann and Sc4licI, in (ecember of N1/1) ,ere is t4e relevant passage w4ere t4at point is recorded in WWD6 * used to believe t4at t4ere was t4e everCdaC language t4at we all usuallC spoIe and a primarC language t4at e@pressed w4at we reallC Inew, namelC p4enomena) * also spoIe of a first sCstem and a second sCstem) .ow * wis4 to e@plain w4C * do not ad4ere to t4at conception anC more)

* t4inI t4at essentiallC we 4ave onlC one language, and t4at is our everCdaC language) We need not invent a new language or construct a new sCmbolism, but our everCdaC language alreadC is the language, provided we rid it of t4e obscurities t4at lie 4idden in it)

5ur language is completelC in order, as long as we are clear about w4at it sCmboli=es) Hanguages ot4er t4an t4e ordinarC ones are also valuable in so far as t4eC s4ow us w4at t4eC 4ave in common) For certain purposes, e)g) for representing inferential relations, an artificial sCmbolism is verC useful) *ndeed, in t4e construction of sCmbolic logic Frege, "eano, and %ussell paid attention solelC to its application to mat4ematics and did not t4inI of t4e representation of real states of affairs) >WWD, pp) Q:-QE?

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NR1 Faced wit4 t4at assessment, one mig4t wonder 4ow e@actlC would t4e Iind of comparison indicated in .ojPs last sentenceBt4e consideration of a number of alternative Omet4ods of representationP, w4ic4 >.)G)? s4ould not >anCmore? be conceived as in anC sense improved or better suited to represent p4enomena t4an t4e ordinarC onesBallow us to get clear about t4e content of Oimmediate e@periencePBand t4erebC about t4e essence of w4at is representedW .oj starts answering t4at &uestion claiming t4at suc4 a comparison would compel us to Oe@plore fullC t4e &uestion of w4at it maIes sense to saC about w4atever t4e domain in w4ic4 we are interestedP >ibid), p) /0?) As an illustration of 4ow t4at met4od is supposed to worI, .oj &uotes t4e following passage from t4e >emarks, w4ere Wittgenstein presents 4is notorious >alt4oug4 often misunderstood? proposal of eliminating t4e first person pronoun, O*P, from our Orepresentational tec4ni&uesP6
5ne of t4e most misleading representational tec4ni&ues in our language is t4e use of t4e word O*P, particularlC w4en it is used in representing immediate e@perience, as in O* can see a red patc4P)

*t would be instructive to replace t4is waC of speaIing bC anot4er in w4ic4 immediate e@perience would be represented wit4out using t4e personal pronounY for t4en wePd be able to see t4at t4e previous representation wasnPt essential to t4e facts) .ot t4at t4e representation would be in anC sense more correct t4an t4e old one, but it would serve to s4ow clearlC w4at was logicallC essential in t4e representation) >"%, c:L, p) MM?

* will come bacI to t4e details of t4at specific proposal of representational c4ange >i)e), t4e elimination of t4e O*P? in t4e ne@t c4apter) For t4e time being, let us onlC taIe notice of two general points t4at t4e passage is meant to illustrate6 first, t4at Wittgenstein does in fact offer a different notation, or a new met4od of representation in t4at passage, and one w4ic4 would, indeed, enable us to get clear>er? about w4at is >and w4at isnPt? Oessential to t4e factsP t4us represented, 4ence allowing us to Oe@plore fullC t4e &uestion of w4at it maIes sense to saCP in our o"n, familiar notation >i)e), ordinarC language?Y second, t4at 4e e@plicitlC acInowledges t4at t4e Iind of clarification t4at t4is comparison wit4 a new notation maIes possible is not a result of our being offered a met4od of representation w4ic4 would be Omore correct t4an t4e old onePBsaC, bC better mirroring t4e underlCing structure of p4enomena) !4e moral .oj draws from 4is analCsis of WittgensteinPs c4ange of mind is twofold6 first, t4e main reason w4C a p4enomenological languageBunderstood as t4e result of an

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NQ0 investigation Ointo t4e possibilities of p4enomenaPBseemed >momentarilC? important to 4im was t4at it promised to offer a waC to Odetermine w4at could sensiblC be said, and t4us w4at t4e rules of sCnta@ of t4e ?egriffsschrift s4ould permitP >p) /N?Y Cet >second? at some point 4e came to recogni=e t4at Ot4e p4enomenological investigation <ust is a consideration of w4at it maIes sense to saC about p4enomena, vi=) a grammatical investigation of t4e words used to describe immediate e@perienceP >ibid)?) And t4at recognition, in turn, is w4at >ultimatelC? would e@plain t4e c4ange of mind avowed in t4e opening section of t4e >emarks6
For, clearlC, on t4is picture t4e tasI of constructing a new notation becomes redundant, since w4at is difficult and important is to get clear about w4at it maIes sense to saC in our own familiar language) At first, t4en, t4e view t4at p4enomenologC is grammar seemed to Wittgenstein to provide an elucidation of w4at t4e inspection of t4e p4enomenon reallC amounted to) Gut wit4 c4anges in 4is understanding of t4e nature of grammar, t4is identification leads to 4is re<ection of t4e need to construct a p4enomenological language altoget4er, and, ultimatelC, to t4e re<ection even of t4e possibilitC of suc4 an accomplis4ment) >.oj, N11Q, p) /N?

:) !4ere is, to mC mind, muc4 to agree wit4 in .ojPs assessment) \et * 4ave some &ualms concerning t4e claim about t4e redundancC of Oconstructing a new notationP, given t4at Ow4at is difficult and important is to get clear about w4at it maIes sense to saC in our own familiar languageP) *f taIen at face value, t4at claim is certainlC true enoug4Y 4owever, * t4inI it is misleading, in t4at it seems to carrC t4e implication t4at t4ere was a time in Wittgenstein t4inIing >namelC, before 4is radical c4ange of mind? w4en constructing new notations was not seen as >in some sense? OredundantP, or w4en t4e Odifficult and importantP tasI was not seen as Oto get clear about w4at it maIes sense to saC in our own familiar languageP) *t is somew4at perple@ingBlet me notice at t4e outsetBto find suc4 an implication at t4is point of .ojPs analCsisY after all, 4e was t4e first to emp4asi=e t4at >i? Ot4e logicallC clarified notation of !H" recommends itself not because it 4as e@pressive powers above and beCond ordinarC language, or because it is a better logical order, but onlC because it is less misleading and can serve as a more fait4ful guide to underlCing structureP, and >ii? t4at OWittgenstein was verC clear t4at t4e value of a p4enomenological language was not t4at it enabled us to saC somet4ing, as it were, unsaCable in ordinarC languageP >p) N0?) .ow, donPt >i? and >ii? alone alreadC implC t4at logicallC perspicuous

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NQN notations are redundantBrelative, i)e), to >t4e Oe@pressive powers ofP? ordinarC languageW And Cet, if .oj was not commited to t4at implicationBi)e), to t4e view t4at t4ere was a time w4en Wittgenstein t4oug4t t4at constructing new notations was not redundantBt4en w4at e@actlC would be t4e point of saCing t4at new notations 4ave become redundantB after, i)e), 4is radical c4ange of mindW * taIe it t4at at least part of t4e reason for .ojPs >tacit? commitment to t4at implication lies in 4is incipient attemptsBin t4e te@t under consideration, in anC caseBto get clear about t4e actual use of logical analCsis in t4e Tractatus itselfBparticularlC in 4is neglecting of t4e distinction, discussed at t4e end of t4e previous c4apter, between t4e OpreventiveP and OcurativeP tasIs t4at Wittgenstein devised to be accomplis4ed >bC w4atever ot4er names? bC t4at booI) Gearing t4at distinction in mind, one would saC of bot4 !ractarian >as opposed to, saC, Fregean, %ussellian or %amseCan? ?egriffsschrift and post-!ractarian p4enomenological language, t4at, notwit4standing t4eir s4ortcomings as preventive devicesBbelatedlC acInowledged bC Wittgenstein 4imselfBt4eC were never meant bC 4im as t4e onlC or even t4e primarC means to cure >to solve or to dissolve? already e)isting p4ilosop4ical confusions) !o suppose t4at t4eC were is, at least in part, a conse&uence of embracing t4e >all but unavoidable? view t4at p4ilosop4ical cureB4ence, t4e Iind of clarity soug4t of bC >earlC and late? WittgensteinBcould be accomplis4ed simplC bC laCing down t4e >logico-grammatical? Haw, t4us >dogmaticallC? s4owing to a misguided interlocutor w4at it does >and w4at it doesnPt? OmaIe sense to saCP, i)e), bC pointing out w4ic4 of 4isT4er sentences violate a set of >sCntacticTgrammatical? rules for t4e emploCment of signs1L) .ow if t4at assumption is discardedBas * 4ave been trCing to s4ow it s4ould1MBone will be in a better position to understand w4C, for >earlC and late? Wittgenstein, logicallC perspicuous notations were seen as >intrinsicallC? neit4er more nor
1L

1M

"reciselC t4at assumption can be seen to be at worI in some conte@ts of .ojPs argumentBe)g), w4en 4e illustrates t4e general claim t4at O_a` p4enomenological language _)))` aims to be w4at Wittgenstein calls a JcorrectK representation of p4enomenaP wit4 t4e case of t4e >JcorrectK? representation of colours, and saCs t4at it would amount to Oa notation in w4ic4 onlC w4at is possible is representable and in w4ic4 t4e impossibleBJreddis4-greenK or JblacIis4-blacIKBare ruled out by grammatical rulesP >.oj, N11Q, p) N0, mC emp4asis?) 5ne of t4e tasIs of t4e analCsis of Wittgenstein dialogue wit4 t4e solipsist in t4e preceding c4apter was preciselC to <ustifC t4at general claim wit4 respect to t4e TractatusPs caseY in t4e following sections * s4all attempt an analogous demonstration wit4 respect to t4e >emarks) For t4e time being, it maC be of some 4elp recalling t4e Tractatus!s claim, stated in proposition E):R, t4at t4e "ould9be Ocorrect met4od in p4ilosop4CP, i)e), logical analysis%t4at of Ow4enever someone else wanted to saC somet4ing metap4Csical, to demonstrate 4im t4at 4e 4ad failed to give a meaning to certain signsP %would not be OsatisfCing to t4e ot4er personPY 4ence t4e need for more sop4isticated curative strategies, suc4 as t4e selfsubverting one enacted bC t4e w4ole booI and its process of Ot4rowing awaC t4e ladderP)

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NQ/ less capable of curing p4ilosop4ical confusions t4an >t4e rest ofW? ordinarC language itselfY and t4is is e@actlC t4e sense in w4ic4 one can saC t4at suc4 notations were al"ays seen bC 4im as OredundantPBbC comparison, i)e), wit4 t4e e@pressive powers of ordinarC language) Gut of course t4at does not maIe t4ose notations useless, and, w4at is more important, it does not prevent Wittgenstein of seeing t4em as necessarC for a particular and restricted aimBnamelC, t4e >preventive? tasI of avoiding logical confusions) !o sum up, t4en, mC disagreement wit4 .oj, * taIe it t4at WittgensteinPs avowal of a c4ange of mind 4as to be reassessed, in lig4t of t4e distinction between p4ilosop4ical cure and prevention, so as to maIe clear t4at it 4as more to do wit4 t4e latter, rat4er t4an t4e formerBin ot4er words, t4at w4at c4anged was 4is belief, or rat4er 4is 4ope, in t4e preventive capabilities of 4is >variouslC envisaged? OlogicallC perspicuous notationsP) GC stating, t4en, at t4e opening of t4e >emarks, t4at 4e Odo_es` not now 4ave p4enomenological language _)))` in _4is` mind as _4is` goalP, and t4at 4e Ono longer 4old_s` it to be necessarCP in order to Oseparate w4at is essential from w4at is inessentialP in our >ordinarC? language, Wittgenstein is actuallC acInowledging, probablC for t4e first time, t4at ordinarC language alreadC contains all t4e necessarC means >not onlC to cure but? to prevent Ological misunderstandingsP, and, 4ence, Op4ilosop4ical confusionsPBprovided, i)e), t4at we trC to Orid it of t4e obscurities t4at lie 4idden in itP 11, e)g), bC comparing t4e uses of t4e words and sentences w4ic4 maC be causing confusion wit4 new, invented ones, t4us coming to acInowledge w4en our >familiar? words and sentences become Ow4eels turning idlCPN00)

E) ,aving presented mC &ualms concerning t4at aspect of .ojPs analCsis, let me now turn to anot4er important point made bC 4im, 4aving to do wit4 Cet anot4er c4ange in WittgensteinPs t4inIingBnamelC, wit4 4is understanding of grammar and, in particular, its arbitrariness) As we 4ave seen, Wittgenstein initiallC tried to account for some >grammatical? Jpro4ibitionsK >e)g), t4at of talIing about Oreddis4-greenP? bC means of an investigation >w4ic4 would be Oin a sense a posterioriP? of t4e underlCing structure of t4e
11 N00

Cf) &uotation on n) M1) A met4od w4ic4, as we s4all see in t4e ne@t c4apter, would eventuallC develop into t4e construal of language-games, w4ic4 mig4t t4us be seen as Cet anot4er successor >besides t4e p4enomenological language? of t4e erstw4ile Orichtige ?egriffsschriftP)

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NQR p4enomena t4at one wants to describe, or represent) \et 4e eventuallC relin&uis4ed t4at pro<ect, declaring t4at sentences liIe Ot4ere is no suc4 t4ing as reddis4-greenP are not >properlC so-called? propositions at allBi)e), not true or false descriptions of p4enomenaB but rat4er e@pressions of our norms of representation >i)e), grammatical rules?) Alt4oug4 t4at development gets e@pressed in some passages of t4e >emarks t4emselvesN0N, it is e@plored in greater detail in t4e ?ig TypescriptPs section on grammar) !4e following remarI, e@tracted from t4at section, s4ould be enoug4 to illustrate t4e c4ange under analCsis 4ere6 O#rammar is not indebted to realitC) #rammatical rules first determine meaning >constitute it? and are t4erefore not responsible to anC meaning and are to t4at e@tent arbitrarCP >G! /RR?N0/) W4en analCsing t4is pointBt4e c4ange in WittgensteinPs view of grammar and its arbitrarinessB.oj e@tracts t4e following conclusion6
!4ese considerations about t4e arbitrariness of grammar, about its autonomC, force Wittgenstein to recogni=e t4at t4e &uestion of "hat it makes sense to say about immediate e@perience, vi=) t4e grammatical investigation of t4e language used to describe e@perience, is at best misleadinglC c4aracteri=ed as re&uiring t4e inspection of e@perience, or t4e p4enomenon itself) !4e claim t4at grammar is arbitrarC amounts to t4e recognition t4at, for e@ample, a statement liIe Jt4ere is no suc4 t4ing as reddis4-greenK is not true because in fact t4ere is no suc4 color t4at is a mi@ture of red and green) *ndeed, it is not JtrueK at all, but is rat4er a potentiallC misleading formulation of a rule of grammar, one e@pressing t4at no sense is attac4ed to t4e words Jreddis4-greenK) >.oj, N11Q, p) /Q?

*mportantlC, according to .oj, t4e emergence of t4is new conception of t4e arbitrariness of grammar maIes more apparent Ot4e rationale for _WittgensteinPs` renunciation of t4e pro<ect of constructing a p4enomenological languageP >p) /Q?) .oj presents t4at rationale as follows6
From t4e beginning of N1/1 Wittgenstein 4ad e@plored t4e significance of t4e idea t4at t4e p4enomenological investigation and t4e grammatical investigation were in fact one) Gut t4is led 4im finallC to reali=e t4at t4e appropriate p4ilosop4ical tasI oug4t not be t4at of developing a notation t4at is structurallC isomorp4ic wit4 realitC, but oug4t rat4er to be t4at of understanding w4at it maIes sense to saC about e@perience) Gut since w4at it maIes sense to saC about e@perience is independent of w4at e@perience is liIeBsince anC description of w4at e@perience is liIe begs t4e issue of w4at it maIes sense to saC about e@perienceBt4ere is no need for p4enomenologC, nor for a new p4enomenological notation) >.oj, N11Q, p) /:?

N0N

N0/

.oj calls our attention particularlC to cc :R and ::, w4ic4 4e guesses Owere written towards t4e verC end of N1/1 or at t4e beginning of N1R0P >see p) //, n) L/?) Xuoted on >.oj, N11Q, p) /R?) See also G! /RE for an interesting >and illuminating? comparison wit4 units of measurement)

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NQQ ,aving become convinced t4at, in .ojPs p4rase, Op4enomenological investigation <ust is t4e investigation of a grammatical structureP >ibid)?, Wittgenstein will continue to use t4e word Op4enomenologCP to describe >at least one important aspect of? 4is new p4ilosop4ical met4od) !4at e@plains not onlC w4C 4e titles a section of G! O"4enomenologCP, but also w4C 4e seems absolutelC untroubled to stateBas we saw 4im doing in t4e opening passages of t4e >emarks, soon upon claiming t4at a Op4enomenological languageP was not 4is aim anCmoreBt4at O_a` recognition of w4at is essential and w4at inessential in our language if it is to represent _)))` comes down to t4e same t4ing as t4e construction of a p4enomenological languagePN0R)

L) !4is analCsis s4all enable us to >finallC? understand t4e reason w4C Wittgenstein 4as decided to open t4e te@t of t4e >emarks stating t4at O_a` proposition is completelC logicallC analCsed if its grammar is made completelC clear6 no matter w4at idiom it maC be written or e@pressed inP) Again, a comparison wit4 .ojPs assessment maC 4elp us to better understand t4e import of t4at claim) According to .oj, WittgensteinPs main reason for stressing t4at it is understanding t4e grammar of a proposition t4at is crucial, and not t4e notation in w4ic4 it is e@pressed, is t4at t4is captures 4is Omost important new insig4t, t4e one w4ic4 most s4arplC brings to t4e fore t4e evolution in 4is t4inIingP %namelC6 Ot4at 4is new conception of grammar undermines t4e earlier account of JanalCsis,K and so c4anges radicallC 4is earlier account of p4ilosop4ical activitCP >p) RN?) Gearing in mind mC previous &ualms about w4at e@actlC Wittgenstein 4oped to ac4ieve wit4 4is >earlier or later? met4od of >p4enomeno-?logical analCsis%namelC >primarilC? prevention instead of cure of p4ilosop4ical confusion%* would suggest t4at we &ualifC .ojPs assessment, saCing instead t4at t4e fundamental c4ange in WittgensteinPs t4inIing lies in 4is recognition t4at logicallC perspicuous notations maC be unnecessarC even for prevention%alt4oug4 t4eC remain useful means >among manC ot4ers? for t4at tasI) *n ot4er words, w4ile .oj seems to assume t4at perspicuous notations were >momentarilC? seen bC Wittgenstein as t4e primarC means to indicate to an interlocutor t4at 4is signs do not amount to sCmbolsBt4at 4e failed to maIe sense w4en 4e tried to OsaC somet4ing metap4CsicalPB* would rat4er saC t4at from t4e verC beginning t4at was >onlC? t4e "ould9be Ocorrect met4od in p4ilosop4CP, 4ence, t4at it was preciselC not WittgensteinPs met4od, not t4e waC 4is propositions
N0R

!ranslation amendedBsee n) MM)

"rologue6 analCsis, p4enomenologC, grammarBunderstanding WittgensteinPs c4ange NQ: elucidate >not even in t4e Tractatus?) AccordinglC, per4aps * s4ould saC t4at * do not find WittgensteinPs Jnew met4odK >as e@pressed in t4e opening of t4e >emarks, i)e),? to be as radically distinct from 4is !ractarian approac4 as .ke t4inIs it is) %adical or not, t4at is undoubtedlC an important c4ange, w4ic4 4as manC ramifications in WittgensteinPs t4inIing) 5ne of t4ose ramificationsBw4ic4 .oj 4imself notes in 4is conclusionBis t4e adoption of new Oleading metap4orP for describing p4ilosop4ical activitCBone w4ic4 dispenses wit4 OanC sort of _talI about` digging beneat4 t4e surface and e@cavating, or a breaIing down of t4e sCmbolP >p) RN?, focusing instead on t4e O4ori=ontal planeP of our language) A related c4angeBw4ic4 * mentioned at t4e end of t4e former c4apterBis WittgensteinPs reali=ation t4at t4e origins of p4ilosop4ical confusions are waC more entangled and difficult to unveil t4an 4e initiallC supposedBand, conse&uentlC, t4at t4eir disentanglement would 4ave to be pursued in a muc4 more piecemeal waC, t4us s4attering 4is >initial? 4ig4 4opes of definitivelC curing t4em) !4e analCsis pursued so far s4all also serves as a warning, s4owing w4at awaits anC prospective reader of t4e >emarks%in particular, s4owing 4ow comple@ and difficult can be t4e tasI of trCing to e@tract a clear and final message from a te@t w4ic4 was itself composed along suc4 a constantlC evolving >even radicallC c4anging? process of t4oug4t) And CetBand * t4inI t4is is wort4 noticing in t4is conte@tBto a lesser or greater e@tent, t4at would applC to virtuallC any of WittgensteinPs >post-!ractarian? te@ts) *n t4e analCsis t4at follows * will trC to do mC best in taIing WittgensteinPs remarIs seriouslC, trCing to avoid t4e >all too tempting? tendencC of dropping 4is reflections before letting t4em c4allenge onePs most ingrained p4ilosop4ical assumptions and pre<udicesB4ence, before letting t4em elicit onePs deeper and most liberating responses)

%"# 0+$e world as idea : solipsism and t$e limits of e8perience

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience NQE M) !4e first continuous set of reflections dealing wit4 solipsism in t4e >emarks is grouped under c4apter S >comprising ccQL-:E?N0Q) !4e c4apter opens wit4 t4e following passage6
!4at it doesnPt striIe us at all w4en we looI around us, move about in space, feel our own bodies, etc), etc), s4ows 4ow natural t4ese t4ings are to us) We do not notice t4at we see space perspectivelC or t4at our visual field is in some sense blurred towards t4e edges) *t doesnPt striIe us and never can striIe us because it is the waC we perceive) We never give it a t4oug4t and itPs impossible we s4ould, since t4ere is not4ing t4at contrasts wit4 t4e form of our world)

W4at * wanted to saC is itPs strange t4at t4ose w4o ascribe realitC onlC to t4ings and not to our ideas _Iorstellungen` move about so un&uestioninglC in t4e world as idea _Iorstellungs"elt` and never long to escape from it) >"% cQL, p) M0?

%emarIablC, t4e passage above purports to critici=e t4e attitude of some p4ilosop4ers >call t4em realists? w4o taIe t4e t4ings t4eC >t4inI t4eC? perceive as being >metap4CsicallC? independent from t4e "ay t4eC are perceived, i)e), from facts concerning and conditioning t4e Oform of our worldPBe)g), Ot4at we see space perspectivelCP, and so on)BFaced wit4 t4at initial criticism, s4all one conclude t4at Wittgenstein would be, 4owever implicitlC, willing to support t4e opposite >call it idealist or solipsist? attitudeW *t surelC seems soB after all, 4e >all too e@plicitlC? saCs t4at t4e p4ilosop4er we are calling realist is in fact moving 4imself Oun&uestioninglCP, and against 4is own p4ilosop4ical e@pectations, Oin t4e world as ideaP) ,e also claims, apparentlC in t4e same vein, t4at Ot4ere is nothing t4at contrasts wit4 t4e form of our worldP >mC emp4asis?Ba claim w4ic4 is reinforced furt4er in t4e te@t >still in cQL?, w4en 4e concludes6 O!4at is, w4at we neit4er can nor want to go beCond would not be t4e world)P

N0) Gefore going on wit4 t4e analCsis of cQL, let me notice 4ow close t4e view presented so far would be to >w4at 4as been traditionallC interpreted as? WittgensteinPs earlier commitment to some form of solipsism in t4e Tractatus. As we saw in c4apter /, t4at >supposed? commitment was e@pressed in section :)E of t4at booI, w4ic4 is meant as an elucidation of t4e proposition according to w4ic4 OThe limits of my language mean t4e limits of mC worldPY now t4at proposition, as Cou maC recall, purported to state t4e e@istence of >w4at * 4ave called? an internal relation, or necessarC congruence, between t4e
N0Q

!4e numbering of paragrap4s, along wit4 t4eir grouping under different c4apters, is %us4 %4eesPs editorial decision, not WittgensteinPs)

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience NQL limits of >mC? world and t4e limits of >mC? language, t4erefore implCing t4at anCt4ing JoutsideK or JbeCondK t4ose limits would be simplC nonsense, i)e), not4ing possiblC t4inIable or e@pressible) %ead against t4at bacIdrop, * t4inI one cannot avoid noticing a familC resemblance between t4e verC approac4 taIen in t4e opening passage of >emarks S >in order to introduce WittgensteinPs investigation about t4e nature and limits of e@perience? and t4e TractatusPs approac4 to t4e same topic) Similarities notwit4standing, let us also recall t4at, according to t4e reading pursued in t4e former c4apter, t4is w4ole Jmetap4Csical talIK of an impossibilitC of going beCond t4e limits of onePs world T languageBw4ic4 in t4e Tractatus was said to c4aracteri=e solipsism as well as t4e Opure realismP wit4 w4ic4 t4e former would coincide >see !H" :)EQ?Bwas presented as a rung in a ladder w4ic4 s4ould be >ultimatelC? t4rown awaC)BGut if t4at is true, t4en w4C in t4e world would Wittgenstein want to go bacI, in t4is new conte@t, to t4at Iind of Jmetap4Csical talIKBbC presenting, i)e), >w4at appears to be? a verC substantial t4esis about t4e essence of realitC, or its conditions of representationW Would Wittgenstein 4ave c4anged 4is mind about suc4 an important matterW .eedless to saC, s4ould t4e answer to t4e last &uestion be positive, one would be well advised to ret4inI t4e reading presented in t4e last c4apter) Are t4ere anC alternativesW !4e obvious >initial? candidate would be to taIe suc4 an impossibilitC of going beCond t4e limits of Ot4e world as ideaP as some Iind of rung w4ic4 s4ould be >ultimatelC? t4rown awaC)B\et, 4ow could one possiblC want to defend suc4 a claim in relation to t4e >emarksW !o begin wit4, t4ere seems to be not4ing in t4at worI w4ic4 could possiblC be seen as analogous to t4e TractatusPs concluding, Jself-undoingK instructionsBw4ic4 in turn would prompt one to pursue some sort of self-subverting reading of t4e >main? te@t) Gut t4en it is onlC sensible to Ieep in mind t4at t4e Tractatus is a >carefullC composed? booI, w4ile t4e >emarks are a fragmentarC researc4 report) 8oreover, even concerning t4e reading of t4e Tractatus presented above, t4e main <ustification for t4e idea of a selfsubverting strategC lied not so muc4 in t4ose final instructions alone, but rat4er in a careful analCsis of >a number of sections from? t4e main bodC of t4e te@t itself) .ow of course t4e same Iind of analCsis maCBand in mC view reallC s4ouldBbe applied to t4e >emarksB or, for t4at matter, to anC of WittgensteinPs writings)BGut t4en again, if t4ose >ot4er? writings do not present us wit4 anC >e@plicit? Jself-undoing instructionK, w4at would be t4e motivation for pursuing suc4 an analCsis in t4eir caseW As * will trC to s4ow, t4e motivation

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience NQM comes from t4e verC content of WittgensteinPs claims, provided t4at we engage criticallC wit4 t4em, so as to taIe notice of t4eir own self-subverting c4aracterBt4e fact t4at t4eC actuallC amount to >miniature? dialectical e@ercisesBsmaller laddersBoffering specific directions to pass from >particular pieces of? disguised nonsense to >corresponding pieces of? patent nonsense) Gut in order to see t4at we need to allow ourselves to become >simultaneouslC? tempted bC and suspicious of t4eir >all too evident? Jmetap4Csical toneKBa tone w4ic4, as we s4all see, is particularlC perspicuous in t4ose claims purporting to state w4at can or cannot be t4e case, and, still more particularlC, t4ose purporting to state w4at can or cannot be done in language or thought, t4us leading to t4e view t4at t4ere are some >determinate? t4ings w4ic4 are ineffable or unthinkable)

NN) .ow surelC t4at piece of >e@egetical? advice is easier to state t4an to applC to WittgensteinPs writingsBnot surprisinglC, if * am rig4t in mC general contention about 4is signature strategC of trCing to tempt t4e reader to indulge >4owever momentarilC? in t4e verC Iind of p4ilosop4ical confusion w4ic4 4e wants to dissolve) As a first illustration of t4is strategC at worI, let us go bacI to t4e analCsis of t4e opening passage of c4apter SB w4ose >apparent? result was, * recall, a Iind of solipsistic view according to w4ic4 t4ere is no world, or realitC, outside or beCond t4e limits imposed bC our form of representing it) !4at t4is is onlC an apparent result s4all become evident w4en we start to asI ho" e)actly Wittgenstein would be entitled to so muc4 as state it, given 4is former claim >in t4e same passage? according to w4ic4 it is simplC impossible to Ogive a t4oug4tP to t4e conditioned c4aracter of our e@perienceBsince, i)e), Ot4ere is nothing t4at contrasts wit4 t4e form of our worldP >mC emp4asis?) !4e dialectical situation illustrated in t4at opening passage is in fact verC complicatedY * suppose * would liIe to portrait it as follows6 on t4e one 4and, Wittgenstein seems to be tempting us to assume t4at t4ere is a perspective >call it a Oview from now4ereP? from w4ic4 one mig4t consider, e)g), t4e dispute between t4e realist and t4e idealistTsolipsist, and t4en <udge t4at t4e former is wrong, since s4e is not taIing into account t4e conditioned c4aracter of our e@perienceBi)e), not taIing into account t4e verC fact t4at t4is e@perience is al"ays perspectivalY Cet, as if t4e idea of a perspective from w4ic4 one would conclude t4at all e@perience is perspectival was not pu==ling enoug4, Wittgenstein

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience NQ1 also seems to be tempting us to accept, on t4e ot4er 4and, t4at suc4 a view from now4ere is itself impossibleBa claim w4ic4 now seems to be made from no perspective at all[ Confronted wit4 t4at complicated dialectic, a reader ac&uainted wit4 WittgensteinPs earlier worI would be reminded of anot4er, verC !ractarian device, w4ic4 was apparentlC introduced in order to relieve us from t4e same Iind of difficultC in w4ic4 we seem to be involved nowBnamelC, t4e distinction between saying and sho"ing) ActuallC, Wittgenstein resorts to a verC similar distinction in a number of different conte@ts t4roug4out t4e >emarks) 5ne suc4 conte@t is c4apter S itself, in c:Q ><ust a few pages below t4e ones we 4ave been analCsing?) !4ere we read, for e@ample, t4at OW4at belongs to t4e essence of t4e world cannot be e@pressed bC languageP, and t4at OHanguage can onlC saC t4ose t4ings t4at we can also imagine ot4erwiseP >"%, p) MQ, c:Q?) A bit furt4er >still in t4e same paragrap4?, Wittgenstein repeats t4at Ow4at belongs to t4e essence of t4e world simplC cannot be saidPY to t4is, 4e adds t4e following, more positive consideration6
And p4ilosop4C, if it were to saC anCt4ing, would 4ave to describe t4e essence of t4e world)

Gut t4e essence of language is a picture of t4e essence of t4e worldY and p4ilosop4C as custodian of grammar can in fact grasp t4e essence of t4e world, onlC not in t4e propositions of language, but in rules for t4is language w4ic4 e@clude nonsensical combinations of signs) >"%, p) M:, c:Q?

.otice 4ow smoot4 is t4e transition from t4e older, !ractarian viewBaccording to w4ic4 t4e essence of t4e world is indeed ineffable, but would nonet4eless be Omade manifestP bC logicTp4ilosop4CBto t4e newer oneBaccording to w4ic4 p4ilosop4C could OgraspP t4e >e&uallC ineffable? essence of t4e world bC presenting grammatical rules, t4us enabling one >t4e p4ilosop4er, saC? to Oe@clude nonsensical combinations of signsPB<ust liIe t4e presentation of t4e Ogeneral form of propositionP would, according to t4e TractatusPs official pro<ect) *s Wittgenstein, t4en, resuming t4e !ractarian view t4at a line can be drawn separating sense from nonsenseBt4us enabling one to tell w4at can or cannot be said, and, conse&uentlC, w4at can or cannot be t4e case in t4e world, i)e), t4e totality of possible facts, t4e verC form of t4e worldW 5r are we >rat4er unself-consciouslC? pro<ecting our own p4ilosop4ical pre<udices to t4e te@t, prompted bC WittgensteinPs >verC selfconscious? use of Jmetap4Csical languageKW >And do we reallC need to be reminded of t4is parallel wit4 t4e metap4Csical storC >in t4e meantime? told in t4e Tractatus in order to

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience N:0 become suspicious about claims suc4 as t4ose, purporting to e@press, or at least to OmaIe manifestP, t4e Olimits of sensePW?

N/) *n t4e following passage, w4ic4 comes from a later conte@t of t4e >emarks, Wittgenstein 4imself seems to support t4e latter, more self-&uestioning view about t4e possibilitC of telling sense from nonsense6
*f someone said6 SerC well, 4ow do Cou Inow t4at t4e w4ole of realitC can be represented bC propositionsW, t4e replC is6 * onlC Inow t4at it can be represented bC propositions in so far as it can be represented bC propositions, and to draw a line between a part w4ic4 can and a part w4ic4 canPt be so represented is somet4ing * canPt do in language) Hanguage means t4e totalitC of propositions) >"% cM:, p) NNR?

(oes t4e categorical denial presented in t4e passage above allow us to settle our previous issueBabout t4e verC possibilitC of trCing to tell t4e representable from t4e nonrepresentable, 4ence t4e t4inIable from t4e unt4inIable, sense from nonsenseWB* donPt t4inI so) As * said above, * t4inI we s4ouldnPt accept so easilC and uncriticallC any of WittgensteinPs >maCbe a little too overtlC? categoricalBone mig4t saC6 dogmaticBdenials of logico-metap4Csical possibilities) Concerning t4e particular passage under analCsis, t4e reason is not, .)G), t4at t4e opposite claimBt4e affirmation of t4e possibilitC under investigationBwould be more plausible t4an its denialY t4e problem is, rat4er, t4at none of t4e alternative claims would 4ave a clear senseBor would t4eCW *n order to answer t4at &uestion, asI Courself e@actlC "hat possibilitC would Wittgenstein be e)cluding bC >categoricallC? denCing t4at we can Odraw a lineP between w4at is and w4at is not representable Oin languagePW (oes t4at denial implC t4at t4ere is >a determinate, particular, specifiable? Jsomet4ingK t4at we cannot doBor talI or t4inI aboutW ,ow could we >possiblC? give a determinate sense to suc4 an ineffable and unt4inIable JpossibilitCKW And if we cannot, t4en w4at e@actlC are we saCing, or t4inIing, w4en we read a JsentenceK >a string of signs? liIe t4e one emploCed in t4e passage above bC WittgensteinBnamelC6 Oto draw a line between a part w4ic4 can and a part w4ic4 canPt be so represented is somet4ing * canPt do in languagePW GC suggesting t4at we trC to answer t4e &uestions above, * am not implCing t4at we simplC can!t give anC sense to eit4er of t4e alternative JclaimsKBon t4e contrarC, * am trCing to

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience N:N &uestion preciselC t4at Iind of p4ilosop4ical move, t4at Iind of a priori, categorical denial of linguistic possibilities) W4at * am implCing is, rat4er, t4at we s4ould not taIe so &uicIlC somet4ing t4at appears to be a >determinate? proposition >i)e), somet4ing w4ic4 4as t4e form of one, in t4at it is composed of familiar words, in a familiarBi)e), grammaticallC or sCntacticallC correctBorder? as in fact being so) !4e reason w4C we tend to adopt t4at uncritical attitude was presented in t4e last c4apter, w4en we analCsed >w4at 8c8anus dubbed? t4e OmCt4 of t4e independent life of signsPBa mCt4 w4ic4, as we saw in t4at conte@t, Wittgenstein was alreadC trCing to unveil >and undo? in t4e Tractatus, not e@actlC bC means of refuting it, but rat4er bC allowing us to become aware of its influence in generating p4ilosop4ical confusion) !4e JsolutionK w4ic4 was t4ere presentedBt4e cure for t4at p4ilosop4ical temptationBinvolved, besides our becoming aware of t4e power of t4at mCt4, t4e active effort to turn our attention awaC from t4e mere form of JpropositionsK emploCed in suc4 >p4ilosop4ical? conte@ts, and bacI to t4e roug4 ground of our linguistic practices, w4ere words are emploCed for determinate >and determinatelC specifiable? purposes) SimilarlC, * submit, in conte@ts liIe t4e one provided bC t4e passage aboveBconte@ts, i)e), w4ere Wittgenstein tries to give voice to some p4ilosop4ical Jt4esesK or JproblemsK, so as to maIe t4eir apparentlC incompatible demands perspicuous to t4e attentive readerB4e is again trCing to ac4ieve t4at t4erapeutic end of allowing one to use onePs own linguistic e@pertise in order to unveil t4e >ultimate? emptiness, pointlessness, or utter confusion be4ind t4e formulation of suc4 Jt4esesK and JproblemsK) Gut in order for t4at aim to be properlC ac4ievedBso as to reallC prevent one from falling bacI into a particular confusionBWittgenstein first needs to tempt 4is reader to accept t4ose >all too convenient? categorical JanswersK to some >all too neatlC formulated? p4ilosop4ical JproblemsKY bC doing soBi)e), bC self-consciouslC emploCing JpropositionsK wit4out >as Cet? anC clear sense, and 4aving us bite suc4 p4ilosop4ical baitsB4e is ultimatelC trCing to maIe us aware >and suspicious? of our own eagerness to accept suc4 categorical, Jmetap4CsicalK talI of >im?possibilities) At t4is point, one maC find oneself wondering6 but ho" far s4all we go wit4 t4is self-aware >even self-suspicious? attitude in relation to >our reactions to? WittgensteinPs writingsW ,ow would we Inow w4en to stop t4e >t4erapeutic? process, taIing a particular result as final, as not furt4er &uestionableW W4ere e@actlC is t4e limit separating Jmetap4CsicalK

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience N:/ >mis?uses of language from ordinarC onesWBAs it 4appens wit4 manC &uestions raised bC t4e reading of WittgensteinPs writings, * t4inI t4e answers can onlC be found in >eac4 particular enactment of? t4e t4erapeutic process itselfBnot surprisinglC, given t4at >according to t4e reading * am pursuing? t4e ultimate aim of t4e w4ole self-subverting process is preciselC to allow a reader to find 4er own waC aroundB4ence 4er own resolution ofB4er own p4ilosop4ical confusions, as t4eC come to be mirrored bC WittgensteinPs writings) 5f course t4is puts a 4eavC burden upon t4e readerBw4o must, in a waC, simultaneouslC undertaIe t4e roles of analCst and analCsandY Cet * t4inI Wittgenstein was indeed suc4 a demanding aut4orY also, it goes wit4out saCing, not all of us >including some of 4is most committed advocates? are prepared to accept t4ose demands)

NR) "art of t4e lesson t4at * want to e@tract from t4e preceding considerations is t4at, instead of going around trCing to find te@tual evidence of WittgensteinPs Jfinal wordK on anC particular sub<ectBincluding t4e possibilitC of drawing a line between sense and nonsense, or t4e verC nature of p4ilosop4C and its grammatical investigationBone is better advised to go onePs own waCBencountering onePs own resolutionBworIing on particular passages) Wit4 t4at aim in mind, * would liIe to go bacI and worI on t4e remainder of cQL, w4ic4 closes as follows6
!ime and again t4e attempt is made to use language to limit t4e world and set it in reliefBbut it canPt be done) !4e self-evidence of t4e world e@presses itself in t4e verC fact t4at language can and does onlC refer to it)

For since language onlC derives t4e waC in w4ic4 it means from its meaning, from t4e world, no language is conceivable w4ic4 does not represent t4is world) >"% cQL, p) M0?

W4at is t4at te@t statingW Again, a verC natural and straig4tforward answer would be6 a Iind of >logico-metap4Csical? impossibilitCBt4at of limiting t4e world t4roug4 language) Gut let us stop for a moment in order to reflect about "hat e)actly t4is impossibilitC would amount to) * t4inI at least two possible, competing, and e&uallC plausible interpretations are availableBcorresponding to two verC different starting points from w4ic4 t4is first, JnaturalK reading could be pursued, depending on t4e readerPs p4ilosop4ical frame of

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience N:R mind) 5n t4e one 4andBfor a committed realist, saCBt4e message would be t4at since Olanguage can and does onlC refer to _t4e world`P >and so on?, t4en t4e world must be seen as more fundamental than our linguistic means of representing it >in t4e sense t4at t4e former would surpass, be independent from, even indifferent to, t4e latter?) According to anot4er p4ilosop4ical frame of mindBt4at of a linguistic idealist, or even a solipsistBt4e message would be rat4er different, vi7., t4at since Olanguage can and does onlC refer to _t4e world`P >and so on?, t4en t4ere must be an internal relation between language and world, and, conse&uentlC, t4e verC idea of a world Joutside ofK, or JbeCondK our linguistic means of representing it would be simplC nonsensical, 4ence unt4inIableBe@actlC t4e same message t4at was >apparentlC? stated in t4e opening remarIs of cQL) Confronted wit4 t4ose two competing >and apparentlC incompatible? interpretations, w4at are we supposed to doW S4all we c4oose one of t4emBpresumablC on t4e grounds t4at it would be t4e one intended bC Wittgenstein 4imselfW Gut 4ow could we be sure about thatW B5ne possible strategC would be to trC and collect a number of te@ts dealing wit4 t4e same or related issues, in order to see w4ic4 interpretation >t4e realist or t4e idealistTsolipsist? would better fit t4e w4ole set) ,owever, as * said above, * t4inI suc4 an strategC would be 4opelesslC flawedBas is in fact attested bC t4e e@istence of an unending dispute, about virtuallC any piece of writing bC Wittgenstein, w4et4er it is to be taIen as an instance of >some sort of? JrealismK or Janti-realismKBas it is preciselC t4e ambivalence >or maCbe polCvalence? of claims liIe t4e ones above w4ic4 is of interest, given t4e >t4erapeutic? aims of t4e w4ole enterprise) GC t4us allowing both >or, more generallC, anC number of? interpretations to be >e&uallC? defensible, WittgensteinPs te@t would resonate wit4 severallC-minded readersBeliciting different reactions according to t4eir own p4ilosop4ical pre<udices or inclinationsN0:) Het me trC to elucidate t4ose met4odological claims bC sIetc4ing anot4er parallel wit4 t4e met4od emploCed in t4e Tractatus) First of all, notice 4ow t4e possibilitC of a double interpretation of t4e passage above 4arIs bacI to t4e >muc4 more e@plicit and direct?
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5ne could 4ere be reminded of DantPs treatment of t4e Antinomies, and surelC t4ere is at least a familC resemblanceBwit4 t4e important difference t4at, as * 4ave been arguing, in WittgensteinPs case t4ere is no privileged theoretical point of view >saC, O!ranscendental *dealismP? from w4ic4 t4e dispute would be settled, or else s4own to be 4opelessY rat4er, t4e onlC resource available to deal wit4 cases liIe t4ese is our practical masterC of ordinarC language, and t4e onlC and ultimate aim of t4e process envisaged bC Wittgenstein in presenting t4ose JantinomicK claims is preciselC to allow us to recover t4at >momentarilC lost, repressed, or forgotten? masterC, i)e), to recover an awareness of 4ow our words are used in concrete conte@ts, so as to overcome our own p4ilosop4ical confusions)

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience N:Q message conveCed in t4at earlier worI, about t4ere being a sense in w4ic4 realism and solipsism OcoincidePBin t4at, i)e), bot4 can be made co4erent wit4 t4e >more fundamental? metap4Csical assumption of an impossibilitC of telling world and language apart) .ow, as we saw in c4apter /, it was preciselC t4at s4ared assumption w4ic4 Wittgenstein was >ultimatelC? trCing to undermine t4roug4 t4e self-subverting process enacted in t4e Tractatus. *n order to free 4is reader from suc4 an assumptionBand, conse&uentlC, from t4e confusions afflicting bot4 JrealistsK and JsolipsistsKBt4e reader was initiallC tempted to accept t4e t4esis >repeatedlC e@pressed, in different formulations, in !H" :)Eff? t4at world and language are JinternallC relatedK, as well as to follow its >apparent? logical conse&uences, until t4e latent nonsense of t4at initial Jt4esisK >i)e), its emptiness or pointlessness? was made patent) .ow, t4e verC fact t4at we can so easilC be tempted to pro<ect our own p4ilosop4ical pre<udices into t4e te@t of t4e >emarks >as illustrated above? is, to mC mind, an important inde@ t4at somet4ing analogous to t4e self-subverting >t4erapeutic? process enacted in t4e Tractatus is also at plaC in t4e later worI)

NQ) *n t4e ne@t sections, * s4all trC to >furt4er? illustrate t4is process bC analCsing anot4er set of crucial remarIs concerning solipsism and related issues) Gut before closing t4e present one, * would liIe to offer anot4er preliminarC illustrationBone w4ic4, 4opefullC, will serve at least two additional purposes6 first, to t4row some lig4t on WittgensteinPs general, met4odological claim about t4e nature of p4ilosop4C as t4e Ocustodian of grammarP >see above, cNN?Y second, to give furt4er support to mC contention t4at Wittgenstein s4ould not be understood as being prone to eit4er JrealismK or Janti-realismK) !4e illustration * 4ave in mind comes from a later conte@t of t4e >emarks%namelC, c/NE %w4ere Wittgenstein purports to critici=e t4e use of a particular p4rase6 Osense-datumP) OA sense-datumP, 4e e@plains and illustrates, Ois t4e appearance of t4is tree, w4et4er Jt4ere reallC is a tree standing t4ereK or a dummC, a mirror image, an 4allucination, etc)P >"%, c/NE, p) /L0?) So far, not4ing to worrC aboutBafter all, one is surelC allowed to define and emploC a >tec4nical? p4rase in t4e waC one wants, provided t4at it fulfils anC >number of? practical function>s?Be)g), enable us to see more clearlC a conceptual distinction, etc) Gut confusion arises w4en oneBe)g), a p4ilosop4erBforgets 4er initial, determinate >t4eoretical? purpose in introducing a new description, and assumes t4at it is somew4at

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience N:: more ade&uateBeven OessentialP >see ibid)?Bfor representing realitC) *n sum, t4ere is, according to Wittgenstein, not4ing >in4erentlC? problematic about a p4rase liIe OA sensedatum is t4e appearance of t4e treeP, 4owever, 4e continues, Ow4at we want to saC is t4at its representation in language is onlC one description, but not the essential one) 2ust as Cou can saC of t4e e@pression Jmy visual imageK t4at it is onlC one form of description, but bC no means t4e onlC possible and correct oneP >ibid)?N0E) At t4is point one maC wonder w4at e@actlC would be t4e reasons leading one to privilege some forms of description over t4e alternativesBto assume t4at some notations are intrinsicallC more fait4ful to t4e realitC t4eC purport to represent) Wittgenstein does not spill muc4 inI in t4e >emarks trCing to identifC t4e possible causes of t4is Iind of attitudeN0L) 5n a rare occasion 4e risIs a general statement about t4e issue, resulting in t4e >rat4er obscure? claim t4at O_i`n p4ilosop4C we are alwaCs in danger of giving a mCt4ologC of t4e sCmbolism _)))`6 instead of simplC saCing w4at everCone Inows and must admitP >c/Q, p) E:?) .ow, instead of trCing to clarifC t4at general, met4odological claim in some >e&uallC? general and abstract waC, * t4inI we are better advised to approac4 t4e &uestion above bC maIing it internal, so to speaI, to our reading of particular cases w4ere suc4 JmCt4ologiesK are s4own to be at worIN0M) So, let us go bacI to t4e analCsis of t4e remainder of c/NE, w4ere Wittgenstein reacts to t4e attitude of some p4ilosop4ers >t4e OidealistsP? w4o would be inclined to give one suc4 JmCt4ologCK, bC privileging >taIing as essential? t4e emploCment of t4e e@pression Osense-dataP >and related ones?6
*dealists would liIe to reproac4 language wit4 presenting w4at is secondarC as primarC and w4at is primarC as secondarC) Gut t4at is onlC t4e case wit4 t4ese inessential valuations w4ic4 are independent of cognition >JonlCK an appearance?) Apart from t4at, ordinarC language maIes no decision as to w4at is primarC or secondarC) We 4ave no reason to accept t4at t4e e@pression Ot4e appearance of a treeP represents somet4ing w4ic4 is secondarC in relation to t4e e@pression OtreeP) >"% c/NE, p) /LN?
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N0L

N0M

.otice 4ow t4is claim ec4oes WittgensteinPs met4odological remarIs, analCsed in t4e "rologue to t4e present c4apter, to t4e effect t4at one s4ould not taIe alternative OnotationsP or Omet4ods of representationP as being eit4er more or less OcorrectP t4an our everCdaC descriptions of realitC) An important c4ange in t4e development of 4is reflections is t4at muc4 more attention will be given to t4is issue afterwardsBstarting wit4 t4e reflections recorded some Cears later in t4e ?lue ?ook, as we s4all see in t4e ne@t c4apter) *nterestinglC, t4e OmCt4ologCP Wittgenstein 4imself presents in t4e conte@t of t4at general claim 4as to do wit4 a c4ess game6 OW4at if someone plaCed c4ess and, w4en 4e was mated, said, JHooI, *Pve won, for that is t4e goal * was aiming atKW We would saC t4at suc4 a man simplC wasnPt trCing to plaC c4ess, but anot4er gameP >"%, c/Q, p) E:?) From t4e analCsis of t4is simple illustration one can conclude t4at Ogiving a mCt4ologCP is, at least in part, a function of forgeting, or repressing, or ot4erwise deviating from t4e familiar practices involving t4e use of a word T sentence T piece in a game)

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience N:E *n case Cou are wondering w4ere e@actlC we would find an e@ample of an OidealistP willing to Oreproac4 language wit4 presenting w4at is secondarC as primarC and w4at is primarC as secondarCP, notice t4at we donPt need to looI verC farY after all, wasnPt suc4 a Oreproac4P alreadC enacted in cQL, w4ere Wittgenstein 4imself >W? purported to critici=e t4ose w4o Oascribe realitC onlC to t4ings and not to our ideasPWBGut t4enBif, t4at is, Wittgenstein himself >W? is now critici=ing 4is own previous criticismBisnPt 4e contradicting 4imself at t4is pointWBWell, Ces and noY 4e surelC is contradicting a JpositionK w4ic4 was illustrated before in >and bC? 4is te@tY Cet, as * 4ave been arguing, t4at JpositionK was notBnot reallC, not e@actlCBbeing defended in t4at earlier conte@tBrat4er, it was being presented >one mig4t saC6 being given voiceBbut bC w4omW WittgensteinW 5urselvesW? in order to tempt us to >momentarilC? accept it, to follow its >apparent? conse&uences, and >ultimatelC? become aware of its emptiness, or confusionBseeing it as a mec4anism consisting of >at least some? Ow4eels turning idlCPBand, t4erefore, Oovercoming itP and Ot4rowing it awaCP) !4is, * repeat, is a verC comple@ dialectical situation, and one w4ic4 puts a 4eavC burden upon WittgensteinPs readersY and Cet, it seems an absolutelC pervasive, structural feature of 4is remarIs >w4at doesnPt mean, of course, t4at it is alwaCs visible from t4e mere inspection of t4eir surface, re&uiring t4at one paCs attention to t4e JcluesK gat4ered bC a closer surveC?) For t4e moment, t4e implication, or moral, * would liIe to e@tract bC calling attention to t4is dialectic is t4at one s4ould not t4inI of t4e Jc4aractersK being given voice in t4ese and ot4er remarIsBincluding Ot4e idealistP of c/NE and Ot4e realistP of cQLBso muc4 as Jot4ersK, but rat4er as, saC, so manC facets of oneself >of one!s self?, or, maCbe more aptlC, as ec4oes of onePs own >innerBper4aps even repressed? p4ilosop4ical voices, w4ic4 are unleas4ed >per4aps for t4e first timeBor at least for t4e first time wit4 t4is level of articulation? bC WittgensteinPs own use of carefullC crafted, tempting >metap4Csical? claims >suc4 as, e)g), t4ose presented in t4e opening passage of c4apter S?N01) Gearing t4at >met4odological and e@egetical? lesson in mind, let us see if we are in a better position to understand w4at e@actlC would be t4e problem of adopting t4e OidealistPsP >reproac4ing? attitude toward >ordinarC? language) *n order to start dealing wit4 t4is issue,
N01

