Clipping do Dia 07/06/2017

Sumrio
Clipping do Dia 07/06/2017 ...................................................................................................... 1
Brasil .................................................................................................................................... 2
Viagem do ministro Aloysio Nunes aos Estados Unidos e ao Haiti ......................................... 2
Oriente Mdio....................................................................................................................... 3
Trump exalta ruptura de pases rabes com Catar, parceiro militar dos EUA .......................... 3
China .................................................................................................................................... 4
U.S. says China likely to build more overseas bases, maybe in Pakistan ................................. 4
Direito Internacional............................................................................................................. 6
Repblica de Montenegro formaliza seu ingresso na Otan ....................................................... 6
U.S. Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention ................................................................. 7
Infraestrutura e Logstica.................................................................................................... 12
Governo quer erguer hidreltrica Tabajara na Amaznia ....................................................... 12
Lnguas Estrangeiras .......................................................................................................... 14
Au Conseil des droits de l'homme, Zeid condamne les exactions de Daech et alerte sur les
violences en RDC .................................................................................................................... 14
Addressing Human Rights Council, UN rights chief decries some States lack of cooperation
................................................................................................................................................. 15
La ONU pide a Venezuela que permita la entrada de una misin al pas ............................... 18
 Brasil

Viagem do ministro Aloysio Nunes aos Estados Unidos

e ao Haiti
por: facebook - leia na ntegra

Viagem do ministro Aloysio Nunes aos Estados Unidos e ao Haiti

O ministro Aloysio Nunes Ferreira regressou no ltimo sbado de visita oficial aos
Estados Unidos e ao Haiti. Em Washington, participou de encontro extraordinrio de
chanceleres da #OEA (Organizao dos Estados Americanos-OEA), convocada para
discutir as crises poltica, econmica e humanitria da Venezuela. Reunidos na sede da
organizao no dia 31 de maio, os ministros e representantes de 33 pases das Amricas
concordaram que a #OEA um dos foros adequados para auxiliar os venezuelanos na
busca de uma soluo pacfica para a situao em seu pas. Os representantes
permanentes junto organizao continuaro trabalhando at a Assembleia Geral,
prevista para os dias 19 a 21 de junho, com o propsito de obter o mais amplo consenso.
Ainda na capital norte-americana, o ministro Aloysio reuniu-se em 2 de junho com o
secretrio de Estado, Rex Tillerson, com quem trocou ideias sobre temas globais e
regionais. No campo das relaes bilaterais, concordaram em dar impulso poltico a
uma agenda pragmtica que possa reverter em benefcios concretos e efetivos para os
dois pases em curto prazo. Entre os pontos que compem essa agenda, merecem
destaque medidas para facilitao de comrcio e investimentos recprocos; acordos
aeronuticos, para aumentar as opes de transporte areo entre os dois pases; acordo
para utilizao comercial da base de lanamento de satlites de #Alcntara (MA); sade;
segurana e defesa. Os dois ministros decidiram acompanhar a evoluo desta agenda e
realizar a primeira avaliao dos avanos no prazo de trs meses.
J no encontro com o ministro de Relaes Exteriores do Mxico, Luis Videgaray Caso,
o ministro Aloysio Nunes reiterou a importncia da ampliao do comrcio entre os
dois pases. Os chanceleres querem impulsionar as negociaes em curso sobre
complementao econmica em direo a um ambicioso acordo comercial.
No retorno ao Brasil, Aloysio Nunes fez uma visita de dois dias ao Haiti, sua primeira
frente do Itamaraty. Na capital, Porto Prncipe, reuniu-se com a representante das
Naes Unidas no pas, Sandra Honor, e acompanhou a cerimnia de substituio das
tropas brasileiras que participam da MINUSTAH (das iniciais em francs de Misso das
Naes Unidas para a Estabilizao do Haiti). Comandada por militares brasileiros
desde sua criao h 13 anos, a MINUSTAH se despede neste ano do Haiti, onde
realizou trabalho essencial para pacificao do pas, alm de ter participado
decisivamente nos esforos de recuperao nacional depois do terremoto de 2010 e da
passagem do furaco Matthew, em 2016. Aloysio Nunes tambm foi recebido pelo
primeiro-ministro Jack Guy Lafontant, que se fez acompanhar pelos ministros das
Relaes Exteriores, da Sade, da Defesa e do Interior. Na reunio, passaram em revista
as iniciativas da cooperao brasileira para o desenvolvimento doHaiti. O premi
Lafontant agradeceu o compromisso do Brasil com seu pas, refletido tanto na
cooperao quando na participao das tropas brasileiras na MINUSTAH.

