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Startin!! with the
AprIl 1 }j45 issue. the
Command and General
Staff School broadened
Its scope by publl'hing
VIEW 111 thrt'c lan
g'U3g'llS, lHlInrly Eng-
Span"h. and Por
Thl' artieks that ap
peal' In the Spanish
A111<" lean and In the
Brazilian editions will
be foun,1 that same
month in the Engltsh
This nntlPe is to ac
quaint our readers with
the fact and to insure
OUt" Spanl..:;t--Amel'ican
and Brazilian n<'igh
bors that It will be our
mo"t sincere endeavor
to the English
text faithfully, and to
produce. to the best of
our ability, a magazine
that is authodtative,
infol'111utive, interest
ing and instructive,
The b'dito/'s
,on el numero del
mes de abril de 1945, la
Esruela de Comando y
Estado Mayor ampli"
sus actividades con la
puhlicaci(lll de la MILI
tres idiomas: e:.-.panol,
portugucs e Ingles.
Los articulos que se
pubhran en las erlicio
neg hlspanoamerirana y
brasilena apareceh,n en
.Ia edicion norteameri
cana del mlsmo mes,
POl' medio de estas
de.seamos hacer
selo saber a nuestros
lectol es y. aseg-urades
a nuestros vecinos de
Hispanoamerica y del
Brasil. que dedicaremos
!Iluestro mas slncero CR
fuerzo a traduclr con
exaetitud la version in
glesa y a presentar, de
acucrdo con los medios
a nuestro alcance, una
revista autontativa, in
fOI mativa. interesante e
La Rcdacci6n
Com 0 numero do mes
de Abril de I94ii. a
Escola de Comando e
Estado Maior estendeu
seus horizontes com a
publica<,;ao da MILI
tres idiomas. 0 portu
gues, 0 espanhol e 0 in
Os artigos publicados
nas edi<,;ues brasileira e
hispano-americana apa
r<'rerao tambem na edi
<;ao em ingles do mesmo
Este aviso tem em
vista dar conhecimento
deste fato aos nossos
Ieitores e assegurar aos
vizinhos bl'asi
leiros e hispano-ameri
canos que serao envida
dos sinceros esfor<,;os na
tradu<;iio do ingles. para
apresentar-Ihes com os
meios ao nosso aJcance,
uma revista fidedigna,
informativa, "interes
sante e instrutiva.
A Redu,iio
Colonel Frederick M. Barrows
Editor. Spanish-American Edi tion Editor. Brazilian Edition
Colonel Andres Lopez Major Severino Sombra. Brazilian Army
Assistant Editors
Lt Col C. Montilla, Maj D. E . Gribble. Maj T. D. Price. Maj J. McAdams. Capt C. B. Realey,
Capt D. K. Maissurow. Lt A. D. Bettencourt, Lt L. Galvan. Lt A. Galvan
Production Manager: Maj G. M. Smith. Jr. - Business Manager: CWO C. Williams
AIR PoWER........... .. ............. .................................................................................................... Brig. Gen. R. C. Candee 3
STRATEGICAL AsPECTS OF THE FINAL CAMPAIGNS AGAINST GERMANY'....................... ........................... CoL Conrad H. Lanza 9
REPEAT YOUR INTELLIGENCE TRAINING........................................................................................ Lt. Col. James F. Miller. GSC 15
KUZUMEl MAKES THE TEAM.... _ ......................................................................................................... Col. Jack W. Rudolph, GSC 17
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES............................................................ .......................................... ................. Lt. Col. David A. Hornby. AC 24
TilE 7TH DIVISION IN LEY'TE...................................................................................................................... Maj. Gen. A. V . Arnold 30
SELL YOUR FIELD ARTILLERY WITH SPARE PARTS AND F REE SERVICING ......................... ..... Lt. Col. E. L. Hoopes, Jr FA 33
A CURE FOR SHIPSIDE CONFUSION................................................................................. ............. Lt . Col. Edmond E. Russell. TC 38
TilE PILLBOX-A TRAP............ _ ................................................................... ........................................ Lt. Col. John E. Kelly. Inf 40
PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH MILITARY LEGISLATION.... ..................... ..................................... .............................. .... I rving M. Gibson 48
THE FALL OF ORMOC ON LEYTE....................... ................... _ ............................................................................ From official reports 51
HOSPITAL SHIP COMPLEMENT.... ............................................ Maj . Sidney Robbin. MC. and Capt. Thomas G. Scott. TC 57
T HE UNIT ENGINEER...... .. .............................................. ...................................................................... Maj . Maurice W. Johns. CE 60
ARTILLERY AS AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCy.......... ................... .'................................ ........................ L t. Col. Samuel S. Edson. FA 65
WHY COMMAND INSPECTIONS? ................................................................................ ........................... Lt. Col. Leon C. Jackson.Inf 70
THE PREVENTION OF TRENCH FOOT................................................From The Bulletin of the U. S. Army Medical Department 74
AUXlLIARY PROPELLANTS.. ........................................ .......................... _ ................................................... Capt. Roy G. Tulane. Inf 76
ATTACK THROOGH WOODS ................................................................. _ ............... _......... ..................................................................... 78
MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD................................................................. ...................................................... .............. ........... 79
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS............................................... ............ .................................................................................................. .... . 85
Japanese Morale................................................................. ........................................................................... ........................... ......... 85
Military Doctrine of the Red Army.......................................................... .................... ................................................................... 89
The Air War in Southeast Asia................................... ................................................................................................................... 93
The Value of Permanent Fortificati ons............................................................................................................................................ 97
Attack on a Fortified Zone in East Prussia..............................._ ................................................................................................. 100
The Renaissance of the French Air Force....................................................................................... .................... ............................. 103
Modern Trends in the Development of Armed Forces ................................ .................................................................................... 105
RAF Photographic Reconnaissance UniL............................. ......................................................................................................... 109
Victory in the Pacific ............................................................................... .................. ..... ................................................................ .
Smoke Scrl!ens in Tank Operations............................................................... ............ ....................................................................... 115
Tt,rning the Siegfried Line ................................................................................................................................................................ 117
Jungle Fighting in Burma............................................................................................................... ................................................. 120
Artillery Support of I nfantry Attack ................................................................................................................................................ 121
Airships............................................................ ............................................................................................. ..................................... 124
Tactic8....................................................................... ........................................................... _ ............................ ....... 127
!\fA.JOlt GE1'>:I':ItAL K \Hl. TIU'ESI>I;l.l.
nHII;.\lllElt GEl'>:EIL\I. w. A. (',\\ll'BEI.I.
nR!(;AlJlEH Gl';NEltAL H.. c. CA1'>:llEE
BHl<;AlJlER GI;NER.\L A. \\'. "I;Nn;
CAPTAIN .I. 13. EAHI.E, [',,;1,,1 SIII/" .\'11/,11
COLON!';L ]\;AI.LE, ('II/'fill Y
COLON!;L D. C. SnnL\llL, Fi.ld .1/,111I'/,!1
Class /Jirec/uo;
COLOt\EL J. II. \'AN rLlET, 1"/111111''1
COLON!';L \V..J. BAIRn, III/lll1lry
COLONEL M. F. !\I 0\ EI(, .4 iJ (or/I."
LlI';lIn:NANT CUI.O'<EL .1. W. l'.\OR(;AN, Fi."" :lrtill"I!!
Faculty Chiefs
COLONt:L H. J. SnIROEDr:R, SiU/1I1/ ('lIrw
COLONEL T. DEI". ROGERS, ('OI'j'S of Rngilln"""
COLONEL L. H, COOK, In/llntrll
COLON!';L N. D, FIWST. Air ('01'/'."
COLONEL H. L. p, KING. Signlll ('or/,s
A('I ing AssIstant Commandanl
nir"t'lor, Ail' I'nstruction
DirPl'tor, Sprviee Instruetion
Din!'t"r, Naval Instruction
Din'clor, Ground Instruction
Army & Navy Staff CollpW'
MILITARY REVIB'W -- I'uhh.. hed ml,nthly by the' CommMHI and C('tlC'r.1i Stuli S('hm)] at Fort Lp<lvf'nwurth, Kansa3
Entered as matter .\ugust 31, l!J.lL <Lt til(> Pu.-.t Offke .tt Fort LpJ.vt'll\...'lJrth, under thE' .\ct flf 18i!}.
SubscriptIOn rate..,: $3.00 d'.S. 1 per J,'t'J.r for I:! No) p'i.tra ('harg"f' fur forf'lgn un new or
$-sa St-eL ueStttQIa 2
-9A.V p.teaPOOfl
UOJ:SlAM te:>l'P<nJ:9d:
Air Power
nhCl'hH", Air Inall'nt,tilln. Cilmmand Jlllll Staff Schonl
J\ I R power sllmethinp; n<,w tlll,ll'l' the
n sun. The short space of thirty-seV('ll
during which the United Stat('s
hIli! military a brief Ilt'riocl
cOllljlllr\!<! with the fifty 01' l'cntul'ies
of recorde,\ history an<\ till' ntll11hel'les8 ap;es
of ]lrl'hiRtorie life upon earth through
out whil'h I\l(,ll anti natinns have fought each
otlwl'. Alltl in (hi:,; "hort of hut a
singh- human g'l'lleration tllC'rc ha:; al'i:;cn
a n,'w military force whos" hlow,; are meas
un,t! in of of high explosive:;
shattering whole and destroying'
strnng' nlilitul!Y forl't's and \\'hose lltuchin0s,
flyillg' with allllMl lh,' ']leed of Round, find
th"i!' through the ohRl'ul'ity of dOll<\';
and darl<n,'"'' whkh lwretofon' have
redut'l'd 01' enlin'ly haltl'r\ thl' o]ll'l'ations of
\\,p havl' Iivl'd so l'l",,' to the growth uncI
d,'vl,lollmcnt of air power in th,' prt'Sl'llt war
that "',' ha\,<' ('0111<' to take it for gran!<',l. For
thoRe who hay" not bt't'll oil tIl<' cur
lcnt fit'hh; of \)attle the ]In',,, thl' nl<lio, anel
the havt' !'{'pI'odul't'll the Pl'l'ct'ption"
!1l1,1 l'e"ctions of com].at most vividly, But
most persons al't' so l'ngl'o",ed in tht' ,mall
rn,lividual tasks a;;"ignl'r,l them that tht'y
hay" little timt' to air powel' as one of
th(' few dominating ngun', in this vast pan
Gmma of World War II. In th,' hri"f space
of this article an aUl'mpt will he made to
Jll'eHmt some pertilll'nt hut gt'nerul points in
legard to th(' soure,', capahi\itks, ol'ganiza-,
tion, and employment of air power that may
have "scaped the layman,
In discussing any new or important suL
jf'ct it is advisahIe to define the' principal
terms involved, Unfortunately this is not
easy in the case of ail' power. This is Ilue not
to the fact that air power is an abstract
concept but also to the fact that it is con
stantly growing and changing with thl' <Ic
velollmeht of aeronautics and new invt'ntions
in all fields of physical Although the
concept of sea power is much ol,ler than
I! that of air power, the continuing streal11 of
books 'that are still being written on sea
power to the difficulty of defining
that term. Kevertheless, in order to have a
]leg' ol1.whit.'h to hang this discussion, the fol
lowing short definition of air power is of
fl'r"cl: "Ail' ]lower includes everything that
cont dbut"s to a nation's stl'ength in the air
or through the medium of ail'craft." From
this dt'finition it is seen that an almost infi
nite variety of hoth tangible and intangible
factors al'(> include,l in the concept.
In uljclition to organized military air
forces, thl'OUll;h which it is' applied in "time
of war, a nation's air power includes its
industrial capacity for the production of
aer,lI1autic'a.l and equip
nWI1t. It includes the manpower and the
technieal' skill required for this industrial
prodlletion. It includes the air, highway. rail.
and wat"l' shipping that transports the raw
materials and finished prodUct!'. Civil avia
tion, aidinl's, private flying, airports and
haRl's for both, are all a part of ail' power.
Th" l')eatioll of bases, military or civil, from
which air olwrations are conducted, the lo
cation and distrihution of ail'craft and mu
1litiollS faetories, of oil training
estahlishnwnb, an,l depots are also air power
faetOl's. (;eograJlhy, climate, and the polit
ieal, c'conomiC', and jlsychological attributes
of the ]leople contribute to a nation's strength
in the air. EV('n the other organized military
fO!'('t's-armies and fleets-affect and con
tribute to the of a nation in the
"air. Thu", it if; seC'll that military air forces
alone are but a small, though none the less
l'sst'ntial, purt of this larger concept of air
But air power cannot as:;ert exclusive
claim to the various national resources and
attributes that I have just mentioned. Many
0f them are also ekments in the land power
and sea power of a nation. What then. one
mig-ht ask, are the gTounds for thinking
th()l'e is such a thing as air power-distinct
from the older forms of military strength?
Why do some people and some nations see in
the'airplane the basis for a new and separate
kind of warfare-coordinate in concept and
equal in with the older of
land and sea operations? The reasons are
found in the fundamental difft:renc('s between'
ail', land, and 1<('a forces; betwl'en the air
plane, th.: naval vessel, and the basic equip
ment of combat and l{l(?omotion of the grnund
forces; and in the essential differenc!!s be
tween the ell'n1Pnts or environments in which
they move, It was lwither a('Chlent nor en
price that hroug'ht about through the cen
turies the :wpnrate tlevelopllwnt of fleets Hnd
armies; rather it was the inhlrent physical
differencps in their Rl1ITOUn,lin1!,'s Hn,l the
for using different weapons ami
vehicles and diff('rent and skill.
Men who follow the profession of arms.
ashore and atloat, inl'vitably Cl'{'ate "lwciul
iZl't! materiel, methods, and Ol'1!,'anization,.; to
fit the p('culiar l'l'f)uil'el1ll'nts of their opera
tions and Thi, l'l',ultcti in
funuaDlelltal ditl'.. l'{ne.. " hdwl'l'n land and
sea forc!'s, The ,hordinl' mark" clear a
division lll'!w('en th..,,,l' two fOl'ces as it do('s
hetwet'n the ('klllcnt" on which they fight. In
th" same way. man's new ability to fly pro
vides the ha,:is of a new kiml of military 01'
gallizatiol1-iliffel'l'nt fl'om eillher armies or
flet'tfl. Aircrafts al'e by ail.. naval
craft float in tll(' water, and g'l'Ound unit"
operate firmly upon th.. earth. To this
condition, fllllon1!,' oth('r" i,: tnlc('ai.]P th!' fact
that comoatant air, spa, and land for('t,; are
:.1>< fundal1l('ntally diff('rPllt frolll PHch other
as are the gases, liquids, and which
support them.
Since thp distindive nature of its organ
ized combatant forces is the chief feature
distinguishing air power from lan,1 and sea
power, it is to military air forces that we
must look for an understanding of the capa
bilities, limitations, and organization of air
power, and its adaptation to war. And while
considering what can and cannot be done by
air power in the broad sense, and by the or
ganized combatant air forces through which
air power is made manifest in war, it is well
to bear in mind the distinction' between these
two terms, "air power" and "air forces,"
that are so often confused in popular usage.
The capabilities and limitations of air
powel' have ueen" matters of speCUlation an.l
(:ontrovel\sy since the first flight of the
\'{right ul:others in 1!J03, It was uut natul'al
during the early years of aviation that mIll
have held widely ,Hift>ring views eon
l'e1'l1ing its future. They hall hall no actual
(:,perience with air warfare on which to' ha-i.'
informed or expert Opllllon, Their vicw,
conl,1 hut reflect the 1lll'aSU1'e of their imag
ination or emotion. The World War,
1!l14 to H1l8, was and .,.1
only to conn I'm most people in their previous
beli..r!'l or prdutlices regarlling tlJ(' impor
tance of air power as a factor in war. Nevl'r
our enemies-Germany, Italy, and
,Japan-had th.. fOl'egight to huild, and the
to employ. air powel' un,l air forces ,,0
to uef)uil e trl'mendon;; advantage in tIlt'
,ta1!,'i's of the pl'Psenl conflict.
(it'nnan nil' POWl'l' -l'l!al O}'
\\ a, to rOlllp'!l Britain to try to ap
l'l'a,c Hith'l' at :\[llnieh in ID::H. Gl'l'man :!lr
J)()W('l'- l'{lal OJ' hu:.. a
factor in bring-ing about the Soviet-l;crman
...don in air
1)O\\'ll'-1110rC' apparent than (1'(..ul- an
l'ffeetive thn'ut for 111 the :\ledit('l'
ranean an'a, in hoth diplomatic and military
until its actual ,t!'eng'th !li,
('overed and The failure of eer
many',: Lnftwaff(', F\ comhination with h,,1'
lan,l llnd ,,'a force,. to win decisive victo!'y
{.ver En1!,'lan!l in 1H40 Was till'! not so mnch
to the actual or potcntial llli1!,'ht or
of German air power as it was to Nazi mis
calculation of the defensivl' of the
Royal Air Force and the rugged character
of the British peopk. Japan('se air power
much stronger in fact than in the calcula
tions of our military men prior to December
1941-dealt us a staggering blow in opening
the long-predicted war in the Pacific. Para
doxically, in her shattering air attack at!
Pearl Harbor, Japan sealed her own doom
by awakening the United States from its
twenty-year-Iong self-induced military slu,m
The precise capabilities of air power can
not be measured with accuracy_ Too many
and intangible factors are involved,
\IR l'OWlm
nnd what lil's bt'rvlHI tIl<' hvrizoll of llC'rO
ll:lutical dl'vt'I')jllllt'llt i, al,o. ht'YIllld illHW:
illation, But the conl'ret<' Hl'hil'vl'lllt'nt, of a it,
ha\'\.' hl'Cll viYidly and
Pl'O\'l'l1 c1ul'ing: the' pa.... t livt' It}!}/.!.' \\:\1'
The {:f'l'Blan Ail' Foree dl''''il'\)ycd tht' 'Vl'akl'l'
aviation iUlll1ldiatlly Ht'lPt \vat'
::-tadl'd in I ..... ioll t IOt)p .....
rHI'ril'd to "'''r\\"H.I' and H"llalld I,.\" I h., I.lIf\
watl,!', ,dthin a f,,\\ 11<>lIr, tilt'
of d{f(llbt.' Ill" llllhapp.\' l-tlttll
(;cl'nlall aviation ... :thk
to tIlt' pallZI'I' that
F'l't'neh l'l.lsbtatlt'v in a Blat tt'I' pf day ..... Hnt!
It'd to th(' di",,(<,,' "r 1IIIIIk<'r'lIl", :\azi ail'
f1t'!'t" 1,lm;tpd [o:ngll,h .. il iv, alld lIt! .'all-Ilt'd
Iil'itain's bland (It,f''I1' ... , '" Ih".\" h"d lint
Iwen thr('all'llt'd for a IllI,u,alld .I"'" I',. III It II
1H'1' hopv. if not lit'" alld dt.,tt.'l'lHintl
t 1011. \nq'll all but Itl:-:t. (i{'rnl.ln !o!lt!'-l
ail'l'l'uft "I'ui,,''] Ih" :\olth ,\II,,"lii 1'oul."
a:-. \\'(,,11 a .... tht' rIal !'in\" ..... (.:\ ..... to .... talk thll ,it'
ti1l1:-' of t-Iw :\azi .... ulllllat in' ........1:lPilllt'-..t' ail'
naft t 11<' proud H"il i,h "''1011:11 ,hip'
Pl'il1t't' of and .... t. :llld in {'l'lll
plinj.!' (jUt' pl'l'-\\al :\"V)', I'"d,,'all.l' IlII,dilit'd
olt)' ",h()h: Paeifk plan,
Thc'H' :111" lit IHI!' .... t ;U.!.L!t'l ill;..!" 111(1\\ ....
of :\-..;:i:-:: air furn':-. LI'HlI:!ht aHt.!'lli .... /l to tIlt>
IW'lIb of ,\liil:d lh,l! h"o! failt-o! tn
h('(d tht' warnin.t,!':-' of tht' proplwt .... of ail'
po\vcr. But with prtldll!io!l..... lv:-.\)lutinll.
{'nl'J'g'Y. and g'ttnitt:-., we ::-l't :i1H!lIt dvv{lnpill}.!'
the potpntial of Ollr aViation and
n']'ltl'(l which thl' :\azb had he
littled as Wl' had ulId.. rJ':ltt'd tllt, dl'j.!'t'l,,, of
their pl'el'al't'dnl'" alld the <'1I01'Illit,\' of tlwil'
('vii plll'pm;l'S, Xot ,oon, \Jut at long tlIP
tide ,,1' \Vat' tUI'l1(,d in tl1l' ..\lIil'" favol' alld
<'Ul' ail' power l'erfnrn1l'd 111 th..
und "ll<'l'at iolt of (llll' Hlt'
Fight"I' ainTaft wel'e "Illpped and flown
fron1 AnH'rie:.t in eVPl'-illert' a:-.ill}1.' l1tllllhel's to
holster the' dwindling' of Eng-Ialld,
Eg-ypt, and Allil'd 110mlieI" IIc'g'an to
strike damaging: 1110\\ S OUl' ellclllh,,:-;
in 1<:urop(", Afril'a, and the l'acilil', Army
I,omhel's joined with Xavy
planes and the RAF to s(,pk and sink till'
V-boats that were starviltg' the British Isles,
:lIu-chant v('sse1s hastily converted, and new
1!iI'('I'aft caniers built with incr('dible speed,
:';'Ilal'ded OUI' vital convoys across'th(' oceans,
,\ ir tl'llnsport Illalll's canied ammunition in
hours from the l:nite<l States to
Egypt tn tip the ,cales in favor of Britain's
d{':-'Jil'l'Hlt' defl'l1Sl
again:--t the Xazi'g farth
",t ddvl' towal'(! the vital Suez Canal and
til<' oil lOr the "'("ar East, A,nll tinaIly, in this
t1pl\lU..,iv(' pt'l'iod of OUl' Anlel'ican
,\1'111,\' alld l\avJ' aircraft, land-based and
l :ll'I'i"I'-IIol'lI. I Ul'lll,d haek .1 apan's offensive'
1I,'d, at idwa \' alld tIlt' Sololllon Islands,
,lopping' th., thrust aj.!'ainst our life
LIll' to the !'\outhwC'::-t Pacitic.
l.at'k of 1II','vl'nt, Ibting all thl' kinds
111' at'litllI and a('hh'v(lments of nil' po\ver
<l ftt), \\'(-' thl' :-.tl'uttgic oifenf'ive in
Vllli<'ll" thcakn; of op('rations. It is enough
tn poiltt ollt that we bla,t('d Germany from
th., all' and 0111' far beyond
Ill<' I'anp:c of the weapOllS of our surface
to <lttHt'k the of' 'Xazi mili
llll\\"l'!'-airCl'aft, and vehicle
ra..tori.,,,, and oil. ball hl'aring', stppl, and rub
I,.... it'S, altd ..Jl'etric power and trans
IH'rt'l\loll ,."stI'IllS, Alliell forces pl'<,pareo
the way and .ioillPd in the asoault on Fortress
1':11101''' liy Allil,d ground ana naval forces
III the gTealt"t alllphihious attack of all
tin1<', Our (l',)OP ('alTiers airborne
divisions ,,\,('1' greatcr dIStances and with
11101'C' pl't..'ci::--iun ulld t'tTcl'tivencs:-. than v:ere
('V,'I' achieve,1 IIy the ing'l'niotls GI'rl1lanS, On
the ot h,,1' shle of the wode!, ail'. land, and sea
fOl'ce" c()mbilll,tl to isolate and kill the J aps
in island after island and has(' after base
untIl :llacArthul' once again stands firmly in
tIlt' PhilippilH's, and the relllnants of the
Xav:,' have been' driven back on
t h(' d"uhtfnl jll'otl'ction of its weakpned home
Thl'ouj.!'hout all t}wse offensive
"peration" Allil'II ail' pruvided in
l protection ag'ainst Axis air at
tack on our surface forc,'" Air transport
Ill(}VP.! important staff and (:ombat r,el'sonnel
and ill volllnlE' to the com
hat and has been of incalculable
importancl' in th(, evacuation of sick and
wounded, thus boosting both the morale and
tl1<' c"mllal of th,' tkhting- forces,
If emphut'is been placed on till' capa
bilities UlHI dee,ls of aviation, and the g-rent
growth and aC'hicVl'nll'nt, of laud and st'a
force>' in this Wat' hav" h,'pn npg'\t'ctt'd, it
onl)' h<'l'ause the suh,it'd of this if'
air powey. OUI' in the
forct's of tilt' ArlllY and :-\avy hav(' hOln('
tht'ir triab in hatth' with no I"" ,'ourag'p and
tenadty than haYt' tIlt' ail'll1l'n, and lanel and
l'ell fore,',; have fat' ".'\"I'<'Ikd all p",t mili
to tht' liluitntion:-:. of' ail' pn\\"t'I'. WP have
s('en the of air ron'''''''' tl) :ll'l'(Hllpli:-:h
SflnHI of for whil'h hlnd and H'H
are <H'g'aniz,'') 'lllt! "'lUIPP".!'
JU1't a:4 only ail' forep" call opl'ratl' in the
field of air ,'oillhat and at I an)!"" Ilt':;ond till'
reach of pitl1l'r land and ,,'a 1'01<,<'" -0 ail'
units al'(' inf"l'ior to the latt,'r in of
thl' ('olltilat Hnd ;o.PI'\'iet' opl'ratttlH:-- til'
fact.' and are \\ hnp,\' itH.:apablt of cal
j'ying: out ....-otllp of thl' lhual t:l!,}.;: .... of at tnip ....
::nd tll'P!', .-\\thoug'!! all tint'" ("O!'l'P' -land,
:-:ea, and produl'(d }'t::--lIlts dHl'jllg'
this war which. hy old WI'!'l' Ill'
lievl'd the' ntlVl'lty wpH as th,'
important'" of ib opl'l'ations f'l'l'fjul'lltly
tUl'nl',1 th" "potIi)!'ht on ait, I)<I\\'('}', Its fu
pos"ihilitit" are lh lilllitl<" as the sky
which is it, fi .. ld of Hut <lUI' I'X
pel'il'nce ,lul'ilH\' thl' past fiv(, yeat's pl'ovidl's
no sound for a ('oHC'lu:--ion that :-;trong
ef1<!lnit,!-- cun he hl'att'n hy ait, action alol1P.
Thf' vast ruction I)l' (;el'llian indu,trial
eRtahlishllll'nts hy ail' homhing' l'ould not h,'
fully appn'C'iat ..d ul;til the ('ollap>,' of :-\azi
dom permitted of th,' dalllllgc, But
ail' pOW"I' did not alolw eaUl't' th,' ,'olllplett'
stoppag<' (If :-\azi urhan activitil'S no\' tIll'
('ol1lpld,' c"llap,,, of {;"I'lllan nl<>l'HI(', It takes
all availahlP ail' 1>0\\'('1' plus land and ","a
P(lW"}' for vil'lory in llltHlet-ll \\'ar, In union
thel'f' iR alld th... st of each
fprce-Iand, sea, and l1IultipliC'd whpll
joincd with th.. others in til<' fulfilllll'llt of a
common plan,
Having' consid,'rl't! th,p natun' of air power
and tht', t'llpabilitil'" of ail' fol'ct'", Ipt U1' tllrn
to th(' of their ol'j!l\nization, By organ
ization i;;, meant the structure of authot'!ty
and control within an aggl'Pgation of parts,
and tIlt' inlel'l'erntionship of part" Ily
which eOl1lman,1 lIn,l coordination al'(' made
an,\ more throughOllt the
\\ holt> g'roup, Orgnnic strllctui'e determinl'd
the purpose which the organiza
tion exist" and abo by the eguipllwnt and
tvchniqlll'" uvuilahl(' for its liSt':
Bl'I'ore consilJeol'ing' tht' inlt'rnal 01 ganiza
Lon of ail' fon'es, It't us examine their 1'('1,,
tilm to tlw older lund and fore"s, Histol i
ail' forct's dl'vploped first within and ""
Pllt'\>' of tIll' two old"I' sPI'vicps, It has !""'ll
widely m'l'eptl'd in the TJ nited States until
the l't'"",'nt wal' that the g'l'llcral fUllCtit)l'h
of an pertain tu hUHl alld
tht' l:!'l'l1t'ntl fUlletion:.-) of a navy to sea opt.ra
t Tht' rang'p of and thtl doetrint,.'
of of lund 'and ,,'a forces will
alway:-. pl'event tht' ('olnhat opl'rations (If
(,lth"I' flolll ('v('l'lupping far into th,' pal'tien
lal' til'ld of tIl<' "tht'I', Th" of tli"
and "Vel' ait'cI'uft and
air hl't\V('cn our Anny and ::\uvy
\\'a:o: ag:o wht'n tht.'
eapahilitjps of ail'cI'aft limitl'd thl' lattt'r 10
lllinol' . 'UPPOI't of tlwil' parPllt
But ho\\"pv{\l' propel' havt'
I"','n tIl<' pa!'ly ,Ipportioning of aviation b,'
tw,'pn the two traditional tl1<' in
"I'pa'l' in tl1<' rang" atHl the ,It-structive powpi'
of the' airplarw no\\' providl' thl' for a
'-'t'JHll'tHe fol'c{:}. are lal'g'c ail'
radil'all:; diifel'Pllt in l'fjuipm ..nt and Ol'g'aniza
t ion .from land and ,,'a i'm'e,'". hut their ahility
to attack till' ohjectives of both armie1' and
and al"o to targl'ts far,lll'yond
the !'ang" of eitht'r, is sountl atIditionalreason
for ('rpating a stl'ong' national ail' component
di,tinct fl'om both th,' Army and the
The War Departl1ll'llt has t'eeognized thp
distinct nature and capahilities of ail, fOl'cI"
and within tl1<' Arl1lY has as
a element coordinate with the A
(;round Forces and the A t'llly SCl'vice Force"
:-\(1 long-el' b aviation I'egard..a as on" of the
ground arms 01' services, Th" Wal' D('part
Blent has gone even farthl'j' in its appreciation
(If the }ll'",,,ent stalus and future possibilities
of ail' IlOWt'1' and l'eeonlllll'nciL,d to the
major and radical reorganization of
. lillI' ttl'nH'd This r('organization would
a Dcpartnll'nt of the Arlllcd
to int'ludL' thl'PC ('ool'<linate comhatant
.. ArlllY, till' Navy, and tIll' Ail'
FClI'ceH-and a [oul'lh l'Ollllltlncnt of (''l llaI
ilHpOl'tallt'(I, namely. a Sl'l'Vil'{i of lOllHllon
("ool'diuatiol1 of thtl and taetit .... of
!lI'lltip, and !lcvts lig'hting in a colllllllln th('atel'
"I' opl'ration"'ha,, always lll'l'n a dillicult pl'oh
It'Ill, ThiH lll'oblelll has hl'('11 l'olllplicate(1
by the a<lflition of ail' fol'L'C'" \\'hil'h opcl'ate
\\ ith (-'qual eHse OVI'I' hoth land and :-.{.'a arl'as:
\\,hl'1'<.' ('Ollllnand of t h()t'-e ai I' i'O}'l'f.':'>
" div(dc'd lwt \\'L'l'n tit" land and spa ('0111
mand"I''', Snlutitln of tIll' )lrohll'ln in till' titold
h"c I>('l'n found hy pla('ing all fOI'l"',,-lanll,
;--l'H. alld ail'-in one tl1l'.atl'l' undt'l' the
t iolla} ('ont rol of a :-.in,..dt' tlwatl'" eOlltl11
II It" i, ,u"ordinal<' to Iwith,'r the Will' 01'
Hl'pal'tnl(lnt:-;, hut to a ('Ollllllllll
.. ;h the f'ncitit- to tilt> .)Olllt Chid"
"I' Statr th(' PI'l,,,jdl'llt and in
Europe to tht, COlllhint'<I ('hid, of StatL 1111
llIediate ('outl'Ol of tl1<' Twentkth Ail' POI'tl'
Su}It'l'fort whkh fronl
and within llln}'l' than ont'" theatl'l', is
taim,d I,y the .J"int of Staff th"l1l
",lve,;, TIll' \\'al' ll<>partnwnt'" proposal would
provide tIll' "allle unity of command at the
national lllilital'Y lc-vd during 1'('aCl'
tiJll(, a,:.; h-; now found in ,val', and
tIl<' unity of command in \Yu,hington
a, in the fit'ld,
Although lund, ,;ea, and ail' force,; bhould
he handled ,li,;tinet and cool'dinatt' l'lenH'nt,;
at 'each level of command, it 'l1ot follnw
that {'ueh plan and l'Oll!lnl'l its OPl'l'!I
independently of thl' otl1<'I', Quitc the
('ontrar:) tl'Ut', Thl'ir "cveral
be coordinated thl't)ugh a COllllllOll aim
and a COIlllllon plan, \Ve find in military or
ganization, just as in thllt of the nOll-military
it be commerce, indu"try,
,'ducation, Ol' any otil('1' fil'ld of endeavor
that it is neeessat'y, in order to develop the
greatest technical efficiency in hoth personnel
and equipmCllt, to separate a large mass of
)Hell and nlatel'iel intu diffcl'cRt groupings,
l'uch base,1 on of machines 01' tech
This administrative or technical
,'rganizatlon, 1'11<'n, ff})' the most effective
c'l11ploynll'nt of thi" in one 0)' more
area", all tIll' l'lcments operating
ng'aillt-it g'iVUH ohjeetiv(' in eaeh area rnust
he !>roue;ht undcl' u ,ingle eommandel', This
i" orgunizati,)t1 for a common mi>;sion, 01' task,
Only through the l'xbll'nl'c of a l'otlltllon aim
"'HI lllutual cooperation uIHll'\, a single direct
i}lg' lu . .'nd cun. the gTcatc:-;t effectiveness be
"htained from thc \,U!'ious eomponents of a
large and c0111plex ul'g'anization.
Lt,t us turn OUl' attl'ntion now briefly to
till' intel'nal organization of the ail' forces of
the Army and the t>\uvy. Suffice it to hcre
that lluval ail' and al'e very
,'lo,,,ly illtt'!'\\'OVt'n within tilt' fabric of naval
cd'l.!,anizutioll and l'OIl1111:.tnd. The 1110lnentous
of OUI' naval ('01'('", in the \VL':;tern'
!'aeil;,' in I'('('"nt month" al't' proof of the
of ,;u('h organization, In the
:\avy, airnart have hl'en kept as an integral
pal t of the tll'ets atul until thi, war were
l""d pl'ineipally in ,UppoI't of ,UI fucl' opcra
tiDI", !lO\\'<'\'L'I', naval task built
:ll'onnd tilt' "l1lplnYlllent of aireraft eal'riers,
have incn'a:-.ed g'l'uutly in !-tize and importance
t" compared with task fOI:C('S of other kinds,
In the Army, 011 the othL'l' hand, full scope
for th,' op,'ration>, of ail' fOl'ces would be
jlllpo,,,il>lc' \\'l'l'(' thl'y tied to the ground armies
or gl'Ound task fOj'ces in t'aeh theater, The
of tllt'atL'r air forees include both
til(' "trnt<'gil' operatiuns far beyond the imme
diate operations of ground forces and the
taelical ail' openltion,; dpsigl1l"\ to help the
armies within theil' hattie areas, Hence we
tin,l the bulk of the Army air units organizer!
into two major types of ail' comnH\l1d: stra
tegic and tactical ail' fOl'ces, A nd as long as
the nil' foree is capable of serious
offen,ive bomhing, an ail' defenst' command
c01l1prbing day and nig'ht interccpter fighters
is l'('fjuil'ed ill each theate!'. Two additional
major COlllllHll1ds, whel1 the war
rants, are the troop carrier units fo1' airbol'ne
operutions and coastul 01' antisubmarine
for safeg'ual'ding coasts and shipping.
The structure of internal organization of, air
forces const.anth' changing to I1W('t til!'
nc\v sit.uations that 111011crn \\Ul'faI'll inc..