G! cML is composed of a set of verC interesting and clarifCing >self-?descriptions of t4e p4ilosop4ical tasI, all of t4em >* would submit? capable of offering furt4er support to mC own description) Het me 4ig4lig4t a couple of passages w4ic4 maC illustrate t4e point >* &uote from t4e translation publis4ed in "5, p) NE:?6 O!4e p4ilosop4er tries to find t4e liberating word, t4at is, t4e word t4at finallC permits us to grasp w4at up until now 4as intangiblC weig4ed down our consciousnessPY O5ne of t4e most important tasIs is to e@press all false trains of t4oug4t so c4aracteristicallC t4at t4e reader saCs, J\es, t4atPs e@actlC t4e waC * meant it)K !o trace t4e p4CsiognomC of everC error)PY OFor onlC if 4e acInowledges it as suc4, it is t4e correct e@pression) >"sCc4oanalCsis?)P

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience N:L let us first trC to get clear about t4e contrasting case presented in t4e passage aboveB namelC, t4at of t4e Oinessential valuations w4ic4 are independent of cognitionP, w4ic4, according to Wittgenstein, is t4e >onlCW? use of language correctlC described as presenting Ow4at is secondarC as primarC and w4at is primarC as secondarCP) *n order to facilitate t4e analCsis, let us first taIe note of t4e #erman wording of t4at description, w4ic4 reads6 O_)))` diesen un"esentlichen, und mit der Erkenntnis nicht 7usammenhTngenden Wertungen der 6allP) W4at would be t4e reference of t4e description at 4andW !4e onlC 4int Wittgenstein gives us in t4is passage is >w4at appears to be meant as? an instance6 OJonlCK an appearance _UnurV die Erscheinung`PY Cet, t4at doesnPt get us verC far) *n fact, not4ing in t4e conte@t surrounding t4is passage in t4e >emarks does) * taIe it t4at t4e difficultC 4ere 4as editorial causesB* mean, is caused bC WittgensteinPs arrangement of 4is reflections to produce t4e >emarksY so muc4 so, t4at some Cears later, w4en 4e once again tooI up t4ose reflections for >re?arrangement, t4e result is muc4 clearer) !4at result is recorded in cN0N of The ?ig Typescript, titled O!4e %epresentation of w4at is *mmediatelC "erceivedP) As its verC title indicates, t4is section deals wit4 e@actlC t4e same issue w4ic4 is central to c/NE of t4e >emarksY in fact, t4at section >i)e), "% c/NE? is fullC reproduced in G! cN0N, onlC in t4e later conte@t it is prefi@ed bC a couple of reflections w4ic4 were apparentlC suppressed in its first iteration) Among t4ose reflections, we read t4at Ot4e words JseemK _scheinen`, JerrorK, etc), 4ave a certain emotional emp4asis t4at isnPt essential _nicht "esentlicht ist` to p4enomena) !4is emp4asis is some4ow connected to t4e will, and not merelC to Inowledge _nicht bloss mit der Erkenntnis 7usammen`P >G!, cN0N, p) RQL?) As an illustration of suc4 >cognitivelC? OinessentialP, OemotionalP emp4ases, w4ic4 would be embedded in our >p4ilosop4ical? assessments of realitC, Wittgenstein offers t4e following6 OWe saC JWe can only remember somet4ingK) As if, in some primarC sense, memorC were a rat4er weaI and uncertain image of w4at was originallC before us wit4 complete claritCP >ibid?) Attention to t4e #erman te@t s4ows >more? conspicuouslC 4ow t4e passage closing "% c/NE comfortablC fits in t4e wider conte@t provided bC G! cN0N) %ead against t4at bacIdrop, t4e te@t of "% c/NE seems to be implCing not onlC t4at it would be rig4t to describe some particular uses of languageBi)e), t4ose e@pressing Oinessential valuations w4ic4 are independent of cognitionP, and 4aving more to do wit4 t4e will >e)g), t4at Owe can only remember somet4ingP, and so on?Bas presenting Ow4at is secondarC as primarC

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience N:M and w4at is primarC as secondarCPY it also implies t4at there is no problem in maIing suc4 a Odecision as to w4at is primarC or secondarCP in t4ose particular cases) >,ence, to sticI to t4e e@ample of c/NEBt4at of Ot4e appearance of a treePBt4ere would be no problem at all involved in t4e decision to emploC, for a number of >non-cognitive? reasons >i)e), t4ose 4aving to do wit4 t4e "ill? a p4rase suc4 as Ot4is t4ree is only an appearancePY per4aps one feels liIe saCing it to oneself, sotto voce, reacting to a >pitifullC? ama=ed reaction from an >inveterate citC-dweller? friend, w4en faced wit4 some particular >real? t4ree, placed all too JnaturallCK among ot4ers in an >artificial? JforestK inside a big s4opping centre)? \etBand t4is is t4e important point for w4ic4 t4e cases analCsed t4us far serve as a counterpointB t4at is preciselC not t4e sort of reason t4at we would e@pect an OidealistP to 4ave in mind w4en maIing a Odecision as to w4at is primarC or secondarCP, and, conse&uentlC, w4en Oreproac4ingP >ordinarC? language for maIing t4e wrongBindeed invertedBdecision about t4at) !4e ups4ot of t4ese considerations is t4at t4e main problem involved in Ot4e idealistPsP position lies not so muc4 in 4er JrevisionarCK proposal >t4e proposal, i)e), to replace one notation for anot4er, inverting t4e order of w4at is to be considered primarCTsecondarC?, but rat4er in a misleading self-interpretation of t4at proposal, as if t4e mere use of a new notation would enable one to taIe noteB4ence, to saCBsomet4ing JessentialK about Jt4e nature of realitCKBsomet4ing, i)e), w4ic4 would be 4idden >or even reversed? in our familiar forms of description) !o repeat6 as far as it fulfils anC practical goal, a new Oform of descriptionP would be as good or acceptable as anC ot4er) So, in sum, bC asserting t4at OordinarC language maIes no decision as to w4at is primarC or secondarCP, Wittgenstein is calling our attention to t4e fact t4at >as one mig4t put it? our language is JontologicallC neutralKNN0, 4ence, t4at it does not privilege eit4er OrealismP or OidealismP, as far as t4ose e@pressions are supposed to name two >competing? metap4Csical stances towards t4e Oessence of t4e worldP) As Wittgenstein 4imself asserts bacI in c4apter S6 O_f`rom t4e verC outset J%ealismK, J*dealismK, etc), are names w4ic4 belong to metap4Csics) !4at is, t4eC indicate t4at t4eir ad4erents believe t4eC can saC somet4ing specific about t4e essence of t4e worldP >"%, c::, p) ME?) \et, not4ing of OspecificP is reallC said bC means of t4eir
NN0

From t4e fact t4at our >ordinarC? language is JontologicallC neutralK and OmaIes no decision as to w4at is primarC or secondarCP, it does not follow >as * 4ope t4e preceding paragrap4 maIes clear? t4at "e >language users? are >or have to be? JneutralK in t4at senseBon t4e contrarC, we maIe t4at sort of decisions all t4e time, and luciditC lies not in relin&uis4ing all suc4 decisions, but in Inowing t4at "e are indeed making t4em, and for "hat purposes)

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience N:1 >revisionarC? Jt4esesKBlet alone somet4ing specific about Ot4e essence of t4e worldPBas we are in a position to acInowledge as soon as we uncover "hat t4e utterer of t4ose Jt4esesK maC possiblC mean bC uttering t4em, w4at purposes s4e would be trCing to fulfil)

N:) .ow let us compare, or confront, t4e results of t4is analCsis wit4 t4e general, met4odological claims made in c:Q >see above, cNN?BnamelC, t4at Ow4at belongs to t4e essence of t4e world simplC cannot be saidP, Cet could be OgraspedP >bC p4ilosop4C? Onot in t4e propositions of language, but in rules for t4is language w4ic4 e@clude nonsensical combinations of signs)P .otice, first, t4at in t4e passages analCsed above, Wittgenstein is open to be readBi)e), 4as >on purpose? not armed 4imself against being readBas arguing t4at some particular Ocombinations of signsPBvi7., t4ose sentences emploCed bC p4ilosop4ers in general, and bC OrealistsP and OidealistsP in particular >involving notions suc4 as t4ose of Osense-datumP, Ovisual imageP, OappearanceP?Bmay in fact be e@cluded as, in some particular conte@ts, OnonsensicalP >i)e), as pointless or emptC?) Gut t4e reason 4e offers is notBas a de-conte@tualised reading of t4e met4odological remarIs above would implCBt4at t4ose combinations are >so to speaI? intrinsically nonsensicalBas if t4eC were trCing to e@press somet4ing t4at is simplC ineffable, i)e), somet4ing outside or beCond t4e limits of language and sense) %at4er, t4e reason to Je@cludeK t4ose signs is, simplC, t4e reali=ation t4at w4en t4eC are emploCed in some particular >p4ilosop4ical? conte@tsBliIe t4e ones depicted in, or rat4er prepared bC, WittgensteinPs te@t, w4ic4 are >re?enacted eac4 time a reader gets seriouslC engaged wit4 t4eir dialecticBt4eC can be s4own to be at best Ow4eels turning idlCP, and, at worst, as resulting from p4ilosop4ical >i)e), logical or grammatical? confusion >t4at, e)g), of privileging a form of description as if it were saCing Osomet4ing specific about t4e essence of t4e worldP?) !4e general lesson * 4ope to e@tract from t4e analCsis of t4is concrete application of t4e met4od of Ogrammatical investigationP in t4e >emarks is t4at we s4ould be careful not to read too muc4 into t4e idea of p4ilosop4C as t4e Ocustodian of grammarP, i)e), as an activitC w4ic4 would enable us to Ograsp t4e essence of t4e worldP as reflected in t4e Orules for e@cluding nonsensical combinations of signsPNNN) !o depict p4ilosop4C as being capable of some Iind of Je@traordinarC featK >vi7., circumscribing t4e limits of sense, be it bC means
NNN

A claim w4ic4, .)G), will still be ec4oed in t4e Philosophical Investigations >see cRLN?)

O!4e world as ideaP6 solipsism and t4e limits of e@perience NE0 of logical, p4enomenological or grammatical investigation? is Cet anot4er sCmptomB maCbe t4e ultimate sCmptomBt4at one 4as become victim of t4e Iind of temptation against w4ic4 Wittgenstein 4as been trCing to guard us at least since t4e TractatusB namelC, t4at of evading our 4uman, finite >and t4us conditioned? condition) !4e implication, t4en, is t4at we s4ould be particularlC careful to read t4ose >all too overtlC dogmatic? <udgements about t4e nonsensicalitC of Jt4e p4ilosop4erPsK >metap4Csical? claims) *n fact, WittgensteinPs te@t itself sometimes becomes overtlC >self-?critical about suc4 <udgements, suggesting a more balanced viewY t4is clearlC applies to some of t4e opening remarIs of t4e booI >see esp) cE-1?, of w4ic4 t4e following offers us a good illustration6
AsIed w4et4er p4ilosop4ers 4ave 4it4erto spoIen nonsense, Cou could replC6 no, t4eC 4ave onlC failed to notice t4at t4eC are using a word in &uite different senses) *n t4is sense, if we saC itPs nonsense to saC t4at one t4ing is as identical as anot4er, t4is needs &ualification, since if anCone saCs t4is wit4 conviction, t4en at t4at moment 4e means somet4ing bC t4e word OidenticalP >per4aps OlargeP?, but isnPt aware t4at 4e is using t4e word 4ere wit4 a different meaning from t4at in / e / l Q) >"%, c1, pp) ::-:E?

* taIe it t4at t4e preceding discussion gives at least some initial purc4ase to a conclusion w4ic4 is >once again? verC similar to t4e one obtained at t4e end of our analCsis of t4e Tractatus in t4e last c4apter, namelC, t4at t4ere is no Je@ternalK standard for t4e meaningfulness of our signsBin particular, no philosophical Je@ternalK standard, no JbooI of rulesK waiting to be JdiscoveredK bC means of >p4enomeno-?logical or grammatical analCsisY t4e onlC waC to determine "hether a >particular toIen of a? proposition reallC maIes sense, and if so, "hat is t4at sense, or meaning, is to asI w4at, if anC, is its use >and purpose? in a concrete >possible? conte@tY as Wittgenstein 4imself puts it6 O*f _someone` states t4at a certain string of words maIes sense to 4im, and it maIes none to me, * can onlC suppose t4at in t4is conte@t 4e is using words wit4 a different meaning from t4e one * give t4em, or else is speaIing wit4out t4inIingP >"%, cLY see also cNNQ?) !4e w4ole difficultC of t4e tasI lies in trCing to get clear about w4ic4 of t4e options is true, in eac4 particular case, wit4 t4e >ordinarC? linguistic means at our disposal) Wit4 t4at conclusion in mind, let us move to t4e analCsis of t4e remainder of c4apter S)

!ime, memorC, and sublimation NEN

%"% +ime& memor*& and sublimation

NE) 5ne mig4t call t4e problem presented in t4e opening passages of c4apter SB concerning t4e logico-metap4Csical >im?possibilitC of going beCond t4e limits imposed bC t4e Oform of our worldPBOt4e problem of t4e conditionedness of e@perienceP) ,aving given voice to t4at problemBt4erebC prompting t4e reader to e@amine its sense >or senselessness?BWittgensteinPs reflections turn to a new set of &uestions involving a particular, alt4oug4 ubi&uitous, condition of our e@perience, namelC, time) !4e &uestions raised at t4is <uncture continue t4e tasI of giving voice toB4ence allowing us to probe into t4e sense ofBsome JproblemsK arising in t4e investigation of t4e nature of our e@perience) Among t4ose &uestions we find t4e following6 O*f t4e world of data is timeless, 4ow can we speaI of it at allWP >cQM?Y O*f memorC is no Iind of seeing into t4e past, 4ow do we Inow at all t4at it is to be taIen as referring to t4e pastWP >c:0?Y OCan * conceive t4e time in w4ic4 t4e e@periences of visual space occur wit4out e@periences of soundWP >c:0?) SimilarlC to w4at 4appened in t4e analCsis of t4e previous remarIs of c4apter S, WittgensteinPs overt intentions in facing t4ese &uestions are to unveil >at least some of? t4e logico-grammatical confusions be4ind t4e formulations of t4e JproblemsK t4eC e@pressBe)g), t4e Oconfusion of t4e time of t4e film strip wit4 t4e time of t4e picture it pro<ectsP >cQ1?Band to offer a perspicuous view of t4e sCntactical rules for emploCing t4e relevant concepts in t4eir respective conte@tsBe)g), Owe cannot use _)))` t4e sCntactical rules t4at 4old for t4e names of p4Csical ob<ects, in t4e world of t4e imageP >cQ1?) .otwit4standing t4ose overt aimsBand again similarlC to t4e analCsis pursued in t4e last sectionBa different, more self-&uestioning reading of WittgensteinPs remarIs is also available, w4ic4 suggests t4at be4ind suc4 >all too overtlC? dogmatic e@c4anges >between, saC, Wittgenstein and 4is p4ilosop4ical interlocutors? t4ere is a muc4 more comple@ and subtle dialectic going on) *n order to fles4 out t4at claim, * would liIe to focus t4e analCsis on a rat4er limited subset of remarIs, dealing wit4 >w4at maC be called? Ot4e problem of t4e flow of timeP, and t4e related problem of t4e metap4Csico-epistemological status of memorC) Got4 are traditional p4ilosop4ical JproblemsKBarguablC as old as t4e 4istorC of p4ilosop4C itselfY Cet, as we s4all see below, in WittgensteinPs 4ands t4eC end up >rat4er

!ime, memorC, and sublimation NE/ &uicIlC? leading to some une@pected, radicallC solipsistic conclusionsBparticularlC to w4at 4e would elsew4ere call Osolipsism of t4e present momentPNN/)

NL) Het us trC to reconstruct t4e pat4 leading to suc4 conclusions bC taIing t4e following passage, w4ic4 comprises t4e first 4alf of c:/, as an entrC point6
*tPs strange t4at in ordinarC life we are not troubled bC t4e feeling t4at t4e p4enomenon is slipping awaC from us, t4e constant flu@ of appearance, but onlC w4en we p4ilosop4i=e) !4is indicates t4at w4at is in &uestion 4ere is an idea suggested bC a misapplication of our language)

!4e feeling we 4ave is t4at t4e present disappears into t4e past wit4out our being able to prevent it) And 4ere we are obviouslC using t4e picture of a film strip remorselesslC moving past us, t4at we are unable to stop) Gut it is of course <ust as clear t4at t4e picture is misapplied6 t4at we cannot saC O!ime flowsP if bC time we mean t4e possibilitC of c4ange) W4at we are looIing at 4ere is reallC t4e possibilitC of motion6 and so t4e logical form of motion) >"%, p) MR, c:/?

!4e passage above striIes me as remarIable in manC waCs) For one t4ing, it seems remarIable t4at Wittgenstein s4ould introduce t4e problem of t4e flow of time bC relating its appearance to a feeling >t4at, namelC, of not being able to prevent suc4 flow? as well as bC saCing t4at it arises only Ow4en we p4ilosop4i=eP, and >4ence? not Oin ordinarC lifeP) 5n t4e face of t4ose claims, it seems even more remarIable t4at 4e s4ould open t4e passage saCing t4at it is strange >or remarIable _merk"Srdig`? t4at Oin ordinarC life we are not troubled bC _t4at` feelingPY and Cet, notice t4at it is preciselC because suc4 trouble would not arise in ordinarC life t4at Wittgenstein seems so confident >maCbe all too confident? in saCing t4at some Omisapplication of our languageP would be t4e cause of t4e OideaP of t4ere being suc4 an unstoppable flow)B.ow, can we reallC taIe in t4e claim t4at Oin ordinarC life we are not troubled bC _t4at` feelingPW After all, donPt we commonlC say >Oin ordinarC lifeP, i)e),? suc4 t4ings as t4at Otime is slipping awaCP, and Owe are unable to stop itPW And, in emploCing suc4 sentences, are we not purporting to e@press some feelings we are e@periencingBsaC, e)g), disappointment at not being able to ac4ieve some of our goals in >ordinarC? lifeW 5r is it t4e case t4at, bC emploCing suc4 sentences, we would be alreadC involved >4owever involuntarilC? in p4ilosop4i=ingWBGut 4ow could we tell t4e

NN/

WHC, p) /:)

!ime, memorC, and sublimation NER differenceW ,ow could we Inow w4en our sentences became Omisapplications of languagePB4ence, w4en p4ilosop4C >as described in t4e &uoted passage? startsW !4at muc4 for t4e remarIableness of t4e first paragrap4 of t4e passage) *n t4e second, Wittgenstein addsBagain verC remarIablCBt4at w4en we are caug4t bC t4at feeling Owe are obviously using t4e picture of a film strip remorselesslC moving past us, t4at we are unable to stopP >mC emp4asis?) * taIe it t4at 4e doesnPt mean t4at it is OobviousP t4at we s4all emploC t4at particular >cinematograp4ic? pictureB4ence, t4at anC of a number of ot4er familiar pictures would e&uallC do) >!4e ancients, w4o unfortunatelC 4ad not cinema, alreadC got pu==led w4en reflecting about t4e Oconstant flow of appearanceP, comparing it not to a film strip, but to a riverY t4e same pu==le returns in a well Inown passage from St) AugustinePs #onfessions, again formulated wit4 t4e 4elp of a simple pictureBnamelC, t4at of time as an infinite measuring tape being unrolled in front of us)? .ow even if one grants t4at t4e application of some picture or other would OobviouslCP be involved w4en we are caug4t bC t4e feeling of t4e Ounstoppable flow of timeP, w4at would be t4e rationale for saCing t4at it is O<ust as clear t4at t4e picture is misappliedP in t4e conte@t Wittgenstein describes >t4at, i)e), of a p4ilosop4icalBsaC metap4CsicalBinvestigation of time, taIen as t4e Oform of motionP, and so on?W Het us notice at t4e outset t4at in order for a picture to be misapplied, t4ere must be somet4ing as a legitimate or bona fide application of itB4ence, t4at in t4e case under analCsis, t4ere must be some other conte@t>s?Be)g), OordinarC lifePBw4ere it would be correct to describe time-related p4enomena bC applCing pictures suc4 as t4at of t4e film strip) *n fact, it seems arguable t4at wit4out resorting to suc4 pictures our ordinarC descriptions would almost certainlC become poorer, less clear and perspicuous, or ot4erwise less powerful t4an t4eC actuallC areB4ence, t4at t4ere is a sense in w4ic4 t4ose pictures are not onlC legitimate, but even necessaryY to saC, e)g), t4at Otime flowsPBor OfliesP, or Ois passing bCP, etc)BmaC be effectiveBbot4 economic and clearBwaCs to e@press lots of t4ings Oin ordinarC lifePBfrom onePs regret for not 4aving taIen all t4e opportunities life offered in t4e past, to impatience wit4 an overlC long p4ilosop4ical dis&uisition) !4is consideration goes some waC toward answering a &uestion made aboveBnamelC, w4et4er one s4ould conclude, from t4e mere fact t4at a person is emploCing a picture liIe

!ime, memorC, and sublimation NEQ t4e ones under analCsis >e)g), bC saCing t4at Otime is slipping awaCP?, t4at s4e would be >4owever involuntarilC? p4ilosop4i=ing) !4e answer, as it s4all be clear, is6 .o) Gut t4at doesnPt answer t4e furt4er &uestion of 4ow to tell >ordinarC, legitimate? applications from >p4ilosop4ical? misapplications of t4e same pictures) .ow Wittgenstein, as * said above, seems rat4er confident of 4aving suc4 a criterion at 4andBafter all, 4e all too &uicIlC concludes t4at our OtroubleP onlC arises because of a particular misapplication of t4e picture of t4e film strip in an e)tra-ordinarC >p4ilosop4icalNNR? conte@tBnamelC, one in w4ic4 we would liIe to speaI >Jmetap4CsicallCK? of time .ua OpossibilitC of c4ange _)))` reallC t4e possibilitC of motion6 and so t4e logical form of motionP, and saC of it t4at Ois slipping awaC from usP, and so on) Gut again, w4at e@actlC is 4is reason to present t4is case as one of misapplicationBas opposed, saC, to t4e >legitimate? applications illustrated in t4e paragrap4 aboveW !4ere is, clearlC enoug4, an important difference in t4e >purported? applicationsBin t4at w4en t4e Jmetap4Csical senseK of time is in view, a sentence liIe Otime is slipping awaCP would 4ardlC be meant to 4urrC up someone or to regret somet4ing) Gut w4at, t4en, would be its pointW 5ne answer w4ic4 seems to be suggested bC t4e te@t is t4at, in fact, there is no point at all in t4e p4ilosop4erPs >purported? use of t4at sentence6 if time is taIen as a condition of possibilitC of c4ange, and, in t4at sense, as Ot4e form of motionP >w4ic4 is <ust a p4ilosop4ical <argon for referring to a verC ordinarC use of our concept of timeBnamelC, as t4at dimension in w4ic4 events, as opposed to things, e@tend t4emselvesB4ence, w4ere c4ange and, in particular, motion can be measured?, then t4ere is no point in saCing t4at Oit is slipping awaCPY for somet4ing to slip awaC it must be possible for it to be grabbed, maCbe to be stopped or accelerated, and so on >a grammatical reminder?Y now time as t4e
NNR

Gut, w4at maIes a conte@t a philosophical oneW Suppose someoneBa c4ild, per4apsBasIs6 OW4at 4appens to t4ings w4en we are not looIing at t4emWP *s s4e not Op4ilosop4i=ingP, in t4e above senseW And Cet, mig4t one not suppose 4er &uestion being made in an >ot4erwiseW? verC ordinary conte@tW W4at t4is s4ows isBas Cavell once putBt4at Oone does not Inow, in advance, w4ere p4ilosop4C mig4t begin, w4en onePs mind maC be stopped, to t4inIP >.A! /EQ?Y or again t4at language can Ogo on 4olidaCP anCtime, in no special setting or frame of mind, t4at t4e Jmetap4CsicalK is our everCdaC predicament) !4ere can be a number of causes inclining one to start .uestioning t4e >ordinarC? waCs of going on applCing our words and pictures, or to imagine >even to crave for? different applicationsY again, one cannot Inow in advance if t4ose new applications will amount to >recogni=ablC? legitimate e@tensions of a previous concept T picture, or become >recogni=ablC? misapplications of it) !o tell t4e difference is a burden t4at anC member of a linguistic communitC faces all t4e time, 4aving as 4er onlC resource >ordinarC? linguistic e@pertise) ,enceBas * 4ope it will become clear as t4e analCsis advancesB* taIe it t4at w4en Wittgenstein saCs t4at a particular use of a concept T picture is a >p4ilosop4ical? misuseBt4at it is an instance of a w4eel turning idlC, instead of a purposeful deviceB4e too is deploCing t4at e@pertise, and t4us maIing a claim for 4is <udgement to be acInowledged and assented bC ot4er language usersY t4ere is no Jsure-fireK, a priori waC to tell t4e difference between ordinarC and p4ilosop4ical conte@ts)

!ime, memorC, and sublimation NE: verC dimension w4ere events occur and c4ange can be measured cannot possibly undergo anC suc4 modifications >as Aristotle, for one, 4ad remarIed?Y 4ence, one cannot >legitimatelC or sensiblC? applC a picture suc4 as t4at of a film strip >or anC ot4er moving or modifCing t4ingBi)e), anC ot4er event? in order to describe it.B5ne mig4t 4ere saC6 time as a dimension and t4e events w4ic4 occur in it are incommensurable, reallC incomparable p4enomena)BAnd finallCBif, i)e), one cannot applC anC suc4 picture to describe time-as-t4e-form-of-motionBt4e verC feeling t4at we are unable to stop t4e Oflow of timeP s4ould disappearY in ot4er words, if t4ere is no sense in t4e idea of suc4 a OflowP, t4ere is e&uallC no sense in t4e idea of trCing >or even willing? to stop it) !4ese considerations seem to offer a sound e@planation of t4e >ot4erwise verC remarIable? claims made bC Wittgenstein in t4e passage under analCsisBabout, i)e), w4C t4e OtroubleP about t4e Oflow of timeP >t4e feeling t4at we are unable to stop it? would arise only Ow4en we p4ilosop4i=eP, and are lead to misapplC language and its pictures) AdditionallC, t4eC seem to offer a good illustration of 4ow one can be freed from a Op4ilosop4ical troubleP bC means of getting t4e application of languageBof its words, sentences, and, in particular, its picturesBrig4t, w4ic4 means, at least in part, bringing some descriptions >e)g), Otime is slipping awaCP? bacI to t4e roug4 ground of ordinarC life, w4ere t4eC would be emploCed for a number of different purposes >e)g), 4urrCing up people or regretting somet4ing? NNQ, instead of becoming verC comple) but useless mec4anisms, full of Ow4eels turning idlCP >as one mig4t saC of t4e AugustinianBp4ilosop4icalBstorC about time?NN:) >We maC e@press
NNQ

NN:

5f course t4e Oroug4 ground of ordinarC lifeP includes some t4eoretical >e)g), scientific? purposes as well as >more? practical ones) .owadaCs p4Csicists do not speaI of t4e OflowP of timeBp4Csical time is >as Wittgenstein alreadC Inew? space-liIe) * suppose t4at >t4eoretical? view could be e@pressed >if roug4lC? bC a sentence liIe Otime does not flowPY if t4at were t4e case, we would 4ave anot4er instance of purposeful use of a description, as opposed to a Op4ilosop4icalP one, in t4e sense 4ere in viewBi)e), Oa w4eel turning idlCP) *n t4is connection, is wort4 4ig4lig4ting t4at even a picture liIe t4at of t4e film strip may be purposefullC emploCed in ordinarC lifeY Wittgenstein 4imself acInowledges at least one suc4 purpose, as t4e last paragrap4 of t4e following passage maIes clear6 *f * compare t4e facts of immediate e@perience wit4 t4e pictures on t4e screen and t4e facts of p4Csics wit4 pictures in t4e film strip, on t4e film strip t4ere is a present picture and past and future pictures) Gut on t4e screen, t4ere is onlC t4e present) W4at is c4aracteristic about t4is image is t4at in using it * regard t4e future as preformed) !4erePs a point in saCing future events are pre-formed if it belongs to t4e essence of time t4at it does not breaI off) For t4en we can saC6 somet4ing will 4appen, itPs onlC t4at * donPt Inow w4at) And in t4e world of p4Csics we can saC t4at) >"%, p) MR, c:N?

!ime, memorC, and sublimation NEE t4at met4odological lesson emploCing WittgensteinPs favourite turn of p4rase in t4is conte@t, saCing t4at one s4ould be careful not to confuse ordinarC, Op4CsicalP descriptions wit4 t4e Op4enomenologicalP ones, i)e), t4ose w4ic4 would be fitted to describe t4e OimmediatelC givenPBCet anot4er grammatical reminder)?

NM) \etBif onlC one was reallC tempted to taIe t4e trouble about t4e flow of time anC seriouslC from t4e beginningBt4ere would seem to be somet4ing in4erentlC dissatisfCing about t4at Iind of >dis?solution) Wittgenstein 4imself is aware of t4at apparent s4ortcoming, as we can see in t4e following passage6
*f, for instance, Cou asI, O(oes t4e bo@ still e@ist w4en *Pm not looIing at itWP, t4e onlC rig4t answer would be O5f course, unless someone 4as taIen it awaC or destroCed itP) .aturallC, a p4ilosop4er would be dissatisfied wit4 t4is answer, but it would &uite rig4tlC reduce 4is waC of formulating t4e &uestion ad absurdum) >"%, p) MM, c:L?

.otice t4at t4e passage above is introduced as an illustration or instantiation of a p4ilosop4ical e@c4angeBone w4ic4, in fact, is recurrent and c4aracteristic in WittgensteinPs writings) #iven t4at illustrative purpose, one mig4t applC a Iind of Ouniversal generali=ationP to t4e passage, t4us getting a useful model or blueprint for suc4 e@c4anges, w4ic4 would go as follows6
*f, for instance, Cou asI, O)P _a p4ilosop4ical &uestion`, t4e onlC rig4t answer would be OyP _a grammatical reminder`) .aturallC, a p4ilosop4er would be dissatisfied wit4 y, but it would &uite rig4tlC reduce 4is waC of formulating ) ad absurdum)

Gearing t4at >generali=ed? version of t4e passage in mind, t4e &uestion * would liIe to asI is 4ow we are to understand WittgensteinPs own assessment, as it gets e@pressed in its final sentence, of t4e results of applCing 4is grammatical met4od >an assessment w4ic4, it is wort4 noticing, striIinglC reminds one of proposition E):R of t4e Tractatus?. !4ere are, * taIe it, at least two waCs of interpreting it) !4e first, and probablC t4e more natural rendition, would 4ave it t4at6 N) notwit4standing t4e p4ilosop4erPs dissatisfaction wit4 y%a dissatisfaction w4ic4, given t4e purposes of logical clarification, would be ultimatelC

!ime, memorC, and sublimation NEL negligibleB4is original J&uestionK >)? was in fact Oreduced ad absurdumP >i)e), s4own to be <ust a pseudo-&uestion? bC means of t4e use of grammatical reminders, and t4at is t4e end of t4e matterBt4e p4ilosop4ical, elucidative tasI would be over at t4at pointY \et a second interpretation is available, according to w4ic4 /) notwit4standing t4e logical correction of suc4 a reductio%w4ic4, from t4e perspective of someone genuinelC pu==led bC t4e difficultC in view, would be ultimatelC negligible >in t4at it completelC misses t4e point?Bt4e use of grammatical reminders would let t4e p4ilosop4er dissatisfied, and >hence? t4at cannot be t4e end of t4e matterBmore is necessarC for a >successful? p4ilosop4ical t4erapC) * find t4at manC readers of WittgensteinPs writings >mCself included, at least in some moods? are rat4er obliviousBor even blindBto t4e possibilitC of t4e latter rendition of t4e e@c4anges between >saC? Wittgenstein and 4is p4ilosop4ical interlocutor>s?NNE, and accordinglC are all too proneBeven an@iousBto stop t4eir reflection w4en t4eC reac4 a >rat4er dogmatic? result similar to t4e one depicted in t4e first one)BW4C is t4atW 5ne possible reason is t4at we >at least in our dogmatic and self-indulgent moods? would be trCing to repress somet4ingBa difficultC, saC, t4at we would rat4er not face seriouslyN 4ence t4e convenience of accepting t4at our OtroubleP >e)g), about t4e unstoppable flow of time, or, as in t4e original version of c:L, t4e unperceived e@istence of ob<ects? is mere nonsense after allBt4at our J&uestionsK are actuallC <ust pseudo-&uestions) Gearing t4at >as Cet abstract and speculative? possibilitC in mind, let us asI w4et4er >and, if so, w4C? a p4ilosop4er pu==led bC t4e problem of t4e flow of time would be dissatisfied wit4 t4e solution offered above >cNL?) * taIe it t4at, contrariwise to w4at we would >rat4er self-indulgentlC? assume if we stopped t4e reading at t4e first rendition, our p4ilosop4er would 4ave an immediate replC to t4e c4arge t4at 4er >purported? use of a sentence liIe Otime is slipping awaCP >made in an e@tra-ordinarC conte@t? is simplC pointlessY granted, its point is not e@actlC ordinarCBbut 4uman beings 4ave ot4er purposes and interests in addition to t4e ordinarC ones) And, 4owever ultimatelC inco4erent t4e attempt maC be, it
NNE

5n t4e identitC of t4e JvoicesK in WittgensteinPs writings, see footnotes N/Q and N/: of t4e ne@t c4apter)

!ime, memorC, and sublimation NEM remains t4e fact t4at reflection about >e)g)? time mig4t ine@orablC lead one to try to e@press, to describe, to call attention to, some e@traordinarC, peculiar, even astonis4ing >metap4Csical? features of t4e p4enomenon under analCsisBe)g), t4at t4e past, w4ic4 is no more, Ieeps becoming distanced from t4e present, w4ic4, in turn, 4as no e)tension, and Ieeps going to"ard a future w4ic4 is not yet) Faced wit4 suc4 an impulse, t4e claim t4at one is emploCing a picture w4ic4 could >s4ouldW? not legitimatelC be emploCedBbecause it is OincommensurableP wit4 t4e p4enomenon one wants to describeBis verC dissatisfCing indeed, not e@actlC because it is wrong or false, but rat4er because it is beside t4e point, and lets t4e real difficulty simplC untouc4edBit is an attempt to c4ange t4e sub<ect completelC) >.otice t4at our dissatisfied p4ilosop4er needs not to be c4aracteri=ed as ignorant of t4e grammatical rules of ordinarC languageY s4e would, as * said, 4appilC accept t4e c4arge of not being able to e@press 4er trouble emploCing ordinarC descriptionsBbut so muc4 t4e worse for t4ose descriptions[?

N1) Supposing t4e replC * <ust imagined >or anot4er to t4e same effect? is plausibleBand w4C would it not beWB4ow would t4e e@c4ange continueW For t4e time being, * will let it standBt4e p4ilosop4er 4aving t4e last wordBto turn to t4e analCsis of some subse&uent remarIs, w4ic4 maC 4elp us to resume t4at e@c4ange in a more productive waC) So let us >re?start wit4 t4e second 4alf of c:/, in w4ic4 Wittgenstein presents a related OtroubleP arising in t4e p4ilosop4ical investigation of timeBnamelC, one 4aving to do wit4 t4e role of memorC in our e@perience of t4e past) ,ere is t4e passage6
*n t4is connection it appears to us as if memorC were a somew4at secondarC sort of e@perience, w4en compared wit4 e@perience of t4e present) We saC OWe can only remember t4atP) As t4oug4 in a primarC sense memorC were a somew4at faint and uncertain picture of w4at we originallC 4ad before us in full claritC)

*n t4e language of p4Csical ob<ects, t4atPs so6 * saC6 O* only 4ave a vague memorC of t4is 4ouse)P >"%, p) MQ, c:/?

!4e reason for presenting t4is new OtroubleP, and relating it to t4e previous one, s4ould be bC now clearBafter all, once one is caug4t bC t4e feeling t4at Ot4e present disappears into t4e pastP >as if ine@orablC, unstoppablC?, it is onlC natural to t4inI of t4e e@perience of t4e past itself >i)e), of t4e stretc4 of t4e Ostrip of timeP w4ic4 4as alreadC OremorselesslC

!ime, memorC, and sublimation NE1 mov_ed` past usP?, as it is recorded in our memorC, t4at it becomes onlC a Ofaint and uncertain pictureP compared wit4 t4e original >i)e), t4e e@perience of t4e present?) .ow, if read against t4e bacIdrop of t4e previous analCsis, t4e last sentence of t4e passage above will 4ave two clear implications, namelC6 >i? t4at t4ere is no problem in putting t4e situation t4at waCBapplCing t4at Iind of pictureBin Ot4e language of p4Csical ob<ectsP >4ence, Oin ordinarC lifeP?Y but >ii? trouble maC arise Ow4en we p4ilosop4i=eP about t4ose familiar facts, and start misapplCing t4at familiar >Iind of? picture) *n fact, t4e ne@t set of remarIs >c:R? can be read as elaborating <ust t4ose implications) ,ere is 4ow it goes6
And w4C not let matters rest t4ereW For t4is waC of talIing surelC saCs everCt4ing we want to saC, and everCt4ing t4at can be said) Gut we wis4 to saC t4at it can also be put differentlyY and t4at is important)

*t is as if t4e emp4asis is placed elsew4ere in t4is ot4er waC of speaIing6 for t4e words OseemP, OerrorP, etc), 4ave a certain emotional overtone w4ic4 doesnPt belong to t4e essence of t4e p4enomena) *n a waC itPs connected wit4 t4e will and not merelC wit4 cognition)

We talI for instance of an optical illusion and associate t4is e@pression wit4 t4e idea of a mistaIe, alt4oug4 of course it isnPt essential t4at t4ere s4ould be anC mistaIeY and if appearance were normallC more important in our lives t4an t4e results of measurement, t4en language would also s4ow a different attitude to t4is p4enomenon) >"%, p) MQ, c:R?)

!4e main point of t4ose remarIs is to indicate t4e precise moment in w4ic4 a JleapK is made from ordinarC descriptionsBe)g), OWe can only remember t4atPBw4ic4 can 4ave manC clear and legitimate uses in our common linguistic practices, to t4e e@traction of some >supposedlC? substantial p4ilosop4ical conclusionsBin t4e present case, t4e metap4Cisico-epistemological t4esis t4at memorC offers <ust a Ofaint imageP of t4e OrealitCP originallC e@perienced) 5nce again, Wittgenstein is 4ig4lig4ting t4at t4is Iind of JleapK occurs onlC w4en one >Ot4e p4ilosop4erP? starts emploCing some pictures w4ic4 would be fine in t4eir original conte@t >OordinarC lifeP? for some supposedlC new >p4ilosop4ical? purposesY t4us, even t4oug4 our current use of some descriptions maC be from t4e beginning impregnated wit4 certain Oemotional overtonesPBafter all, we actuallC say t4at memorC allows us only to remember facts, and we actuallC dra" a contrast between t4at >mnemonic? access to t4e world and a more direct one, namelC, present e@perienceBt4e Iind of trouble t4at t4e p4ilosop4er would liIe to indicate >concerning, i)e), t4e epistemic limitations of memorC? does not arise in t4e ordinarC situations w4ic4 are t4e original

!ime, memorC, and sublimation NL0 4ome of t4ose descriptions) !4e trouble, one mig4t saC, arises onlC w4en t4ose Oemotional overtonesPBw4ic4, .)G), are characteristic of ordinarC language, to t4e e@tent in w4ic4 t4at language is to record our >natural and ot4er? reactions to t4e world >including time and its flow? and our e@periences of itNNLBare sublimated bC p4ilosop4ical reflection, so t4at instead of facing t4e real an@ieties t4at are mirrored in t4ose descriptions, attention gets redirected to some >supposedlC? t4eoretical >i)e), logical, metap4Csical, epistemological, etc)? OtroublesP liIe t4e one about t4e Olimitations of memorCP >as a guide to realitC?) \et memorCBas far as t4e OessenceP of t4is p4enomenon is concernedBis not Oa somew4at secondarC sort of e@perienceP, nor does it offer Oa somew4at faint and uncertain picture of w4at we originallC 4ad before us in full claritCPY t4ose are descriptions we maC feel inclined to maIe >and non-problematicallC so? in our ordinary life%4ence, Oin t4e language of p4Csical ob<ectsPBbecause of t4e emotional responses w4ic4 we >naturallCW? connect wit4, or superimpose to, our >mnemonic? e@periences of t4e past >e@periences?Ba matter w4ic4, as Wittgenstein reminds us, 4as more to do wit4 t4e "ill t4an wit4 cognition.

/0) !4ese considerations prompt me to go bacI to t4e problem of t4e Oflow of timeP, and to resume t4e e@c4ange between Wittgenstein and 4is interlocutor >as * will continue to call t4ose voices? on t4at issue) * said above >cNM? t4at one reason for our >rat4er &uicIBeven an@ious? acceptance of some >rat4er dogmatic? Oreductions ad absurdumP of p4ilosop4ical &uestions enacted in WittgensteinPs writings would be our willingness to repress some e@istential difficultiesBw4at t4e Tractatus >E):/? called Oproblems of lifePBbe4ind t4ose &uestions, to avoid facing t4em seriouslyN but, letPs face it6 isnPt it t4e case t4at, at least for some of us, some of t4e time, it is reallC difficult to accept t4at t4e past 4as gone, ine@orablCBand t4at "e cannot change itWNNM GC t4e same toIen, donPt we sometimes feel
NNL

NNM

*nterestinglC, in t4e last paragrap4 of c:R Wittgenstein describes a language w4ic4 would be free of suc4 Oemotional overtonesPBone w4ic4 Owould not permit anC waC of e@pressing a preference for certain p4enomena over ot4ersP, and, 4ence, Owould 4ave to be, so to speaI, absolutelC impartialPBas OprimarCPY in so doing, 4e offers an important >and, to mC mind, muc4 overlooIed? IeC to understand t4e role of a Op4enomenological languageP in freeing us from p4ilosop4ical confusion) As * 4ave been suggesting, t4e idea is not to use t4at >OprimarCP or Op4enomenologicalP? language to correct t4e ordinarC one, or even to s4ow t4at t4e latter is intrinsicallC misleading, but rat4er to use it as an ob<ect of comparison, w4ic4 maC s4ow to Ot4e p4ilosop4erP >in us? t4at some of t4e features t4at sT4e taIes as troublesome in t4e analCsis of t4e p4enomena are not essential to t4em, and 4ave to do more wit4 will t4an cognition in our ordinary life) .ormallC, t4at is a difficultC felt w4en one reali=es t4at some specific event or deed one would liIe to c4ange cannot be c4anged) As a >rat4er dramatic? illustration, t4inI of t4e &uest of Ale@ander ,artdegen >#uC "earce? to rescue 4is girlfriend 7mma >Sienna #uillorC? from deat4, in t4e beginning of Simon WellsPs remaIe of The Time <achine >/00/?)

!ime, memorC, and sublimation NLN burdened w4en facing t4e fact t4at t4e future is not yet%and, 4ence, t4at at least in part, it is our responsibilitC to bring it aboutW Hittle wonder, given t4is >doublC? difficult situation, t4at one s4ould react toward t4e present as if it were, on t4e one 4and, alwaCs alreadC becoming pastBas if escaping us, becoming unc4angeable, toget4er wit4 our deeds >or lacI of t4em?%and, on t4e ot4er 4and, as if it were alwaCs alreadC pointing toward t4e futureBas if accomplis4ing it, maIing it 4appen, t4us reminding one of t4e burden of 4aving to c4oose 4ow to act >and to live? 4encefort4) Gut again, t4ere is a clear sense in w4ic4 none of t4ose descriptions captures t4e Oessence of timePY rat4er, t4eC are waCs of e@pressing our own >all too 4uman? reactionsBin particular, our e)istential an)ietiesB toward >our e@periences of? time and its flow, and, ultimatelC, toward >t4e awareness of? our own mortalitCY now, similarlC to t4e case of memorC analCsed above, t4ese are all matters w4ic4 4ave more to do wit4 our "illBCet it is all but impossible to sublimate t4em in p4ilosop4ical reflection, w4ere t4eC Ieep being presented as 4aving to do merely "ith cognition) Het me taIe one furt4er step bacI in our discussion6 * asIed above >cNL? if we were reallC supposed to taIe in >wit4out more ado? WittgensteinPs claim, in "% c:/, to t4e effect t4at Oin ordinarC life we are not troubled bC t4e feeling t4at _e)g),` t4e p4enomenon is slipping awaC from us, t4e constant flu@ of appearance, but onlC w4en we p4ilosop4i=eP) ,aving reac4ed t4is point in t4e analCsis, * find * would liIe to answer t4at &uestion bC saCing t4at it is onlC in t4eir sublimated form t4at t4e OtroublesP w4ic4 Wittgenstein presents us do not arise in ordinarC lifeY Cet, it is preciselC for t4at reason t4at t4e >dis?solution of t4e logical confusions be4ind >t4e sublimated versions of? t4ose OtroublesP would not solve or dissolve t4e life problems w4ic4 get deflected, or displaced, bC t4em)B(oes t4at maIe logical clarification anC less valuableW Well, Ces and no6 w4at it s4ows is t4atBagainst some dogmatic and self-indulgent e@pectationsBt4ere is a rationale be4ind t4e Iind of OdissatisfactionP t4at Wittgenstein 4imself 4as diagnosed as an inevitable reaction of Ot4e p4ilosop4erP faced wit4 4is grammatical remindersY onlC t4e real >e@istential? difficultC would end up being once again deflected if t4at rationale were presented >as mC own dissatisfied p4ilosop4erPs replC presented itBsee cNM? in an intellectuali=ed garb, as if t4e trouble were reallC derived from t4e analCsis of t4e Op4enomenaPBmore specificallC, as if it 4ad to do wit4 t4eir essenceBand our language s4ould be blamed bC not being capable of e@pressing it) !4e point * am trCing to maIe, t4en, is t4at anC effective and satisfCing >to

!ime, memorC, and sublimation NL/ t4e p4ilosop4er, i)e)? use of clarificationB4ence, of t4e grammatical reminders emploCed to ac4ieve a perspicuous view of t4e logico-grammatical sCnta@ of ordinarC languageB would 4ave to be made in a larger t4erapeutic conte@t, in w4ic4 Ot4e p4ilosop4erP were not onlC >intellectuallC? s4own to be asIing pseudo-&uestions, but, additionallC, were enabled to become aware of t4e real difficulties w4ic4 were getting unselfconsciouslC repressed, deflected or sublimated bC 4er verC attempts at e@pressing t4em)

%"(

Solipsism of t$e present moment

/N) !o t4e e@tent t4at one is reallC pu==led bC t4e OtroublesP e@amined in t4e last sectionB about, i)e), t4e Oflow of timeP and t4e e@perience of t4e pastBone mig4t be tempted to go one step furt4er, and 4old t4at OonlC t4e e@perience of t4e present moment 4as realitCP >"%, c:Q, p) M:?) Het us call t4at t4esis OSP, and t4e position e@pressed bC it Osolipsism of t4e present momentP) *mmediatelC after presenting S, Wittgenstein saCs t4at Ot4e first replC must be6 As opposed to w4atWP >ibid)?) ClearlC, t4at &uestion aims to bring t4e prospective solipsist >i)e), eac4 of us, to t4e e@tent in w4ic4 we maC feel ourselves tempted to e@press our feelings in t4at waC? JbacI to eart4K, compelling 4er >us? to t4inI about t4e sense>s? of S, i)e), about its possible use>s? in concrete situations of ordinarC lifeNN1) Again, t4at is a verC c4aracteristic te@tual move, w4ic4 perfectlC fits t4e blueprint indicated above >cNM?, in t4at we are presented, first, wit4 an implicit p4ilosop4ical &uestionBsaC, O,ow would * Inow w4et4er anCt4ing but t4e e@perience of t4e present moment 4as realitCWPBand t4en a replC based on a grammatical reminderBnamelC, t4at in anC concrete situation, to claim t4at somet4ing O4as realitCP implies distinguis4ing it from somet4ing else, w4ic4 4as no realityN one mig4t summari=e t4at grammatical point bC saCing t4at in suc4 cases, OrealP and its derivatives are relational or comparative &ualifications, and, 4ence, t4eC do not 4ave an absolute sense) \etBso t4e replC would continueBw4at a solipsist would liIe to e@press using S depends on assuming >4owever tacitlC? t4e >supposed? absolute sense of t4ose &ualificationsY now t4at is t4e reason w4C t4e resulting position would be inco4erent >Oreduced ad absurdumP?Bafter all, if onlC >mC? present e@perience 4as realitC, and,
NN1

* suppose t4e same would applC to concrete situations of e)traordinary lifeBin times of crisis, danger, catastrop4e, and so on, words suc4 as t4ose comprising S could undoubtedlC assume particular >albeit far from ordinarC? meanings, an >4ence? 4ave manC possible oppositions)

Solipsism of t4e present moment NLR conse&uentlC, t4ere is nothing wit4 w4ic4 * can possiblC compare it, 4ow would * be able to JpicI it outK from t4e rest >W? of e@perience in order to confer it some Iind of JprivilegeKW *n order to indicate t4e inco4erence involved in t4e solipsistPs attempt to e@press 4er JpositionK, Wittgenstein presents >and immediatelC discards? two candidates to t4e role of counterpoint to S >per4aps one mig4t call t4em O8oorePs responsesP?) !4eC go as follows6 N) O(oes it _i)e), S` implC * didnPt get up t4is morningW >For if so, it would be dubious)? Gut t4at is not w4at we mean)P >"%, c:Q, p) M:? /) O(oes it mean t4at an event t4at *Pm not remembering at t4is instant didnPt occurW .ot t4at eit4er)P >id) ibid)? As to t4e first statement, let us asI w4C, e@actlC, it would be a OdubiousP implication of S) ApparentlC, t4e reason is t4at t4ere is a varietC of situations in w4ic4 * could state t4at O* didnPt get up t4is morningP, but in none of t4em t4e resulting opposition between OappearanceP and OrealitCP would satisfC t4e solipsistPs >implicit? re&uirements in e@pressing S) * could, e)g), mistaIenlC t4inI t4at * got up t4is morning, w4ile in fact * was <ust dreaming >at nig4t? t4at * got up in t4e morningY similarlC, * could be 4allucinating t4at, w4ile in t4e middle of a desert, and after some daCs wit4out falling asleepY or, finallC, * could <ust be a brain in a vat, w4ic4 never sleeps neit4er waIes up, but <ust receives stimuli from a computer generating t4e illusorC e@perience of falling asleep and waIing up) Ge as it maC, in none of t4ose cases * would be allowed to saC t4at OonlC t4e e@perience of t4e present moment 4as realitCP, in t4e absolute sense envisaged bC t4e solipsistBafter all, in all t4ose cases t4ere is somet4ing w4ic4 opposes to t4e Opresent e@perienceP, and >supposedlC? is OunrealP T OillusorCP T OapparentP, namelC, t4e pseudo-e@periences of waIing up t4at * 4ad w4en dreaming, 4allucinating, or being stimulated bC a computer) All t4ose pseudo-e@periences of waIing up can be described as >saC? OunrealP only comparatively, i)e), bC contrast wit4 t4e present >and real? e@perience of waIing upY but t4ere seems to be no point in saCing t4at, e)g), t4eC are Ounreal in themselvesPBafter all, in anot4er sense, all of t4em were bona fide >4ence OrealP? sub;ective e)periences, w4ic4 could be c4ecIed bC means of >ordinarC? ob<ective criteria) >Similar considerations can be applied to t4e second candidate above)?

Solipsism of t4e present moment NLQ

//) !4ese considerations go some waC toward s4owing t4at it does not seem possible to e@press S wit4 t4e >absolute? sense intended bC t4e solipsist) Wittgenstein taIes up t4at conclusion in t4e se&uence of t4e te@t, bC claiming t4at6
!4e proposition t4at onlC t4e present e@perience 4as realitC appears to contain t4e last conse&uence of solipsism) And in a sense t4at is soY onlC w4at it is able to saC amounts to <ust as little as can be said bC solipsism)BFor w4at belongs to t4e essence of t4e world simplC cannot be said) And p4ilosop4C, if it were to saC anCt4ing, would 4ave to describe t4e essence of t4e world) >"%, p) M:, c:Q?