Oriente Mdio

Trump exalta ruptura de pases rabes com Catar,

parceiro militar dos EUA
por: Estado - leia na ntegra

Sede da maior base militar dos EUA no Oriente Mdio e aliado

crucial dos americanos na luta contra o Estado Islmico, o Catar
transformou-se no mais recente alvo da poltica externa de Donald
Trump difundida no Twitter. O presidente americano exaltou nesta
tera-feira, 6, a ruptura de pases rabes com o emirado, o que
provocou uma crise diplomtica.
Durante minha recente viagem ao Oriente Mdio eu afirmei que no poderia mais
haver financiamento ideologia radical. Os lderes apontaram para o Catar olhem!,
escreveu o presidente dos EUA em um post publicado s 8h15 de hoje.
Em seguida, ele atribui a sua influncia a deciso da Arbia Saudita e de outros aliados
Emirados rabes, Egito, Bahrein, Imen, Maldivas e Mauritnia de cortar laos
diplomticos e comerciais com o Catar, o que jogou a regio na que pode ser a mais
grave crise desde a Guerra do Golfo, em 1991.
to bom ver que a visita Arbia Saudita com o rei e 50 pases est rendendo frutos.
Eles disseram que adotariam uma linha dura contra o financiamento (...) do extremismo
e todas as referncias apontavam para o Catar. Talvez esse seja o comeo do fim do
horror do terrorismo!, escreveu Trump em dois tutes sucessivos.
Cerca de 10 mil militares dos EUA esto na base do Catar, que o principal ponto de
lanamento de ataques contra o Estado Islmico na regio.
Segundo a imprensa americana, diplomatas e militares dos EUA reagiram
negativamente ao ver o presidente atacar um aliado crucial e tomar partido em uma
disputa entre pases rabes, em vez de intervir para tentar resolv-la.
O pretexto para o corte de relaes foi o suposto financiamento do Catar a grupos
extremistas, argumento frgil diante da promoo de uma das mais fundamentalistas
interpretaes do Isl por parte da Arbia Saudita.
O real motivo parece ter sido a suposta manifestao de simpatia do lder do Catar,
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, em relao ao Ir e a Israel. No ms passado, a imprensa
estatal publicou artigo que trazia elogios dele aos dois pases, mas seu governo reagiu
com a afirmao de que o texto era falso e havia sido plantado por hackers.
Segundo a CNN, investigadores dos EUA acreditam que a ao foi promovida por
hackers russos. Ainda de acordo com a emissora, o FBI enviou uma equipe a Doha para
ajudar o governo a identificar os responsveis pela publicao das declaraes
supostamente falsas. Poucos dias depois do artigo ser veiculado, Al Thani telefonou
para Hassan Rohani para cumpriment-lo pela reeleio no Ir, o que enfureceu os
sauditas.
O Pentgono reiterou sua cooperao com o Catar e disse que continuar a operar a base
militar no pas. O porta-voz Jeff Davis preferiu no fazer comentrios sobre o conflito
entre as declaraes e Trump e a importncia estratgica do pas no combate ao Estado
Islmico. Eu no posso ajud-lo com isso, respondeu Davis em um entrevista coletiva
quando questionado sobre o assunto.
O secretrio de Defesa americano, James Mattis, telefonou para sua contraparte no
Catar, mas o contedo da conversa no foi revelado.
O rompimento de relaes deixa o Catar isolado diplomtica e fisicamente. A nica
fronteira terrestre do pas com a Arbia Saudita. A TV Al-Jazeera, de propriedade do
Catar, disse que caminhes estavam estacionados na fronteira, do lado da Arbia
Saudita, de onde vem grande parte dos alimentos consumidos pela populao local.
O Catar tem a segunda mais elevada renda per capita do mundo, segundo o CIA Fact
Book, mas um bloqueio por tempo indeterminado pode afetar o pas. As aes de
empresas locais caram nesta tera-feira e a moeda ficou sob presso, depois que alguns
investidores deixaram de compr-la.

China

U.S. says China likely to build more overseas bases,

maybe in Pakistan
por: Reuters - leia na ntegra
A Pentagon report released on Tuesday singled out Pakistan as a
possible location for a future Chinese military base, as it forecast that
Beijing would likely build more bases overseas after establishing a
facility in the African nation of Djibouti.
The prediction came in a 97-page annual report to Congress that saw advances
throughout the Chinese military in 2016, funded by robust defense spending that the
Pentagon estimated exceeded $180 billion.
That is higher than China's official defense budget figure of 954.35 billion yuan ($140.4
billion). Chinese leaders, the U.S. report said, appeared committed to defense spending
hikes for the "foreseeable future," even as economic growth slows.
The report repeatedly cited China's construction of its first overseas naval base in
Djibouti, which is already home to a key U.S. military base and is strategically located
at the southern entrance to the Red Sea on the route to the Suez Canal.
"China most likely will seek to establish additional military bases in countries with
which it has a longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic interests, such as
Pakistan," the report said.
Djibouti's position on the northwestern edge of the Indian Ocean has fueled worries in
India that it would become another of China's 'string of pearls' of military alliances and
assets ringing India, including Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka.
The report did not address India's potential reaction to a Chinese base in Pakistan.
But Pakistan, the U.S. report noted, was already the primary market in the Asian-Pacific
region for Chinese arms exports. That region accounted for $9 billion of the more than
$20 billion in Chinese arms exports from 2011 to 2015.
Last year, China signed an agreement with Pakistan for the sale of eight submarines.
QUANTUM SATELLITE, CYBER HACKS
The Pentagon report flagged Chinese military advances, including in space and at sea.
It cited China's 2016 launch of the first experimental quantum communications satellite,
acknowledging that it represented a "notable advance in cryptography research."
As in past years, the Pentagon renewed its concerns about cyber spying, saying U.S.
government-owned computers were again targeted by China-based intrusions through
2016.
"These and past intrusions focused on accessing networks and extracting information,"
the report said.
"China uses its cyber capabilities to support intelligence collection against U.S.
diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors."
In a section discussing China's Navy, the report predicted that China's first domestically
designed and produced aircraft carrier would likely reach initial operating capability in
2020.
(Reporting by Phil Stewart; Editing by James Dalgleish)