Thl' final topic in the Inoa.\ sul',it'd of ail'
powel' jg that of the Ill'illciph's and malllll'r
of it;; "lllploYlIll'nt. It was parlll'I'
that tlw allotnll'llt of nul jonal "HII'l'PS alll"lll!;
land, spa, and ail' fOI'cl" j, a matter of
national policy, So, too, i, the' applkatioll or
the principles of, \\'HI' to the lll'lllll.'l' or
l'lllploying ou)' national a\'lall<lll, (htly 11ll'
nation as a whole, aeting' th1'01H;1I natiollal
legblation suppol'l.,.1 by apPl'opl'iatiollS, "an
decide the objectives of 0111' national ail' PO\\ l'I',
Shall it be usp,1 to CO<'!'t'l' and dl"troy thl'
\veaI,el' (;t'l'lnany tiMid Ilt'I':';'! Or
,hall it hl' uscd only for til<' d"fl'nsp ,of ottl'
national IpI'l'itol'Y and til'l! of Olll' in
this hl'lllbphel'l'? Shall \\'(' build OUI' llll' Corl'l'
enol1gh to 111t'l'l our t'tll'lllil':-- at allY
time'-lll' \\'" l'i,k ddl'at by havine:' too
expan,l a tol(en pl'aedinll' ail'
a hundt'{,dl'o!,1 aftvl' t Ill' ha,
a "rippling' blow'? Shall \\'C' L,' PI'l'P"I''''.! \0
lead with OUl' Ii,( or only wilh Olll' t'lllll'! TIll'
policy b l'xppn,iv(', hut the !allvl' lIlay
be fatal. Shall we "Pnt'l'ntrall' our lilllitl,d ail'
strength ill thl' t'nit ..d Stal,", or
it thl'oug'hout (h .. w(ld'! If Wl' adopt till'
latter Wf' (H.'quil'! ill :-;tnl
tegic un'as, Shall w(> 1'1 ,)vid" fol' lItl>'
foret"'! TIll'1I We' lllU"t maintaill adl''lUa!l'
S(ll'vicc fn]'(.. HncI a ;-;t ronCo ::\Ien'hant :\I a l'inp.
Shall \\'C' give Ilel'd to '" we did
\vhen \v.p huilt ou!" ail'craft fal'tol'ie:-
in the interior of til!' country, 01' \\'('
court hy loeating vital illdu>'t
near the where elilllatic conditions and
the lahol' marl(et are mOl'!, plea,ant? Shall we
simplify our structure and fa
cilitate cooperation hy givIng It'gi,lativl'
J'ecognition to our ail' forces as coordinatl'
with 01;1' lund ancl sea all tt!1,lPl'
a single head, or shall w(' continue to
divide the direction of our ail' power l)(>(\\'e(' II ,
the Army ancl the whose ha"ic l'oillhat
functions arc divided hy the coastline mth'!!'
than being determined by the single purpose
of defeating a common enemy? These are
questions of national policy which may weI!
II" pund('n,d by of our g'l'l'at de,
Thb' war, the fir,.,t conflict in 'which
"il' Jltl\\l'l' ha, heen " major factor, ha,
\\'l'iclll'd l"t:lhlishcd 11l'inciple8 of tactics,
'll'atl'!.!,, und ol'g'unizatioii and found them
suUII,l, ncpl'alcu 01' successful
"ii' q"'I'ations have abo pI'oduced what ap
i,l"'" to he principles applicahle particularly
10 ail' ",a!'fare, Time and fUl'thC'r test will
l,,,t,lloli,h thc validity of these new principles,
It would l!;1 ,implify the wOl'k of making
military del'isiol1' if we jlossessed fixed 1'ules
1'01' tit" ""lcct iOIl of ail' fot'ce ohjectives and
lal'l!;l't>, !lut in the IOIlg' run such simpJ..
PI',"'(',lut'l' woul,1 ollly play into the hands of
an al"r! pnl'lllY, Each prohlem must be solved
"II it, oWIl fadm's, It i, Olll' thing to stud,'
alld kIIOl\\' tit" pl'inl'iplt,s (If OUI' pl'of('ssiolb
,,1101 a 11I"l'l' dil1il'ul! ta,k lo apply tlll'lll with,
.\il' PO\\('.'l' pl'uviclPH a longel' ann for stl'H.
ill", lI11lital'Y hlows than has l'Vcr existed ill
I h,' 1""1. It' hrillg' within rang'e e!1L'my objec.
of a kitHI nl'VCI' \wfol'e attainable, It
.,0 iOllgl'1' necessary to destroy 01' defeat hos
t dl' 'tll'fal'l' forcl's heforE' stl'iking directly at
the 11<'''I,t 01' jugtllal' vein of thl' enemy, Thb
fad, in ttllll, higher headquarters
1"I aill di I'l'I'[ eont 1'01 of IOllg-range ail' forces,
It for this l'l'a,on that not only the specific
ol"'l'ltl iOll' of small ail' fOl'cl's are sometimes
I)ll"(" ih .. d by th,'atl'l' eOml1HlIHlel'S but that
tIll' I'lallnine; of operations and the supervision
and ('"ntl'ol of tIl(' TWl'lltieth Ail' FOl'ce are
l,,'pl in till' hands of our Joint Chiefs of Staff
in \\';),hillglol1, An,1 the, destruction, for
instanl'l', of production of petroleum p)'oducts
in (;l'I'nl<lny, being' a matter which affected at
ib roots the ahility of our Nazi enemy to con
duct all a'pt'rls of his war against us, led i
('V('J1 the hig'hest Allied authorities themselvcs I
to plans for the strategic employment
of AlIil'<l Air Forces in Europe.
The hi"tol'Y of air power is Its
future is ohscure, But Kipling spoke with
the voice of prophesy when he said of air
POW('I', "We arc at thc opening verse of the
opening pagl' of the chapter of endless pos
Strategical Aspects of the Final Campaigns
Against Germany
N 1 March 10-15. three major offensives
)I'cn' undcr way ug-ainst Germany. one
('!!eh on thc w(,,,tel'n. southern. ano' eastern
The Wl'stel'll Allie,; conducted the
tit:st two. under the dircetion of the Chief,;
of lloard in Washinc:ton, Hussia con
dueted the third. There was linisoll between
tht' westcl'l\ Allie" and Ru"sin hut there \Va>;
till joint ('OmmalHl. They \\'ol'Jwd
and with somewhat difl'crent strateg'ic points
uf vicw.
The pl'ineipal mi%ion of the wes(CI'II Al
lies was (0 crush Gcrmany, '1'I11il' main fOl'ce
\\as Ill! the w!"tel'n front. As lwar as can
he fron) iit!lIl'c;': far },plen:->cd,
the ,\llil's had, includine: Frcnch (roops.
million::> tlf nll'II, an
,'Jlcmy who h, ..! about two lllilli"Il', Oil (h"
,outhl'l'll front. about :l50,OOO (icl'lllans fa{'ed
at lea,t half a lllillinll Alli""
Ditl'C}('Jlt'llS ill llulllhers dll nllt .... l1tlil'iently
indicate the real difi'ercnce in stl'"ndhf;, In
thc ail', thc Alli(', ha,l ull(li,!,utcll oupcrioritr,
Thcil' plam', could g'" Hnywl1<'re at tilllC,
superio}' was the air fOl'l'e 0\'('1 that of
the cn('my that \lUI' troops could march and
mllneU\'Cr b;.' day, while tlll' Germans WPI e
oblig'l'd til l'l'strict all mO\'pml'nts in the O)lpn,
The Allied \\'ere SllpCl'bly cquippcd
and had abulldHnt mlltol' tl'anspol'tntion, The
Gel'lllanS had motor tran"lllll'tati011, hut most
of it was 1l01l-0}lPI ating, This had l)('en
gnHlually brought about by constnnl ail'
bombing of German plants and utilities, Gel'
had built a c(,l'tain numbcr of under,
g'l'ouno manufactul'in,e: establishmento, Thpi ..
had been based ilpon expede,1 losse's
from night bombing' by the British Royal
Ail' Forcc, Nil allowance had b('en made fOI'
day bombing' which came later f!'Om the
Americall Eiy:hth all, I Fifteenth Ail' FOl:ces,
This was mOl c accurate, and \ more
destructive, than night bombing, Under these
air assaults, German production declined,
and by March it was at a low lev!'1.
Dne to luek of motor transportation, Ger
man nnits hm! but limited manenvering
capacity, Some units appeal" to have
almost none, The Germans wcre prepared
to dcfen,1 positions, On all three fronts" as
soon as their front line was either pierced
, 01' broken, German resistance rapidly van
ished, In no did the Germans have
troops in reservc who had transportation
to ell able them to concentrate against
}lPlleti a tiOl1:4.
In this situation. each of the three fronts
when brokcn through rapidly fell apart, It
was impractienble to establish a new front
in rear, as troops coult! not, on foot or with
animal-drllwn tl'anspol'tation, faJl back as
quickly as hostile forces with motor trans
pOItatinl! ,'ould advance deepct' into German
real' a1'<'as, 1\[ either was it found possible
to hold cities and other likely places as
centers of rcsistallcc or roa,1 blocks, except
in is,llated casc's, And ill lIone of' the isolated
cases whel e German troops Wl're able to hold
did this han' any material effect 'In the
final ,rcoltlt. Motor transportation was al
ways able to avoid particular areas by
dP!ourin!(' aroun(1 them, with only minor
On th(' Russian front. the Gerlllan strength
apl)('a1'S to have approache!1 two millions,
The Russian strength is unknown, It was
superiol' and, like the west
ern Allies, had supel'iol' equipment,
On both the westel'll and the eastern
front.", Allied and Russian maneuvering was
facilitated by magnificent I'oads, and in the
northel'l1 half of the f!'Onts, by g-enerally
open and flat tel'l'Uin over which motor
tl'Unsportation ("luld opel'ate. German efforts
to delay advances of thc Allies by destroying
bridgcs had little 8ll{'ceSf;, The increasingly
Iarg-e nut;lbcl' of amphibious vehicles in the
military services make them much less de
pcndent upon bridges than in preceding
wars, Even wide rivers have not been
scrious obstacles,
Dudng- the fil'st half of :\Iareh, opemtions
were on a limited scale, direct,'d
ousting- the German forces west of the Rhine
River, While the made nHmtcr
from time ttl tillie, rontilllled
to fall back sJowly and undeI'look no In l'!.!'('
scale ('ounteI'Ofl'l'nsi\'(':<, Frolll the AII ied
point of view, d(,l'P pcn<'tl'atiOlh \\'('1'(' not
}ll'ilcticabl(' ill viC'w of thl' ((,l'l'aill, whkh
was blocked by widp rivel" "nly a shol't
(listance in rpal' of the (;el'llI:tn fr,m!.
III this fighting' the (;Pl'IIJan< did
well, and \\'Pl'e able to \i'ithdl'aw the g'1'!'ntcl'
part of their troop" to 111 leal'"of (11<' Hhin,'
without ulldel'l!,'uillt!,' t'Xll'!-- .... Itl:-. .... <., ..... There
'vas (InC' (\vt.-'nt U}H",Pt'l'tl'd htlth .... Oil
7 :'.Ial'ch thp Allies t'apillred,:a hdd!.!'l' inlal'l
tht' Rhitw lll'HI' JtC'll1Ht!:t.-'ll. toeal <.'11I11
l1Hlnd(,.'r:-... aPPlt'l'iatillt!, thl' impUI'LIIll"(' Ill' thi:-
llVl'nt, da!->hed and a III l'a...;t
of (he Rhine wa, eotabll"he.I, If thl' C"IIlJaIl,
had had good llIotor tran'pIII'tali'"I, 1"(,,('1 \'e'
might have b(,l'n hl'oll!.!ht lip til I'l'''('"(' tlwil
But thl')? had Ill) lllllhih v" ....
immediatl'ly availabk, \\,<'1 e lInllh!P to
conecntl'nte as mpi<lly '''' th,' Allie:, and
were ullahll' (0 pn'\'"nt thl' hridQ'l'hcad 1'1'0111
being' daily ,'xpan<!l',L
By 1:; :\Ial'l'h th(' ,\ II i<" "Ollliollp<l th"
entil'e west bank of thp Rhitw and wel(' ready
fOl' till' tinul attllck,
.Just as the Allit's on thl' \\es( ,,10",'<1 Oil
the Rhine Rivel', thp Ru,sian annie, elm,pd
on the line of the OdeI' and !\"('bse IlivC!'"
between the Baltic Sea and o,he l\I,llllltains
of Bohl'mia, This \\'a" 11 VPI'Y g'one! line for
an offensive to\\'a I'ds the wpst. But
the westem Allie, were rendy to attack
across the Rhine ll1id-:\Iarl'h, tIl(' Rm,,,ians
were Jlot rc;ady,
South of (he honlel' betweell GerlllallY alld
Bohemia, the Germans had heen ahle to hold
a Russian offensive headed southwest fl'Om
upper Silesia and westward throug'h Slo
vakia, They themselves und"ertook what be
came their final offensive of the war, This
was south and west of the Danube in wcstern
Hung-a!'y, and employed a panzer arl11Y with
eleven al'l11ore(1 divisions, It had initial
sucee"" but failed to reach Budapest," It (lid
draw off Russian from other sectors,
Whether this wafi a matedal reason why thl'
Russians did not attack across the Odel' at
the snme tillle that the western Allies at
tacked acro,:s the Rhine is not yet knowno
Th() initial operation was the <.:'l'ossing: of
the nOI th from Cologne on :2:) c\1arch,
!lue to the kllown supel'iol' powel' of th,'
Allied artillery and ail' forces, the Germans
(,]P"t('d lIot to defend the riveI' bank, but
IIHld,' (heir til',t stand ,,'vernl miles inland,
An Allit'd inllovation was the u,:e of naval
l'ontin.!..!:ent.;o; to operate lllotnl' lauJ1ehe:-: :1<.'IU:-=: ....
the riVl'1'. Al11jlhibioll>, vehicles ('!'Os,:e(1 by
thl'il 0\\ n POWl'I, and the wh"le operation
aided b) dll>ppin(!" pal'aehut
tl'!ll>pS ill
I"par of I h" enemy, By these cOlllhillPd meall'.
hl"id!!:ehends were quickly s('cul'ed, hut thel'('o
a ftel" it took several days to hl'cak thl'OlIl!:h
the Inain Cel'lllHn litlc of 1'l
Sisianee. It \\a ....
I'ot ulltil 1 April that (he line waB dl'finitely
pit'l'ep" and Hl'nlOl' had thl'otH.!.'h tn
lIol,th and then east of the Ruhl'.
In the meantime, the Remag'pn hridg'ehead
had heen undel going' daily ('nlar."(,III('nt. At
the end of :\I:1I'<:h, a I'IlW I' there brnke thl'ol!gh
and Oil 1 April linked with that c()lIlin!!
around from th(' north side of the Ruhr b:,
advancing' al!lund the south ,ide, On 2!I
:'Ilarch the AIli"d right attacked at'I''''' tIll'
Rhine neal' the area, anci
it al"" broke through,
By:! April the Allies were 1I0t only aerO"
the Rhine in -trength but al'l1lOl'ed c1i\'isions
in north, center, and south were throug'h
the German fl'ont, and were "not only lthead
of their own troops but in n'ar of the main
So faJ' as now reported, the Allies had
l!bout twenty arlllored divisions in line abreast
nvel' a 300-mile front. They were neadr
('venly distl'ibuted on a basis of one armored
100 50 0
It , ! ! I , J I , I
100 50 0
'",.' .. ,,'