%ead against t4e bacIdrop of t4e preceding analCsis, * taIe it t4at w4at Wittgenstein means bC saCing t4at solipsismBpresented 4ere as an instance of a p4ilosop4ical positionB cannot saC w4at it purports to saC bC means of SBsomet4ing belonging to t4e essence of t4e worldBis not t4at t4ere is somet4ing w4ic4 cannot be said, but rat4er t4at t4e verC idea of t4ere being suc4 an OessencePBsome feature of our e@perience w4ic4 could be JpicIed outK and presented as t4at w4ic4 alone >or ultimately? O4as realitCPBis essentiallC misguided) !4at, of course, does not implC t4at we cannot distinguis4, in ordinarC life, between some aspects of our e@perience t4at we feel inclined to 4onour wit4 &ualifications suc4 as OrealP T OgenuineP T OlegitimateP, on t4e one 4and, and aspects w4ic4 we prefer to diminis4 as OunrealP T OillusorCP T Omere appearanceP, on t4e ot4er) 5nlC t4e impulse to maIe suc4 distinctions would again 4ave more to do wit4 our "ill%wit4 our waC of reacting to t4e contents of our e@perienceBt4an wit4 cognitionY and, preciselC to t4at e@tent, t4ose >ordinarC? comparative descriptions and <udgements would not belong to anC >supposed? Oessence of t4e p4enomenaP) !o go bacI to a claim &uoted above >cN1?6 Oif appearance were normallC more important in our lives t4an t4e results of measurement, t4en language would also s4ow a different attitude to _)))` p4enomen_a`P >"%, p) MQ, c:R?) \et, * t4inI t4at part of t4e point Wittgenstein is 4ere trCing to maIe is preciselC t4at t4ere is no suc4 a t4ing as aTt4e OcorrectP attitude toward p4enomenaBas some p4ilosop4ers, and, in particular, our solipsist, would 4ave itY language, as Wittgenstein would later saC, is Ot4e e@pression of our interestsP >see "*, c:L0?) !4ose considerations are confirmed and furt4er elaborated in t4e ne@t remarI, w4ic4 concludes c:Q) *t goes as follows6

Solipsism of t4e present moment NL:

*f someone saCs, onlC t4e present e)perience 4as realitC, t4en t4e word OpresentP must be redundant 4ere, as t4e word O*P is in ot4er conte@ts) For it cannot mean present as opposed to past and future)BSomet4ing else must be meant bC t4e word, somet4ing t4at isnPt in a space, but is itself a space) !4at is to saC, not somet4ing bordering on somet4ing else >from w4ic4 it could t4erefore be limited off?) And so, somet4ing language cannot legitimatelC set in relief)

!4e present we are talIing about 4ere is not t4e frame in t4e film reel t4at is in front of t4e pro<ectorPs lens at preciselC t4is moment, as opposed to t4e frames before and after it, w4ic4 4ave alreadC been t4ere or are Cet to comeY but t4e picture on t4e screen w4ic4 would illegitimatelC be called present, since OpresentP would not be used 4ere to distinguis4 it from past and future) And so it is a meaningless epit4et) >"%, pp) M:-ME, c:Q?

!4e passage above sums up WittgensteinPs diagnosis about t4e logico-grammatical confusions involved in t4e attempt to give e@pression to t4e Osolipsism of present momentP bC means of S6 t4e problem is, in s4ort, t4at t4e absolute sense w4ic4 t4e solipsist intends to give to t4e words w4ic4 are fundamental for formulating 4er positionBin t4is case, OrealitCP, OpresentP, O*P, and its derivativesBis inco4erent, 4ence, it is no sense at allY in fact, t4ose words become completelC pointless and empty w4en used in a >p4ilosop4ical? conte@t in w4ic4 one tries >if tacitlC? to isolate t4em from t4e conceptual relations t4eC 4ad in t4eir original 4ome) So, similarlC to w4at 4appened in t4e diagnosis presented in t4e Tractatus, t4e general lesson to be e@tracted from t4is analCsis of solipsism seems to be t4at, if t4at position is taIen until its last conse&uences, it s4ows itself unsustainable, and its central t4esis nonsensical)

/R) Would our solipsist be satisfied wit4 suc4 a reduction ad absurdum of 4er positionW !4e answer is, of course6 O.oP) After all, * imagine s4e >we? could grant t4e grammatical point about comparative T absolute senses of t4e words involved in t4e formulation of S, and still feel inclined to 4old t4at, notwit4standing t4e inco4erence of suc4 an attempt, t4ere remains a >possiblC ineffable? e@perience of Jlosing touc4 wit4 realityK >in particular, at least in t4is conte@t, wit4 t4e past?, and, conse&uentlC, of becoming distrustful of t4e >ordinarC? comparative assessments of it) !4ere simplC is suc4 condition of being 4uman as being sub<ected to t4e >t4reatening? e@perience, or feeling, of being isolated from, or out of attunement wit4, t4e worldBparticularlC its >presentlC? unperceived aspectsN/0Y in t4e
N/0

SimilarlC, t4ere is suc4 condition of being 4uman as t4e >t4reatening? e@perience, or feeling, of being separate of, or out of attunement wit4, ot4ersBparticularlC t4eir >e@ternallC? unperceived states >see c4apter N?) StanleC Cavell 4as argued t4at be4ind t4e >eminentlC epistemological? &uests for <ustification

Solipsism of t4e present moment NLE face of suc4 a condition, both t4e attempts at escaping our metap4Csical loneliness bC resorting to a p4ilosop4ical fantasC >e)g), Osolipsism of t4e present momentP?Bconceiving all realitC as internal to our all-embracing e@perience >t4e Oworld as ideaP?Band t4e >dogmatic? denials of t4e legitimacC of our troubles can be seen as 4Csterical and forced repressions of our 4umanitCN/N) !4is prompts me to maIe a claim w4ic4 was ec4oed in t4e general *ntroductionBnamelC, t4at as * read Wittgenstein, 4is is a te@t w4ere bot4 Iinds of repressions are >alternatelC? enacted, none of t4em to be simplC taken in as t4e Jfinal wordK on t4e sub<ect bC 4is readersY little wonder, t4en, t4at one maC find commentators willing to ascribe eac4 of t4ose attitudes to 4imBi)e), to saC eit4er t4at Wittgenstein was tempted bC some form of solipsism, or t4at 4e refuted it bC means of 4is grammatical clarifications) \et solipsismB as one among so manC instances of our all too 4uman attitudes of p4ilosop4ical indulgence in t4e face of t4e problems of lifeBis neit4er refuted nor defended in t4ese te@tsY rat4er, it is s4own bC w4at it reallC is, partiallC bC means of grammatical reminders, w4ose >negative? purpose is to indicate t4at, contrarC to w4at one would initiallC suppose, t4ere is no suc4 t4ing as a >meaningful, bona fide? formulation of t4at Jp4ilosop4ical positionKB 4ence, t4at resorting to solipsism >among manC ot4er suc4 JpositionsK? is not reallC a matter of presenting and defending Jt4esesK or Jt4eoriesK about t4e essence of t4e p4enomenaY rat4er, it is a matter of deflecting t4e attention from t4e real difficulties faced bC creatures endowed wit4 suc4 capacities >and burdens? as we 4ave of taIing up our e@periences, our condition in t4e world, and give t4em senseBor fail to) \et in order to accept t4at diagnosis one 4as to be prepared to counteract old p4ilosop4ical 4abits, w4ic4 maC be deeplC rootedY faced wit4 t4at c4allenge, it is all but impossible to fall bacI, taIing t4ose verC grammatical reminders presented bC Wittgenstein as furt4er pat4s, or e@cuses, to sublimation, onlC reinforcing repression)
of our claims to kno"ledge of t4e Oe@ternal worldP and Oot4er mindsP stand t4e prior issues of acceptance >of t4e world? and ackno"ledgement >of ot4ers?) Supposing, as * am inclined to do, t4at 4is argument for t4at view is sound, an interesting &uestion arises w4et4er an analogous point mig4t be made concerning sIepticism about t4e past) Alt4oug4 * will not trC to pursue furt4er t4at possibilitC 4ere, * t4inI it would be wort4 considering a positive answer to t4at &uestion, starting wit4 t4e intuition t4at be4ind t4e >epistemological? troubles concerning OcognitionP of t4e past, t4ere maC be t4e prior >e@istential? difficulties of acInowledging and accepting onePs own pastBas part of t4e tasI of coming to terms wit4 onePs own mortalitC and finitude) >.iet=sc4ePs notion of amor fati, as well as ,eideggerPs attempt to unveil our own condition as OGeings-toward-(eat4PBw4ic4 in turn s4ould enable a more aut4entic attitude of Dasein toward life, as opposed to a mere identification wit4 t4e impersonal OonePBare instances of t4e Iind of alternative, non-sublimated p4ilosop4ical stances * imagine one mig4t adopt dealing wit4 t4ese issues)? * am 4ere ec4oing %ic4ard 7ldridgePs verC apt formulations of t4ese points >see 7ldridge, /00N, p) N1Q?)

N/N

Solipsism of t4e present moment NLL Again, it is up to eac4 of us to find a resolution to t4is situationBto taIe WittgensteinPs reminders as laCing down t4e >grammatical? law, or as mere rungs in so manC ladders to be t4rown awaC once t4e w4ole t4erapeutic progress is over) ,aving reac4ed t4is point in t4e analCsis of t4e >emarks, mC own inclination would be to emp4asi=e t4at, in writing t4e reflections we 4ave been reading, Wittgenstein was still moved bC an et4ical pro<ect of sorts, w4ic4 gets conspicuouslC displaCed in t4ese reiterations of 4is attempts to cure t4e readers >and 4imself? from some of t4e temptations e@pressed bC solipsism)

VVV

%"7 ,pilogue: on letting oneself be 0dragged into t$e mire

/Q) *f t4e preceding reading is on t4e rig4t tracIs, * 4ope it 4as gone some of t4e waC toward s4owing t4at Wittgenstein, bC t4e time 4e wrote t4e >emarks, 4eld a rat4er similar attitude to solipsism as t4e one adopted in t4e Tractatus%4ence, a rat4er different attitude from t4e self-indulgent one commonlC adopted bC most p4ilosop4ersBin t4at 4e reallC tooI t4e pains of t4e solipsist for 4imself, sCstematicallC engaging in t4e tasI of acInowledging and giving full voice to a w4ole range of p4ilosop4ical fantasies w4ic4 go associated wit4 t4at JpositionK) As * said above, it is not e@actlC surprising t4at suc4 an attitude could be sometimes confused wit4 a sCmptom of 4is own JsuccumbingK to t4ose temptationsY Cet a more sCmpat4etic and fait4ful assessment is available, w4ose starting point is t4e recognition t4at for Wittgenstein >earlC and late?, t4ere is no effective treatment to Ot4e diseases of t4e intellect to w4ic4 p4ilosop4ers are so proneP e@cept immuni=ation >4owever momentarC and local, as t4e late Wittgenstein would per4aps liIe to add? t4roug4 onePs own defencesBsomet4ing w4ic4 is broug4t about onlC bC being first infected oneself) And since solipsism, besides being t4e paradigm of t4ose diseases, maC also be seen as one of t4e most intenseBcall it an outburst or paro@CsmBt4is could account for t4e rat4er careful, aseptic 4andling w4ic4 c4aracteri=es t4e standard attitude of p4ilosop4ers toward it, few of w4om would 4ave t4e willingness to OstrictlC follow outP t4e implications of t4eir initial assumptions)

7pilogue6 on letting oneself be Odragged into t4e mireP NLM GC waC of bringing t4e present c4apter to a close, * would liIe to call attention to a passage from a different conte@t, w4ic4 * 4ope will 4elp clarifC t4e met4odological claims <ust madeBbringing t4eir point 4omeBas well as paving t4e waC for t4e analCsis w4ic4 * will pursue in t4e ne@t c4apter) !4e conte@t is t4at of a lecture, delivered some Cears after WittgensteinPs return to CambridgeN//, and t4e reason w4C * t4inI it maC 4elp us at t4is <uncture is t4at in it Wittgenstein provides an interesting new metap4or, w4ic4 is designed to clarifC >w4at 4e sees as? t4e correct p4ilosop4ical met4od to deal wit4 JpositionsK liIe solipsism) * &uote t4e relevant passage in full6
"4ilosop4C maC start from common sense but it cannot remain common sense) As a mater of fact p4ilosop4C cannot start from common sense because t4e business of p4ilosop4C is to rid one of t4ose pu==les w4ic4 do not arise in common sense) .o p4ilosop4er lacIs common sense in ordinarC life) So p4ilosop4ers s4ould not attempt to present t4e idealistic or solipsistic positions, for e@ample, as t4oug4 t4eC were absurdBbC pointing out to a person w4o puts forward t4ese positions t4at 4e does not reallC wonder w4et4er t4e beef is real or w4et4er it is an idea in 4is mind, w4et4er 4is wife is real or w4et4er onlC 4e is real) 5f course 4e does not, and it is not a proper ob<ection) \ou must not trC to avoid a p4ilosop4ical problem bC appealing to common senseY instead, present it as it arises wit4 most power) \ou must allow Courself to be dragged into t4e mire, and get out of it) "4ilosop4C can be said to consist of t4ree activities6 to see t4e commonsense answer, to get Courself so deeplC into t4e problem t4at t4e commonsense answer is unbearable, and to get from t4at situation bacI to t4e commonsense answer) Gut t4e commonsense answer in itself is no solutionY everCone Inows it) 5ne must not in p4ilosop4C attempt to s4ort-circuit problems) >WHC, pp) N0M-N01?

!4is passage offers a IeC to understand WittgensteinPs Jt4erapeuticK met4odologC concerning not onlC solipsism, but manC ot4er Jintellectual diseasesK of w4ic4 solipsism stands as a paradigm) As * 4ave been trCing to illustrate wit4 t4e preceding analCsis t4e default procedure adopted in order to free 4is Jp4ilosop4ical interlocutorsKBi)e), WittgensteinPs own Jinternal voicesK, w4ic4 are also our o"n, to t4e e@tent to w4ic4 we reallC engage wit4 4is te@tsBfrom t4eir >our? p4ilosop4ical temptations involves preciselC to Oallow oneself to be dragged into t4e mireP, in order to reallC feel t4ose temptations arising Owit4 most powerP, and t4enBbut onlC t4enBto trC to Oget out of itP, going ObacI to t4e commonsense answerPBw4ic4, as we also saw, is never to be confused wit4 t4e dogmatic and self-indulgent standpoint of t4e Ocommonsense p4ilosop4erP) Gearing t4ose considerations in mind, and taIing t4e analCsis pursued up to t4is point as a bacIdrop, one mig4t conclude t4at to strictlC follow t4roug4 solipsismPs implications, in
N//

8ore specificallC, near t4e end of <ichaelmas Term of N1RQ)

7pilogue6 on letting oneself be Odragged into t4e mireP NL1 eac4 of its multiple formulations, is preciselC a waC of Oletting Courself to be dragged into t4e mirePY but w4at we s4ould reali=e after doing itBas a condition of coming ObacI to t4e commonsense answerPBis t4at, from t4e verC beginning, we were not saCing anything w4en combining words in order to JformulateK t4e solipsistic >supposed? Jt4esesK) !4at is, of course, a rat4er negative and destructive resultY t4e bonus is t4at, bC 4aving our positions reduced ad absurdum in suc4 a waCBbC seeing t4at our J&uestionsK were onlC pseudo-&uestionsBwe maC become able to climb beCond t4em, redirecting our attention to t4e real difficulties underlCing our evasive attempts to sublimate t4em) !4ose are t4e met4odological aims w4ic4, as we s4all see in t4e ne@t c4apter, were still being pursued bC Wittgenstein bC t4e time 4e dictated w4at became Inown as The ?lue ?ook)

Solipsism, "rivacC and t4e #rammar of t4e First "erson in !4e Glue GooI NM0

( Solipsism& !rivac* and t$e :rammar of t$e First !erson in The Blue Book
What the solipsist "ants is not a notation in "hich the ego has a monopoly, but one in "hich the ego vanishes. >Wittgenstein, WHC //?

("1

!rologue

N) As * 4ave been arguing, t4e p4ilosop4ical temptation of solipsismBits nature, sources, and cureBis among t4e central and most recurrent concerns in WittgensteinPs writings) W4en dealing wit4 t4at temptation, 4e continuouslC went bacI to issues involving t4e nature of t4e O*P, OselfP, Osoul or Osub<ectPBwords w4ic4, as ,ans Sluga aptlC notes w4en surveCing a nearbC terrain, were used Omore or less indiscriminatelCP during WittgensteinPs lifetime >see Sluga, N11E, p) R/0?) ActuallC, since 4is verC earliest recorded p4ilosop4ical reflectionsN/R, Wittgenstein 4as been interested in t4e connection between t4e temptation to assume some form of solipsism and certain confusions concerning t4e grammar of t4e first person pronounY eventuallC, 4e also came to believe t4at t4e <oint treatment of t4ose issues would be an effectiveBper4aps the most effectiveBwaC of blocIing some of t4e ma<or sources of p4ilosop4ical confusion arising in t4e analCsis of language in generalB particularlC, but not e@clusivelC, t4at portion of language used to talI about our Opersonal e@periencesP) 5ne of t4e most sustained and detailed analCses of solipsism and t4e grammar of t4e first person occurs in t4e worI we Inow as The ?lue ?ookN/Q) Among t4e claims presented in t4at analCsis, one s4all find some of t4e most surprisinglC counter-intuitive, as well as
N/R

N/Q

At least as earlC as N1NE, in t4e middle of a continuous stream of remarIs dealing wit4 solipsismBw4ic4 would be latter incorporated almost wit4out c4ange in section :)E of t4e TractatusBWittgenstein 4ad alreadC written t4at O!4e *, t4e * is w4at is deeplC mCsterious[P >.G M0?) The ?lue ?ook is a selection of notes dictated bC Wittgenstein to some of 4is pupils at Cambridge in t4e intervals of t4e lectures delivered in t4e academic Cear N1RR-RQY its title is due to t4e fact t4at t4e first set of mimeograp4ed copies of t4ose notes w4ic4 circulated among students 4ad a blue cover)

"rologue NMN some of t4e most remarIablC trivial of all 4is writings) !o t4e first categorC belong t4e claim t4at t4e pronoun O*P does not refer to anCt4ingBbe it a bodC, a soul or a person >w4ere t4e latter is taIen as a different Iind of entitC from t4e former two? >see e)g) GG E1?Y regarding t4e second categorC, an e@ample is t4e claim t4at O*n J* 4ave painK, J*K is not a demonstrative pronounP >GG EM?) As it 4appens so often wit4 WittgensteinPs writings, t4ose claims pose a difficult e@egetical c4allenge for t4e reader, w4o mig4t find 4erself unable to devise t4eir meaning and relevance) Again, an important part of t4at difficultC lies in t4e all but unavoidable failure in taIing notice of t4e peculiar nature of WittgensteinPs p4ilosop4ical prose, engaging in t4e process of self-e@amination and selfcriticism t4at 4e sets up for 4is readersBcall it t4e internal relation between form and content in 4is te@ts)

/) Het me trC to brieflC illustrate t4at claim6 t4ere is a widelC spread opinion among WittgensteinPs supporters to t4e effect t4at 4isBparticularlC 4is post-!ractarianBtreatment of sub<ectivitCN/: represents a fundamental breaI relative to t4e w4ole >Western? p4ilosop4ical traditionN/E) 5ne of t4e main reasons presented in support to t4at opinion is preciselC t4at 4e would 4ave been t4e first to &uestion an assumption s4ared bC virtuallC anC aut4or in t4at traditionBnamelC, t4at t4e first person pronoun 4as a referential role in Jself-ascriptiveKN/L statements concerning actions, mental states, events and attitudes, in t4e present of t4e indicative tenseN/M) * s4all from time to time refer to t4at view as t4e OnonN/:

N/E

N/L

N/M

!4e p4rase Otreatment of sub<ectivitCP is 4ere being emploCed in deliberatelC broad sense, so as to cover bot4 t4e analCsis of traditional metap4Csical &uestions about t4e nature of Ot4e selfPBsuc4 as personal identitC, substantialitC of t4e sub<ect .ua t4inIing being, and t4e possibilitC of its e@istence in isolation from t4e rest of t4e world and ot4er mindsBas t4e analCsis of t4e grammar of t4e pronoun O*P in first person statements) 7c4oing a claim made bC Wittgenstein in t4e ?lue ?ook >see GG /M?, one mig4t per4aps saC t4at 4is treatment of t4e grammar of first person is one of t4e O4eirsP of w4at used to be called Op4ilosop4C of t4e sub<ectP) ,ere is a representative pair of &uotes from ,acIer in #onne)ions and #ontroversies6 O!4e Tractatus is, and was intended to be, t4e culmination of a tradition of 7uropean p4ilosop4C) !4e Investigations and t4e ot4er unfinis4ed later worIs were not) !4eC were meant to be a breaI wit4 t4e great tradition of Western t4oug4tBindeed a destructive breaI, w4ic4 would undermine its most fundamental tenets)P >"reface, p) i@?Y OFor t4e contour lines of t4e bodC of 4is t4oug4t cannot be represented on e@isting p4ilosop4ical maps) And t4at is not a mere coincidence, but rat4er a conse&uence of t4e fact t4at 4e re<ected t4e most fundamental presuppositions of received p4ilosop4ical t4oug4t)P >p) i@? !4e p4rase Oself-ascriptiveP is emploCed 4ere due to its prominence in t4e p4ilosop4ical literatureY for t4e time being, * s4all set aside t4e &uestion about w4et4er it is legitimate to use it in t4e conte@t of WittgensteinPs p4ilosop4CBafter all, one of 4is main contentions seems to be preciselC t4at >presumptive? Oself-ascriptiveP statements 4ave an e)pressive function, w4ic4 is verC different from t4e role of bona fide, t4ird person statements describing actions, mental states, events and attitudes of ot4er sub<ects) * s4all come bacI to t4at issue below) *n an essaC w4ic4 is seminal for t4is discussion, 7li=abet4 Anscombe >N11Q, pp) NQ0-N:1? e@plores some

"rologue NM/ referential viewP) (espite finding prima facie strong te@tual support, * taIe it t4at t4e nonreferential view undulC simplifies and distortsBone mig4t saC6 caricaturesB WittgensteinPs stance on t4e issue of t4e grammar of t4e first person, leading to a series of e@egetical and p4ilosop4ical misunderstandings, w4ose culmination, at least to mC mind, is t4e attempt to e@tract from 4is remarIs some Iind of straig4tforward logico-grammatical JrefutationK of positions suc4 as dualism, idealism, solipsism or be4aviourismBi)e), some of t4e views w4ic4, preciselC in WittgensteinPs eCes, were to count among t4e most pervasive and stronglC tempting ones in p4ilosop4C, and >conse&uentlC? would re&uire a muc4 less dogmatic and more self-&uestioning approac4 in order for t4eir real sources to be unveiled, and t4eir grip to be loosenedBas opposed to repressed or sublimated) GC taIing WittgensteinPs claims about t4e ordinarC use of t4e first person pronoun as direct attempts at >grammaticallC? blocIing some substantial metap4Csical results, t4e supporters of t4e non-referential view seem to be missing, at least to some e@tent, t4e t4erapeutic nature of 4is argumentation) !4at is t4e main reason w4C * t4inI it is crucial to analCse WittgensteinPs remarIs concerning t4e grammar of first person in t4eir proper conte@ts, as parts of a >dialectic? process of gradual overcoming of some p4ilosop4ical temptationsB particularlC, given mC present concerns, t4e solipsistic one) AccordinglC, aiming to supplC a more detailed picture of 4is treatment of t4e first person pronoun, as well as to laC bare some of t4e main problems faced bC t4e non-referential view, t4e following analCsis will remain as close as possible to t4e te@tual development of 4is argumentation in t4e particular conte@t provided bC t4e ?lue ?ook. >SinceBas t4e subtitle of its publis4ed edition indicatesBt4at te@t also served as an important OpreliminarC studCP to t4e >rat4er condensed? treatment of t4e issues involving privacC and t4e grammar of t4e first person in t4e Philosophical Investigations, bC analCsing it * 4ope to go part of t4e waC toward t4e aim of s4eding some >still needed? lig4t upon t4e latter worI)?

of WittgensteinPs claims >especiallC t4ose presented in t4e ?lue ?ook and in "* cc R1M-QNN?, and offers a series of connected arguments defending t4e t4esis t4at O*P is not a referential e@pressionB4ence, t4at t4e following definition is incorrect6 O J*K is t4e word t4at a person uses to talI about 4erselfP >ibid) p) NQ/?) GasicallC t4e same view is 4eld bC manC ot4er interpreters, among w4om figure .orman 8alcolm >N11:, pp) NE-/E?, Ant4onC DennC >N1MQ? and "eter ,acIer >N110, c4) Q ] N11Lc, cap ) S***?)

8eaning, $nderstanding, and "ersonal 7@periences NMR

("# ;eaning& <nderstanding& and !ersonal ,8periences

R) * would liIe to start t4e present reading bC maIing some preliminarC considerations about t4e waC in w4ic4 t4e treatment of solipsism emerges in t4e ?lue ?ook) * s4all taIe t4e following passageBw4ic4, for reasons soon to be mentioned, serves as a sort of waters4ed in t4e argument presented in t4e booIBas an entrC point6
!4e reason * postponed talIing about personal e@perience was t4at t4inIing about t4is topic raises a 4ost of p4ilosop4ical difficulties w4ic4 t4reaten to breaI up all our commonsense notions about w4at we s4ould commonlC call t4e ob<ects of our e@perience) And if we were strucI bC t4ese problems it mig4t seem to us t4at all we 4ave said about signs and about t4e various ob<ects we mentioned in our e@amples maC 4ave to go into t4e melting-pot) >GG QQ?

At first sig4tBfor t4e reader w4o 4as been following t4e pages of t4e ?lue ?ook up to t4is pointBw4at t4e passage above states is >literallC? &uite incredibleY after all, it purports to marI a c4ange in t4e focus of t4e analCsis pursued in t4e booIBsupposedlC going from talI of OsignsP and Oob<ectsP to t4e e@amination of our Opersonal e@periencePBw4ic4 is far from conspicuous, in t4at it is &uite manifest t4at Wittgenstein did not spend t4e first 4alf of t4e booI talIing onlC of OsignsP and Oob<ectsP, and it taIes onlC a &uicI looI forward to reali=e t4at 4e will e&uallC not talI e@clusivelC about Opersonal e@perienceP in its second 4alf) ,owever, a more attentive reading of t4e analCsis preceding t4at passage is available, w4ic4 mig4t s4ow t4at, appearances notwit4standing, it is possible to interpret WittgensteinPs argumentative strategC up to t4is point in accordance to 4is own assessment BnamelC, as an attempt to divert our >and, we maC suppose, 4is studentsPs? attention from t4e >supposedlC? inner and private Opersonal e@periencesP to t4eir overt and public linguistic e@pressionBOsignsP, in a broad senseBas well as to t4e ob;ects emploCed in t4e ordinarC conte@ts in w4ic4 t4ose signs are used)

Q) *n fact, t4e verC first move presented in t4e booI can be so construed as to illustrate t4at strategCBas an attempt, i)e), to divert our attention from t4e &uestion Ow4at is t4e meaning of a wordP >GG N, emp4asis added?Ba &uestion w4ic4, if asIed of a word for personal

8eaning, $nderstanding, and "ersonal 7@periences NMQ e@periences, maC naturallC incline one to seeI for some OinnerP and OprivateP item in responseBto &uestions liIe Ow4at is an e)planation of t4e meaning of a wordY w4at does t4e e)planation of a word looI liIeWP >ibid, emp4asis added?) According to Wittgenstein, t4e advantage of asIing t4e second Iind of &uestion, instead of t4e first, is t4at6
\ou in a sense bring t4e &uestion Jw4at is meaningWK down to eart4) For, surelC, to understand t4e meaning of JmeaningK Cou oug4t also to understand t4e meaning of Je@planation of meaningK) %oug4lC6 JletPs asI w4at t4e e@planation of meaning is, for w4atever t4at e@plains will be t4e meaning)K StudCing t4e grammar of t4e e@pression Je@planation of meaningK will teac4 Cou somet4ing about t4e grammar of t4e word JmeaningK and will cure Cou of t4e temptation to looI about Cou for some ob<ect w4ic4 Cou mig4t call Jt4e meaningK) >GG N?

Wittgenstein elaborates on t4is last pointBabout, i)e), Ot4e temptation to looI about Cou for some ob<ect w4ic4 Cou mig4t call Jt4e meaningKPBin a number of different conte@ts of t4e booI, starting wit4 t4e following passage, in w4ic4 4e presents a picture of t4e relation between signs and mental processes t4at will plaC a central role in 4is subse&uent argumentation6
*t seems t4at t4ere are certain definite mental processes bound up wit4 t4e worIing of language, processes t4roug4 w4ic4 alone language can function) * mean t4e processes of understanding and meaning) !4e signs of our language seem dead wit4out t4ese mental processesY and it mig4t seem t4at t4e onlC function of t4e signs is to induce suc4 processes, and t4at t4ese are t4e t4ings we oug4t reallC to be interested in) _)))`BWe are tempted to t4inI t4at t4e action of language consists of two partsY an inorganic part, t4e 4andling of signs, and an organic part, w4ic4 we maC call understanding t4ese signs, meaning t4em, interpreting t4em, t4inIing) !4ese latter activities seem to taIe place in a &ueer Iind of medium, t4e mindY and t4e mec4anism of t4e mind, t4e nature of w4ic4, it seems, we donPt &uite understand, can bring about effects w4ic4 no material mec4anism could) >GG R?

Against t4e temptation to accept, or to assume, t4e picture described aboveBabout t4e Ooccult appearanceP of t4e processes of t4inIing, meaning and understanding >see GG Q?B Wittgenstein suggests preciselC t4at we Oreplace in t4ese processes anC worIing of t4e imagination bC acts of looIing at real ob;ectsP, as well as OeverC process of speaIing to oneself bC speaIing aloud or bC writingP >GG Q, emp4asis added?) ,e illustrates t4at met4odological advice suggesting t4at, instead of assuming t4at Ow4en * 4ear t4e word JredK wit4 understanding, a red image s4ould be before mC mindPs eCeP, * s4ould trC to Osubstitute seeing a red bit of paper for imagining a red patc4P >ibid)?)

8eaning, $nderstanding, and "ersonal 7@periences NM: :) .ow, if one recalls t4e analCsis pursued in t4e former c4apter, one mig4t per4aps conclude t4at t4e replacement strategC >of OinnerP bC OouterP processes? presented in t4e ?lue ?ook is an instanceBor better6 a 4eirBof t4e Onew met4odP of grammatical elucidation conceived during t4e time Wittgenstein wrote t4e Philosophical >emarks) As we observed analCsing t4at te@t, t4e met4od t4ere prescribed and pursued was grounded in t4e comparison between actual >ordinarC? uses of words, sentences and pictures wit4 somew4at modified or even invented ones) Gearing t4at in mind, one mig4t also notice t4at w4en Wittgenstein introducesBfor t4e first time in 4is recorded t4inIingBt4e notion of language-games, 4e seems to be preciselC resuming and re-elaborating t4at former met4odological conception6
* s4all in t4e future again and again draw Cour attention to w4at * s4all call language games) !4ese are waCs of using signs simpler t4an t4ose in w4ic4 we use t4e signs of our 4ig4lC complicated everCdaC language) Hanguage games are t4e forms of language wit4 w4ic4 a c4ild begins to maIe use of words) !4e studC of language games is t4e studC of primitive forms of language or primitive languages) *f we want to studC t4e problems of trut4 and false4ood, of t4e agreement and disagreement of propositions wit4 realitC, of t4e nature of assertion, assumption, and &uestion, we s4all wit4 great advantage looI at primitive forms of language in w4ic4 t4ese forms of t4inIing appear wit4out t4e confusing bacIground of 4ig4lC complicated processes of t4oug4t) W4en we looI at suc4 simple forms of language t4e mental mist w4ic4 seems to ens4roud our ordinarC use of language disappears) We see activities, reactions, w4ic4 are clear-cut and transparent) 5n t4e ot4er 4and we recogni=e in t4ese simple processes forms of language not separated bC a breaI from our more complicated ones) We see t4at we can build up t4e complicated forms from t4e primitive ones bC graduallC adding new forms) >GG NL?

.ow, to replace OinnerP bC OouterP processes is of course one "ay of isolating a region of t4e language we want to elucidate from its Oconfusing bacIground of 4ig4lC complicated processes of t4oug4tP, t4us dissipating at least part of t4e Omental mistP ens4rouding t4e ordinarC use of t4e relevant concepts, Cet wit4out producing a complete breaI wit4 t4ose >more complicated? ordinarC practicesN/1)

E) *n t4e conte@t of t4e ?lue ?ook, t4e central aim of emploCing t4at replacement strategC is preciselC to divert t4e readerPs attention from t4e picture of meaning as somet4ing mental, to t4e picture of meaning as use6 Oif we 4ad to name anCt4ing w4ic4 is t4e life of
N/1

!4at, bC t4e waC, seems to be preciselC t4e role assigned to t4e builderPs language-game in "* c/) For an interesting discussion of t4is point, see 8ul4all >/00N, esp) pp) :/-:M?)

8eaning, $nderstanding, and "ersonal 7@periences NME t4e sign, we s4ould 4ave to saC t4at it was its useP >GG Q?Y O%oug4lC6 understanding a sentence means understanding a language) T As a part of t4e sCstem of language, one maC saC, t4e sentence 4as life)P >GG :?) !4at aim gets clearlC e@pressed w4en Wittgenstein presents a Orule of t4umbP to deal wit4 cases in w4ic4 we become pu==led about t4e nature of Omental processesP6
*f Cou are pu==led about t4e nature of t4oug4t, belief, Inowledge, and t4e liIe, substitute for t4e t4oug4t t4e e@pression of t4e t4oug4t, etc) !4e difficultC w4ic4 lies in t4is substitution, and at t4e same time t4e w4ole point of it, is t4is6 t4e e@pression of belief, t4oug4t, etc), is <ust a sentenceYBand t4e sentence 4as sense onlC as a member of a sCstem of languageY as one e@pression wit4in a calculus) >GG Q/?

*n fact, Wittgenstein taIes 4is Orule of t4umbP to some e@tremes, originating claims w4ic4 are verC counter-intuitive, if read outside t4eir original conte@ts) !4e following passage offers a representative e@ample6
*t is misleading t4en to talI of t4inIing as of a Jmental activitCK) We maC saC t4at t4inIing is essentiallC t4e activitC of operating wit4 signs) !4is activitC is performed bC t4e 4and, w4en we t4inI bC writingY bC t4e mout4 and larCn@, w4en we t4inI bC speaIingY and if we t4inI bC imagining signs or pictures, * can give Cou no agent t4at t4inIs) *f t4en Cou saC t4at in suc4 cases t4e mind t4inIs, * would onlC draw Cour attention to t4e fact t4at Cou are using a metap4or, t4at 4ere t4e mind is an agent in a different sense from t4at in w4ic4 t4e 4and can be said to be t4e agent in writing) >GG E-L?

!aIen at face value, t4at passage seems to be stating t4at t4ere is no suc4 t4ing as a OmindP or OconsciousnessP above and beCond t4e physical activities of writing and speaIingB t4ese being t4e onlC ones w4ic4 mig4t literallC >as opposed to metap4oricallC? be described as thinking) .ow t4at surelC sounds parado@ical) !4e parado@icalitC fades awaC, 4owever, w4en one reali=es t4e methodological role of suc4 claimsY one mig4t saC t4at, in practice, w4at Wittgenstein is aiming at is maIing a crooIed sticIBt4e analCsis of t4inIing T meaning in terms of inner processesBstraig4t, bC bending it to t4e opposite directionBt4at of t4e public, outward e@pression of t4inIing T meaning) ,is intention, t4en, is neit4er to deny t4at mental processes do e@ist, nor t4at t4eC do go 4and in 4and wit4 t4e use of linguistic OsignsPNR0)
NR0

!4at point is made clear in t4e se&uence of t4e passage &uoted above, w4ere Wittgenstein introduces 4is Orule of t4umbP6 .ow we are tempted to imagine t4is calculus _i)e), t4at of Oa sCstem of languageP`, as it were, as a permanent bacIground to everC sentence w4ic4 we saC, and to t4inI t4at, alt4oug4 t4e sentence as written on a piece of paper or spoIen stands isolated, in t4e mental act of t4inIing t4e calculus is t4ereBall in

8eaning, $nderstanding, and "ersonal 7@periences NML !4e prima facie parado@icalitC of t4e claims resulting from t4e emploCment of languagegames is, in fact, a welcomed aspect of WittgensteinPs met4od, as 4e acInowledges in anot4er telling passage6
*t is wrong to saC t4at in p4ilosop4C we consider an ideal language as opposed to our ordinarC one) For t4is maIes it appear as t4oug4 we t4oug4t we could improve on ordinarC language) Gut ordinarC language is all rig4t) W4enever we maIe up Oideal languagesP it is not in order to replace our ordinarC language bC t4emY but <ust to remove some trouble caused in someonePs mind bC t4inIing t4at 4e 4as got 4old of t4e e@act use of a common word) !4at is also w4C our met4od is not merelC to enumerate actual usages of words, but rat4er deliberatelC to invent new ones, some of t4em because of t4eir absurd appearance) >GG /M?

L) !4e considerations made so far go some waC toward e@plaining 4ow one s4ould understand t4e passage wit4 w4ic4 our analCsis began, and w4ic4, as * said above, serves as a waters4ed in ?lue ?ookPs argumentY w4at t4eC s4ow is t4at t4ere is a met4odological concern be4ind WittgensteinPs decision to postpone talIing about Opersonal e@perienceP, calling t4e readerPs attention instead to t4e OsignsP and Oreal ob<ectsP emploCed in our linguistic practices) !4at said, we are still left wit4 t4e tasI of understanding w4ic4 would be t4e Op4ilosop4ical difficultiesP t4at would Ot4reaten to breaI up all our commonsense notionsP about Ot4e ob<ects of our e@perienceP >GG QQ?, were we to attacI t4e &uestion about t4e nature of Opersonal e@periencesP directlC, instead of going sidewaCs, following WittgensteinPs guidance) Wittgenstein begins to account for t4is latter pointBas well as to direct our attention to t4e &uestions w4ic4 will lead to t4e analCsis of solipsismBin t4e following passage6
W4en we t4inI about t4e relation of t4e ob<ects surrounding us to our personal e@periences of t4em, we are sometimes tempted to saC t4at t4ese personal e@periences are t4e material of w4ic4 realitC consists) ,ow t4is temptation arises will become clearer later on)

a lump) !4e mental act seems to perform in a miraculous waC w4at could not be performed bC anC act of manipulating sCmbols) .ow w4en t4e temptation to t4inI t4at in some sense t4e w4ole calculus must be present at t4e same time vanis4es, t4ere is no more point in postulating t4e e@istence of a peculiar Iind of mental act alongside of our e@pression) !4is, of course, doesnPt mean t4at we 4ave s4own t4at peculiar acts of consciousness do not accompanC t4e e@pressions of our t4oug4ts[ 5nlC we no longer saC t4at t4eC must accompanC t4em) >GG Q/?

8eaning, $nderstanding, and "ersonal 7@periences NMM

W4en we t4inI in t4is waC we seem to lose our firm 4old on t4e ob<ects surrounding us) And instead we are left wit4 a lot of separate personal e@periences of different individuals) !4ese personal e@periences again seem vague and seem to be in constant flu@) 5ur language seems not to 4ave been made to describe t4em) We are tempted to t4inI t4at in order to clear up suc4 matters p4ilosop4icallC our ordinarC language is too coarse, t4at we need a more subtle one) >GG Q:?

*n t4e passage above, Wittgenstein presents t4e pat4 leading from an apparentlC innocent consideration of t4e relation between Oob<ectsP and Oour personal e@periencesP, to t4e temptation of revising >ordinarC? language, replacing a OsubtlerP one for it) #iven t4at t4e account of t4e origins of t4at temptation is 4ere postponed, one mig4t >re?construct WittgensteinPs central claim in t4at passage as a conditional wit4 >somet4ing liIe? an occult variableBstating t4at if we assume a certain picture >)? of t4e relation between t4e Oob<ects surrounding usP and Oour personal e@periencesPBone w4ic4 implies t4at our e@periences would be OvagueP and Oin constant flu@PBthen our analCsis would end up leading to a Iind of feeling of loss from t4e Ofirm 4oldP on t4ose ob<ects) !4at feeling, * taIe it, mig4t in turn originate a w4ole range of distinct attitudes, according to onePs p4ilosop4ical frame of mind) !4us, to sticI to t4e e@tremities of t4at range, if one 4as an idealistic or solipsistic bend, t4e inclination would be to conclude t4at our personal e@periences simplC are t4e only realitC t4ere isY Cet, for someone wit4 realistic &ualms, t4at conclusion would be obviouslC unacceptable, 4ence t4e inclination to taIe anot4er route, seeIing for >Cet anot4er? p4ilosop4ical t4eorC allowing to revert t4at situation, bC providing some guarantee against metap4Csical and T or epistemological separation from t4e Je@ternalK realitC)

M) *n t4e se&uence of t4e te@t, Wittgenstein offers anot4er description of t4e initial attitude triggered bC t4at >still unidentified? pictureBand also indicates t4e waC out of itBin t4e following waC6
We seem to 4ave made a discoverCBw4ic4 * could describe bC saCing t4at t4e ground on w4ic4 we stood and w4ic4 appeared to be firm and reliable was found to be boggC and unsafe)B!4at is, t4is 4appens w4en we p4ilosop4i=eY for as soon as we revert to t4e standpoint of common sense t4is general uncertaintC disappears) >GG Q:?

8eaning, $nderstanding, and "ersonal 7@periences NM1 *n order to clear up t4e O&ueer situationP faced bC t4e p4ilosop4erBas well as t4e waC out of itBWittgenstein offers w4at 4e describes as Oa Iind parableP >GG Q:?, comparing it wit4 t4e difficultC generated w4en Opopular scientistsP present t4eir discoveries bC stating t4at, contrarC to common sense beliefs, t4e floor on w4ic4 we stand is not solid, since it consists onlC of tinC particles in a mostlC emptC space) .ow t4at claim is verC liIelC to generate perple@itCBsince, on t4e one 4and, Oof course we Inow t4at t4e floor is solid, or t4at, if it isnPt solid, t4is maC be due to t4e wood being rotten but not to its being composed of electronsPY on t4e ot4er 4and, 4owever, Oeven if t4e particles were as big as grains of sand, and as close toget4er as t4ese are in a sand4eap, t4e floor would not be solid if it were composed of t4em in t4e sense in w4ic4 a sand4eap is composed of grainsP >ibid)?) .ow, according to Wittgenstein, t4at w4ole perple@itC is Obased on a misunderstandingP, created bC a misapplication of t4e picture of t4e Ot4inlC filled spacePBw4ic4 was, .)G), originallC meant to Oe@plain t4e verC p4enomenon of soliditCP >ibid)?) !4e problem, one mig4t saC, arises from t4e conflation of two Iinds of descriptionsBtwo different Olanguage-gamesPB to talI about t4e floor, onlC in one of w4ose >i)e), ordinarC language? clear rules are available to emploC t4e concept of OsoliditCP) ,ow are we to compare t4e situation <ust described wit4 our p4ilosop4erPs original pu==le about t4e nature of our personal e@periencesW ,ere is WittgensteinPs answer6
As in t4is e@ample t4e word JsoliditCK was used wronglC and it seemed t4at we 4ad s4own t4at not4ing reallC was solid, <ust in t4is waC, in stating our pu==les about t4e general vagueness of sense-e@perience, and about t4e flu@ of all p4enomena, we are using t4e words Jflu@K and JvaguenessK wronglC, in a tCpicallC metap4Csical waC, namelC wit4out an antit4esisY w4ereas in t4eir correct and everCdaC use vagueness is opposed to clearness, flu@ to stabilitC, inaccuracC to accuracC, and problem to solution) !4e verC word JproblemK, one mig4t saC, is misapplied w4en used for our p4ilosop4ical troubles) !4ese difficulties, as long as t4eC are seen as problems, are tantali=ing, and appear insoluble) >GG Q:-QE?

!4e main idea presented in t4e passage above is t4at, * taIe it, similarlC to t4e difficultC created bC t4e popular scientist in WittgensteinPs parable, t4e p4ilosop4erPs pu==le about t4e nature of personal e@periences arises from a conflation between two Iinds of descriptions, or language-games, onlC in one of w4ose t4e words Oflu@P, OvaguenessP, and so on, 4ave clear rules of emploCmentBin particular, clear antitheses) *n bot4 cases, t4e waC out of t4ose perple@ities involves getting clear about t4e grammar of everCdaC statements, in order to notifC and T or to avoid suc4 Iind of conflation)

8eaning, $nderstanding, and "ersonal 7@periences N10

1) .otice again t4e close parallel between t4e waC Wittgenstein presents t4e situation in t4e passages &uoted above and in t4e Philosophical >emarks6 in bot4 conte@ts 4e tries to s4ow 4ow some OtroublesP originate w4en one departs from t4e Ostandpoint of common senseP to describe onePs >supposed? Jp4ilosop4ical discoveriesK, and suggests t4at, in order to free oneself of suc4 troubles, w4at one needs is a perspicuous view of t4e grammar of t4e e@pressions involved) *n t4e remainder of t4e ?lue ?ook, Wittgenstein will point out a number of suc4 troublesBall of w4ic4, according to 4im, arise naturallC in t4e analCsis of Opersonal e@periencePBs4owing, in eac4 case, t4at if we strictlC follow t4roug4 t4eir implications, we will end up adopting one of t4e p4ilosop4ical attitudes belonging to t4e range mentioned above >e)g), sIepticism, realism, idealism, solipsism, and so on?) Also, for eac4 detected trouble, t4ere will be an attempt to bring us >or, w4at comes to t4e same, t4e p4ilosop4er in eac4 of us? bacI to t4e Ostandpoint of common senseP, t4us >supposedlC? dissolving t4e p4ilosop4ical motivation to revise ordinarC language, replacing a OsubtlerP one for itBw4ic4 is 4ow realists and idealists and solipsists aliIe would interpret t4eir respective proposals) *n t4e ne@t sections * s4all present some of t4e main arguments aiming to accomplis4 suc4 ob<ectives, focusing on WittgensteinPs remarIs on t4e latter >i)e), t4e solipsistic? p4ilosop4ical temptation)

("% 0I can t feel $is pain : a first route to solipsism

N0) Wittgenstein introduces 4is diagnose of t4e confusions leading to t4e t4esis t4at Opersonal e@periences are t4e material of w4ic4 realitC consistsP >GG Q:? wit4 a verC c4aracteristic enactment of a dialectical e@c4ange wit4 some JinterlocutorsK) *n order to facilitate t4e analCsis, * will taIe t4e following passage as an entrC point, enumerating its main dialectical moments6
_i` !4ere is a temptation for me to saC t4at onlC mC own e@perience is real6 J* Inow t4at I see, 4ear, feel pains, etc), but not t4at anCone else does) * canPt Inow t4is, because * am * and t4eC are t4eC)K

O* canPt feel 4is painP6 a first route to solipsism N1N

_ii` 5n t4e ot4er 4and * feel as4amed to saC to anCone t4at mC e@perience is t4e onlC real oneY and * Inow t4at 4e will replC t4at 4e could saC e@actlC t4e same t4ing about 4is e@perience) !4is seems to lead to a sillC &uibble) _iii` Also * am told6 J*f Cou pitC someone for 4aving pains, surelC Cou must at least believe t4at 4e 4as painsK) _iv` Gut 4ow can * even believe t4isW ,ow can t4ese words maIe sense to meW ,ow could * even 4ave come bC t4e idea of anot4erPs e@perience if t4ere is no possibilitC of anC evidence for itW >GG QE?

As * read t4e passage above, its dialectical structure can be reconstructed as follows6 >i? Wittgenstein e@presses a p4ilosop4icalBin t4is case, solipsisticBtemptationY >ii? 4e indicates t4e parado@ical situation w4ic4 would arise if oneB4ere6 t4e p4ilosop4er wit4 solipsistic inclinationsBwere to trC to e@press 4is view to a non-p4ilosop4ical interlocutorY >iii? 4e t4en presents a p4ilosop4icalBin t4is case6 realisticBreplC >Cet anot4er temptation?Y finallC, >iv? t4e solipsistic p4ilosop4er reverts to 4is original stance wit4 renewed convictionBsince t4e previous, realistic replC not even seems to make sense to 4im) !4e ne@t passage taIes t4at e@c4ange a little furt4er, and adds a new c4aracter, or voice NRN, to t4e e@c4ange6
_v` Gut wasnPt t4is a &ueer &uestion to asIW #an!t * believe t4at someone else 4as painsW *s it not &uite easC to believe t4isWB_vi` *s it an answer to saC t4at t4ings are as t4eC appear to common senseWB_vii` Again, needless to saC, we donPt feel t4ese difficulties in ordinarC life) .or is it true to saC t4at we feel t4em w4en we scrutini=e our e@periences bC introspection, or maIe scientific investigations about t4em) Gut some4ow, w4en we looI at t4em in a certain waC, our e@pression is liable to get into a tangle) *t seems to us as t4oug4 we 4ad eit4er t4e wrong pieces, or not enoug4 of t4em, to put toget4er our <igsaw pu==le) Gut t4eC are all t4ere, onlC all mi@ed upY and t4ere is a furt4er analogC between t4e <igsaw pu==le and our case6 *tPs no use trCing to applC force in fitting pieces toget4er) All we s4ould do is to looI at t4em carefully and arrange t4em) >GG QE?

Step >v? in t4is imaginarC dialogueBamounting rat4er to a piece of internal monologueB mig4t be described as a self-&uestioning moment in t4e solipsistic p4ilosop4erPs reflection Bone w4ic4 is clearlC motivated, as in t4e case of step >ii? above, bC an imaginarC
NRN

!4e c4aracteri=ation of WittgensteinPs >mature? writing as a dialogue among different JvoicesK, to w4ic4 * am 4ere subscribing, was introduced it an earlC essaC of StanleC CavellPs6 O!4e AvailabilitC of WittgensteinPs Hater "4ilosop4CP >first publis4ed in N1E/, republis4ed in 8W8?) *n t4at essaC, Cavell distinguis4es two main JvoicesKBnamelC, >i? t4e voice of temptation, i)e), t4e one w4ic4 tempts t4e reader to t4eori=e or p4ilosop4i=e, and >ii? t4e voice of correctness, w4ic4 aims to return t4e reader to ordinarC lifeBin particular, to ordinarC linguistic practices) *n a latter essaCBO.otes and aftert4oug4ts on t4e opening of WittgensteinPs InvestigationsP >N11E?BCavell re-dubs t4e pair of voices, calling t4em Ot4e voices of melanc4olC and merriment, or of metap4Csics and t4e ordinarCP >p) /L0?) *n mC own reading, as it mig4t be clear bC now, * tend to distinguis4 among different inflections >intonationsW? of t4ose two voicesBafter all, one mig4t be tempted bC a number of different p4ilosop4ical views, and accordinglC mig4t need to be OcorrectedP, i)e), broug4t bacI to ordinarC life, bC different means)

O* canPt feel 4is painP6 a first route to solipsism N1/ confrontation wit4 common sense beliefs, and is preciselC not motivated bC t4e realistic p4ilosop4erPs replC >iii?) Step >vi?Bcoming after a pause for reflection, marIed bC t4e use of t4e long das4Bseems to be a &uestion directlC addressed to t4e reader, w4ic4 is not e@actlC answered afterwards >more on t4is in a moment?) !4en finallCBafter anot4er pause Bwe get to step >vii?, w4ose originating voice does not seem to be anC of t4e former ones Bas if it came from above or beCond t4e dispute) >!o saC t4at t4e latter voice would be WittgensteinPs ownBor more c4aracteristicBwould not e@actlC be wrong but, * taIe it, at best emptC, and at worst biasedY after all, w4C s4ould we suppose t4at t4e former voices are not, or not as c4aracteristicallC, WittgensteinPsW And if t4eC are not, w4at is t4e point of t4e identificationW !4at said, * s4all continue using t4e name OWittgensteinP to refer simplC to t4e aut4or of t4e booI we are readingBsomeone w4o is all and none of t4e JinterlocutorsK 4e createsNR/)?