Direito Internacional

Repblica de Montenegro formaliza seu ingresso na

Otan
por: Agncia Brasil - ltimas notcias do Brasil e do mundo - leia na ntegra

A Repblica de Montenegro formalizou hoje (5) seu ingresso na

Organizao do Tratado do Atlntico Norte (Otan) em uma cerimnia
em Washington, na qual o primeiro-ministro do pas, Dusko
Markovic, definiu a aliana militar como "a mais poderosa da
histria". A informao da agncia EFE.
O pas balcnico se tornou o 29 membro da Otan, com sua adeso oficializada em um
ato realizado na sede do Departamento de Estado dos Estados Unidos. "Hoje nos
transformamos em parte da aliana mais exitosa da histria", afirmou Marcovic, que
disse que o seu pas ser um aliado "forte".
O subsecretrio de Estado para Assuntos Polticos dos EUA, Thomas Shannon, felicitou
Montenegro e destacou que o pas "foi um parceiro confivel e um fornecedor de foras
para misses da Otan, da Unio Europeia e da ONU". Segundo ele, o ingresso de
Montenegro na Organizao do Tratado do Atlntico Norte representa um marco
importante para a "viso" americana de uma Europa livre e em paz".
Tambm participou do ato o secretrio-geral da organizao, Jens Stoltenberg, para
quem o ingresso de Montenegro bom para o pas, bom para a estabilidade dos
Balcs ocidentais e bom para a paz e a segurana internacional".
Tenses
A entrada de Montenegro na Otan acontece em meio a tensas relaes entre o Ocidente
e a Rssia, que criticou a expanso da aliana militar para o sudeste da Europa e
lamentou a deciso de ingresso do pas balcnico, um aliado tradicional de Moscou.
Montenegro, que tem uma populao de cerca de 625 mil habitantes, controla o ltimo
trecho do mar Adritico que ainda no fazia parte da Aliana Atlntica. O seu ingresso
representa ainda a primeira ampliao da Otan desde 2009, quando entraram dois dos
seus vizinhos: Crocia e Albnia.

U.S. Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention

por: The Diplomat - leia na ntegra

Measuring the raison dtat in the Trump era.