JUTERBOG .. '" '
DESSAU 1; '\
-' "-",""\
K()NIGSBRUCK 'If. 0",-'.
:(1: '!" l...-....
/j,V 'l
o 0'1-\,>0'" <">(.,....'. C.
"'" :" ","; .... \ )
: '::': .PRAGUE ;:" :(
: ....: :;.... !..
.. J>.. \)S\\\!
/\ .f\....,j :-..\-..'-" '".,
(-' ''-''' i i \.. \.. r/, \. ..
' \. v.
" 6'0
: ,,<p(
"I .
division to ea('h fift('('n mil's "l' f,'ol1t. The;;
cirded arounu defentle,] ,'enters and
and sep1irated Slll\\'-llJoving-, or nOll-llloving,
German un{tb. Th('s(' \\'e,'e tak('n
care of followinl/: infantry divisions, ea<:h
of which was equipped with ('onsiderable
motor tra'Ilsportation and could make sub
stantial daily nUI,'ehes, III some eases it was
considered advil'able to "uppkment the ill
fantry with tank units t,) reduce defended
cities more The GCl'llllln front Ul1d{'l'
these blows just disinteJ:!'l'ated. Tlwil' l'u}'pliC's
were cut off. They wen' bomhed Illereil('s,l:;.
They were seplll"ated from l'ach <lthel'. They
were unable to maneuve,. No matter what
position they elected to defcnd, the' Allic",
could concC'1l [,'at<' a su perio1' f"1'l'e in k,s
time than the German,. "ot olle position
was able to holtl for Ion!!;, althoulKh many
were b,'avely ,1('[cIl<led,
"'ith not too much fi)!htinc;, AlliC'd al'1ll0"
,eachI'd the hank:; "f the Elbe by 11
April in the vicinity of l\Ingdehul'g'. Thb
wa:; an advance-in an air line- of :200 mihl'
in twenty days, or ten miles a <lay
the breakthroug'h pel'i,)(!. Exclu<lin)! the h"cak
thl'ou/2:h period, in the last eight days 15(1
miles had bcen made, or neady t \\ enty lllilL-,
a day, l\JaXill1Ulll advance on anyone day
was fifty miles.
The we"tel'll Allies h;H] PI'l'ViOllsly aC"Pl'.!
with Russia at the Yalta conferencc not to
go beyond the Elbe in the l\lag'(]ebul'/2: arCH.
Consequentl?, althou)!h therf' was compara
tively little opposition, the advance was
halted in that sector, The Allied flanks to
north and south were yet in l'('ar of the
agreed-upon between the we,tel'll
Allies and Rus"ia. crarlually a,lvHnced
eastwards, but at the same time they /2::l\'e
more attention to explotine; theil' gains with
a view to thost' portions of Ger
many which by the Yalta agreement Wl', {'
to be permanently occupied by British and
Americans. The "n the l1ortlll'l'll flank
turned towards the sea and the approllche"
to Denmark; the Americans un<l French on
the right turned to an advance into Bavaria.
The German armies on the west were split
by the wedge driven to the Elbe, Still having
fiE\, lEW
defl'nsive PO\\'''!', tIl(> German fore",
l'l'sislt'<i, hllt their ultimate destl'ul'tion \Va,
The main ofl"'n"ive launchc'<!
01\ ,j{; /'lll'il am! was dil'ected towards Be,
lin, only >on)e forty miles away from the
line of dl'JHll'itlle the OdeI' River, .\
dirl'l't attack wa" made along the shorte"t
lilll' of apprnaeh; it also sought to envelop
B,'din f,'nm the north, A second, but not
",,'<>ndary, attack \\as launched from th..
Xeb,e Hivl'l', hnvin).'." two pmngs. The north
4..'1 n oJle. l nnlflo:--fld of large arnl0red force:-..
hl'aded 1'",' a breaktlll oug-h, amI then to Hn
attaek on Bl'llin fl'olll the south, The south
ern eolullln hC'a,led towards Dresden,
with the to head otl' German force,
in that al'C'a fron, the rear of their
nfll'tlwl'n column, l'nlike the offensive of the
\\l',tel'll Alli ..s, th,' ]{ll"sian fl'ont was nut
1. Plll iflllOLl'" lint il l:lh't' \\ 11l'11 junctions \VCl'e
('11'(,,'ted. ] 1<><",>, the Russian,
hroke thrullL!;h.
Berlin wa> ,'cneh..d on the 2:2d, and a
liel'l'l' attack was "tar[('<1 illlmediately, Thi,;
dC'\'(lopld illte) a ,ava!.!C' ,treet and
battlc whil'h l'olltinued day and nig-ht until
the fin:l1 battle on :lray when 1:l5,000 re
111Ulllill!.!.' C(,l'lnan:-- :--,ul'lendcl'ed. ThiR See11}"':
like a 1>11 IKe f"I','e to defend one city, but
had no t,
CCllll<ln General Headqtl:ll'ters was at Ber
lin. It oJlCl"ate<l in a deep ,lug-out under the
Chancl'll('ry. On 21 April, when the Russian,;
\\ cre at 11w J:!'nte, of lkrlin, fell neal'
the At the daily General Statf
Hweting. therp \\(1 ..... a dive}'gT'nCe of opinion
ttl what to do. Hitler was present, but
\\'n, in a hOjl"les:; condition, and had nothing
tIl SIU!"""t. XOI' woul,l he approve of any plan.
On April, what ,,('ems to have heen the
Jinal lll('eting took place fr0111 3 :00 PM to
N:OO PJE. Hitler was more hopeless, He
li"tl'nC'd to reports and advice and
then announced that the others could do
as they pleased. For himself, he was satisfied
that Berlin would fall within two to seven
d,'Y8; he would and fall with it. The
General Staff thereupon disbanded and went
Himmlel' went to Flensllm'g', whel'c by 24
April he had established liaison with Sweden
and had propose,1 surrender to the western
Allies. Gocring' went south to Berchtcsg'a<ien
to orll:anize thcre a eenter of resistance, but
failed to accomplish this. General Jodi joined
tr(lOps outside, a8 the roa,1 to the west was
y<'t open, and made a "e!'ious eflort to relieve
;,Bp}lin. A new Twelfth Army was ol'p:anized
of troopS opposite the American Ninth and
First Armies between Tangcl'munde and
ll('SHII Jodl ha,1 correctly guessed that the
AIlIerican8 would not C}'O:;S the Elbe an,1
'attack hi:; rcaI'. The Twelfth Ar".1Y was
ordered to advullce to the line Potsdam
Between the t\\'o Russian attacks ft'om th('
l'a,l and south of Berlin was a large lake
at ea southeast from Berlin not occupied
the Russians, The German Ninth Army was
ordered to' concentrate aU available troops
III that sector and th('n advance west to
join the Twelfth Army. A third German
arlUY tuken partly from the fronts of the
and Third U.S. Anuie:; in Saxony
was ordered to attack northwards from the
line Dresden-Gorlitz. To enable Berlin to
htlld, reinforcements were sent in, partly
dropped by air.
The southern attack met the Hussian force
specially detailed to watch for a counter
offensive in this direction. The Germans
succeeded in reaching the line Konigsbruck
Kamenz, but hatl insufficient force to go
farther, The Twelfth Army in its attack
the line Potsdam (exclusive) -Treu
pnbl'ietzen, and established a preca rious con
nection with the Berlin garrison. It was
, attacked by the Russians on both flanks. but
on the whole maintained its initial gains.
The Ninth Army completed its aS8embly and
then started west. Its preliminary move
ments had been noted by the Russians, who
thereupon attacked it from all sides. In spite
of this, in a hedgehog formation and prac
tically without motor transportation, it did
west and, not without severe losses,
joined the Twelfth Army by 2 May.
By this date, the western Allies had re
fused to deal with Himmler, but they had
ag'reed to accept surrender of German forces
by separate armies, Thereupon the Ninth
and Twelfth Armies reversed their fronts
and marched back to the Elbe, where on
:3 and 4 May they :mrrendcred to Americans.
The garrison of Berlin, without transpor
tation and practically surrounded, could not
break out, and surrendered on the 2d.
German troops in and south of Saxony
and those facing the Russians in Silesia,
Moravia, and received ol'dcrs to break
contact with the Russian armies and march
west and surrender to the western Allies.
This movement commenced on either 2 or
;J May. The Russians do not appeal' to have
noticed it until 5 May, when they started
a pursuit. The maximum distance for the
Germans to go was 200 miles. The Germans
completed this movement on 11 May, their
real: guards fighting until this day. How
large a llumber of Germans reached British
and American lines is, at date of writing,
a secret,
In the meantime, German forces in all of
north Germany reported their willingness
to surrender to the western Allies on 3 May,
and signed a surrender act effective as of
8:00 AM, 5 May. By what appears to have
been a secret advance agreement, German
General Headquarters issued in:;tructions,
and broadcast them, to allow Allied (British)
troops tf) enter Denmark and Norway with
out delay. First British troops arrived at
Copenhagen by air on 5 May,
A German general Act of Surrender was
negotiated at Reims a!'ld signed at 2 :41 All-f,
7 May. This provided for the surrender of
all German forces to the western Allies and
Russia effective as of 11 :01 PIll, 8 May,
This surrender was broadcast by Germany,
but was held secret by the Allies. pending
a ratification meeting apparently demanded
by Russia. This was signed about midnight,
8-9 May, near Berlin, at the local Russian
command post. It has not been made public
at date of writing.
German forces-two armies-in Aus;triu
sUl'rendered to American forces on 5 ::'IIay,
On 1 March the Allies hel,I a line across
the neck of the Italian JWllinsula. There were
no important operations until 9 April when
the Allies commenced an otl'en8ive on the east
flank. On 16 April the attack was ma,le gen
eral along the entire front. It had
strong ail' support. By April the Allied
right entl!red Ferrara, >\lui the C;crmlln line
became untenable, On that day the Gl'rllHlI1
commander decided to SUl'l'IHll'r and Sl,nt
word to lIIm;solini to meet him to disc\lSS how
to go about it. The Gernllll1 was late at tIll'
prescribl'li nwC'tillg point in ;,\lilull, On the
way there from his headquartl'ro at Como, Ill'
had bl'en delaYl'd hy a l'OU<i block op('rated by
Partisans. lIIussolini, fearing treachery,
thereupon fled, and also ran into tilt' Partisans
and was murdl,rcd,
When the German <iid'arrive at l\iilan, :'tlus
solini had gonl', Conseqlll'ntly he got
into touch with the Allies carly on April.
An Act of Surr('n,h'r was sigm>d at
20 April, effective at 12 :00 noon, 2 May. It
cannot now be established that this German
was the result of the final Berlin
conference on 22 April. But the dates and
methods employed indicate that it was. The
<il,lay of three days between signing and th"
date fixed for surn,ndel', during which the
sllITen<if>l' was kept Bccrct, enabled the Allied
t l'OOpS to n,ach the northeast boundary of
I taly, with on(' exccption, before troops of
and its Yugoslav ally did. The excep
tion was Tri('ste, where the eastern and west
"I'n Allies aHl'ived at the same time,
So l'n!lcd the war with Germany, A critical
examinatIOn of ,n'cl>nt campaigns is not yet
jloHsiblP. Esscptial information fOI' an'
'll1Uot wait until it is known just
\\'hat forces aIHl otrl'ngths Were involved, what
their o]'(I,'rs werc, all' I their casualties. Most
of this is still sccret.
But to the officers amI mcn who fought and
!Ii"d for OI1l' of thc greatest victories which
the \\'(ll'Id has <,vel' there is due honor,
and the g'l'atitudc and appl'l'eiation of th"
(ntire nation,
Britain's J.\Jaquis
From a British Bource.
IT has lll'cn oflicially rCVl'uled that in 1040
an underground mov,'lllent \\'a,; organizl>,1 in
Britain in preparation fot, a Gcrman invasion
of England.
According to unofficial report>, the mov('
ment was so .secretly organized that even
today many mcmbers do not know the names
of others. It was not founded on any continen
tal example, since it was established before
France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and
Norway organized their undergrounds. The
members had radio transmitters and receiv
ers, messengers and code clerkR, and were
organized and supervized by :\00 specially
picked officers of the British Army Special
Dutil" Branch. ::'I!L,mlll'rs were all eivilians
doing ordinary jobs.
Radios hidden in thc countryside in small
l'oncrl'te hideoub werc so well camouflaged
that many people have walked over them
without suspecting that anything was there.
It wa, no amatl'ur f01'ce, but highly skilled,
minutely trained, and kept in training by an
army of intplligencp officers, so that if the
Germans had invaded England a merciless
underground warfare could have been car
ried out against them.
The names of members remain on the files
HUll marked "top secret," and will remain
unknown lest the occasion should ever arise
again for them to be ordered underground.
Repeat Your Intelligence Training
LmUTE:->ANT COLO:->EL JAMES F. MILLER, Gel1c'}"(ti Staff COI'))S
Instructor, Command and Gon.ral, Staff School
"WHAT was your division doing when
you left thllt uetivc thl'nter?" a re
tUl"llin,g G-2 was nsked.
"\Ve \vere training 011 fundalnentuls
" l'tune
thl' prompt response.
"Training! But you'll bel'n in ('ombat for
"True, y<'t at every during
, ea('h lull, in faet evcry time we had a ('han('(',
we renewed nUl' training."
"But what can you teach battle-wi""
.. FundanH'ntalg."
('n,dit for angw{'}'s canllot he giv"1J
fai lly to anyone ofllcl'r, [01: the <lllSWl'r has
],"en the same so often. Tntining' is continuou,.
Ever-changing personnel, ,!Ut' to ]1romo
tiong, tl'ansf(ll':;, l'eplael111011tS. cU:-iualtil's,
what not. leavl's G-2 with tlw ""tatl' of intel
lig'cnce trainin/!:" an unknown quantity. The
of fil'e dL\'llop5 wl'aknc:-.:-.es. Chang{'$ in
l'nl'my llwtho,ls and changes in telTain call
for new application of old principll's. .Just as
a championship football t,'am rPlul'ns on
to "skull practic(''' and drill on
fundamentals, so G-2 must rf.'itl'rate basic
intelligE'llcl' principks, eOlTed had practices,
and correet wl'akness.
No unit, it is Bafe to ever left this
country without training and experience in
Fil1lple ll10ssage writing. Those expcrienc'cd in
combat insist, however, that faultily written
rl'pol'is and poorly wl'itten messages nrc a
most general weaknesR. drill (under
combat 01' closely simulated combat condi
tions) in this fundamental is the c{He. Once
pl'oficienc:. is obtained, continuing practice
alone will maintain it.
The estahlishment and operation of ohser
vation posts is a subject iterated and reiter
ated in training. Few units going to the
Southwest Pacific, however, have moved into
the tight without first needing (and getting')
intensive review and practice in this simple
yet important art.
One could go on enumerating the need for
at each opportunity, of every .of
intl'lligence instruction. Some G-2's have felt,
privately,"that this was due to a wealmtss in
the baRic instruction they have given, They
forget that contitant repetition is e8S ntial
fOl' succeRsful teaching. Instead of goin back
over familiar ground, correcting erro eous
impl'essionR and clinchillg the lessons pre
taught, the issue was dodged.
Fortunately, how,'ver, many intelligence
otlicers, throug'h foresight or circumstance,
realiz,' this need for repeating, refreshing,
and reiterating instruction in training. Now
the ohject of all training in time of war is
,UCCeSH ill hattll'-victor)l. Success results
flom ('ach unit and each man doing his small
t but illlpo}'tant) part in a complete and most
proticient manner. Failure by some small part
of till' machine must be prevented.
Recently returned from active combat, an
officer descrihed many an ohservation post at
night as looking like a "crowded, dimly-lit
night club," hecauRe of the many groups con
grl'gated arounrl peering at maps by flash
light. Failur(' to observe blackout discipline
ancl rigid OP ,Ii"ciplin(' could well have caused
the lOBS of such an observation post as just
"e'crihed. Often, want of information which
a good OP could furnish can in turn cause
fuulty decisions to be marie. Repetition of
truining' in rigid OP discipline alone may
not hring victory, hut its failure could con
t rihut(' to enemy SUccess.
G-2's intelligence instruction naturally falls
into two general classes: (1) training of
Military Intelligence personnel, and (2)
t raining of all personnel in intelligence sub
jects. The fOl'lner mUBt be more detailed, of
cOlll'se. TimE' for training each group is al
ways limited. The wi-se G-2, however, is
pl'epared and ready to supplement and refresh
the training of Pither group constantly. To be
ready, he has plans, schedules, and tools at
hand to tak,' advantage of every opportunity.
Experience in,licates that few extended
periods for uninterrupted schools are ,avail
ab.Je to a combat unit. Scattered periods for
l'efreshing all or part of the intelligence
personnel do occur, If time must be taken
the!! to make preparations, the opportunity
will be wasted. If prior planning leaves G-2
"ready," these scattered periods will pay
Intelligence training of different parts of
combat organizations can be had through con
current training (concurrent with other
training) if each unit commander is ready
(by <1-2 having made necesHary preparations
for him) to teach intelligence. G-2 should
give him the means, the reference, the sched
and the aids, and when opportunity
knocks, G-2 should help the- unit commaildel'
respond to her call.
Since fUlHhullentals are 'luite conRtant.
since rep('tition an,l praclicl' develop,; pro
ficiency, plans C(l1I lll' mad{' to inlel
ligence profieiency if G-2 has 1)lan8 l"l'ady for
which "stick to fundal11{'ntals."
Field manual references; notes on your
unit's ('xperience; short, intel'('sting exercis('s
t('sting and improving the senses (of
sedng, snwl!ing, am! feeling); plans for
conducting instruction; and simple aids to
teaching- will give G-2 II start toward h('ing
ready to "hl'ush up" int('llig<:nl"e IWrsol1l1l'1
"during a breathl'l''' on the following suhject":
Map Reading
At'rial Photo Rl'ading'
Creeping and Crawling
;\Iessage Writing
Countcrintelligenc(' matt('rs
Time and Space Estimation
short schedules, com]1]('t(' and
ready to USl', broken down into many small
periods. which G-2 can prl'pal'e. wilI" permit
the> harrierl unit commander to take advantage
of ti)11e when all his troops are not busy and
improve their state of training. A list of
subjects with manual references, like the
following, prepared for a unit commander,
has helped materially wh('1'(, y-2 or his as
are ready to lend a hdnd.
To illustrate, here is a review list for combat
Meaning. Par. 120 and 122,
Talking with strangers. Pal'. 121.
'What can be written home. Par. L
Troop movements. Par.
Censorship of letters. F:'\l 30-25,
Sec. IX.
Diaries and photography. Par. ,
Classified documents. Par. 127. (
Actions prior to going into combat. t
Par. 128. f
Action in case of capture. Par. 129. t
Par. 1:W. I Rights of prisoners of war.
Propaganda. Par. 131. I
CO:\IIlAT INTELLIGENCE, F:'\l 21-45: .1',
Estimation of troop strength.
Par. 45 (n) and (h).
Estimation of troop stl"l'ngth.
Par. 45 c and d (1) (a) to (e).
Estimation of trooJl strength.
Par. 45 d (1) (f).
Oml messag('s. Par, 4 .. (a) and
:\!essages. Par. 46 (c).
PnrSO:\,ERS OF WAR, F:\I :1O-15:
Coercion. Par. 8.
S"gI'0g-ation. Par. fl (a) and (h).
Dispo;,itioll of effects.
Par. !) c.
Proc('dure (front-lin" units),
Par. 9 <I (1), (2), and (:q.
of guards.
Pal'. !) d (4) and (5).
Enemy desel'tel. Pal', 14.
Emmy civilians. Pal'. 15, 23 h.
F:\! :10-2Fi:
Ohject and measures to takt'. Par. 1,'::.
Secrecy disciplinC'. Par...-7.
Concealment. Par. 8-1:!.
Each subject as thus broken down ,'!l11 he
covered in a ten-minute period. Those suh
jects where greater emphasis is desired may
be prolonged, of course.
Plenty of time is available if we take full
advantage of it. Deep, involved studies arc all
right in their place, but until fundamentals
become second nature. their reiteration will
bear greatest dividends. SO )'('[1N,1 YOW' intel.
ligencc training and the results will surprise
Kuzume Makes the Team
COLONEL JACK W. Rl'OOLPH, Geneml Staff Corp8
A ME1UCANS would have called hIm
n Kuzume. But the Japanese.
who a cockeyed angle on a lot of things,
indudinf' their "divine" mission to rule the
world for the glory of Nippon and tilt' Gn-atel'
, EaHt Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, eallld him
I KUZlIllle Naoyukie. Since Naoyukie was a
, Jap and since what follows is told frolll the
t viewpoint of the SOilS 01- -heaven--':"'we'll <'all
I hun that too.
I l\.uzume Naoyukie, latc' Colond in the 11lI
i perlal Japanes" AI"nv, the 222,1
Infantry Regiment and the gar
rison of Diak Island when Biak
was an outpost of Nippon",
l'l'lllni>ling "lllph'" of conquest.
with ,;ollle 10,000
,;Iant-ey"d coml'adl's who lived
and died mist'rably on a wild
and hostil,' jungle ihiand they
I Illtht hav,' thoroughly hatl'd,
Kuzullll' b
today in Yasukuni a1' one of his
! count !'y's minor gods. HE.' made
r it the hard way.
, On the morning of 27 May
\ 1 assault tl',oops of the U.S.
I 41st Infantry Division stormed th" south
'beachl's of Kuzume's stronghold, Twenty
s(,Vl'n days later, huddll'd in a miserahle is
lund cave, Kuzullle Naoyukie accepted the
inevitable accordin/! to the code of the Samu
Irai. Cercmoniom,]y his
Icolors, he ordered the fanatIcal banZai charge
'that has heralded the end of so many Nip
hopes. and committed hara,kiri. He
was a long way from sunny, flower-perfumed
I Biak Island, lying athwart the entrance
to Geelvink Bay between the head and
fohoulders of lizard-like New Guinea (Figure
1), is a -triangular-shaped mass of coral and
limestone jutting out of the green sea. Like
its smaller sister island of Soepiori to the
, northwest, Blak is blanketed by a dense and
tang-led jungle wherein an average rainfall
of Il1O}'e than a hundred inches a year spawns
tlw ultimatt: in tropical wilderness.
The hypotenuse' of Biak's triangle faces
northeast (Figure 2). The northern third of
the }sland is a rugged mountain lnass, falling
awny to a centrnl tableland which stretches
(ll a series of relatively flat terraces toward
the south const. Here a border of narrow
!waeh friligcH a rampart of steep coral cliffs,
Luning the way to the terraces behind them.
Thelie cliffs are a series of coral ridges
parallel to the coast, rising precipitously be
tOO 0
FWl HE },
tween onE.' hundred and three hundred yards
from the shore. Captain George Andrew, who
landed \'1ith the first wave and subsequently
fought through the Biak operation, describes
them aR follows:
"lIIany a ridge crest is so sharp and narrow
that it is traversed only with difficulty. Rising
to an elevation of 250 to ;)00 feet above the
beaches, they form an impressive barrier be
tween the coast and the comparatively flat
inland terrain. This elevated coral reef is
evidently the result of several geological up
thrusts; for even in its most perpendicular
places it' consists of a series of terraces now
overgrown with thick rain! forests.
The cliffs and terrace$ are pocked with
caves and potholes, mamy of them large
enough to conceal a battEjry of mortars and
to give shelter to several l\undred men. Many
of these caves are entere4 from the terraces
through small oPllnings. The potholes have The mission of the Biak garrison was to
been formed by similar caverns into which complete the airstrips and to secure the island
the roofs have collapsed. Their gides are often against an invasion that. after the fall of
pitted with smaller caves and which Hol!andia. appeared inevitable. Kuzume ac
may lead to larger caverns." conlingly formulated his defense plan, the
Midway of the southern coast line. hetween salient featUl'es of which were the of
the villages of l\Iokmer and Sorido, the ridge the vital landing fields and the repulse of
turns away from the beach, runs generally any amphibious attack "at the water's edge'''l
-. The l'<lstem end of the island.,
IpMt particularly the ail'strips, was tOi
____ ? 5 10Km be held at all costs, landing' at-,
templs to be I1Wt and crushed'
''''::0\ .-\ on t I1e I hes. A I I' 1 I' _, ..r leac all< mg e se
v where on the island was to be,
""'C.\ resisted until the arrival of rein
, KORIM-\=::o':::,:;, fOl'Ct'l11l'nts. If a landing in the
"'. , vital al'ea successful, it was
B A K " to he contained by periodic as
from prepare,\ positions. 1
'SSKOWHO.AI.ARGlR '., 1", All this was orthodox planning,
SCA,E '" '1'"U<' 3 ;;:<r ' ,- lluplementcd by careful dispo-I
I., 't' .1 ffild
,"\ II:J0 0< it J{ , /-: -" Hl lOllS allu constl'uctlOn 0 e,
Ci %] 0.; ; ./ . !
_ 0 ____ _ )0_ '
_ __ ___ _I. The 1st Battalion, 222d In,
____ ___ _ _,_ - - __ _____ __ fantry, was assigned a sector
FtnPRF. 2. east of a line running north,
north for about a mile, then west again before west through the village of Opiaref (Fig'ure
angling back to the coast (see Figure :3). In 2), with the naval unit, 450 strong, on its
the small, comparatively flat and brush- right between Opiaref and Bosnek. The mis
covered pocket thus tucked between the hills sion of these units was to repulse any land.
and sea lay the prizp for which Biak became ing on the eastern part of the island. I
a battlefiE'ld. Here, early in 1944, the Japa- The zone between Bosnek and SOl'ido
nese began construction of three airstrips- (Figure :3), which contained the vital landing'
those vital counters in the grim contest for "trips, was the responsibility of the 2d Bat-l
poss('ssion of New Guinea. These airfields. talion, backed by the 3d. The latter, less two
and nothing else, made the jungle-choked companies, constituted Kuzume's reserve and
rockpile called Biak a pearl of price in the assisted in the feverish work to rush the still i
struggle for the South Pacinc. unusable airdromes to completion. I
To rush completion of these fields, whose One reinforced company was ordered to,
importance increased greatly after the loss of construct a road between Mokmer and Korim I
Hollandia (Figure 1) in April, the Japanese Bay on the north coast, detaching a party tOl
garrisoned Biak with approximately 10,000 cover Korim and report any landing on thaq
men under Colonel Kuzume. Besides his own shore. The tanks were assembled in the Saba,
222d Regiment of 3,000 men, he commanded area (Figure 2), some ten miles east of the
a naval guards battalion, a tank detachment airfields, while the engineers began construc-I
(seven tanks), and miscellaneous engineer, tion of roads and fortifications. They were
ack-ack, and service units. About one third of also prepared to carry out demolitions
this force rated combat status, but in an (Kuzume called it "explosive warfare") when
emergency Kuzume could and did arm his called upon.
service elements and fight them as infantry. Automatic weapons and antiaircraft ele
j) ments were charged with the ack-ack defense
d of the ail' fields. Supplies were tQ be dispersed
~ in small dumps, and cave defenses along the
:. tliffs were to be stocked with ammunition,
food, and other necessities to last four months.
,f Kuzume ordered the construction of con
,f crete pillboxes along the coast at key points
"I but left the selection of sites .and the organiza-,
I, i tion of sectors to zone commanders, The
lattc>r were given wide latitude in organizing
and conducting the defense of their sectors,
On the logical assumption that any serious
I landing attempt would strike the southeast
j coast, the defenders constructed a haphazard
P: line of reinforced caves and pillboxes' among
narrow beach defile and block an approach
from Bosnek. Although the'main ridge was
not so precipitous nor so high at this point,
the confusing pattern of cross ridges and
depressions, together with a lack of trails,
made it an area which could only be traversed
with gl'eat difficulty under even the easiest
conditions.' .
This perimeter came to be known as the
Ibdi Pocket (Figure 3). Recognizing it as a
valuable blocking position, thEl Japanese con
tinued, even in the midst of battle, to build
lllore pillboxes and to repair those damaged in
the fight.
North of lI10kmer airstrip a large cavern
en 1 ~ 2 2 2
'j' the rocks above high water. Between Opiaref
and Saba the job was exceptionally well done.
) These caves. entered from defiladed ap
.) proaches in rear, were well camouflaged and
:1 fortified by concrete gun ports covering wide
) fields of fire across open water. They were
I backed by mortar positions guarding their
flanks and gaps between them. The wide. open
beach at Bosnek was defended by four large
steer and concrete pillboxes. at least one of
which mounted an al'lillel'Y piece,
The principal defensive works covered the
airdromes and were well designed to deny
, possession of the fields except after costly and
i direct assault. Main defenses consisted of
Ithree pockets in the ridg'es behind and to the
. east of Mokmer airstrip.
Between the coastal villages of lbdi and
Parai, among a series of tumbled. knife-like
cora1 ridges. a strong perimeter of mutually
supporting pillboxes was built to cover the
runs under the terrace overlooking the field.
The cave. about a hundred" yards long, has
two gallery entrances, leading. into the
chamber from the rear at a forty-five degree
angle. At its opposite end a large sump, once
part of the original vault, whose roof has
fallen in, opens into the cave. This pothole,
sixty to eighty feet deep and measuring one
hundred feet across its long axis, has sides
so precipitous that it can be entered only by
the use of scaling ladders.
The Japanese called this the West Cave and
made it the anchor for the final defense of the
airfield, Capable of housing a large force, it
was used as a billeting area and headquarters.
Around it was built a powerful series of pill
boxes and extensive log-and-coral emplace
ments along the ridge.
Midway between the lbdi Pocket and West
Cave another strongpoint was constructed on
the ridge dominating Mokmer village. The
position, built around two large sumps and
connecting caverns, was known as the East
Caves. Here again the galleries were used as
living quarters and the sumps as emplace
ments for mortars and machine guns whose
fin' covered the road and beach approaches to
the airstrips.
As long as 'Vest Cave occupied, the
ail'ficl<ls were neutralized. With the Ihdi
Pocket g'ual'ding the eastward entrance to
the littl" valley and the East Cavps covering
the heach detlle, thest' perimeters constituteei
a po\\'t'rful ohstacle to possl'ssion of the
coveted strips.
Xo elL-fenses were prepared along the coast
road from Bosnek to :\Ioknll'r. This road, main
approach from the east. ran along the narrow
corridor between thp cliffs and the sea. At
one point the corridor narroweci to n bottle
Ill'ek only a few Yl\l'(ls wide. Xot until it had
actually been pem-trate,1 and latcr cleared
was any attempt made to block it. nor were
01' mines <'vel' laid to ohstruct
1Il0Vl'lllent to 01' on the heaches.
A rtilll'I'Y installations. while well sited,
Wl'rt' inadequate and incomplete. ;Iolost of the
"uns Wt're concentrated to covel' the air
<lI'ollle, an,1 tlwir direct "ell approaches. These
positions included at least a battery of moun
tain g'uns. three 01' four antiaircraft guns of
thrpe-inch ealib<'r, many mortars and auto
matic w('apons. and foul' 120-llIm dual-purpose
naval guns.
A six-inch rifle was installed south of the
:\lokl1l('I' strip and another in the Bosnek area.
These weapons had fields of fire for at least
six miles up and clown the coa"t, with over
lapping' sectors in the center. One naval
120-mm dual-purpose piece was emplaced on
the Bosnpk beach, while several other navy
six-inchers were being installed but were not
ready for action on D-day,
From the date of the Hollandia landing on
22 Apl'il, Colont'l Kuzume had slightly more
than a month to prepare his defenses. Thel'e
is evidence, too. that if .Japanese intelligence
did not know the exact point of invasion, it
had a pretty good idea of when it would
come. Several days before the assault,
Kuzume apparently received warning to
along the ridge and cut in behind the Yanl,s.
This maneuver isolated t'he' hard-pressed
American battalion. except for one company
which fought its way out of the trap. Kuzume
had his enemy where he wanted him
!!nd laid his plans fo\' a quick annihilation.
During the night, h<.> hrought th<.> 1st Bat
talion into the airdrome urea. morning.
with entire r('gillll'nt concl'ntrat('d. he
thrl'w his 2d and :ld against the
trapPl'd AllJericans in thr(>e .sL'l'arate and
Ill'avy att'H'ks, TIll's<'> failed to over
run the hard-pr(>ssC'd invac!l'rs but intlkted
ht'avy casualties.
The opening attack, launeill'd at 0700 on tIll'
2flth. was pacell hy Kuzume's tanks. The seven
vehicles, a,lvancing in two wave,; half an
hour apart, werl',lll'olllptly wiped out. The
first wave of three was met by nve U.S. me
(limn tanks, which hac! l'ushe;l to the aid of
the beleaguered 'lIlll was quickly de
stroye(l. \Vhen th,' remaining foul' attacked at
07:)0, ov,'r the same ground and in the same
formation, they wen' also wrecked in short
Although he had not crushed his trapped
Kuzull1e's attacks and his con
tinuous fire from the ;\[okmer rocket had al
most shattered the American force. Before he
could launch the knockout blow. however,
nightfall intervened. Un!ler ('OVl'l' of darkness.
a rescue flotilla move!l in hy water and
evacuated the survivors, who wel'e so badly
mauled that the battalion was unusable for
the rest of the campaign.
Colonel Kuzume moved down
through :'.10kmer to the nal'l'owing defile and
t'ook up positions from which he effectively
hlocked further attempts to reach the airfields
hy the coastal route, He had lost the first
round, but the second was his by a wide
Next day he ordered the :ld Battalion into
the Ibdi Pocket, left the 2d ,to hold the defile.
and moved with the 1st Battalion back to the
original bivouac north of Bosnek. Here he
encountered the Amel'ican column which,
after crossing the ridge at Opiaref. was
advancing across the flat inland plain to take
the airdromes in rear. The 1st fought a bitter
l'l'ar-guard action back to the Mokmel' area,
where regimental headquarters returned to
West Cave.
During this withdrawal the 3d Battalion
made no effort to assist its retreating com
rades. It neither withdrew nor attempted to
strike the advancing Americans i;p flank 01'
real', but holed up in its perimeter and was
cut off without a fight. By D plus 7, rein
forcements had arrived for the attackers and
had moved north of the ridge, securing the
American communications and destroying
Kuzume's last chance to attack and crush his
enemies in detail.
On 12 June the 1st Battalion, reinforced by
hastily armed service troops, was driven over
tho ridg'o and onto the 1\10kmer strip. This
defeat required Kuzume to withdraw his
troops to the terrace north of the field, in the
vicinity of. West Cave. A week later his block
ing position on the coastal road was forced,
anll the American columns established
While Kuzume was being squeezed into his
final defensive pockets, two attempts were
made to reinforce him. On 12 June about 200
riflemen landed at Korim, followed a week
latel' by an additional battalion of infantry.
These reinforcements were thrown piecemeal
into action. Attacking a' company at a time,
this previous help was dissipated and de
stroy<.>d without having rendered the slightest
assistance to the sorely pressed Colonel.
By D plus 19. when more Amel'ican rein
forcen.cnts landed. the bulk of the defenders
had been compressed into the area around the
airdromes. The :ld Battalion was still cut off
in the Ibdi Pocket, while the :'.10kmer Pocket
was also manned. Neither garrison offered
more than occasional patrols and slight haras
sing fire that dosed the coastal road for brief
A coonlinated American attack on 20 June
cleared the strips and drove Kuzume onto the
ridge north, of the fields. The Colonel, with a
'considerable force of mixed units, barricaded
himself in the West Cave. All next day this
force endured a savage and unremitting at
tack which it resisted bitterly.
One by one the defending pillboxes were
.reduced and their savagely fig'hting garrisons
wiped out, Sniper fire, tank guns, and gre
nades drove the des\ll'rate away
from the cave 1l1otlths, hack into the dark
chambel:S, Here any hopes of prolonged sur
vival were sh,)l't-live,1.
Although the winding tunnels were protec
tion against the flame thro\\'ers that now
came into lll'tion ag'ainst tllPlll, tllP harried
fugitives snon discovcn'd that the ing't'nious
Americans had a solution, ])rums of p:asoline
were bl'ought up and poured into the sloping
entrances, Gl'l'nades transforn1e,1 the gasoliIw
into rivers of tlall1l' that ,lI'o\'e the Japanese
deepcr into the caverns, which soon shuddered
with the dl'lonations of TNT blocks lowered
into them.
That was l'nough for 1\ uzume. That nig'ht
he call1'd his and SUI'ViVOl'S around him
'in the hatt('rC'd v:lult. Ill' "I',lL-red all who
cou!'1 still walk to It'av<, tl1<' ,'aVl' and laulleh
their tinal banzai attack. Hand grenades were
issue,1 to the woullde,l with orders for self
destruction, Then Kuzullw :\'aoyukie impres
sively set fire to his regill1l'llta! colors, retire,l
to a far ('01'11('1' of the eave, and, in obedience
to his code as n defeate,I Samurai warrior,
disembowdled himself.
Latel' in the night tht, s\lI'vivors hurled
themselves against SPH">Ill'd jungle fighters
who had such charge's hpfore. The Slllzai
was crushed as furiously as it ha,r heen
The charge of the night of 21-22 June ende,l
the organized defense of Biak. The troops
isolated at Ihdi and :-'lokmer held on tena
ciously and had to he slowly and completely
eliminated, Tedious as this phase was, it was
of little tactical importance, ,ince the airfields
were clear and Before the last of the
trapped ,Taps w('re liquidated, American
planes were opC'rating from Kuzume's iIl
starred strips. A few survivors escaped into
the rugged northern hills, there to be
hunted down or to succumb to
the l'eveng'e of tht' jungle had defied.
Captain Andrew says that !(uzume's defeat
was inevitahle from the day the Americans
landed on Bial,. Strategically, the statement
is probably true; nevertheless, a study of hb
subsequent tacties confirms the suspicion that
Colonel Kuzume was his own worst enemy,
A more flexible commander could, at thl'
minimum, have made the conquest of Biak a
far more protracted and costly victory.
Kuzume fought stubbornly and with de,
perate courage, as the Japanese do.
From the beginning, however, he made mis
tak,'s which progressively hurt his chancl's
and made his ,lefeat more prompt. These mi,
tak(>s were important, for ther were typical
of NipPoll('se weaknesses which have ghowll
up repeatedly and may he expected to eCClir
orig'inal plan was sound. He made l1i<
,\i"positioIl8 with care, he delegated l'l'sponsi
to hI" and left him';l'lf frc,'
ior th.. overall conduct of the battle, He cor
rpctiy diagnosed the al'l'a of the landing and
11" knew thp approximate tillle it woul,l conw.
Thl'l'e was nothing wrong with the siting nor
quality of his field worb, and although the,'
lacked depth, this was partly due to lack of
time in which to prepare them.
But having formulated a good and careful
plan, Kuzume \vr('cked it by allowing himsl'lf
to be surprised, The landing caught him out
of position and apparpntly rattled him so
balll, that he could think of nothing to P\,l'
\ent consolidation of a beachhead which coul,I
have bl'en a costly if not untenable foothold.
For an entire day the Americans were allowed
to advance without intel'l'uption or loss.
The D plus 1 cncirclement of the advancing
U.S. battalion at Mokmer was extremely well
done. Although he failed to destroy hi,
trapped adversaries, Kuzume',; attacks were
so 'punishing that they effectively neutralized
a good proportion of the landing force. The
badly pummeled unit nl'vC'r again fit for
use in the campaign.
But even in this, the high point of his
defense, Kuzume revealed his weakness in thl'
destruction of his armor. Having lost almost
half his tanks in the first assault, he blindly
threw the remainder into the same trap where
they were likewise destroyed, He simply could
not break away from the Japanese addiction
to :following 'a set plan even in the face of
ohvious failure.
Another mistake was failing to guard the
Im'ach in the ridge at Opiaref, through which
the Americans advanced to outflank him. He
hall the troops to do this; the naval battalion,
which shoUld have done the job, appears nev('l'
to have played a role in the fig'ht. Dispersed
nil ovcr the islanll, it was rounded
up in weak detachments,
The rl'arguard tight of Ow bt Battalion,
while well execute!I, was futile in the face of
twO-tO-Olll' It was an bolatl'!1 action,
foug'ht 'without thl' help which wa" readily at
J.:md, !md acc'omplished little more than a
glig'ht delny. If, instea(1 of di"persing hI,;
l'l'g'iment again after having concentrated it,
I\uzume han held his hlocking positions
lidltly while tjll'owing his main body into an
,'nvl'lopment 01' thL' Allll'rican column behind
tl\l' ridg'", hl' mip!ht have dumgl'!i thl' whole
""IlI'Se of the battle.
With part of their force already out of
netion, a repUlse of the column bL'hind the
ridge would have placed the Americans in
the beachhead in an extremely pl'edl'ioUi;
position. Kuzume had little to lose and much
to g-ain by a swift offensive blow here, but
he lacked the ability to make such a decision.
The arrival of American reinforcements
finally snuffed out the opportunity,
The fate of his own reinforcements was
also typical. Arriving on the battlefield in
,mall increments, they were thrown into futile
counterattacks, a company at a time, and de
stroyed without achieving any worthwhile
results. It was Guadalcanal again on a smaller
. The arrival of additional Americans com
pletely upset what was left of Kuzume's ptan
rendered futile his subsequen:
HIS plan had revolved around the lnvulnera
bility of the pockets between the Americans
and their objective. These pockets were now
reduced to death traps which wcre little more'
than a nuisance to the invaders.
Having lost the fields, Kuzume did not
recognize these pockets for the tl'aps they'
were, but holed up in thtm in slavish adher
l'nee to his original concept. Once sealed in,
all he could do was defend them to the
inevitable Im;t man. Had he abandoned them
and moved into the hills, he might have car
ried on mohile offen.ive operations long
enoug'h to hold on until substantial help
al'l'ivcd or his troop' Wl're evacuated.
For all hi,; mistakes, Kuzume put up such
a stubborn I'e:;istance that he eventually re
quil'l'd the A ml'I'ican" to double their attack
ing forc..,. Tadically, he had much in his
laval', points which a more daring and
imaginative leader might have put to good
account. But, like hO many of compatriots,
he lacked the flexibility to change his plans
in the heat of battle. Because he could not
improvise and make prompt decisions in the
face of failurl', h(' w('nt to his death a frus
trated man.
Frustration dog'ged him even in death.
. l\lonths later, long' after' Biak had become a
g-<ll'l'ison post with screened barracks and
quintuplicate requisition ffJl'Il1s,' a fever-rid
den, Japalll'se fug'itive walked into
a mess hall and gave himself up.In exchange
for a square meal, he offered the slightly
charred remnant of a Japanese flag he car
ried wrapped about his waist. It was l{uzume
Naoyukie's battle stantlaJ'{1.
A British officer points out the fact that in today's war. responsibility has
been lifted from the shoulders of the individual fa.r ,too often. He says, "The
.tendency must be rather to thrust responsibility 'on to him, and the more' the
better ." Nowhere is this more true than in operation ot: a preventive mainte
nance program, for its success depends almost entirely on performance of
by the individual soldier.
-Maintenance Division, ASF
Strategic Objectives
Int-<l111C'tllr, ('nmnullld anti G(>nernl Staff
J\ L\IOST any morning while rea,ling the
I1 morning' 1>\11)(>1" at you will
undoubtedly find some nlt'ntion of air opera
tions again,;t the industri<11 empire of Japan,
When you l'PlId the headline's an,l karl! thut
large forl1lations of have :\ttacked the
aircraft plants at 01' Tokyo. you arc
prone t(1 ta!;" the attacks for granted. give
the bop, who did thl' ,Iirty work a mental pat
on the back, and then forA'"t ahout tIll' whol('
.th ill g', However, that is not all there is to such
an attack, Wa, this OIll'ration merely an idle
impube on thl' p:lI't of the 'conu1I1ding oftice!'
of the O).'g:lnizatiol1 which pL'rformed it? Tlw
answer is definit<'ly "1\0," In back of the
actual o]H.'l'Htion of nttaeking this target are
long hotll's or l'l'se:ll'ch and l'ollsid,'ratiun on
the part of many 1'l'opl", In vil'\\' of this fact,
it seems fitting to take tinw to consider th,'
1>robll'm of why awl how the", targ'l'ts ar!,!