NN) .ow, w4at t4e latter JvoiceK in t4e passage prescribesBin order to get us out of t4e trouble faced bC t4e solipsistic p4ilosop4erBis grammatical >re?arrangement) WittgensteinPs first attempt at >re?arrangement in t4is conte@t involves preciselC distinguis4ing two Iinds of propositions, or descriptions, namelC6 >a? t4e ones refering to Ofacts in t4e material worldPBin particular, Op4Csical ob<ectsP >GG QE?Band >b? t4e ones Odescribing personal e@periencesPBw4ic4 would be Oindependent of bot4 p4Csical and p4Csiological factsP >GG QL?) !4e point of presenting suc4 a distinction is to remind us t4at, provided t4at we Ieep emploCing eac4 of t4e descriptions in its normal, everCdaC conte@tsBincluding, .)G), introspection and scientific investigationsBno >special? difficultC would ariseY t4e trouble onlC s4ows up in t4e peculiar conte@t of philosophical investigation about t4e relation between t4e ob<ects referred bC propositions of group >a?, and t4e psCc4ological e@periences referred bC t4ose of group >b?) !4e first t4ing to notice 4ere is t4at, preciselC because of t4e peculiaritC of t4e conte@t in w4ic4 t4at p4ilosop4ical trouble arises, it is of no use, in trCing to >dis?solve it, to offer a
NR/

*nterestinglC, on CavellPs reading >see preceding footnote?, none of t4e JvoicesK in WittgensteinPs writings is to be taIen as e@pressing 4is own real or final viewsY instead, Cavell construes t4em as e@pressing opposing trains of argument, w4ic4 form part of a larger dialectical e@c4ange in w4ic4 t4eC ultimatelC >and 4opefullC? cancel eac4 ot4er out) 5n t4is reading, t4e aim of WittgensteinPs enacted dialogues is not to lead t4e reader to accept anC particular p4ilosop4ical view, but rat4er to 4elp us overcome t4e temptations originallC leading us to seeIBeven craveBfor t4em)

O* canPt feel 4is painP6 a first route to solipsism N1R list of Ocommon sense beliefsPY from t4e perspective of t4e pu==led p4ilosop4er, t4e verC fact t4at we s4ould actuallC 4old suc4 beliefs is <ust part of t4e >supposed? problem, not its solution) *n fact, WittgensteinPs opinion about t4e p4ilosop4erPs doubtBabout, i)e), t4e verC sense of ascribing Opersonal e@periencesP >suc4 as pains? to ot4er peopleBis even more radical6 it is not onlC t4at recounting common sense beliefs would not >dis?solve it, but neit4er would it be >dis?solved bC t4e >dogmatic? replies coming from a OrealistP or Ocommon sense p4ilosop4erPBi)e), t4e one w4o interprets 4erT4is own stance as being t4at of a p4ilosop4ical defender of t4e beliefs w4ic4 Ot4e common sense manP >supposedlC? assumes in an un&uestioned and naive manner, but w4o s4ould not be confused wit4 t4e latter, w4o, according to Wittgenstein, Ois as far from realism as from idealismP >GG QM?) For suc4 a p4ilosop4er, Wittgenstein claims, OsurelC t4ere is no difficultC in t4e idea of supposing, t4inIing, imagining t4at someone else 4as w4at * 4avePBe)g), a toot4ac4e >ibid)?) Gut, 4e continues, Ot4e trouble wit4 t4e realist is alwaCs t4at 4e does not solve but sIip t4e difficulties w4ic4 4is adversaries see, t4oug4 t4eC too donPt succeed in solving t4emP >ibid)?) *n fact, t4e Orealist answer, for us, <ust bring out t4e difficultCP >GG Q1?) W4ic4 difficultCW !4ere is, according to Wittgenstein, a Otroublesome feature in our grammar w4ic4 t4e realist does not noticeP, but t4e solipsist does >ibid)?) Suc4 is t4e difference between >at least? two uses of propositions of t4e form OA 4as @P, w4ic4 Wittgenstein illustrates as follows6
JA 4as a gold toot4K means t4at t4e toot4 is in APs mout4) !4is maC account for t4e fact t4at * am not able to see it) .ow t4e case of 4is toot4ac4e, of w4ic4 * saC t4at * am not able to feel it because it is in 4is mout4, is not analogous to t4e case of t4e gold toot4) *t is t4e apparent analogC, and again t4e lacI of analogC, between t4ese cases w4ic4 causes our trouble) >GG Q1?

!4e lacI of analogC between t4e sentences OA 4as a gold toot4P and OA 4as a toot4ac4eP s4ows itself more clearlC w4en we compare t4em wit4 two different, Cet related sentences, vi7.6 >i? OWe canPt 4ave >4avenPt as a rule? pains in anot4er personPs toot4P and >ii? O* canPt feel 4is painP >GG Q1?) !4e last sentence, Wittgenstein 4as it, is meant to e@press a metaphysical impossibilitC, w4ic4 s4ould not be confused wit4 t4e >merelC? empirical impossibilitC e@pressed bC t4e first one, in w4ic4 Ot4e word JcanPtK is used in t4e same waC as in t4e proposition JAn iron nail canPt scratc4 glassK P >ibid)?) *n ot4er words, >i?

O* canPt feel 4is painP6 a first route to solipsism N1Q describes onlC a >contingent? fact about t4e waC our pains are e@perienced, and it is conceivable t4at suc4 a descriptionBsimilarlC to t4e empirical law describing scratc4es in t4e glassBcould be revised if >empirical? conditions c4angedY as Wittgenstein 4imself puts6 OWe could write t4is in t4e form Je@perience teac4es t4at an iron nail doesn!t scratc4 glassK, t4us doing awaC wit4 t4e JcanPtK P >ibid.?) And in fact, Wittgenstein strategC in t4e se&uence will be e@actlC to argue t4at we can easilC imagine some suc4 c4anges, so t4at at t4e end of t4e process, t4e opposite possibilitCB4aving pains in anot4er peoplePs toot4 >or bodC?Bs4ows itself as intelligible as t4e one from w4ic4 we started)

N/) !o accomplis4 suc4 results, Wittgenstein presents a finelC detailed analCsis of t4e criteria for pain location >see GG Q1-:L?, w4ic4 * s4all not reconstruct 4ere) As * read it, t4e main contention of t4at analCsis is t4e following6 generally, w4en one 4as a pain in some part of onePs bodC, t4ere is a coincidence or correlation among certain sensorC e@periences Bi)e), visual, tactile, Iinaest4etic, audible, and so on) So, for e@ample, w4en a s4arp ob<ect 4urts mC arm, * can >simultaneouslC? see mC arm being pricIed, feel t4e pricI, determine >bC means of Iinaest4etic awareness? w4ic4 is t4e position of mC pricIed arm, and so on) ,owever, in some special cases t4ose e@periences do not coincideBt4e most radical case per4aps being t4at of so called Op4antom painsP, in w4ic4 one can feel >e)g)? pain in onePs >p4antom? leg, t4us 4aving all t4e tactile and Iinaest4etic e@periences normallC associated wit4 t4at feeling, but wit4out t4e corresponding visual data) W4at cases liIe t4ese s4ow is t4at our concept of OpainP >or, to sticI to WittgensteinPs specific e@ample, Otoot4ac4eP? is sufficientlC comple@ and indeterminate so t4at we can imagine, wit4 no great difficulties, e@tended uses, or pro<ections) 5ne of t4ose pro<ections, w4ose indication will be useful for our subse&uent analCsis, would be t4at of6
a person 4aving t4e Iinaest4etic sensation of moving 4is 4and, and t4e tactual sensation, in 4is fingers and face, of 4is fingers moving over 4is face, w4ereas 4is Iinaest4etic and visual sensations s4ould 4ave to be described as t4ose of 4is fingers moving over 4is Inee) *f we 4ad a sensation of toot4ac4e plus certain tactual and Iinaest4etic sensations usuallC c4aracteristic of touc4ing t4e painful toot4 and neig4bouring parts of our face, and if t4ese sensations were accompanied bC seeing mC 4and touc4, and move about on, t4e edge of mC table, we s4ould feel doubtful w4et4er to call t4is e@perience an e@perience of toot4ac4e in t4e table or not) *f, on t4e ot4er 4and, t4e tactual and Iinaest4etic sensations described were correlated to t4e visual e@perience of seeing mC 4and touc4 a toot4 and ot4er parts of t4e face of anot4er person, t4ere is no doubt t4at * would call t4is e@perience Jtoot4ac4e in anot4er personPs toot4K) >GG :/-:R?

O* canPt feel 4is painP6 a first route to solipsism N1: 5ne mig4t saC t4at, in t4e passage above, t4e concept of Otoot4ac4eP is put into a Jstress testK, w4ere e@tended uses are presented and evaluated t4at would accommodate a set of possible c4anges in t4e empirical conditions normallC associated wit4 t4at concept) !4e suggestion is t4at, given t4e appropriate c4anges, we would be rat4er inclined to accept some >small? e@tensionsBincluding t4e p4enomenon of Otoot4ac4e in anot4er personPs toot4PBbut rat4er un-inclined to accept some >big? ot4ersBincluding Otoot4ac4e in t4e tablePs edgePNRR) .ow t4e main point of t4e w4ole e@ercise, we s4all recall, is to indicate t4e empirical status of t4e proposition according to w4ic4 OWe canPt 4ave _)))` pains in anot4er personPs toot4P, t4us allowing us to better understand t4e solipsistPs motivation to emp4asi=eB against 4is realist interlocutorBt4e special, i)e), metaphysical status of t4e impossibilitC described bC proposition t4at O* canPt feel another person!s painPBa proposition w4ic4 >apparentlC? no possible or imaginable situation would maIe one feel inclined to revise) !4at is preciselC w4at Wittgenstein emp4asi=es bC reminding us t4at t4e solipsist could saC6 O* maC 4ave toot4ac4e in anot4er manPs toot4, but not his toot4ac4eP >GG :R?) !4e conclusion Wittgenstein e@tracts from 4is analCsis is t4at, after all, Ot4e propositions JA 4as a gold toot4K and JA 4as toot4ac4eK are not used analogouslC) !4eC differ in t4eir grammar w4ere at first sig4t t4eC mig4t not seem to differP >ibid)?

NR) .otice t4at t4e conclusion aboveBt4e ac4ievement of a grammatical >re?arrangement Bis presented in direct opposition to t4e Ocommonsense p4ilosop4erPsP assumptions, for w4om t4ere seemed to be no special difference between t4ose propositions) ,ence, up to t4is point in t4e dialogue, t4e solipsist p4ilosop4er seems to be winning t4e dispute) \et, t4is is <ust t4e begining of t4e pat4 w4ic4 will eventuallC lead to some radical implications of t4e solipsistic positionBto recall t4e metap4or presented at t4e end of c4apter R, we are <ust starting to be Odragged to t4e mireP) !4e real trouble 4as to do wit4 t4e revisionarC attitude t4at t4e solipsist 4imself is inclined to taIe concerning t4e Iind of Ometap4Csical impossibilitCP 4e 4as <ust identified) #iven t4at, in complete agreement wit4 ordinarC language, 4e perceives t4at t4ere is a profound difference in t4e status of t4e propositions mentioned above, and given t4at t4eir >superficial? grammatical form sometimes conceal
NRR

* s4all saC more about our inclinations to accept or denC new conceptual pro<ections in c4apter :)

O* canPt feel 4is painP6 a first route to solipsism N1E t4at differenceBleading to t4e Iind of innocuous and pointless claims made bC t4e Ocommonsense p4ilosop4erPBt4e solipsist would liIe to propose a Onew notationP, capable of presenting in its verC form t4e difference of content between t4ose propositionsBso t4at, for e@ample, it would onlC make sense to saC of my e@perience t4at it is real) !4e ultimate motivation for proposing t4at >or anC ot4er? Onew notationP is, according to Wittgenstein, a sort of Ocraving of t4e metap4Csician w4ic4 our ordinarC language does not fulfilP >GG ::?) ,e describes t4at craving in t4e following terms6
5ur ordinarC language, w4ic4 of all possible notations is t4e one w4ic4 pervades all our life, 4olds our mind rigidlC in one position, as it were, and in t4is position sometimes it feels cramped, 4aving a desire for ot4er positions as well) !4us we sometimes wis4 for a notation w4ic4 stresses a difference more stronglC, maIes it more obvious, t4an ordinarC language does, or one w4ic4 in a particular case uses more closelC similar forms of e@pression t4an our ordinarC language) 5ur mental cramp is loosened w4en we are s4own t4e notations w4ic4 fulfil t4ese needs) !4ese needs can be of t4e greatest varietC) >GG :1?

.ow, 4owever multiple t4e p4ilosop4ical motivations maC be to tempt one to embrace a Osolipsistic notationPBone w4ic4 would e@press more conspicuouslC t4an ordinarC language does t4e differences w4ic4 t4e solipsist deems relevantBit is important not to confuse t4at met4odological proposal wit4 a disagreement about t4e verC facts being described bC eac4 notation) As Wittgenstein clarifies6
.ow t4e man w4om we call a solipsist and w4o saCs t4at onlC 4is own e@periences are real, does not t4erebC disagree wit4 us about anC practical &uestion of fact, 4e does not saC t4at we are simulating w4en we complain of pains, 4e pities us as muc4 as anCone else, and at t4e same time 4e wis4es to restrict t4e use of t4e epit4et JrealK to w4at we s4ould call 4is e@periencesY and per4aps 4e doesnPt want to call our e@periences Je@periencesK at all >again wit4out disagreeing wit4 us about anC &uestion of fact?) For 4e would saC t4at it was inconceivable t4at e@periences ot4er t4an 4is own were real) ,e oug4t t4erefore to use a notation in w4ic4 suc4 a p4rase as JA 4as real toot4ac4eK >w4ere A is not 4e? is meaningless, a notation w4ose rules e@clude t4is p4rase as t4e rules of c4ess e@clude a pawnPs maIing a Inig4tPs move) >GG :1?

Gut, if t4at is rig4t, t4en w4at e@actlC is t4e problem of t4e solipsistPs proposalW OAnd w4C s4ouldnPt we grant 4im t4is notationWP, Wittgenstein asIs 4imself >ibid)?) !4e problem begins to s4ow up w4en we reali=e t4at t4e solipsistBor t4e revisionist p4ilosop4er in generalBOis not aware t4at 4e is ob<ecting to a conventionP >GG :L?) Wittgenstein clarifies t4at claim bC means of a new metap4or, comparing t4e solipsistPs attitude wit4 t4at of a

O* canPt feel 4is painP6 a first route to solipsism N1L person w4o Osees a waC of dividing t4e countrC different from t4e one used on t4e ordinarC mapP6
,e feels tempted, saC, to use t4e name J(evons4ireK not for t4e countC wit4 its conventional boundarC, but for a region differentlC bounded) ,e could e@press t4is bC saCing6 J*snPt it absurd to maIe this a countC, to draw t4e boundaries hereWK Gut w4at 4e saCs is6 J!4e real (evons4ire is t4isK) We could answer6 JW4at Cou want is onlC a new notation, and bC a new notation no facts of geograp4C are c4angedK) *t is true, 4owever, t4at we maC be irresistiblC attracted or repelled bC a notation) >GG :L?

.ow, as a new cartograp4ic notation does not alter geograp4ical facts, so a new notation to describe personal e@periences >suc4 as pains? does not alter anC facts concerning t4ose e@periences) ,ence, t4e disagreement between t4e solipsist and t4e ordinarC language speaIer Ois not founded on a more subtle Inowledge of factP >GG :1?)

NQ) W4at is it, t4en, t4e true motivation for t4e solipsistPs >or t4e p4ilosop4erPs in general? proposals to revise certain ordinarC forms of e@pressionW !4is is not a simple &uestion to answer) !4ere is an enormous varietC of apparent analogies and disanalogies, of pictures and associations underlCing our linguistic practices, and manC of t4em can mislead usBor Ot4e p4ilosop4erPBin t4e tasI of getting clear about a determined region of ordinarC language) !4at maIes t4e investigation of t4e sources of p4ilosop4ical confusion, in a great measure, a matter of creativitC >to imagine, i)e), recogni=able waCs in w4ic4 one mig4t feel OirresistiblC attracted or repelled bC a notationP?, toget4er wit4 a careful comparison wit4 our ordinarC practices >in order to evaluate t4e point of t4ose Onew notationsP, bC putting t4em under Jstress testsK, so to speaI?) ActuallC, from t4is point until t4e end of t4e booI, Wittgenstein will do virtuallC not4ing besides presentingBand trCing to blocIBdifferent routes w4ic4 maC lead one to accept some solipsistic conclusions) Gut t4ere is no simple recipe for t4at procedure, no predetermined limit for its ending, and not4ing can guarantee a priori t4at it 4as gone far enoug4, resulting in a definitive cure for t4e solipsistPs confusions) 5f course Wittgenstein is well aware of t4at, as t4e following passage testifies6
W4en we saC t4at bC our met4od we trC to counteract t4e misleading effect of certain analogies, it is important t4at Cou s4ould understand t4at t4e idea of an

O* canPt feel 4is painP6 a first route to solipsism N1M

analogC being misleading is not4ing s4arplC defined) .o s4arp boundarC can be drawn round t4e cases in w4ic4 we s4ould saC t4at a man was misled bC an analogC) !4e use of e@pressions constructed on analogical patterns stresses analogies between cases often far apart) And bC doing t4is t4ese e@pressions maC be e@tremelC useful) *t is, in most cases, impossible to s4ow an e@act point w4ere an analogC begins to mislead us) 7verC particular notation stresses some particular point of view) _)))` !4e cases in w4ic4 particularlC we wis4 to saC t4at someone is misled bC a form of e@pression are t4ose in w4ic4 we would saC6 J4e wouldnPt talI as 4e does if 4e were aware of t4is difference in t4e grammar of suc4-and-suc4 words, or if 4e were aware of t4is ot4er possibilitC of e@pressionK and so on) >GG /M?

%ead against t4e bacIdrop of t4e preceding analCsis, t4e met4odological lesson presented in t4e passage above mig4t be formulated somew4at liIe t4is6 let us taIe note of grammatical differencesY if we do t4at well, our remaining problemsBincluding our inclination to misuse analogies, to misapplC pictures, and to revise ordinarC languageB will taIe care of t4emselves) *n anot4er conte@t, Wittgenstein 4imself emploCs an interesting analogC in order to describe 4is procedure, w4ic4 mig4t s4ed some lig4t upon our present, met4odological issue6
Hanguage sets everCone t4e same trapsY it is an immense networI of easilC accessible wrong turnings) And so we watc4 one man after anot4er walIing down t4e same pat4s and we Inow in advance w4ere 4e will branc4 off, w4ere walI straig4t on wit4out noticing t4e side turning, etc), etc) W4at * 4ave to do t4en is erect signposts at all t4e <unctions w4ere t4ere are wrong turnings so as to 4elp people past t4e danger points) >CS NM?

*n w4at follows * s4all present some of t4e OsignpostsP erected bC Wittgenstein in order to prevent t4e Owrong turningsP responsible for leading t4e solipsist to feel dissatisfied wit4 ordinarC languageBand, conse&uentlC, to feel inclined to revise it, proposing notations capable of satisfCing 4is Ometap4Csical cravingsP)

("( 9$en language goes on $olida*: some furt$er routes to solipsism

W4en language goes on 4olidaC6 some furt4er routes to solipsism N11 N:) Wittgenstein indicates furt4er possible sources for t4e solipsistPs confusions bC means of 4is c4aracteristic dialectical strategC, presenting, alternatelC, some formulations of t4e solipsistPs main t4esis, followed bC a diagnosis of t4eir grammatical flawsBin particular, t4e inco4erences involved in t4e simultaneous presupposition and repudiation of certain conditions for t4e emploCment of concepts w4ic4 are central to eac4 formulation) !4e conclusion, invariablC, is not onlC t4at t4e solipsist misapplies some pictures and analogies Ba result of 4is lacI of attention to important grammatical differencesBbut also, and more important, t4at 4e is simplC incapable of e@pressing 4is position wit4 anC sense, not being able to supplC clear rules for t4e emploCment of t4e signs 4e wants to use) A first possible source of confusion leading to t4e solipsistPs proposal of a new notationB in w4ic4 it would not maIe sense to saC of ot4er people t4at t4eC feel pains or possess e@periences of anC IindBis t4e apparent analogC between not Inowing w4at anot4er person feels or thinks and not Inowing w4at anot4er person sees6
!4e p4rase JonlC * reallC seeK is closelC connected wit4 t4e idea e@pressed in t4e assertion Jwe never Inow w4at t4e ot4er man reallC sees w4en 4e looIs at a t4ingK or t4is, Jwe can never Inow w4et4er 4e calls t4e same t4ing OblueP w4ic4 we call OblueP K) *n fact we mig4t argue6 J* can never Inow w4at 4e sees or t4at 4e sees at all, for all * 4ave is signs of various sorts w4ic4 4e gives meY t4erefore it is an unnecessarC 4Cpot4esis altoget4er to saC t4at 4e seesY w4at seeing is * onlC Inow from seeing mCselfY * 4ave onlC learnt t4e word OseeingP to mean w4at I doK) >GG E0?

According to Wittgenstein, w4at mig4t incline one to argue according to t4ose linesB 4ence, to adopt a sIeptical position relative to t4e possibilitC of Inowing Oot4er mindsPBis a perverted picture of t4e use of t4e concept of vision, as well as t4e concept of w4at counts as an ob;ect of vision6
!4e difficultC w4ic4 we e@press bC saCing J* canPt Inow w4at 4e sees w4en 4e >trut4fullC? saCs t4at 4e sees a blue patc4K arises from t4e idea t4at JInowing w4at 4e seesK means6 Jseeing t4at w4ic4 4e also seesKY not, 4owever, in t4e sense in w4ic4 we do so w4en we bot4 4ave t4e same ob<ect before our eCes6 but in t4e sense in w4ic4 t4e ob<ect seen would be an ob<ect, saC, in 4is 4ead, or in 4im) !4e idea is t4at t4e same ob<ect maC be before 4is eCes and mine, but t4at * canPt sticI mC 4ead into 4is >or mC mind into 4is, w4ic4 comes to t4e same? so t4at t4e real and immediate ob<ect of 4is vision becomes t4e real and immediate ob<ect of mC vision too) >GG EN?

*n t4e passage above Wittgenstein calls our attention to a picture of t4e perceptual relation w4ic4 seems to underlie t4e solipsistPs positionBnamelC, t4at of an immediate contact

W4en language goes on 4olidaC6 some furt4er routes to solipsism /00 between t4e sub<ect and some Iind of private entitC >e)g), a sense9datum?, w4ic4 would be Obefore his mind!s eyeP >ibid)?) #iven t4at picture, t4e conclusion becomes trivial t4at * cannot see w4at ot4er people seeBor even t4at onlC * can really seeY after all, if t4e onlC evidence * 4ave concerning w4at 4appens "ithin t4e ot4er person is 4er out"ard be4aviour, t4en t4e claim t4at s4e also sees becomes at best an inference, and, as suc4, a result of a fallible processNRQ) !4e waC out of t4at confusion, Wittgenstein suggests in t4e se&uence, is to Oe@amine t4e grammatical difference between t4e statements J* donPt Inow w4at 4e seesK and J* donPt Inow w4at 4e looIs atK, as t4eC are actuallC used in our languageP >ibid?) Wittgenstein 4imself does not elaborate t4at suggestion furt4er in t4e te@t, but, given t4e clues 4e 4as left, t4is is not a difficult tasI) *n our ordinarC language we 4ave relativelC clear criteria to determine w4at a person is looking at) * suppose one suc4 criterion mig4t be6 finding out t4e region toward w4ic4 4er eCes are directedY if t4at is rig4t, t4en a good reason for saCing t4at we do not Inow w4at >or w4ere? a person is looIing at mig4t be6 being unable to observe 4er eCePs directionB because it is too darI, s4e is giving 4er bacI to us, s4e is too far awaC, and so on) ,owever, even if t4e conditions to Inow w4at a person is looking at are satisfied, sometimes we mig4t still be unable to determine w4at s4e is seeing) "aradigmatic cases would be t4ose of a sub<ect en<oCing a worI of art w4ic4 seems completelC meaningless to us >or vice9versa?, or t4at of a sub<ect looIing to a pu==le-picture >suc4 as t4e ducI-rabbit?, saCing t4at s4e can see two figures >obviouslC, not at t4e same time?, w4ile we can see onlC oneBsaC, t4e ducIY in t4at case, per4aps t4e sub<ect could c4allenge us bC saCing Onow * am seeing anot4er animal, not t4e ducIP, and we would remain completelC at loss as to w4ic4 animal t4at can be) \et anot4er, simpler case to illustrate t4e difference between looking and seeing is t4at of observing a sub<ect w4o looks steadilC at some point in order to reflect, or to recollect somet4ing, but w4o is not seeing anCt4ing at t4at moment) !4e problem wit4 WittgensteinPs solipsist is t4at 4e conflates t4e two cases presented above6 w4at 4e saCs is t4at one cannot see w4at t4e ot4er person seesY 4owever, w4at motivates 4im in saCing t4at is t4e picture of a private ob<ect presented Obefore 4is mindPs eCeP) #iven t4at picture, 4e mig4t >easilC enoug4? imagine analogous conditions to t4ose in w4ic4, in ordinarC language, we would saC t4at we cannot Inow w4at a sub<ect is looking atBafter all, O* canPt sticI mC 4ead into 4is >or mC mind into 4is, w4ic4 comes to t4e
NRQ

Compare PI, p) M:, c /1R)

W4en language goes on 4olidaC6 some furt4er routes to solipsism /0N same?P >GG EN? in order to determine w4ere 4is OmindPs eCeP is directed at) Gut, in so proceeding, t4e solipsist tacitlC emploCs t4e relevant conceptsBin t4e present case, t4ose of OseeingP and OlooIingPBmaintaining some of t4e conne@ions and contrasts t4eC 4ave in ordinarC language, w4ile at t4e same time maIing it impossible to satisfC t4ose conditions in 4is Onew notationP) *n t4is waC, one ends up wit4 a notation w4ic4 is not <ust completelC arbitrarCBw4ic4 in itself would be no problem at allBbut w4ic4 4as no clear rules for t4e emploCment of its signs) .ow, if one is aware of t4e picture underlCing t4e solipsistPs claims, as well as t4e conditions for emploCing t4e concepts of OseeingP and OlooIingP in ordinarC language, one can reali=e t4at >at least so far? no >grammatical? <ustification 4as been offered to t4e >revisionist? claim t4at we do not >or cannot? Inow w4at a sub<ect sees in normal circumstancesBi)e), circumstances in w4ic4 we are able to determine t4at 4e is looking at t4e same ob<ect T place as we are)

NE) ,aving pointed out t4at first possible source for t4e solipsistPs confusion, Wittgenstein >dialecticallC? presents a reformulation of t4e central t4esis of t4at position, aiming at immuni=ing it from t4e criticism previouslC sIetc4ed6 OSometimes t4e most satisfCing e@pression of our solipsism seems to be t4is6 JW4en anCt4ing is seen >reallC seen?, it is alwaCs * w4o see itK P >GG EN?) !4e reason for taIing suc4 a reformulation as an attempt to circumvent t4e precedent criticism is t4at now t4e solipsist seems to be granting t4e distinction between looking and seeingBconcepts w4ic4 4e seemed to be conflating before Band giving up t4e picture of t4e OmindPs eCeP, arguing instead t4at t4e looIing T seeing distinction itself depends on an essentiallC private and sub<ective e@perience) ,is contention seems to be t4is6 O!rue, we can Inow t4at we are looking at t4e same ob<ect as anot4er person, Cet t4e verC fact t4at sometimes we cannot be sure t4at we are seeing t4e same as s4e alreadC indicates t4e e@istence of an e@perience w4ic4 is accessible onlC to t4e person w4o 4as it)P WittgensteinPs line of criticism now turns to t4e conditions for t4e use of t4e pronoun O*P in t4e formulation of t4e solipsistPs t4esis6 OW4at s4ould striIe us about t4is e@pression is t4e p4rase JalwaCs *K) AlwaCs "hoWBFor, &ueer enoug4, * donPt mean6 JalwaCs H) W)K P >GG EN?) *n replC to t4at &uestion, Wittgenstein reminds us t4at our use of t4e p4rase Ot4e same personP, as well as our use of proper names, are Obased on t4e fact t4at manC c4aracteristics

W4en language goes on 4olidaC6 some furt4er routes to solipsism /0/ w4ic4 we use as t4e criteria for identitC coincide in t4e vast ma<oritC of casesP >GG EN?) Amongst suc4 c4aracteristics figures, e)g), p4Csical appearance, be4aviour and memories) *t is because t4ese and ot4er facts concerning people are relativelC persistent t4at we use names to refer to t4em) *n order to marI t4is point, Wittgenstein suggests anot4er conceptual Jstress testK, consisting in a set of t4ree language-games presenting Odifferent JgeometriesK we would be inclined to use if facts were differentP >GG EN?) Since * believe t4e cases speaI for t4emselves, * s4all &uote t4em at lengt4, wit4out maIing furt4er comments6
_Case N6` *magine, e)g), t4at all 4uman bodies w4ic4 e@ist looIed aliIe, t4at on t4e ot4er 4and, different sets of _psCc4ological` c4aracteristics seemed, as it were, to c4ange t4eir 4abitation among t4ese bodies) _)))` $nder suc4 circumstances, alt4oug4 it would be possible to give t4e bodies names, we s4ould per4aps be as little inclined to do so as we are to give names to t4e c4airs of our dining-room set) 5n t4e ot4er 4and, it mig4t be useful to give names to t4e sets of c4aracteristics, and t4e use of t4ese names would now roughly correspond to t4e personal names in our present language)NR:

_Case /6` 5r imagine t4at it were usual for 4uman beings to 4ave two c4aracters, in t4is waC6 "eoplePs s4ape, si=e and c4aracteristics of be4aviour periodicallC undergo a complete c4ange) *t is t4e usual t4ing for a man to 4ave two suc4 states, and 4e lapses suddenlC from one into t4e ot4er) *t is verC liIelC t4at in suc4 a societC we s4ould be inclined to c4risten everC man wit4 two names, and per4aps to talI of t4e pair of persons in 4is bodC) .ow were (r) 2eICll and 8r) ,Cde two persons or were t4eC t4e same person w4o merelC c4angedW We can saC w4ic4ever we liIe) We are not forced to talI of a double personalitC)

_Case R6` _)))` *magine a man w4ose memories on t4e even daCs of 4is life comprise t4e events of all t4ese daCs, sIipping entirelC w4at 4appened on t4e odd daCs) 5n t4e ot4er 4and, 4e remembers on an odd daC w4at 4appened on previous odd daCs, but 4is memorC t4en sIips t4e even daCs wit4out a feeling of discontinuitC) *f we liIe we can also assume t4at 4e 4as alternating appearances and c4aracteristics on odd and even daCs) Are we bound to saC t4at 4ere two persons are in4abiting t4e same bodCW !4at is, is it rig4t to saC t4at t4ere are, and wrong to saC t4at t4ere arenPt, or vice versaW _Conclusion6` .eit4er) For t4e ordinary use of t4e word JpersonK is w4at one mig4t call a composite use suitable under t4e ordinarC circumstances) *f * assume, as * do, t4at t4ese circumstances are c4anged, t4e application of t4e term JpersonK or JpersonalitCK 4as t4erebC c4angedY and if * wis4 to preserve t4is term and give it a use analogous to its former use, * am at libertC to c4oose between manC uses, t4at is,

NR:

!4e Clone ArmC portraCed in t4e series Star Wars%esp) in t4e episodes (ttack of the #lones >/00/?, >evenge of the Sith >/00:?, and Star Wars@ The #lone Wars >/00M?Bsupplies an interesting furt4er case for comparison, w4ic4 is still more aIin to t4at of t4e Oc4airs of our dining-room setP6 since t4ere is no difference in p4Csical or psCc4ological c4aracteristics among t4e clones, t4ere is no need to use proper names for distinguis4ing among t4emBt4eir commanders live well simplC calling t4em OclonesP, OsoldiersP, or w4atever) !4at mig4t bring 4ome t4e point, e@plicitlC made bC Wittgenstein in some conte@ts, t4at our conceptsBincluding t4at of personal identitCBare e@pressions of our interestsB4ence, t4eC can be simplC dropped out if t4ose interests suitablC c4ange)

W4en language goes on 4olidaC6 some furt4er routes to solipsism /0R

between manC different Iinds of analogC) 5ne mig4t saC in suc4 a case t4at t4e term JpersonalitCK 4asnPt got one legitimate 4eir onlC) >GG EN-E/?

!4e main purpose of assembling t4e grammatical reminders aboveBabout different uses of t4e concept of personal identitCBis to indicate a problem wit4 t4e solipsistPs t4esis, in t4at none of t4e c4aracteristics listed so farBconstancC in p4Csical appearance, be4aviour or memoriesBseems to be relevant to determine t4e Iind of identitC envisaged w4en 4e tries to state 4is position bC saCing t4at OW4en anCt4ing is seen >reallC seen?, it is alwaCs * w4o see itPBafter all, * do not alwaCs see parts of mC bodC w4en * see somet4ing else, and it does not matter for determining t4e content of mC visual e@perience if mC memories and T or be4aviour are t4e same as before) *n fact, t4e pronoun O*P seems completelC superfluous and even alien to t4at formulation)

NL) #iven t4at result, if t4e solipsist still wants to defend 4is position, 4e 4as to find a better suited e@pression for 4is main t4esis) Wittgenstein offers a furt4er candidate in t4e following passage6
W4en * t4inI about it a little longer * see t4at w4at * wis4ed to saC was6 JAlwaCs w4en anCt4ing is seen, somet4ing is seenK) *)e), t4at of w4ic4 * said it continued during all t4e e@periences of seeing was not anC particular entitC J*K, but t4e e@perience of seeing itself) >GG ER?

!4e passage above presents t4e motivation w4ic4 maC lead t4e solipsist to >ultimatelC? e@clude Ot4e *P, or t4e sub<ect of e@perience, completelC from consideration, focusing instead on contents of t4e e@perience itselfBa move w4ic4 is reminiscent of (avid ,umePs >so-called? Obundle t4eorC of t4e selfP) !4e reasoning be4ind t4at reformulation seems to be as follows6 first, given t4e grammatical >or, if Cou will, metap4Csical? constraints imposed bC t4e solipsist in order to e@press t4e peculiaritC of first person e@perience, t4ere is no possible waC of doing t4at w4ile satisfCing t4e >ordinarC? conditions for personal identitCY 4ence, eit4er one gives up t4e initial tasI, or t4e O*P 4as to be droppedY now, given t4e person 4e is, our solipsist would be rat4er inclined to c4oose t4e latter optionY and Cet, 4e still needs to present some element or ot4er w4ic4 would be s4ared bC all cases of visual e@perienceBsince ot4erwise t4ere would be no point in treating t4em 4omogeneouslC as cases of t4at Iind of peculiar first person e@perience 4e

W4en language goes on 4olidaC6 some furt4er routes to solipsism /0Q wants to e@pressY but all t4at remains to plaC t4at role now is t4e e@perience itselfBto emploC "eter ,acIerPs apt >and economic? Sc4open4auerian formulation6 OW4at is uni&ue is e@perienceY t4e world is ideaP >N1ME, p) /QN?) !4e problem wit4 t4at positionBas ,ume 4imself probablC reali=ed NREBis t4at it entails a Iind of Oinversion of prioritiesP relative to our actual use of language, generating a conception w4ic4 is ultimatelC unsustainableBafter all, t4e region of our ordinarC language w4ic4 is responsible for t4e talI about Opersonal e@periencesP seems to be so structured t4at t4e identitC of t4ose e@periences depends on t4e identitC of t4e sub<ects w4o O4aveP t4emNRLY now, if t4e sub<ect is to be dropped, w4at could t4e alternative criterion for t4at identitC beW

NM) 5nce more, t4e solipsist is depicted as someone w4o borrows some concepts from t4eir native 4omeBi)e), ordinarC languageBsmuggling >some of? its conditions of use, Cet ultimatelC neglecting t4emBeven maIing t4em impossible to satisfCBt4us ending up unable to provide anC clear sense to t4e signs 4e emploCs in order to >trC to? e@press 4is position) SimilarlC to w4at 4appened in t4e te@ts we 4ave been analCsing in t4e former c4aptersB* mean, of course, t4e Tractatus and t4e >emarks%t4e main result of WittgensteinPs enacted e@c4ange wit4 a solipsist interlocutor is to remove a number of prima facie motivations for t4e latterPs proposal of Onew notationsP) 5ne upon anot4er, t4e attempts at <ustifCing 4is stance were e@amined, and s4own to be ultimatelC flawed NRM) \et, bC reac4ing t4is conclusion, * find it important to emp4asi=e once more t4at t4ere is no problem at allBat least in principleBwit4 t4e mere attempt to offer suc4 alternative notations) Wittgenstein 4imself emp4asi=es t4at point recurrentlC in t4e te@t, and t4e following passage maIes a good representative case6
!4ere is _)))` no ob<ection to adopting a sCmbolism in w4ic4 _e)g)` a certain person alwaCs or temporarilC 4olds an e@ceptional place) And t4erefore, if * utter t4e sentence J5nlC * reallC seeK, it is conceivable t4at mC fellow creatures t4ereupon will arrange t4eir notation so as to fall in wit4 me bC saCing Jso-andso is reallC seenK instead of JH) W) sees so-and-soK, etc), etc) W4at, 4owever, is
NRE NRL NRM

See Treatise of Buman Eature, Appendi@ i) !4at is preciselC t4e point of "eter StrawsonPs argument in c4apter R of Individuals >see c4apter N?) A couple of furt4er suc4 attempts receive WittgensteinPs attention in t4e se&uence of t4e te@t >see GG EE ss)?, Cet * s4all left t4em unanalCsed, 4oping t4at t4e preceding reconstruction is representative enoug4 for understanding 4is c4aracteristic met4odologC in dealing wit4 t4ose cases)

W4en language goes on 4olidaC6 some furt4er routes to solipsism /0:

wrong, is to t4inI t4at * can ;ustify t4is c4oice of notation) W4en * said, from mC 4eart, t4at onlC * see, * was also inclined to saC t4at bC J*K * didnPt reallC mean H) W) _)))`) * could almost saC t4at bC J*K * mean somet4ing w4ic4 <ust now in4abits H) W), somet4ing w4ic4 t4e ot4ers canPt see) >* meant mC mind, but could onlC point to it via mC bodC)? !4ere is not4ing wrong in suggesting t4at t4e ot4ers s4ould give me an e@ceptional place in t4eir notationY but t4e <ustification w4ic4 * wis4 to give for it6 t4at t4is bodC is now t4e seat of t4at w4ic4 reallC livesBis senseless) For admittedlC t4is is not to state anCt4ing w4ic4 in t4e ordinarC sense is a matter of e@perience) >And donPt t4inI t4at it is an e@periential proposition w4ic4 onlC * can Inow because onlC * am in t4e position to 4ave t4e particular e@perience)? >GG EE?

Gesides recalling t4at t4ere is no a priori problem involved in t4e proposal of new notations, t4e passage above also presents t4e general picture w4ic4 seems to underlie all t4e >solipsistic? manoeuvres analCsed up to t4is pointBt4at of a special ob<ect, t4e OmindP, as being t4e real, or ultimate referent of t4e first person pronoun) *n WittgensteinPs own words6 Ot4e idea t4at t4e real * lives in mC bodC is connected wit4 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e word J*K, and t4e misunderstandings t4is grammar is liable to give rise toP >ibid)?) *n order to indicate suc4 misunderstandings 4e proceeds to a detailed analCsis of t4e grammar of t4e first person pronoun) !4at will be t4e ob<ect of t4e ne@t section)

("7 0 5I6 does nor refer : t$e peculiar grammar of t$e first person
N1) !4e first step in WittgensteinPs new attempt at grammatical >re?arrangement is calling attention to a distinction w4ic4 became well InownBin fact, * s4all suggest, per4aps a little too well InownBin secondarC literature, namelC, t4at between two uses of t4e word O*P) !4e distinction is introduced in t4e following passage6
!4ere are two different cases in t4e use of t4e word J*K >or JmCK? w4ic4 * mig4t call Jt4e use as ob<ectK and Jt4e use as sub<ectK) 7@amples of t4e first Iind of use are t4ese6 J8C arm is broIenK, J* 4ave grown si@ inc4esK, J* 4ave a bump on mC fore4eadK, J!4e wind blows mC 4air aboutK) 7@amples of t4e second Iind are6 J I see so-and-soK, JI 4ear so-and-soK, JI trC to lift mC armK, JI t4inI it will rainK, JI 4ave toot4ac4eK) 5ne can point to t4e difference between t4ese two categories bC saCing6 !4e cases of t4e first categorC involve t4e recognition of a particular person, and t4ere is in t4ese cases t4e possibilitC of an error, or as * s4ould rat4er put it6 !4e possibilitC of an error 4as been provided for) _)))` *t is possible t4at, saC in an accident, * s4ould feel a pain in mC arm, see a broIen arm at mC side, and t4inI it is mine, w4en reallC it is mC neig4bourPs) _)))` 5n t4e ot4er 4and,

O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person /0E
t4ere is no &uestion of recogni=ing a person w4en * saC * 4ave toot4ac4e) !o asI Jare you sure t4at itPs Cou w4o 4ave painsWK would be nonsensical) .ow, w4en in t4is case no error is possible, it is because t4e move w4ic4 we mig4t be inclined to t4inI of as an error, a Obad moveP, is no move of t4e game at all) >GG EE-EL?

For obvious reasons, it is t4e last use of t4e word O*PBits Ouse as sub<ectPBw4ic4 will be t4e main focus of WittgensteinPs analCsis in t4e remainder of t4e booI) *n pursuing t4at analCsis, 4e presents four main claims, as follows6 N) O!o saC J* 4ave painK is no more a statement about a particular person t4an moaning isP >GG EL?Y /) O!4e word J*K does not mean t4e same as JH)W)K, even if * am H)WP >GG EL?Y R) O_!4e word J*K does not` mean t4e same as t4e e@pression Jt4e person w4o is now speaIingKP >GG EL?Y Q) O*n _propositions suc4 as` J* 4ave painK, J*K is not a demonstrative pronounP >GG EM?) !4e four claims above, as well as t4e arguments supporting eac4 of t4em, are intimatelC connected in t4e te@t) .ote, 4owever, t4at in none of t4em Wittgenstein offers a positive c4aracteri=ation of t4e use of first person pronoun, limiting 4imself instead to describe analogies and disanalogies between some uses of t4at pronoun and t4e uses of ot4er words in our language, t4erefore 4elping us to ac4ieve a perspicuous view of t4e grammar of t4ose words in some more or less interconnected language-games) !4e central aim of t4at process is, once again, to indicate grammatical differences, w4ic4 in turn can be used to maIe conspicuous t4e confusions involved in t4e c4aracteri=ations offered bC 4is interlocutor, t4us 4opefullC 4elping to set 4im free of certain pictures w4ic4 are commonlC assumed in t4e p4ilosop4ical treatment of first person pronoun) >.ote t4at, according to t4is reading, WittgensteinPs intended results are rat4er 4umbleY now one s4all be careful not to leap too &uicIlC from t4ose >essentiallC negative? results to t4e >rat4er substantial? conclusion t4at 4e would be offering an Jalternative accountK, or a JdefinitionK of the use of O*PBsaC, a non-referential one) * s4all return to t4e point of t4is warning below)? *n order to ac4ieve t4at aim, WittgensteinPs analCsis will be again structured dialecticallC, alternatelC presenting some t4eses about t4e use of t4e pronoun O*P t4at naturallC >if tacitlC?

O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person /0L suggest t4emselves w4en we reflect about t4e grammar of t4e statements in w4ic4 it is emploCed, and diagnosing t4e problems involved in eac4 of t4ose t4eses)

/0) *n order to <ustifC claim >N?BO!o saC J* 4ave painK is no more a statement about a particular person t4an moaning isPBWittgenstein indicates some grammatical differences between propositions ascribing pains in first and t4ird person, as t4eC are normallC emploCed in ordinarC language) According to Wittgenstein, O_t`4e difference between t4e propositions J* 4ave painK and J4e 4as painK is not t4at of JH) W) 4as painK and JSmit4 4as painK) %at4er, it corresponds to t4e difference between moaning and saCing t4at someone moans >GG EM?) Some lig4t can be s4ed upon t4e latter claim bC reminding ourselves of t4e role of language-games in Wittgenstein analCsis >see cQ above?Bin particular, t4at w4en we looI at simpler or more primitive forms of language
t4e mental mist w4ic4 seems to ens4roud our ordinarC use of language disappears) We see activities, reactions, w4ic4 are clear-cut and transparent) 5n t4e ot4er 4and we recogni=e in t4ese simple processes forms of language not separated bC a breaI from our more complicated ones) We see t4at we can build up t4e complicated forms from t4e primitive ones bC graduallC adding new forms) >GG NL?

.ow, bC indicating t4e pro@imitC between propositions e@pressing pain in first person and instinctive be4aviours of painBsuc4 as moaningBWittgenstein is preciselC moving along t4e lines presented in t4e passage above, indicating a Oprimitive form of languageP from w4ic4 we can Obuild upP our own, more complicated vocabularC for t4e e@pression of painsNR1) *n t4e OprimitiveP level of reactive be4aviour, it is manifest t4at t4e e@pression of pains does not involve recogni=ing a person as its condition) !4e person moaning in pain is
NR1

5ne 4as to be careful not to taIe t4at too literallCBas if Wittgenstein was proposing >or assuming? a JgeneticK or JevolutionarCK account of t4e development of 4uman language) As a matter of empirical or scientific fact, it seems indeed verC liIelC t4at suc4 an account would prove trueY Cet, as * read Wittgenstein, t4at would be simplC beside 4is >met4odological? pointBw4ic4 is defending t4e p4ilosop4ical relevance of paCing attention to natural or instinctive 4uman reactions, as t4eC s4ow up in real or invented language-games, in order to get clear about our own, actuallC more comple@ and sop4isticated linguistic practicesY t4ose reactions, to borrow from 2oac4im Sc4ultePs apt formulation, are Ot4e point of intersection of acting and speaIing, of conduct and use of languageP >N11R, p) NM?) 5ne mig4t saC6 to indicate suc4 an intersection is to go as deep as p4ilosop4ical analCsis can getBonlC t4at would be misleading, since it suggests a picture of JlaCersK to be JdugKY w4at it means is t4at it would be pointless, from t4e perspective of someone seeIing grammatical elucidation, to trC to Jget beCondK t4at point bC finding some >empirical? <ustification>s? for our language-gamesY as Wittgenstein reminds us in &n #ertainty, O_a` language-game _)))` is not based on grounds) *t is not reasonable >or unreasonable?) T *t is t4ereBliIe our lifeP >5C c::1?) >See also %"" *, c1NE and %"" **, cQ:RBJ!4e primitive language game we originallC learned needs no <ustificationP)?

O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person /0M >of course[? not stating somet4ing about 4erselfBs4e is not describing 4er own state, in t4e sense in w4ic4 anot4er person could do it) Again, in normal conditions, s4e obviouslC do not need to observe 4er own behaviour, or to maIe anC Iind inference, or to gat4er anC Iind of evidence in order to moanBs4e simplC reacts, in an instinctive and natural waC, to w4atever 4as 4urt 4er) GC t4e same toIenBand given t4at t4e more complicated forms of language t4at we use to e@press pains can be recogni=ed as belonging to t4e same JfamilCK to w4ic4 t4at Iind of instinctive be4aviour belongs, in t4at t4eC are Onot separated bC a breaIPBt4e conclusion seems to be t4at, even in the case of ordinary language >of our actual language-games?, e@pressions of pain in first person are not statements about a personY t4eC belong to different >grammatical? s4elves) .ow, it is preciselC because of t4at grammatical peculiaritC t4at t4e analCsis of t4e Ouse as sub<ectP of first person pronoun >in e@pressive sentences? becomes relevant in t4e debate wit4 t4e solipsist) #iven t4at suc4 use does wit4out t4e satisfaction of anC conditions for t4e use of names, or for t4e recognition of a person as being suc4-and-suc4NQ0, t4e solipsist Band not onlC 4imBmaC feel inclined to imagine a set of somew4at analogous conditions, e)g), some Iind of introspective access to t4e content of personal e@periences, suc4 as pains) Wittgenstein presents t4at point as follows6
We feel t4en t4at in t4e cases in w4ic4 J*K is used as sub<ect, we donPt use it because we recogni=e a particular person bC 4is bodilC c4aracteristicsY and t4is creates t4e illusion t4at we use t4is word to refer to somet4ing bodiless, w4ic4, 4owever, 4as its seat in our bodC) *n fact this seems to be t4e real ego, t4e one of w4ic4 it was said, JCogito, ergo sumK) >GG E1?

Against t4e illusion presented above, Wittgenstein attemptsBbC inventing a more primitive form of e@pressive language-game, in w4ic4 individuals simplC react to pains wit4 natural and instinctive be4aviourBto dissipate t4e Omental mistP surrounding t4e use of our actual e@pressive language-games, presenting us Oactivities, reactions, w4ic4 are clear-cut and transparentP, t4us diverting our >t4e solipsistPs? attention from t4e picture of Ointernal processesPNQN)
NQ0 NQN

See above, cN:) 5f course, one s4all not e@pect t4at suc4 a procedure would at once eliminate t4e appeal of t4e picture under analCsisBafter all, people can be tempted to applC it even in t4e case of pain moans emited bC non4uman animals >w4ic4, .)G), 4ave been traditionallC used as paradigmatic e@amples of creatures guided bC instinctive be4aviour?, bC imagining t4ose animals JinternallCK 4aving t4e same >or similar? e@periences we 4umans 4ave) !4is is again to remind t4at Wittgenstein aims 4ere are rat4er 4umble, in t4at 4e is attacIing >onlC? one of t4e sources of t4at pictureBt4e one w4ic4 departs from t4e analCsis of t4e first-person pronoun in its use Oas sub<ect)P

O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person /01

/N) 5f course t4e strategC illustrated aboveBt4at of comparing linguistic e@pressions of pain wit4 instinctive be4aviour, suc4 as moaningBis open to manC criticisms, and it is a source of muc4 controversC even among WittgensteinPs supporters, some of w4om are not willing to grant t4at suc4 an analCsis would s4ow t4at t4e use of O*P is not intended to refer to t4e person w4o saCs O* am in painP) \et Wittgenstein 4as anticipated t4ose reactions) ,aving presented t4is first defence of claim >N?, 4e immediatelC points outBin t4e voice of an interlocutorBan ob<ection t4at runs on t4ese lines6 O JGut surelC t4e word O*P in t4e mout4 of a man refers to t4e man w4o saCs itY it points to 4imselfY and verC often a man w4o saCs it actuallC points to 4imself wit4 4is fingerK P >GG EL?) As a replC 4e observes t4at6
it was &uite superfluous to point to 4imself) ,e mig4t <ust as well onlC 4ave raised 4is 4and) *t would be wrong to saC t4at w4en someone points to t4e sun wit4 4is 4and, 4e is pointing bot4 to t4e sun and 4imself because it is he w4o pointsY on t4e ot4er 4and, 4e maC bC pointing attract attention bot4 to t4e sun and to 4imself) >GG EL?