When at the steps of the Louvre, turn your gaze toward Rue de Rivoli, to a work of
Parisian art, the Palais-Royal (originally the Palais-Cardinal), the former residence of
Cardinal Richelieu. Richelieu is credited with articulating the principle of raison dtat,
the national interest, as a transcendent entity, an ideal above and beyond the private
concern of statesmen. As Louis XIIIs chief minister, during the religious wars of the
17th century, he rose above confessional loyalties, allying Catholic France with
Protestant powers in order to maintain the European balance of power. In the Testament
Politique, Richelieus political manual, he observed: The public interest must be the
sole end of the prince and his councilors.
In Washington today, we have the opportunity to assess the raison dtat as defined by
the current U.S. leadership: the new Trump administration and a Republican-controlled
Congress. One significant measure will be whether the United States finally ratifies the
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS or the Convention), the
comprehensive treaty regime that governs activities on, above and below the worlds
oceans. Although the United States was an original architect of the treaty, Senate advice
and consent to ratification has remained stalled through three successive presidential
administrations. For more than 20 years the national interest has fallen victim to the
confessional nature, the hardened doctrinarism, of modern American politics.
Now a powerful tide of populism has swept over the banks of the Potomac one that is
suspicious of globalization, international law, and technocratic bodies. In this context,
can Congress elevate the national interest above narrow partisan aims? Will President
Donald J. Trump exercise the necessary leadership to realize an objective that has
eluded his White House predecessors? Only Washington can address these questions.
Make no mistake, though, the answers will have a global ripple effect, from the melting
plates of the Arctic Ocean to the choppy waves of the South China Sea.
Outside Looking In
Following nearly a decade of negotiations, UNCLOS was completed on December 10,
1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. Even at that time, the United States refused to sign the
treaty. The United States, along with other industrialized states, took issue with aspects
of the treaty (Part XI), which dealt with deep seabed resources beyond national
jurisdiction. Largely at Washingtons instigation, negotiations continued and resulted in
the Agreement relating to Implementation of Part XI of the Convention (1994
Agreement), completed in New York, July 28, 1994.
Determining that the remaining deep seabed issues were resolved, on October 7, 1994,
President Bill Clinton transmitted the Convention and the 1994 Agreement to the Senate
for advice and consent. On November 16, 1994, UNCLOS entered into force, but
without accession by the United States. The 1994 Agreement entered into force on July
28, 1996, also without U.S. ratification. To date, the treaty remains one of forty-five
treaties (one dating back to 1945) awaiting Senate action once referred to as the
worlds greatest deliberative body.
As a result, the United States remains off the list of 168 state parties to UNCLOS, a list
which includes all other major maritime powers such as Russia and China. In practice,
the United States has accepted and complies with nearly all the treatys provisions. On
March 10, 1983, President Ronald Reagan issued the United States Oceans Policy
Statement, supported by National Security Decision Directive 83, which documents the
U.S. view that UNCLOS reflects customary international law and fulfils U.S. interest in
a comprehensive legal framework relating to competing uses of the worlds oceans.
Successive presidential administrations Republican and Democrat have relied upon
Reagans precedent to legitimize and guide the Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program
in global hot spots like the South and East China Seas.
So even as the United States invokes UNCLOS to assert the freedom of navigation and
challenge excessive maritime claims, Washington has no seat at the table in protecting
U.S. rights and claims within the treatys institutional framework. As a non-party,
Washington remains on the outside looking in as the international community moves
forward in defining the legal landscape affecting over 70 percent of the worlds surface.
Identifying the National Interest
To the extent that the United States relies on custom to protect its interests, there is
some benefit to free riding from the UNCLOS regime. As I have written in these pages,
however, the law of the sea has not followed a linear progression and customary
international law is subject to contestation. Moreover, arguments against accession
ignore the significant costs that the United States has incurred and continues to pay by
remaining a non-party. Put another way, in determining the national interest, we have to
fully account for the material advantages provided by accession to the Convention.
Ratification will give the United States a direct voice in UNCLOS bodies like the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, and the International Seabed Authority. For instance, at a recent
gathering at the American Society of International Law (ASIL), Douglas Burnett, a
maritime attorney and advisor to the International Cable Protection Committee,
explained that, in the current landscape, U.S. telecommunications companies are forced
to seek foreign state sponsors to voice their concerns in UNCLOS disputes over undue
interference by coastal states to the freedom to lay undersea cables. An estimated 98
percent of worldwide internet data is transmitted through the web of fiber optic cables
lying on the ocean floor, which are the arteries of the global economy, and, therefore, a
significant U.S. concern.
In addition, UNCLOS reflects current U.S. policy with respect to living marine resource
management, conservation, and exploitation. For example, from within the treaty, the
United States can more effectively exert its leadership in managing depleted fish stocks,
which migrate internationally across maritime zones and the high seas. Organizations as
disparate as the World Wildlife Fund and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have strongly
supported U.S. accession. According to John Norton Moore, director of the Center for
Oceans Law and Policy at the University of Virginia, since the U.S. already follows the
treaty, the costs of compliance are insignificant, particularly when weighed against the
U.S. capacity to influence institutional development in global maritime policy.
More broadly, the UNCLOS regime is part of the bedrock of the U.S.-led liberal order.
As G. John Ikenberry argued in After Victory, since the Congress of Vienna, leading
states have employed institutional strategies as mechanisms to establish restraints on
arbitrary state power and embed a favorable and resilient international system. In this
instance, the Convention and 1994 Agreement were negotiated during a time of U.S.
ascendance and Western unity in international affairs. At ASIL, Myron Nordquist,
Associate Director of the Center for Oceans Law and Policy, expounded on how
UNCLOS reflects important U.S. interests regarding restraints on economic exclusive
zone, continental shelf resources, innocent passage across the territorial waters, the
passage rules for transiting straits and archipelagic sea lanes, and, of course, the high
seas freedoms. U.S. ratification will serve to lock in these advantages, negotiated by
the United States from a position of primacy in world affairs.
The strategic necessity of preserving U.S. national interests via accession to UNCLOS
is most evident in the evolving waters of the Artic and South China Sea.
The Arctic and South China Sea
Climate change is heating up the race for the Arctic as receding sea ice gives way to
increasing human activity. In addition to advancing new sea lanes, nations bordering the
Arctic Ocean are seeking to develop offshore resources, particularly in the energy
sector. UNCLOS (Part VI) gives the coastal state sovereign rights over the resources of
its continental shelf. The Convention also permits a coastal state with a broad
continental margin to establish a shelf limit beyond 200 nautical miles, subject to the
review and recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
Accordingly, the five Arctic coastal states the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway,
and Denmark (via its Greenland territory) have made or are in the process of
preparing submissions to the commission.
Given that the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, U.S. nationals may not serve as
members of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. It is not clear
whether the United States, as a non-state party, can even make a legally recognized
submission to the commission to assert its claim and fully protect its proprietary rights
and energy interests. In contrast, Russia, which may be entitled to almost half of the
Artic regions area and coastline, has already made its submission for vastly extending
its continental margin, including a claim to the Lomonosov Ridge, an undersea feature
spanning the Arctic from Russia to Canada. Russia and Canada are the two countries
with which the United States has potentially overlapping extended continental shelf
claims.
This maritime boundary dispute is no small matter. The U.S. Geological Survey
estimates that the Arctic holds 22 percent of the worlds undiscovered oil and gas,
amounting to more than 412 billion barrels of oil equivalent. Legal certainty in maritime
delimitation is critically important for Arctic states and their respective energy
companies. On June 8, 2012, Rex Tillerson, as chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil,
wrote to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to vociferously urge U.S. accession to
UNCLOS:
Perhaps the best example of the need for certainty in an area with great unexplored
potential involves the Arctic OceanSeveral countries, including the United States, are
provided with a claim to extended exploitation rights under the application of UNCLOS
in the Arctic. The legal basis of claims is an important element to the stability of
property rights.
In the absence of treaty ratification, Tillerson noted that the United States suffers from