First of all. let us consider the reason
behind these strategic ail' operations, A vCl'y
Lroad detinition of the reason is the "further
anr (. of the ,tratt'gic plan,;," but this does
not give us a very cOlllpkll' pietul'c, Let us
put it this way: thl' mission is the "prog'l'cs
sive destruction al1(l di,;loealioll of the enemy's
military, industrial, and systl'ms to
a point where his eapacity for armed resist
ance is fatally weakenl'd," Even this definition
does not give a complete l'ictUl'e berllu,e some
times the operations may be carded out
against objl'cti\'('s which do not fall strictly
within the categ,\ril'S of military, iIHlustrial,
or economic sysL'ms, An objective which (Ioes
not fall within these three eatl'gories
best be illustrated by an operation whose sole
purpose is to lower the morale of the civilians,
such as dropping' propaA'anda leaflets,
If this is the case, let us makl' a brief study
of sonw of the possihle objectives for these
operations to see why they are selectc(1 and
of what they consist, First, let us Jist the
various categories of objectives and then
break each one down into the various targets
of which it is compost,d. These ohjectives may
be as follows:
0, Concentrations of forct's, land 01' sea.
b. Em'IllY lines of cOlllmunications,
c, Hostile sourc,'s of materiel.
d. Source" of Jlower,
c. E1llln]),> ai}' f'orce.s.
Xow that \\'l' have listed the general
of objectives. let us bl'l'ak l'aeh one
down into its turg'ets and see why it
he e1as"t'd as a objective,
COnL'entrations of land forct's will be found
to includ.. brlth military and naval establish
!Ill'nts, bases, camps. ot' schools, It b nece,
sal'y at one time 01' another to eoncentrat('
persolll1l'I, eithl'r fol" purposes of t..,lining,
01' education, concentl'ations
take the forlll of training posts,
tions, 01' gl'neral an,l spl'cial ,chools, sUl'h a,
tht' enemy's counterpart of the Infantry
School at Fort Benning. Geot'gia, Ot' the Com
tlIand ami General StatY School at Fort Lea
venworth, KanSlb, \\' e may find thftt they
will consist of technical such as Scott
Field, Illinois, where radio operators are
trailwd for the Ait, Forces, 01' research
instaJIations sl1ch as Wl'Ight Fiel,!. By strik
ing conccntrations we can deprive the
enemy of their use nnd of the personnel who
Wl're being tmine,l in them, It is easy to
visualize the cfft'ds of a possible shortage of
highly trained an(1 skiJIl'd such as
('Iectronic operators, However, it is not quite
so ('asy to visualize a shortage of less special
iZl,d personnel, Staff oftieers may appeal' to
he an inexhaustible itl't11. but the fact
that more is required of an officer than just
battlefield training to make him a qualified
officer, He must have the background of
basic principles and procedure in ol'der prop
erly to a]lply personnel, materiel. and infor
mation to lll'oduce a successful operation. This
background is usually presented at one
specialized school devoted to this subject
alone and to nothing If we can destroy
this school, and along with it some of the po
h'utial material in we will deprive
the enemy of the flow of roplace
llwnts which he so badly needs to cany out
present-day combat.
Concentrations of sea forcl's are among the
fOl'cmost of all strategic objcctivl's. The
reason for this is that no nation is completely
solf-sustaining, especially wh<'re the con,luct
of war is COnl'el'llC'l. Evei'y nation fin,I8 it
necessa)'y to import cl'rtain items of eithel'
raw or finished mutl'rials, and the only way
in which tlwy can do this is hy maintaining
tIll' ship]ling-. If it is possihle fOI'
us to deprive him of this shipping hy ,Ie'stroy.
ing it 01' damaging it r('pair, we will
eventually cause him to u"e inf,'riol' mat"riel
or to do without (,(,Itain it,'llls of lllat"ri('1
which aJ'e vital to tIll' l'ondu('t ,)f his

\\' e Will nOl"luully find till' ,'nl'my making
,'Ifol"t to Pl'ot"ct thb ,hi]l]llllg' with
liBval it will he
fol' u:-; to hb naval power :1:-' wt.'ll
nis llH.'r-chant A uothl.'l l'pason for the
destruction qf his naval power is that it is a
]l{)tential threat to tIlt' intelTuptioll of our
,upply linl's.
For example, We' ('an take the elmat ]lens
along the coast of France. Germany was
out an extl'n"ive wal" against our
bhipping which was transporting supplies to
our forces oVeI'Sl'as. The losses incurred by
the U-1:roats were such that action on OUr part
was required. We thl'l"l'fol'c ,l!.'tt'l'l11ined that
the easiest to counteract these opcmtions
was first of al1 to (,est roy the factories whl're
the U-boats w('re heing fabricated, and sec
ondly, to destroy, 01' damage beyond sel'vic('
ability, the pens which were u,:('d for \'efitting
and I ('supplying boats. was in con
junction with the opl'l'ations conrl;lctl'd by
pur navies. The operations were eventually
but it I'cCluil'e,] the diversion of a
large force of our to neutralize this
threat to our supply lin('s. The V-boat b('cal11l'
a strategic tal'g('t bccal1st' it was interfering
with the execution of OU!' strategic plans.
The German battleships Sci1al'nhol"st,
Gneisenall, and Tirpitz were classed in this
same category because of their potential
threat to our lin(>s of supply. In this case we
find that a force of only three sh.ips becljme
a strategic target. The efforts of the Royal
Air Force and part of the British Home
Fleet were l'l'Cluired over a period of five
years before this thr(>at could be satisfactor
ily neutralized,
The next objective we come to is that of
enemy lines of communications. Under this
categor,' we will normally find targets such
as hages, depots, and transportation
tJy attacking port and harbor installations,
and damaging them, we deny their use to
tho enemy as points at which to unload the
fhipping which we have not pl'eviously de
stroyed. prevent the enemy from being
able to usc the materials that he has imported
from outside sources. In our attacks on St.
Nazaire, Lorient, and the other ports along
the French coa,t we had a second purpose
which was to dl'ny the use of these ports as
refitting" and resupply points to U-boats, as
previously mentioned,
Bases and depots are invariably found to
he Ijoints of concentration for parts and
completed assemblies awaiting further dispo
to the forces in the field. By attacking
and ,Iestroying these hases and depots, we
can the enemy of the use of these
matedals and thereby create a shortage of
critical items at some future time.
Transportation facilities are found to in
..Jude sHeh targC'ts as roads, railroads, and ca
nals. Ie b an undeniahlp fact that once a cer
tain product has bl.'en manufaetured it has to
be transported to another point before it can
be used. This requires an extensive and effi
cient transportation system in order to insure
that materiel arrives at the proper time and
place. By disrupting this system we can pre
vent the enemy fl'om moving. vital materials
from thpir point of manufacture to the points
when' they arp needed. We can accomplish
this by destroying marshalling yards, critical
railrond junctions, and the lines themselves.
We can cl:ater roads and cause vehicles to
take We can destroy bridges crossing
natural obstacles and cause the rhouting of '
both trains and vehicles. By destroying the
locks in the canal systPI1I we effectively deny
the use Qf the as a of transporta
One of the most outstanding examples of
the disruption of transportation facilities took
place in Italy just prior to the breakout from
the Garigliano River in l\lay 1\)44. For a
period of approximately two months priolo to
the attack, the Twelfth an,] Fifteenth Air
Forces joint',1 hands to carry out a combincd
opcration against these facilities. The fmal
result of this operation was the complete
denial to the Gcrmans of the transportation
rE-quil'e!1 for lll'eded supplies anti rein force
Just prior to the attack it was found
that the (,erman" troops in the fl'ont lines
wcrc not receiving full rations, Thpy were
being ratione'] ammunition to slIch an
that sOllle of the artillpry piel"'s were able to
fir" onl,' fOUl' or fivc' rounds a day. It was im
possihle for tIll' (,"l'mans to llh)V(' supplies or
troops anywhl'l'l> south of the Arno River by
rail 01' motor tr<ln>'IHlrtation. One rC:ierve divi
sion lllOving up to th,' I'lont found that it had
to nlllr{'h the la,t hundnd mi1c-" The nl<lralc>
facto)' l'lt'atl'd 1):-,- ..'h it not l'Oll
dlH.'IV" to Ih, (,'ndu('\ of war, :\Iuch
the ,ituation ('xi"ted in France at the
tinH' of the of tht> XOll11an
Hostilt, SOlll'('('" of matl'ripl are, logically,
nne of the oh,kctivl" availahle for stra
tl'gil' opl')'ations, Within this catpg'lll'y we find
the following' tal'gl'tt; mi)1l's,
factoril''', and a,,('mhly planb,
One of t 11<' to Ill'l'Vent the
enemy from ohtainiJlg the' materiel which he
needs [01' the <,ondue! of war is to deny him
the source of the raw materials. We can ac
complish this denial hy attacking, and
damaging- or destroying, mines. As these are
smull targets and hard to attack, we
find few exampl('s of typc of operation,
There is one ease on record in which a flight
of bomhprs attacked a coal mine in
Mallchui'ia and succeeded in damaging' it to
the extent of depriving the Japanese of its
use for a period of at least six months, This
"was accomplished by destroying the pumping
system which was used to drain the mine,
thereby flooding it.
As a mine is a fairly difficult target to hit,
the next best way to deprive the enemy of
his mated!'1 is by damaging or destroyinp;
the facilities with which he refines his raw
materials. It is an unfortunate fact for the
enemy th'at practically every type of raw"
material which is taken out of the ground
requi!'es processing of one sort 01' another ill
order to get it into a form which is usable,
This applies whether it be oil, ore, or gas,
The attacks on the Ploesti oil fields C0I110
within this category, They were aimed at the'
source of about twenty percent of the oil
supply for Germany. By attacking and de
stroying these fiL'lds we were able to deny th"
use of this oil or any of its bYPl'oducts to th"
Germans, This was not only felt by the Luft
watt'" hut by the Wehrlllacht as well. By deny
ing this source to the Gernlans we seriously
handicappl'd their mobility.
Should it prove to be impOSSIble to attack
the refineries or the mines, we must select
the next most vulnerable point in the "hain
of production. This is the factory. l!el'e w('
tind that the raw materials are converted
into the tinal shapes in which they will be
elllployed the militar,' forces. \\' e find
that at this point it is more difficult to hind,,)'
the enemy becausl' his factories are Illon'
widely disperse,l than his mines,
for u" the Germans did not dispen'e theil
before the declarntioll of war, and
we fOllnd that there were certain installa
tions in which a large pcrcentag-e of
g-iven product was produced. A case snch
this is the ball bearing industry. It is im
possible to manufacture machinery of
type at all without the use of ball bearing-s
to protect the rotating parts. It so happened
that about forty percent'of the ball bearing'
inf\ustry was concentrated in Schweinfurt.
Thus, when it was decided by highel' head
quarters that the ball bearing industry was
to take a high place on the priority list
of targ'ets, it was not hard for the Eighth
Air Force to select the factories located in
Schweinfurt in ordel' to deal the most telling
blow in the shortest possible length of time.
Finally, if it is found to be impracticable
or,impossible to attack any of the previously
nlt'ntioned targets, we will find it necessary
tll turn our attention to tho
wh('l'(, the various parts are gathered ami
a"sc11lble(1 into the cOlllplete article. Again
\\(, find that we are faced with a further
(Ii<persion of thC'se which makes it
1'l'tlportionatl'ly more difHcult for us to pro
dtll'(' the c!"sirt'd (ffect on the industry being
The next {'ateg-ory of objective that was
, llll'ntione!1 was that of sources of power sup
ply. llHluRtl'Y must have powei" of one sort
tH' another in order to produce the finished
article. This power will usually take the
form of eleCtricity, sleam, 01' g-as. Ag'ain \\'e
find an objective which, if attacl(ed, and
ti('stroyC'!i or damage!l, will deny the use of
these facilities for at least a shurt period
of time.
;-'Tany of you will remember how the Royal
Ail' Force attal'l'd and destl'oved the l\lo
('llIle, F.der, and Sorpc dams in the Ruhr
valley. The sole objective of this attack was
ttl deny the enemy the use of the power with
\\'hich to operate his factories located in
the Ruhr. It so happens that the Ruhr valley
is one of the most hig-hly electrified areas
ill Europe, and that the source of the ma
jority of this electdcal power was derived
from these three dams, The attacks were
highly successful and resulted in the com
plete drainage on the part of the l\1oehne
and Eder dams and the partial drainage of
the Sorpe dam. This meant that the Germans
would have to rebuild the dams, and then
wait until the reservoirs had filled again
before they would be able to draw on the
electrical power these dams had supplied. A
result was achieved with this at
tark in that many roads and railroads were
washed out, many bridges were destroyed,
crops were damaged recovery, and
many thousands of the workers supplying'
the labor required in the various industries
were made homeless. A further result was
achieved in that the population of the Ruhr
valley was deprived of its source of water
supply. These three dams had provided prac
tically, all the drinking water used by the
natives of this valley.
We finally come to the last, but far from '
the least important, objective, that of the
enemy air forces. Attacks are beillg' con
stantly carried out against this objective,
both in the air and 011 the ground. The
attacks in the air tal{C the form of aerial
combat. Those against the air force on the
ground may take the form of attacks against
airdromes, where the aircraft are gathered
for operations, or uf attacks against the
assembly plants amI factories which ,pro
duce und assemble the various parts that go
into the completed ailcraft.
The requisite ,for any operation, either
land, sea, Or air, is to obtain and maintain
ail' superiority. Without this superiority no
force can operate .. as has been demon
strated in both Europe and the Pacific. At
such times as the Germans utilized the rem
nants of their Luftwaffe in mags they were
able to gain temporary loeal ail' superiority,
thus pel'mitting theil' gl'ound forces to at
tack without hindrance from the ail'. An
example of this uccuned at the time of the
Battle of the Bulr:e. Von Rundstedt was able
to muster a force of about one thousand
aircraft which he uged to gain local air
supel:iority and assist the advance of his
ground forces. Aftel' a day or two, this local
superiority was lost and, through the com
bined efforts of the g'l'uunci and ait forces,
the Wehrmacht was forced to consolidate its
positions and later withdraw because of the
air attacks against its troops, guns, and
The success of many of our attacks against
enemy installations has been predicated on
our ability to gain ail' superiority. This was
true in the operations in the Ploesti area.
Due to the large amount of enemy territory
we had to pags over, "it was necessary for
us to neutralize the Luftwaffe to as great
an extent as possible in erder to minimize
our 10,sseg, Likewbe, in our in
the Pacific it will be noted that the enemy
ail' forces. are subjected' to intense attacks
prior to our landings in order to obtain the
air superiority which provides us the neces
sary freedom of action for our forces.
Having briefly cl)vered the various targets
which are classified as 8trategic and seen
what their destructio;1 will do, let us tak<!
a look';,-nt the process by which the
targets are selected and allotted a priority,
It seem that this would be an almost
task, It does entail a great deal
of work, but it is not quite so ditlicult as
it sound, The process follo\\'('(l in this
selection is somewhat as follows:
A special board, composed of industrial
and military expert,;, will gathcr togethel'
all the information which they can tind rela
tive to the various industries, This is I)OS
sible since very few of' the large industl'ies
were created solely by one nation, Foreign
capital has been im'ested in many of them
and foreign labor has been used in thci I'
design and development. Thercfnl'e, it is
almost possible to fin(l someone who
wiII have a knowledge of what the various
plants are like, how they are laid out, and
what their construetion is, This board will
then proceed to evaluate l'aeh one of these
objectives from the point of view of the
effect their destruction will luwe on the
strategic plans laid down by highel' head
quarters an(l the vulnerability of each in
stallation to air attack. In some cm,(>s the
board will even go so far as to recommend
the type of bomb and the fuze to be
in the attack, As a of these inves
tigations the board will allocate to each
objective a of attack, Finally, after
all angles have been considere(l and studied,
the board will make recommendations in the
form of reports to the ail' fOl'ce commander,
theater commander, 01' the combined and
joint chiefs of staff, Oll the lewl
at which the planning' is beine; done,
\Vhen we commenced operations against
f!'Om England, we were partially
guided by the list of priorities which had
already been set up by the British, As our
operations progressed, we found that we
would have to readjust some of these prior
ities to tit the type of operations which we
were conducting, As most of our attacks
were being made during the hoUl's of day
light, we were subject to severe opposition
, from the Luftwaffe, This meant that the til'st
thing we would have to do was to plal'e
our main effort against the ail' force until
we had reduced it to such a point that it'
coul(l not effectively hinder our
Our next priority on objectives was placed
on gas ancl oil refineries, By destroying' this
source of power we would eventually dl'
mobilize the German Army and Ail' Forel',
1\' ext on the list was the ball bem'ing' in
dustry, and from there on the
varied as the situation demalHled, From time
to time we have had to switch our e/forb
to certain objectives such as the U-boat pens
and factories, When the Germans started
using the V-l, we found it necessaJT to in
terrupt OUI' normal operationR and co-ncen
trate on the launching- for these weapon"
Onte the "perial board has made its rec
ommendations, the staff then proceeds to
e\'aluate them against an estimate of the
which is available at all times, One
of their primary concernR is the logistical
factor, but th(>y will also consider the size
of the force neede(l to out the attack"
recommended, Providing the logistical, intel
ligence, and factors will permit
the attaeks to bl' aecolllplishe(l, the staff \\iIl
w'ually accept the priority alld recommenda
tions of the hoard,
One factor which the picture at
this time is the politieal effect of the opera
tion, It was found in many ca>es that the
Eighth Ail' Force was unable to attack vital
targets in the occupied ('ountdes of Franct:',
Belgium, and Holland because of the pos
sible detrimental effect that would result on
t he native population, The possibility existed
that, if certain tal'g'ets ,vel'C hit, lal'g'e
of the natives mig-ht be injured
or killed, If this were to happen often, it
would 'inevitably turn the natives against
us and hinder our operations on the con
tinent at such a time as we could
fully mount our invasion,
Finally, after the objective has been se
lected and the attack completed, it remains
fo\' the ground and the ail' forces to
exploit the results created by these strategic
In the Pacific our rapid progress has
accomplished a large degree ,of neutraliza
tion of the .Japanese sources of raw materi
als, Our bases are now located in such a
way that we press home our attacks
against the industrial empire on the .Japanese
mainland, Our B-:;!!)'s are cal'1'ying out ex
tensive operations against the aircraft and
steel industries, The outside sources of pe
tl'oleum have been cut oft' and are being
neutralized by other units of our armed forces,
Thus, when we pick up a paper and read
in it that Tokyo was attaeked by a large
force of B-2f)'s, we realize that it is not
just an idle impulse or hunch on the part
of some commander which has caused this
attack to be made. It is the culmination of
a long and arduous process of evaluation
and research on the part of hundreds of
people, and was designed to, depriv;e the
enemy of some vital materiel or force 'for
the conduct of war, It is a continuation of
the strategic plan and another step in the
successful and timely conclusion of this plan.
Dig'e!>ted at the Command and General Staff School from an article in
Qual'tcoi1llstcr TrailLii1g Sader .1'lll/nUlI 4 May 1945,
\\' liEN of the dangerous position of
Ba,(og'lle came thlough, supply wheels began
,urllillg, Immediately, qunrtermasters sta
tioned at t,'oop carrier bases from which the
supplies were to be flown began preparing
for the mi,;,ion. They workLd day an,1 night.
HUlldreds of hundll's were wrapped, plnced
ill the special chute containers, and loaded
into the planes,
Plans were made quickly for the dropping.
Fin.t lloillt to h" settle,1 was how the pilots
\\',"'1' to recognize the exact drop areas. Here
was a snag which had caused considerable
trouble in aerial ,uppl,' at Arnhem. There,
Ie"", than ten percent of the supplies dropped
actually reached the Allied troops fighting
below. Chief reasons were bad weather and
intense low-level flak.
RAF nig'ht-bolllber tl'chniques were copied.
A special "pathfinder" force was selected,
consisting of specially trained and highly
skilled pilots and navigators. Theil' job was
to pinpoint the precise drop zones (DZ's), in
(lieated by the garrisons below, in acil'lHICC of
the C-,!7 skytrain,
These "sharpshooters" started out well
ahead, After >;couting, they found the DZ's,
and on' these spots dropped paratroops
equipped with special visual and radio signal
ing aids. The paratroopers set up their appa
ratus, the tense moment came,
As, soon as they sighted the planes, the
paratroopers began operating their signaling
('quipment, The pilots of the didn't
have to bothe,' about landscape identification.
All tlll'Y had to do was watch for the ground
signab an,1 fly to them.
Once over the target, the quartermaster
"dropmasters" on the C-47's went into action.
\Yithin forty-five seconds fro111 the time the
pilot flashed the green light that told the
flying quartermasters they were over their
tal'get, all the heavy packages were out of
th,' planes.
The containers settl0d with high' accuracy.
Less than five percent of all the tonnage
dropped missed the tiny DZ's. In fact, so ac
curate was the timing that some of the
ground SIgnaling apparatus was hit by the
parachuting cargops, One paratroopPl' with
,ix COl1lhat drops behind him said that the
most dangerous job he had ever'done was
standing by the apparatus while 300-pound
f,upply containers fell around him.
Altogether, 878 C-47's flew over the target.
In all, 807 t0118 of ordnance, medical and
food supplies, plus 348 bundles of equipment,
were packed during those vital hours and
parachuted to the men below.
The 7th Division in Leyte
Commanding 7th I1Ifantry Division
/7'" INf DlV
CampaIgn for the L,beratIon 01 1M PhlhDPlnes
20 Delobe, 1944 10 febru'", 1945

Tactical Operation of the 7th Division in the Battle for
Uberation of the Philippines, Leyte, P. I.
A. A-DAY. 20 OCTOBER 1944.
Assault landing Dulag.

B. A TO. A PLUS 2.
Captured Dulag Airstrip.
Captured Burnuen and Sun Pablo Air
strips One and Two.
11 ( 3d Bn) Atcl!d 2d lin 184
l2SJ 184 ( lsI & 2d Bns)

32d Infantry captured Buri Airstrip.
17th Infantry advanced on Dagami.
184th Infantry moved to La Paz.
17th Infantry captured Dagami, pushed
west from Dagami, Guinarona, and
32d Infantry guarded airfields.
184th Infantry patrolled frQm La Paz.
F. A PLUS 10 TO A PL'WS 12.
17th and 184th Infantry patrolled into
32d Infantry (minus one battalion) to
Abuyog en route to Baybay.
One battalion 32d Infantry re
lieved RCT, 24th Division,
Panaon Island.
*The symbo1 fat" the leading ''lement in the center
of the formation indicates the 767th Amphibian Tank
Battalion.-The Editor.
G. A PLUS 13 TO A PLUS 29.
17th Infantry relieved by 96th Division.
In turn, relieved 96th flivision was re
lieved by 11th Airborne Division.
Regiment (minus one battalion).
One battalion. Tanauan.
32d Infantry (less 1st Battalion) with
Reconnaissance Troop patrolled west
coast Caridad to Sogod Bay.
1st Battalion patrolled Panaon, Sogod
Bay. and east coast to Hinunangan.
Infantry reconnoitered east coast
to Hinunangan.
3Zd Infantry (less 1st Battalion) de
fpnded at Palanas River against
elements Japanese 27th Division'j
184th Infantry reinforced 32d Infantry
at Damulaan.
17th Infantry followed 184th Infantry.
I. A PLUS 46 TO A PLUS 53.
Division attacked toward Ormoc.