W4at is t4e point of suc4 a replCW *n order to answer t4at &uestion we need first get clear about t4e parallel Wittgenstein draws between t4e case of t4e sub<ect emploCing O*P >in t4e situation presented above bC 4is interlocutor? and t4e sub<ect w4o, in t4e last passage, points to t4e sun) As * understand t4at parallel, its purpose is to s4ow t4at, as t4e former sub<ect can point to 4imself w4en saCing O*mP, so t4e latter can call attention to 4imself w4en pointing to t4e sunBonlC t4at is generally not t4e case, i)e), t4at is neit4er t4e primarC function of t4e pronoun O*P, nor of t4e ostensive gesture pointing to an ob<ect) *n fact, one mig4t saC t4at t4e primarC function of t4e ostensive gesture is preciselC t4e oppositeBnamelC, to call attention to the ob;ectY now, if t4at gesture is to succeed, of course t4e ot4er persons involved in t4is piece of communication 4ave to react appropriatelCBw4ic4 means, among ot4er t4ings, t4at t4eC s4all taIe t4e speaIer as t4e >provisional? centre or point of origin of an >ad hoc? inde@ical sCstem) Conse&uentlC, it would be simplC "rong, in t4e vast ma<oritC of >ordinarC? cases, to taIe t4e speaIerPs ostensive gesture as an attempt to call attention to 4imselfBe)g), bC looIing at 4is hand instead of looIing at w4ere 4is 4and is pointing) \et none of t4is prevents t4at, in some specific >e@traordinarC? cases, a speaIer s4ould use t4e ostensive gesture also to call attention to 4imselfBe)g), w4en 4e points toward t4e sun, but, given t4at all 4is

O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person /N0 interlocutors are looIing at a different direction >from t4at one in w4ic4 4e stands?, 4e 4as to s4out somet4ing >maCbe somet4ing about t4e sun?, t4us calling t4eir attention first to 4imself and t4en to t4at star) GC t4e same toIen, in some specific >and e@traordinarC? casesBsaC, t4at of a student s4outing O*[P in a classroom, answering to a callBa referential analCsis would seem correct) ,owever, as indicated previouslC, in most casesBparticularlC in t4e case of t4e sub<ect s4outing O* am in pain[PBt4at analCsis would be simplC false, in t4at t4ere is no need at all for t4e sub<ect to recogni=e 4imself as being suc4-and-suc4 a person in order to crC t4at out) >*t is wort4 noting t4at Wittgenstein does not need denCing t4at t4ere are similarities between, saC, t4e self-referential and t4e e@pressive uses of O*PY 4is aim is simplC to indicate one essential difference between t4e language-games in w4ic4 t4at pronoun occurs, so as to prevent a 4astC assimilation of all t4e sorts of use to a rat4er narrow paradigm, w4ic4 is t4at of reference) !4ere are cases in w4ic4 we clearlC intend to refer to ourselvesBor to speaI about t4e particular person we are, or recogni=e ourselves as beingBbC using t4e first person pronounY and t4ere are manC ot4er cases in w4ic4 t4at is clearlC not t4e point) 5ur c4allenge is not to lose tracI of suc4 differences, motivated bC p4ilosop4ical Ocravings for generalitCP >see GG NL?NQ/)? Het me repeat, for t4e saIe of claritC, t4at t4e main problem wit4 t4e assimilation to t4e paradigm of reference is not so muc4 its falsity, but rat4er t4e fact t4at suc4 an assimilation mig4t be t4e tip of an iceberg of serious p4ilosop4ical confusions) W4en we are dealing wit4 statements in w4ic4 O*P is used Oas ob<ectP, t4e referential analCsis seems to worI
NQ/

*t maC 4elp comparing t4at wit4 WittgensteinPs claims in t4e following passageBw4ere t4e p4ilosop4ical Ocraving for generalitCP is illustrated bC t4e searc4 of a single definition for t4e concept of OnumberP6 *f, e)g), someone tries to e@plain t4e concept of number and tells us t4at suc4 and suc4 a definition will not do or is clumsC because it onlC applies to, saC, finite cardinals * s4ould answer t4at t4e mere fact t4at 4e could 4ave given suc4 a limited definition maIes t4is definition e@tremelC important to us) >7legance is not w4at we are trCing for)? For w4C s4ould w4at finite and transfinite numbers 4ave in common be more interesting to us t4an w4at distinguis4es t4emW 5r rat4er, * s4ould not 4ave said Jw4C s4ould it be more interesting to usWKBit isn!tY and t4is c4aracteri=es our waC of t4inIing) >GG NM-N1? %ead t4e passage above replacing t4e reference to t4e O*P for t4e reference to numbers, andB* submitB Cou s4all get t4e essence of w4at Wittgenstein 4as to saC about t4e use of t4at pronoun6 t4e Oreferential viewP >or analCsis? of t4e O*P maC be Jmore elegantK, but it is not elegance t4at we >s4ould? seeIY rat4er, w4at we are most in need of, in order to free ourselves from grammatical and p4ilosop4ical confusions, is a subtler and more nuanced understanding of t4e various forms and circumstances in w4ic4 we emploC t4e first person pronoun in our ordinarC language)

O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person /NN seamlesslCBin t4at t4e sub<ect w4o utters T t4inIs suc4 statements intends to refer to a particular ob;ect t4at we too can perceive, recogni=e, and so on) ,owever, if one tries to generali=e, applCing it to all first person statementsBincluding t4e ones in w4ic4 t4e O*P is used Oas sub<ectPBone maC >correctlC? notice t4at in suc4 cases t4e intended ob<ect of reference is not necessarilC t4e body of t4e sub<ectY 4ence, t4e temptation maC arise to seeI for some other Iind of referentBsuc4 as t4e mind, spirit, and so on NQR) *t is, t4erefore, wit4 t4e ultimate aim of loosening t4e grip of that Iind of picture upon t4e reader T interlocutor t4at Wittgenstein finds it important to 4ig4lig4t t4e grammatical differences we 4ave been tracIing so far)

//) ,aving critici=ed t4e t4esis contained in claim >N?Bt4at first person statements would serve to speaI about a personBWittgenstein turns to t4e t4eses contained in claims >/? and >R?BnamelC, t4at O*P means t4e same as OH) W)P, or as Ot4e person w4o is now speaIingP) Against t4ose assimilations, 4is main contention will be t4at t4e first person pronoun >in its Ouse as sub<ectP? and t4e words OH) W)P, and Ot4e person w4o is now speaIingP are Odifferent instruments in our languageP >GG EL?) Again, t4at does not mean t4at t4e latter p4rases simplC cannot be used in similar waCs to t4at pronoun in some conte@ts6 it is conceivable t4at in some special circumstances someone could s4out, e)g), OH) W) is in pain[P >t4inI of a little c4ild, or a !ar=an-liIe 4uman being? or even Ot4e person w4o is now speaIing is in pain[P >t4inI of a c4aracter in SaramagoPs ?lindness?, be4aving as people normallC do w4en t4eC feel painY Cet, if we were to react to t4ose utterances similarlC to t4e waC we react to people s4outing O* am in painP, in ordinarC circumstances, we would preciselC not be understanding t4em according to t4e paradigm of referenceBas if t4eC were intending to refer to a particular person, to speak about 4im or 4erBbut rat4er as somet4ing aIin to a moan) *n t4is sense, t4e same rule would applC to suc4 a speaIer as t4e one applCing to a person w4o cries out in painBnamelC, t4at 4e or s4e Odoesn!t choose the mouth "hich says itP >GG EM?NQQ)
NQR

NQQ

StrawsonPs strategC of taIing t4e notion of OpersonP as primitive >relativelC to ObodCP and OmindP? is designed to avoid <ust t4at Iind of move >see c4apter N?) \et, provided t4at one is aware of t4e variety of different roles t4at first person statements plaC in our language-games, t4e verC motivation for t4at Iind of >a little too reductionist and artificial? solution mig4t seem to fade awaCBor so * t4inI) !4at remarI maC sound enigmaticY its point is, * taIe it, calling our attention once again to t4e e)pressive c4aracter of certain be4avioursBlanguage included) *ntuitivelC, it seems clear t4at if we were to reali=e in t4e be4aviour of a person saCing t4at s4e is in painBregardless of using O*P, OH) W)P, or Ot4e person t4at is now speaIingP as a prefi@ to 4er utteranceBa deliberate attempt to Oc4oose t4e mout4 w4ic4 saCs itPB

O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person /N/ As t4ose brief considerations s4all suggest, * taIe it t4at WittgensteinPs purpose, in presenting claims >/? and >R?, is simplC to s4ow t4at, in their primary uses, sentences emploCing t4e first person pronoun Oas sub<ectP are t4e ones we >normallC? taIeBeven in t4e absence of anC ot4er companion circumstancesBas genuine e@pressions of Opersonal e@periencesPBin ot4er words, t4eC are >fallible? criteria for suc4 ascriptionsNQ:) \et t4ere is no indication t4at suc4 an analCsis s4ould be e@tended to t4e totality of Olanguage-gamesP for t4e use of O*PNQE) As * noted above, Wittgenstein is not trCing to ac4ieve a definition of t4e use of O*PBin t4e sense of a set of necessarC and sufficient conditions for the use >or the Ouse as sub<ectP? of t4at pronoun) ,e is, rat4er, describing some uses w4ic4 are particularlC relevant for 4is t4erapeutic purposesBparticularlC, t4at of loosening t4e grip of certain pictures w4ic4 are deeplC rooted in p4ilosop4ical analCses of t4e first person pronoun, leading to rat4er narrow, even monolit4ic views of its grammar, suc4 as t4e assimilations to t4e paradigm of reference) 8oreover, let me recall t4at Wittgenstein introduced t4e distinction between two uses of O*P bC listing e@amplesBof sentences concerning physical c4aracteristics of t4e speaIer >t4e Ouse as ob<ectP?, and ot4ers concerning 4isT4er psychological c4aracteristics >t4e Ouse as sub<ectP?) \et one mig4t wonder if t4at dic4otomC was reallC supposed to e@4aust t4e uses of O*P, wit4 no space being left for intermediate or composite cases) *s it not remarIable t4at cases suc4 as t4at of personal identitC and t4e use of proper namesBO* am suc4-andsuc4 a personP, O* am H) W)PBbot4 of w4ic4 4ad been mentioned previouslC in t4e analCsis, s4ould be left out preciselC at t4e moment in w4ic4 Wittgenstein lists 4is
t4at is, some Iind of artificialitC in t4e formulation or even in t4e tone of 4er e@clamationBwe would be rat4er inclined to distrust 4er, to t4inI s4e is dissimulating, and 4ence would probablC not react to 4er case as we normallC do w4en faced wit4 bona fide pain be4aviourBi)e), pitCing, trCing to assist, etc) >Again, a comparison wit4 StrawsonPs view in OFreedom and %esentmentP maC 4elp clarifC t4at point)? *n order to bring t4at point 4ome, it maC 4elp to t4inI about t4e case of a sub<ect suffering from retrograde amnesiaBsomeone liIe Heonard S4elbC >#uC "earce?, t4e main c4aracter of t4e film <emento >/000?Bw4o bC no means possess t4e capacitC to use a proper name or to identifC 4imT4erself as being suc4-and-suc4 a person, but still can use t4e first person pronoun to e@press >e)g)? pain, t4us enabling ot4er persons to understand 4isT4er situation and react appropriatelC) *t is notorious, especiallC in t4e ?lue ?ook, t4e recurrent reminder of WittgensteinPs to t4e effect t4at, w4en faced wit4 &uestions about w4et4er it maIes or it does not maIe sense to saC t4at a term O@P 4as t4e meaning y >e)g), w4et4er O*P can be used referentiallC or not?, t4e onlC sensible attitude is imagining concrete conte@ts of t4e proposed or intended useBJstress testK situations, as * 4ave been calling t4em) As in t4e earlier te@ts we 4ave been reading, t4e suggestion be4ind t4at reminder is t4at t4ere is no intrinsic c4aracteristic to t4e use of words t4at would 4inder >or legitimise? a priori certain uses >or senses?Bin 8c8anusPs words, signs do not 4ave an Oindependent lifeP of t4eir own >see c4apter /?) *t is onlC wit4 t4e analCsis of concrete language-gamesBeffective or inventedBt4at we can 4ope to arrive at suc4 conclusions) *t is somew4at surprising, 4owever, t4at so manC readers of t4e ?lue ?ook s4ould suffer of so intense a lacI of imagination, as to conclude t4at >in WittgensteinPs view?, O*P simplC does not >ever? referB4ence, t4at any statement purporting to use it referentiallC must be >a prioriW? nonsensical)

NQ:

NQE

O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person /NR e@amples of t4e two uses of O*PW Would not t4ose cases be recalcitrant relative to t4e dic4otomC Oas ob<ectP T Oas sub<ectPW And if t4eC are, would not one 4ave enoug4 reason to put into &uestion WittgensteinPs w4ole analCsisW !4e answer, * taIe it, is negative) As * read Wittgenstein, t4e dic4otomC 4e presents is bC no means intended to e@4aust t4e description of t4e uses of first person pronounY it amounts, rat4er, to a presentation of two e@tremities of a range of usesBbetween w4ic4 t4ere maC lie an indefinite number of intermediate cases, suc4 as, e)g), t4at of a student s4outing OI[P in replC to 4is name in a call, as mentioned above) .ow4ere Wittgenstein denies t4e possibilitC or legitimacC of suc4 intermediate or composed uses6 t4eC are simplC not interesting for 4is immediate, t4erapeutic aims) "aradigmatic cases of t4e Ouse as sub<ectP, on t4e contrarC, are of interest, because t4eC are responsible for some of t4e biggest p4ilosop4ical distortions in t4e analCsis of t4e grammar of t4e first personB ultimatelC capable of leading one to feel inclined toward some form of solipsismY and paradigmatic cases of t4e Ouse as ob<ectP are e&uallC of interest, because t4eC provide a clear counterpoint, and also serve to indicate t4e fundamental flaw in analCses w4ic4 intend to assimilate all t4e uses of O*P to t4e referential model)

/R) !4ose considerations s4all become clearer as we advance in t4e analCsis of t4e argument presented in t4e ?lue ?ook) Het me go bacI, t4en, to t4e attempt to elucidate t4e differences between pain statements in first and t4ird person) %egarding t4at difference, in t4e se&uence of t4e passages we 4ave been analCsing, Wittgenstein offers t4e following considerations6
All t4is comes to saCing t4at t4e person of w4om we saC J4e 4as painK is, bC t4e rules of t4e game, t4e person w4o cries, contorts 4is face, etc) !4e place of t4e painBas we 4ave saidBmaC be in anot4er personPs bodC) *f, in saCing J*K, * point to mC own bodC, * model t4e use of t4e word J*K on t4at of t4e demonstrative Jt4is personK or J4eK) _)))` *n J* 4ave painK, J*K is not a demonstrative pronoun) >GG EL-EM?

!4e last sentence above presents our claim >Q?Bt4at t4e pronoun O*P, in sentences such as JI have pain!, does not function as a demonstrative) !o understand t4e point of t4at t4esis, it s4all be useful to investigate wit4 more detail w4at Wittgenstein means w4en 4e talIs about modelling t4e use of O*P in demonstrative e@pressions) HetPs start t4inIing about t4e

O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person /NQ analogC presented in t4e suppressed part of t4e passage <ust &uotedBt4e case of a mat4ematical proof concerning t4e sum of t4e internal angles of a triangle) HooI at t4e following diagram6

nP n

pP p

!4e notion w4ic4 is relevant to draw t4e intended analogC wit4 t4e case of first-person pronoun is Oe&ualitC)P According to Wittgenstein, t4at notion is emploCed in one waC w4en we saC, regarding t4e diagram above, t4at X Y X! and Z Y ZP, and in anot4er waC w4en we saC t4at [ Y [) .ow, to assimilate t4e pronoun O*P to a demonstrative, suc4 as Ot4is personP or O4eP, would be Osomew4at analogousP to assimilate t4e two e&ualities above) !4e point of t4e analogC seems to be as follows6 in t4e case of t4e e&ualities X Y X! and Z Y ZP we actuallC compare t"o thingsBnamelC, two anglesBand saC t4eC are e&ualY Cet in t4e case of o l o, one mig4t saC t4at we are facing a sort of degenerated e&ualitC >i)e), self-identitC?, since no t"o elements are being compared) Somet4ing analogous would applC to t4e case of someone using O*P w4ile pointing to onePs bodC6 in t4eir primarC and strict uses, demonstrativesBliIe O4eP T Os4eP and Ot4is T t4at personPBneed to be supplemented wit4 ostensive gestures, in order to be correctlC understoodY but, as we noticed above, understanding ostensive gestures involves, in its turn, looIing at t4e person w4o maIes a >demonstrative? statement, taIing 4e or s4e as t4e centre in an ad hoc inde@ical sCstem) #iven t4ose conditions, in t4e case of a sub<ect emploCing O*P w4ile pointing to 4imT4erself, w4at we 4ave is >at best? a degenerate Iind of ostensionBone in w4ic4 t4e centre points to itself, so to speaI) *n suc4 a case, it maC be correct to saC t4at t4e pronoun O*P is being used as a >degenerated? demonstrative, but onlC to t4e e@tent in w4ic4 one mig4t saC t4at o l o is a >degenerated? case of e&ualitC) !4ere is no problem in principle wit4 t4at possibilitCBon t4e contrarC6 as degenerated e&ualitC is useful for t4e construction of a mat4ematical proof, so t4e use of degenerate ostension maC be useful >and legitimate? in some cases) >!4inI of t4e following situation6 * want to draw t4e attention of a friend to mCself, in a conte@t w4ere t4ere is too muc4 noise and people talIing everCw4ereBmaCbe a partCY * t4en s4out t4at friendPs nameY s4e 4ears mC scream, Cet is unable to determine

O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person /N: from w4ereB4ence, from w4omBit comesY in suc4 a case, s4outing O*[PBor, more liIelC, O,eC, itPs me[PBw4ile pointing to mC own body would seem to be t4e best waC of ac4ieving mC initial aim)? 5nce again, t4e main lesson * would liIe to draw from t4ose brief considerations is negativeBnamelC, t4at Wittgenstein is not defending t4at O*P simplC is not a demonstrative6 stones maC well serve as 4ammers from time to timeY words 4ave t4e uses we put t4em to in concrete situations, for certain specific purposes) WittgensteinPs suggestion seems to be rat4er simpler, even trivialBnamelC, t4at, in some of its primarC uses, suc4 as t4e one paradigmaticallC e@pressed w4en someone saCs O* am in painP, t4e first-person pronoun does not, as a matter of >grammatical? fact, function as a demonstrative) \et t4at trivialitC is not uselessBin its original conte@t, it 4as a particular >dialectical? purpose, w4ic4 is avoiding t4e 4astC assimilation to a rat4er narrow grammatical paradigm, motivated bC a lacI of attention to grammatical differencesY and it is in order to avoid t4at mistaIe t4at it becomes useful to present cases in w4ic4 t4e move would be conspicuouslC inappropriate)

/Q) $nsurprisinglC, WittgensteinPs interlocutor s4ows 4imself dissatisfied wit4 t4at negative result, claiming t4at OsurelC t4e word J*K in J* 4ave painK serves to distinguis4 me from ot4er people, because it is bC t4e sign J*K t4at * distinguis4 saCing t4at * 4ave pain from saCing t4at one of t4e ot4ers 4asP >GG EM-E1?) *n replC to t4at claim Wittgenstein proposes t4e following >rat4er remarIable? language-game6
*magine a language in w4ic4, instead of J* found nobodC in t4e roomK, one said J* found 8r) .obodC in t4e roomK) *magine t4e p4ilosop4ical problems w4ic4 would arise out of suc4 a convention) Some p4ilosop4ers broug4t up in t4is language would probablC feel t4at t4eC didnPt liIe t4e similaritC of t4e e@pressions J8r) .obodCK and J8r) Smit4K) W4en we feel t4at we wis4 to abolis4 t4e J*K in J* 4ave painK, one maC saC t4at we tend to maIe t4e verbal e@pression of pain similar to t4e e@pression bC moaning)BWe are inclined to forget t4at it is t4e particular use of a word onlC w4ic4 gives t4e word its meaning) >GG E1?

*s difficult to understand t4e point of t4e analogC above, e@cept if one analCses it against t4e broader bacIdrop of t4e criticism of solipsism) %ead t4at waC, w4at t4e analogC seems to indicate is t4at, in our ordinarC language, t4ere is a similaritC between t4e use of O*P in

O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person /NE sentences suc4 as O* am in painP >t4e Ouse as sub<ectP?, and t4e use of O*P in cases in w4ic4 we actuallC identifC a person, or even a particular bodC, in order to maIe our utterance >t4e Ouse as ob<ectP?Y t4at similaritC, in turn, can eit4er tempt one to assimilate bot4 cases to t4e latter modelBand, accordinglC, alwaCs to seeI for a referent of t4e term O*PBor to simplC drop t4e >supposedlC? problematic use of O*P, t4us proposing a new notation, in w4ic4, e)g), one would saC simplC Ot4ere is painP) .ow t4at would be a revisionist proposal similar to t4e one a p4ilosop4er grown up in t4e language presented in t4e passage above would probablC maIe, bC arguing t4at we s4ould simplC drop t4e p4rase O8r) .obodCP, in order not to conflate it wit4 t4e p4rase O8r) Smit4P, t4us >supposedlC? escaping t4e temptation to imagine t4at t4ere is some 4idden entitC in t4e room w4en we saC t4at 8r) .obodC is in t4e room) *f we went on saCing simplC Ot4ere is painPBinstead of O*Pm in painPBwe would stop t4inIingBso t4inIs WittgensteinPs interlocutorBt4at t4ere is some Iind of 4idden referent of t4e pronoun O*P) And 4ere we arrive to an opposite >but congenial? attitude to t4e ones presented earlier) Got4 t4e proposal to assimilate all t4e uses of O*P to grammatical paradigms primarC applicable to t4e Ouse as ob<ectP, and t4e proposal to drop t4at pronoun from our language Bin order to sticI to w4at is supposedlC peculiar in our personal e@periences, ending wit4 t4e surface similarities wit4 e@pressions used to talI about t4e e@periences of other sub<ectsBstem from t4e same deep p4ilosop4ical roots, among w4ic4 are t4e craving for a single e@planation w4ic4 would account for all uses of certain concept, t4e assumption t4at if t4ere is a noun t4ere must be a referent, and so on)

/:) !4e >negative? results of t4is analCsis seem to me &uite straig4tforward6 first, Wittgenstein does not advocate a Onon-referential viewP of t4e grammar of t4e first person in t4e ?lue ?ookY to defend t4at would be liIe saCing t4at stones do not serve to nail, for t4e simple reason t4at t4eC are not 4ammers >a conclusion w4ic4 some p4ilosop4ers could per4aps draw from t4eir armc4airs, w4ile e@amining t4e conditions of possibilitC of building?) Second, Wittgenstein also does not argue t4at t4e first-person pronoun 4as t"o uses%one Oas ob<ectP and ot4er Oas sub<ectPY t4ose are onlC two e@tremities of a range of usesBtwo rat4er different members of a family, if Cou liIe >see GG NL?Bt4e indication of w4ic4 was useful for diagnosing t4e congenial errors of several monolit4ic accounts of t4e

O J*K does nor referP6 t4e peculiar grammar of t4e first person /NL role of t4at pronoun) Getween t4ose two e@tremities t4ere is an enormous varietC of ot4er possible and more or less overlaping uses, w4ose JidentitCK depends on t4e re&uirements of t4e concrete linguistic conte@t w4ere t4eC are emploCed, and, in particular, on our concrete interests and purposes in eac4 case) FinallC >and more positivelC?, t4e fundamental lesson of t4is w4ole analCsis is methodologicalBnamelC, t4at one s4all strive to paC attention to differences between t4e various uses of certain conceptsBsuc4 as t4e pronoun O*PBrat4er t4an trC to fit t4em all in a single, narrow bin, w4atever t4at isBe)g), reference, demonstration, description, e@pression, etc) !4at, bC t4e waC, is preciselC t4e lesson presented bC Wittgenstein in an earlier passage of t4e booI, wit4 t4e &uotation of w4ic4 * would liIe to bring t4is reading to a close) !4e passage goes as follows6
_S`ome of t4e greatest ac4ievements in p4ilosop4C could onlC be compared wit4 taIing up some booIs w4ic4 seemed to belong toget4er, and putting t4em on different s4elvesY not4ing more being final about t4eir positions t4an t4at t4eC no longer lie side bC side) !4e onlooIer w4o doesnPt Inow t4e difficultC of t4e tasI mig4t well t4inI in suc4 a case t4at not4ing at all 4ad been ac4ieved)B!4e difficultC in p4ilosop4C is to saC no more t4an we Inow) 7)g), to see t4at w4en we 4ave put two booIs toget4er in t4eir rig4t order we 4ave not t4erebC put t4em in t4eir final places) >GG QQ-Q:?

"4ilosop4C, as t4at activitC is envisaged and carried on in WittgensteinPs te@ts, is alwaCs provisional) !4at s4all e@plain, at least in part, w4C 4is >post-!ractarian? writings never end upBand, as far as * Inow, were never intended to end upBwit4 a proper, structurallC distinguis4able conclusionBas if to marI t4at t4e Jlast wordK is onlC contingently so, and t4at t4e invitation is alwaCs open to continue t4e conversation) !4at, * taIe it, is an e@emplar attitude from an aut4or trulC engaged in t4e continuous and difficult tasI of trCing to accept, and to maIe good of, our finite condition)

VVV

7pilogue6 !4e "at4 to t4e *nvestigations /NM

("= ,pilogue: +$e !at$ to t$e Investigations

/E) ,aving broug4t mC reading of t4e ?lue ?ook to a close, * s4all also abandon, at least for t4e time being, WittgensteinPs imaginarC conversations wit4 4is solipsist interlocutor) \et before doing t4at, * would liIe to taIe a few steps forward in one of t4e pat4s w4ic4 t4at reading opens up, indicating some possible applications of t4e met4odologC * 4ave been following in mC analCsis of t4ose e@c4anges to WittgensteinPs later treatment of privacC, particularlC in t4e Philosophical Investigations) GC doing t4at, * s4all in fact follow a trail left bC Step4en 8ul4all in 4is Wittgenstein!s Private +anguageBa booI w4ic4 4as been an important source of inspiration for mC own readings) 8ul4all c4aracteri=es two opposed waCs of reading WittgensteinPs te@ts in general, emploCing for t4at purpose a distinction w4ic4 was originallC presented in t4e discussion of t4e Tractatus%namelC, t4at between OresoluteP and OsubstantialP readingsNQL) According to 4im, t4e Ofundamental pointP of a resolute reading is Ot4at of identifCing and aiming to overcome our attraction to t4e idea t4at t4ere is somet4ing we cannot do in p4ilosop4CP >/00La, p) M?Y t4e intended contrast is wit4 a reading w4ic4 postulates certain a priori limits%logical, grammatical, metap4CsicalBto w4at oneBbe it oneself, or an interlocutor Bcan Odo in p4ilosop4CPBin particular, to w4at one can >sensiblC? say in a p4ilosop4ical e@c4ange, suc4 as t4e ones illustrated in WittgensteinPs writings) For t4e purposes of t4is e@ercise, * s4all taIe as definitive of t4e difference between t4ose two readings t4eir respective understandings of 4ow t4e appeal to logic T grammar is supposed to 4elp oneBWittgenstein, or a Wittgensteinian p4ilosop4erBac4ieving claritC in a conceptual investigation) !4us, for a supporter of t4e substantial reading, t4e main point of invoIing logic T grammar is to enable one to OanalCseP certain p4ilosop4ical sentences, supported bC a determinate set of constraintsBa particular Ot4eorC of meaningPBw4ic4, in turn, can allow one to re<ect t4em as OdeterminatelC nonsensicalPBas if t4eir nonsensicalitC was Oa result of t4e speaIer attempting to con<oin intelligible words in unintelligible waCsP >8ul4all, /00La, p) 1?Y from suc4 a >substantial? perspective6
grammatical reminders _would` articulate t4e limits of sense, and t4erebC identifC a region or domain t4at lies beCond t4ose limits, from w4ic4 we are
NQL

See 4is O*ntroductionP in /00La)

7pilogue6 !4e "at4 to t4e *nvestigations /N1

e@cluded) *t maC furt4er lead us to assume t4at _)))` grammatical investigations presuppose or ot4erwise deploC an implicit p4ilosop4ical t4eorC of t4e _)))` conditions of senseB&uite as if our everCdaC abilities to distinguis4 sense from nonsense re&uire at t4e verC least a p4ilosop4ical grounding or foundation >per4aps a criterial semantics, or a t4eorC of language-games, or an ant4ropologC of t4e 4uman form of life?) >8ul4all, /00La, p) 1?

From a resolute point of view, bC contrast, a grammatical investigation s4all be understood

as simplC deploCing our everCdaC capacitC to distinguis4 sense from nonsense in a p4ilosop4ical conte@t, and 4ence as depriving itself of anC claim to e@pertise or aut4oritC t4at e@ceeds t4at form of practical abilitCBan abilitC t4at can e&uallC well be laid claim to bC anC competent speaIer, and 4ence bC anC p4ilosop4ical interlocutor) *t will, in s4ort, see t4e primarC tasI of _WittgensteinPs, or a Wittgensteinian` p4ilosop4C as a matter of identifCing and attempting to overcome our sense t4at grammar is a limitation on our capacities for speec4 and t4oug4tBt4at it deprives us of somet4ing) *t will, in effect, amount to t4e same pro<ect of acInowledging >as opposed to despairing of, resenting, or denCing? our finitude t4at resolute readers find alwaCs alreadC at worI in t4e Tractatus) >8ul4all, /00La, p) N0?

W4et4er t4e readings * 4ave been pursuing in t4e c4apters /-Q 4ave t4e marIs of OresolutenessP, in 8ul4allPs sense, is not for me to decideB* cannot do better t4an letting t4e particular analCses of t4e solipsistPs attempts at formulating 4is point speaI for t4emselves) * s4all nonet4eless trC to maIe mC own self-assessment clear, if onlC to let ot4ers <udge on its correction) * find t4at a central and recurrent concern of mine in t4ose analCses was indicating t4at for WittgensteinBappearances notwit4standingBt4e solipsistPs main problem was not so muc4 t4e Odeterminate nonsensicalitCP of 4is formulationsBt4e attempt, i)e), of violating logic T grammar, trCing to get beCond t4e Olimits of senseP bC combining individuallC intelligible signs in illegitimate waCsBbut, rat4er, t4e fact t4at t4e signs 4e was emploCing simplC did not 4ave anC clear pointBnot bC anC Iind of logical T grammatical T metap4Csical necessitC >verifiable onlC from t4e vantage point of someone w4o masters a t4eorC of t4e conditions of sense?, but as a contingent matter of >linguistic? fact, verifiable bC anC competent speaIer)

/L) !4at said, * move to mC vowed tasIBt4at of assessing t4e gains of trCing to applC a resolute approac4 to t4e Philosophical InvestigationsPs treatment of privacC) 8ul4all contends, and * second 4im, t4at OWittgensteinPs remarIs on t4e idea of a private language mig4t be seen as an illuminating test-case for t4e claim t4at even t4ose genuinelC

7pilogue6 !4e "at4 to t4e *nvestigations //0 sCmpat4etic to 4is later worI can find t4emselves defending it in terms, and wit4 a tenor, t4at amounts to its subversion into substantialitCP >/00La, p) NN?) *n fact, 4is own booI is preciselC an attempt at Odiagnosing and overcomingP t4e temptation to >mis?read WittgensteinPs remarIs t4at waC) * s4all offer an illustration of t4at diagnose belowY but before doing t4at * would liIe to address an apparent problem, amounting to a prima facie obstacle to draw mC own envisaged parallel between WittgensteinPs >earlC? treatment of solipsism and 4is >later? treatment of privacC) 5ne waC of indicating t4at problem is simplC bC noticing t4at t4e e@pression OsolipsismP is notoriouslC absent from t4e later worIBt4e onlC e@ception being "* c/Q, w4ere we read6 O!4e significance of suc4 possibilities of transformation, for e@ample of turning all statements into sentences beginning J* t4inIK or J* believeK >and t4us, as it were, into descriptions of my inner life? will become clearer in anot4er place) >Solipsism)?P) .ow, since no furt4er e@plicit reference to solipsism occurs in t4e remainder of t4e te@t, w4ereBif at allBwould t4e Osignificance of suc4 transformationsP be clarifiedW 8C guessBper4aps unsurprisinglCBis t4at t4e tasI anticipated in c/Q will be fulfilled preciselC in t4e conte@t of t4e analCsis of t4e possibilitC of Oprivate languagesP, w4ic4 starts in c/QR) !4e main reason for t4at guess 4as to do wit4 t4e verC c4aracteri=ation of a Oprivate languageP, as stated in c/QRBnamelC, as one Oin w4ic4 a person could write down or give vocal e@pression to 4is inner e@periencesB4is feelings, moods, and t4e restBfor 4is private useP, so t4at in it Oindividual words _)))` are to refer to w4at can onlC be Inown to t4e person speaIingY to 4is immediate private sensationsP, and Oanot4er person cannot understand itP) As * 4ope t4e analCsis pursued up to t4is point s4all maIe clear, t4at c4aracteri=ation maIes t4e private languages referred in "* direct descendants of t4e Osolipsistic notationsP presented in t4e ?lue ?ook) *n fact, one mig4t per4aps taIe a step furt4er, and saC t4at t4e Oprivate linguistP of "* is >basicallC? a new iterationBa 4eirWBof Ot4e solipsistP in WittgensteinPs earlier writings) 5nce t4at first linI between t4e treatment of solipsism and privacC is establis4ed, some furt4er structural parallels between earlier and later te@ts start s4owing up) For t4e present purposes, * s4all indicate a rat4er restricted set of suc4 parallels, comparing t4e elements w4ic4 were emp4asi=ed above, in mC own reading of t4e ?lue ?ook, wit4 t4eir counterparts in "*) !4e resulting list goes as follows6

7pilogue6 !4e "at4 to t4e *nvestigations //N N) !4e initial strategC6 bot4 te@ts >i)e), GG and "*? start dealing wit4 problems concerning t4e nature of meaning and understanding, and go on immediatelC trCing to divert t4e readerPs attention from certain pictures w4ic4 stand in t4e waC of a clear view on t4ose notions >among suc4 pictures belong t4e referential or OAugustinianPNQM, as well as, for lacI of a better term, an internalist view of meaning and understanding?Y /) "ostponing t4e treatment of Ot4e innerP6 as we saw, in bot4 cases Wittgenstein prefers to delaC talIing about t4e nature of Opersonal e@periencesP >GG QQ? T Oimmediate private sensationsP >"* c/Q? at least until 4e 4as gone some waC toward freeing t4e reader from t4e initial pictures referred in >N?Y R) A privileged target6 w4en 4e taIes up t4e topic of personal e@periences T private sensations, t4e analCsis rat4er &uicIlC turns to t4e solipsistPs T private linguistPs attempts at revising ordinarC languageY Q) A furt4er >related? target6 finallC, t4e analCsis of solipsistic notations T private languages will eventuallC lead Wittgenstein to turn to t4e grammar of first person and t4e nature of t4e selfBt4e parallel remarIs in "* being ccR1M-QNN)

/M) Steps N-Q form a te@tual pattern w4ic4 is clearlC s4ared bC t4e ?lue ?ook and t4e InvestigationsNQ1) .ow t4e main reason for calling attention to t4at pattern is to indicate some possible parallels between >mC reading of? WittgensteinPs treatment of solipsism in t4e ?lue ?ook, and 4is treatment of privacC in t4e Investigations) Wittgenstein starts t4at treatment, in "* c/QR, bC recalling us of some refle)ive%hence, in t4at >ordinarC? sense, privateBuses of language6
A 4uman being can encourage 4imself, give 4imself orders, obeC, blame and punis4 4imselfY 4e can asI 4imself a &uestion and answer it) We could even imagine 4uman beings w4o spoIe onlC in monologueY w4o accompanied t4eir
NQM

NQ1

!4e presentation of t4e so-called Augustinian view in "* cN 4as an important precedent in t4e opening pages of t4e ?ro"n ?ook >pp) LL ss)?) *n factBalt4oug4 * s4all not trC to <ustifC or go into details about t4is claimB* believe t4at t4e same pattern can be found in manC of WittgensteinPs writingsBincluding t4e Tractatus and >possiblC? all t4e drafts to w4at for manC Cears after N1R0 4e called OmC booIP) * 4ope t4e analCses advanced in t4e preceding c4aptersBnamelC, t4ose dealing wit4 t4e Tractatus >/? and t4e >emarks >R?Bcan, in retrospect, lend some initial support to t4at claim)

7pilogue6 !4e "at4 to t4e *nvestigations ///

activities bC talIing to t4emselves)BAn e@plorer w4o watc4ed t4em and listened to t4eir talI mig4t succeed in translating t4eir language into ours) >!4is would enable 4im to predict t4ese peoplePs actions correctlC, for 4e also 4ears t4em maIing resolutions and decisions)? >"* c/QR?

*n t4e ne@t paragrap4, Wittgenstein >refle@ivelC? asIs 4imself a &uestionBabout t4e possibilitC of anot4er >e@traordinarC? Iind of private use of languageBand answers it, t4us resuming a >bC now? familiar pattern of dialectical e@c4ange) ,ere is 4ow t4e e@c4ange goes6
Gut could we also imagine a language in w4ic4 a person could write down or give vocal e@pression to 4is inner e@periencesB4is feelings, moods, and t4e rest Bfor 4is private useWB BWell, canPt we do so in our ordinarC languageWBGut t4at is not w4at * mean) !4e individual words of t4is language are to refer to w4at can onlC be Inown to t4e person speaIingY to 4is immediate private sensations) So anot4er person cannot understand t4e language) >"* c/QR?

After t4at point, WittgensteinPs te@t will proceed in t4is refle@ive, self-&uestioning manner, alternatelC presenting >re?formulations of t4e idea of a private use of language for t4e e@pression of Oinner e@periencesP, and t4en asIing w4et4er t4e envisaged results reallC maIe anCBand, in particular, anC e@traordinarCBsense)

/1) *n commenting t4e passage above, 8ul4all remarIs t4at t4e Otwists and turns of t4e furt4er &uestions and answers, directions and self-criticismsP t4at follow Ocan be interpreted so as to be consistent wit4 two different readings of t4at opening e@c4angeP >/00La, pp) NE-NL?) ,ere is 4ow 4e summari=es t4e firstBsubstantialBreading6
!4e first sentence sIetc4es an ideaBt4at of using language to give voice to our inner e@periences for our personal useBand t4e rest of t4e paragrap4 distinguis4es two different waCs of filling it out) !4e first is e@emplified bC our ordinarC life wit4 language, w4en Ieeping a <ournal, writing a memoir, composing a love poem, and so onY but Wittgenstein swiftlC re<ects t4is as not w4at 4e means) !4e final two sentences specifC w4at 4e does mean6 t4e idea of a language w4ose words refer to t4e speaIerPs immediate, private sensations, and 4ence w4ose meaning can be Inown onlC to t4at speaIer) !4is idea, and t4e p4ilosop4ical issues it puts in plaC, are t4e topic of t4e succeeding sections of t4e te@t) >/00La, p) NL?

!4at, * taIe it, is a &uite straig4tforward reading) .ow, if one follows t4roug4 wit4 it, t4e succeeding sections of t4e te@t will be seen as attempts to s4ow t4at, Ogiven t4e meaning of t4e words in t4e interlocutorPs penultimate sentence, t4e idea of a private language t4at 4e

7pilogue6 !4e "at4 to t4e *nvestigations //R attempts to construct out of t4em must be nonsensical or inco4erent, a violation of grammarP >ibid, p) NM?) \et a second reading of t4e passage above is also available, according to w4ic46
!4e first sentence asIs w4et4er we can imagineBliterallC, find t4inIable t4e idea ofBa language in w4ic4 someone can e@press 4is inner e@periences for 4is personal use) !4ere is t4en a double-das4 in t4e te@tBan unusuallC long pause, as if Wittgenstein needs time to contemplate w4at 4as <ust been said) !4en 4e responds bC reminding 4is interlocutor >reminding 4imself? t4at we do <ust t4is in ordinarC language) #iving voice to our inner life for our own purposes is a commonplace of our life wit4 words) ,ow, t4en, can anC participant in t4at life find 4imself asIing w4et4er we can imagine suc4 a t4ing, t4erebC implCing t4at its verC intelligibilitC is &uestionable, w4en it is a 4umdrum actualitCW ,is interlocutor t4en 4astilC replies t4at t4is everCdaC banalitC is not at all w4at 4e meantY and in t4e final two sentences of t4e paragrap4, 4e attempts to e@plain w4at 4e reallC wanted t4e words of t4e first sentence to mean) And in t4e following sections, Wittgenstein tries to determine w4et4er t4is attempt is reallC successfulBw4et4er t4ere is a waC of meaning t4e words of t4e penultimate sentence t4at does not simplC return us to a banalitC, w4et4er in fact 4is interlocutor means anCt4ing in particular bC t4ose words) >/00La, pp) NL-NM?

*f one follows t4roug4 wit4 t4is second, resolute reading, t4en t4e remaining sections of t4e te@t will be seen as genuinelC dialectical6 Wittgenstein will t4en be read as engaged in an effort to Otr_C` to imagine, and t4en tr_C` out, waCs of giving meaning to t4e constituent terms of t4e interlocutorPs formulationP >ibid), p) NM?, Cet sCstematicallC failing in t4at tasI Bin t4at t4e interlocutor would alwaCs feel dissatisfied, 4ence inclined to repeat 4is response6 OGut t4at is not w4at * meanP) According to t4is second reading, t4en, t4e result will not amount to an indication of t4e interlocutorPs Oviolations of grammarP, but rat4er to t4e indication of a failureBw4ic4 is as muc4 4is as it is ours, or WittgensteinPsBto give >as Cet? anC particular and clear sense to t4e words 4e is inclined to emploC6
,e is left wit4 a form of words, and a varietC of waCs in w4ic4 t4eC mig4t co4erentlC be taIenY but none of t4ose waCs satisfC 4imBnone capture w4at 4e 4ad it at 4eart to saC) *t remains open to 4im to imagine anot4er suc4 waC, and t4erebC to find t4e satisfaction 4e seeIsY but if 4e does not, t4en Wittgenstein implicitlC invites 4im to asI 4imself w4C 4e is passionatelC convinced t4at 4is words mean somet4ing in particularBindeed somet4ing deeplC significant about our inner life and our e@pressions of itBand Cet re<ects anC particular assignment of meaning to 4is words) >/00La, p) N1?

R0) .ow, since WittgensteinPs te@t seems to support bot4 >substantial and resolute? readings simultaneouslC, 4ow s4all one decide w4ic4 of t4em is rig4tW As 8ul4all

7pilogue6 !4e "at4 to t4e *nvestigations //Q indicates, muc4 will depend on w4ere one decides to place t4e emp4asis of onePs reading, and t4e reasons one 4as to offer for t4at decisionY t4us, a resolute reader maC Ostress t4at Wittgenstein repeatedlC begins 4is investigation of t4e interlocutorPs formulations bC asIing w4at t4eir elements mig4t mean, rat4er t4an telling us w4at t4eC do meanP >ibid), p) N1?Bin ot4er words, t4e emp4asis in t4is case would be placed on t4e imaginative e)ercise of trCing to get t4e interlocutorPs intended sense rig4t) \et for a substantial reader t4e emp4asis would be placed on Ot4e numerous occasions on w4ic4 Wittgenstein seems not so muc4 to e@ercise 4is imagination on 4is interlocutorPs be4alf, but rat4er to laC down t4e law to 4imP >id) ibid)?N:0) Worse still6 besides being bot4 compatible wit4 WittgensteinPs te@t, eac4 reading is also able to accommodate t4e aspects of t4at te@t w4ic4 seem to encourage t4e opposite one) !4us, for a substantial reader, WittgensteinPs imaginative efforts at getting t4e interlocutorPs meaning rig4t could be easilC put aside as mere Or4etorical devicesP, w4ose ultimate function is to pave t4e waC for w4at reallC mattersBnamelC, t4e grammatical reminders t4emselves, bC means of w4ose Wittgenstein would be able Oto reclaim 4is interlocutor for t4e common ground of ordinarC meaningsP >ibid), p) /0?) %esolute readers, on t4e ot4er 4and, would claim t4at t4ose OapparentlC decisive grammatical remindersP 4ave in fact onlC a dialectical role, in t4at t4eC are OessentiallC responsive to possibilities invoIed bC 4is interlocutorP, and, conse&uentlC, function Oas invitations to acInowledge t4at 4is imagined pro<ections of 4is words eit4er 4ave implications t4at will not satisfC 4im, or are in fact insufficientlC substantial or contentful to generate definite implicationsP >id) ibid)?) Faced wit4 t4ose findings, 8ul4all invites us to reflect about t4e >e@egetical? 4Cpot4esis t4at, after all, per4aps Wittgenstein reallC intended to give us Otwo apparentlC different waCs of reac4ing t4e same conclusionPBnamelC, in t4e case 4ere at staIe, Ot4at t4e private linguist 4as failed to invoIe anCt4ing in particular in attempting to invoIe t4e JideaK of a private languageP >id) ibid)?) *f t4at is true, t4en per4aps we s4ould stop asIing w4ic4
N:0

7@amples of suc4 occasions abound in t4e te@t) 8ul4all offers t4e following, representative list6 *n c/QQ, we are simplC told t4at Ot4e verbal e@pression of pain replaces crCing and does not describe itPY in c/QE, we learn t4at O!4e trut4 is6 it maIes sense to saC about ot4er people t4at t4eC doubt w4et4er * am in painY but not to saC it about mCselfPY and in c/:R, t4at Oone does not define a criterion of identitC bC emp4atic stressing of t4e word Jt4isK P) >/00La, p) N1?

7pilogue6 !4e "at4 to t4e *nvestigations //: reading is rig4t, and start reflecting about Ow4et4er it matters w4ic4 waC we dramati=e t4e process of reac4ing t4at conclusionPBin ot4er words, w4at we s4ould start asIing is Ow4at difference does it maIe w4et4er we present t4ese acInowledgements and claims as earned bC recalling us to our ordinarC life wit4 words, or bC recounting waCs in w4ic4 we mig4t imagine t4at we can repudiate itWP >id) ibid)?) !4e suggestion 4ere is, * taIe it, t4at per4aps bot4 >substantial and resolute? aspects of t4e te@t maC prove useful, or even essential, from a t4erapeutic perspective, in t4at t4e ambiguitC, or possibilitC of multiple readings, maC itself be t4e best waC of creating an attunement wit4 t4e readerPs own >possiblC conflicting? tendenciesBmeaning t4at a te@t will be as good a basis for self-e@amination and self-criticism as it is capable of reflecting t4ose tendencies) !4ose considerations prompt 8ul4allBand usBto e@amine t4e relation between form >or style? and content in WittgensteinPs writingsBOto investigate not onlC 4is treatment of t4e idea of a private language, but also 4is idea of 4ow one s4ould treat anC p4ilosop4ical problem, and t4e one in relation to t4e ot4erBeac4 as if called for bC t4e ot4erP >ibid), p) /N?) At t4is <uncture, 8ul4all reminds us t4at WittgensteinPs interlocutorC dialogues are t4emselves Ointernal or self-addressedP >id) ibid)?B4ence private, in t4at familiar, ordinarC sense recalled at t4e beginning of c/QRY t4at suggests a waC of t4inIing about t4e Oe@plorerP, w4o in t4at paragrap4 is said to encounter e@clusivelC monolingual speaIers, as being 4imself a portrait of t4e reader of WittgensteinPs >private? dialogues) !4e &uestion t4en arises w4et4er t4ose Ointerior monologues for more t4an one voice _can` ever trulC speaI to or for anot4er, and 4ence elicit a genuine p4ilosop4ical dialoguePB4ence if we, as e@plorers of WittgensteinPs te@ts, can Oever reallC succeed in translating 4is language into oursP >ibid), p) //?) !4at &uestion is not answered in 8ul4allPs te@t, and t4e reason, * taIe it, is t4at t4e onlC effective waC to answer it is not JbC descriptionK, but rat4er JbC ac&uaintanceKB* mean, bC trCing to engage wit4 WittgensteinPs monologues, seeing if t4eC can reallC speaI for and to oneselfY 4ence, if an answer is to be found in our reading of 8ul4allPs booI, it will surelC not be gat4ered in anC particular point of it, but rat4er bC t4e verC process of >re?enacting 4is own e@emplarC engagement wit4 t4e Investigations) Since no s4ortcut is available for t4at end, t4e best * can do rig4t now is to stop, letting t4e pat4 open for future continuations)

8eaning, .ormativitC and %esponsibilitC6 A Cavellian Approac4 //E

;eaning& >ormativit* and Responsibilit*: A ?avellian Approac$

The re.uirement of purity imposed by philosophy no" looks like a "ish to leave me out, I mean each of us, the self, "ith its arbitrary needs and unruly desires.

StanleC Cavell

7"1 Introduction
N) As we saw in t4e preceding c4apters, elucidating t4e nature of meaning%t4at w4ic4 is conveCed bC our linguistic signs, in a broad senseBand mental content%t4at w4ic4 is e@pressed bC means of ascriptive propositions in w4ic4 psCc4ological predicates occurB were among t4e central concerns of StrawsonPs and WittgensteinPs writings) Got4 issues are still intenselC debated in contemporarC p4ilosop4C, particularlC in t4e analCtic traditionN:N) From a strictlC met4odological point of viewBt4e onlC w4ic4 will be relevant 4ereBone can distinguis4 two main positions polari=ing t4at debate6 individualism and anti-individualismN:/) W4ile t4e former is 4appC to analCse meaning and T or mental content t4roug4 an inspection of t4e individual >or of some part T aspect of t4at individual, e)g), 4er brain or be4aviour? taIen in isolation from 4er remaining p4Csical and T or social environments, t4e latter re&uires t4at analCsis to taIe into account a set of factors w4ic4 are

N:N

N:/

* interpret t4at p4rase along t4e lines of t4e >commendablC? multi-sided approac4 taIen in #locI >/00M?, eventuallC condensed in t4e claim t4at OanalCtic p4ilosop4C is a tradition 4eld toget4er both bC ties of mutual influence and bC familC resemblancesP >p) /0:?) 5ne of t4e advantages * see in an approac4 liIe #locIPs is t4at it allows oneBanCwaC it 4as allowed meBto regard worIs normallC categori=ed under different 4eadings >e)g), Ocontinental p4ilosop4CP? as also belonging to a single "4ilosop4C familC, t4us smoot4ing some >artificial or imaginarC orBdare * saCWBpre<udiced? obstacles preventing >possiblC? fruitful encounters and conversations) 5t4er >per4aps more common? 4eadings for t4ose positions are, respectivelC, OinternalismP and Oe@ternalismPY t4e main reason * 4ave not to use t4em is to avoid confusion wit4 4omonCm positions in contemporarC epistemological debates, w4ere w4at is mainlC at staIe is t4e source of <ustification of our cognitive claims, or beliefs) >For anot4er reason not to use t4ose 4eadings, see below, n) N:Q)?

*ntroduction //L Joutside t4e individualPs 4eadKN:R >e)g), t4e p4Csioc4emical constitution of t4e stuff wit4 w4ic4 s4e interacts, or t4e social relations4ips s4e maintains wit4 ot4er 4uman beings?N:Q) !4e dispute among supporters of bot4 positions in t4e analCtic corner 4as proven verC proficuous, and seems to be far from overN::) \et * s4all not trC to review t4at discussion 4ereY instead, * s4all pursue t4e more 4omelC aim of trCing to recollect and >self-?critici=e some of t4e main reasons w4ic4 eventuallCBif unstablCBled me to favour certain forms of anti-individualistic approac4es over individualistic alternatives) !4at maC sound as a rat4er selfis4 concern, but it is meant ot4erwiseY * could saC it is meant as a CavellianB 4ence, according to CavellPs and mC own <udgement, WittgensteinianBe@ercise in p4ilosop4ical >self-?t4erapCBif onlC t4e meaning of t4at description could be taIen for granted) Since it >most probablC? cannot, 4ere goes anot4er attempt6 t4e basic ideaBat anC rate t4e regulative ideaBis to provide an analCsis w4ic4, if pursued wit4 enoug4 detail, can serve as an e@ampleBanCwaC as a useful ob<ect of comparisonBcapable of creating bot4 resonance and dissonance wit4 t4e readerPs own views >4owever tacit up to t4at point?, t4us allowing for a genuine p4ilosop4ical e@c4ange, a continuous dialogue based on mutual understandings >not to be confused wit4 mutual assent?, w4ic4 will 4opefullC develop into some s4aredB4ence more universal, and 4ence 4opefullC universali=ableB conclusions)

/) #iven t4at aim, * s4all start mC >self-?analCsis bC recollecting a pair of strong >if prima facie? general reasons * 4ad for favouring anti-individualism over individualism) !4e first
N:R

N:Q

N::

!4at is of course an allusion to ,ilarC "utnamPs emblematic claim6 OCut t4e pie anC waC Cou liIe, JmeaningsK <ust ainPt in t4e head[P >N1L:, p) //L?) >8ore about t4at claimPs original conte@t below, in c:)? *t mig4t go wit4out saCing t4at, according to t4e general c4aracteri=ation * am proposing, positions suc4 as be4aviourism and >at least some forms of? functionalism s4ould be classified as individualistic) "ersonallC, * welcome t4at implication, for it 4ig4lig4ts a linIBw4ic4 normallC seems to go unnoticedB between t4e latter positions and traditional individualistic viewsBi)e), t4ose we use to describe collectivelC as OCartesianP) >!4at implication offers a furt4er reason for prefering t4e pair OindividualismP T Oanti-individualismP over OinternalismP T Oe@ternalismP, in t4at, from t4e mere fact t4at an analCsis taIes into account Je@ternalK aspects of an individual >e)g), 4er be4aviour?, it does not follow t4at it is Oe@ternalistP in the relevant senseBt4e sense, i)e), w4ic4 was originallC intended bC t4e supporters of t4at positionBabout w4ic4 see below, section :)/?) $ntil some time ago, * would risI t4e claim t4at t4ere is a growing tendencC toward >some or ot4er form of? anti-individualistic met4odologCY some, in fact, are willing to go furt4er t4an t4at, describing antiindividualism as a Onew ort4odo@CP in analCtical p4ilosop4C >see FarIas, /00R, p) NML?) Gut p4ilosop4ers s4ould be particularlC aware t4at everC ort4odo@C, as it consolidates, tends to generate an increasing number of dissidentsY it maC be too earlC to <udge w4et4er a Jcounter-movementK is arising, but signs of t4ar are getting ever more conspicuous)

*ntroduction //M is t4at, bC re&uiring its supporters to paC attention to a larger set of factorsBlarger, i)e), if compared wit4 individualistic >lacI of? constraintsBin order to construct t4eir analCses of meaning and mental content, anti-individualistic met4odologies seem to pave t4e waC for more sop4isticated or compre4ensiveB4ence more realisticBp4ilosop4ical models of language and mind) !4e second >and related? reason for privileging anti-individualistic accounts is t4at t4eC seem to be far less susceptible to some of t4e traditional problems in4erited bC p4ilosop4ers trCing to elucidate t4e nature of language and mindBproblems suc4 as e@plaining t4e contact between mind and world >w4ic4 are anti-individualisticallC construed as in some sense JinternallC relatedK?, as well as t4e Inowledge of t4e contents of Jot4er mindsK >w4ic4 are again anti-individualisticallC construed as at least partiallC comprised of t4e same Je@ternal factorsK w4ic4 comprise mC own mental contents?) %egardless of proving ultimatelC successful concerning t4e points * <ust mentioned, antiindividualism is not free from its own, internal difficulties) 5ne difficultC w4ic4 particularlC caug4t mC attentionBand w4ic4 will be part of t4e bacIdrop for t4is c4apterPs argumentB4as to do wit4 w4at one mig4t call, following C4ristop4er "eacocIe, OpsCc4ological self-InowledgePN:EBi)e), t4e Inowledge t4at one is supposed to 4ave of t4e content of one!s o"n mind) !4e problem of psCc4ological self-Inowledge presents itself clearlC in t4e analCsis of t4oug4t-e@periments commonlC referred in t4e literature as Oslowswitc4ing scenariosP) !CpicallC, t4ose e@periments involve t4e idea of a sub<ect being transported, wit4out Inowing, from one environment to anot4er >e)g), from 7art4 to !win7art4?, causing 4er to 4ave >and e@press? t4oug4ts wit4 different contents according to w4ere s4e finds 4erself >e)g), about "ater if on 7art4, and t"in9"ater if on !win-7art4?, Cet wit4out being able to reali=e t4e c4ange) #iven t4at possibilitC, t4e conclusion seems to be t4at suc4 a sub<ect would not Inow t4e content of 4er t4oug4ts until s4e proceeds to an empirical investigation of 4er environment) .ow, since t4at conclusion manifestlC contradicts some of our most deeplC-rooted intuitions about t4e nature of psCc4ological self-InowledgeBe)g), t4at it is endowed wit4 first person authority, t4at it is immediate and transparentBwe seem forced eit4er to abandon t4ose intuitions, or to conclude, bC a Iind of reductio, t4at anti-individualism is false)

N:E

See "eacocIe >N11M, p) ER?)