the dual disadvantage of having both a cloud over the international status of U.S. claims
and a weakened ability to challenge other states conflicting claims.
As a sovereign state, the United States can object to overlapping claims and take action
in the Arctic consistent with international law. Awkwardly, however, arguments against
UNCLOS ratification must turn to support from the International Court of Justice,
which has ruled (Nicaragua v. Columbia, 2012) that continental shelf rights exist as a
matter of fact and do not need to be expressly claimed. Even if custom provides one
remedy, a contract is better than a handshake more so in a world of power and
interdependence. Moreover, the Arctic coastal states, including the United States, have
positively affirmed that the law of the sea provides the legal framework for resolving
overlapping territorial claims. Intergovernmental bodies like the Arctic Council, while
useful for multilateral cooperation, lack authority for resolving territorial conflicts. As
the future secretary of State, Tillerson, wrote to the Senate: UNCLOS can provide an
efficient, comprehensive legal basis for the settlement of these conflicting claims, thus
providing the stability necessary to support expensive exploration and development.
The South China Sea is another area of heated contestation where UNCLOS serves as
the guidepost for clarity. Of notable importance is the ruling from the South China Sea
arbitration that UNCLOS comprehensively allocates rights to maritime areas thereby
precluding historic claims like Chinas Nine-Dash Line. From this principle, the
arbitral tribunal systematically refuted Chinas extensive claims and actions in the South
China Sea beyond the treatys carefully crafted limitations. In the view of Washington,
these limitations include undue attempts to curtail the freedoms of navigation and
overflight in exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Notably, China takes an opposing view
and asserts the ability to prohibit foreign military operations in its claimed EEZs. Thus,
although the United States remains neutral on competing claims in the South China Sea,
Washington has a compelling national security interest in upholding the substance of
the arbitral tribunals ruling.
Source: U.S. Department of State
Like U.S. claims in the Arctic, the United States legal rights in the South China Sea are
not academic. As reported by Ronald ORourke, a U.S. naval affairs analyst, the EEZ
legal dispute between Washington and Beijing has led to significant confrontations
between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in and above international waters. For
example, in August 2014, a Chinese J-11 fighter dangerously intercepted a U.S. P-8A
Poseidon, a naval reconnaissance aircraft, operating in the South China Sea
approximately 117 nautical miles east of Hainan Island. Thanks to the arbitral tribunals
artful debunking of the nature of Chinese-claimed maritime features and related
entitlements, there is greater legal clarity on U.S. operational rights in the South China
Sea. By formally joining UNCLOS, the United States will be in a stronger position to
support the ruling of the arbitral tribunal in the face of Chinese opposition.
More broadly, because substantial portions of the worlds oceans are claimable as EEZs,
universal adoption of the Chinese position would significantly alter the U.S. militarys
ability to sail and fly worldwide. These debates over high seas freedoms and EEZs are
likely to continue. For example, as I wrote in the Harvard National Security Journal, the
so-called Castaneda formula under UNCLOS (Article 59) opens the door for further
articulation of EEZ functional jurisdiction and any potential limitation on the high seas
freedoms. Defining residual rights requires interpreting what rights are included in the
text as well as what rights are omitted. The United States can more effectively anticipate
and shape these debates impacting U.S. national security as a state party to UNCLOS.
In a twist, U.S. opponents of ratification may view the South China Sea case as
supporting their position for remaining outside of UNCLOS. One of Beijings chief
objections was that the arbitral tribunal should not have intervened, arguing that the
dispute essentially involved delimiting maritime boundaries, which would fall outside
compulsory dispute settlement pursuant to a declaration China made under UNCLOS
(Article 298(1)(a)(i)). As I explained in these pages, the arbitral tribunal was careful to
limit its discretion to determining whether certain Chinese-claimed features
particularly in relation to the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal could generate
maritime entitlements as high-tide features.
The arbitral tribunal, however, could have declined to even rule on these issues in light
of the impact an analysis on maritime features and entitlements would implicitly have
on Chinese boundary claims. By analogy, under the U.S. legal system, courts defer
certain political questions because the matter is considered unsuited to judicial
inquiry, and more constitutionally appropriate for settlement by the political branches.
While the arbitral tribunal may have been technically correct on the legal merits in the
case, UNCLOS faced a greater institutional harm if China had followed through on
Beijings threat to withdrawal from the treaty. The fact that China did not withdraw
suggests that the balance of interests favored continued participation in UNCLOS, a
calculus that could further tilt as Beijing advances its blue-water navy.
U.S. critics of UNCLOS may perceive the South China Sea scenario as prime evidence
of meddling by an international court. Myron Nordquist offered a hypothetical in which
the United States ratifies and submits a similar declaration, but in relation to excluding
disputes over military activities from compulsory dispute settlement (Article 298(1)(b)).
Despite such a declaration and U.S. objections, an international tribunal may attempt to
intervene in a dispute where another state party challenges U.S. FON operations in its
EEZ. Even if you believe that this fact pattern seems improbable, American opponents
of UNCLOS and international law may seize upon the South China Sea arbitration as a
dangerous harbinger.
During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Tillerson backed away from his 2012 letter,
acknowledging domestic critics of international courts. General James Mattis was
similarly circumspect before the Senate. Even the abstract threat of international court
jurisdiction results in theatrics in American politics. To recall, in response to the Rome
Statute, Republican Senator Jesse Helms sponsored the American Service-Members
Protection Act, which was affectionately called the The Hague Invasion Act. There
are those in Beijing that may share the late senators sentiments.
The Domestic Trump Card
For a White House under siege, UNCLOS ratification may present an opportunity for a
specific foreign policy achievement. After all the United States is engaged in an unequal
bargain: adhering to the terms of UNCLOS without enjoying the benefit of shaping the
treatys rules or institutions. In contrast, if the Trump administration were to oppose
UNCLOS ratification it would be a remarkable and deplorable break in bi-partisan
presidential leadership.
Even assuming the Trump administrations support, accession will not come easily.
According to a Congressional report, in the course of U.S. history, only 1,100 treaties
have been ratified in comparison to over 18,500 reported executive agreements. Senate
inaction has proven to be a very effective veto. Even treaties that flow from American
leadership, in areas like protecting rights for persons with disabilities, are rejected. As
such, treaty ratification would be a monumental (and surprising) legacy-builder for
Trump.
Global frameworks like UNCLOS are also exceptional events in international affairs.
Advocates and opponents of U.S. accession both acknowledge that the terms of
UNCLOS would be impossible to negotiate today. In my view, this reality demonstrates
the wisdom of locking-in U.S. gains and the importance of establishing international
institutions capable of maintaining validity in a changing geopolitical environment.
Treaty-making and diplomacy require a certain suppleness, to borrow from Ruth
Wedgwood, Professor of International Law and Policy at the John Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies. U.S. participation could strengthen UNCLOS by
ensuring that new life is breathed into the documents text, consistent with U.S.
interests.
Unfortunately, Americas political environment is characterized by a rigidness and
polarization that defy supple solutions for U.S. accession to UNCLOS. The current
populist strain is characterized by a faith in strong leaders, a disdain of perceived limits
on sovereignty and a distrust of powerful international institutions. Criticism of
international law has taken on a religious fervor, become an emotional calling. The
South China Sea case may only prove the ideological point of UNCLOS detractors, no
matter how shortsighted.
Perhaps in this Trump era, only a figure like Donald Trump can lend legitimacy to a
complex global undertaking that is in the U.S. national interest. In other words, a
populist dealmaker may be required to overcome the trump card of domestic politics in
this vital area of U.S. foreign policy. This scenario will require decisive presidential
leadership (bigly) and a clear view of the national interest in Washington.
If Richelieu were able to roam the halls along Pennsylvania Avenue, would his Red
Eminence be able to find what he described as the torch of reason the light that must
guide the conduct of princes and their states? During the Thirty Years War, the stakes
were high and politics unforgiving, but Richelieus vision of the raison dtat provided
grounds for a future Westphalian peace. Fortunately, we need not resort to hypotheticals
to assess U.S. leadership and the national interest in the Trump era. Whether the United
States ratifies UNCLOS will provide us the measure we seek.
Roncevert Ganan Almond is a partner at The Wicks Group, based in Washington, D.C.
He has advised the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on issues
concerning international law and written extensively on maritime disputes in the Asia-
Pacific. The views expressed here are strictly his own.