A PLL'S 51.
77th Division captured Ormoc.
.J. A PLUS 54 TO A PLUS 59.
17th Infantry held Talisayan River Line.
184th Infantry attached to 77th Division
to defend Ormoc.
32d Infantry attacked east to join 11th
Airborne Division advancing from
K. A PLUS 60 TO A PLUS 64.
17th Infantry protected MSR [main
supply roadl Ormoc-Baybay.
32d attacked north to line east
of Ormoc.
184th Infantry defended Ormoc.
A PLUS 65.
Organized resistance declared ended.
10,167 Japs killed.
L. A PLUS 65 TO A PLUS 69.
184th Infantry attacked north to
32d Infantry Ormoc.
17th Infantry protpcted MSR.
M. A PLl'S 70 TO A PLUS 110.
Division avpragN! thirty patrols per day.
CovPf('d area south of Valencia-Palom
pon Linp.
N. A PLUS 87 TO A PLUS 108.
3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, rpinfor('(',l,
seized Camotes Islancls.
A PLllS 110, 10 FEBRUARY.
7th DiviRion relieved hy plpments of
Am('rical Division.
A PLUS 66 TO A PLUS 110.
6,392 Japs killed.
16,559 Japs killed (total;.
233 Prisoners of war taken (total).
Total miles covered in coorclinated attacks --34.
Total miles moved-llO.
Total area reconnoitered-l.950 square miles
of Leyte, inducling Panaon and
Camotes Islands.
Total time active fighting-3 months 20 days;
Soviet Underwater Bridges
From an article by Maj,)! Rohert B. Rlgg in The .1Iilitl1/'!I EIIginccl' March 1945.
THE Red Army has pioneered in the con
struct.ion of underwater brirkcs, and, to the
author's knowledge, it was the first model'll
army to achieve in the combat use of
such structures. Actually, some underwater
bridges for tanks and heavy vehicles are, in
effect, artificial fords. OtherR, however, are
actual log' structures built under wate,.
The tl'ue underwater bridges for vehicles
are pile-anchored, prefabricated sections
made either of plain logs or milled timbers.
The sections are assembled upstream a short
way from the place where piles are <.!tiven
into the river. Once the piles are in place.
the sections are floated downstream one or
two at a time, and swung into position where
they are weighted by stones from nearby
rafts to SUbmerge them. The next phase is
to fasten these sections permanently to the
piles, thus securing them to the bottom of the
river, This is a difficult underwater job which
has never been completely perfected. Methods
of fastening vary; clamps, brackets, pegs,
and spikes arl' uxed, but they all have their
drawbacks. This part of the technique needs
improving. It is the Soviet practice to do
e\'ery bit of prefabricating possible un the
in orde,' to eliminate the amount of la
bor and fitting to be done uncleI' water.
Bridges of this type are usually built up in
tiel's, althoug'h the velocity of the river cur
rent will limit the number of tiers. The usual
bridge is from four to five tiers. In order to
prev.ent the prefabricated bridge sections
from floating below the bl'iclge foundation,
guide piles protrude above the water's sur
face; these piles are spaced at regular inter
vals along the downstream edge of the
bridge. Later they are either sawed off or
driven below the waterline. Because of the
effect which the current can have on even
well-anchored sections of a bridge, constant
inspection is necessary. No details are avail
able on the Rubject, but there is some infor.
mation to the effect that the Soviets hav!
used special underwater masks for personne
who must perform the underwater fastenings
Sell Your Field Artillery with Spare Parts and
. Free Servicing <
LIEU CO!'o!\,EI_ E. L. HOOPES, JR., Field Artillery
Illfltl'l1Ctut, ('onunalill un.t (;(>I)('ral BtatT Sehuol
"I ELI! Marshal Montgomery recently has
"Succes,; [in hattle1 iR bOUIHI to be
colhlitione<1 hy many of which I con
sid"l! lhe following are the lII'h,l illlportant:
II. TIH' degree of knowledge PO",,{,,{,d by
ell..!l S, I'\'ic{' of the othcl",; taRk, their capac
ant! their IimitationR.
1>. The deg:rce of mutual trust and honesty
of Illotive whid1 is I'<,ached between the two
Sl'l'vil'l'S .. "
This slaten1l'nt was made with particular
ll'g<a I'd to joint air-g'l'ound op('rations. It is
Ilt'lieved applicable in ('qual force to any two
anus 01' services operating together in the
]wl'fol'lnllnce of a {'ommon mission.
TIll' IHlrpOSl' of this article to iIlustrat{'
I,ow a fit'ltl artillcry ('ommander, ('ither per
sonally or throug:h the m(',lium of his staff,
ean do muC'h to insure the most efi'('ctive use
uf antiaircraft artill!'ry, tank-destroyer, and
tank units when employed on the secondary
mission of serving as additional artillery.
The arUd{, will also illustrate what assist
allCP antiai],C'J'llft, tank-destroye,', and tank
unit comllHlIlders or staff offic('rs can render
ttl the al'tilleryman. This exchange of assist
alice betweell repr('sentatives of these sepa
rate arms dematHls the degree of knowledge
and the degree of lllutual trust to whit:h Fi<'ld
:llarshal l\!ontgomery )'('ferrecl.
As :World War II continues, primary mis
,ion5 for antiaircraft, tank-destroyer, and
tank units arc hecoming increasingly scarce.
'The decided decrease in enemy ail' strength
has already' dictated the conversion of cer
tain antiaircraft artillery units; present and
futUl'e reductions in the strength of enemy
armor will decrease the need of tank-de
stroyer employment on antitank missions;
and, as the earth's terrestial battlefield con
tinues to be diminished in size, suitable ter
rain for utilizing ind!'pendently the shock
action of our own tanks will become increas
mg'ly difficult to obtain,
Such an overall picture brings up the
'luestion: "What use can be made of anti
aircraft artillery, tank-destroyer, and tank
weapons where their employment on their
pl'imary mission is imprudent?" One an
!'wer might' be to hold them in reserve until
a favorable situation does occur. Another
solution might be conversion to the most
l'ee<led type of unit, pJ'ohably infantry. A
third possibility is the one to be considered
in thi article, namt'ly, th!'i!' employment as
ndtiitionaI field at'tillery. Such employment is
lint a new idea hy any mNll1R. Our command
el's ill the theaters have already used certain
of thcse units in just such a role,
Lct llS a;;sume for illustrative purposes
that the 11th Infantry Division committed
to a('tion in X Th!'atcr of Operations has
muong' its various' attachments the 701st
Antiaircraft Gun Battalion, Mobile, the 802d
Tank-Dl'stroyt'! Battalion, Self-Propelled,
anti' the 00;1<1 Tank Battalion. The special
on the 11th Division front has
reachet! tht' puint where either the nature of
{'neIllY opposition or the employment of or
gunic and other attached units (augmented
by additional antiaircraft and tank-destroyer
support from corps) has caused the division
commander to attach all three of these units
to th(' division artillery.
To justify its t'mployment on the battle
field, field artillery mllst be able to shoot,
march, and communicate. In order to be
(apahle of performing these three "musts,"
many specific related problems crop up in
the mind of the artilleryman. Of these, let us
consider only the following: materiel, com
munication, observation. gun (howitzer) posi
tions, ammunition, control, and fire direction.
In a situation involving only field artillery
personnel and equipment, the solution t;>f
these prol;>lems requires thought, time, and
cooperation among artillerymen. In a situa
tion such as we have assumed for the 11th
Infantry Division artillery and its three at
tachments, certainly no less thought, no less
time, and much more cooperation between the
supported unit and it:> will he
Ll't heg-in our of thi, ('x
change of by tHatlriel.
How much a(hlitional artillcry i, tl1(' 11 th
Division artillery rcceiving from ('neh of
these Onc nll'lhod of' ohtaining'
the answcr to lhb qU('stion would he n'fcr
('ne(' to the appropriate Tables of Organiza
tion and Equipment. A hettel' lllethod, in
view of pos"ihl l, hattll' easualties in matL'l'iL'1
and also in view of frcquenth' chan"'in'"
Tables of Organization and I':quip;nent. w';;ulJ
be by l11ean$ of a statf ('onfcl'pn{'c. B\' either
method, thc artillcl'\' con;lllandcr
could obtain the folltl\\'ing' inf:,rmatioll: (1)
The 7,01st Antiail'craft Gun Battalioll, :\[obile,
is equippe(1 with (lO-lllll1 antiaireraft
dividc(l equall,' among foul'
(2) The Tallk-De.,tl'o,wl Battalion,
Self-Propcl\L'd, has thill\'-,ix lllotO!' car
riage'S, I\T::I;, ('aeh C'qliipp;'<! with a HO-lllm
gun; t\vl,lvp of thp:->t ,,'capon::.; are IH't.';.;ent
in each of three tank-destroYl'r
and within eaeh cOlllpany thl're al'C' threl'
fOUl'-gun platoons, (:l) Thl' !1O:ld Tank Bat
talion has fifty-foUl' :'.1-4 llledium tanks each
arlllcd with a 'j'5-ll1111 gun; of this nUlllber,
fort)'-fivL' is prohahly tIll' maxilllull1 numbl.'r
which would be available to i1r{' I!S ti{'ld a!'
tillery, the rClllaindn heing' conlllland tanks;
these forty-five avnilable are divi<IL'<I among
three cOlllpanil's, jjJ'tl't'n in L'ach comJlany;
each company is further capable of subdivi
sion into three platoons of five tanks each,
In adJition to these 'j'5-ll1ll1 guns, it is also
possible'to form frolll tank-battalion weapons
a six-howitzCl' battery of 105-111111 howitzers,
This can be done hy tnking one such tank
from C'ach of the three mediullI tank com
panies and combining them with three simi
lar tanks found organically in the tank
battalion hea(lqual'ters company, Summariz
ing the available arl1lanent in thl."c three at
tached units, the divi"ion artillery could
obtain from the antiaircraft gun battalion,
foul' batteries, each consisting of four !lO-mm
guns; from the tank-destroyer battalion, nine
batteries, each consisting of four !lO-mm
guns; and from the tank battalion, nine bat
tpl'ips, each consisting of five 75-mm guns
<)Ilt' hattery of HIx 105-Hlm howitzers, It
j, {'viclt'nt that anyone of these ol'gapiza
would nott'wol'thy assistance
to any al'tilkry organization. The assump
tion ]ll't'viously stat('ri of having all three
battalions attltched to our division artillery is
not meant to be indicative of any specific bat
tle situation, It is maLip only fol' purposes of
pxplanation nnd comparison, Actually, a di
vbion :50 far in this war would have been
l110re likely to have leceivct! the attachment
oj' ju,t one 01' two of these battalions and
tlwn havl' bL-en able to make only one or two
01' hatterh,s available as addi
t ional field artillery,
The subject for consideration is
('{Illllllllllication<;, The primary means of com
l11unil'ation of an antiaircl'tlft gun battalion
wjJ'('; of a tank-dl'stroyer battalion ancl
tank hattalion. it is radio; and of artiJIer,'
in an infantry divbion, it is also wire. Thl'
nwans of t'xchanging this informa
tion would also be a conference of C0111
nland,'r:-< 01' staff officers, At the same confer
('nc(', our fiL'ld aJ'tillery representativc coult!
ill forlll th(> of each of these
units that wire ('omlllunieation between the
divbion artillery "witchboal'd and the at
tach(,d unit will be il4stalled and maintained
Ly the divj,;ion artillery, Also, wire communi
cation l'equired between the attached unit's
Lattalion switchhoa}'(l and each of its firing
I'attl.'ries (companies) is normally a unit re
sponsibility, In the of the tank destroy
ers ane! tank:;, this will also usually include
at least one and preferably two circuits be
tween each company fire-direction center and
each firing platoon, In the event> one unit
commander or officer states that he does
not havL' that much wire on hant! in his bat
talion, once again the field artillery repre
sentative can af'sist by stating that the
artillery communications officer and
8-4 will make excess artillery wire avail
!J hIe, Should even this be insufficient, the di
dsion artillery commander will request ad
ditional wire from the division signal officer,
Now what about observation? Here again
til<' field artillery must The
tank and battalion!; both
"'," reconnaissance persOlllll'l who can sprve
as ground obs(,I'v('r,;, ",l]('n their unit iH func
tinning in this secondary role, However', in
"!'Iler to coordinate the location and obs,'rvn
tion of all field artillery observers, our fil'ld
artillery commander or staff officer must tel!
thelll in what sector to observe a11<1 possibly
"ith what other field artillel'Y unit to es
tahlish one or more joint' ohscrvation
This joint ohservation ]lost Sl'tUP would have
lhl' advantage of giving the uttnchC'l1 unit a
field artillery adviser to aHsist its own ob
server in the attack of targets using indirect
fire. The antiaircraft gun battalion is an en
tirely dift'erent arrangement hC'cnuse the
hnttulion has no ground, observel'8, Conse
fluently, some field artillery ohsern'r will be
l'!,fluired to hamIll' all flre missions
of tl10 antiaircraft hattali"n. The l'xtensive
flel(\ artilll'ry communication system will
I'eadily permit such an arranl!;cmpnt. The
hlltiuircl'aft battalion must he RO informed.
:\'ext let us consider position areas. The
Rtaff officer (command('r) of each of our at
taehed hattalions familiar with the type
of position normally occliPied by his unit
when performing its primary mission. Ho\\,
e\,er. he is no doubt somewhat less familiar
with the characteristics desirable in a field
artillery position. Consequently, here again a
mutual ('xchange of information between
commanders or staff officers is r<'quired. The
fleld artilleryman knows where the bulk of
the fire from these attached units will be de
sired, The specialist (antiaircraft artillery,
destroyer, or tank) knows the trajec
tory of his weapons. With range and tra
jectory being so interrelated, the most
desirable result is gcnaal ilt'"igllation of po
sition areas of attached units by the field
artillery commander. Ddailed selectioll of
actual battery (company) (platoon) firing
position's is left to the attached unit com
A firing weapon without ammunition is of
no value. Such a concluRion causes an artil
lery commander to take action to ensure the
value of both his- organic and attached 'units,
111 situation. the commanding genel'al .
of the 11 th Division artillery would have I
three consicil'rations concerning ammunition I
for the attached antiaircraft artillery, tank
({""tl'oyel', and hmk battalions, First. he
must ""tima!e what quantity of ammunition
will],,, expclHlt,,] by thes" attachments dur
in!): till' cOllling' action. Second, he must as
(l'rtaill whether ammunition for these
will be made available by corps in suffi
cient quantity to the estimated ex
pC'nditl11'l' m!l'; If !lot, he llIay have to revise
his e5timate, And, finally, he must consider
whethcr 01' not the attached units can trans
port in their own transportation the quantity
of ammunition allocated an(l If the
amount is bCY"llIl their capabilities, he must
l'itl1l'r reduce tlH' expl'nditure rate to a figure
COllllnensurate with their hauling capacity,
allot them some of the organic flcld artillery
ammunition sUPllly vehicles, or ohtain the
additional transportation else
where, This alllmunition supply problem is an
oth<'r example of the need for knowledge of
the capacities anti limitations of a cooperat
ing branch of the s<'rvice. Exaggeration of
either capabilities or limitations would vio
late the mutual trust and honesty of motive
described hy Field Marshal :\lontgomery as
e,sential to success, .
The next major point of concern to the
"gunner" was that of "control." Until re
cently, this subject would probably have
given an antiaircraft artillery, tank-destroy
er, or tank unit more difficulty thlln any
other phase of serving as additional field ar
tillel'Y. Actually, with the proper fire control
and survey equipment, with which all such
units are now being equipped, it is very
simple. What is the artilleryman trying to
obtain when he seeks "control"? Nothing
more than the l'l'lative location on a firing
chart of at least one gun (howitzer) in each'
of his batteries with regpect to a point or
points in target area. It may be obtained
in sev('rai ways, such as by inspection, by
by survey. In every situation,
regardless of its speed. the artilleryman con
stantly se\'ks to improve his "control." This
means that the goal for which he strives is
either a complete grin Rurvey of both
position and target areas or at 80111('
type of map, showing both tIw.-e al'ea", whi"h
has been cill'l'CCted by "tlI'Vt'y, Who doe,; the
SUl'vl'ying'! Personnel in ('vel'Y tiel,! artillery
organization from COl'PS tll,tillel'Y l1l'ac!qutlr
tel'S clown to at least each hattalion, very
often to each battery, Th(' desirahility of
accUl'ate Hrtilll'ry tin' requiI'es that
sooner 01' later all survey Ill' ('oonlinatc,l,
How is this ('oordination l'Ifcded'! By having
a hight'r "ueh as corps artillery
give a 10Wl'1' headquarter,; as division
artillery a point of known hJt'atl<ln ancl eleva
tIOn (and 1'1'0111 that point a 1000\\'n direction)
from which to start its (the sllhordinutt'
unit's) SUrVl'Y, At lem;t two points. one in
the target ar('a an,l onl' in tilt' position area,
are more desiru1>I(', In tIlt' of attacht'd
unib, how('ver. sueh as 0111' antiaircraft :tr
nnd tanl,
no tal'get al'ea is 1'e'lui1'l',1 01' ,',,
pected, Tlw parpnt tield (in thb
the 11th
sible for all tnrg<'l al'('a control. In thl' l""i
tion U)"(IH., lIt, IH'e
pareel to survl'y lll'tilll'l'ynwn, Spl'citicall,'.
if anel when 11 th Division artillery g;ives any
one of these units a point and a direction
with which to that unit must
be able to locate its ba[tc'ry (company) (pla
tOOIl) position:; nccll1'ately both horizontally
ancl with to that point.
Eventually, that "lllust" will Ilt' une with
which compliance b easy, HO\\'('vcr, it may
remain in our th,'aters until the state
of training and issue of ,'quipment is more
complete, Until such occurs, the artilleryman
can once again a:;sist the sllpporting' tlnit to
accomplish its mission. The voluntary loan of
both survey personnel ami equipment will
do much to solve the problem,
Since the development of the public;ized
massed-fire field artillery technique, many
artillerymen think in terms of fire-direction
centers, Fire-direction center computation is
an application of simple mathematics capable
of improvement with practice. In this re
spect, also, training and receipt of fire-direc
tion equipment will have a definite bearing on
how much assistance a Iloll-field artillery.
nrgnnization will require. An antiaircrai't
gun hattalion, such as our 701st Antiaircraft
(iun Battalion will have to furnish the per
sonnel and equipment to operate a battalion
fire-direction center, A tank.destroyer bat
talion or a tank battalion such as our 80:2d
Tank-Destroyer Battalion and our !lO:3(1 Tank
Battalion, will each have to provide a bnt
talion fire-control ccnter in additinn to a
company tire-direction ccnter, This is
sal'y becaw,e each company with its thrc,'
platoons of either six (tank-de;;troyet) or
five (tank) g'uns is comparahle to the fipld
artill,'ry battalion organizatioll, E"pcriencl'
has dl'nllHlst]'atl'd thnt a fire-dir('ction cpntl']'
b c1esit'able for each field al'tillel'Y hattalion,
Purticularly in the cuse of tank destroyers
and tanl,s, this fire tli rcdion St'tllJl r('quires
a of tl'ained fire-direction pPI'sllnllel.
In the evcnt training' 01' equipment has heen
laeking', once ag'ain the field artillery should
"Ifer all pnssihle as,istancc by
loan", Aside from the training' an,l equip
nll'nt angIPs, it will be normal for the sup
ported /icld artillery organization (in thi,
case, 11 th Divisinn artillery) to relieve th"
;.uppol'ting unit of much of the command 1'('
of fire direction, The field <lrtil
!t'ry commtlndel 01' his representative in hb
lire-direction l'enter will u;.ually dcsignat('
targets to be altack"d, time the fin' is to h('
delivt'rl"l, and tht, Humber nf rounds to be
Tn condusioll, it is po"sibl" that th(' day
lllay cnme when tank-destt'oyer" battalions,
antiaircraft-gun hattalions, and tanl, hat
talions may be capable of superior, unas
sisted performance of the field artillery role,
This, of course, will depend on the training
and equipment of these organizations. Until
such training; and issue of equipment is ac
complished, the field artillery organization
supported by either the attachment or rein
forcement of these units can do much to
bridge the training and equipment gap. Much
has been written about the salesmanship
necessary to make the arms supported by
field artillery "artillery-minded." In the case
of antiaircraft artillery, tank-destroyer, and
tallk such cducl\tion iH not neces
in the lwcause the vcry na
tun' of wcapons callS(,S them to be
"sl'l'eialist" 01' "dircctfire" artilielTmen, In
stead .If the infantry type salesmanship, this
tl'llllsaction is similal' to one asp('ct of the
prewar sale of an automobile, Included in
lOllY such wOllI.1 have hN'n' a frce 1,000
mile inspection, a set of tools, a spare wheel
aIHI tire, and a grease and oil change. In,
other words, when your customer is a mem
her of an antiaircraft artillery, tank-de
stl'(lyer, or tank organization, sell your field
artillery with spare parts and free servicing,
Such a sale would subscribc to Fiela ;:\Iarshal
;:\lontgomery's formula for success,
Bearing a Burden
by tht' Oir.:.:tol', Maintcnance Division, Army Service Forces.
B \Ll. anti rollvl' b0<lI'inc::-. Hl'(.l currying the
war tn th(l ()ll tl'lltl\:-;, tank:-;.
tl'ain" plan<"', alltl .\nd bC'arings are
ju,.,t H1HHlt 11 tlllll 11,'1' 111le' Wlll'll it to ('l'iti
en} Itt'lll .... 11:-'l'<1 in thl' A 1'l1lY.
Th",'" Illaill point, in tilt' CHn' and handling
"f 11\'aring'< should hl' I,cpt in nliJlIl at all
lillh ..... l\ll!,p dean! Ht'1111'111
hpl' that nl' g:nt will :--l'pre a hearing in
,h"l't Ol'dl'1 a ('PlY d 1'0p' of 1'(> will
1u-..t it 11:-- quiekly. So h()PP
1\T;tppC'd at all tilll\" wlH'11 arp not ItI
P"'{', Hnd \\ llllll 01" l't.'lll()ving thl'111
::Iwa,'< placv tlWlll on "/f'IIlI ThC'
dl'y-eh'Hninc: :--nivPllt .... you U;--t' tn cll'an thenl
and thl' 11Ihl'll'anl< 1I,<, tn l,l'C']> them run
ning' ,mo"thly nll"t Ill' ..!van too, 1-'01' this
",'a"lIl it i, important t hat containers he
1,(lpt l'OVl'rt..'d nlueh a .... to prC'vent
tlust alld grit from 'l'((ling' and !>Iowing into
th\'m, Hands, hC'nclll's, I'ag'';,
that tout'h(lf, he elean.
S,'cond, kC'el' \JC'aril\g" adjusted properly.
Thi, is lI1l}mrtant in operation of
IIItitol' \'t'hicll's wlll'l', I'PI\\Oval. of front
\\'hl'('ls for luhril'atjoll i, a fl'Pf}uent occnr
Il'nC', Hpinstallution of hearings at time:;
likl' thpsl', or installation of new h('urings
II hen nece",,,'y, must he pel'formed carefully
,(I that h('aring's are Iwitht'l' too tight nor
too Ie)!)SI'. A hearing that is too tight will
o\erheat qlliekly an,1 a hparing that is too
loose will he slIhj(>ct(>d to jolting and jarring
far in excess of its ahility to withstand,
Bearings are shock breakers, not shock
Luhrication is the third important main
\pnancl' service in the cal'e of bearings. \Val'
Departl1ll'nt Lubrication Orders for specific
items of ef}uipment should be followed so
that the right lubricant in the right amount
is ap}llied. Here, again, the cleanli
ness of lubl'icants must be emphasized and
the practice of keeping lubricant containers
lovpred whenever they are not actually in
\1'\' must be stresseel,
In conneetinn with s{'cond, third, and
fourth l't'helon handling anel reclamation of
\J(,HI'ings, a new technical manual, TM2856,
""'Iaint'nance of Ball and Roller Bearings,"
IS no\\' in the process of pl'eparation for dis
tl'ihution in the neal' future, This manual
gives special attention to inspection pro
(e<lures in' connection with determining
whether hearings are serviceahle or unsel'v
iceable: It would be well for personnel re
sJlonsible for this phase of bearing mainte
nance, especially, to watch for the appear
ance 0\ this manual, th01,lgh of course, every
one who handles bearings will finel the man
tlal of interest and help.
It takes just as mtlch, if not m:>re, equip
ment to win a war as it does to lose one. So
the fact that we are winning many victories
as the days pass does not mean that we can
let up on our efforts to make our ef}uipment
last as long as possible and give the utmost
in efficient 'lervice. Bearings are small in
size, but they are big in importance. Give
lhem the attention they geserve-keep them
clean. keep them adjusted properly, and keep
them lubricated-to keep them rolling. '
A Cure for Shipside Confusion
('omnHlIlrl n11el
URI1\G tlw d,\Y8 of this war a
c('\'tain transport nrnvcl\ at onc of our
major with some :100 on
roard illlllati,'ntly awaiting- the ll!-ollping of
the gang-plank. On tllP dock an "<lunl numl)('r
of pl'rsol1lll'1 ('alrcrl,' awltit,'d an opportunity
to board ship to welt-oml' th"lll. or to assist in
the debarkation. It might Ill' eXI'Cdel\ that
such n 'situation. e1os"ly reglllat,'d,
would I('a<l to confusion. It did. As a rl'sllit.
it was <lecidl'<I to <,liminal" the cro\\,ll on the
pier by admitting only llL'rsons as w,'re
<'l"scntial to thc opcl'ation and tlwn only wlll'n
called for hy til(' Troop 7IIov(,Il1,!lt Ollicl'r.
The latlcr was diJ'('ctl'd to ctlnduet the' <1<,
uarkation in acelll'dance with tIlt' pl'ocedul'('
outlilH'd in tIl<' lllPllllll'undlllll ht'I,,\\'. Th" pl'O'
('"dul'" olltlilll'd th"I'pin has h(>('n in operation
CPlleral Staff 8l'hool
for sevC'l'ul years nnd has prove',l a most d
f"ctiv(' l'en1l'dy for the situation cited.
The I'eatll'r will no doubt be uy
the heading of the procedure, which lin><
.lnll'Jllll',l slig'htly to COnfOIl\! with a 1('('<'111
\Val' Dl'panllll'nt dirt'ctive. Dccause port "p
between ptlrts as wpH as from
tUlll' ttl time within ports, we h,'re at the
school have allopte<1 for instructiollal Plll"
HOg"" a hypothetical port known as the
Port of and 11,,\'o
located it on Chcsap.:ake Bay below Ralti
Ill'll','. so doing, we have been ahle to
!('ach the prineipl('s of port operation at a
typi"al POl't without harassment tIll' !
variatiolls ('xisting in tIll' flcld. The pl'nt'('du}'('
:I" usc,1 in school
!.eav,'nworth Port of Embarlwtion
Chesapeak(', :\Id.
DEBARKATIO:-1 11 l'\ovemlwr If)
Ko. :!:1 (
1. The following will s('\'ve ag a general guid,' to goverll debarkationg.
a. BOUl'dillf/l'u/'ly (Boards ship as soon as possible).
Troop Movement Offic,,!'
Port Surgeon
E:-'T Medical
:\aval Boarding Officer
Naval Logistical Officer
(1) Contacts Transport CommalHler and
obtaills passenger list; advis('s Trans
port Commandl'r lllethod anti or<1er of
debarl{ation. Gives welcoming address
to RO & TD Group".
(1) Clcars ship per AR 30-1245; notifles
TMO to proceed; a1'1'angcs ,Ietails for
debarking sick and wounded.
(l) Clerk .
(1) Interviews survivors.
(1) Arranges interrogation of civilians.
Total 5
b. Following clrlrdls board ship 1I"hcn dacked, ill orr/er ltftmed:
(1) Customs Inspector
Baggage 11aster
(1) Secures declarations on haggagf'.
(1) Arrl).nges to inspect civilians.
( 1 ) Effects transfer baggage from ship to
(1) Reports to TMO; issues such instruc
tions as may be necessary to accomplish
orderly debarkation ancl control of pas
(2) MP Detail:
NCO (1) ReportH to TMO for instructions.
E!\Is (as directed
by TMO)
1 (3) Medical attendants
(As required) Relieve attendants provided by CO of Trans
port. (Report to Port Surgeon.)
(.1) Balance Navy Logistical Party:
Control OfficN' (1) Sets up panels for interviewing civil
Opcrations Officer (1) Sets up palwls for intcrvi('wing civil
EM Xavy (1) Clerk.
Total 3
e. I'I'iSOtlCl'S of iraI' first to be dcbatked.
d. SCI'victJ PCI'SOlll1('/ debarks in the following on/a:
(1) For duty,
(2) Ambulant sick.
(3) Mental caseR.
(4) Litter cases.
(Troop 1I10venll'Ilt Officer).
,'. [<,,,lIoU'illg board ship UI! c<wqlldion of deu(lrkatiull "r servIce pcrsvlllld, 011 cull vI' TJIO:
(1) Intellig'('nce Pa!lLls:
Navy Panels for interviewing and clearing' civil
FBI ians for debarkation.
(2) W. S. A. Representative Arranges transportation details for mer
chant seamen. _
(:l) Red Cross Repl'l'sentative Handles Red Cross personnel. Arranges
transportation details for other civilians
when called upon by TMO.
f. Civilians debal'!. in fullowing Ul'd!!l':
( 1) Hospital casps Xames and place of to Intelli
(2) Other
Director Troop l\Iovement Division.
I say, then, that when you have gained a victory, you ought by all means to
pursue it, and to imitate Julius Caesar rather than Hannibal in that respect;
the latter of whom lost the empire of the world by trilling away his time at
Capna, after he had routed the Homans at the battle of Cannae. Caesar, on the
other hand, nevcr rested after the victory. but always pursued and harassed the
enemy after they were broked and flying. with vigor and fury than he
lIttacked them at first.
, -Machiavelli, The Art of Wa,'
The Pillbox--A Trap
('ommnnding omeN', 3,1 HnUnhnn, lnfntltl').
Major Gelleral Han'y L. Tlcadd{."
Commalldilly Gelleml, 95th III/It/dry Di
l'i8iol1, ill {dtN of translllittal of this
article to the editol', stated: "Cololle[
Kel/y is all authority 011 thr subject 0/
pillbo.1' pyhting, hlll'ing had sepent!
1I'eek8' e,"jlcricnc{' ill reduction of the de
fensl's of thc Sie[J/rier/ Linc ill the /Jritl[Je
head /chi('11 th" Il,ith ])i,'isio/! [J({illcd al
SWII'lauicrll, (1('/ JIIIIIIY, Throlluhollt tltis
Division, we pllt into practice the meth
ods which he lias l'eI'Y ably c,1'plail1etl ill
his altiele, Pillbox fiUliting is a special/y;
therc is 110 doubt abollt that."
,-,THl!: ImlTOU,
ILLBOXES are traps, tombs frolll which
there is no cseape for thOSl' who clect to
I'emain and tig'ht from within the rabe ,eeu I'
ity of their walls, Perhaps this reads a bit
differently from the usual remarks on German
bunkers, but havin\!; successfully r!'duced
every pillbox we have assaulted, we would
much prefer to attack thcl11 than to defcnd
True, th,,\' offer morc protection than the
foxhole aml'are strongly manned and
arme(l, yet from the viewpoint of the attacker,
there are some advantag'es in fighting them,
For example: All pillboxes havc certain
characteristics in common, Thcy all have an
entrance and usually VIII!! oJ/e, This, in itself,
means there is but one route of escape for
JeITY. Cover it and hc is trapped, Anothc)'
gene'ral feature of all pillboxes the tiring
embrasurc or port. On the whole, thcse are
points of weakness, as I shall show later,
Moreover, Sieg-fric<i bunkers are made of
concrete, This gives the occupants a false
sense of security, which in allY military opcra
tion facilitates the attack,
Considering the above-mentioned similar
ities among pillboxes, one might believe that
they are aJl alike, This i,; not true! In thc
Siegfried Line we encountered two general
classes of bunkers, The "embrasure" type
(Figure 1) whose fire power is delivered
from one 01' more opellllll\S in the wails, "nd
the ste<.>1 cupola ]lillbox (Figures 2 and 3)
which has only the tU1'l'et cxpo,ed, the re,1 of
the ]liJIbox b('ing- coverecl by a Ian!;e 1l10lHld of
earth, TIll' former more readily lends it'clf
to CHtl1ouflap:e in a .e:a l'ag'p, :--ht:d.
small house, 01' bnnd and in the
as a ha,'stal'k 01' dirt n]olInc!. The
lattel', ho\\'('ver, is the sl I 011,,1'1', \\,ith ,"'''ItI
liel<ls of tin; in all dirl'l'tions, It h,,, nn Llllld
>,pots and pI'e"ents a Hlost ditlil'ult problem to
the attack"I',
"'hat al'E' the means of .Iefellse "pel1 to the
(icrlll!lns fOl' protectinl!,' these pillb"xcs, alld
how can wc overcome them?
First, riflelllen usually f1n:uJlY trem:he,
around the bunker to kl)ep 0\11' a:-. .... ault pallll''';
fl'llll1 infiltrating' Hlld utllllOle:-;'tcd. OUI
conccntratcd artillcl'Y and mortal' tlre ,,-PIIPI"
ally <leals with thl' problem slH'ce,sfllll>',
ddvillg this sccunty \!;I'OUp illto the I'elathe
,afety of ib hox, }lllrl'over, with hi, own Inell
under l'O\'{}l' now, to (1i!"WOHI'<lQ'(l us fronl at
tacking, the (lefendpI' will !ll'obahly plal'l'
artillery tire on the pillbllx, This {'all he,;t be
combate(1 by (a) feints on othl'l' bUl)k"I",
which will ('allse the tll divi<it' hb
support t1re:-. Inuny uIl11 by (u)
clluntel'battt'ry tirE' on ]lI'edo\1sly <letel'luilll'd
01' Su"pccted .1 CITY artillE'ry and morbI'
the (;"I'n1'lI1s lay mine Del,]"
m'oulI(1 their bunkel's, Ret'OnlIab,alll'e should
determine the prescnce Ill' ab"enl'e of such a
field, Eng'ineers probing' or a e tOl"
pedo crew with the tcam ('an usually
breach a path' through thc lield, A dillel'Y
tire usually disrupts any casual mines in the
area, though this is not a sure method to clcal'
a fiE'ld,
The principal difficulty in redut'ing pillboxes
lies, however, not in the bunker itself, but in '
the supporting tires which protect it again"t
assault. The neutralization of tl1('se weapons
is the toughest problem confl'onting the at
tacker, The best solution is to fight tire with
tire. With this in mind, all possible fire power
')v.-1S0l III Ik{)I(AT(') HAND
NOll AlL 51\OWtl
S'O"XZ'E,'X 'h,' 5T(L,
.If HltiGES
Fua HE t.
if available, {';l11 be effectively employ('(\, pin- been discussed. However, the isolation of the
, pointing- the strongest pillboxes. The fll'e f!'Om objective is not its reduction. The attacl-er
these guns U'<ually cncourag'es the occupants must force ,the defenders to surrender. This
tn leave the firing chambers and ,J@scenti to will probably ca!! for a dose-in assault,
the bott()m ()f their sheltet where they at'e though sometimes fire power alone will suffice.
impotent. Ho\\,('\,er, don't on 01' In any case, \ve always try to place a 90-mm,.
mediulll artillery to a steel tUlTeted 75-ml11, or even a 57-111111 gun in position to
pillbox. On one occasion at Ensdol'f, Germany, fire on the bunker from close range, When we
we rolled a 155-mm "Long Tom" to within obtain penetration and put smoke shells into
800 yards of a menacing steel cupola., The the bunker, the occupants often come
is placed on the known and localities
{If ('nemy I'csistanc:e. None of the weapons at
the disllOHal of the attackel' be over
looked. Tl\l1k ,lest and antitank fire
should he plneer! on the 1ll0l'e formidable
bunker:.; the Dbjective, while mu
rhine guns UIlI.! lire or all in
u(j,lition to mortar aile! lig-ht al til1c.>IY, shoul<1
be .Iir,cted on "II targ'pt areas. Hc.>avy artil
lei)'. Slll'h as the R-inch and 240-mnl howitzcrs,
target absorbed five direct hits and hardly
showed the effects at all. Against this same
box, some fifty rounds of 90-mm TD fire was
directed without registering a dent in it, In
the same area we registered hits with 8-inch
howitzers on another box of this type without
visible results. They are really toug-h nuts to
Thus fal' the means at hand to isolate the
small b(lttlefield around the objective have
Halide 11';,,11. If don't sunenrler of their
own accord, we broa<lcast to them throup;h a
public adrlress systelll to tell the'llI to give up.
has saved us lives,
often perl'ua<1ing to sUl't'en<1et' without
our l1H:'l1 l1ulldnp:
Frequentl,', howeyer, the above means do
not Rain the and so the assault
whatever adrlitional strength the commander
of the assault group ,Ieems necessary to pi o
teet the operation from small counterattaeh
and other developments, The demolition el'l'\\'
should be large enough to carry the necessary
explosiYes to destroy the box, once it has bpen
captured, '
In order to neutralize any fire that may
Flr,I'RJo: 2.
is in or<1el', The groups will YUl'Y in
,ize, dependinR on the situation. It will p;en
erally consist of the a,,,ault teams, the sup
port and group, and the demolition
crew. The a:;;sault teams should contain H
leader, some riflemen, and at lea"t one man
cal'l'ying- thp chal;g'e III hreach the bunker.
The minimum number that can accomplish the
mitision should be employed. Don't expose u
platoon where half a squad will succeed. The
support and security group should consist of

come from the bllllkpr or frolll fil'e trenche,
protecting it, the assault team l11ust carry a
lal'P;e proportion of automatic weapons, 'Ye
have found that BAR's, Rubmachine gunR, and
automatic carbines aJ'e particularly yuhwblp
for work. We haye also USE',] flame
throwel's in this capacity. All the membels
of the party should carry smoke and frap;mcn
tation grenades for use against enemy re
sistance, both inside and outside of the box.
Moreover, there should be at least two such
teams-one <l fOl' the other,
"should the unavoidable and ('""pceted nee,1

il(fore the on the hunker is made,
plans must be laid and ea rried out to "button
up" the alHl iil'ing ports from
which it may itself, Usually this t(lsk
i, the 'sullpol't group which, from
its dose pusi lion to the hox, may be able to
POUI' withering' ilre into thes!' opening's, forc
ing' the occupants to close up the trap com
pll'tdy in unlel' to save themselves: This lire
is lifte,1 when the assault team masks it, at
which time the latter takes up the neutraliza
tIOn of these defenses, When the engineor with
the charge sig'mlls for the til'e to be raised, he
rushL's in lind places the explosive at the point
,elected 1'01' hreaching',
Which "hould hl' in sueh an action-a
,at,.:ht.'l dUll"}'!"(,.' 0)' a 'ht'l'hiVt'.u,? \Ve have ('111
pIIlY,',] both With success. The main difficulty
in tlsing a "beehiye" it; thut it must" he placed
lllore carefully than a satchel charge or it will
be of little value, JIowevcl', when it call. be
positioned, as in an embrasure, it is
I!"l'nt'l'ally mOl'!, effpcti\-e than a ehat'ge
of the sallie wcig'ht. On one of OUI' nig'ht op
erations pillboxes \\"e placed a thirt;)
five potlnd "beehive" on the top of a stee)
cupola, A satchel charge woul.d have been
ineffective, but the "beehive" droye a hole
into the turret, spiattcl'ing m'1Jtcn steel in
the inside, On the other hand, have as
saulted pillboxes where it was impossible to
place a "beehive" properly, In these instances,
satchel charges were effectively ,Ye
have pushed them,. attached to poles, into
otherwise inaccessible positions. Standing on
the top of turreted pillboxes, we have swung
g,itchel charges attached to the end of gOllle
tel<'phOlle wire into the entrances of the pill
boxes, hlowing in the doors. However, I believe
that, where ther can be placed correctly, "bee
hives" should be used.
The bunker should be bl'eached where it is
.. Thp satchel charJ((' del'hes itl' from the fact
that it is t'nrried in a cloth halo{ with a carrying str.ap.
The "bcehl\ e" charge I't'hembles a beehive in shape.
The dTec>t of a satchel cral'ge is that of an ordinnry
(i,\ plo!Sj\'e charge. while the "bechi\'e" charge is a
'lliHnt 1 I"h;ll''.!' rrivinl! mnl'e npnetl,ation in the direction
in which the b"se points,-THE EDITOR.
most vulnerable-where the concrete walls are"
not so thick. There are two weak points to
all pillboxes, the entnlllce and the
or firing port. Where there are embrasures
(there alie 1I0ne in the steel turret-type box),
we believe that the charges should be placed
ng'ainst them rather than against the door,
for these reasons: (1) The door is usually
covered by fire that is "zeroed" in on it from
boxes to the rear. (2) Aftel' hreaching the
<1001', one lUu,t hreak down othel' doors dosing
of!' the narrow conidors inside the box to get
to the defenders in the firing' chambers. These
doors usually are covel'ed by fire from small
ports facing' them. (3) And of course most of
the defenders are in the firing' compartment,
and so, when a charge placed at the embra
explodes, it kills or stuns most of the
After the box has been breached, the assault
team should toss in smoke and fragmentation
g'renades to inflict furthC'I' casualties on the
At this time, it is necessary to wait some
five or ten minutes for the slIIoke and dust
to clear before attempting to enter the box
through the blown opening'.
Whenever possible during this period we
elllploy a public address system to inform the
occupants of their positioll and to warn them
to leave the box or die, When a public address
system is not available, "a German-speaking
soldier can call out the pertinent illstructions.
If a prisoner is available, we usually send him
to influence the defenders to sunender. 'Ve
take all these steps, not from any heartfelt
sympathy for the JelTies in the pillbox, but
to save possible casualties among our own
men. Generally, the "supermen" quit at about
this time-those that can still walk coming
out of the bunker with great alacrity,
Howe:ver, the few times we have had to
assault the interior of the box, we haye been
successful, adhering to the tried and true
principle of fire power, We pOUl' all the fire we
can into the box and sweep from rooin to room,
killing' all the "diehards."
This entire operation, when properly
planned and executed under the best condi
tions, will take from ten to twenty minutes.
The best condjtions, however, rarely prevail
and the inevitable and c,l'perted difficulties
arise. it' will take longer than
twenty minutes when charges do not blow,
communications "go ont," key Illen are hit, 01'
Gcrm!\n suppol,ting fire has not been com
The best solution to these
and other contingencies is to e,l:pect them and
be prepared with alternate plans, teams,
leaders, and explosives.
The job has not been completed, however,
until the bunker has been made unserviceable
for future use. There are a numbcr of ways to
accomplish this. \Ve can seal off the
by melting the doom to the box with thel'l1lite
grenades, This is not the best solution. ft)I' if
we abandon the boxcs anu Jel'l'Y can get thelll.
all he need do to re-enter thenl is to melt th"
welding alHI remove the doors, Another way ttl
seal the entrances is by shoveling' dirt oV('r
them, Tankdozel's can oftcn accomplish this
quite effectively, but here too. if the 0PPOI'
tunity presents itself, the can dig' his
way in and once mol'l' defend the box, \\'e
believe the best method for denying' t'alltut'ed
boxes to future use by thE' E'nE'llIY is to d,,
molish them, It normally requires SOIlIC 700
to 1,000 pounds of T"-IT to destroy a German
bunker completely, It does no g'ood merely to
crack them. they be converted into a pile
of rubble, This we do!
The German ArillY believed that pillboxes
were the answer to the that to at
tempt to crush them would prove too
for the attacker. Instead. they have been
crushed. anu each one that defended
proved to be a trap for the Germans inside, I
do not mean to imply that it is easy to capture
and destroy a pillbox, On the contrary. it
a most difficult operation refluiring cal'efnl
reconnaissance. planning. and execution,
In Fraulautel'l1 and Ensdot'f. Get'many,
fortified towns in the industrial Saar Valley.
we had many experiences attacking' pilboxes
of all ty.pes in the Siegfried Line, There is no
one way to prescribe for the reduction of
enemy bllnkers. However, the following de
tailed account of the actual reduction of a
pillbox underlines the application of the gen
eral principles discussed above:
During the first part of January 1945, my
battalion \vas protecting' a bl'idgehead over
the Saar mver near Saal'Iautern. Germany,
Our mission was to maintain an active defl'nse
and knock out any German pillboxes that
menaced the bl'idg'eheacl. One of tlH'se buukPrs,
No, 337. continued to be a thom in our "ide,
So on about 5 January we decided to capture
anu uestroy it. The opCl'ation was set fur 7
January, Reconnaissance was immediately
initiated to determine the shape. size. and de
fenses of the objective. All this information
\YUS obtained priOlO to the ope1'ation
the box a couple of days later,
Not controlling; the buildillg's (Row "A")
pamlleling' the riVt'I' IIOt' the IJillLox('s protl't't
iug its bank (see Fie;ul'l' 4). we decided to
neutralize both hy the houses. and
from there. covering' the leal' of th" bunlwrs,
Hence. \\e pushed out thl' next day against
the Llol'k of buildings and by 1700. aftl'l'
srattered resistance. o('cupic,1 the Piltire I'o\\',
From positions in these houses we also
planned to direct fire on aI'eas not under oUI'
control to the north and ea,t of our "bjl'ctive,
In addition. the nig'ht bl'fol'e the as"ault. we
occupied the hou,es ;,f
the objedive to s(,('UI'e the elo-!'-t
point'from which to "jullIP off,"
The fire plan fOl' neutralizing' t;el'lIIan "up
porting' positions callcd for Ikht and lII('diulII
artillery at H-houl' to drive to eovel' all G('I
mans in fire trenches, The kept ('on
tinuous hamssing fin' on trenches in the area
during the assault. and in addition. the larg't'st
,uPllorting pillb,)x on the ridge to tllC' east m1>; i
taken under fire by an 8-inch howitzer, At i
the sante time. a sneen of smokc blankett<J ;
the entire al'ea. concealine; from ob- l
sen'el', the exad location of OUI' operations i
ami preventing aimed fire fl'Om being' directed J
on the assault team aftel' its disco\'CI'Y, It was I
planned that smoke ]lilts anll mort:11'5 ,i
would be used for thi>; but tlw ,\inll ;
were unfavorabll! with tht result that foul' Ilf
our .gl-mm mortars had to he employed to !
complete the screening', The othel' two 81-mlll
mortars and all 'the GO-mm mOI'laI'S in the
battalion were used to thieken the artillery
fires. At thi" time too, riflemen and a platoon
EA'RTH rill ------....