*ntroduction //1 !4e alternative adopted bC some defenders of anti-individualism is a compatibilist positionN:L) !4e difficulties concerning t4e acceptabilitC of compatibilism >in particular?, and t4e possibilitC of psCc4ological self-Inowledge >more generallC?, 4ave received a considerable amount of t4e attention dispensed in recent literature on anti-individualism N:M) Again, given mC present aims, * s4all not trC to engage directlC in t4at debate in w4at followsN:1Y t4e onlC reason for mentioning it 4ere is, to repeat, 4ig4lig4ting t4at part of t4e bacIdrop against w4ic4 * s4all trC to articulate mC own suspicions concerning some assumptions w4ic4 seem to be s4ared bC bot4 parties involved in t4at debate) #iven t4e comple@itC of t4e matterBw4ic4 maIes it difficult to obtain a perspicuous view of t4e positions involvedBmC analCsis will 4ave to be limited in two important respects6 first, it will be restricted to a small >alt4oug4, * 4ope, representative? number of aut4ors and te@ts BnamelC, t4ose of Saul DripIe, ,ilarC "utnam, and !Cler GurgeY second, it will focus on onlC one problematic assumption s4ared bC t4ose aut4ors, w4ic4 * s4all 4encefort4 refer to as an Oimpersonal model of linguistic normativitCPNE0)

R) Alt4oug4 providing a full c4aracteri=ation of w4at * mean bC Oimpersonal modelPBas well as an account of t4e s4ortcomings of t4at modelBare among t4e main tasIs of t4is c4apter as a w4ole, * t4inI some preparatorC remarIs are in order) * s4all call OimpersonalP anC position purporting to find a ground or foundation for linguistic normativitC >and, conse&uentlC, for our agreement on t4e meaning of our signs? w4ic4 would involve some Iind of >impersonal? Inowledge of a set of Job<ectiveK facts) !4e identitC of t4ose facts, as we s4all see, varies from aut4or to aut4or) W4at is invariant, t4oug4, is t4e general
N:L

N:M

N:1 NE0

5ne of t4e original defenders of compatibilism is !Cler Gurge >see esp) N11Mb ] N11Mc?) Compatibilist positions are also advocated in Gilgrami >N11E?, 8cHaug4lin ] !Ce >N11M?, and FaleC >/000?) !4ere are at least two furt4er, internal problems still discussed in t4e literature on anti-individualism, and w4ic4 will not be touc4ed in w4at follows) !4e first concerns t4e possibilitC of rationality6 if * 4ad to proceed to some Iind of empirical investigation in order to distinguis4 t4e contents of mC t4oug4ts, and if distinguis4ing t4ose contents is a condition for establis4ing logical relations4ips among mC t4oug4ts, t4en * could, at anC given time, be commiting mistaIes regarding t4ose relations4ips, unless * proceed to an empirical investigationY but t4at seems to undermine our verC concept of rationalitC) !4e second problem 4as to do wit4 t4e >apparentlC absurd? possibilitC of a priori Inowledge of t4e Je@ternal worldK6 if * Inow t4e contents of mC t4oug4ts, and * Inow t4at t4at content is individuated bC its relations4ips wit4 t4e world, t4en * can Inow the "orld from t4e Inowledge * 4ave of my mindY and t4at maC well sound as a reductio of t4e anti-individualistic position >see, e)g), Gog4ossian N11M?) Grown >/00Q? offers a sCstematic and detailed e@amination of t4e t4ree problems mentioned 4ere, as well as of some of t4e main answers w4ic4 can be found in t4e literature) Alt4oug4 * tried to do <ust t4at elsew4ereBsee !ec4io >/00E?) ActuallC, * taIe it t4at suc4 an assumption is s4ared bC anti-individualists and individualists aliIeY Cet * s4all not trC to support t4at claim e@plicitlC 4ere)

*ntroduction /R0 assumption t4at t4e burden for linguistic correction >for w4at one means wit4 w4at one saCs? s4ould be placed upon some Je@ternalK factor >suc4 as Jt4e worldK, or Jt4e communitCPs conventionsK?) 5ne of t4e main difficulties wit4 t4at assumption t4at * s4all trC to 4ig4lig4tBone w4ic4 * t4inI did not receive t4e deserved attention in t4e literatureB is t4at it implies conceiving t4e verC problem of linguistic correction upside-down, or, at t4e verC least, from a limited perspective, in w4ic4 t4e individualPs responsibilitC to maIe sense of 4er and ot4ersPs wordsB4ence, to supplC t4e conditions for linguistic agreement Bis discredited, or sCstematicallC suppressedNEN) *n order to indicate t4e influence of t4at impersonal model of normativitC in t4e antiindividualistic analCses mentioned above, as well as to present some of t4e problems originated from t4at commitment, * s4all adopt a somew4at comple@ argumentative strategC, w4ose main steps can be summari=ed as follows6 in section :)/ * indicate t4e e@istence of a common structure in t4e analCses of t4e Ofounding fat4ersP of contemporarC anti-individualismBrespectivelC, DripIe, "utnam, and GurgeBpointing out t4eir s4ared acceptance of t4e impersonal model of normativitC) !4at result obtained, * go on to reconstruct, in section :)R, t4e OsIeptical solutionP for t4e OsIeptical parado@P of linguistic normativitC presented bC DripIe in 4is Wittgenstein on >ules and Private +anguage, suggesting t4at t4e latter argument can also be framed bC t4e structure obtained in section :)/) ,aving t4us drawn a parallel between t4e anti-individualistsPs and DripIePs arguments, * turn, in section :)Q, to t4e reconstruction of StanleC CavellPs criticisms against t4e resulting position, focusing on 4is diagnosis of t4e problems in4erent to t4e impersonal
NEN

!4ese brief considerations about t4e impersonal model of normativitC allow me to mention two furt4er and intimatelC related general assumptions t4at * glimpse in t4e 4ori=on of t4e debate concerning psCc4ological self-Inowledge, but w4ic4 will not be directlC addressed in w4at follows >e@cept for a parent4etical remarI in cRN, w4ere * s4all indicate 4ow t4e results obtained in t4is c4apter could be e@tended to t4eir case?) !4ose assumptions concern, respectivelC, t4e nature of our default attitudes toward t4e world >particularlC its ob<ects and events? and toward 4umanBor, more generallC, animatedB beings >particularlC t4eir mental contents?Bincluding ourselves >our own mental contents?) Got4 can be &ualified as t4eoretical and cognitivistBt4e former for assuming t4at our default attitude toward t4e world and its ob<ects is e@pressed in our gat4ering of evidences >particularlC perceptual ones?, wit4 t4e ultimate aim of constructing Jt4eoriesK w4ic4 would, in turn, >ideallC? amount to Oviews from now4ereP >notoriouslC t4us called in .agel, /00Q?, i)e), views in w4ic4 t4e sub<ect would be completelC suppressed, 4ence e@empted from anC responsibilitC in maIing sense of 4er e@perienceBor failing t4erebCY t4e later for assuming, similarlC, t4at our default attitude toward our own and ot4erPs minds is one of "itnesses or in.uirers, so t4at, in order to Inow t4eir contentsBas if kno"ing t4em were our onlC or primarilC aimBit becomes again necessarC to gat4er certain evidences >e)g), introspective and T or be4aviouristic ones?) W4at t4ose suppositions 4ave in common wit4 t4e impersonal model of normativitC is preciselC t4e ideal of, in an important sense, removing t4e individual from t4e scene, suppressing anC mention, in t4e conte@t of p4ilosop4ical analCsis, to irreduciblC Jsub<ectiveK >i)e), personal? conditions, on be4alf of a >supposedlC? more Job<ectiveK >i)e), impersonal? analCsis)

*ntroduction /RN model of normativitC assumed bC DripIe in 4is booI on Wittgenstein) !4at criticism s4all prompt me to present, in section :):, a sIetc4 of an alternative picture of 4uman language and normativitCBone t4at * t4inI is free from t4e problems of t4e impersonal model >particularlC, from t4e Iind of evasion it implies?, and w4ic4 can supplC a waC out of difficulties suc4 as >but not e@clusivelC? t4ose presented in t4e debate involving >compatibilist? anti-individualists and t4eir critics)

7"# Anti@individualism and t$e impersonal model of normativit*

7"#"1 Anti@individualism: contemporar* roots

Q) Anti-individualism 4as its contemporarC roots in t4e debate concerning t4e reference of singular terms, w4ic4 tooI place in t4e second 4alf of /0t4 centurC, culminating wit4 t4e emergence of t4e so-called Onew t4eorC of referenceP or Osemantics of direct referenceP, of w4ic4 Saul DripIe is one of t4e main e@ponentsNE/) 5ne of DripIePs main results, at least for present purposes, is t4at t4e reference of some terms of our languageBproper names and natural Iind predicatesBonce fi@ed, will persist independentlC of t4e descriptions associated to t4em bC language users, as well as t4eir Inowledge of w4ic4 is t4e referred ob<ect) *n DripIePs tec4nical terminologC, t4at result gets formulated in t4e t4esis t4at proper names and natural Iind predicates are Origid designatorsP, i)e), terms t4at designate t4e same ob<ect in everC possible world in w4ic4 it e@ists >see N1L/, p) QM?NER)
NE/ NER

See esp) 4is Eaming and Eecessity, N1L/) Some unpacIing of t4e analCsis summari=ed in t4e paragrap4 above mig4t be in order) *nitiallC, DripIe applies it to proper names >e)g), O.i@onP?, assuming t4at t4eir reference is fi@ed bC means of an initial JbaptismK, and s4owing t4at its maintenance depends on t4e e@istence of chains of use, w4ic4 enable one to defer reference to competent speaIers >ultimatelC, specialists in a certain area of Inowledge?Y later, 4e e@tends t4e analCsis to natural Iinds predicates >e)g), OgoldP?, w4ose reference, analogouslC to t4at of names, would be fi@ed in a particular normative conte@tBinvolving an ostensive presentation of a sample of t4e Iind to be introduced, or t4e emploCment of a description w4ic4 picIs t4at Iind out bC means of a >generallC? contingent propertC of t4eir instancesBand w4ose maintenance would be t4us normativelC guaranteed, independentlC of anC mental association t4at users mig4t maIe) *n ot4er words, t4e use of predicates for natural Iinds will be instituted for "hatever it is of the same kind as t4e c4osen sample >at t4e moment in w4ic4 its reference is fi@ed?, or again for "hatever possesses t4e propertC >or properties? mentioned in t4e initial description) .ow given t4at, at t4e moment in w4ic4 t4e Iind is introduced, it is possibleBand often is t4e caseBt4at we do not kno" w4ic4 are t4e constituent properties of t4e sample

Anti-individualism and t4e impersonal model of normativitC /R/ ,ere is a simple illustration of t4e point6 let S be a speaIer w4o t4inIs about t4e Harge ,adron Collider >H,C, for s4ort?) As it commonlC 4appens, S maC associate a vast number of descriptions to t4at nameBsome of w4ic4 maC be e@tremelC vague and T or idiosCncratic >e)g), H,C l OAn insanelC e@pensive toC located somew4ere in 7uropeP? or even completelC wrong >e)g), H,C l O!4e mac4ine w4ic4 will cause 7art4 to vanis4, absorbed bC a giant blacI-4oleP?) ,owever, since >bC 4Cpot4esis? t4e reference of t4at name was successfullC fi@edBbC a group of engineers and astrop4Csicists initiallC worIing on t4e pro<ect, saCBand since >again bC 4Cpot4esis? S 4erself belongs to t4e same linguistic communitC w4ic4 was responsible for t4at initial JbaptismK, s4e is ipso facto licensed to emploC t4e name OH,CP to refer to the very same thing referred to bC t4e scientists w4o used t4at name for t4e first time) !4e same applies, mutatis mutandis, to t4e case of predicates for natural Iind >suc4 as OgoldP or OtigerP?, t4e relevant difference being t4at in suc4 cases w4at is emploCed to fi@ t4e reference is not a particular ob<ect as such, but rat4er an ob<ect taIen as a sample of t4e Iind to w4ic4 we want to refer 4encefort4) !4e anti-individualistic moral of t4at analCsis is, * taIe it, &uite straig4tforward6 if t4e storC told bC DripIe is rig4t, one s4ould conclude t4at reference is not an >isolated? individualPs business, in t4at t4ere is an irreducible >normative? role to be plaCed bC6 >i? >s4ared? linguistic institutions in t4e determination of t4e reference of proper namesY as well as bC >ii? the "orld, i)e), t4e p4Csical environment surrounding us, in t4e determination of t4e reference of predicates for natural Iinds)

:) Alt4oug4 developed &uite independentlC of DripIePs analCsis, ,ilarC "utnam and !Cler Gurge develop a similar anti-individualistic approac4 in t4eir respective t4eories of meaning and p4ilosop4ies of mind) *n t4e seminal essaC O!4e 8eaning of J8eaningK P >N1L:?, "utnam emploCs 4is famous t4oug4t-e@periment of !win-7art4 in order to s4ow t4at t4e e@tension of a number of predicates is not completelC determined bC t4e psCc4ological states >in t4e Onarrow senseP, see p) //0? of t4e speaIer w4o is emploCing t4emBafter all, 4e argues, two speaIers >or
used to fi@ t4e reference of t4e relevant term, it is possible t4at furt4er empirical investigations mig4t come to fill t4at gap, or even s4ow t4at t4ings we initiallC believed to belong to t4e same Iind >e)g), gold and JfoolPs goldK? actuallC do not)

Anti-individualism and t4e impersonal model of normativitC /RR t4e same speaIer in different situations? wit4 identical >narrow? psCc4ological states can use t4e same term >e)g), OwaterP? to refer to different substances according to 4er p4Csical environment >e)g), B$& if s4e is on 7art4, \OK if on !win-7art4?) "utnam generali=es t4at conclusion in a claim w4ic4 became one of t4e trademarIs of anti-individualism6 OCut t4e pie anC waC Cou liIe, JmeaningsK <ust ainPt in t4e head[P >p) //L?) Again, t4e antiindividualistic moral of t4is analCsis is clear6 for a large number of predicatesBas well as for t4e content of t4e t4oug4ts e@pressed bC means of ascriptive sentences using t4ose predicatesBt4eir e@tension >4ence6 t4eir meaning? depends on conditions belonging to t4e individualPs p4Csical environment >4ence6 outside 4er 4ead?) !Cler Gurge >N11Ma? taIes a slig4tlC different approac4Bbut one w4ic4 also finds precedents in DripIePs analCsisBpointing out t4e role of socio-linguistic institutions in t4e determination of t4e meaning of our terms, and, conse&uentlC, of t4e contents of t4e t4oug4ts e@pressed bC t4ose terms) GurgePs argument also begins wit4 a t4oug4te@periment, presenting two temporallC distinct situations in w4ic4 a sub<ect emploCs t4e term Oart4ritisP intending to refer to a certain p4enomenon >namelC, r4eumatoid diseases, including one in 4is fist?, t4e result being t4at s4e would be rig4t in one case >tN? but wrong in anot4er >t/?, due to differences of t4e socio-linguistic environment in w4ic4 s4e finds 4erself in eac4 situation) Gurge also generali=es 4is conclusions, claiming t4at O_t`4e argument can get under waC in anC case w4ere it is intuitivelC possible to attribute a mental state or event w4ose content involves a notion t4at t4e sub<ect incompletelC understandsP >p) /1?NEQ) !4e alternative model 4e presents emp4asi=es Oa certain responsibilitC to communal conventions governing, and conceptions associated wit4, sCmbols t4at _one` is disposed to useP >p) L1?) !4e fundamental idea is to Osee t4e language of content attribution
NEQ

* find GurgePs idea of Oincomplete understandingP somew4at misleadingY * t4inI * Inow w4at 4e meansB namelC, t4at t4ere is a Jdivision of linguistic worIK underlCing our practices, in t4at t4e use of a particular term >4ence its meaning?, being shared bC a large linguistic communitC, is >more often t4an not? more comple@ t4an anC single user can reali=eBit mig4t 4ave more >or less? legitimate applications t4an a >generallC? competent user can t4inI ofBe@cept, per4aps, if t4e user is an specialist in t4e relevant area, case in w4ic4 one mig4t saC t4at s4e 4as a Ocomplete understandingP of t4at particular term >or terminologC?) So far, so good) \et surelC t4at model cannot be applied to all t4e terms of our language6 t4ere is no Ocomplete understandingPB4ence, no correspondent Oincomplete understandingPBw4ere ordinarC >non-tec4nical? terms are concerned >one mig4t saC t4at t4e meaning of t4ose terms is intrinsically open to new applications, intrinsically fle@ibleBmore on t4is point below, in section :)Q?Y t4erefore, it would be preposterous to draw a general division between JspecialistsK >JinsidersK? and JlaCmenK >JoutsidersK? concerning linguistic understanding) #ranted6 t4ere are subtler and grosser understandings, varCing wit4 t4e degree of t4e userPs e)perience and cultivation, but t4at is about itB t4ere is no more sense in t4e idea of JcompleteK linguistic masterC t4an in t4e idea of JcompleteK cultivationY one mig4t saC, concerning t4ose abilities, t4at progress in t4em is asymptotic. >.ote t4at * am not saCing t4at Gurge subscribes to t4at absurd proposalBCet, to repeat, * taIe it t4at 4is waC of putting t4e matter misleadingly suggests it)?

Anti-individualism and t4e impersonal model of normativitC /RQ as constituting a comple@ standard bC reference to w4ic4 t4e sub<ectPs mental states are estimatedP >ibid)?) >!4at standard, in turn, can be presented bC means of a number of metap4ors or models >see ibid)?, among w4ic4 Gurge privileges one derived from musical analCsis >see pp) L1-M0?)?

7"#"#

A s$ared structure

E) !4e brief analCsis pursued so far let manC relevant aspects of DripIePs, "utnamPs and GurgePs arguments simplC untouc4ed) \et * 4ope t4at will be enoug4 to indicate t4e e@istence of a basic structure s4ared bC t4em) !4at structure, * taIe it, is articulated in five distinct p4ases or moments, t4at * go on to enumerate and c4aracteri=e as follows6

N) Problemati7ation6 t4e bottom line of t4e t4ree analCses is t4e presentation of a problem, w4ic4 can be broadlC formulated as follows6 4ow it is possible t4at t4e meaning T reference of a particular term O@P s4ould persist t4roug4 time >if emploCed in different moments bC t4e same individual?, space >if its use is transmited or deferred from one individual to anot4er in a linguistic communitC?, or both together >in t4e case of anap4oric c4ains of past use?W Het us call t4is problem the problem of the persistence of meaningY /) 6irst candidate to ans"er6 4aving presented >a variation of? t4e problem of t4e persistence of meaning, eac4 aut4or presents a first, 4Cpot4etical answer for the sake of argumentBmore specificallC, for constructing a reductioBt4at assumes t4e central t4esis of t4e individualistic modelBnamelC, t4at meaning T reference can or must be accounted for t4roug4 an inspection of t4e individual taIen in isolation of 4er >p4Csical and T or social? environmentY R) #ounterfactual scenario6 aiming to indicate t4e flaw of t4at first answerBand, bC e@tension, t4e falsitC of t4e individualistic modelBa t4oug4t-e@periment is set up in w4ic4 an individualPs Jinternal statesK >including 4er psCc4ological

Anti-individualism and t4e impersonal model of normativitC /R: and T or p4Csiological states, 4er 4istorC and be4aviour? remain constant, but 4er >p4Csical and T or social? environment c4anges) !4e counterfactual situation is t4en analCsed, and a twofold lesson is drawn6 negativelC, t4e analCsis s4ows t4at t4e individualistic candidate fails to account for t4e persistence of meaning, because alt4oug4 t4e individualPs Jinternal statesK remain constant, t4e reference of t4e term O@P s4e emploCs c4angesY positivelC, t4at analCsis prompts one to seeI for an alternative accountBt4e antiindividualistic proposalBt4at will be presented in t4e ne@t p4ase of t4e argumentY Q) Second candidate to ans"er6 in t4is p4ase an account is presented t4at assumes t4e central t4esis of anti-individualismBnamelC, t4at t4e meaning T reference of a term O@P is determined, at least partiallC, bC Je@ternalK factors or conditions, derived from t4e individualPs belonging to a certain environment >social or linguistic?) !4e problem of t4e persistence of meaning is t4en solvedY :) Aenerali7ation ] e)tension of the results6 in spite of t4e starting point >N? being a problem related to a particular instance of use >of a particular term O@P?, t4e results ac4ieved in step >Q? can be appliedBso claim t4e argumentPs proponentsBto wider areas of languageBultimatelC to language T meaning as a w4ole)

!able N below displaCs wit4 more detail 4ow eac4 aut4orPs argumentation can be framed bC t4e general structure t4at * 4ave <ust presented)

Table @ The structure of the anti9individualists!s arguments 'Kripke, Putnam, ?urge*

Anti-individualism and t4e impersonal model of normativitC /RE

1. #. (. Pro le! 1st $andidate $ounterfactual mati"ati! %Individua! )ituation on listic &odel' .ripke O.i@onP descriptions ] associated bC OgoldP eac4 individual *. #nd $andidate %+nti!individualistic &o! del' ,. -enerali"ation

anot4er Opossilinguistic institutions ble worldP >ObaptismP e c4ain of use? ] ] anot4er 4istori- environmentPs contributical period on >stuffPs p4Csioc4emical constitution? !win-7art4

rigid designators >proper names ] terms for natural Iinds?

Put! nam

OwaterP

narrow psCc4ological states

environmentPs contributiOCut t4e pie anC waC Cou on >stuffPs p4Csioc4emical liIe, JmeaningsK <ust ainPt constitution? in t4e head[P

Burge

Oart4ritisP

>narrow? psC- anot4er linguis- a Ocomple@ _social` stanc4ological ] tic communitC dardP p4Csiological >communitCPs conventions states ] rules?

attribution of mental states Ow4ose content involves a notion t4at t4e sub<ect incompletelC understandsP

L) * assume t4e table above is self-e@planatorC) * s4all nonet4eless 4ig4lig4t t4e point in w4ic4 t4e influence t4e impersonal model of normativitC >mentioned in t4e *ntroduction? appears more conspicuouslC in t4at pictureB* refer, as it s4ould be clear, to its fourt4 p4ase >4ence, to t4e fourt4 column of !able N?, w4ose e@plicit role is to establis4 t4e >antiindividualistic? conditions for t4e reference of a term to remain constant) W4at is per4aps not so clearBanCwaC, w4at is not commonlC emp4asi=ed in t4e anti-individualistic argumentation, particularlC in t4e seminal te@ts * mentionedNE:Bis t4at, given t4e waC in w4ic4 t4e conditions for persistence of meaning T reference are presented bC t4ose aut4ors, t4eC are also conditions for t4e possibilitC of linguistic correction, and, conse&uentlC, for t4e verC normativity of language6 it is based on t4ose conditions t4at, in communicative e@c4anges, speaIers can <udge if t4eC are understanding eac4 ot4erBif t4eC are talIing about the same t4ings, or about different onesBw4en using certain terms) Wit4out t4at base, neit4er linguistic agreement nor linguistic disagreement would be possible) !4is, t4erefore, is t4e first point t4at * would liIe to maIe6 tacitlC or not, t4e antiindividualistic positions presented so far are invariablC commited to a particular model >or account? of linguistic normativitC)
NE:

Gurge mig4t be considered an e@ception, since, as * indicated above, 4e e@plicitlC presents an >antiindividualistic? model of normativitC at t4e end of 4is essaC >see N11Ma, p) L1-M0?)

Anti-individualism and t4e impersonal model of normativitC /RL W4at is lacIing is a fuller c4aracteri=ation of t4at model) * assume it will not be necessarC to spend a lot of argumentative effort to s4ow t4at, concerning t4e t4ree cases above, t4e conditions presented in t4e fourt4 p4ase >column Q? depend on >or implC? w4at in t4e *ntroduction * described as a Iind of impersonal Inowledge of certain Job<ective factsK) !4at connection appears clearlC in t4e verC c4aracteri=ation of t4ose conditionsBincluding bot4 t4e e@istence of linguistic institutions >DripIe and Gurge? and t4e constitution of the substances wit4 w4ic4 speaIers relate >DripIe and "utnam?) Gesides, and more important, t4at connection is also manifest in w4at one mig4t call t4e dynamic of t4e arguments w4ic4 culminate in t4at fourt4 p4ase, amounting to a sCstematic attempt of weaIening >ultimatelC suppressing? t4e isolated individualPs role, and, conse&uentlC, 4er authority, over t4e meaning of t4e terms s4e emploCs) !4is, indeed, is t4e trademarI of anti-individualism, and it is preciselC t4e aspect of t4at position w4ic4 >to me, at anC rate? seems more promising if t4oug4t against t4e bacIdrop of t4e problems faced bC t4e individualistic tradition) \et w4at * want to suggest 4ere is t4at we start paCing attention to t4at glassPs emptC 4alfBsomet4ing t4at neit4er defenders nor critics of anti-individualism seem to be doing as * t4inI t4eC s4ould) !4is is because * suspect t4at be4ind t4e argumentative dCnamic * <ust 4ig4lig4ted t4ere mig4t lurI a radicallC distorted picture of normativitCB one in w4ic4 t4e individual responsibility over meaning and linguistic agreement is eit4er missing or displaced or replaced bC somet4ing else) *n t4e remainder of t4is c4apter * s4all trC to elaborate and <ustifC t4at suspicionY w4at * 4ope to ac4ieve along t4e waC is, on t4e one 4and, an increased awareness of t4e assumptions w4ic4 mig4t be influencing some particular waCs of looIing at our linguistic practices, and, on t4e ot4er 4and, a defence of an even more demanding met4odological directive, i)e), one re&uiring t4at we paC attention to an even larger set of conditions or constraints t4an t4ose imposed bC anti-individualists in order to provide a >more? realistic understanding of meaning and normativitC) >.ote t4at w4en * refer to a OradicallC distorted picture of normativitCP * mean somet4ing rat4er different t4an a Ot4esisP or a Ot4eorCP or somet4ing to t4at effectBin particular, * do not mean somet4ing t4at needs to be e)plicit, let alone defended, bC anCone on its gripY on t4e contrarC, * actuallC t4inI t4at, if formulated as a theory or a set of theses, probablC no supporter of anti-individualism would >or would immediatelC? acInowledge >or assent to? t4em) !4at said, one mig4t wonder w4at, t4en, would be t4e point of presenting suc4 a picture in t4e first place)B* believe nobodC would e@pect of a person recentlC told of an

Anti-individualism and t4e impersonal model of normativitC /RM >as Cet? unconscious motivation for 4er actions t4at s4e would >or would immediatelC? accept 4er analCstPs interpretationBon t4e contrarC, one is rat4er well advised to e@pect resistance) (oes t4at maIe t4e analCstPs worI pointlessW?

7"% Arip'e s 9ittgenstein on Rules and !rivate Language: a Furt$er !arallel

M) *n 4is Wittgenstein on >ules and Private +anguage >4ereafter D?, Saul DripIe argues t4at t4e central problem of t4e Philosophical Investigations is a OsIeptical parado@P concerning t4e conditions of meaning, or, more generallC, normativitC >t4e possibilitC of following rules?) !4e relevance of t4at parado@ would lie in its absolute generalitC, w4ic4 is clearlC indicated in DripIePs >interim? conclusion t4at OWittgensteinPs main problem is t4at it appears t4at 4e 4as s4own t4at all language, all concept formation, to be impossible, indeed unintelligibleP >D E/?) Gut DripIe also >notoriouslC? claims t4at Wittgenstein offers a OsIeptical solutionPNEE >P la ,umeNEL? to t4at parado@Bone w4ic4 would Ocontain_)))` t4e argument against Jprivate languageK P >D E0?) Alt4oug4 admitting t4at t4e position resulting from DripIePs reading is superficiallC verC different from t4ose of t4e aut4ors analCsed in t4e previous section >including DripIe 4imself, in Eaming and Eecessity?, * will trC to s4ow t4at, in a more fundamental level, t4ere are important parallels among t4ose argumentsBparallels w4ose attestation serves to 4ig4lig4t features of t4ose positions w4ic4 would remain 4idden, or at best wit4 verC imprecise contours, if looIed at separatelC) Aiming to draw t4ose parallels, * go on to offer a brief reconstruction of t4e argument establis4ing t4e OsIeptical parado@P of normativitC, as well as of DripIePs OsIeptical solutionP to t4at parado@NEM)
NEE

NEL

NEM

As opposed to a Ostraight solutionP, w4ic4 would s4ow t4at Oon closer e@amination t4e scepticism proves to be unwarrantedP a Osceptical solution of a sceptical p4ilosop4ical problem begins _)))` bC conceding t4at t4e scepticPs negative assertions are unanswerableP >D EE?) !4e locus classicus for Osceptical solutionsP of t4at sort is, of course, ,umePs En.uiry) >,ume 4imself calls 4is OsolutionP to a set of epistemological problems a OscepticalP one, in t4at 4e accepts t4e legitimacC of >sceptical? doubts concerning reason or understanding, purporting to s4ow t4at neit4er facultC can ;ustify our beliefs about future Omatters of factPBe)g), t4at t4e sun will raise tomorrowBnor our drawing of causal lawsBe)g), t4at bread will al"ays nouris4 us)? For ease of e@position, * s4all ascribe t4e views presented below to DripIe, in spite of 4is disclaimersB e)g), t4at O* do not in t4is piece of writing attempt to speaI for mCselfP >D i@?, or again t4at Ot4e present

DripIePs Wittgenstein on %ules and "rivate Hanguage6 a Furt4er "arallel /R1

7"%"1

Adding& 2uadding& and t$e s'eptical parado8 of normativit*

1) DripIe introduces 4is presentation of t4e sIeptical parado@ proposing an ingenious t4oug4t-e@periment in w4ic4 a Obi=arre sIepticP &uestions mC rig4t to claim t4at mC past usage of t4e word OplusP >and t4e sCmbol OeP? denoted t4e function plus rat4er t4an t4e function .uus >see D L-1?NE1) !4e function .uus >sCmboli=ed bC OP? is defined as follows6

@ C l @ e C, if @, C a :L _@ C` l : ot4erwise

!4e problemBor c4allengeBpresented bC t4e sIeptic is as follows6 suppose * am asIed to compute t4e result of EM e :LBa computation w4ic4, bC stipulation, * face for t4e first time in mC lifeY suppose furt4er t4at all t4e computations * did in t4e past involved numbers smaller t4an :L, and, conse&uentlC, w4et4er * Inew it or not, all mC computations up to now resulted in answers w4ic4 agreed bot4 wit4 t4e functions plus and .uus) !4at being t4e case, it follows t4at t4ere seems to be no reason to prefer t4e claim t4at * 4ave been maIing additions rat4er t4an >saC? .uadditionsBOW4o is to saCP, asIs DripIe, Ot4at _&uus` is not t4e function * previouslC meant bC JeKWP >D 1?) According to DripIe, t4e rationale be4ind t4e sIeptical conclusionBi)e), t4at t4ere is no reason to prefer a claim over t4e ot4erBis t4at * am not able to Ogive an account of w4at fact it is >about mC mental state? t4at constitutes mC meaning plus, not &uusP, and t4at Js4ow_s` 4ow * am <ustified in giving t4e answer JN/:K to JEM e :LK _rat4er t4an J:K`P >D NN?)

NE1

paper s4ould be t4oug4t of as e@pounding neit4er JWittgensteinPsK argument nor JDripIePsK6 rat4er WittgensteinPs argument as it strucI DripIeP >D :?) *t is important to emp4asi=e, as DripIe 4imself does at t4e outset, t4at alt4oug4 4e is following Wittgenstein in Odevelop_ing` t4e problem initiallC wit4 respect to a mat4ematical e@ample, _)))` t4e relevant sceptical problem applies to all meaningful uses of languageP >D L?)

DripIePs Wittgenstein on %ules and "rivate Hanguage6 a Furt4er "arallel /Q0 N0) Assuming t4at * am actuallC unable to produce or indicate anC suc4 OfactPNL0, 4ow would t4at lead to t4e impossibilitC >or nonsensicalitC? of t4e verC notion of meaning, and, conse&uentlC, of Oall languagePW * believe DripIePs answer to t4at &uestion becomes reasonablC clear in t4e <oint analCsis of t4e following pair of passages6
5f course, ultimatelC, if t4e sceptic is rig4t, t4e concepts of meaning and of intending one function rat4er t4an anot4er will maIe no sense) For t4e sceptic 4olds t4at no fact about mC past 4istorCBnot4ing t4at was ever in mC mind, or in mC e@ternal be4aviorBestablis4es t4at * meant plus rat4er t4an &uus) _)))` Gut if t4is is correct, t4ere can of course be no fact about w4ic4 function * meant, and if t4ere can be no fact about w4ic4 particular function * meant in t4e past, t4ere can be none in t4e present eit4er) >D NR?

!4e important problem for Wittgenstein is t4at mC present mental state does not appear to determine w4at * ought to do in t4e future) Alt4oug4 * maC feel >now? t4at somet4ing in mC 4ead corresponding to t4e word OplusP mandates a determinate response to anC new pair of arguments, in fact not4ing in mC 4ead does so) >D :E?

*n ot4er words, if t4ere is no past fact <ustifCing t4e claim t4at * 4ave been following a certain rule >meaning ) rat4er t4an y bC using O@P?, t4en t4ere is e&uallC no present fact to w4ic4 * can appeal in order to <ustifC mC current >rule-following? be4aviour) !4e conclusion, stated radicallC and parado@icallC, is t4at apparentlC * never kno"Bin t4at * could never <ustifC mC belief aboutBw4at * mean wit4 anC term * use) DripIe formulates t4at conclusion in a still more dramatical waC w4en 4e summari=es, at t4e beginning of t4e t4ird c4apter, t4e results of 4is sIeptical argument, asserting t4at6
!4ere can be no suc4 t4ing as meaning anCt4ing bC anC word) 7ac4 new application we maIe is a leap in t4e darIY anC present intention could be interpreted so as to accord wit4 anCt4ing we maC c4oose to do) So t4ere can be neit4er accord, nor conflict) !4is is w4at Wittgenstein said in c/0N) >D ::?

!4at concludes mC reconstruction of DripIePs sIeptical parado@) Gefore turning to 4is sIeptical solution, * would liIe to emp4asi=e an aspect of t4e precedent e@position t4at alreadC points toward t4e parallel * want to draw wit4 t4e anti-individualistic arguments) *
NL0

!4at w4ic4 4ere * am proposing to assume is somet4ing DripIe taIes considerable pains to prove in 4is subse&uent argument, bC successivelC e@cluding several candidates to OfactsP capable of <ustifCing t4e sub<ectPs answer to t4e OsIeptical c4allengeP) For brevitCPs saIe, * will not e@amine t4ose arguments 4ere) *t mig4t nonet4eless be of some 4elp to enumerate t4e Jt4eoriesK 4e analCses and e@cludesY t4eC are, in te@tual order6 >i? dispositionalism >pp) //-RL?, >ii? t4e e@planation from t4e Osimplest 4Cpot4esisP >pp) RMQN?, >iii? t4e appeal to an Ointrospectible e@perienceP >pp) QN-Q/?, particularlC >iv? an introspectible e@perience conceived according to t4e Oclassical empiricist pictureP >pp) Q/-:R?, and, finallC, >v? Omat4ematical realismP or O"latonismP >pp) :R-:Q?)

DripIePs Wittgenstein on %ules and "rivate Hanguage6 a Furt4er "arallel /QN refer to t4e verC formulation emploCed bC DripIe to introduce 4is parado@Ba formulation w4ic4 striIes me as verC close to t4ose emploCed bC t4e supporters of anti-individualism to s4ow t4at t4e problem of t4e persistence of meaning cannot be solved bC an appeal to Jindividualistic factorsK >see !able N, column /?6 in bot4 cases, w4at is indicated is t4at inspecting a single individual, taIen in isolation from 4er p4Csical and T or social environment, is not a sufficient basis to e@plain t4e possibilitC of meaning) Alt4oug4 t4at move alreadC appears in t4is sIeptical p4ase of DripIePs argument, it is onlC in t4e conte@t of t4e establis4ment of t4e sIeptical solution t4at it will receive an e@plicit and sCstematic treatment) Het us t4en turn to t4at argument)

7"%"#

+$e s'eptical solution and t$e impersonal model of normativit*

NN) DripIe begins 4is presentation of t4e sIeptical solution wit4 a statement t4at, at least prima facie, points preciselC to t4e Iind of consideration t4at * 4ave <ust emp4asi=ed6
_WittgensteinPs` solution to 4is own sceptical problem begins bC agreeing wit4 t4e sceptics t4at there is no Jsuperlative fact! 'LPIM^ F$* about my mind t4at constitutes mC meaning addition bC OplusP and determines in advance w4at * s4ould do to accord wit4 t4is meaning) >D E:Y mC italics?

!4e problem wit4 t4e statement above is t4at it mig4t lead to a misunderstanding, due to t4e use of t4e p4rase Oabout mC mindP to c4aracteri=e t4e Osuperlative factP t4at, according to DripIe, is re<ected bot4 bC Wittgenstein and bC Ot4e sIepticsP as a suited candidate for t4e <ustification of >t4e possibilitC of? meaning) .ow t4at is a rat4er restrictive formulation, if compared to t4ose presented in ot4er conte@ts >suc4 as t4e passages &uoted above?, w4ere DripIe refers to Ofact_s` about mC past 4istorCBnot4ing t4at was ever in my mind, or in my e)ternal behaviorP >D NRY mC italics?) ActuallC, t4ere are conte@ts in w4ic4 DripIe uses a still more general formulation to describe t4ose OfactsPBe)g), w4en 4e asserts t4at OWittgensteinPs sIeptical solution concedes to t4e sceptic t4at no Jtrut4 conditionsK or Jcorresponding factsK in t4e world e@ist t4at maIe a statement liIe J2ones _)))` means addition bC OeP trueK P >D ME?)

DripIePs Wittgenstein on %ules and "rivate Hanguage6 a Furt4er "arallel /Q/ For t4e saIe of claritC, let me repeat w4ic4 are t4e candidates to OfactsP offered so far, in order of increasing generalitC6 >i? facts concerning t4e sub<ectPs mind >P la "utnamPs Onarrow psCc4ological statesP?Y >ii? facts concerning t4e sub<ectPs global history >somet4ing liIe a sum of be4avioural, psCc4ological and p4Csiological states, P la Gurge?Y or somet4ing still more general, namelC, >iii? any Ocorresponding facts in t4e worldP) GC reasons w4ic4 s4ould be obvious, t4e first two formulations >particularlC t4e second? would maIe t4e life of someone w4o wants compare t4e anti-individualistic arguments wit4 DripIePs muc4 easierY 4owever, given t4e importance of t4e notion of OfactsP in t4e latterPs analCsis, one is well advised not to privilege an interpretation over t4e alternatives, in an ad hoc fas4ion) So, 4ow are we to solve t4is interpretative problem, so as to get clear about t4e nature of DripIePs OfactsPW * suggest t4at we s4all start from t4e identification, made in t4e last &uoted passage >D ME?, between t4ose Ocorresponding facts in t4e worldP and trut4 conditions) !4at suggestion gets an initial <ustification from t4e importance DripIe confers, in 4is presentation of t4e sIeptical solution, to t4e fact t4at, in t4e Investigations, Wittgenstein would 4ave proposed a new Opicture of languageP, w4ose innovation would lie preciselC in t4e abandonment of t4e analCsis in terms of truth conditions >supposedlC pursued in Tractatus?, on be4alf of an analCsis in terms of Oassertability conditions or ;ustification conditionsPBi)e), conditions w4ic4 specifC Ounder w4at circumstances are we allowed to maIe a given assertionP, or, Omore generallC, of t4e conditions w4en a move >a form of linguistic e@pression? is to be made in t4e Jlanguage-gameK P >D LQ?) W4at t4ese considerations indicate is, * taIe it, t4at DripIePs sIeptical solution for t4e problem of meaning essentiallC re&uires one to abandon t4e analCsis in terms of truth conditions for assertions, andB4ere goes mC suggestionBin that sense, it essentiallC re&uires one to abandon t4e analCsis in terms of Ofacts in t4e worldP corresponding to t4ose assertions, looIing instead Oat 4ow suc4 assertions are usedP and Ounder w4at circumstances attributions of meaning are made and w4at role t4ese attributions plaC in our livesP >D ME?)

N/) .otice t4at at first sig4t t4e suggestion made in t4e preceding paragrap4 goes against t4e aim of establis4ing a parallel wit4 t4e anti-individualistic positionBa tasI for w4ic4, as * said above, candidates >i? and >ii? would be clearlC more appropriate) ,owever, it is

DripIePs Wittgenstein on %ules and "rivate Hanguage6 a Furt4er "arallel /QR preciselC w4en DripIe starts to do t4at w4ic4 4e 4as <ust promisedBi)e), to analCse t4e use of Oattributions of meaningP and t4e Orole _t4eC` plaC in our livesPBt4at w4at * s4all call t4e Oanti-individualistic moveP of 4is argument becomes clear) Het me trC to spell t4at out) * start bC calling attention to t4e fact t4at, similarlC to t4e waC t4e anti-individualists 4ave structured t4eir arguments, DripIe proposes an analCsis w4ic4 4as two distinct moments or p4ases6 initiallC 4e e@amines t4e case of an individual taIen in isolation, an then goes on to analCse t4e case of an individual inside a wider environment >in 4is case, a wider linguistic communitC?) .ow, t4e conclusions obtained in t4e first p4ase of t4at analCsis are preciselC t4e same w4ic4 were relevant for t4e purpose of presenting t4e sIeptical parado@ in c4apter /) * enumerate some passages w4ere t4ose conclusions are most clearlC e@pressed6 N) Oone person considered in isolation _)))` act_s` un4esitatinglC but blindly.! >D ML?Y /) O*t is part of our language game of speaIing of rules t4at a speaIer maC, wit4out ultimatelC giving anC <ustification, follow 4is own confident inclination t4at t4is _)))` is t4e right waC to respond)P >D ML-M?Y R) Oif we confine ourselves to looIing at one person alone, 4is psCc4ological states and 4is e@ternal be4avior, t4is is as far as we can go) We can saC t4at 4e acts confidentlC at eac4 application of a ruleY t4at 4e saCsBwit4out furt4er <ustificationBt4at t4e waC 4e acts, rat4er t4an some &uus-liIe alternative, is the waC to respond)P >D MM?Y Q) OAll we can saC, if we consider a single person in isolation, is t4at our ordinarC practice licenses 4im to applC t4e rule in t4e waC it striIes 4im)P >D MM?Y :) Oif one person is considered in isolation, t4e notion of a rule as guiding t4e person w4o adopts it can 4ave no substantive content)P >D M1?) *n at least one occasion DripIe 4imself identifies t4e conclusions e@pressed aboveBw4ic4, it is wort4 to repeat, are obtained in t4e first p4ase of c4apter RPs analCsis of t4e Oattributions of meaningPBwit4 t4e results of t4e sIeptical argument of c4apter /Bin particular, wit4 its sCstematic attempt to s4ow t4at no fact can <ustifC a sub<ect in saCing t4at 4e is following one rule rat4er t4an anot4er) !4at identification occurs in t4e claim t4at

DripIePs Wittgenstein on %ules and "rivate Hanguage6 a Furt4er "arallel /QQ Ot4e w4ole point of t4e sIeptical argument was t4at t4ere can be no facts about 4im _i)e), t4e sub<ect w4o, in c4apter R, 4as been repeatedlC described as taken in isolation` in virtue of w4ic4 4e accords wit4 4is intentions or notP >D MM?)

NR) So muc4 for t4e first p4ase of DripIePs analCsis of t4e Oattributions of meaningP) *ts second p4ase is introduced wit4 t4e following consideration6
!4e situation is verC different if we widen our ga=e from consideration of t4e rule follower alone and allow ourselves to consider 4im as interacting wit4 a wider communitC) 5t4ers will t4en 4ave <ustification conditions for attributing correct or incorrect rule following to t4e sub<ect, and t4ese will not be simplC t4at t4e sub<ectPs own aut4oritC is unconditionallC to be accepted) >D M1?)

,aving presented t4ose general considerations, DripIe immediatelC offers an e@ample aiming to clarifC t4emBt4at of Oa small c4ild learning additionP >ibid)?) ,is first comment on t4at e@ample is t4at O_i`t is obvious t4at 4is teac4er will not accept <ust anC response from t4e c4ild) 5n t4e contrarC, t4e c4ild must fulfill various conditions if t4e teac4er is to ascribe to 4im masterC of t4e concept of additionP >ibid)?Y DripIe t4en goes on listing some of t4ose conditions, Cet * s4all put t4em aside, since * am more interested in somet4ing 4e saCs soon afterwards, w4en contemplating t4e results one mig4t e@tract from t4e analCsis of t4at particular e@ample for t4e conditions of attributions of meaning in general6
.ow, w4at do * mean w4en * saC t4at t4e teac4er <udges t4at, for certain cases, t4e pupil must give t4e Jrig4tK answerW * mean t4at t4e teac4er <udges t4at t4e c4ild 4as given t4e same answer t4at 4e 4imself would give) SimilarlC, w4en * said t4at t4e teac4er, in order to <udge t4at t4e c4ild is adding, must <udge t4at _)))` 4e is applCing t4e Jrig4tK procedure even if 4e comes out wit4 a mistaIen result, * mean t4at 4e <udges t4at t4e c4ild is applCing t4e procedure 4e 4imself is inclined to applC)

Somet4ing similar is true for adults) *f someone w4om * <udge to 4ave been computing a normal addition function >t4at is, someone w4om * <udge to give, w4en 4e adds, t4e same answer * would give?, suddenlC gives answers according to procedures t4at differ bi=arrelC from mC own, t4en * will <udge t4at somet4ing must 4ave 4appened to 4im, and t4at 4e is no longer following t4e rule 4e previouslC followed) *f t4is 4appens to 4im generallC, and 4is responses seem to me to displaC little discernible pattern, * will <udge 4im probablC to 4ave gone insane) >D 10?)

DripIePs Wittgenstein on %ules and "rivate Hanguage6 a Furt4er "arallel /Q: NQ) #enerali=ing t4e analCsis of t4e conditions for t4e Oattribution of meaningP e@pressed in t4e passages above, we obtain t4e following result6 mC statement t4at a sub<ect S means ) rat4er t4an y bC using t4e term O@P >e)g), plus rat4er t4an .uus bC using t4e term OplusP? is assertable if and only if t4e use S is inclined to do of t4e term O@P agrees wit4 t4e use t4at * 4ave been inclined to do of t4at term up to now >see D 10-1N?) .otice, 4owever, t4at mC license to maIe suc4 an Oattribution of meaningP e@pires if S starts using O@P in a deviant waCBcase in w4ic4 * s4ould conclude t4at S does not mean ) bC O@P >see D 1N-R?) !4at result can be sc4emati=ed as followsNLN6

Attributing meaning ) to SPs use of O@P q C4ecI w4et4er S is inclined to use O@P as * 4ave been inclined to use it up to now

*t is important to notice, concerning t4e sc4eme above, t4at even in t4ose cases w4ere * am able to c4ecI w4et4er SPs procedures w4en using O@P 4ave sCstematicallC matc4ed mine, t4ere is an important respect in w4ic4 * do not 4ave anC guarantee >of t4e sort t4at an OantisIepticP would liIe to obtain? to eliminate t4e possibilitC of an >still? undetected disagreementBi)e), t4e possibilitC t4at, in all the cases observed up to no", S was following Cet anot4er rule >saC, 7? t4at accidentally 4as generated t4e same >be4aviouristic? results as t4e ones rule ) 4as generated in mC own case) .ow, since that sIeptical possibilitC >of an undetected, and, w4at is more important, a potentiallC undetectable disagreement? would, in DripIePs own view, be unavoidable, * taIe it t4at, in that sense, 4is solution for t4e sIeptical parado@ obviouslC does not aim to refute sIepticism about normativitCBw4at does not prevents us from maIing fallible >since ultimatelC ungrounded in anC set of facts ot4er t4an our s4ared inclinations? Oattributions of meaningP) .otice also, finallC, t4at if t4e role t4at t4ose attributions 4ave in our lives is picIed out rig4tlC bC t4e sc4eme above, t4en clearlC t4ere is no place for suc4 attributions e@cept in a community, i)e), in a conte@t in w4ic4 individuals are able to compare t4eir respective
NLN

.otice t4at t4e sc4eme to follow does not present, strictlC speaIing, a bi-conditionalBi)e), a relation of logical >or semantic? e.uivalence, e@pressing t4e truth conditions of t4e propositions involved) "reciselC in order to avoid suc4 a misunderstanding * decided not to present t4e relata in propositional terms, but rat4er in terms of descriptions of actionsBJmovesK in a language-game)

DripIePs Wittgenstein on %ules and "rivate Hanguage6 a Furt4er "arallel /QE inclinations >to use some terms?, t4us becoming able to mutuallC correct eac4 ot4erNL/B t4at being t4e reason w4C DripIe finds 4imself to be <ustified in saCing of t4at sIeptical solution t4at it includes WittgensteinPs famous argument against t4e possibilitC of a Oprivate languageP, in t4at it Odoes not allow us to speaI of a single individual, considered bC 4imself and in isolation, as ever meaning anCt4ingP >D EM-E1?)

7"%"%

+$e parallel between Arip'e s and t$e anti@individualists s arguments

N:) !4e parallel between t4e precedent argumentation and t4at of t4e anti-individualists gets conspicuous w4en we frame DripIePs analCsis according to t4e five p4ases or moments enumerated in section :)/) !4e result is, conciselC, t4e followingNLR6 N) Problemati7ation6 difficulties involving t4e determination of t4e meaning T reference of a particular term >OplusP?NLQY /) 6irst candidate to ans"er6 analCsis of t4e conditions of use of t4at term bC an individual taken in isolationY R) #ounterfactual scenario6 t4e t4oug4t-e@periment presenting t4e Obi=arre sIepticPsP c4allengeY
NL/

As 7spen ,ammer clarifies in 4is summarC of DripIePs OsIeptical solutionP6 DripIe does not claim t4at we continuallC c4ecI t4e assertibilitC of our own and eac4 ot4erPs utterances6 predominantlC, we relC on practical capacities t4at 4ave been internali=ed troug4 training) ,is point is rat4er t4at wit4out t4e possibility of mutual control, we would never Inow in cases of doubt w4at t4e rig4t use of a concept mig4t be) For an individual regarded in social isolation, 4owever, no suc4 possible c4ecI on rig4t and wrong uses of e@pressions would e@istY t4us, in suc4 a case assertibilitC conditions and t4erefore also meaning and language would collapse) >,ammer, /00/, p) /:?

NLR

NLQ

.ote t4at * Ieep t4e original ordering, alt4oug4 in DripIePs te@t p4ases / and R appear initiallC amalgamated, being clearlC distinguis4ed onlC later on) !4ere is a subtle difference in DripIePs starting point, compared wit4 t4e t4ree analCses presented in section :)/) %ecall t4at, in t4e latter case, t4e problem was formulated in terms of t4e conditions of possibilitC for t4e persistence of meaning >or reference? of a particular term, O@P) .ow in DripIePs case t4e problem is sCstematicallC formulated in a different waCBnamelC, as t4at of e@plaining 4ow is it possible t4at an individual s4ould mean ) rat4er t4an y bC emploCing a particular term O@P) \et t4at difference is onlC superficial, as it is indicated bC t4e verC fact t4at t4e t4ree original >anti-individualistic? analCses can be easilC >re?formulated in DripIePs terms >see !able / below?, and vice-versa) >!4us, e)g), "utnamPs problem can be >re?formulated bC means of t4e &uestion O,ow can one Inow w4et4er a sub<ect means "ater rat4er t4an t"in9"ater bC using t4e term OwaterWP, and so on)?