Infraestrutura e Logstica

Governo quer erguer hidreltrica Tabajara na

Amaznia
por: Estado - leia na ntegra
BRASLIA - O ministro de Minas e Energia (MME), Fernando
Coelho Filho, disse nesta tera-feira, 6, que o governo prepara a
licitao de uma nova hidreltrica na Amaznia. O projeto, que est
em fase, de licenciamento ambiental, j teve seus estudos de
viabilidade concludos e, segundo o ministro, ser licitado em 2018.
A hidreltrica, batizada com o nome de Tabajara, seria construda na regio norte de
Rondnia, numa rea prxima ao Estado do Amazonas. Com a barragem construda no
Rio Machado, no municpio de Machadinho DOeste, a usina Tabajara geraria 400
megawatts de energia.
A regio de Machadinho uma das reas da Amaznia que mais sofrem com o
desmatamento irregular e ocupaes ilegais de terra. Os estudos tcnicos entregues
Agncia Nacional de Energia Eltrica preveem que a usina inunde uma rea de 96
quilmetros quadrados da regio.
O projeto, que j chegou a figurar na lista de empreendimentos do Programa de
Acelerao do Crescimento (PAC), est h anos no papel, mas no avana por conta de
dificuldades de licenciamento ambiental.
O empreendimento defendido pelo senador Valdir Raupp (PMDB-RO), que em maro
se tornou ru na Operao Lava Jato, quando a Segunda Turma do Supremo aceitou a
denncia oferecida pela Procuradoria-Geral da Repblica, pelos crimes de corrupo
passiva e lavagem de dinheiro.
A PGR acusa o senador de ter solicitado e recebido vantagem indevida de R$ 500 mil
para a sua campanha ao Senado de 2010, oriundo do esquema de corrupo na
Petrobrs, por meio de propina disfarada de doaes oficiais. A defesa do senador
afirmou que a verso acusatria est baseada apenas em delaes fantasiosas, e ser
afastada ao longo da investigao.
Nos ltimos anos, Rondnia recebeu dois dos maiores empreendimentos hidreltricos
do Pas, as usinas de Jirau e Santo Antnio, erguidas nas guas do Rio Madeira. Santo
Antnio est entre os empreendimentos citados pelos delatores da empreiteira
Odebrecht como um dos principais projetos de infraestrutura que foram usados para
pagamentos de propina, conforme revelaes apuradas pela Polcia Federal no mbito
da Operao Lava Jato.