of machine gunners ill thebuildinQ'" liMth' of
the objective fired on knowl1 Hnt!
enemy locations to the south and (''1st. T\\,tl
other pllltoons of riflemen aJ1(1 machine ll;un
ners in the newly occupied rin'l' block fil'l'd
on housef< and pillboxes to the north and east.
A plutoon of tank plueed din>et
fire 011 the pillboxe. to the and en"t of
Yet in spite of the fact that for eonmlUnica
(iOll between the M'salllt g'1'OUP'S position and
the hattalion nbsen'ation 110:;t we used two
SCR 53!l's, two wil'c lines, and an SCR 300,
we hu,l to rely O'n rUllners at one time in the
operation becnllse we hnd no other contact.
At H-hour one tank destroyer (90-mm)
tirl,,1 on the obj('etive ane! piel'ced the wall
aJ' a' J "'a
z ...
5,0 190VARDS
our objective. Thus all the supporting posi
tions were neutralized by laru;e :In,1 small
caliber, direct and indir('ct tires.
The assault platoon was orQanir.c,j at the
"jump-off" point into a secul'ity and support
group, a demolition crew, and two assault
teams. We tried to foresee all conting-encies.
preparing more charg'e:;, fuzes, personnel, and
equipment than we thought we woul,1 need.
with five rounds. Then, using a public address
sYbtelll, we called on the defenders to come
out, Heeeiving no response, the assault team,
consisting of two men with BAR's, two men
with submachine guns. and one eng'ineel' with
a beehive, under the covel' of supporting fin>s.
attacked the box, placed the charge, lit the
fuze, and withdrew. But at this time the op
eration ceased to proceed accol',ling to plan.

The charge did not explo,le ancl a. chance centration. Jerry- as all of his boxes regis- :,
"round" killed the aSRault engineer. The as tercd and RO, thou

'h he WaF;' shooting blind,

sault group, however, immediately l'ea,lied the fire was quite effective. When it "let up,"
itst'lf to "hit it" again and 10t no time jump the crew Ret the fuze and infiltrated back to
inl!,' off when they received the word fl'om the the jump-oft' point. The bunker exploded and
battalion observation post which waR co all that remained was a mass of rubble.
ordinating the supporting fireB and the a,, The was acomplished because we
sault. The second team attacked the box, Ret anhered to what we believe to be the elements
the charge, and blew a hole into the emlH'a of the atta('k and reduction of a pillbox. T!,ey
surc. They then returned to the bunker, threw are:
grenades into the opening, spraye,i it with 1. Neutt'alizatioll of
automatic fil:e, and retul'lled to the jump-off ;Y. Attack 011 the box.
position (it being- unhealthy to remain arouni! J. Destruction of the objective.
a German pillbox when it is not neceRsary).
Pillboxes being integral parts of well-pre
The public address system ag'ain was and
pared permanent defensive systems, their
this time with good results. Nine German,
attack }'equires careful planning, rapid action,
gave up, the rest, Rome seven, being ,k'nd
prior reheat'sals (if possible), and additional
inside. '
to meet the c'''llceteel but unavoidable
Immediately, the demolition crew sped nut conting'encies. If the above is carried out, the
to the box carrying' some 750 pou nd, of German pillbox will crumble, and instead of
H!'r(l again there \Vas delay, for a ft(>t remaining' a pillnr of str<>ng,th fol' the Weh\'
setting the explosives, the g-roup was trappe,l macht, will become a trap from which the de
by a heavy mortm' allli artillery Col1- fenders Callnot escape.
Then the Americans took a hand. Although virtually cut off during the da.y,
we were not out of reach of American artillery, in particular their, SP 155's who
had been supporting us throughout. We had an OP Officer called 'Chunk' Bab
cock, a bloody great monster of a man who certainly knew all the answers.
As the firing died down it was known that there were quite a number of' Ger
man Infantry in a certain wood to our right front. The American OP then
called for a special concentration on it, calling (or every gun within range to
engage, and it was one that could only be ordered by an American General.
However, it came down within a minute and a half and it certainly was a real
"pandemonium." Afterwards two Germans who surrendered said that arms and
legs were flying right and "left in the wood and they must have had 800
or 900 casualties. Although this is no doubt a grosR l'xaggeration, it will, I think,
give you some idea of the of shoot it was. It may have caused telegrams
from Washington due to the colossal amount of ammunition expended, but it
certainly put "finis" to any further German attack that ewning or that night,
and must haw done a lot of damage.
-Extract from a from a C.O. of a British Battalion
fighting in France.
Principles of French Military Legislation
N the organization of national defense
there are two elements: the regular army
of experts and professionals who satisfy the
redu'Ced peacetime requirements, and the
trained citizens or reserves who swell up the
ranks in war. The relationship of these' two
factors determines the character of armies.
If the professional element preponderates and
succeeds in forming a class or caste in society
like the Junkers in Germany, we get militar
ism at its worst. If the citizen element pre
vails, the result is a mass incapable of ma
neuvering and major tactical 'ffort. The
army of Vercingetorix-the first lcvee en
masse-was kept in check and ultimately de
feated by Caesar's few leg-ions. Two thou
sand years later, history rC'peated itself on
the classic soil of Gaul. The panzers rode
to ealiY victory. trampling- clown III J/oliv)!
anllee, the product of a military legislation
which ha,1 consistently r(>jected General DC'
Gaulle's suggestions for thC' C'stahli"hllwnt of
an anncc de metier.'
The ideal thing is the happy IllC'diulH. Th"
aim has been established by the directive
issued on 1 September 1()41 by (;C'l1era I
George' C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, relating
to the postwar army, which rpjects the Eu
ropean type of standing army as the old
breeding- ground of class and
militrrism. It wlluld, hO\\'C'\'pr, be a llli"tak(>
to overgeneralize. The history of thp French
army in the Third Republic that prin
ciples, no matteI" how in
evitably be altered or transformed by the
force of circumstances.
French military legislation in modern timeR
derived much of its inspit'ation from the
"amalgamc" of the lepre e/1 maRge decreed by
the Convention in 1793 with the royal army
which the Revolution had inherited fl'om
1 Colonel Charles Dc Galllle. I'llnn,ir dt' ntf.-t/rr
(Paris. 1934). Amt"rican (>ditinn: Th(' Arm" of tll('
Future (Philadelphi.a. 1tl 11). At that timl' nn U11
knvwn offi('er receiving no rt.'('fwll1twn. thfJ nllw fanlOU!'>
I'"'rench leader, through Uti ... 1lOdh, h'('aml' the
tor of modern warfare bv the taetl(''"> and
organization of the armoTE'd divi,... ion. Before 1940 h(>r
coulfl get no recognition in France. out the German5
fully develoved his iden,.
the old regime, Thus the ideal of the combina
tion of the regular and the citizen soldier was
attained with results which later surpassed
the wildest expectations. The various regime,
following Napoleon experimented with vari
ous methods and devices. The defeat at Sedan
made fundamental legislation imperative.
The question was how to find the happy
medium, what should be the right proportioll
between the active force and the reserve. III
the following political controversies the par
ties of the Rig-ht became the advocates of a
heaVier regular force in the peace establish
ment, whereas the parties of the Left insistc,l
that the militiaman was a better expression
"f the eg-alitarian principles of a democraq'
than the long-service reg-ular. This may ap
pC'ar an extreme view in America, but in th('
country of the Napoleons and Boulangers it
was a natUl'al reactiun. H"re the regular"
t here the militia. Quality versus quantity,
dite' against mass.
Problems of national defense were thu,
dragged into the political arena. There was
an underton(' of mutual suspicion in these
debates which on the whole were motivaterl
hy g-el1uine patriotism on both sides. But the
LC'ft scented reaction in an active army
which numbered 25,000 officers tC'nding-, as
t h<,y thought. to develop dass spirit, whereas
the n'membering the bloody excess",
,)f thC' COllllllune of Paris in ISil, showed
reat reluctance to "put a gun on the
of ewry socialist.'" In subsequent
the ten"iO,n increased until it came to
full explosion in the Dreyfus affair in which
the Left won a great victory.
As a consequence, a radical reform was
prepared and voted in 1905. After this law the
French army emerged as the ideal organiza
tion in national defense in a democracy, a
true nation-in-arms. Its officers were to be
"educators," teachers of the "citizens in uni
form." Formal mechanical discipline was rc
j<'cted, to he replaced inner discipline
:: The slogan of Adolph Thi'rs. first President of the
Third R('puhlic and the man chiefly responSIble tor
'ery con-:;C'rvaUve military law of 1872.
arising from a ,deep faith in the cause which
thi:; army wOl1id be called upon to defend.'
,When, however. the German standing army
was raised to almost 000,000 men in 1013,
panic broke out in France which swept ;lWUY
the' ideal rc(ol'm (lnd reinstituted the old
annce de CIlSCI'I!C with the three-year service.
TI10re was no other choice, aR the majority
mllintllined. The fate of the reform of 1905
p!,<w('s the famous dictum of General Castel
nau, chairman of the powerful Military Com
mittee of the Chamber of Deputies in the
1919-1924 lcgislatur(', that m.,ilitary laws are
always the results of or adaptations to cir
cumstances: In other words, much depends
Oll the probable opponent and the probable
th(,lIter of war.
Aftor the war, the Left proposed the aboli
tion of the standing army, since Germany
w,as to disarm. The demand seemed just. The
coulltry needed a respite. But circumstances
1 intervened.
The war produ('ed a great revolution ill mil
itary thought and particularly in military
organization. Before 1014 the field armies
were prepared without plans for industrial
mobilization or total effort. With light equip
ment and tactics based on mobility, they were
expected to seek a quick decision by annihilat
In!! the enemy's field forces. Wars waged by
(ntlle nntions with aU their resources were
unlmllwn. As a ]ladiamentary paper declared,
milital'Y legislation hefore 1914 prepared the
armies but not the nations.'
3 A stat('nt('nt ma.de by General Andre. Minbter Qf
War. on ]D 1902 in th\.. Senate. Annales du Senat.
DJbats, LXI-LXII. p. 1040.
"'fhe law of 1913 raised the stanuing army to 830,
000 ml.'n. ""hat that meant to France can be better
\"isunli7.cd by applying the Pl"Oportion wnich this law
created bet ,"'een the army and the population to Arrter
lean conditions. It would correspond to a. peace estab
lishment of nlmost 3,000,000 men in this country! See
Senator J)ullmer's apprnisal of the law in his reform
proj.'ct, Se1wt. DOC1-lments (1920). p. 2. Doumer
in 1913 was the official rapporteur of this law.
.:1nnalt s de la Chambre des Dcpute.:r. Debats. Journal
OfJicicl. 22 March 1922. J). 961. General Castelnau was
Deputy Chief of Staff in 1914 and later one of the most
bucC"cssfu} army commanders. His speech in behalf of
the project nrepared by his (:ommittee
IS one of the most typical summaries of the postwar
Frell-c-p viPW' on military legislation as seen by the
Ri}!ht. For the best exposition of the program of the
Left 15ee Paul Boncour's speechp lbid. p PI). 1182 1f.
t> Commission Militaire de la Chambre des Depute6,
"Ornanisation militaire generalc/' Chambre,
ment. (1922), Nr. 6321, p. 733.
After 1918 parliament f;lced a set of new
and pel'plexing total war had to
be organized in peacetime. Modern industrial
nations with their complex social and eco
nomic organization require a long time to
convert from peace economy to war econ
omy. We have experienced the birth pangs, of
our own war effort quite recently and we
all remember the Herculean task. It took us
two years just as it had taken the French
two years after the Battle of the Marne to
complete total mobilization. The result was
their victory at Verdun.
After the peace treaty, the French parlia
ment realized that total effort in a future
war would 'require a long time again. Who
would protect the national frontiers while,
this conversion took place?
The law of 1923 provided for a couverture,
as they called this protective force, of thirty
two divisions. It was to be highly mobile
and was to operate offensively by carrying
the war into enemy territory. While the
couvcrl1o'c would fight, the nation would
mobilize for a total effort. But it was impos
sible to maintain thirty-two divisions in
peacetime even at reduced effectives without
a large standing army. The old dispute of
how man;' regulars and how many militia
men flamed up again.' The. Left parties, point
ing to the lessons of the war when, as they
the nation fought in the trenches and
won and not the officers,' demanded the re
duction of the regular force 'to the minimum
and' the establishment of a national militia
with a short eight or nine months of service.
Yet the com'crtll)'(' had to be maintained.
There was no way out of this dilemma except
to build the l\faginot Line, which replaced the
thirty-two mobile divisions with fortifica
tions. Behind this wall the militia could be
1 -: As the counter-project of Deputy Daladier declared.
the natio.n-in..arms has nothing to do with the men in
the b;1rracks but only with those who left the barracks
fully trained. Chambre. D.bau (1922), p. 1412.
S For a typiC'al instance. :see Ibid.. P. 612. On 1,(
March. Deputy Bouteille. who claimed to represent a
moderate party group. declared that the real hero of

cd out that this was bad language apt to set the men
against their commanders. Great cheers from the Rhrht
greeted this remark.
organized preparing the nation-in-arms, that
is, a mass army. The legislation of 1927-28
set up a system in which, if generalmobiliza
tion were ordered again, not an army would
march to battle but the whole nation.
France was peace-loving' and tired of war.
But her people were also utterly conscious
of the need for security. They built the l\fagi
not Line hoping to be safe behind its ram
parts even though they the military
burdens to the minimum.
Training Was absolutely defensive in this
militia, because the policy of the naiion
rested on principles of non-aggression and
collective security. The tactics were modeled
on the gigantic defensive battle of Verdun
where fire power proved to be the decisive
factor. Yet circumstances called for motoriza
tion and mechanization, for speed and offen
sive tactics. All this could be achieved only
if the army includ('d as a professional
or semi-professional as the budget
could bear-- as De Gaulle Tightly foresaw.
But the universal acceptance of the
principle by the vast majority of the public,
and after the elections of 1924 also by par
li:mll:nt, un the one hand and the demand for
cOIH'crlure on the other fdrced this solution
upon the nation and its armed forces. It was
the road which led to Dunkirk.
The lesson of the French experience stands
out clearly: it is impossible to legislate in
army matters with preconceived rigid prin
dpies. Organization of defense may rest on
a few fundamental ideas but othery;ise it
must be pliable so as to adjust itself to chung
ing circumstances. Defense in wartime is a
task force of strategy, in peacetime a task
force of policy. As General Castelnau put it,
the legislature of a nation must either C1'('ate
the army of its policy ,or else must be satis
fiet! with the policy of its army.
New Dive Flaps Overcome "Compressihility"
From Army Or(/Ilancr .January-February 1945.
VICTORY has at last been achieved over the
most baffling puzzle of modern fighter ai r
planes-the strange phenomenon of compres
sibility in high-speed dives. To the aerody
namicist compressibility has been a stone wall
which has barred his aircraft from reaching
the speed of sound. But to the fighter pilot,
compressibility lms been a phantom hand
that seized his airplane during combat dives
and shook it out of control.
After three years of incessant research by
pilots and engineers of Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation and of the Army Air Forces
Materiel Commano, a device has been
developed which overcomes the effects of com
pressibility. It consists o( two hinged strips
of metal smaller than a card table hinged to
the i1nder side of the airplane wing and oper
ated by a button on the pilot's control wheel.
Where ordinary dive flaps serve primarily as
a brake, the Lockheed flaps control the flow
of air across the wing to defeat the phe
nomena of compressibility. They permit the
Lpckheed P-38 Lightning to dive at tremen
dous speed but "till under full control. \\"ith
the possible exception of the new Gerllwn
rocket fighter, the Lightning' now can uutdive
any fighter it meets in the ail'. It is under
stood tthat the flaps have been successfully
tested on another ranking American fighter
and are under test on a third. They have
been in full production on the Lightning' for
months, and "flap kits" are en route to the
theatel's for modification of earlier
fighters whose first carried the airplanp
into the zone of compressibility.
The phenomenon may be likened to snow
piling up in front of a plow and breaking
loose in chunks. ::\-Iasses of air pile up in front
of the wing during sharp dives. These masses
break off, roll back, and strike the tail sur
faces so hard that the turbulence causes ex
treme buffeting of the airplane. Additional
buffeting is set up in the wing itself by, a
conflict between two laws governing air flow.
The dive flaps are a solution to this difficulty
throughout the tactical speed range of to
day's aircraft.
The Fall of Ormoc on Leyte
From oQkiul reports of the operations on Leyte.
The ilth hl/cll/try DivisioN IWI[/cd f)1I
the east coast 0/ Leyt" latc ill No'pcmber
oj 1!JH a lid l('a8 att((ched tv XXIV Corps,
lI'hieh 1{'I'th X Cor}m h,ui 11lfIr/r tile beach
head !,wriillgs 0/1 II,,' i"hllld "ulIl,' limc be
f"re, Oil 1 /)e{,(,lIIbCl' th" nth, b!l that
litm' di>l])"I'S('rl {Ol' the III"S[ />fll't ((mOllll
fhe !'III'intl" lcithlll Ih,' XXIF
('Oi'PH ((r('t(, W((H ail-dnl fOl' {Ol ilJc/f'
)11'111/1'111 "I""n'!"-sl,,,,'(' III""" (//lrI ((8"(lull
l(lor/illY ,,/I th" /("'81 C"flst ai I.,'ut,', liu
3.1 net'l'mbl'I' tiff' 11'111("" sftui,d ';
f){'C'('/ubej' lPitli lIu' clit'hn'(1J1's IIs.... tutif lalld
illg 1111 the br{{c]' JIfNf NlItfth of nell/lsilo
WrlRt (lCCOJ'{lill!/ to J ('lloris, fo iHitiatr tltt'
llf'PWU}1l'/ oj fht' olfj(lui:::ufiO}1 to N.fJlIl(' ol
fhe billcNs! Jighlill{1 ;11 Ihe l'IIc;,I;c Ihcu
f('/' "I) fo thaf tillu'. Clu,;..dmas DUN
'/1111'''''(1 /hr' NlflllfI'(' or ['uri Po/nll/I/OII
tlild the (,(II1S('(jHCHf dflsiill/ of the eHctllll','{
IUNt Hi'ai/oble 1){)/,! "inJ' I'ciJlio}'('CmrHt:-:
II)' {'I'rH'lftlfioll of hi'{ tI'UH/'R:' The lall oi
!Jfl f"III/JOIi ,,/.ow thr ('rJlHlilrfr dc
oj till J'('lI1uiuiul} ('tWill!! I'l'sist
III/{',' "" Iii" i,'/,lIIrI (If Lf'!lle,
TIIl,,{ (lI,til'h', aitf /' ft s/tui'f illtrmlll(,
!/f}U til tlie SiftHtti(lH, will ill/hut til<
JO'OfJl'CSN 0/ the frow ilg
(fl'ril'll/ in the T( J J(lfjollfl-[)uf(lfJ {(J'{'O 011
the ('uRI CIII/S! uj Lf'!JII' IIlIlil 111/11 IW) I of
itN c(uu}Jrtiyu (HI the U'CNt copst ll'bich
Iii,' ('ollq)(,RI pi OI')I!O(', -THI;'
Rl\\OC, on the wpst coast of Leyte (see
sketch), proved to be a thorn in thl'
sitic of American forces liberating,the island,
Through this point the Jal!anpse poured r'ill'
forc{'ments and supplil's to maintain their
on the h.1and ag'ainst the Auwl'iclln
X and XXIV Corps, Operations by the X
Corps were pl'og'l'e""lng' t'atisfal'tol'ily in tl1t'
northern part of Leyt", In the XXIV Corps,
the \l6th Division reached Dagam!; and the
ith l)ivision which had captured BuraUl'n,
cont.l!lued its advance w<'stw>lrd against con
sid(,l'Uble resistance, The 7th Division, how
ever, was relieved in this area hy the 11th
A irbol'lH' Division. and it then moved vi",
j)ulag' and Abuyog til secure the Abuyog.
llayhay road and to aUack north on the west
,'oasl of the isian,l from Baybay toward
Orllloc. An amphibious attack on th' west
coast had been considered, bpt the idea was
abandoned for the time beu) :e of lack of
TIlL, mov" of the 7th Division proved-to be
a herculean task"', but elements of that di
vi"ion had reached BaylJay by 5 November
and had g-ot as far as Damulaan by 11 No
Tlw 77th lJivisi<m lander! in the vicinity of
S{'C' "SIIP1;'> on I.e> to" hy Colonel F. E.
Gillett(\ MrUTAR'i RF.\'IEW Allril 194:1.
Tarragona and Dulag on 25 November 1944,
after having had its destination changed
while en route to New Caledonia from Guam,
and was attached to XXIV Corps. By 27
November the possible employment of the
77th st'emed to be tending toward parceling
out elements of the division h<:re and there
to prot('ct corps and army installations;
roads, bridges, and mountain passes; and to
r(>infol'ce or relieve other Pi"IlH'nts of the
XXIV Corps for more <lctivp opprations
against till' ,lH'my.
About this time, shipping' became avail
able, and thl' de('ision was Illade to launch
an amphioi1.us' assault on the wc"t coast of
Lt'yte in an arca propitious for an attack
on Ormo(', TIl(' 77th IVa" as;;igllcd
the mission.
\\'hen thc Wal'lllng for the> 77th Di
vision's movl' to the w('st coast of Leytl'
were r('cl'ive,\ 011 1 Declln\Jl'l'. Cl"llll'nt" of the
division extended from Baybay on thp wcst
coast of Tarl'agona on the cast coast, to th('
vicinity of Tal'loban Oll till' northeast CO'lst.
t'l](1 to the mOllntains in the Buraucn
Guinarona area. One battalion of the :107th
Infantry was located on Samar Island, and
other ekml'nts of the divisIOn werp ulld"r op
erational control of XXIV Corps, the 7th In
fantry Division, UlHI the 11th Airbornl'
Assembly of the scattered division unit"
was begun in fael' of dimenlt COIl
ditions of weather, roae! conditions, trans
portation, and other factors. Wide dispersion
of all elements and extremely poor roads
hampered movement of both troops and
equipment, particularly the 307th Infantry
which had to return to the staging area over
a road that torrential rains and continued
movement of supplies had turned into a rib
bon of mud, Pocked with deep holes, the road
permitted movem!'nt of trucks only with the
assistance of guns could not be
towed by their prime movers and had to be
pulled through the mud by tanks and bull
dozers. Officers and men worked day and
night to get the equipment to the beach on
time, By 5 December it became apparent
that all units scheduled to make the initial
convoy would reach the assembly point soon
enough, although some of them, particularly
the 306th and 307th- Infantry, would probably
complete assembling on the beach just about
in time to load into the shipping.
Scheduled to leave in the convoy were the
:W5th Infantry and the 307th (less
2<1 Battalion), the 2d Battalion, 30Gth In
fantry, and the 902d Fiel,l Artillery Bat
talion. Also included were military police, re
connaissance, signal, qual'tel'111ustCl',
nance, engineer, medical, antiaircraft artil
lery (automatic weapons), chemical weapons,
bOlllb amphibian tank, aJHI amphib
ian U'actor units and a SUppOl't aircraft
The remainder of the 306th Infantry and
.the :105th Field Artillel'Y Battalion did not
join till' division until !l DecembPl', landing
at Ipil.
The ,Iivision had bcell warned that "hip
ping in tlw initial convoy could not rl'main
more than approximately two in the
landing' area. This n1l'ant that all troops.
supplies. and l'quipment ha,1 to hp land,'d ull
a hostile shorl' within that timc, TI1l'rl'forl',
all Hnpplip" and Njuipmellt to support thl'
initial attack and to thl' "ivi"i. n un
til the arrival of the second convoy had to llt'
mobile loaded: i. e., loaded on the lill1itl'd
number of vt'hicles ,\'hieh t h" \\ a<
taking so that all Hupplies could hl' In'oul!'!lt
ashore with the vehi(,\('s when t hcy ,jphark(',1.
Tlw 7th mcanwhilt,. launched au
attack northward from Dmnnlaan 011 5 Ul'
('ember, at which time thJ 11th Airborne
Division attacked weRtwa1d through the
mountains to complete a pirccr on the' J ap
anese 26th Division.
The 77th Division convoy left the n'll
dezvous area with its escort at ahout 1:100 on
() December en route to the west coast of
Leyte via the southern tip of the island anrl
thence north through the Camotes Sea. The
move to the vicinity of the landing beaches.
whieh were Just south of Deposito, was made
successfully and without incident under cover
of darkness,
At 0640 on 7 December, bombardment of
the beaches was started by some of the escort
ships. Air cover arrived over the transport