DripIePs Wittgenstein on %ules and "rivate Hanguage6 a Furt4er "arallel /QL Q) Second candidate to ans"er6 analCsis of t4e conditions for Oattributions of meaningP in t4e conte@t of a comparison between an individual and members of a wider communitCY :) Aenerali7ation ] e)tension of the results6 t4e analCsis seems to applC to Oall meaningP, Oall languageP)

,ere is t4e complete table resulting from t4at comparison6

Table $@ Parallel bet"een the arguments of the anti9individualists and Kripke!s

1. Pro lemati"ation #. (. *. 1st $andidate $ounterfactu! #nd $andidate %Individualistic al )ituation %+nti!individualistic &odel' &odel' linguistic institutions >ObaptismP e c4ain of use? ] environmentPs contribution >stuffPs p4Csioc4emical constitution? environmentPs contribution >stuffPs p4Csioc4emical constitution? ,. -enerali"ation

.rip! O.i@onP l t4e same descriptions as- anot4er Oposke %1' individual or a diffe9 sociated bC sible worldP rent one in / possi- eac4 individual ] ble worldsW anot4er 4isto] rical period OgoldP l element "ith atomic "eight _F or a shiny, ducti9 le 'etc.* metalW Put! nam OwaterP l B$& or \OK= narrow psCc4ological states !win-7art4

rigid designators >proper names ] terms for natural Iinds?

OCut t4e pie anC waC Cou liIe, JmeaningsK <ust ainPt in t4e head[P

Burge

Oart4ritisP l arthritis or tharthritis=

>narrow? psCc4ological ] p4Csiological states

anot4er linguistic communitC

a Ocomple@ _social` standardP >communitCPs conventions ] rules?

attribution of mental states Ow4ose content involves a notion t4at t4e sub<ect incompletelC understandsP all meaning T language

.rip! ke %#'

OplusP l plus or .uus=

OfactsP about an t4e Obi=arre an irreducible role of isolated indivi9 sIepticPsP 4C- t4e community l asdual >4er mind, pot4esis sertabilitC conditions be4aviour, etc)? l trut4 conditions

DripIePs Wittgenstein on %ules and "rivate Hanguage6 a Furt4er "arallel /QM

7"( Arip'e s 9ittgenstein versus ?avell s 9ittgenstein: problems wit$ t$e impersonal model
NE) StanleC Cavell was t4e pioneer among WittgensteinPs interpreters in assigning a central >and positive? role to sIepticism in 4is reading of t4e Philosophical InvestigationsNL:) Cavell 4imself acInowledges t4at DripIePs account is Ot4e onlC _)))`, ot4er t4an t4at in The #laim of >eason, t4at taIes Philosophical Investigations not to mean to refute sIepticism but, on t4e contrarC, to maintain some relation to t4e possibilitC of sIepticism as internal to WittgensteinPs p4ilosop4CP >N110, p) E:?) !4at statement is presented in t4e second c4apter of #onditions Bandsome and Cnhandsome >C,$?Btitled O!4e Argument of t4e 5rdinarC6 Scenes of *nstruction in Wittgenstein and in DripIePBw4ic4 is dedicated preciselC to t4e confrontation wit4 DripIePs sIeptical reading of t4e Investigations) Similarities notwit4standing, alreadC in t4e introduction of C,$ Cavell 4ig4lig4ts an important disagreement wit4 DripIe concerning WittgensteinPs relation to sIepticism6
5n DripIePs view Wittgenstein maIes a sIeptical discoverC for w4ic4 4e supplies >w4at DripIe stCles? a sIeptical solution) For me Wittgenstein discovers t4e t4reat of t4e temptation of sIepticism in suc4 a waC t4at efforts to solve it continue its worI of denial) !4e &uestion is w4at t4e denial is of) Sometimes * saC it is of finitude, sometimes of t4e 4uman) >C,$ /R?

Cavell &uicIlC acInowledges t4at t4is allusion to t4e denial of finitude and T or Ot4e 4umanP is far from supplCing a Ofinal responseP to 4is own preceding &uestion >see ibid)?) *n order to ac4ieve suc4 a response, Cavell t4inIs we first need to get clear about t4e role of OWittgensteinian criteriaPBin particular, to get clear about Ow4C p4ilosop4ers 4ave tCpicallC taIen _t4ose criteria` as designed to solve t4e &uestion w4et4er we can Inow t4at t4ere is a world and ot4ers in it, t4at is, to answer t4e &uestion of sIepticismP >C,$ /R-/Q?) .ow, since DripIe 4imself e@emplifies t4at OtCpical attitudePBto t4e e@tent t4at 4is analCsis of t4e nature of rules aims preciselC at answering Ow4et4er * can Inow, be certain, t4at * mean one t4ing rat4er t4an anot4erP >C,$ /Q?Bt4e critical e@amination of 4is
NL:

!4at reading was presented sCstematicallC for t4e first time in CavellPs magnum opus The #laim of >eason@ Wittgenstein, Skepticism, <orality and Tragedy >N1L1?, but 4ave since t4en developed in numerous ot4er writings)

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /Q1 position provides an indirect waC of elucidating t4e nature of OWittgensteinian criteriaP) Wit4 t4at aim in mind, Cavell will argue t4at, pace DripIe, >i? O_r`ules are not a >sIeptical? solution to t4e problem of meaningP, and >ii? t4at Oapart from a certain appeal to rules >t4e Iind * believe DripIe maIes for Wittgenstein, but w4ic4 * believe Wittgenstein preciselC repudiates? t4ere would be no sIeptical crisis of meaning >of t4e Iind DripIe develops?P >ibid?) *n t4e remainder of t4is section * s4all be primarilC concerned wit4 reconstructing t4e arguments for t4eses >i? and >ii?) Gefore going on, * find t4at one cautionarC note is in order BnamelC, t4at one s4ould not lose sig4t of t4e fact t4at t4eses >i? and >ii? e@press onlC t4e negative aspect of CavellPs analCsisBi)e), t4eC indicate >primarilC? w4at OWittgensteinian criteriaP are notN Cet bC defending t4em Cavell doesnPt mean to denC t4at anot4er Iind of OsIeptical crisisP is important for t4e InvestigationsPs argumentBon t4e contrarC, 4is own understanding of t4e Osc4ematism of criteriaP is t4oroug4lC informed bC 4is concern wit4 elucidating t4e conditions of possibilitC for t4e OsIeptical temptationP >see C,$ /Q?NLE) >* s4all come bacI to t4is point later on)?

7"("1

Rules& multiple interpretations& and t$e 0s'eptical parado8

NL) According to Cavell, DripIePs OsIeptical parado@P >and, more generallC, DripIePs reading of Wittgenstein? is based on a twofold misunderstanding6 first, a peculiar >and mistaIen? view about t4e nature of rules, and, second, an improper emp4asis on t4eir role in t4e InvestigationsPs argument) $nderlCing t4at mistaIen view would be t4e assumption t4at agreement in action >be it among different sub<ects, or t4e same sub<ect at different times? depends on a particular interpretation of t4e rule t4at determines >and, conse&uentlC,
NLE

As Step4en 8ul4all clarifies w4en commenting on CavellPs view on t4at point6 _)))` since criteria are based on agreement, a sIeptical repudiation of suc4 agreement is a standing 4uman possibilitCY anCt4ing essentiallC conventional must be vulnerable to t4e wit4drawal of consent) So it can never be rig4t to combat sIepticism eit4er bC claiming t4at criteria confer certaintC, or bC denCing t4e possibilitC of t4eir repudiation) W4at must rat4er be s4own is t4e true cost of t4at repudiationY for if criteria determine t4e use, and so t4e meaning, of our words, to refuse t4em is to deprive oneself of t4e power of co4erent speec4) >8ul4all, N11E, p) L?

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /:0 is e@pressed bC? t4at action) !4e first clear inde@ s4owing t4at DripIe commits to t4at assumption lies in 4is initial re&uirement t4at t4e sub<ect, w4en c4allenged bC t4e sIeptic, s4ould >at least in principle? be able to present a fact >or set of facts? t4at could <ustifC >or consist in? a particular interpretation of a ruleBi)e), to resume t4e preceding notation, t4e fact <ustifCing >or consisting in t4at? a linguistic statement of a rule >O@P? denotes one rule >)? rat4er t4an anot4er >y?) Aiming to indicate t4e problems wit4 t4at view on t4e nature of rules, Cavell starts calling our attention to t4e fact t4at, pace DripIePs reconstruction, Wittgenstein 4imself does not assign suc4 a 4eavC weig4t to t4e role of rulesBlet alone t4e >sIeptical? possibilitC of Omultiple interpretationsP of rulesBin 4is original argument) !4e first clue supporting t4at conclusion lies in t4e verC JtoneK of t4e second 4alf of t4e first paragrap4 of "* c/0N >w4ose first 4alf, it is wort4 to recall, supplies one of t4e main te@tual supports for DripIePs analCsis?, in w4ic4 Wittgenstein presents >in retrospect? w4at would be t4e OanswerP for 4is Oparado@P) ,ere is t4e >full? relevant paragrap46
!4is was our parado@6 no course of action could be determined bC a rule, because everC course of action can be made out to accord wit4 t4e rule) The ans"er "as6 if everCt4ing can be made out to accord wit4 t4e rule, t4en it can also be made out to conflict wit4 it) And so t4ere would be neit4er accord nor conflict 4ere) >"*, c/0NY mC italics?

Commenting on t4e answer indicated above, Cavell asserts t4e following6

!4is _answer` seems to me e&uallC readable as suggesting not t4at t4is parado@ is JcentralK _as DripIe would 4ave it` but t4at it is no sooner named t4an its significance is undermined) WittgensteinPs tone is6 W4at our so-called parado@ came to was no more t4an t4is so-called answer can completelC tame) !4e facts about possible interpretations of a rule are not sufficient to cause sIepticism >t4oug4 t4eC maC plaC into a sIeptical 4and, one t4at 4as alreadC portraCed rules and t4eir role in language in a particular waC?) !4e Wittgensteinian issue is, as elsew4ere, w4C we imagine ot4erwise) >C,$ EM?

Faced wit4 t4ose words one mig4t well wonder w4C, according to Cavell, would t4e Ofacts about possible interpretations of a ruleP not be Osufficient to cause sIepticismP) *t is in t4e answer to t4at &uestion t4at we s4all get clear about w4at e@actlC are t4e problems involved in DripIePs assumption t4at agreement in actions depends on a particular interpretation of t4e rule t4at determines t4ose actionsBand, conse&uentlC, about w4at is

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /:N wrong wit4 4is putting so muc4 emp4asis in t4e possibilitC of Omultiple interpretationsP of rules)

NM) CavellPs basic idea, as * understand it, is t4at DripIePs assumption would create an infinite regress%one t4at was actuallC implied in WittgensteinPs te@t, but t4at will be appropriated bC DripIe for verC different purposes >namelC, sIeptical ones?) ,ere is 4ow t4e regress would originate6 t4e first premise is t4e assumption t4at acting according to a rule >rat4er t4an anot4er? implies interpreting it in a particular waCY t4e second premise is a conclusion argued for bC Wittgenstein >and accepted bC DripIe?, namelC6 t4at eac4 interpretation of a rule amounts to no more t4an a replacement of a linguistic e@pression >or sCmbol? t4at denotes it for a new e@pression >a new sCmbol?Y now, if bot4 premises are true, it follows t4at a >new? interpretation is alwaCs needed, in order for t4e e@pression resulting from a previous interpretation to be understoodBin ot4er words, we can alwaCs trC to supplC a rule for t4e application of a rule) .ote t4at bot4 Wittgenstein and DripIe would agree wit4 t4e argument presented in t4e paragrap4 above) \et, preciselC because of its conclusion >because, i)e), it creates an infinite regress?, one can use t4e understanding of t4e nature of rules bC w4ic4 t4at argument is prefi@ed to present a new argument, w4ic4 would 4ave t4e form of a modus tollens, as follows6

>N? !o act according to a rule >rat4er t4an anot4er? implies interpreting it in a particular waCY _Assumption` >/? !o interpret a rule is not4ing but replacing a linguistic e@pression for anot4erY _!4esis defended in "*` >R? >N? ] >/? r infinite regress >Q? !4erefore, t4e initial assumption >N? is false) _Conclusion`

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /:/

* taIe it t4at somet4ing liIe t4e argument presented above is w4at Cavell finds in WittgensteinPs analCsis) >!4at, at anC rate, is t4e waC * read Wittgenstein)? .ow DripIe seems to see t4ings differentlCY for according to 4im premise >N? is not to be taIen as an assumption introduced in order to construct a modus tollens, but rat4er as a truth concerning t4e nature of rulesBt4at being t4e reason w4C, wit4 t4e aid of an additional premise >amounting to a different understanding of premiss /?, 4e will be lead to defend another argument, t4at 4as t4e following form6

>N? !o act according to a rule >rat4er t4an anot4er? implies interpreting it in a particular waCY _Assumption` >/? !o interpret a rule is not4ing but replacing a linguistic e@pression for anot4erY _!4esis defended in "*` >RP? >/? q .o fact >or set of facts? can be presented bC a sub<ect <ustifCing or consisting in a particular interpretation of a rule >rat4er t4an anot4er?Y _DripIePs taIe on >/?` >QP? !4erefore, in order to act according to a rule >rat4er t4an anot4er?, one s4all eventuallC give up interpreting it in anC waC, instead following onePs inclination Bin ot4er words, one s4all eventuallC act blindlyY _SIeptical conclusion`

!4is analCsis lets us wit4 two readings, bot4 seeminglC compatible wit4 WittgensteinPs te@t) ,ow s4all we decide w4ic4 is correctW *n order to answer t4at &uestion, we need taIe anot4er step bacI, seeIing to unveil some furt4er assumptions be4ind t4at dispute)

7"("# +$e individual B communit* relation: two wa*s of reading 9ittgenstein s 0scene of instruction

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /:R N1) !4e need to investigate t4e most general assumptions underlCing DripIePs reading is e@actlC w4at Cavell e@pressed at t4e end of t4e passage &uoted above >cNL?, mentioning t4e OWittgensteinian issueP of Ow4C we imagine ot4erwisePBw4C, i)e), it is so natural to read "* c/0N >and ad<acent ones? as DripIe does, taIing t4e possibilitC of Omultiple interpretationsP of rules as a basis to draw a sIeptical conclusion) !4e pat4 to clarifC t4at issue is alreadC indicated in t4at same passage, in t4e observation t4at t4e nature of rules might aut4ori=e suc4 a conclusion, provided t4at t4eir role in language is portraCed Oin a particular waCPY it is in order to indicate more preciselC t4e content of t4at portraCal t4at it becomes necessarC to identifC t4e assumptions w4ic4, so to speaI, constitute its frame. According to Cavell, t4at frame is comprised of at least two related >problematic? views6 one about t4e nature of 4uman agreement, and t4e ot4er about t4e relation between t4e individual and 4er communitC) ,ere is 4ow 4e elaborates t4e point6
W4at DripIe calls t4e JsolutionK to t4e sIeptical &uestion or parado@ turns on a picture of 4ow t4e JisolatedK individual comes to be JinstructedK >and accepted or re<ected? bC t4e JcommunitCK, in terms of JinclinationsK e@pressed bC someone >presumablC regarding 4imself or 4erself as representing t4e communitC? w4o J<udgesK w4et4er t4e JsameK inclinations are e@pressed bC t4e ot4er seeIing >as it were? t4e communitCPs recognition or acInowledgement) >C,$ E1?

DripIePs portraCal of agreementBas if it was al"ays a matter of a communitC deciding to accept or re<ect a JbeginnerKBbetraCs a commitment wit4 t4e ideal of an ob<ective >impersonal? ground for <udging t4e e@tent of t4at agreementY alt4oug4 DripIe emp4aticallC denies t4at suc4 a ground would consist in a set of truth conditions for <udgements concerning t4e correct emploCment of our words >4ence, in a set of Ofacts in t4e worldP corresponding to normative propositions?, 4e does allow it to consist in anot4er set of factors >factsW?BnamelC, t4e ones concerning assertability conditions, and, to t4at e@tent, t4e pre-e@istent JconventionsK of a linguistic communitC >i)e), t4e set of rules e@pressing our s4ared inclinations to act under certain circumstances, w4ic4 in turn allow us to mutuallC correct eac4 ot4er concerning t4e JmovesK we taIe in particular languagegames?)

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /:Q /0) Cavell would not e@actlC want to deny t4at t4e Iind of situation imagined bC DripIe is possibleBin effect, * believe 4e could easilC grant t4at sometimes t4e problem of agreement taIes place preciselC along t4ose lines, and, conse&uentlC, mig4t be solved as DripIe proposes) As * understand 4im, 4owever, Cavell would want to saC t4at suc4 a portraCal falls s4ort of presenting t4e most commonBlet alone t4e main or t4e onlyBIind of risI w4ic4 is involved in our ordinarC linguistic e@c4anges) Aiming to counteract DripIePs reductionist approac4, Cavell tries to call our attention to anot4er aspect of t4e problem, indicating t4e costs involved in t4e abandonment of t4e Iind of OagreementP >w4ic4 Cavell prefers to call OattunementP? wit4 t4e communitC t4at is already possessed bC an individual w4o 4as in4erited its language) Cavell describes t4e particular Iind of agreement t4at 4e taIes as c4aracteristic of our linguistic practices in The #laim of >eason, bC means of t4e following comparisons6
!4e idea of agreement 4ere is not t4at of coming to or arriving at an agreement on a given occasion, but of being in agreement t4roug4out, being in 4armonC, liIe pitc4es or tones, or clocIs, or weig4ing scales, or columns of figures) !4at a group of 4uman beings stimmen in t4eir language Sberein saCs, so to speaI, t4at t4eC are mutuallC voiced wit4 respect to it, mutuallC attuned top to bottom) >C% R/?

Alt4oug4 >generallC? we do not need to come to agreement >partaIing in anC Iind of previous JdiscussionK? about t4e use of our wordsBand, w4at is more important, about t4e ;udgements we maIe using t4emBwe >generallC? are in agreement concerning t4at, in t4e same waC as we >generallC? Jare in agreementK concerning >i)e), we share? certain natural reactions6 OWe maC laug4 and crC at t4e same t4ings, or notY some e@perience maC t4row us out of, or into, agreement 4ere, but t4e idea of achieving agreement in our senses of comedC or tragedC seems out of placePBmore specificallC, it suggests Oa re<ection of WittgensteinPs idea of agreement, or _)))` a contractuali=ing or conventionali=ing of itP >C,$ 1Q?NLL) .ow, since in t4at basic level agreement in <udgements reflects t4e
NLL

.ote t4at t4e verC e@ample Cavell uses in t4is conte@tBOour senses of comedC or tragedCPBalreadC indicates t4at 4is appeal to our Onatural reactionsP s4ould be understood broadlC, so as to include t4e most sop4isticated reactions t4at are developed wit4 cultivation) Cavell clarifies t4at point in anot4er conte@t, accusing t4e Oover-conventionali=ed interpretations of WittgensteinPs notion of life formsP of wis4ing Oto denC 4uman beings t4eir natural 4istorC, in its perpetual intersection wit4 4uman cultivation >a vision linIing Wittgenstein wit4 Freud?P >W7 _/00E` NQ?) >5ne mig4t feel inclined to saC t4at t4ose Onatural reactionsP would be better described as belonging to our second natureBCet are we sure of w4at we mean bC 4uman beings first natureW OW4atP, asIs "ascal in 4is Pens5es, Oare our natural principles but 4abitual principlesWPY and 4e adds, a little later6 O,abit is a second nature t4at destroCs t4e first) Gut w4at is natureW W4C is 4abit not naturalW * am verC muc4 afraid t4at nature itself is onlC a first 4abit, <ust as 4abit is a

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /:: attunement in our natural reactionsBin our form of lifeBCavell draws t4e conclusion t4at Onot4ing is deeper t4an t4e fact, or t4e e@tent, of agreement itselfP >C% R/?) !4at conclusion can be misleading, in t4at one mig4t taIe it as offering an >alternative? p4ilosop4ical e@planation of t4e ground of Jlinguistic agreementKY w4at it reallC means is, on t4e contrarC, to O&uestion w4et4er _suc4` a p4ilosop4ical e@planation is needed, or wantedP >ibid)?NLM)

/N) Gut w4C e@actlC would suc4 an e@planation be unnecessarCW *s not t4e reason t4at CavellPs conclusion is, after all, rat4er similar to DripIePs OsIeptical solutionPW For if nothing is more fundamental t4an >t4e fact of? agreement itselfBif, i)e), no Je@ternal guaranteeK for it is availableBdoes not t4at implC t4at agreement is, after all, >ultimatelC? ungroundedB4ence, t4at at some point we reallC 4ave to act blindly, as DripIePs sIeptic would 4ave itW * assume sometimes we do 4ave our reasons to feel liIe we are Jacting blindlCKBdonPt weW Suppose someoneBa c4ild, saCBs4ould asI me endlesslC "hy * >4ave to? act as * do,
second nature)P >N1EE, p) EN??) "eg 5PConnorPs <orality and &ur #omplicated 6orm of +ife >/00M? offers an e@tremelC insig4tful >and somew4at novel? treatment of t4e Iind of intersection mentioned in CavellPs last &uote >and one w4ic4 seems consistent wit4 "ascalPs suspicions?) !4at treatment is condensed in 4er useful notions of Ofelted worldP and Ofelted conte@tualismP, w4ic4 can >4opefullC? get an initial purc4ase from t4e reading of t4e following pair of passages6 !4e deep agreement of communitC in t4e sense of natural 4istorC is not untet4ered and freefloating) *t is verC muc4 a product and a producer of our world, in all its givenness and contingencC) 5ur natural 4istorC is part of, responsive to, s4aped bC, and s4aper of t4e p4Csical world we in4abit) !4e actions, practices, rules, regularities, reactions, and givens of nature overlap, crisscross, and tangle wit4 one anot4er) !4is is t4e felted world) >5PConnor, /00M, p) M:? _F`elted conte@tualism does not presume a worldTlanguage divide, but rat4er maintains t4at practices 4ave a dept4 t4at goes all t4e waC down into w4at most people simplC call t4e natural world) 8C position is t4at our world is not one part natural and one part social, but rat4er is a s4ared world w4ere t4ese are intermingled and tangled, resulting in waCs of acting and conventions t4at are inescapablC bound toget4er) >ibid), p) N0/?
NLM

,ere one mig4t recall some of Cora (iamondPs claims, in 4er >ealistic Spirit, about t4e Iind of OunrealismP one s4ould trC to avoidB4ence, t4e Iind of OrealismP one s4ould trC to seeIBin p4ilosop4C) %epresentative claims are t4ese6 Ot4e unrealism to w4ic4 Wittgenstein was trCing to draw our attention was not t4at of failing to see w4at t4e given reallC is, or oug4t to be for us in our p4ilosop4ical t4inIing) !4e unrealism was in t4e &uestions we were asIing) We asI p4ilosop4ical &uestions about our concepts in t4e grip of an unrealistic conception of w4at Inowing about t4em would beP >N11:, p) EE?Y and again6 Ot4e 4ardness of realism is in not asIing _some` &uestionsP >p) L0?)

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /:E rat4er t4an some ot4er waCY 4ow far could *B4ow far could CouWBgo wit4 mC answers before feeling >embarrassinglC? out of reasonsB4ence ungrounded, and t4us reduced to Jact blindlCKW *n cases liIe t4at, * mig4t well feel tempted to conclude t4at t4e cause of mC JblindnessKBi)e), mC incapacitC to find furt4er reasons and <ustifications for mC actionsB is somet4ing about t4e "orld, or about human condition as suc4Bsomet4ing t4at t4eologC or metap4Csics or p4Csics or biologC or ant4ropologC s4ould e@plainBas if it were >as CetW? Jtoo darIK, meaning t4at t4e verC attempt to trC to see t4roug4 t4is darIness is >for t4e time beingW? 4opeless) Somet4ing analogous mig4t 4appen w4ere a disagreement arises concerning 4ow to applC a conceptB4ence, a ruleBin a particular conte@t) Suppose * feel stronglC inclined >as * actuallC do? to call t4ose two big cardboard bo@es lCing >rat4er looselC? one upon t4e ot4er in t4e middle of mC living room a tableBafter all, * use to put a lot of t4ings on it, and even use it to 4ave mC dinner everC now and t4en) \et, * can t4inI of manC a friend finding t4e verC idea of calling >let alone using[? suc4 a t4ing >as? a OtableP a funnC or eccentric or simplC outraging oneNL1) Faced wit4 t4at disagreement, * mig4t again feel tempted to conclude t4at t4ere is not4ing about the "orld >or its facts? t4at obliges one to applC >or not to applC? a certain concept or ruleB4ence, t4at not4ing * can point to in t4e world can possiblC put an end to itY and t4at feeling can in turn lead me to conclude t4at >sometimes? * 4ave to >ultimatelC? act blindlC, merelC following mC inclinations) .ow t4at is preciselC t4e Iind of conclusion w4ose >apparent? necessitC Cavell wants to &uestion) * taIe it t4at 4e would do t4at bC suggesting t4at >sometimes? we actuallC suffer a Iind of blindness, Cet we onlC avoid t4e real issueBt4e real source of t4at blindnessBif we pro<ect t4e darIness upon t4e worldNM0) !rue6 t4ere is not4ing about t4e world and its facts t4at alone would be responsible for our agreementY Cet t4at does not implC t4at agreement is >necessarilC? ungroundedBit onlC implies t4at "e must provide suc4 a
NL1

NM0

5f course disagreements can get waC more serious in ot4er conte@ts) "eople do sometimes feel outraged facing common practicesBincluding linguistic onesBfrom ot4er cultures, or even from onePs own culture) >!4inI about, e)g), 4ow peoplePs inclinations differ about t4e practice of eating meet, and, conse&uentlC, of applCing t4e concept JfoodK >and ad<acent ones? to >some? animals)? * am 4ere adapting a suggestion made in a rat4er different conte@tBnamelC, "art Four of The #laim of >eason, titled OSIepticism and t4e "roblem of 5t4ersP) !4e sentence w4ic4 interests me is t4is6 O* suffer a Iind of blindness, but * avoid t4e issue bC pro<ecting t4is darIness upon t4e ot4erP >C% REM?Y t4at sentence occurs in t4e middle of an investigation about t4e sources of w4at Cavell t4ere calls t4e OmCt4 of t4e bodC as a veilP >see ibid)?BparticularlC t4e sIeptical doubts concerning Inowledge of ot4er>Ps? minds w4ic4 arise w4en >supposedlC? all t4e evidence available comes from t4eir bodies)

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /:L ground, in eac4 particular conte@t, bC finding or constructing or inventing conditions for itY it implies, in ot4er words, t4at t4e burden for ac4ieving and maintaining agreement is upon our capacities to invest our interest upon t4e world and upon ot4ersBto single out some facts or aspects as important >for some particular purposes?, finding t4em wort4C of s4aring, and 4ence of universali=ing) .ow, w4en no >universallC accepted or assumed? t4eologC or metap4Csics or ideologC or science is available for one to lean onBa condition w4ic4 was not so muc4 created as it was disclosed bC >some? modern t4inIersBt4e tasI of reac4ing and maintaining agreement mig4t understandablC appear difficult, even 4opelessY accordinglC, one mig4t >again understandablC? feel tempted to avoid t4e issue, prefering to adopt t4e >rat4er desperate? attitude of accepting some form of relativism or sIepticism or idealism or solipsism, or again prefering t4e >rat4er sublimated and evasive? acceptance of some form of t4eological or metap4Csical or ideological or scientific dogmatism) !4e implications of t4ose brief considerations are numerous and important, and in w4at follows * s4all cover onlC a small set of t4em) For t4e time being, t4eC s4all allow me to indicate somet4ing verC important about DripIePs reading of WittgensteinPs argument6 on t4e one 4and, * find DripIePs is one of t4e few readings >beside CavellPs? sufficientlC sensitive to a result of t4at argument w4ic4 actuallC deserves t4e &ualification OsIepticalPB namelC, t4e t4esis t4at linguistic agreement and normativitC simplC cannot be grounded bC anC set of Job<ectiveK facts about t4e world >andTor about ourselves?Y Cet 4is mistaIe was to stop at t4at reali=ationBassuming t4at Jt4e sIepticK s4ould 4ave t4e last wordBinstead of looIing to t4e ot4er side of t4e coinBnamelC, t4at t4e burden of linguistic agreement and normativitC is >at least partiallC? mine, i)e), is upon eac4 of us, and, to t4at e@tent, 4as at least one irreducibly personal aspectNMN) *n ot4er words, * taIe it t4at DripIePs OsIeptical solutionP mig4t be seen as one of t4ose understandable >if somew4at desperate? reactions
NMN

5f course t4ere is a number of >contingent and c4angeable? constraints over w4at eac4 of us can personally do in order to ac4ieve and maintain agreement in anC particular conte@tBincluding, e)g), attention to empirical regularities >in t4e waC t4e world and 4umans be4ave?, social practices, traditions and customs of a communitC, and so on) \et t4e reason w4C * 4ave been emp4asi=ingBand will continue to emp4asi=e, particularlC in t4e present c4apterBour personal role in t4at tasI is preciselC mC wis4 to counteract a rat4er strong temptation to evade t4at burdenBa temptation w4ic4, as * indicated in t4e *ntroduction, 4as influenced >and undoubtedlC continues influencing, against mC better <udgement? mC own stance on manC of t4e issues under analCsis) * grant t4at t4is biased strategC can lead to some >different? misunderstandingsY Cet t4e difficultC of combining all t4e important aspects of a p4ilosop4ical sub<ect under a single analCsis increasinglC convinces me of t4e correction of StrawsonPs claim t4at Otrut4 in p4ilosop4C _)))` is so comple@ and manC-sided, so multi-faced, t4at anC individual p4ilosop4erPs worI, if it is to 4ave anC unitC and co4erence, must at best emp4asi=e some aspects of t4e trut4, to t4e neglect of ot4ers w4ic4 maC striIe anot4er p4ilosop4er wit4 greater forceP >S. viii?)

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /:M to t4e destructive aspects of WittgensteinPs argumentationY but * also t4inI, more importantlC, t4at it betraCs a deeper commitment >w4ic4 seems to influence t4e antiindividualistic analCsis of meaning as well?, w4ic4 gets e@pressed in 4is impulse to condemn 4uman language >rat4er &uicIlC? for not corresponding to a pre-conceived, impersonal picture of normativitC)

//) DripIePs commitment to t4at impersonal picture gets >more? conspicuous in 4is interpretation of t4e Oscene of instructionP presented in "* c/NL, w4ic4 serves as a Iind paradigm of language ac&uisition in t4at worI) As we saw in t4e previous section >see esp) ccNR-NQ?, DripIe sees t4e teac4erPs role in determining t4e correction of a c4ildPs answer as a matter of <udging w4et4er s4e O4as given t4e same answer t4at 4e 4imself would giveP, or Ois applCing t4e procedure 4e 4imself is inclined to applCP >D 10?) *n e@amining t4at view, Cavell accuses DripIe of completelC perverting WittgensteinPs appeal to t4e teac4erPs OinclinationsP in t4e scene of instruction) !o s4ow t4at, Cavell compares t4e original formulation contained in c/NLBdescribing w4at 4appens w4en t4e teac4er reac4es t4e ObedrocIPBwit4 t4e parap4rase t4at 4e attributes to DripIe) !4e formulations are, respectivelC, t4e following >* emp4asi=e t4eir differences?6
*f * 4ave e@4austed t4e <ustifications * 4ave reac4ed t4e bedrocI, and mC spade is turned) !4en I am inclined to say6 J!4is is simplC w4at * do)K

*f * 4ave e@4austed ))) _etc)` !4en I am licensed to say6 J!4is is simplC w4at I am inclined to do)K >C,$ L0?

!4e difference between t4e formulations above is subtle, but full of implications) Cavell notices, first, t4at O_w`4at * am inclined is preciselC not somet4ing * necessarilC go on to saC6 * maC be inclined to saC Ces to an invitation, but t4ere are considerations against it, and * 4esitate to give an answer on t4e spotP >C,$ LN?) !4us, t4ere is a 4esitationBan opennessBin t4e be4aviour of WittgensteinPs teac4er t4at DripIe completelC disregards) \et t4at 4esitation, or openness, is crucial to understand t4e teac4erPs role in t4e scene of instructionBparticularlC t4e moment w4en 4is instruction comes to an impasse) Cavell presents t4at point in t4e following passage6

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /:1
* conceive t4at t4e good teac4er will not saC, J!4is is simplC w4at * doK as a t4reat to discontinue 4is or 4er instruction, as if to saC6 J* am rig4tY do it mC waC or leave mC sig4tK) !4e teac4erPs e@pression of inclination in w4at is to be said s4ows readinessB>unconditional? willingnessBto continue presenting 4imself as an e@ample, as t4e representative of t4e communitC into w4ic4 t4e c4ild is being, let me saC, invited and initiated) >C,$ L/?

DripIe conceives 4is teac4er as a Iind of ;udge of 4er linguistic communitCPs practices, and, consistentlC, identifies OnormalitCP >and, t4erefore, normativitC? wit4 blind obedience on t4e part of t4e beginner in t4at communitC) Cavell, on t4e ot4er 4and, emp4asi=es t4e teac4erPs 4esitation and openness6 in a moment of impasse, s4e does not taIe t4e >possiblC easier? pat4 of evading her responsibility in t4e pursuit of instruction >as DripIePs rat4er aut4oritarian teac4er does?, but finds 4erself instead forced to face 4er limitationsB limitations w4ic4 are c4aracteristic of relations4ips among finite individualsBaccepting and even s4aring t4em wit4 t4e c4ild, bC presenting 4erself as >after all? onlC an e)ample, or representative, of t4e communitC of >finite? 4uman beings in w4ic4 s4e is being initiated) *nterpreted t4at waC, t4e scene of instruction illustrates t4e 4uman &uest for real agreement, 4owever difficult in some cases, among concrete individualsBsomet4ing w4ic4 would never be ac4ieved bC mere >impersonal? OconformitC of inclinationsP) CavellPs taIe on t4e scene of instruction provides some furt4er elements to ret4inI t4e JproblemsK of meaning, agreement and normativitCBin particular, for discarding t4eir sIeptical c4aracter, at least in DripIePs sense) !4e Cavellian lesson, as elsew4ere, is t4at we s4ould not assumeBas bot4 DripIe and t4e anti-individualists doBt4at t4e onlC alternative to a OsIeptical solutionP would be t4e indication an ob<ective, impersonal foundation for meaning, agreement and normativitC) !4ere is a better waC out of t4ose JproblemsK, w4ic4 involves acceptingBreallC accepting, as opposed to despairing of, as DripIePs sIeptic does, or sublimating, as t4e anti-individualists seem to doBour condition as finite >4uman? beings) *n particular, we need to face t4e fact t4at, as finite, we are actuallC separate from eac4 ot4erBt4at t4ere is no metap4Csical or epistemological Js4ortcutK to ot4erPs t4oug4ts, meanings, and intentionsBmaIing it our responsibilitC to ac4ieve and maintain agreementBsomet4ing t4at mig4t feel liIe a rat4er 4eavC burden sometimes) Cavell e@presses t4at feeling bC claiming t4at Oplacing confidence in t4e ot4erBwaitingB means letting mC confidence be c4allenged, anCwaC become 4esitant in, t4oug4tful about, e@pressing itselfP >C,$ LE?) *t is t4at Iind of c4allenge t4at we trC to avoid, or to deflect,

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /E0 bC un&uestioninglC subscribing to t4e p4ilosop4ical Ore&uirement of puritCP w4ic4 underlies all Iinds of fantasies about meaning and normativitC as being totallC impersonal p4enomena, on t4e prete@t of ensuring an Je@ternalK, and, conse&uentlC, >more? Job<ectiveK foundation for our agreement)

/R) ,aving t4us reformulated t4e Jproblem of agreementK >anCwaC, 4aving emp4asi=ed ot4er crucial aspects of it?, and offered an alternative JsolutionK to DripIePs sIeptical one >anCwaC, an alternative description of t4e options available to face t4at problem, in concrete situations?, Cavell raises a &uestion t4at per4aps mig4t be going on in t4e readerPs mind at t4is verC momentBnamelC, Ow4at Iind of solution is t4isWP >ibid)?) ,is answer to t4at &uestion, alt4oug4 purelC negative, furt4er elucidates t4e difference between 4is and DripIePs position concerning t4e Oabsence of foundationP >4ence, t4e limits? of 4uman agreement) ,ere is an e@tended &uote presenting t4at answer6
*f * let mC confidence or aut4oritC be c4allenged, and * wait, it cannot be t4at * conceive mCself to be wrong about 4ow * add or, in general, talI) And * can per4aps t4en come to an astonis4ing insig4tBt4at mC aut4oritC in t4ese matters of grounding is based on not4ing substantive in me, not4ing particular about me Band * mig4t saC6 t4ere is no fact about me t4at constitutes t4e <ustification of w4at * saC and do over against w4at t4e ot4er, saC t4e c4ild, saCs and does)

*n t4us coming upon a derivation of some of t4e language of DripIePs formulationB Jt4ere was _and is` no fact about me t4at constituted mC 4aving meant _or meaning t4is rat4er t4an t4at`K _)))`B* am surelC strucI bC its trut4 and gravitC) Gut * find t4at * do not wis4 to draw a sIeptical conclusion from t4is insig4t, somet4ing to t4e effect t4at * do not Inow w4at * mean, or w4et4er * mean one t4ing rat4er t4an anot4er, or mean anCt4ing at all) _)))` 5ne reason * resist a sIeptical moral 4ere is per4aps t4at * do not Inow, as it were, w4et4er or 4ow meaning somet4ing re&uires t4ere to be a fact about me t4at constitutes meaning it6 W4at is not t4ere w4en t4ere is not t4is factW *n terms more or less from The #laim of >eason , * mig4t e@press mC resistance t4is waC6 DripIe taIes t4e discoverC of t4e absence of 4is fact _e)g), as to w4et4er * mean plus rat4er t4an &uus` to be itself a fact, to 4ave >eventuallC? t4at stabilitC) W4ereas * taIe t4is Jabsence of t4e factK not as a >sIeptical? discoverC but as t4e sIepticPs re.uirement) >C,$ LE-LL?)

%eali=ing t4at, appearances notwit4standing, t4e Oabsence of a factP constitutes a re.uirement rat4er t4an a discovery of t4e sIepticBa point to w4ic4 * s4all returnBis t4e IeC to e@plain t4e similarities and dissimilarities between CavellPs and DripIePs readings, in t4at it invites us to seeI for deeper assumptions, or pictures, about t4e nature of

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /EN meaning, agreement and normativitC t4at underlie t4eir respective reactions) SimplifCing t4ings a bit >Cavell emp4asi=es t4at 4is Oinsig4tP implies onlC a partial OderivationP of DripIePs formulation, and 4e 4as good reasons for t4at reservation, as we s4all see?, one mig4t saC t4at bot4 aut4ors agree t4at t4ere is Ono factP grounding meaningY t4e difference is t4at Cavell, unliIe DripIe, does not intend to generali=e t4at insig4t into a sIeptical conclusion) !4e difference, in ot4er words, lies in t4e morals t4at eac4 aut4or wants to e@tract from t4e analCsis of t4e OWittgensteinian parado@P of "* c/0N >of w4ic4 DripIePs Oparado@ of &uadditionP is an instance?6 for DripIe, w4at t4at parado@ s4ows is t4at t4e sIeptic is rig4t in pointing out to t4e absence of anC Job<ective groundK >e@pressible in terms of trut4 conditions? for meaningB4ence, t4at one s4ould looI for an alternative ground >e@pressible in terms of conditions for <ustified assertion?Y for Cavell, on t4e ot4er 4and, w4at t4e parado@ s4ows is t4at t4e verC idea of t4ere being Oa fact about me t4at constitutes meaning _somet4ing`P was not4ing but a O4ouse of cardsP >see "* cNNM?) 5nce t4at Jp4ilosop4ical structureK is undermined, all t4at remains is t4e Jbrute datumK, so to speaI, of our agreement, or attunementBa datum w4ic4 is undoubtedlC a factBeven a fact about me, i)e), about eac4 of us, and our practicesBbut w4ic4 is unfit bot4 as a JgroundK of t4e Iind initiallC envisaged bC DripIePs sIeptic, and for 4is conclusion t4at, on t4e absence of suc4 a ground, Ot4e entire idea of meaning vanis4es into t4in airP >D //?) >*nstead of agreeing wit4 t4at conclusion, Cavell indicates t4at Ow4at vanis4es was alreadC air, revealing no scene of destructionP >C,$ M0?)?NM/

/Q) ,aving reac4ed t4is point in our reconstruction of CavellPs argument, one mig4t reasonablC demand a more detailed account of t4e latterPs view on OattunementP) *n t4e c4apter we 4ave been analCsing, bC waC of offering suc4 an account, Cavell goes on to &uote a well Inown passage of 4is own OearlC p4ilosop4ical selfP >see C,$ M/?, in w4ic4 4is view on t4e role of Wittgensteinian criteria gets summari=ed) !4e passage goes as follows6

NM/

%ogerio Severo 4as suggested to me t4at CavellPs negative view, as summari=ed in t4is paragrap4, parallels XuinePsBparticularlC t4e t4esis t4at Otwo conflicting manuals of translation can bot4 do <ustice to all dispositions to be4aviorP, and its immediate conse&uence, vi7., t4at Ot4ere is no fact of t4e matter of w4ic4 manual is rig4tP >Theories and Things, p) /R?) For t4e time being * s4all suspend mC own <udgement on t4at parallel, marIing it for future reflections)

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /E/
We learn and teac4 words in certain conte@ts, and t4en we are e@pected, and e@pect ot4ers, to be able to pro<ect t4em into furt4er conte@ts) .ot4ing insures t4at t4is pro<ection will taIe place >in particular, not t4e grasping of universals nor t4e grasping of booIs of rules?, <ust as not4ing insures t4at we will maIe, and understand, t4e same pro<ections) !4at on t4e w4ole we do is a matter of our s4aring routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of 4umor and of significance and of fulfilment, of w4at is outrageous, of w4at is similar to w4at else, w4at a rebuIe, w4at forgivenness, of w4en an utterance is an assertion, w4en an appeal, w4en an e@planationBall t4e w4irl of organism Wittgenstein calls Jforms of life)K ,uman speec4 and activitC, sanitC and communitC, rest upon not4ing more, but not4ing less, t4an t4is) *t is a vision as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is >and because it is? terrifCing) >O!4e AvailabilitC of WittgensteinPs Hater "4ilosop4CP, N1LE, p) :/ _&uoted in C,$ MN`?

W4en commenting on t4at passage, motivated bC t4e confrontation wit4 DripIePs position, Cavell taIes a new and important step forward in relation to 4is previous analCsis, and e@plains t4at6
_!o saC t4at` 4uman speec4 and communitC JrestK onlC on 4uman attunements, does not &uite saC t4at * 4ave no ground of agreement >wit4 ot4ers or wit4 mCself? but rat4er suggests t4at if * am inclined to present mCself as suc4 a ground >or t4in reed?Bw4en, t4at is, * am inclined to saC J!4is is simplC w4at * doKB* 4ad better be prepared to saC more about mC representativeness for t4is role, since obviouslC is not me personallC, t4is w4ole man, w4o in particular bears t4is burden) Gut mC &uestion isBtaIing t4e passage _from OAvailabilitCP` as a test caseBw4et4er it e@presses sIeptical, parado@ical doubt) 8C answer 4as in effect been t4at it does not, t4at * can accommodate suc4 a revelation of mC life in mC life, t4at * mean to, t4at * want no solution to it, t4at it is not insaneB w4ile it is not e@actlC w4at * 4oped sanitC would be liIe) >C,$ M/?

*n t4e passage above, Cavell e@plicitlC denies a commitment wit4 a OsIeptical conclusionP P la DripIeY but note t4at 4e does not do t4at based on a t4esis suc4 as t4at, s4ould we reac4 an impasse in our communicative e@c4anges, t4e onlC Jground of agreementK would be >necessarilyBas if bC metap4Csical compulsion? me, i)e), eac4 of us, individuallC) !4e formulation of t4e passage is conditional >Oif * am inclined to present mCself as suc4 a ground _etc)`P? for a good reason, w4ic4 is to maIe room for t4e fact t4at, in concrete situations, many different things can 4appen) !4us, we may or may not be inclined to act as t4e teac4er of "* c/NL, presenting ourselves as e)amples or representatives of our linguistic communitC >be it as OgroundsP or Ot4in reedsP?Y if we are not, t4en we can again react in several different waCsBranging from simplC giving up the conversation >bC treating our interlocutor as a OlunaticPNMR?, going t4roug4 presenting other candidates to ground our <udgement >a JbooI of rulesK, t4e JcommunitCPs conventionsK, a set of
NMR

See WittgensteinPs ?ro"n ?ook, p) 1R, cR0

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /ER Job<ective factsK, etc)?, until presenting ourselves as omniscient >omnipotentW? ;udges, demanding Jblind obedienceK) .one of t4ose reactions is intrinsicallC better, more appropriate, or more correctBall depends on t4e particular conte@t in w4ic4 we find ourselvesNMQ) An obvious conse&uenceBw4ic4 not because of its obviousness s4ould remain unnoticedBis t4at one cannot decide a priori w4ic4 reaction s4ould be adopted in eac4 case) Gut w4at one can indicate a prioriBanCwaC, w4at Cavell, contra DripIe, 4as attempted to indicateBis t4at none of t4ose reactions suits all conte@ts) W4at we 4ave 4ere is a clear instance of a general consideration presented bC Cavell in t4e beginning of t4e c4apter t4at we 4ave been analCsingBnamelC, t4at OWittgenstein taIes t4e ideas DripIe is e@plicating and organi=ing to be more various and entangled and specificP t4an t4e latter seems to assume >see C,$ EL?) *n t4e remainder of t4is section, * s4all present one last argument for bringing 4ome t4at general point concerning t4e problems of a reductionist analCsis, t4us illustrating t4e relevance of t4e Wittgensteinian commitment to a less restrictive diet of e@amples)

7"("%

9al'ing& 2ual'ing& and becoming dissatisfied wit$ our criteria

/:) As t4e preceding analCsis indicates, in several moments Cavell s4ows strong reservations concerning t4e idea of meaningBor, more generallC, rule-following be4aviour, 4ence, normativitCBas grounded on some Iind of fact) Among t4e main reasons for t4ose reservations is 4is finding t4at t4e absence of a fact is not a discovery, but rat4er a re.uirement of t4e sIepticNM:) >!4at t4e sIepticPs favoured self-interpretation is presented in terms of a discoverC, as if 4e 4ad detected a 4opeless problemBan imperfection, an absence, a lacIBin4erent to our condition, is Cet anot4er indication of t4e

NMQ

NM:

7ven t4e Swiftian attitude suggested bC Wittgenstein in t4e ?ro"n ?ook >i)e), to treat t4e pupil presenting a Odeviant be4aviourP w4en adding as a OlunaticP, e@cluding 4im of certain activities? mig4t, in some conte)ts, be <ustified) *n 4is analCsis of t4at passage in The #laim of >eason, Cavell elaborates preciselC on w4at could suc4 a conte@t be >see C% NN/?) Cavell sometimes e@presses t4ose reservations saCing t4at bot4 t4e facts >initiallC? envisaged bC DripIePs sIeptic and t4e >ensuing? re&uirement of t4eir absence reminds one of t4e Osomet4ingP and t4e correspondent Onot4ingP mentioned bC Wittgenstein in "* cR0Q >see C,$ L1 ] 1:?)

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /EQ evasiveness of 4is attitude, of 4is inclination to taIe limits as limitationsBanot4er instance of t4e p4ilosop4ical denial of finitude)? *n t4e final part of t4e c4apter we 4ave been analCsing, Cavell elaborates on t4ose reservations, beginning bC presenting t4e following &uestion6
(o *Bor, 4ow do *Be@pect t4ere to be a fact about me >in suc4 a waC as to be astonis4ed to discover its absence? t4at e@plains or grounds or <ustifies or is t4e reason for mC applCing a concept, using a word, as * doW >C,$ MQ?)

*n order to indicate t4e problem wit4 t4at idea of seeIing for >or Oe@pectingP? t4at t4ere s4ould be some fact>s? grounding our application of concepts, Cavell presents a new conceptBa new wordBt4at, s4ould DripIePs general re&uirement be correct, would be analCsable <ust in t4ose terms >in t4at it would make sense, at least in principle, to t4inI about t4e presence of a fact <ustifCing its use?) !4e c4osen word is OwalIingP, and t4at c4oice is not arbitrarCY its inspiration comes from "* c/:, particularlC t4e following passage6
*t is sometimes said t4at animals do not talI because t4eC lacI t4e mental capacitC) And t4is means6 Jt4eC do not t4inI, and t4at is w4C t4eC do not talI)K GutBt4eC simplC do not talI) _)))`BCommanding, &uestioning, recounting, c4atting, are as muc4 part of our natural 4istorC as walIing, eating, drinIing, plaCing) >"* c/:?)

!4e pro@imitC indicated in t4e passage above between walIing and commandingBt4e fact, i)e), t4at bot4 activities are e&uallC part of our Onatural 4istorCPBadded to t4e parallel drawn bC Wittgenstein in ot4er conte@ts between obeCing commands and following rules >see, e)g), "* cNML ] c/0E?, aut4ori=es Cavell to set up a case bC means of w4ic4 4e intends to put DripIePs analCsis under a Jstress testK, raising t4e &uestion w4et4er t4e application of t4e concept "alking is compatible wit4 t4e idea of Oa fact about me t4at e@plains w4C * go on taIing steps as * 4ave in t4e pastP >C,$ M:?) !4e case is presented as follows6
Suppose t4at one daC * start sliding mC feet one after t4e ot4er rat4er t4an lifting t4em _)))`, or start sIipping or 4opping or goose-stepping or w4irling once around on t4e toes of eac4 feet in succession) *f Cou &uestion me about t4is per4aps * answer6 _)))` J* am doing t4e same as * alwaCs 4ave done, t4e same as Cou do, maIing measured moves in a given direction under mC own steam) * am not moving faster t4an walIing, and we are comfortablC Ieeping up wit4 one anot4er

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /E:
BunliIe our ac&uaintance far bacI t4ere w4o taIes a step once a minute and calls t4at walIing)K >C,$ M:?)

>Gefore turning to CavellPs analCsis of t4e case <ust presented, let me note t4e parallel between t4e >potential? difficultC created bC it, and t4e difficultC >allegedlC? created bC DripIePs Oparado@ of &uadditionP6 in bot4 cases we are presented wit4 instances of Jdeviant be4avioursK from t4e part of a sub<ect, w4ic4 mig4t in turn lead us to wonder if we s4ould continue applCing a certain concept >adding T "alking? rat4er t4an anot4er >.uadding T .ualking? to describe t4at be4aviour)? Cavell e@amines 4is caseBimplicitlC comparing it wit4 DripIePsBas follows6
We are liIelC in t4e case of t4is walIer >&ualIerW? to t4inI t4at t4ere must be a reason 4e does it as 4e does >rat4er t4an our waC?) 2ust possiblC we will, because of 4im, be impressed bC t4e groundlessness of our waCBt4ere are plentC of <ustifications for our waC, but t4eC will come to an end) We maC feel t4e reason for t4e walIerPs deviance to lie in t4e presence of some fact about 4im) Gut do we feel our lacI of ground to lie in t4e absence of a fact about usW _)))` * mig4t wis4 t4ere to be suc4 a fact, as some assurance t4at * will not become deviant, go out of control, an assurance against certain fear of going mad, or being defenseless against t4e c4arge of madness) *t maC seem a fear for 4uman race) _)))` *t is an an@ietC, it seems to me, t4at WittgensteinPs e@amples 4abituallC cause or court) _)))` Gut, so far at least, t4e deviance of anot4erPs walIing, and t4e possibilitC t4at * mig4t find mCselfBsince walIing is groundless or grounded onlC on t4e 4uman and t4e groundBsometime in anot4er gait, does not generali=e to >does not cause, or court? a parado@ical conclusion) >C,$ M:-ME?)

As Cavell clarifies ne@t in t4e te@t, t4e moral 4e wants to draw from t4e considerations presented above is t4at t4e verC notion of a >generali=ed? re&uirement for a fact grounding our rule-following be4aviour seems preposterous, in t4at ordinarC concepts >suc4 as t4e concept of walIing? Ofail_)))` to satisfC DripIePs formulation according to w4ic4 t4ere is no fact about me in w4ic4 t4e function * claim to be following consists _)))`Y or rat4er, * donPt Inow w4et4er to affirm or do denC t4at t4ere is anC fact in w4ic4 mC walIing mig4t be conceived to consistBot4er t4an mC walIing itselfP >C,$ ME-ML?) >!4e formulation of t4e latter sentenceBO* donPt Inow w4et4er to affirm or do denC)))PBmig4t striIe one as rat4er sIepticalY Cet its role is onlC to &ualifC t4e preceding sentence, w4ose formulation could, in turn, striIe one as a little too categorical) W4at t4is dialectic aims to s4ow is, * taIe it, t4at since DripIePs original re&uirement 4as no clear senseBat least w4en applied to a concept suc4 as walIingBno determinate or final response is fort4coming 4ere)?