Lnguas Estrangeiras

Au Conseil des droits de l'homme, Zeid condamne les

exactions de Daech et alerte sur les violences en RDC
por: - leia na ntegra

6 juin 2017 A l'ouverture de la 35e session du Conseil des droits de

l'homme Genve, le Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux
droits de l'homme, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, a condamn mardi dans les
termes les plus fermes les lches attaques perptres par des entits
terroristes dans le monde, notamment Daech et d'autres groupes
affilis.
 La brutalit de Daech et des autres groupes terroristes ne semble pas connatre de
limites , a dclar M. Zeid devant le Conseil, indiquant que le 1er juin, le groupe
djihadiste a tu 163 personnes qui cherchaient fuir l'ouest de la ville iraquienne de
Mossoul.
Le Haut-Commissaire a soulign que le terrorisme doit tre radiqu par les
gouvernements de manire intelligente en prservant les droits humains. Pour toute
personne injustement dtenue, humilie, abuse, torture sous couvert de vagues lois
antiterroristes, ce n'est pas cette seule personne qui est atteinte, mais toute sa famille , a
dit M. Zeid.
Envoyez ainsi une personne en prison et vous pourrez pousser six ou sept autres
personnes dans les bras de ceux qui s'opposent au gouvernement, avec quelques-uns
capables d'aller plus loin , a-t-il prvenu.
Devant le Conseil des droits de l'homme, M. Zeid a galement soulev la question du
problme d'accs, incluant l'absence et la dimension slective de la coopration de
certains gouvernements avec les mcanismes de droits de droits de l'homme et son
bureau.
Par ailleurs, s'agissant de la Rpublique dmocratique du Congo (RDC), le Haut-
Commissaire a soulign que la situation dj grave dans les provinces du Kasa
continuait de se dtriorer.
Il a indiqu qu'il insisterait sur la cration d'un mcanisme d'enqute internationale
concernant les violences perptres dans ces provinces moins qu'il ne reoive avant le
8 juin une rponse approprie de la part du gouvernement congolais concernant une
enqute conjointe.
Dplorant les difficults d'accs en RDC, le chef de droits de l'homme de l'ONU a
annonc l'envoi la semaine prochaine d'une quipe dans la rgion pour rencontrer les
personnes qui ont fui les attaques.