o 500 '000 1000YARD)
area at 0700, and at that time assault waves Because of the light resistance, the Command
of the division headed for the beach. The' ing Gel1t'ral decided to move on fpil farther
first wave cleared the bcach immediately, up the coast without delay instead of holding
tulvanccd inland, and was followed in g-ood on the bank of the Baot! River as had beel],
order by thc l'cmainl\cr of the landing- fOl'cc. orig'inully plalllwd. By 1600 on 7 December,
The bench ar('a was extremely limited, and Ipil had been captured and the positions were
til{' landing of a major part of till' division
dl1g' in for the night.
(In thi", nanow beach within the spact' Ill' two The character of the operation for the first
hours was t'xtn'nl('ly hazardous, lind op day ha,i indicated that the division had landed
position to the latli\ing- bc'('n Ll1l' di ill all urea occupied Ly service elemef!ts of
vision would hav,' sutl't'rpd s<,!'ious los,; during
those two lwurs, 'l'h(' h('lil'i' of the <.'onlln1lI1d
illi!: General, ha:{pd Oil pl'\.viou::; rl'C'onnah:.
sanee by aerial pholoti aIHi questioning- th\'
nativ(,B, that this an'a would be lig'ht I,' (jp
fendcli if at all, and his s('il'l-dun of this
particular iJl'Hch just south of Dl'posito, wc're
justitiHi the succl','et'nl landing- of tIlt' as
:--ault forec. Divi,:iol1
th(' ASSIstant Hivi,ioll (:o111:11a"d,r and (;"1
,'ral Stliff St'dions, lalllkd at H pltl' ftlill
ut(lR--a ullhtill' in
warfare up to thi>. timt',
The landing' of tht' 7ith ,lllvi,itlll plaC'vd
the division hehind :111' :!t:t h .lap" l."'" Pi
visinll, which had beC't! the' 1101'[ il'
wanl advance of the 7th Division frum ilay
hay, and in rear of troops
in tl1(' upper Ormor Yalley ag-ainst lll<' X
Corps to the nort h,
ail' was Ul"tiVl 11\ the oppu;-.jtion
(.f the landing-, but or it was dil'eell'd
at assault shipping' aH it kft tht' tranoport
area, Only two atta"I,s were madt' on tlte
fiivir;ion beaches, and no clnnlHg'(' to in:-;tnl1a
tions l'P,;ultecl,
Organic artlllen' sUP1lort available initiallJ'
was Dnly the Dfl2d Battalion ant! 011e eOl1lparlY
of amtanks [amphibian ttlllksl Wirll ib-Illlll
,'nemy divisions fighting to the eaRt, north,
howitzers whiC'h \\'''''C initi!llly atta(\wd to the and south, Since this meant that it would
307th Infantr,'. Artillery fire of the :lOGth probably be a day or more before the enemy
Field Artillery Battalion was available I)Il could assl'lllble sufficient forces to counter
call from positions immecliately behin,i 1]1<' the landing. the Division Comma,nder de
front lines of the 7th Infantl'y Division cided on a relentless drive northward to ex
about 8.000 yards to 1IlC' >louth, The :!2iith tmd the beachhead and capture commanding
Field Artillery Battalion of the X Corps had turajn features before the enemy had a
been moved into positions neal' Daro 011 U1(' challce to reg-roup his
east side uf the mountains and could al80 The drive was pressed forward from .1pil
fire on call. toward Camp Downes on 8- December against
All initial objectives lvere reached mounting resistance which became extremely
heavy about halfway to CalllP Downes, 1\l-8's
and 1\1-10's [selt-propellPd artillery] were
brought well forward and in many cases de
livered point-blank fire on the enemy, who
were then assaulted by OUI'
Camp Downes was sited on comnu1l1ding
tprrain whieh was v..,ry favorable for the de
ff>nders and ext1'c'n1l'ly .liffkult for the at
taekers. TI1<' .fapan,'oe fully realized the
situation an.1 dcfend<,,j this terrain stubbOln
ly, prohahly hoping' to stop the driv.., north
wanl at thi!" point. As a rl'Slllt, the dl'orts
of .the division sllcc,'edl'd ill hringing it only
to tIl(' high ground jll"t ",lUlh of Camp
Downes by tlw "lHI of till' .. ; howl'vel', til<'
307th had l'aptu]'('d this ohjl'divl'
by 1600 on HDecember. P\'('r\ in face \If heavieJ'
opposition than had bl'l'n nll't the day hl'fol'e.
The 305th Infantry had, since th,' landin)!',
pl'oteded the' Hank: and llo\Y, as
the attaek was Pl'('';8['.] llorthward, tlw Routh
<"I'll flank \\'as gradually withdrawn, This
kft tlw ('It':\l'lng Btation and the
at Ih'posito \\lthin small-
arms rang" of tIlt' main line of on
11ll' flank. but this was ll('ecssitntl'd
and 11,' thC' advantage's )!'ainl'd froll!
a j'apid continuatioli of the Irive northward,
Sl'rvice forces \\,pre \\',u'n..,,J that tlH'Y would
be r..,sp,Hlsihle fnr their own d('f"llses to sup
pll'nH'l1t the protel'tioll afi'ordpt1 them by the
305th III an attal'k of this nature.
wh(,1'e infantry is limit(>d. it may
frequently be eo me for artillery
battaliolls and "'l'rviec troops t.l furni"h their
own close-in in ordt'r to p,'rlllit rapid
advance on the enemy by our infantr,'men,
All Buch troops should be pr('pal'l'.1 for this
An early-morning convoy on !I Decemb,'r
I)l'ought the 305th Fipl.1 Artillery Battalion
and the remainder of thl' :1Ol1th Infantry to
the beach at Ipil.
The division command post. was llltlvl'd flll'
ward to the of ('amp ill the
midst of bitter fighting still going on in that
area, The advance l'cl1l'lon of the command
post was tllH!er enemy mortar alH! small-
til''' Wh(>l1 it occllpil'd tIll' new 10l'ation,
At his new command post, from which Ormoc
was clearly .viSible, the divisioh command,'r
on H Dt'CPlllher issued oral orders for the at-
Sei7.Ul'e of that town the next da,-, i
" plan of attack wa;; to advance nn
Ol'lllOe with two reg'iments ahreast. TIll'
:\O,th Infantry was orderpd to make a frontal
:lltnck. while 1;,he 306th l!lfantry envclop.,d
th.. enemy's northeast flank. maintained C'>I'
uu't betwl'en the 305th and 307th Infantl Y.
and furnished one coinpany in division n'
f<'l'Ve at Deposito for protection of
tht:' clearing' station. The Infantry lntS
tf' rf'main in position initially defending its
rart of the line, The 902d Field Artillery,
whkh had accompanietl the division in its
bnding, was piaeed in direct support
of the 307th Infantry, The newly arrived
:W5th Field Artillery Battalion was placed
in dil'l'ct support of the 306th Infantry,
Devastating preparation fires for tl1<' co
or<linated attack which was to jump off at
00:30 were d"livl'rcd by the 002d and :105th
Field ArtillC'l'>" Battaliolls anll we're supple
llwnted by infautry mortars, 4,2-inch chpn,,
e:tl mortars. :'I1-8'B, :'I1-10's, and the' 'i5-nun
howitzcl" of Company "A," 776th Amlank
Battalion, I'1'C'paratory fhes lasted from Oll2n
to 0()30 aIH! W"l'e follow cd closely by the ad
vancing- wavps of dfi<'men, In addition to
organic and close 'llpporling weapOnS, tIll'
town of 01'1110(' was (>ffectively h,
rocket firing of the 2d Engineer SP"
l'ial Brigade which mov(>.1 in close to the pil'r
at Ormoc to r1eliv('r their terrifying fires on
the heart of tlw town, While the roek(>ts
were firing, the crew!" of the LCl\I's were en
gaged in, a small-arms fire fight with tl1l'
Japanese defenders on tlw,pier, Enemy rifle
heavy machine-gUll firC' was returned hy
the !30-caliber antiaircraft machine guns on
the LeM's, After all the rockets had been
discharged. the LC:'Il's withdrew from the
harbor while still under enemy
As the leading "Iements of t.he 306th and
307th Infantry approached thd outskirts of
Orl1loc. their progress could be clearly fol
low('d by the naked eye from the {livision
('ommantl post on t.hl' high ((round neur Cam)!
Downes, The town of Ormoc itself was a
, blazing inferno of bursting white phosphorom<'
shells, buming hous<.'s, and C'xploding am
munition dumps; and over it all hung a pal1
t,j heavy smoke. frOl\l burning fl1l'1 dumps,
mixt,d with tIll' g'l'UY <lust of (kstrorl'cl COll
cl'<.'tC' lmi1(lings, blastetl by aJ't ilkry, nHll't,u',
nnd rocket fin'.
1'I.e frontal alt:... k of tll<' :)071h
,;;IS met hy dt'tollllincd .k1p
allese defenders who opposed it with heavy
! :1]" ane\ maehine-gull fire from positions dug
ill under eaeh Orgal:ic mOl'tars of the
rq:-inwnt mailltniIwd a continimus barragt'
i 111 front of th\! mlvllncing' infuntQ'llll'n, ant!
1 i\l-R's and l\I-IO's Wt'1'<' brought into the in
fantry front lines to lil'e point-blank into tht'
A deep draw parall"l to our frent linl's jllst
; 011 tilt' southern outskirt" of Ornltlc m'ltl" a
-, f0l'111itlabll' olrslae1e 1'01' oUl' attal'l;;illg'
, for tIl!' IId'endt'rs Wt'!'l' well ill a11< I hat!
1 h{' l"<lutl,d out \vith and
I ttw hayolle-t. t\) our OWl! t\l1 t't'':-> ,
1 in !-ipih' or the stuhbol'1l \\'('l'l' t''\
lid!t "Win!! tn th" ('xlt'nsi\(' u,e of
,1Ias",'d artille 1':> fire and of
\\'(':lpon,. Impossible it m,,:, seem, frit'll,lly
for the clearing of Ormoc num
, hcrt'<1 only thirteen. "Credit g'oes to the ar
, tillery and the chC'mieal mortln' company for
their intense ane! accurate fires anti to the
infantn'1',)1' the use of H" own mortars, self
i alltl l111parallell'<1 operation
of the rifh'lllen,"
The :106th rnt.mtry oper:ltinj?' on the right
of the :1071h reliev.:d some of the pressure
from the 307th by a rapitl ane! well-conducted
en.velopnwnt of the enemy'" northeast flank.
'rite 30fith als" met resistaTIce in its
i hut mnnaged to efrccl the envelopment.
thus trapping the enemy in an untenable po
in the town of O1'moc, As a result of
the action of the 306th Infantry, the enemy
,vas uncleI' attack from two sides, was unable
to withdraw into the hills to the east, and
was foreed to withdraw through the town of
01'I110C to the north where he was continually
harassed l,y the division artillc-ry fire,
At 1330, leading elements of the attacking
l forces entered the town of Ormoc and fought
steadily through it' from to house in.
tlH' fac{' of ht'uvy elH'my urtillt!I'Y,' mortar,
machme-gun, alle\ Rlllall-Ilrms fire, most of
whit-h came from wl,1I Jug-in ano camou
Hag'l',1 fox holes antI pillboxes uncler houses,
By tlw enel of the day, the town of Ormoc
was tkared ,,1' all C'llel11Y except those who
Jay alll()llg' th,' blastl'd rl1ins of the town,
front Iilh'S for the highl w(>re e><tablished
on the nOl'thcrn outskil-is "f the town' on the
south bank of the AntiJao River.
1. Accurate intelligence materially aidt',l
ill the operations. So-called boltI plans were
made, but before being executetl were pre
cetled by an intensive reconnaissance to the
vicinity of the objective; hence little risk was
.!. From a ""I'ply vic:wpoint. the operation
wa" macle 011 a ," At tin;l'S only
"lIl'-tldl,1 ,,[ a ullit "f fil'(' \HIS aVllilable
which might have caust'" a e1isast('r in ,'as,'
of a 01H'lllY ('(l:'llltl'l.. tttack. .:
, ,I. The lanelillg was at'compli><hl"\' with
litlll' opIHl"ition hy pl:"'ing approxinHttt'iy
- nH'll on a l.OOO-yar,1 bt'ach ev('ry five
lllillutt'S. Total timt', ineluelillg mohile-loaded
supplies, was approximately two anel one-half
hma's. Lo(>,'istically. pushill!{ that mass of
troops on a beach in so ".hort a time was a
difficult operation; and had there been any
consielerable unexpected enemy ,mortar or
artillery fire at any time during thi;; period,
g'reat casualties have' r('sulted,
;" The Ormoc operatiun was accomplished
b:-: '1ttacking to the nortl, immediately after
landing and by elnily attacks against in
creasing' (,l11'IllY resiHtm,ce, which resulted in
the captul'o of Ormoc befon' the enemy could
put up a strong defense. Fire power was
employed to a maximulll, that of
the divisional artiJlt'ry and self-propelled guns
of the cannon and antitank companies. Op
erations \vere characterized by attacks by
day and defensive positions of the entire di
vision at nig'ht.
5. rt has been rarely practicable to make
large movements at night in this theat"l'.
*' See "SllPp-Iy Problems on Leytp" by Colonel- F. E.
GHlettt'. MILITARY April 1945.
6, Every effort was Iluule hy t\1(' diviFion
to issue orders for nig'ht dispoHitions by nOOll
and to issuc ordcrs for the 11<')(t day':< op
t-rations by 1500, Halts about 1600 \\'t'rc Illali<
for the purpose of adjusting lilll'R anti flll'
tligg'illg' in befon' dark, OCt'm;iollally a 1'01'
tion of the troops fOllg'ht until after dark to
captllre key terrain.
;', Emphasis was placed on anticipatory
liPtaik'l planning, from higher J1l'arlquartel'8
dowll to illeiluk the ti(juad, in order to avoid
pict'cllleal action,; nn<l to relluce casualties,
Mobile and Statk Defense in Island Warfare
LIBt'TE;>;A:\T ]lAY l\T. STROUPE, Illfalll,'y
Stall' :lnd Faculty, Command and GellC'ral Staff School
ALI.n:1> t'n/.?:ag'('t! ill I'(,l'ent operations
on a Pacific archipelago were cOl1fl'ontl'ti h:.
a parudoxieal :-:.eherne
which eontel1lplatpd tile' Hl'hievem('nt of m,,
bility hy the of ('Olllltt'I'
attacks and, at tlH' bame time, the mainte
nance of n static c1efense CH\'e
installations an,l holding }l,,,itiolb,
In the lirst or tIll' ,'IWIIIY plall, ('(>nn
\\'('Ie int,'nlled to di,rupt the
Httae}.;.. t'ho:'-l'l1 for
operations Wt}l'e to lw grouped intI)
ullits capahle' or indel'l'IHlellt al'lioll, UPOIl
lunding, tlH'"e tfoop, \\'t'l'e ,upposeti to create
havec ill th(' Allied real' pdll'lon hy cuttin/.?:
supply rout('s and l'oll1ll1lll1ication lines; th('n
they were instructed to fig'ht theil' way hack
to the original llPll('hhc'ad, Apparently, no
thollght was giv,'n to th,' sla!!;ing' of a ('on
opcmtion hehind Allied lines, Theil'
"hit-and-run" taeties "'en' l1Iodekd 011 CO!ll
mando Jines,
To pl'l'vide a nece>',"'y for tl1<'
countel'landing pal'tit's. c]",e-qual'tcl' attael,
units directly C'ngaged with A !lied "n
the beacllh('ad were intended to dl'iv(> wedges
into their oppol1l'nts' lim's, paying particular
attention to destructioll of tank" l'\o pre
pl'{'pareti ('ountel'attack seclIlC'ti
to cxitit; instead, J trcops \\,('I'C' to
receive sperial training in movement
jungles,and swampy terrain, A l,tillel'Y, tan]",
anti heavy vehicles were to he hrought along
such avenues as could h\' {'Ieal'ed by the
At seeming variance with the fo"regoing
policy of creating an active and mohile de
fense, the Japane:<e planned to increase the
mllnlier and "tn'ngth of their fortificatiOn",,:
"Illch \\PIP to },p organized in considerahle
dl'pt h, Th" pl'inltll'y conc('rn here was to
1'(,d1lee the numhcr of easualties incurred I
durin/.?: artillery barl'llt':es and aerial bom
ha !'lImen t.
;\l1ll1eI'OU< dwgraills for the construction
of e.lV" in'tallations w,'re set forth a8 j.
1'd..;, Pu.... it illtl:-- W('n..' 01 g-ani7.C'd as: water':., I
",!g'c' ,'mplacl'menb, ineluding' "key holding
p",;tions"; attaek main in,;talla
t iOl1:-; l'{>;-.,tll've and
Wate,I"> "dge' Wel'e cquipped with
hntitank machine g'un:-:. and, if pos
,..ible, automatic cannon. The prime mission
!'''r we;lj)()n" was the destl'uction of
Ulllphlhiou< tanks, landing' harges, and such
pel'>onnel as reached shol'e, If the terrain
wljoininv: the' wat"l"s edge proved suitable,
key hold in/.?: p",ition> welC to he established
to elH'ck tl1<' lallilill/.?:', Forces rccupying beach
\\'('I'e to lay dowlI heavy small-arms
lirC', }'l'"k"d hy al,tillC'l"Y, during' the initiall
Troops in thp main were to
ell't,et a al'ti(,n until l't'inforcements I
linin'.! from olher areas, If, however, a
favol'ahl" opportunity for counterattack:
pl'l'"elltl'd ihelf Ill'fol'l' I'eserves lllTived, the t
local ,'ollllllandcl' was empowered t,) attac\<, I
Till'se main position> \\','re intended to con- ,
tain battalion comhat teams, including: ar- j
capable of indepenlll'llt action, De- i
pending' upon tenain, each position was to 1
he !,fi(lO to :!,OOO meters in Iliametel', pl'O- i
tected minc fields, tank ditches, andI
It is ohvious that the Iimitecl te1'l'ain
HlIII artificial balTiel's erected left small
scope for mobile warfare thel'ein.
The Personnel Pro hlem of the Hospital Ship
MAJOR SIDNEY ROBBIN, Medical ,C{)1'1l8, and
CAPTAIN THOMAS G, SCOTT, Tral1spol'tation Corps
Clwdl'ston Port
1\ if A"Y of the di111eultieR of all untri",l
1V1 of o}'g:anization nUl)" not hp
11I'OIll'l'ly pvnluah'd until the unit o..en
i committed to uduul p(,I'forlll<llH'e 01' it,; nlis
, sion, TInts, tIl(> of tIlt' lll'r,olltH'1
, Pl"ohl('lll to tilt' 1I"';l'itnl Ship Conlph'ment
\y<l" not "Plll't't'iated until it had b"t'n
el11llhaHizt'tl by 0)(>1 at l'xp.'ri,'nl.'l', Th,'
growth of this prool(>lll and the d,'vl'lopnH'!1t
of COITl'ctivl' lllCUSUtps havl' bl'l'll
to good advantage at th" Cha rJc.,.,tol1 Port ,of
Emoarkation h"t'ause this port lUI' R.'r\'Cu
I.h(' honlt' port for h'''pital "hi}" In \\'hi"h
, Hospital Ship Contplt'mPII1" ai'" fnr

TIll' Illlspital Ship ('''lllpl,'n,,'lIt b a ;Il"di
cul D"pat;J.mL'nt ullilllrl!:anized to O}lt'Utlt' hos
pital facilitit's 011 h,,,pl!al TIll' orl!:ani
zation i" ]lre<crilJPd ill T '0 and E
It of nH'diL'al, dC'lIltll"
'::\))<1 tnedic.:al adnlini:-tl':lLiVt' otlh.t'l'l-- llUI .....
and clIlistl'd Illell, TIl(> 1I11111h,'r (If p,'r'Olllll'l
in {'aeh of tht,,,, ('/ilq!"l\'i," val'i,'" with lhe
I",t! of Oil' (tllH'l'I'lIc'd,
TIll' ho'pitlll \I 11I('h i, opt'ralt't! the \1",
pital Ship COlllplt'lllt'lit Illay he' vislializ(,tt u,
a large ho,pital fitttd into tit" n'
hpa('(' of a III the utilizatloll
I, I' of the availahlt, ship hPUl'l', ('on<idcrutioll
Illll"t he g-ivpn to 11101'1' thlll till' ho,pital fa
; I dlitics, Tht'l'" hl' 'lllal'lt',., fc,l' (h.. "hip',
civihan officers ant! CI'CW as wl'il liS f,,1' til('
I pe,l'SOl1l1l'
0 tilt' Ho,plVt
Sl1lp COlllplt'n,,'nt.
\' Spat'c must h" availahle- fot' tIlt'
lIP{'cssary flIl.>l, \vatel', and othel'
Htpplies needed for th" voyage, .'l.!lowaneL'
_ i must also be made for lnundry anu baggagc.
" The gallers must be larg'l' ('lIough ttl providr
1 food for everyone nhoard, and. in addition
there are speeial rliet kite hen"
This result" in crowding- the 1lt'l"onne! of
the Hospital Ship Complement into a 1110l'e
closely confined existence than pl'evioll';ly
experienced" While housed in ban'acks prior
of Embnrl'dttion
to assignment to a ship, each enlisted man
\\'HS allotted from forty to sixty square feet
of floor space, depending- on local housing
In general, all personnel have
I,,",; "pace aboard ship. The enlisted man,
howevel', finds that he now has an average
of about seventeen square feet, considerably
1ess than was provided in the barracks,
Ob\'iously, there can be little privacy for
the man in quaders or elsewhere
on the ship,
PC'rsonality tlifficulties take (JIJ incI'eased
signiticance as a result of the forced close
intimacy of the pel'sonnel on hospital ships,
,An individual with mildly irl'itating person
alitr trait, i" J'l'adily tolerable linuer cir
clllllsiance" where periods of separation are
pos,iole, Aboarll the hospital ship, however,
pel'"onalities become troublesome, pa1'
II f(cl' weeks at sea, and disturb the
t''luilibrium and morale of the org'anization,
Pt'I"lltl" with marke,) asocial 01' objectionable
t I'ait" of charactl'l' are also llnsuite,1 for this
of duty,
COlllpany llUnishlllt'nt is not 11" effective
as it might be, Restl'iction to quartel's has
little meaning under thc cil'culll,tances which
exbt on the hospital "hip", Further, the
individual being puni"hed cannot 1)(> sepa
l'atl'd frolll thost' who m't' 1I0t being' punished,
A problem of particular is the
close proximity of militar? personnel to the
civilians provided fnl' sailing the ship and
npemting the messes, The standarus of dis
cipline for the civilians naturally differ from
those of the military Punishment
is more Be\:ere for the military personnel,
and crimes which go completely ullPunished
among the civilians result in penalties in
the case of military personnel. Among' the
of discontent is the great difference
bet ween the pay of militar? pe\'sonnel and
the civilians. Because it is not possible to
effect a segregation of the military personnel
and civilians, these sources of difficulty as
. sume greater importance than otherwise,
RealiRtic consideration 1l1l1Bt be given to
the usual pl'oblems that appeal' where men
and women live and work in such close
relationship. Except for the' o(,l'H"ional mem
ber of the \Yomen's Army C,)l'PS 01' the
Amel'ican Cross \Vorkel', the fC'male pel'
sonnel aSbig'lll'd to the ship are officers of
the A Nun'e ('OI'PS :Inti hospital die
ticians. The ,'f IlInintainil1g' a pI'opel'
and dig'nitiC'tl offil'PI'cnlistetl man relation
ship is evi<il'nL It is fUl'tlwl' t'Olllplieated
by the presence of dvilian otTicl'rs and erew
members who are not subject to military
discipline, Problems im',)\vil1('.' military and
civilian personnel l'equin' extreme tad and
diplomacy, where "affairli of the
h!lHl't" are C{H1("'CI'lllld.
The chlll'acteri,tie tli,atlv1lntaC!:cs of ships
also have a heal'illg' on thC' w('Hal C' of tIll'
pel'SOI1lll'l. S'lI1le intlividual< ha\'e tH' develop
an intolel auce 1'01' ,lup ,ouut!, Hll'h as th,
jltlUlHling of the endnC's or the of
the propeller, Others are unabl!' to b,'etlille
accustomctl to the mo(itll1 of the ship, In
Rpite of insulation anti vent il:ttion, the odors
and h('at of the' hllll('!' I'tlolll, and fidd]('y,
become irritating', An O('clbional individunl
is afntltl of the water and i, '"
apprehensive of it that it is n,,( to
'obtain huffi"ient ,Ieep.
Th!'l'l' is 11 ctlntlition to whit-It the name
"hospital ship fatig-ue" has been applied,
Indivi(luals who \\'('I'e healthy, l'flkicnt, co
operative worker, whell as:;igned to the ship
develop symptolllR of ins"mnia, 1",< of ap
petite, loss of weight, lack of
interest in duty, and extreme Jlersistent
fatigue, "Hospital ship fatigue" is
to the maladjustment experienced whel'ever
prolonged COnnnellll'nt and boretlom is COll
cerned, It is necessary to remain
alert to detect these cOllditiom;, for fre
quently it affects super!.)}' in(lividuals who
will fall to complain of thei I' con(lition. All
persol1l1el develop a degree of fatigue, but
this is usually eliminated by shore leave,
Individual tolerance for the confinement
attending duty aboard a hospital ship shows
considerable variation. While some individ
uals manifest only a mild dislike for th"
assignment at nrst, this may develop illt.o
a strong aversion over a' period of time' an.]
if prolong-ed may actually produce neU! 0

Because there is little opportunity 1\,1'
"esl'ape" froll! these confining condition,-.
e\'ery effort is made to grant lean,-,
and furioug'hs when the ship is in port. 111
rontr,ldiction of this, however, every efl''''1
is made to keep the ghip at ,ea pel'fol'mitlc'
its mission; thc'refore, the ship rl"
mains in port undel'going' repairs, there i,<
little time fOl' the personnel to be absent
from it.
Another persollnel problem that is cbal
acteristic of service on hosjlitnl ships i,
the fact that persollnel sent ashore for Olle
I'eason or atbe.' cannot return to the unit
at will. Individuals who have heen left ashOi e
becau,e of illlll''<S, lho,e A \\-01., ant! tho,,'
c,mtinet! awaiting' trial fall into this gTOUJ>,
lit., !..dYl'll ('onsidel'utioll.
,\ hill'h percpnlagl' of th,' ]ll'rsonnel ex],,',
1 il'lH.'l' at but lutel" beconll'
adapted to duty at sea, This type of sea
sickness do<'s not take on the proportin."
of an important perstll1nel problem, It is nl
importance, htlwevel" where adjustnll'nl t"
tbe motion of tbe at ,eOl cannot IlP
made, und the habitual ,ea,icknes
g-I catly reduces efficient';.' and ,tate of health,
:\Iorale and health al'e adversely utIected
by rotH!'h weather at sea, This is larg-ely a
result of ('ontinued loss of sleep beeauRe of
the rolling- ant! pitehing motion of the ship,
Further, portholes are clORed, and ventila
tion is not so efficient as at other times,
The first prerequisite to corrective action
is I'l'cognit ion and understanding of the pl'Ob
It m by those in authority, There is an
initial tendency to treat personnel
in the same nU\II11er as they would be treated
in a land hospital. This tendency must be
overcome, IHll'ticularly by thORe who hav{'
not been to sea with a HMpital Ship \om
plement. It must be> re{'ognized tbat a differ
('nt condition exists and that necessary
readjulitmcnts must be made with prompt
The of th""" who l''''luitc
a few a way froln the ship to reJ.!,'uill
their <'<)uilibl'iulll mny often be
the need for repair of the 1f the ship
arrives in port in such condition as to require
t'xtensive most of the personnel ma,,'
be g-ranted sub"tantial leaves Hno furloug-hR,
All the personnel leave, berllus" it
for a detail to rcmain at all
timl'''. The il-avt' and furl(lug'h is
libpl'al, and pvc I',' cfrort is malle to malte
it l'OIlVL'nil'llt to gTant h.\UV0S, and
I'u doug-hs.
The pcr$onncl mu,t be ob,crved at
:,11 timp" fot, l'vident'e of for whom
life on a ho"pital "hip is incompatible, Th""e
1'01' which no other adjuRtnwnt can be made
hl' tl'all<fl'I')t'.\ to othe,' duty,
A rotation policy' has been for' "
"hospital ship fatigue" cases. As much as
\['11 percent ()f the org'anization may be'
to duty 011 land for the duration
of one or more voyages, depending on the
condition of the individuals. The station
hospital at the Charleston Port of Embar
IUltion lends real in 'making this
rutation policy possible, "Hospital ship fa
tigue" cases al'e given relief .in the form of
temporary assignment to the station hospital
in duty simi1ar to that performed on the
ship, In this mannt'r, the indivitlual expe
ril'n,cl'" no loss of skill an,j at the same time
undergoes rehabilitation, A suitable replace
ment is assigncd to temporary duty in the
vacancy createll aboard the ShlJl,