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /EE

/E) !4e moral e@tracted from t4e case presented above is intimatelC connected wit4 t4e result establis4ed in The #laim of >eason, according to w4ic4 Onot4ing is deeper t4an t4e fact, or t4e e@tent, of agreement itselfP >C% R/?) !4e advantage of >re?t4inIing t4at result under t4e lig4t s4ed bC t4e analCsis of t4e concept of walIing is t4at it JdisarmsK one of certain p4ilosop4ical pre<udices, allowing one to see more clearlC t4e absurditC of t4e >general? re&uirement for somet4ing t4at s4ould ground our agreement in activities t4at, in WittgensteinPs saCing, are Opart of our natural 4istorCP >"* c/:?Y t4at in general we JagreeK in t4ose activitiesBin our waCs of walIing, commanding, talIing, and >w4C notW? addingNME Bis a refle@ of t4e fact t4at we s4are a form of life) \et one s4ould not lose sig4t of t4e conse&uence indicated aboveBnamelC, t4at if nothing is more fundamental t4an >t4e fact of? agreement itself, t4en t4e responsibilitC for preserving t4at agreement falls upon eac4 of us, upon Oour capacitC to taIe and maintain an interest in one anot4er and in ourselvesP >8ul4all, N11E, p) EM?) !4us, as onePs possible reactions facing a Jdeviant adderK are multiple, so are t4e ones available in t4e case of a Jdeviant walIerKBranging from absolute intolerance >we mig4t trC to pro4ibit 4im of walIing in public places, putting Otremendous pressureP on 4im to conform to our waCBsee C,$ M:? to unconditional acceptance) !4e important t4ing to notice 4ere is t4at, in a case of impasseBw4en we feel we are losing our attunementBt4ere is no Jfirmer groundK for us to lean onY as Cavell indicates, in a suc4 case O* am t4rown bacI upon mCselfY * as it were turn mC palms outward, as if to e@4ibit t4e Iind of creature * am, and declare mC ground occupied, onlC mine, ceding CoursPY Cet t4at can maIe me an@ious, for6
W4enW W4en do * find or decide t4at t4e time 4as come to grant Cou secession, allow Cour divergence to stand, declare t4at t4e matter between us is at an endW !4e an@ietC lies not <ust in t4e fact t4at mC understanding has limits, but t4at * must dra" t4em, on apparentlC no more ground t4an mC own) >C% NN:?

NME

As Wittgenstein saCs6 Omat4ematics is after all an ant4ropological p4enomenonP >%F8, S**, cRRY p) R11? Be)g)6 Ow4at we call JcountingK is an important part of our lifePs activities) _)))` Counting >and t4at means6 counting liIe this? is a tec4ni&ue t4at is emploCed dailC in t4e most various operations of our lives)P >%F8, *, cQY p) RL?)

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /EL *t is t4e an@ietC depicted aboveBcaused bC t4e responsibilitC of 4aving to dra" limits for our agreement, w4en we 4it t4e ObedrocIP of our differencesBt4at bases manC a p4ilosop4ical attempt to avoid t4e real issueBe)g), t4e attempt enacted bC DripIePs sIeptic >among ot4ers?, w4o prefers to pro<ect our JdarInessK upon t4e world, as if it were a necessarC feature of our condition, implCing t4at t4ere is not4ing for us >for me? to do about it, ot4er t4an blindlC following our inclinations)

/L) !4e considerations above prompt me to analCse a furt4er step in CavellPs diagnosis, wit4 t4e indication of w4ic4 * s4all bring mC reconstruction of 4is argument to a close) * refer to 4is presentation of an idea underlCing t4e dissatisfaction wit4 t4e >supposedlC? JfragileK basis supplied bC our mutual attunementB4ence, t4e aspiration for a Jfirmer groundK, of t4e Iind >supposedlC? supplied bC logic or mat4ematics) Cavell formulates t4at idea as follows6
5rdinarC language will aspire to mat4ematics as to somet4ing sublimeY t4at it can so aspire is specific to its condition) !4e idea of ordinarC language as lacIing somet4ing in its rules is bound up wit4Bis no more nor less necessarC t4anB t4is aspiration) !4is is t4e place at w4ic4 Wittgenstein c4aracteri=es logic >and * assume t4e rule for addition is included 4ere? as Jnormative,K as somet4ing to w4ic4 we compare t4e use of t4e words >_"*` cMN?Bto t4e discredit of wordsY 4e taIes t4is furt4er a few sections later in posing t4e &uestion, J*n w4at sense is logic somet4ing sublimeWK >_"*` cM1?) *n t4is role of t4e normative, t4e mat4ematical is not a special case of a problem t4at arises for t4e ordinarCY wit4out t4e mat4ematical t4is problem of t4e ordinarC would not arise) >C,$ 1/?

,ow are we to understand t4at last claimBvi=), Owit4out t4e mat4ematical t4is problem of t4e ordinarC would not arisePW W4at, in ot4er words, is t4e sense in w4ic4 ordinarC language Owill aspire to mat4ematicsPW For startersBas a Iind of preparation for taIing in CavellPs answer to t4ose &uestionsBlet us pause to reflect about t4e reason w4C, in t4e Investigations, Wittgenstein presents t4e picture of Orails invisiblC laid to infinitCP >"* c/NM? in order to e@amine w4at would count as a Ofinal interpretationP of a ruleBas t4e OstampP of a Oparticular meaningP in face of w4ic4 we would Ono longer 4ave anC c4oiceP e@cept obeCing it OblindlyP >"* c/N1?) .ote t4at, in spite of t4e re&uirement for a Ofinal interpretationP being presented in t4at conte@t as absolutelC general >i)e), as concerning rules as such?, t4e picture c4osen for Oe@pressing it sCmbolicallCP >see cc//0-//? seems carefullC designed to satisfC t4e Iind of e@pectation t4at is >moreW? natural preciselC in t4e

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /EM conte@t of mat4ematicsBnamelC, t4at a >finallC interpreted? rule s4all Jbring on its faceK >but 4owWBper4aps UvirtuallCKBanCwaC as virtuallC as t4ose invisible rails)))? t4e indication of all t4e steps >4owever infinite? re&uired for its complete pro<ectionNML) !4e bottom line of t4e answer for w4ic4 t4e preceding reflection serves as a preparation are CavellPs considerations about t4e difference between rules using mat4ematical concepts and rules for using non-mat4ematical ones) !4e following passage summari=es 4is view on t4at difference6
* suppose t4at somet4ing t4at maIes a mat4ematical rule mat4ematicalBanCwaC t4at maIes adding addingBis t4at w4at counts as an instance of it _)))` is, intuitivelC, settled in advance, t4at it tells w4at its first instance is, and w4at t4e interval is to successive instances, and w4at t4e order of instances is) !4e rule for addition e@tends to all its possible applications) >As does t4e rule for &uaditionB ot4erwise _)))` it would not be Inown to us as a mat4ematical function)? Gut our ordinarC conceptsBfor instance t4at of a tableBare not t4us mat4ematical in t4eir application6 we do not Inow, intuitivelC, _)))` a rig4t first instance, or t4e correct order of instances, or t4e set interval of t4eir succession) And sometimes we will not Inow w4et4er to saC an instance counts as falling under a concept, or to saC t4at it does not count _)))` >C,$ M1-10?

Commenting on t4e passage above, 8ul4all calls attention to an important point) As we saw in section :)R, DripIe originallC sets up 4is sIeptical parado@ using a mat4ematical conceptBnamelC, additionY now, as 8ul4all indicates, t4e verC fact t4at 4e s4ould assume suc4 parado@ to be Oe&uallC well >if less smoot4lC? developed from nonmat4ematical e@amples amounts _)))` to a failure to appreciate t4e specificitC of mat4ematical conceptsP >/00R, p) N0R?Y more specificallC, w4at t4at s4ows is t4at DripIe Otreats mat4ematical concepts as normative for t4e nonmat4ematicalP >ibid), p) N0Q?NMM) A possible motivation for doing t4at is presented bC Cavell in t4e following passage, w4ic4 resumes and sCstemati=es some of t4e points indicated previouslC6

NML

NMM

!4at suc4 an e@pectation would not seem >would seem lessW? natural in t4e case of non-mat4ematical concepts gets clear if one asIs w4ic4 would be t4e analogue of an infinite number of steps >virtuallC? inscribed in t4e rule>s? for applCing an ordinarC word suc4 as, saC, OtableP) 5f course t4at &uestion mig4t simplC go unasIedBand it often does, particularlC w4en one is on t4e grip of a picture suc4 as t4at presented in "* c/NMY as Wittgenstein would saC6 O!4e decisive movement in t4e con<uring tricI 4as been made, and it was t4e verC one t4at we t4oug4t &uite innocentP >"* cR0M?) 5ne mig4t well t4inI t4at, at least e@egeticallC, t4at manoeuvre is legitimateBor even re&uiredBsince it is Wittgenstein 4imself w4o in 4is te@t uses mathematical rules as paradigms for t4e use of rules as suchY Cet suppose 4e 4ad done t4at on purposeBso as to tempt t4e reader to indulge in 4er own aspiration for t4e >sublime? model of mat4ematicsBas if 4e 4ad prepared a p4ilosop4ical bait >and one w4ic4, bC t4e waC, DripIe seems to 4ave bitten wit4 no 4esitation?) * will not trC to <ustifC t4at suggestion 4ere, but t4ere are good reasons supporting it in 8ul4all /00N >see esp) p) ML ss)?)

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /E1
We understandablC do not liIe our concepts to be based on w4at matters to us _)))`Y it maIes our language seem unstable and t4e instabilitC seems to mean w4at * 4ave e@pressed as mC being responsible for w4atever stabilitC our criteria maC 4ave, and * do not want t4is responsibilitCY it mars mC wis4 for sublimitC) >C,$ 1/?

/M) !4e notion of stabilitC alluded in t4e passage above is absolutelC crucial 4ere) Among t4e numerous sources of onePs dissatisfaction wit4 criteriaB4ence, of onePs sense of language as unstableBis t4e >p4ilosop4ical? assumption t4at onlC foundations provide stabilitC) *n a rat4er different conte@tNM1, "eg 5PConnor proposes an alternative to t4at assumption w4ic4 is as simple in its formulation as it is fruitful in its conse&uencesB namelC, to trC and c4ange t4e dominant metap4or for dealing wit4 normativitC, so t4at instead of seeIing to locate >andTor replace? its foundations, one s4ould trC to understand >andTor c4ange? t4e conditions allowing stability to be created and maintained among numerous aspects of our practices >linguistic and ot4erwiseN10?) StabilitC, as 5PConnor defines it, Ois a matter of balanced relations4ips among a w4ole set of factors, and _it` comes wit4 a constant recognition of limitations and locationP >ibid), p) NQ?) !4at notion 4as its original 4ome in arc4itecture, w4ere one of t4e main aims is to combine 4eterogeneous elements so as to ac4ieve a balance between immobilitC and fle@ibilitC6 OConcrete can onlC bend so muc4, steel can onlC 4old so muc4 weig4t, glass can onlC taIe so muc4 pressureP >ibid)?Y bC combining t4ose materials and properties, an arc4itect can create a structure w4ic4 stands up due to both balance and tension6 O<ust consider t4e importance of movement in a tall building or bridgeP >ibid)?) .ow, according to 5PConnor, somet4ing analogous 4olds of normativitC in generalBbe it ethical or linguistic) !4e following passageBw4ic4 taIes up a metap4or from WittgensteinPs OHecture on 7t4icsPB summari=es 4er view on t4is point6
NM1 N10

See n) NLL) 5PConnorPs booI focuses on our moral practices, and t4e c4ange s4e is primarilC concerned to defend is in metaethicsN Cet, as 4erself indicates in manC conte@ts, t4e general strategC s4e proposes can be applied to different p4ilosop4ical cornersBin particular, to t4e studC of t4e sources of normativitC as such) Alt4oug4 mC first contact wit4 4er worI occurred onlC after 4aving prepared muc4 of t4e material for t4e present c4apter, * found t4at 4er general strategC is verC congenial wit4 mC own approac4, particularlC on t4e issue of t4e nature of normativitC) >*nterestinglC, 5PConnorPs seems to 4ave developed 4er argument &uite independentlC of CavellPs worIBanCwaC, s4e maIes no direct reference to 4im in t4e booI mentionedY on t4e ot4er 4and, 4er w4ole argument was &uite clearlC inspired bC Cavellian readers of WittgensteinBsuc4 as Alice CrarC and Cora (iamondBso t4at t4e similarities 4ere mig4t come as no surprise after all)?

DripIePs Wittgenstein versus CavellPs Wittgenstein6 problems wit4 t4e impersonal model /L0
*n seeIing meaning and value, we 4umans 4url ourselves against t4e bars of our cage, seeIing transcendent meaning and value and ob<ective absolutes beCond t4e bounds of our finitude and limitations) *nstead, * argue t4at our moral frameworIs and language-games provide everCt4ing we need <ust becauseBand not despite t4e fact t4atBt4eC are all pervasive, inescapable, and ineliminable) !4eC are embedded, connected, and overlaping wit4 ot4er frameworIs t4at are part of t4e felted stabilitC but Cet are fle@ible and dCnamic) >5PConnor, /00M, p) NQN?

,aving t4us combinedBanCwaC 4aving appro@imatedBCavellPs diagnosis of t4e sources of our dissatisfaction wit4 ordinarC language and its criteriaBin particular, 4is disclosure of t4e 4uman wis4 for a sublime sort of ob<ectivitC to be >supposedlC? found in logics or mat4ematicsBwit4 5PConnorPs call bacI to t4e Jroug4 groundK of our moral frameworIs and language-gamesBrecalling us of t4eir embeddedness and fle@ibilitC, 4ence t4e stabilitC t4eC allowB* find t4is is about t4e rig4t point to bring t4is subsectionB4ence t4is sectionBto its closeY * s4all do t4at bC &uoting a last passage from 8ul4allPs, w4ere * find its main lesson gets perspicuouslC formulated6
"4ilosop4CPs impulse to regard logic as normative for t4e normativitC of words is emblematic of a broader 4uman impulse to regard suc4 normativitC solelC as somet4ing to w4ic4 we must impersonallC and infle@iblC respond rat4er t4an as somet4ing for w4ic4 we are also individuallC and unforeseeablC responsible) >8ul4all, /00R, p) N0:?

7"7 Final considerations

/1) * began t4is c4apter claiming t4at anti-individualism, at least in some of its contemporarC analCtic manifestations, seems to be commited to a pre-conceived, impersonal model of normativitC) Aiming to articulate t4at claim more clearlC and give it some plausibilitC, in section :)/ * summari=ed and compared t4e positions of t4e Jfounding fat4ersK of contemporarC anti-individualismBDripIe, "utnam and GurgeBindicating a s4ared structure among t4eir arguments, and 4ig4lig4ting a common assumptionBnamelC6 t4at t4e burden of linguistic correction lies upon some Iind of Je@ternalK factor, including t4e e@istence of linguistic institutions >DripIe and Gurge? and t4e p4Csioc4emical constitution of t4e stuff wit4 w4ic4 speaIers relate >DripIe and "utnam?) *n order to

Final considerations /LN indicate t4e problems involved in t4at common assumption, * adopted an indirect strategC, consisting of two steps6 first * drew a furt4er parallel between t4e anti-individualistic argumentation and DripIePs sIeptical solution to t4e parado@ of normativitC >section :)R?, and t4en went on to reconstruct StanleC CavellPs criti&ue of t4at solution >section :)Q?) !4e parallel drawn in section R aimed to maIe more conspicuous an argumentative move alreadC present in t4e anti-individualistPs argumentation, amounting to a sCstematic weaIeningBup to complete suppressionBof t4e individual!s role in ac4ieving and maintaining linguistic agreementB4ence, of 4er authority over t4e meaning of t4e terms s4e emploCs) !4at move, * went on to suggest, is an unwelcome conse&uence of adopting an impersonal model of normativitCBbe it of an essentialist >4ence realist? bent, as in t4e case of DripIePs >in Eaming and Eecesity? and "utnamPs positions, or of a communitarian >4ence conventionalist? bent, as in t4e case of GurgePs and DripIePs >in Wittgenstein on >ules and Private +anguage? positions) !4e confrontation wit4 CavellPs criticisms >section :)Q? soug4t preciselC to e@plain w4at t4ere is of unwelcome and problematic in t4at argumentative moveBindicating in particular t4e evasion or repression of our >individual? responsibilitC over meaning and linguistic agreement t4at its seems to implC) 5ne waC to e@press t4at problem >w4ic4 was used in t4e *ntroduction? is to saC t4at t4e impersonal model implies t4inIing t4e problem of linguistic correction upside9do"nBor, at best, from a rat4er limited perspectiveBas if t4e onlC >or main? risI involved in our communicative e@c4anges were t4e possibilitC of repudiation, on t4e part of Jt4e worldK and T or Jt4e communitCKN1N, of w4at we mean wit4 w4at we saC, and never t4e contrarC, i)e), t4e loss of or wit4drawal from our attunement wit4 t4e world and ot4er 4uman beingsBa loss T wit4drawal w4ic4 mig4t, in turn, 4ave a number of different causes, at least some of w4ic4 can be as Jopa&ueK to t4e individual as t4ose presented in t4e anti-individualistic t4oug4te@periments, Cet are muc4 more serious, in t4at t4eC 4ave to do wit4 t4e real, ordinarC life

N1N

!4e idea of a repudiation >of w4at we saC? on t4e part of t4e world mig4t cause some estrangementY Cet t4at formulation correctlC picIs out t4e conse&uence of t4e reversal of t4e burden for linguistic correction t4at * 4ave describedBparticularlC in t4ose cases in w4ic4 a Iind of metap4Csical realistic assumption is made regarding t4e formation of concepts) An obvious e@ample is "latoPs t4esis, presented in Phaedrus /E:e, t4at we s4ould Ocut up eac4 Iind according to its species along its natural <oints, and to trC not to splinter anC part, as a bad butc4er mig4t doPBot4erwise we would end up wit4 concepts t4at, in one waC or anot4er, t4e world s4ould repudiate) 8c8anus >/00R? presents some instances of concepts t4at would be t4us Orepudiated bC t4e worldP, including >i? concepts 4istoricallC proved emptC >e)g), flogistum?, >ii? Onon-pro<ectableP predicates >e)g), grue?, and >iii? contra natura ta@onomies >e)g), GorgesP C4inese encCclopaedia?) >!4anIs to "aulo Faria for indicating t4ose e@amples, and 4elping wit4 t4e reference to "lato)?

Final considerations /L/ difficulties and burdens involved in t4e continuous tasI of accepting t4e 4uman condition Band living it)

R0) !4e discoverC of t4is reversal of t4e burden for linguistic correction is w4at e@plains, at least in part, mC suspicion t4at anti-individualism mig4t consist in >or assume, or veil, or incline one to? a >newW? form of p4ilosop4ical evasionN1/) Alt4oug4 * am fullC convinced of t4e >essentiallC anti-individualistic? lesson t4at applCing conceptsB4ence6 Inowing t4e meaning of w4at we saC, and t4e content of our >and ot4erPs? mindsBare often OrisIC activitiesPN1R, * find it e&uallC important to stress t4at t4e JrisIK 4ere does not lie mainlC or e@clusivelC in t4e possibilitC t4at Jt4e worldK or Jt4e communitCPs rulesK >or w4atever Je@ternal factorK? mig4t c4ange inconspicuouslCBa possibilitC w4ic4, .)G), is dear bot4 to t4e sIeptic >w4o overstates it? and to t4e metap4Csical realist >w4o tries to JmeetK t4e sIeptical c4allenge bC dogmaticallC denCing it?Bbut also in t4e possibilitC t4at, for a number of different reasons, we mig4t lose our attunement wit4 t4e world and ot4er speaIersN1QBa possibilitC t4at neit4er t4e sIeptic nor t4e dogmatic seem to want to taIe seriouslC enoug4) >"er4aps * can reformulate t4at last point saCing t4at t4ere are risIs involved in our communicative e@c4anges w4ic4 are not so muc4 Jout t4ereK, but t4at are rat4er Jin 4ereKBin t4at t4eC concern 4ow eac4 of us face t4e responsibilitC in4erited bC entering >and becoming a representative of? a linguistic communitC, and a form of life) .ow those risIs are neit4er simply unavoidableBas t4e sIeptic would suggest in 4er 4urrC to evade t4e issueBnor simply avoidableBas t4e dogmatic would assume in a corresponding repressive waCY t4eC are <ust as avoidable or unavoidable as t4e difficulties presented in anC relations4ip among finite >4uman? beings)? !4ese considerations allow me to go bacI to CavellPs t4esis t4at OWittgensteinian criteriaP are not designed to Oanswer t4e sIepticP >i)e), to answer Ot4e &uestion w4et4er we can Inow
N1/

N1R

N1Q

!4at discoverC mig4t also e@plain w4C t4e Ocompatibilist solutionP 4as been seen bC some critics >e)g) Gog4ossian N11M? as still more sIeptical t4an t4e problem it was supposed to solve) * borrow t4at notion of a OrisIC activitCP from "aulo FariaBw4o in turn borrowed it from DripIePs O5utline of a !4eorC of !rut4PBin t4e essaC OA "reservao da SerdadeP _O!4e "reservation of !rut4P` >/00E, p) NN1?) *n The +ives of (nimals, 2) 8) Coet=ee presents a concrete >fictional? e@ample of t4at Iind of estrangement, caused bC 4is central c4aracterPs >7li=abet4 Costello? growing difficultC in accepting and continue living in a world w4ere 4uman beings seem to be Oparticipants in a crime of stupefCing proportionsP >N111, p) E1?) Cora (iamond resumes t4at and ot4er interesting literarC e@amples of Jlosses of attunementK in 4er essaC O!4e (ifficultC of %ealitC and t4e (ifficultC of "4ilosop4CP >/00E?)

Final considerations /LR t4at t4ere is a world and ot4ers in itPBsee C,$ /Q?) As * understand it, t4e >negative? point of t4at t4esis is to recall t4at t4ere is no JbooI of rulesK or set of Jcorresponding facts in t4e worldK t4at can guarantee agreement in our uses of wordsY t4e role of criteria is simplC to record similarities and dissimilarities t4at matter to us, to t4e e@tent in w4ic4 t4ere is an JusK, i)e), to t4e e@tent in w4ic4 we s4are Oroutes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of 4umor and of significance and of fulfilment, of w4at is outrageous, of w4at is similar to w4at else, w4at a rebuIe, w4at forgivenness, of w4en an utterance is an assertion, w4en an appeal, w4en an e@planationBall t4e w4irl of organism Wittgenstein calls Jforms of lifeK P >C,$ MN?) 7videntlC, s4ould t4e world and people stop being >generallC? constant, t4e tasI of maintaining attunement would be made still more difficult t4an it alreadC isY Cet, it is not simply because t4e world in general does not c4ange >did not c4angeW?, or because we in general react similarlC >to it, and to one anot4er? t4at we can forget our individual responsibilitC in t4e tasI of ac4ieving and maintaining agreement Bfor instance, bC proposing new concepts and new pro<ections for old concepts, prompted bC novel or subtler >practical or t4eoretical? needs, t4at can in turn be presented to ot4ers, 4opefullC becoming acInowledged, accepted and assimilated in our Jlinguistic stocIKY or again bC producing new or subtler moral assessments, prompted bC novel situations >or novel waCs of looIing at t4em?, and trCing to s4ow t4eir point to our fellow 4uman beings, 4oping to universali=e t4em) *n bot4 cases >i)e), conceptual pro<ections and moral assessments? t4e individual responsibilitC s4ows verC clearlC, in t4at one will 4ave to taIe into consideration an enormous cultural 4eritage, proposing c4anges t4at, if acInowledged and accepted, will in turn 4ave to be transmited to new generations, w4o s4all establis4 t4eir own mutual grounds for agreement anew) >Similar considerations applC to t4ose ot4er pictures mentioned in t4e introduction >see c/, n) NEN?, to t4e e@tent in w4ic4 t4eC too constitute >or assume or veil or incline to? an analogous form of evasion, manifested in t4e wis4 for a complete suppression of t4e sub<ectPs roleBand, conse&uentlC, 4er individual responsibility%in establis4ing relations wit4 t4e world and ot4er 4uman beings) !4e alternative, in t4ose cases, consists in reali=ing t4at t4ere are ot4er, more fundamental relations wit4 t4e world w4ic4 are not cognitive, or, more generallC, theoreticalB4ence, t4at its presentation >or presentness, or givenness? is e&uallC not >fundamentallC? a function of kno"ing it >obtaining good evidences, and, presumablC, building good t4eories about it?, but rat4er of accepting itB

Final considerations /LQ somet4ing t4at mig4t become verC difficult sometimes, particularlC in moments of great c4anges in our Jworld viewK >c4anges t4at can beBand 4ave continuouslC beenBcaused bC scientific revolutions, but t4at can also be motivated bC events w4ose causes are in turn muc4 more comple@Bsuc4 as, for instance, t4e Odeat4 of #odP announced, among ot4ers, bC .iet=sc4e?) GC t4e same toIen, we s4ould reali=e t4at some of our most fundamental relations wit4 ot4er 4uman beings >or Jt4eir mindsK?, as well as wit4 ourselves >our own JmindsK?, are e&uallC not t4eoretical or cognitiveBit is not >is itW? kno"ledge t4at, in general, we looI for in t4ose relationsY at least for a vast ma<oritC of situations, w4at reallC matters to us is ackno"ledgement, in a broad senseN1:Bsomet4ing t4at is e@pressible in multiple waCs, of w4ic4 love, friends4ip, admiration and respect, in t4eir multiple e@pressions, are important representativesN1E)?

N1:

Cavell introduces t4e notion of acInowledgementBw4ic4 would later become a trademarI of 4is worI as a w4oleBin t4e essaC ODnowing and AcInowledgingP >8W8 /RM-EE?) !4e following passage offers a general idea of 4is meaning6 _)))` Cour suffering maIes a claim upon me) *t is not enoug4 t4at * kno" >am certain? t4at Cou sufferB* must do or reveal somet4ing >w4atever can be done?) *n a word, * must ackno"ledge it, ot4erwise * do not Inow w4at J>Cour or 4is? being in painK means) *s) _)))` Gut obviouslC sCmpat4C maC not be fort4coming) So w4en * saC t4at JWe must acInowledge anot4erPs suffering, and we do t4at bC responding to a claim upon our sCmpat4C,K * do not mean t4at we alwaCs in fact have sCmpat4C, nor t4at we alwaCs oug4t to 4ave it) !4e claim of suffering maC go unanswered) We maC feel lots of t4ingsBsCmpat4C, Schadenfreude, not4ing) _)))` !4e point _)))` is t4at t4e concept of acInowledging is evidenced e&uallC bC its failure as bC its success) *t is not a description of a given response but a categorC in terms of w4ic4 a given response is evaluated) >*t is t4e sort of concept ,eidegger calls an e)istentiale)? A Jfailure to InowK mig4t <ust mean a piece of ignorance, an absence of somet4ing, a blanI) A Jfailure to acInowledgeK is t4e presence of somet4ing, a confusion, an indifference, a callousness, an e@4austion, a coldness) _)))` 2ust as, to saC t4at be4avior is e@pressive is not to saC t4at t4e man impaled upon 4is sensation must e@press it in 4is be4aviorY it is to saC t4at in order not to e@press it 4e must suppress t4e be4avior, or twist it) And if 4e twists it far or often enoug4, 4e maC lose possession of t4e region of t4e mind w4ic4 t4at be4avior is e@pressing) >8W8 /ER-EQ?

N1E

7videntlC, t4ere are manC conte@ts in w4ic4 it is onlC or primarilC kno"ledge t4at we seeI to ac4ieve in our relations wit4 ot4ersY Cet normallC t4at 4appens w4en we are forced to adopt t4e sorts of attitudes t4at Strawson >see c4apter N? describes as Oob<ectiveP and Odetac4edP) ActuallC, t4at applies not onlC to our relations to ot4ers, but also to ourselvesY 8oran >see /00N, p) RN ss)? offers great e@amples of situations in w4ic4 we are reduced to t4e condition of mere OwitnessesP or Oin&uirersP regarding t4e contents of our own minds >t4inI about t4e cases in w4ic4 one tries to come to terms wit4 unconscious, or partiallC opa&ue feelings6 in suc4 cases, w4at one is more in need of are preciselC further evidencesBsomet4ing t4at a good friend, or an analCst, can 4elp one to find?) !4e important t4ing to notice 4ere is t4at t4ose are e)ceptions, not t4e rule) 5ne mig4t saC, parap4rasing Wittgenstein, t4at it is onlC against a bacIdrop of attunement >wit4 ot4ers, and wit4 oneself? t4at kno"ledge can become onePs aimB4ence, t4at doubts can taIe place)

Final considerations /L: RN) As * warned in t4e *ntroduction, t4e considerations offered above are meant onlC as sIetc4es of alternative p4ilosop4ical pictures, w4ic4, s4ould t4eC be finis4ed, would portraC some fundamental aspects of 4uman e@perienceBof our relations wit4 t4e world, wit4 ourselves, and ot4er 4uman beingsBin a more realistic waCN1L) #iven t4e current state of mC reflections, t4at is all * 4ave to offerY actuallC suc4 sIetc4es are not more t4an blueprints, w4ic4 delineate some regulative ideals toward w4ic4 * trC to advanceBif onlC indirectlC, as in t4e case of t4e present c4apter, bC 4ig4lig4ting t4e problems of ot4er >if more finis4ed? pictures, w4ic4 on manC occasions caug4t mC own attentionB4elping mCself of a set of te@ts of w4ic4 t4e unitC lies preciselC in t4eir aut4orsPs conviction t4at p4ilosop4C too can serve as a prete@t to repress t4e an@ieties or evade t4e burdens c4aracteristic of t4e 4uman condition)N1M

N1L

N1M

!4e &ualification OrealisticP 4ere is meant to ec4o Cora (iamondPs taIe on t4e Orealistic spiritPB somet4ing w4ic4 is not to be confused wit4 a p4ilosop4ical doctrine, but amounts rat4er to an attitude t4at Oties t4oug4t to practiceP, and t4at is Oclear 4eaded, practical, down to eart4, rat4er t4an vague, speculative, or superstitiousP >* borrow t4is description of (iamondPs view from Ant4onC %uddPs useful summarC in /00R, p) ML?) !4is te@t 4as benefited from manC comments to previous versions, conveCed orallC and T or in written form) Special t4anIs go to Ale@andre .oron4a 8ac4ado, Andr da Silva "orto, Carlos 8oCa and "aulo Faria, for verC 4elpful remarIs made on two occasions in /00M) !o t4e latter, as well as to prof) 2oo Carlos Grum !orres and %ogrio "assos Severo, * t4anI for 4aving read and made also verC 4elpful comments on previous written drafts)

7plogo6 Hies aprendidas, e proleg3menos a uma metafsica futura /LE

,pClogo: LiDes aprendidas& e prolegEmenos a uma metafCsica futura

(o filosofar, tenho de tra7er a minha pr0pria linguagem e a minha vida P imagina2/o. & .ue e)i;o 5 um apanhado dos crit5rios da minha cultura, para confront19los com minhas palavras e com minha vida, do modo como as levo e como posso imagin19lasN e, ao mesmo tempo, para confrontar minhas palavras e minha vida como as levo com a vida .ue as palavras da minha cultura podem imaginar para mim@ confrontar a cultura consigo mesma, nas linhas em .ue ela se encontra em mim.

Essa me parece uma tarefa .ue merece o nome de filosofia. E 5 tamb5m a descri2/o de algo .ue poder4amos chamar de educa2/o. 6rente Ps .uest3es suscitadas em (gostinho, +utero, >ousseau, Thoreau. . . , somos crian2asN n/o sabemos como acompanh19los, ou .ue terreno podemos ocupar. Iista desse modo, a filosofia se torna a educa2/o dos adultos.

StanleC CavellN11

Abri esta tese evocando uma passagem de $namuno, a &ual impugnava a suposio de &ue 4; >ou deveria 4aver? uma resposta Anica e geral para a pergunta Jo &ue leva algum a filosofarWKBem particular, a difundida concepo da filosofia como busca desinteressada de con4ecimento, guiada apenas ou primariamente pela ra=o) "rossegui articulando a suspeita de &ue essa concepo da nature=a da filosofia poderia estar fundamentada em um >igualmente difundido? auto-engano, relacionado com certa imagem da pr pria Jess+ncia 4umanaK &ue suprime >ou, talve= mel4or di=endo, reprime? os traos decorrentes do fato de &ue somos seres finitos, su<eitos a toda uma variedade de condies &ue sobredeterminam nossos pro<etos em &ual&uer ;rea da vida 4umana, incluindo a pr pria filosofia) A &uesto final suscitada por essa refle@o se seria possvel superar esse auto-engano, adotando uma filosofia genuinamente disposta a recon4ecer e aceitar nossa condio finitaBem especial, o fato de &ue temos corpos, e com eles vontades, dese<os, temores, fi@aes e sentimentos .ue n/o escolhemos, e &ue informam nossa racionalidade e moldam nossas atitudes em relao ao mundo e aos demais su<eitos)

N11

C% N/:)

7plogo6 Hies aprendidas, e proleg3menos a uma metafsica futura /LL A refle@o resumida acima serviu como pano de fundo para meu procedimento subse&uente, o &ual consistiu em tomar um nAcleo de problemas filos ficosBa&ueles relacionados com a possibilidade, e a pr pria inteligibilidade, do solipsismoBcomo e)emplares para e@trair lies mais gerais sobre a nature=a da filosofia, e dai sobre a pr pria nature=a 4umanaBcom a ressalva de &ue em nen4um desses casos tive a pretenso de encerrar a &uesto, no sentido de apresentar condies necess1rias e suficientes para &ue algo possa ser considerado OfilosofiaP, ou O4umanoPY em ve= disso, meu ob<etivo foi simplesmente apresentar algumas amostras capa=es de serem recon4ecidas como tais por outras pessoas >a&uelas em cu<as perple@idades e dificuldades espero &ue meu te@to encontre alguma ressonFncia?) $ma condio essencial para o sucesso dessa empreitada a suposio de &ue um indivduo pode, legitimamente, tomar a si mesmo como um representante de uma certa comunidadeBneste caso, a comunidade dos indivduos incomodados com &uestes filos ficasBde modo a e@trair concluses universali=;veis) 8as como garantir a satisfao dessa condioW 5ra, no me parece &ue e@istam garantias a priori, ou infal4veis$QQY na verdade, no ve<o outro modo de fa=+-lo seno na pr1tica e dialeticamente%ou se<a, por Jtentativa e erroK, compartil4ando min4as pr prias dificuldades, reaes e >auto?&uestionamentos, apresentando-as da maneira mais detal4ada e clara possvel, como candidatas ao recon4ecimento de outros indivduos, buscando estabelecer um di;logo com eles) Z claro &ue e@istem v1rias maneiras de se fa=er isso &ue acabo de descrever, mas min4a opo foi fa=+-lo respondendo 's preocupaes de outros fil sofos &ue admiro, tomando a eles pr prios >e a seus escritos? como casos e@emplares de refle@o detida e cuidadosa sobre as &uestes &ue me incomodamBpor conseguinte, tratando-os como os interlocutores iniciais de um di;logo &ue pode ser posto em marc4a novamente por algum &ue se enga<e com min4as pr prias leituras e respostas)

Sisando a avaliar os resultados obtidos por meio desse procedimento, penso &ue ser; Atil retomar a listagem e a caracteri=ao geral das dificuldades &ue informaram min4as refle@es e respostas at este ponto) So elas6 >i? &ue min4a e@peri+ncia do mundo sempre parcial, e, por conseguinte, limitadaY >ii? &ue sou incapa= de alterar o passado ou de prever o futuro, de modo &ue por ve=es me sinto simultaneamente impotente e
/00

Como esclarece "aulo Faria >ver N11Q, pp) //:-//L?, 4; pelo menos uma condio necess1ria para esse procedimento, a saber, J&ue o e@emplo possa, em princpio, ser escol4ido arbitrariamente na e@tenso d_o` conceitoK &ue se &uer representar)

7plogo6 Hies aprendidas, e proleg3menos a uma metafsica futura /LM sobrecarregado pela necessidade de escol4er um curso >presente? de ao &ue poder; muito bem vir a mostrar-se desastrosoY >iii? &ue as pessoas >incluindo eu mesmo? podem dissimular seus pensamentos e sentimentos, ou simplesmente escond+-los, de modo &ue por ve=es me sinto incapa= de Jacess;-los diretamenteK, como se estivessem ocultosB talve= ocultos <ustamente pelos corpos dessas pessoasY >iv? &ue posso sentir-me incapa= de articular e de e@primir >e, portanto, de compartil4ar? os meus pr prios sentimentos e e@peri+ncias, terminando por me sentir descon4ecido, e incapa= de me fa=er con4ecer, de modo &ue min4a 4umanidade parece estar em riscoY e ainda >v? &ue a&uilo &ue e@presso pode ir alm de meu controle, e contrariar min4as intenes, de modo &ue min4a pr pria identidade, ou auto-concepo, pode estar em risco) 7m diferentes conte@tos, caracteri=ei as dificuldades listadas acima como Oe@istenciaisP, OafetivasP, Opr;ticasP, e OcotidianasPY contudoBe como espero &ue a ressalva feita acima ten4a dei@ado claroBisso no significa &ue as considero universais em atoB perfeitamente concebvel, uma &uesto de fato e contingente, &ue tais dificuldades <amais se apresentem a alguns indivduos) >Wittgenstein possivelmente diria desses indivduos &ue sofrem de uma Jfalta de problemasK/0NY supon4o &ue, se tais indivduos filosofassem, o fariam de uma maneira completamente diferente da &ue a&ui estou propondo)? Se<a como for, o ponto &ue gostaria de salientar este6 como possibilidades, as dificuldades listadas acima parecem caractersticas permanentes de seres finitos, e cientes de suas limitaes >obviamente nem todos os seres &ue satisfa=em a primeira condio satisfa=em a segunda Bse<a por&ue simplesmente no so autoconscientes, se<a por&ue reprimem, ou, possivelmente, so capa=es de superar esse con4ecimento de alguma maneira?) 7star su<eito a essas dificuldades implica estar su<eito a enfrentar a&uilo &ue caracteri=ei como a ameaa da solido, ou do isolamento, ou da perda de sintonia em relao ao mundo e aos demais su<eitosY e essa ameaa &ue, como vim tentando sugerir, parece estar na base de certas reaes intelectuali=adas, as &uais con4ecemos como Jposies filos ficasK) .o limiteBe revelador &ue nen4um fil sofo de carne e osso parea ter alcanado esse limite Btais reaes intelectuali=adas podem levar ' JposioK &ue con4ecemos como solipsismo Bou se<a, a tese segundo a &ual o su<eito e os conteAdos de suas e@peri+ncias so tudo o .ue e)iste6 em outras palavras, &ue no 4; separao entre o su<eito e >seu? mundo)

/0N

Ser ^ Q:E)

7plogo6 Hies aprendidas, e proleg3menos a uma metafsica futura /L1 A escol4a dos autores e dos te@tos analisados nesta tese foi, pelo menos em parte, subordinada ao ob<etivo de e@plorar a sugesto feita acimaBvisando, em particular, a e@trair algumas lies acerca de como lidar com as dificuldades &ue mencionei, de modo a obter resultados filos ficos >espero? menos sublimados, e, nessa medida, uma metafsica mais aut+ntica e realista/0/) Segue uma breve recapitulao das lies &ue pretendi ter e@trado dessas leituras)

Hendo Strawson, aprendi &ue uma descrio ade&uada de nosso es&uema conceitual no deveB<ustamente sob o risco de tornar-se insuficientemente descritivaBprescindir de um e@ame atento das circunstFncias pr1ticas &ue constituem o pano de fundo contra o &ual nossos conceitos ad&uirem uso e significado) 7ssa uma lio geral, mas &ue se aplica particularmente ' an;lise da&ueles conceitos &ue, como o pr prio Strawson nos mostrou em Individuals, constituem a arma2/o da estrutura conceitual &ue usamos para descrever nossa e@peri+ncia de maneira ob<etiva) 7mbora o pr prio Strawson ten4a acenado para a necessidade dessa complementao <; em Individuals, e ten4a dado alguns passos iniciais nessa direo em escritos posteriores >sobretudo OFreedom and %eesentmentP e Skepticism and Eaturalism?, penso &ue podemos >na verdade, devemosBse &uisermos 4erdar e levar adiante o pro<eto de uma metafsica descritiva? ir alm, dando maior importFncia ao tipo de dificuldade &ue, como sua reao naturalista ao ceticismo indica e@emplarmente, Strawson no parece disposto a levar suficientemente a srio) "ara seu crditoBe esta uma outra lio importante &ue aprendi com esse autorBo pr prio Strawson foi o primeiro a salientar &ue e@tremamente difcil obter um &uadro completo da Jverdade em filosofiaK, e <ustamente por isso &ue acredito &ue a sugesto metodol gica &ue apresentei no final do captulo NBa de buscarmos uma compreenso de nossa condio &ue envolva no apenas nossos intelectos, mas tambm nossas sensibilidadesBpode ser vista como uma proposta de continua2/o do pro<eto de metafsica descritiva)

/0/

Xue 4a<a algum grau de sublimao envolvido em atividades 4umanas, particularmente em atividades altamente refle@ivas, como a filosofia, algo &ue no parece sensato negarmosY por outro lado, se nossa finalidade for a clare=a e a obteno de autocon4ecimento, segue-se &ue dese<;vel perseguirmos o ideal regulativo de uma >auto?consci+ncia ma@imalBainda &ue o progresso nessa direo se<a sempre assint tico)

7plogo6 Hies aprendidas, e proleg3menos a uma metafsica futura /M0 Hendo Wittgenstein aprendi no uma, mas sim diversas tcnicas &ue me parecem efica=es para preenc4er o tipo de lacuna apontado na an;lise da abordagem strawsoniana) .o tentarei fornecer uma enumerao ou uma caracteri=ao geral dessas tcnicas a&ui, <ustamente por&ue penso &ue a maneira correta de aprend+-las por meio da an;lise de suas aplicaes em casos concretosB&ue elas devem servir propriamente como amostras, como casos e)emplares, e no como instFncias de um procedimento geral) >Xue no e@ista um procedimento geral para evitar as Jdoenas do intelectoK algo &ue, como tentei mostrar, Wittgenstein ele pr prio s veio a recon4ecer tardia e gradualmente) 7ntretanto, como tambm sugeri, parece &ue ele estava ciente, pelo menos desde o Tractatus, de &ue a cura para doenas <; e@istentes um procedimento bastante comple@o, e envolve o domnio de uma certa JarteK, &ue ele buscou incessantemente mel4orar e desenvolver em seus escritos posteriores)? 7m ve= de uma caracteri=ao geral, gostaria de salientar uma Anica caractersticaBum ponto de partida metodol gicoB&ue me parece compartil4ado por essas variadas tcnicasBa saber, o recon4ecimento de &ue os JproblemasK e as JposiesK filos ficas, assim como as dificuldades e perple@idades pr;ticas &ue as originam, so traos ine@tirp;veis da finitude da condio 4umana, e, como tais, no devem ser dogmaticamente menospre=ados na busca por uma terapia efica=) >.esse sentido, algum poderia ob<etar, contra Wittgenstein e contra a leitura &ue dele vim fa=endo, &ue a pr pria ideia de Jdoenas do intelectoK a serem tratadas infeli=Bafinal, para algo ser considerado uma doen2a isso deve nos sobrevir contingentemente, e, alm disso, para &ue faa sentido pensar num tratamento, essa condio deveria ser cur1velY mas no parece sensato supor &ue possamos simplesmente renunciar, de uma ve7 por todas, ao dese<o de transcender nossa finitudeBuma lio &ue aprendi primeiro de Dant) Z por isso, no entanto, &ue em mais de um conte@to apresentei a ideia de uma tarefa cont4nua >e falvel? de busca de autocon4ecimento e de aceitao de nossa condioY nesse sentido, portanto, &ue acredito &ue a filosofia deva ser vista como uma busca cu<os resultados so sempre provis rios)/0R?

.o captulo final procurei p3r em pr;tica algumas das lies metodol gicas obtidas anteriormente, visando a combater certas imagens &ue podem motivar a aceitao de
/0R

Agradeo ao professor 2oo Carlos Grum !orres por ter-me apresentado essa dificuldade, permitindo assim &ue tentasse esclarecer min4a posio)

7plogo6 Hies aprendidas, e proleg3menos a uma metafsica futura /MN posies anti-individualistas, to correntes na filosofia de nossos dias, sobre significado lingustico e conteAdo mental) Com esse fim em vista, min4a estratgia consistiu em mostrar &ue, no obstante as >aparentemente colossais? diferenas entre tais posies e a doutrina solipsista de imerso total do su<eito no mundo, ambas podem ser vistas como respostas intelectuali=adas a uma dificuldade e@istencial comumBa saber, a ansiedade criada pelo fato de &ue somos, individual e pessoalmente, respons;veis por tentar superar a ameaa da solido, ou da privacidade, encontrando >e mantendo? significados compartilh1veis por outros indivduos, tentando criar acordos com eles, de modo a estabelecer >e manter? uma comunidade de falantes dotada no apenas de conceitos mas >sobretudo? de ;u47os compartil4ados sobre o mundo e sobre os demais su<eitos >essa sendo <ustamente a funo dos critrios wittgensteinianos?) .esse sentido, pode-se di=er &ue o captulo final consistiu em uma nova tentativa de e@plorar a ideia de &ue, possivelmente contra as e@pectativas &ue acalentamos >pelo menos em alguns estados de Fnimo? o sentido >do mundo, de nossas e@peri+ncias, de nossas palavras, <u=os e aesBe finalmente de nossas vidas? no impessoal e e@ternamente imposto ou assegurado >Jpelo ambienteK ou Jpela comunidadeK?) Contra esse Jmodelo impessoal do significadoK, e o >novo? tipo de fundacionismo &ue ele parece constituir, procurei oferecer um contraponto, tratando de lembrar-nos de nossas responsabilidades individuais, permanentes e imprevisveis na busca de significado e de sentidoBum resultado &ue no e@atamente ctico, mas &ue recon4ece e at mesmo simpati=a com as motivaes &ue esto na base do ceticismo, as &uais t+m a ver com o recon4ecimento de nossos limites, particularmente de nossa real separao e distFncia em relao ao mundo e aos demais su<eitos) >.o fosse poss4vel o ceticismo, teramos <ustamente uma situao >solipsista? de total absoro do mundo pelo su<eito, ou Bo &ue finalmente d1 na mesma, como notou Wittgenstein <; no Tractatus%do su<eito pelo mundo)?

7mbora os resultados >re?apresentados acima se<am, pelo menos em grande medida, negativos, espero &ue eles tambm possam ser vistos como uma espcie de Jproleg3menos a uma metafsica futuraKB&ue 4; de caracteri=ar-se por uma atitude mais aberta e autoconsciente em relao ' finitude 4umana e 's ansiedades &ue da decorrem, e, por conseguinte, procurar; avanar lanando mo de uma metodologia mais sensvel a essa condio) 7stou cienteBem parte, devido ao contato >algo tardio? &ue ven4o tentando

7plogo6 Hies aprendidas, e proleg3menos a uma metafsica futura /M/ estabelecer com filosofias mais radicalmente abertas ao recon4ecimento dessa condioB de &ue meu tratamento dessas &uestes ainda est; muito a&um do dese<;vel) "or isso, gostaria de concluir este estudo registrando algumas tarefas &ue ficaro na agenda, e mencionando alguns autores em cu<os escritos continuarei buscando educao)

Ainda 4; muito trabal4o a ser feito para caracteri=ar satisfatoriamente o tipo de relao com o mundo e com os demais su<eitos &ue caracteri=ei como mais fundamental do &ue a relao cognitiva ou te rica) "enso &ue um bom ponto de partida para isso se<a a an;lise do tratamento 4eideggeriano dessa &uesto, condensado por meio da f rmula Jo Dasein serno-mundoKBa &ual sugere um afastamento ou at mesmo uma inverso da imagem de um JegoK colocado diante de um mundo de ob<etos &ue se l4e contrape, em prol de uma imagem na &ual o pr prio envolvimento com o mundo fa= parte da constituio fundamental do &ue significa ser 4umanoBna &ual o Dasein visto como abertura ao mundo, e este, por sua ve=, como algo &ue se anuncia como estando J' moK, isto , como um espao de envolvimento pr;tico com os ob<etos, como o lugar da e@peri+ncia comum, a &ual parece ter sido es&uecida no apenas pela investigao cientfica, mas tambm pelas metafsicas modeladas nesse tipo de investigao) Sisando a superar essa imagem te rica e cognitivista, e a obter uma compreenso e uma descrio mais realista de nossa condio, fa=-se necess;rio proceder a >algo como? uma fenomenologia da nossa e@peri+ncia do mundo, pautada pelo ideal de m;@ima fidelidade '&uilo &ue se mostra, e &ue parta do recon4ecimento de &ue nosso contato primordial com o mundo no a e@peri+ncia de um espectador ol4ando para ob<etos desprovidos de valorY pelo contr;rio, primeiro apreendemos o mundo praticamente, como um mundo de coisas &ue so Ateis e acessveis, e &ue esto imbudas de significado e valor 4umano) >$ma condio fundamental para o desenvolvimento de uma fenomenologia nesses moldes o recon4ecimento do modo como nossos corpos e nossas habilidades determinam nossa e@peri+nciaY um tratamento e@emplar dessa &uesto fornecido por 8erleau-"ontC)?

$m outro ponto insuficientemente desenvolvido no meu te@to o resultado estoico a respeito da absoluta conting+ncia e independ+ncia do mundo em relao ' nossa vontadeB

7plogo6 Hies aprendidas, e proleg3menos a uma metafsica futura /MR e da conse&uente necessidade de se buscar um recon4ecimento desse aspecto de nossa finitude, contra a imagem >solipsista? &ue coloca o su<eito, ou ego, no centro do universo >uma tarefa &ue tanto metaf4sica &uanto 5tica?) ,; algum material de Wittgenstein >alm do pr prio Tractatus? &ue pode ser analisado com vistas a esclarecer esse ponto, mas certamente um tratamento mais aprofundado e@igir; o estudo dos pr prios estoicos antigos e seus leitores contemporFneos/0Q)

A Altima &uesto de fundo &ue gostaria de mencionar a articulao da concepo &uintessencialmente e@istencialista a respeito da preced+ncia da e)ist8ncia 4umana em relao ' sua ess8nciaBum ponto inicialmente apresentado em uma nota ao captulo N, na &ual contrasto essa concepo com a posio de Strawson, e retomado algo mais implicitamente no meu Altimo captulo, por meio da aluso ' tese pascaliana >e, como sugeri, wittgensteiniana e cavelliana? de &ue o h1bito >e apenas ele? constitui a nossa Jnature=aKBou se<a, &ue no 4; limites a priori para o &ue pode ser considerado uma vida genuinamente 4umana) Alm da obra do pr prio "ascal, penso &ue essa &uesto poderia ser aprofundada com o estudo de autores como (ostoivsIi, .iet=sc4e, DierIegaard, ,eidegger/0: Sartre e Camus/0E, alm de seus leitores contemporFneosBparticularmente a&ueles preocupados em estabelecer pontes com a Jtradio analticaK, dentre os &uais StanleC Cavell, Step4en 8ull4al, e ,ubert (reCfus)

/0Q

/0:

/0E

%epresentantes importantes sendo William G) *rvine, especialmente em ( Auide to the Aood +ife@ The (ncient (rt of Stoic `oyY 8art4a .ussbaum, The Therapy of Desire@ Theory and Practice in Bellenistic EthicsY Ale@ander .e4amas, The (rt of +iving@ Socratic >eflections from Plato to 6oucault Y "ierre ,adot, E)ercices Spirituels et Philosophie Anti&ue >agradeo a "aulo Faria pelas tr+s Altimas indicaes?) !ambm ficar; na min4a agenda de leituras futuras o coment;rio de Auben&ue ( Prud8ncia em (rist0teles, &ue aparentemente desenvolve uma leitura afeita 's min4as pr prias preocupaes >sou grato a Fabian (omingues por esta indicao?) 5 te@to de ,eidegger em Ser e Tempo suscetvel de ser lido de uma maneira &ue pode parecer torn;-lo incompatvel com uma concepo e@istencialista da condio 4umana) 7sse, contudo, no me parece ser o casoBvide sua definio inicial do Dasein como Jo ser para o &ual o pr prio ser est; em &uestoKY &ue os resultados ontol gicos de sua investigao em Ser e Tempo se<am mais robustos >ver acima? tampouco acarreta uma incompatibilidade com o ponto e@istencialista, contanto &ue se compreenda o procedimento investigativo peculiar levado adiante nessa obra, o &ual constitui <ustamente um e)emplo de tomada de consci+ncia e de adoo de uma postura aut+ntica a respeito do &ue para o autor da.uelas refle)3es >e para &uem &uer &ue refa2a seu camin4o refle@ivo? ser 4umano) >Agradeo a #iovani #odoC Felice por indicar essa possvel dificuldade)? 7 de cineastas como *ngmar Gergman, !errence 8alicI, StanleC DubricI, %idleC Scott)))

%efer+ncias /MQ

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