Addressing Human Rights Council, UN rights chief

decries some States lack of cooperation
por: - leia na ntegra
6 June 2017 In a major address in Geneva, the United Nations
human rights chief today stressed that denying access or not
cooperating with UN bodies would not diminish scrutiny of a
Governments human rights record.
Addressing the 35th session of the Human Rights Council, Zeid Raad Al Hussein,
decried some Governments for cutting off or selectively choosing how they cooperation
with his office and UN bodies.
It would be intolerable if delegations were to conclude that by maintaining minimal
engagement with the human rights mechanisms they can evade or betray those
commitments to their own peoples, and to the peoples of the world, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights said in an oral update this morning to the Council.
He underscored that every Government is party to at least one of the nine core human
rights treaties and has accepted that it is the duty of States, regardless of their political,
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and
fundamental freedom.
Mr. Zeid noted that the world sees increasingly the results of discrimination, deprivation
and injustice in the escalation of crises and suffering, and the outbreak of war.
Whether or not individual leaders consider this truth convenient, it is nonetheless a fact
that denial of human rights in one county concerns every State in the Organization, he
stressed.
With a mandate from the international community to promote and protect all human
rights, his office (OHCHR) represents the worlds commitment to universal ideals of
human dignity. Its thematic priorities include strengthening international human rights
mechanisms; enhancing equality and countering discrimination; and early warning and
protection of human rights in situations of conflict, violence and insecurity. It also
supports the work of UN human rights mechanisms, including the Human Rights
Council.
Taking place at the UN Office in Geneva, the Councils session will last three weeks
and tackle a range of human rights issues currently before the world.
Refusal to cooperate with UN bodies
The senior UN official also spoke out against some Governments decisions to keep UN
rights experts out of their borders, and rallied against absolutely unacceptable
incidents of threats and insults directed at UN Special Rapporteurs.
I strongly contest the self-serving argument presented by some, that this Council
should avoid addressing country situations a view which is usually voiced by leaders
of States that feature few independent institutions, and which sharply curtail
fundamental freedoms, he stated.
He specified, for example, the Government of Burundi, which was elected to the
Council in 2015, yet continues to commit some of the most serious human rights
violation dealt with by this Council and has suspended all cooperation with the Office
of the High Commissioner (OHCHR).
In September the Councils independent mission was declared persona non grata, and
the current Commission of Inquiry has not been able to enter the country, Mr. Zeid
added.
He noted a number of countries which are not members of the Council, which have not
permitted any visits by Special Procedures representatives, such as Special Rapporteurs.
Included in this group is Syria, which has cut off access to OHCHR and the Syrian
Commission of Inquiry.
This is notwithstanding the continued horrific suffering of the Syrian people,
particularly in besieged communities. I repeat my call for the release of all detainees
wrongfully imprisoned in Syria, Mr. Zeid urged.
As for the already-dire situation in the Kasai provinces of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), which continues to deteriorate, spreading to other provinces and
across the border with Angola, Mr. Zeid said that given the difficulties in accessing the
areas where violations and abuses are occurring, he will be dispatching a team to the
region next week to meet with people fleeing the attacks.
Unless I receive appropriate responses from the Government regarding a joint
investigation by 8 June, I will insist on the creation of an international investigative
mechanism for the Kasais, he stated.
Turning to representatives of his office, Mr. Zeid expressed very serious concern about
intimidation and reprisals brought on by State officials against people who engage with
the UN on human rights. He specifically mentioned smear and hate campaigns against
the Special Rapportuers on Myanmar, Summary Executions in the context of
discussions on the Philippines, and on Iran.
When Government or other officials intimidate, arrest or harm these individuals, they
are attacking a fundamental element of the work of this Council and the UN, and it is
our responsibility to do all we can to protect them, Mr. Zeid said.
He noted also that the Councils next annual report would focus on reprisals, and called
for cooperation with Assistant Secretary-General Andrew Gilmour, who is leading UN
action on that issue.
Condemning terrorism in all forms
Mr. Zeid began his address with a strong condemnation of terrorism throughout the
world.
The brutality of Daesh [also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or
ISIL] and other terrorist groups seemingly knows no bounds, he said.
Yesterday, my staff reported to me that bodies of murdered Iraqi men, women and
children are still lying on the streets of the al-Shira neighbourhood of western Mosul,
after at least 163 people were shot and killed by Daesh on 1 June to prevent them from
fleeing.
After condemning the attacks, he called for Governments to eradicate the threat, but he
cautioned against trampling on peoples rights.
Please remember this: for every citizen wrongfully detained under a vague anti-
terrorism law, and humiliated, abused, or tortured, it is not simply one individual who
then nurses a grievance against the authorities, but most of their family too. Send one
innocent person to prison, and you may deliver six or seven family members into the
hands of those who oppose the government, with a few who may even go further than
that.
The UN Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the UN system
responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the
globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations and make
recommendations on them. It was setup by the UN General Assembly in March 2006,
and replaced the Commission on Human Rights.
The Council is made up of 47 UN Member States which are elected by the General
Assembly.

La ONU pide a Venezuela que permita la entrada de

una misin al pas
por: - leia na ntegra
06 de junio, 2017 El Alto Comisionado de la ONU para los
Derechos Humanos seal este martes que la creciente crisis de
derechos humanos en Venezuela subraya la necesidad urgente de un
anlisis imparcial y de rpida asistencia.

Urjo al Gobierno a aceptar mi solicitud de enviar una misin de trabajo en el

terreno, insisti Zeid Raad Al Hussein.
En su discurso de inauguracin de la 35 sesin del Consejo de Derechos
Humanos, Zeid record que en los pases donde aparentemente se presentan
situaciones crticas y en los que se le niega acceso a su Oficina, la nica opcin
que resta es llevar a cabo investigaciones a distancia y basarse en los reportes
pblicos disponibles.
Por otra parte, Zeid se refiri al conflicto palestino israel y llam a acabar
inmediatamente con los 50 aos de ocupacin de Israel sobre los territorios
palestinos. Subray que un desenlace de ese tipo beneficiara a ambas partes.
Mantener la ocupacin supondr prolongar un dolor inmenso para ambos
pueblos, aadi.
Entre otros aspectos de su intervencin, Zeid conden la brutalidad de las
acciones del grupo terrorista ISIS.
CUT Una vez ms, condeno en los trminos ms enrgicos los cobardes y
enfermizos ataques perpetrados contra personas inocentes por parte de
terroristas insensibles que operan en muchas partes del mundo, seal el Alto
Comisionado.
Las tcticas contra el terrorismo deben ser encausadas de forma inteligente
contemplando el respeto de los derechos humanos, explic, ya que por cada
ciudadano que es detenido injustamente se alimenta el sentimiento de agravio
contra las autoridades.
El Alto Comisionado tambin expres grave preocupacin por las
intimidaciones y represalias que sufren sus subordinados por parte de
gobiernos o funcionarios estatales y les record que al realizar esos actos
atacan a un elemento fundamental de la labor del Consejo.