Comb.it Psychiatty
1"10111 lilt, op:-'Yl"hiatl'Y t 'on:-.ultallt:-. I>ivi:--ion. tiL'Heral'!,> (Hlin',
I("jlrinll'd fl(lm thl' /://III'!; ..
01'1:\10:\ b unaninltHl:--. :'UlllHlg' llOJ only
hut all ollke..", that 1cuIIC'l',hip
thl' gl'catt'st factol' \\'hic:h, hy 111Ukillg'
for mOl'all, anll confidence, rcstlit" in lowering
the ;ll(:idenee of IH'Ul'ops,vchiatl'ic cm'ualtie",
After clllnpaig'n. one division COll1
IlHIll<ll'I' !t'('tUI'C,- to cvel',' Unlt of his com,
malld 011 the tact ie, and strategy whel'eb:,
tilt' unit earl'ied out tlw "ssigne,l to
It. This gc'nel'HI, starting' ut dawn on Chri"t
mas day, visited cvel'Y unit in his ,livisitln
!lcbon.tlly to extend grpl'tillg's, He
his o!ft,'''l'" to l<lIoW their men, to ta!;e a
IH'I',ullal ;nt(']'('s, ill them, and actually to
lead thl']}) in "Il])]ha!. ;\1 orale high in thi"
di'vbion, whieh did mueh of the fighting. Thl'
soldiel's of this .livision have faith in th,,])]
theil' weapons, and their leudcl's
t hreC' factol's of utmost importal]('l' in making'
for low illt'idence of neUl'op"ychiatl'ic
ties, A division neuropsychiatl'i"t has
dpveloped an UnliBlIal!y t>ffective progl'UJ11
which aims at increasing' morale and pre,
venting minor psychiatric disol'del's, This
IJl'og'ram is intimately integrated with the
information anI! education prog'l'am. The
of til" F,8, AI'IllY .Jlu/i,cd
,-\pril HJ45,
divbioll psychiatl'i>t s('rYes in a dual capacity.
Cla,,,,'s in varions sllhjt,C'ts have uecn 01'
ganizl'd among the units, and many men have
1""'11 Rtimulated to tab' coul'ses in the At'med
Forces Hobbit's aI'e encotll'al,l'ed.
011 of wide ini(\l'est are
held, These activities likewbe prevent the
development of apathy i'rom monutony and
Il'ave little time fo .. soldiers to dwell on
hardships, psychintri,t has effected
clORe Iiasion with G-1, thus effecting proper
l'l'as"igpments uf mild psychoneurotics who
;li'e unfit for combat hut who can do a good
job in a service unit. The G-l rcceives morale
I from l'V"I'y unit sllrgl'On and chap
l"il1 \\'('1'1,1",. an,1 from the division m'uro
IlS,'chiat) is! at intervals IlPpcnding on the in
cidence of lleul'opsychintric casualties. The
consolidated reports art' turned in to the
chief -of staff who take;; up the pl'oblcms of
l1l{)rale with each unit command"l', 'Weak
company c011l1l1andel's arc relieve(j and re
classified Ol' reassig'n('(1. All of these
measures make for high morale and a low
incidence of neuropsychiatric ineffectives in
the division.
The Unit Engineer
:.\IAJOR l\IAURJCE W. JOIll'>S, Cm'}J8 of E1111;1I('('):,
In ... tr'tIC.'tnr. CnmnlilIllI ,t,ld (;t'11lllll ;;tilll'
1\ N eng-ineer ottker is provide(! on the
n staff of the Cllmmun(!,'r of eal'h (livision
and of eaeh ]arg'er unit np to an.! induding'
the theater of operatiom, In t\1(' thl'atel' this
offieer is known as the Chief Eng'ineel'; in
the communicatiolls ZOlle us t 11(' En!!;inel'l\
COlll111Unlcation Zone; III the Ul'111Y1 eOl'pi.
division, and ail' fore<' as the Army Enl.'.'ine"r.
Corps Engineer, Division ElH!;ineer, and
Ail' For.ce Engineer resp<'ctiwly.
speaking', however. h<' is known as th<' t'mt
Engineer, The enit Enginc<'!' is Ie"pl'n,ibl"
for executing' an evel' illl'l'ca.::.inc: ntllU1JC1' ot'
tasks, aIH\ in the )lresl'nt w,H' his wle has
nssUtned far gTcatl'l' IIII po l'tlllH'" than e\'er
befol'e. Therefore, it is impel'l\tive that every
staff ofikl'l' thllr"lIgoh!y the
and l'eSpllll'lhilitir,; of the Cnit Endnrel' in
order that thl'Y may wurk tog-ethel' in (,Io,;e
cool'<iinatioll in all eehe\ons of eomman.!,
Since eVCl'y Unit Eng'ineer functions ]lri
marily as a special staff oftiN'I', his principal
duty is to advisc, make
and assi,t his clllllmandel' and the lIlPlllhCI'S
of both the goenel'lll and special in all
engineer matters, Althou).!:h the I'dation"hip
between a Unit En((ineel' ('XC!!pt the Di
vision Eng'ine"r) and tl1C' Unit Engineer of
a subordinate unit is not one of (,(lInnHlnd,
he is charg'e(\ with jll'cpal'ing: W'llCl'al plans
which deter1lline the scope of the work to
be executed by all l'ne;ineel' Uoops in thr
command and with the technical supCl'\'bion
of all cngineer activities of the command,
If in carr),ing- out these rpsponsihilitk's it
becomes to orders to
ordinate Pnit Eng'in('t'l's, the o!'lIcI' lllust be
incorpornted in the ()]'(]en; of the unit COIll
mandel', The t'nit EngilH'el' exel'dses eontl''']
over all engineel' troops in the c01llmand ancl
at the same time the exel'ution
of engineer tm,ks hy means of t{'chnie,,1 in
spections of all cng:ineering: }ll'ilj(>ets ill his
area and by requiring' technical reports dirt'et
from subordinate eng'ineer unit commanders,
The plan'ling' and of thc en
gineer activities of a command include many
and YUrild (lng'il1(l(,l' task:-.. Certain of .the:-.e
al'" of g'reat<'r eOlleern to some UnIt
En,Lrilt('el's thun others, clepending upon the
size of the unit. In a the
duties of all {'nit Emrinecrs include the
following; :
I, Hc('ollllllendatiollS pel tHilling to, and st!
pervision uf. the trainint!; of engineer tl'OOP'
alH] trl)OpS (lthel' thun cng'ineE'rs in engineer
.!. Pn'paration of plaits fO!' the empluy..
IllPnt of {'ltg'int'er troops altd of other pel'
".nnel whit'h un' to be used in executing'
an ('llj,,!,'iUC'f'l' tH.:5k.
.J'. l)ct(\l'nlillatioll of Pl'OCUI'C'
Illl'ltt, stOl'ag'f', ant! dbtl ibution uf eng'ineer
"'llllpmellt and ,upplies, including fortifica
tion, tin-tig'htin.!.!" and c,unouflag'c 111uteriaIs.
:, Prt'paration of plans for all engineer
t'olbtl'llttion. l'cpuil', and nlaintcnance \v:thin
the comman(l.
5, Preparation of plans for the construc
tion, J<'pair, lllaintenane{', and op('ration of
all utilities of !!;l'IH'l'al sen'iet' nut otherwisl'
Ii. Pl'(?pal'Htioll of plans for f.:lng'ineel' l'e
and the collection, evaluation,
and (If en(!inecr information,
7, Preparation <If plans for barrier sys
t<'IW', ancl for pa,sag'e throug'h such haniel's,
s, Tc('hni('al of the construc
tion of (jpfen,;jve
,q, Prepal'ation of' terrain stwIies.
1n. as to traffic l'ep,'ula
tion,; fUl'l1ishing' and ]losting signs for
marking- routes and traffic instructions,
11. Developlllent and supel'\'ision of
Ilres foj' catlloufiag'e of personnel ancl in
stallations; pl'epal'atwn of instructions con
cerning' eanlotIflag'c HIHI of c:ullouflage
12. Pl'ej1al'atiun of plans for adequate fire
protection, maintenance. repair, and opera
tion of fire-tightin!!; equipment, training of
the personnel, etc.
1;1, Plalls for sllt'veys, fur mapping, and
for procurement, reproduction, an\:! distl'i
ImtioJ\ Ilf maps and map
14. Assurallce or an adequate watCI' sup
ply for all troops of the command.
1.5. gXll,minatilln uf captured engineel'
cqui\1ll1enL and intl'l\igenl'e.
The Unit EIIg'illecl' mUHt lit all timeH be
thoroughly cOg'lIiz:lnt of the tactical and
\og'istical situation. lIe mllHt be especially
"areful to keep abreast of the changing sit
uation and be preparc(l to make appropriate
recolllmendations to his cOl1lnl<lnder. To an
ticipate the needs of the command from an
engineering' standpoint, he lIlust keep a very
relationship with both the general and
special Btatt as we\! as with subordinatc unit
The Cnit Eng'incel'" contad with the gen
<'l'al stall' lllust he dose, and eHpeeiaUy so
with reg'art! to the functions of the (;-:1 and
G-1. He tnusl coordinate with the G-4 in
lIlatt<'rs cOllcel'ning location of water ;;upply
points. l'nul'r the supel'vbion of G-4, he
assists in the formulation and execution of the
traffic eirculation and control plan by execu
tion of road and bridge l'econnais>'ance from
a technieal point of view; supplying road
maps, signs, route marking materials and
uther traftic control devices; recommendations
for traffic circulation, sig-n posting, and
route marking; construction, maintenance,
and repair of roads and bridges; and 5uper
vision of traftic control at locations where
engineer wnrk is of prime importance.
The Unit Enginl'er works very closely with
(;-3 in all 'matters concerning troop 'move
llIE;nts (especiallr river crossing's, defensive
operations, and training) and In
river crossings, the Engineel' is charged with
all technical measures for the
crossing', for distrihution of engineel' troops
and: materiel, the construction of bl'idges,
and', the regulation of traffic thereon. There
fore, the G-3 must coordinate VNy
with the Unit Engineer on all river cross
ings; similarly in a defensive situation where
eio.'tensive defensive works must be con
structed and complicated barrier systems es
tablished, in the breaching 'of obstacles and,
mine fields, movement over difficult 1;errain
such as mountains. jung'les, and swamps, and
in other 'tactical operations, close coordina
tion betWeen the G-3 and the Unit Engineer
is absolutely necessary.
\Vith the G-2, he coordinates in matters
concerning camouflage, engineer reconnais
sance and intelligence, and the preparation
or procurement, production, reproduction,
supply, an(I distribution of maps. The 0-2
prescribcs the general map policy and the
Engineer is responsible for the supply.
The Unit Engineel: confers with the G-l
in matters having to do with personnel, ad
ministration, bivouacs, and rest areas. He
must confel' and coordinate with each of his
fellow speci.al staff members on matters which
are of interest to them. Some of the more
important matters which he would coordi
nate with certain special staff officers are as
I. Ordnance Officer-antitan'k mines, am
munition, and maintenance of engineer ve
hicles (trucks, etc.).
2. Signal Officer--communications between
various engineer headquarters and higher
headquartcrs; training engineer personnel
in radio operation.
S. Provost :\Tal'shal-otl'affie circulation
4.' Quartermaster-supply of food, gas
oline, and oil, and necessary additional trans
5. ArtilIel'Y officer (technically not a mem
ber of the special staff in the division)
camouflage. requirements, routes of move
ment of heavy artillery, and survey and map
requirements of artillery.
6. Antiaircraft Officer-protection for river
crossings, construction of landing fields, and
road and railroad work; also camouflage
7, Surgeon-supply and purification of
water, sanitat.idn, and insect control meas
The mission of the Unit Engineer is an
important one and it is extremely important
that complete coordination be achieved in
ordel' thnt he may be of maximum value
to his commander and to the commander's
Although every Unit Engineer has the
general duties and responsibilities previously
discllssed, the actual functions and operations
of the Unit Engineer ill each eehd'H1 of
('ommmHI vary considerably,
The Chief Engineer, Theater of Opera
tions, funt'tions primarily as a planner, He
plans and coordinates the engineer activities
of the theatel'; determines the requirements
for engineer supplies and equipment; sets
up general policies and priorities fllr the
control of all engineer work carriNJ out in
the theater i and allocates engineer Cquijl
ment, matel'ials, and supplies between the
se\'eral al'lllies ami the communication zone.
In sOllle theaters, he is g-iven central control
of all engilll'cr troops (including llvi,ltion
engineers) and equipment in order that he
may alloeate the proper units and el]uipll1cnt
for thc hig-her priority projects.
The COlllmunications Zone, is
primarily an operating ag-ent. The volume
of engineci' operations carril'd out in thc
communications zone is enormous; conse
quently, thc Engineer has thc bulk of the
engineer troops in the theater under his
control, particularly the service troops, for
it is in his area that the greater proportion
of engineer construction work (permanent
type) and l'ngineer supply operation,; arc
carried out.
The engineer activities and responsibilities
of the Engilieer, Communications Zone, can
be arbitrarily separated into three principal
functions: supply, construction, and main
tenance and utilities, In an active theater,
each of these functions alone is astaggering
task. The functions of procurement, storage,
and issue of engineer supplies are the re
sponsibility of the Communications Zone
Enginee'.r. He exercises general control over
all supply activities of engineers in his area
and maintains dose liaison with the Chi,'f
Engineer on all such matters. He is directly
charged with replenishment of all deput
stocks of engineer supplies both in the combat
zonc and in the communications zone as ap
proved by the Chief Engineer, Theater of
Operations. These supply operations are quite
voluminous, as is indicated by the fact that
in one theater the Communications Zone
Engmeer is now operating approximately
one and one half million square feet of en
gineer warehousing space,
Construction in the communications zone
may be handled by the Engineer Construc
tion Scrvice, in which case the Commanding
General of that organization is also the
Comlllunication" Zone Engineel', The volume
of consiniction nccesBary in some theaters
has necessitated the pooling of engineer
heavy construction equipment and all troops
(c\'en aviation enginem's) under the Chief
Theater qf Operations, in order
to execute the construction mission in a('
cOl'dance w.ith a suitable policy and under
the regulation of necessary priorities. The
Chipf Enginecr then makes allocations of
tl'v0l''; and equipment based on the recom
lHcndations of the Gomll1unications Zone En
gilll'l'l" anti the Ail' Force Service Command
Engineer. The Communications Zone En
gineer is dIrectly responsible for practically
all permanent type construction in the thea
ter. It is really a staggering task, the
having been increased enormously
by the shortage of heavy earth-moving ma
chinery and trained construction personnel.
The engineer must supervise the construc
tion, maintenance, and repair of hundreds
of miles of roads and innumerable bridges; ,
miles of railroads must be built arit! re- I
inforcerl to carry the heaviest military loads;
air and landing strips must be pre
pare(1 for the air forces; all types of shelters I
as cantonments, hospitals, warehouses, '
depots, and all other structures required by 1
the Army mllst be constructed and main- i
tained; and ports must be built and re-l
The Communications Zone Engineer's third
large problem is that of maintenance and
"utilities. The maintenance of all engineer
equipment fronl the heaviest item of earth
moving 'machinery to the I;lost delicate in
strument is the n'sponsibility of the Com
munications Zone Engineer. He is charged
with supervision and control of all engineer
maintenance activity in the cOlllmunication,;
zone. The equipment must be kept running
at all costs rcp;al'dless of the
all types of spare parts, which is a hr:;
l'<'al problem in itself. After the necessary
facilities have been constructed, they lllust
bl' maintained and repaired. such
as wator, electricity, heat, and sewag'e dis
p,)sal must be estahlished, repaired, and
maintained. This maintenance of all engineer
l'C[uipment, maintenance and I'<'pair of all
buildings and st),'uctures, and establbhment.
operation, maintenance, and repair of util
ities throughout the COIllI\lUnications zone is
a direct rcsponsibility of til(' Engincer. C0111
Illunication,; Zone.
Additio,nal resl\onsibilities handled
by the COllllllunications Zone Enp;inecr are
the acquisition and disposition of real estate
and facilities. and rccommendations a < to
the use of routes of comillunications based
on phY5ieal condition (traffic control). The
function of real estate acquisition and dis
position is quite an important function and
no other Cnit Eng-ineer is so !.!'reatly con
cerned with it as the Communication, Zone
A.IUIY E:-'(i!!'<EER
Like the Engineer, Communication, Zone.
the Army Engineer is an opel'
ating agent. His primary concern is the
rapid construction, repair, and maintenance
of. communications facilities including roads.
bridges, railroads, and air fiel,ls, The Arl11Y
Engineer does not have the facilities nOI'
the time to engage in any appreciable amount
, of permanent construction; the construction
ill the army area is of a rather temporary
nature, just good enough to take care of the
army needs while it remains in the partic
ular area. The communications zone will
replace army construction with morc per
manent types of structures.
The preparation of plans for the establish-
ment of barrier systems, incl,uding the' con
lltructiOn of obstacles, the laying of mine
fieHs, and the use of demolitions is a very
vital function of the Army Engineer. The
passag'e of 8u<:h baniel' systems is also of
primary eonccrn to him. He may set up
standard policies both for the establishment
of barrier systems and for the passage of
these barrier8. One example of this is an
army policy for passing through mine fields
which was set up by an Army Engineer in
the European Theater of Operations.
The Army Engineer is responsible for the
distribution of enp;ineer supplies to all troops
of the army. The Division and Corps En
gineers are not in the physical channel of
supply except in emel'g'encies; therefore, the
Army Engineer supervises supply of army,
corns, ami division tl'OOI1S and insures an
adequate cngineer suppl;, plan. He recom
mends the location within the army area of
supply establishments not con
t rolled by higher headquarters. Corps and
division troops draw supplies from army
supply poi nts.
CORP;:; E!'<GI:-lEER
The Corps Engineer is a special staff
cer only, and is chiefly concerned with the
rapid repair and construction of communi
cations routes (primarily roads and bridges)
and wiih the establishment and passage of
barrier systems. As in the case of the Army
Enp;ineer, construction in the corps area is
"f a temporary nature, sufficient only for
corps needs. As previously stated. the Corps
Engineer is not in the regular channel of
supply except in ,emergencies;, however, he
is responsible for coordination and super
vision of engineer supply to corps and divi
troops by army. The Corps Engineer
coordinates and supervises the supply of
water to all corps troops by corps engineer
units, and also the procurement, reproduc
tion, and distribution of maps by corps troops
both to corps troops and to divisions in the
The Division Engineer, like all the other
Vnit Engineers, is a special staff officer on
the staff of his commander; however, hEi
differs in one respect in that he actually
commands the engineer troops of the divi
sion, the organic engineer combat battalion,
Under his direction this combat battalion
carries out all engineer missions for the
division. The rilOst important engineer tasks
with which he is concerned are (1) emer
gency repair of roads anll bl'idgcs to
division loads; (2) removal 01' consh'uction,
according to the situation, of obstacles anll
mine fields; (3) engincer reconnaissance;
and (4) river-crossing opcrations,
Like the Corps Eng'inecr, the Divi"ioll En
gineer is not in the normal chal1llQl of "up
ply; he is responsible only f.)r the
of water and maps to division troops anll
for the eng'ineor battalion's organizational
supply. The Division Endlll'er is
with the cOOl'llinatioll anll sU1H'rvi"ioll "f sup
ply of fortification materials and mines to
units of the division by army, but the
only engineer supply point which he actually
operates contains local materials, He may,
when directed by the division commander,
screen all requisitions for engineer supplies
before' forwarding them to army for delivery,
In conclusion, it should be observed that
although policies and procedurE'S varr in
each theater and alsQ in each echelQn of
command, the Unit Engineer will always he
charged with the general engineer tasks
described in this article, anI! the key to his
success will be staff coordination, If
the Unit Engineer is to be of maximum yaluc
to the l'ommand, all nl('mbers of the statr
must understand his duties and rC6ponsi
hiliti('s, and 111ust call upon him for alh'iee
and in nll enginpPl'
Assault Carriers
Extract from "The 'Val' at Sea," an article by Commander Kenneth Edwards, R:-.I,
in The Al'Iny Quarte)'ly (Great Britain) January 1945.
HAVI:-;C; played a notable part in the dC'feat
of the ('.boats in the (,E'ntral Atlantic, the
"escort carriers" have come int.) their own
as "aRsault CfllTiel's/' and have' IHade
operations which wou1<l othel'wi,c have be('n
chancy in thE' ext rem'. An e'(('('lIent exalllple
was the invasion of sOlltlH'l'n FI'Hn('(', In
that operation there wel'l' nilw "as
carriel's," These werc to provide fig'ht
er co\'er over the fOl'et' and the
beaches during' the landings, while the
bomber and fighter-bomher support for the
ground troops was to he provided br the
Twelfth Tactical Ail' Fol'c(' working from
airfields in Corsica. WhilE' it is douhtful
whethel' these aircraft carriers could have
operated off the coast of
without loss if the strength
of the Luftwaffe had not already'been sap
red hy the attacks of th(, British and Ameri
can air forces, it is certain that t
,(> land
ings could not have heC'n undertakC'll without
them, As it happened, too, the !lJ'(lgl'e",", of
,the ground was rfpid that by
D plus 3 General Patch's forces had passed
out of ran),:e of th(' of th('
T\\"lfth Taetical Ail' FOl'cl" o!,C'ratinl.!: fl'o!ll
COI','lra. The whol(, responsibility for PI'D'
\ iding" ail' cllP!,Ol't for tIl(' allvanring troops,
'" \\,,,11 providing air cov('r over the beachc"
anti tIl(' naval force anll tr,msports an.!
<\evol\'ed upon the aircraft
frolll th(' "a"ault calTicrs," This rc"pon
tfll'r h"ld for '.'\'en until cap
tured ail'fi('ld, in thc "outh of Fl'ance had
been "utfkielltly repaired fm' thc Tw('lfth
Tactical Ail' Force to llIo\'e in.
F)'olll tht' south nf France those "11"lall
aircraft ('al'\'i(,I's went to the Aeg'C'an. where
they anll othel' ships did great work, inter
ruptil1:?: the enemy's attempts to with,jraw
his g'a rrisom; fl'Om the islands of the Dode
ram'"e and the Aegean, and paving the way
fOl' thE' liberation of Greece,
Then' is no doubt that these, or other
":I,,,ault aircraft cfLl'I'iC'I"" will proee('d to
th(' Far East, and that the ail'cl'aft-cat t'i'r
force" in that thE'atE'I' of war will be very
gTeatly reinforced in the near future,
Artillery as an Intelligence Agency
LmUTE:"A,\T COLONEL S\l\lUF.L S, EDSON, Field A)'tillery
Commnnd nnd G(>ncrn.l Stoff School
KTELLIGENCE, ac('orlling' to Wobster, is
the capacity to: know O\' untlPl'stuntl,
Concoivably, it can oxist without being
('xel'cis(>d if there is nothing' to h" 10lOWll 01'
und(.'l'stood. OUI' however,
tloeg not tleal in ah:<traetion" i\lililal'Y
in(pJligC'llce is tho inf.)},]llation particu
larly illfol'lllntion of tlI(' ('II,'my, nfl('1' it has
bL'l'n evalmltl,Ll aIHI interpl'l'ted, i.P., un,ler
stood, hy the inlclJigencl' o!tie"l'. Tl1<'
tlwrl'i'ol'e. if ho has been well ,elcc('d. alrcady
hag intl'lligcnee ill tIll' \\' (')"ll'riun sens,', but
militnl':,' intelligence sOllll'thillg' that he
nIn"t llhtain and ,level,,]>. Hi" suc,','," will he
llll'a,<m'ed lal'g','ly hy till' amount of infnnna
tion of ill(' PI1l'lllY nnt! of tIll' ["l'l'ain in "J1('my
hands which 11<' is uhI<- to ('nIIt,l't.
\\'hat a\'c Xlll1Je of the it('l11s of
inf'ol'matioll whil'h G-:! oj' the divi,ion
must hav'l''! He inu,t he able to all,wel' ill!'
('s,,'ntial l'll'nll'llts of infol'lnalhlll (EEl) as
anllounccd by the Cnl1ll11ll1HII..'l".
aloe the tlH' diY! ... ioll (,011111Htlldel' 111U:-.t
kllow in Ol'dl'r to .. hi-::. dl'i.,i...,ion and
formulate the Iktails "I' :1 plan of ojlt'ration.
They will illcluLl(' sueh thing'S as thl' enemy
,Il'l'ng;th and the dispo,ition of fol'('v" in
th" divbion zon,' of adion ; the IO"1Ition of
hi. infantry and "rlillPlY fOI'tifiea
and identification of l'nemy
units; 10l'atioll and ll1oV('Jlll'nt of 01'
rl'infot'C('IlH'llts; the condition of tlI(, te!Tain
in the enplllY zan"; and timely jnfo1'lnatiol1 of
all fonn, of elll'lllY aet ivity.
Being' only human, <llll' "annot produce
aI!, this infol'l11l1tion ",ith a wart! of the
mag'ie wand, Hc' must have sOllrces and eol
Il'ding agl'ncies upon which he can to
procure the neceg,mry information in time for
it to he acted upon, ilIuch of it I11USt come
from elements of his own llivision. Who, in
the division, will be capabl(' of finding' out
what G-2 wants to know? Thl'l'e a1'(' certain
units whose principal for Iwing is the
"ecuring of information: the division
reconnaissanee troop. the intelligence and
reconnaissance platoon of each infantry regi-
Illellt, thc'Reout section of each infantry bat
talion, the l'econnaissunce section, of the
Pllginl'Pl' battal'ion. and the reconnaissance
( 1<'lllentH of any units which may be attached
to the diviHion, All the"e information-collect
ing ag'cncil'g will play an important part in
)llan for getting the answers to the EEL
T1H're at'p, howevet', other elements of the
<liviHion who may, in the course of carrying
<'ut their pI'imal'Y mission, come into posses
"inn of important information of the enemy.
who wants to use all of the tools avail
"hIe to him, will not overlook these agencies
ill making' intelligence plan.
The purp,,,e of this article is to consider
the liS!' of the division artillery as an informa
l ion-cnllC'cting' The artillery's mission,
of <'Otll'"" iH the support of the combat
l'h'''ll'nts of the division by fire power. In
01'.1('1' to C:1l'l'Y out that misgion it must search
out many (1<'tail" of the enemy situation and
of till' t<'l'rain unlll'l' enemy control. Artillery
t:.l'g('ts indudt' such items as enemy artillery,
ldl1itank luachine guns; troop
coneent tankg, vehicles, command
po,\>, lield fortifications. ouservation posts,
and ll11portant hridges or defiles. In order to
hit ""ell targ'et;;, exact locations must be
known. AecOl'dingly. the artillery. in addition
tn its ahility to deliver fil'(" must he and is
organized aJHI ('quipped to ohtain this neces
'''''Y infol'mation,
.\]'(' any of these details of particular
interpst to G-!2? Will they assist him in
answering the essential elements of informa
tion? Considel' the loeation of enemy artillery
positions. If they are well forward, an enemy
:1ttnck may be inllicated, Theil' disposition on
the ground may disclose something of their
fire cupabilities and hpnce one 01' more pos
sihle dirC'rtions of attack. If they are emplaced
in depth, a defense or withdrawal is more
likely. The n.umber and caliber of artillery
hatteries will give G-2 some basis for deduc
tion as to the type and strength of the enemy
unit opposing his division, Similarly, location
of troop concentrations, command posts, and
observation posts may disclose the enemy
strength and possible sclwmes of maneuver
and something about the of rein
foreement. Disposition of antitank wenpons
will be highly important ''';p""inlly if thl' use
of tanks in our division zone is contc'lnplated.
The nature and extent of defensive works
and fortifications will help G-:2 tll'tl'rmine
whether attack, defense, and ,\claying: action
are likely enemy enpabilIties, Ouviously then,
this information whieh the artillery must
have is equally important to G-:2.
Observation is the prinl'ipal llIt'thod em
played by the artillcry to g'p! its information,
and it has many eycs with which tll o\"cl've,
Its eyes for close-in dl'tail aI'' the forwnrd
observers, Nonllnlly, eneh c"ll1Illittt'd infantry
regiment in till' divbion will h,tvl' in ib dir,'('!
support at kast OIW fiel,l al'tilkry hattaliull.
That battalion will otl<' li,'ld a1'liliel'::
liaison otlie"l' to l'aeh lIf tIll' thIn' infantl'Y
battalions and, if JlO"tll]C', Olll' f"l'wal'd
observeI' into the 1:01ll' of l'a, h front -linl'
company. The functioll "t' the ('Ill'ward
ohserver is to sec and repllrt C'vl'l'ything- that
takes place ill the ('omIlan:,' zolh' t(l \\hich he
is aRsigned, He primarily illtt'l'C',d ill
locating and hring'ing dllwn artill,'ry tire upon
hostile eh'ments or aetivitie:i which will inter
fere with tht' IlIls"ion of hb ,IIPIH)\'tl'd IInit.
In doing that, he stay' "lit {If tllP tire tig-ht
and confincR hi, dl'ol't til ol""l'vatinll, some
thing' that the infant ry "I.,,'r\'l\" arc' !lot
always able to ,Ill. Ill' b trainc'd til \\ au'h fol'
and report to his battalioll all h",tik di,:po,i
tions and movell1l'lIb wl1l'thl'r 01' lint artilll'I'Y
targets secm to be involved, !I" mnk,"
negative \'('ports periodically if nothing is
observerl, Hc IllU,t abo hc ('ompldely familial'
with the location of our own troops in thl'
zone, l'cporting pro111ptly any' l'hang'l's and
movementR, He knowR how tn idl'ntify cnemy
materiE'l nnd equipment such g'un', tanks,
antitank weapons, aIH1 obsPl'vation post efjuip
ment, Obviously thi>; "ffiel'\' can be the Rom'c,'
of a wealth of information m, important to
G-2 as it is to thl' artillery. DiI'C'ct eOlllmuniea
. tion by radio and, if po"sible, wire exbls he
tween thd forward obscl'ver and his artil!{'l'Y
Tied in to the forward observer's telephone
line 01' radio net is the artillcl'Y liaison officeT
nt the infantry battalion command post. This
ctlicel' with the infantt;y commander as
much possiblP, goes with him on Teconnab
accompanies him to the infantry obser
vation po,t, allli keepR in touch with the situa
tion from the infantry viewpoint, He will
g-t'llerally know about all enemy information
the infantry up as as the battalion
dnCR, and, 1I0t being involved in
the' tig-htin/!:, may be able to report it more
His mission of seeing to it that the
inf"nlry ha, tlw artillcry support that it
lJl"dR PI il11hrily involves the reporting of
inforlllat ion to hi, own artillL-ry hattalion,
TIH' liaisoll OniCCl' also has the duty of
t'ool'tlinat t he zone, of ,)bservation of all
1he ftll'ward \\"ho are to operate
\\ it h th,' l'{llIlpani", of thc sUPPQrted infantry
battali"l1 ", as to a",Ul'e cOlllplete coverage
"I' thc' l'!lti!''' klttalion zone.
(;"ing hat'!, tIl the hattalion, we
jilld th" hattaliclll who is charged with
jlr,,,'c,;;ing, interpreting, and disseminating
t hl' infol'lllation which comeR back to
I'illl 1'1'0111 his information-collecting
Thp,c indudc not only the liaison officers and
forward observers mentioned above but abo
q \'l'ral other impol'tant ;;ources. Each firing
iHlt\,'I'Y of the battalion will normally have
it, oWlI ,)h""l'vation post from which it can
at its assigned zone
(If' tin'. III additioll, S-2 will cause to he set
up a battalion observation post to cover the
(Iltil'e hattalion zone of fire, which incidcntally
will include considerably more than
t hl' zone of action of the supported infantry
I'vg'iment. These posts might be
eallerl the middle-distance eycs of the artillery,
Th"y will not pick up detail such as is
ohtained from the forward observer but may
g'l't <I l\Iorc integ-rated picture of the wholc.
Width aJl!! depth will he increased at the
,'xpenRC of ,lctail.
TIll' long-distance eycs of the battalion and
its 1'01' looking around corners, ovel'
hills, and into defiles are its two cub
(.rg:anic to the battalion and piloted by artil
lery officers, They are intended primarily to
ARTILLI':!!)" M' AN INTI:Lr.lflEN(,lc Ar.F.Nry
, /
I)" AUf>
REI"F B'\;


CX) &"

:085 ": \

\ \
, \
, \
C><)- _ _ "
Plane, - .... _ )--_-.!...l!.l-'-_--,_
-----1'-- -jSur\e\1

facilitate observation of artillery fire UPOI\
targets at long' range or <lefilatl'ti from
ground obsl'rvation, Incitll'ntal to thb mission
and without. interfering with it. pilot
observers are able to ohtain a gn'at ,ll-al of
enemy information valuahle to G-:.!, Disl"bi
tions, installations, and mOVenh'nts ,)tlwl'\\'ise
invisible lllay show Ull plainly from the ail',
Oblique photographs can bl' tahn, Rl'POrts
from c,)mbat zones indieate that artillL'l'Y
cuh planes' have collect(',l mOl'e iml'nl'tant
information than any othel' oh"el'vation
agency organic to the division.
Thcl'l' is in the hattalion another
agency engag'ed in produt"ing' e,sl'nlinl at'til
lery information which will often hl' illl]lOl'
tant to G-:'!, That is the hattalion sm'Vl'Y
,ection, In ol'fkr to be ahle to mass tirl's, all
artillery hatterie" lllU"t he nc('uratl'ly lo('atl',l
on tIl(' map 01' tll'ing cl1lll't with I'l'lation to
each otlWl' and with rl'lation to l','l'tain
prominent tel'l'ain fcatul'l's, This is tIlL' func
tion of the sm've,' "eeiion. It make'" the of
such maps and a"l'ial phot(lg'l'aphs as e'ist.
an,l snpplements ancl thelll by ]ll'I'fnnn
ing snrVl'Y operations. Tn addition to loeat ine:
the battery positions. it will dderilline the
horizontal and vertical locations of a numbl'r
of identifiable points in the enemy an'a. i.l' .
the target area. in orde!' to facilitnte accuratl'
artilll'ry til'(' in places whcre onitahle
are likc'ly to appeal', This type of information
will assist G-:.! in checking' the of his
maps, which is one of his impol'tant
sibilities. It may abo give him mOl'e exact
locations of enpmy than h,'
may be able to obtain from oth,'r observcrs.
Moreovel', survey personnel ill the COU!'''' (If
their work may set> and report enl'lllY activity
01' dispositions, thu" pl'oviding additional
Finally, in th(' division artillery hea(l
quarters is the division artillery S-2. lIt' is
in direct communication with the S-:.! of each
urtillei'Y battalion an,l is constantly rl'cl'ivillg
evaluated and interpretl"l information from
them, He has facilities for recording and
further evaluation and interpretation. Thl'
division artillery, if feasible, lllay also set up
its own observation post with a field of obser
vat ion t'ov{'l'ing as rnueh of thl\ division Z(}llC
(If action as Ilo"sibl(>. There i, also a divisi,'l1
artilh'ry sedi'lil whllse b tn
pl'uvide "on1l1IOn control for hattalion survey
o\ll'ratiulb. It will estuhlish n survey infol'llm
tion.ccllter-l'l of tCITain and l1ul.}>ping'
infol'lnation for (;-:.!,
Wl'ath,,1' i5 another coneel'U of G-:.! and
ag'ain the division artillery can be of some
":,,,btanct'. Its mt'leol'olog'ical sC'ction exbts
fOl' the IlllI'PO"" of detl'l'mining atmospheric
conditions whirh will affect the flight (If
pl'"jeetill's and l'onseql1ently b ahle to giv,'
,om" \\'l'atlll'r information such as wind
directions anel s]lt'eds and tenllH'raturcs,
Thel'e muy abo bl' attached to the divisitln
aI,tillery, though lIot OI'g'anic. an. observation
klttpl'Y froJll a ('01 i,S al,till,'I'Y observation
battalion. TIllS ol'g'anizatioll is ,'ql1ippe,1 to
l,'cak enemy artilll'ry ]lositions by
(,i):-:l'1 ville,' thL' of the Cl1crny piece;:,
Wlll'll tilin.e:. 01' hy tll'tel'lllining the tlirl'ction
(If tIll' of the dischargl'. The infol'llla
ti,m fUI nisllet! it will be contined chidl:> to
location lIf artillel'Y, lJl1t it al,o assists in
surv,'Y. If no su('h ullit is attached, it 'will
be found in tIll' l'urps artilll'!'Y with whom the
divi,ion artillery will lil' in close liabon.
Divbion artillpl'Y h,'adqual'tl'l's, like ,'ach
of its hattalion", ha" two cub ail'planes for
"h""I'vation. Th"se are Jp,s likely to be til,d
up ill the actual cOlldult of al tilll'ry til'e and
helll'" al'l' Jllorc: availahl" fOl' g'l'lll'ral ohs'l'
\'atioll lHU'POSL\S.
.\Iloth"l' typl' of information dealt with
by the artilll'I'Y i, "hell report". Thpse are
rl'pOi h fo]'wal'cled all units of whatevPl'
natlll'l' Hh to "lwllin:.r by the l'nl'll1,. Thpy
:-hould include the lilllt', clll]'ation. and in
ll'll>il>' of the shl'l!ing anclthe direction from
\\hllh it C!lIll', Pil'Peli(]1l Illay h" cl<'ll'rlllinccl
hy noting' g'lIll tla<hL'" if vi"ihle, an,l the
din'dion of tIll' :-ollnel of rt'Jlort. If thpse are
not the angle of fall of the
pro,i<-ctile anel the :-haJll' of the shell c!'atel'
give some elue. The area shelled ai1d the
amount of damage donQ shoul,1 be accurately
described. Also included if possible should be
thp type nnd caliber of shell. The primary
purpose of shelf reports is to assist the artil
lery S-2 in locating the enemy lIrtillcry. It is
apparent, howevel', that the nature ant!
amount of enemy artillery' action; ant! th...
location and type of targets uttucked may
well be an indication to G-2 us to the courSl'
of lIction heing adopted by the enemy. It will
also be an indication of the effectiveness, or
lack thereof, of OU1' own couBtN'intelligence

The diagram indicut... the infol'J11ution
and intelligenc" that exist
within the division nrtillery of an infantry
division, assuming' a formation with two
regiments committed abreast, each with two
battalions ahreast, and each battalion having
two companies committe(!.
It is not intended to conv(';' the im'pl'l'ssion
that G-2 can get everything' he from
the artillery or rely on it to the ('xt'iusion of
other agencies within thl' division. Certain
information can only be gained hy actual
contact with th(' elWIllY in combat, 01' by foot
patrols or by capture of pl'is01WI'S of war.
These arc the. province of' the infantry.
Longer-range patrols ilnd reconnaissance will
have to he execute(] hy th(' division' recon
naissance h'oop. Also, of course, informatioll
obtained through aerial photographs, agents
in the hostile territory, and strategic studies,
to mention a few items, will com. to him
from higher authority,
The artillery, however, docs have the facili
ties for getting information from all parts
of the battlefield, the communication chantlels
over which to report it, and the intelligence
pt'l'sonnel to interpret and evaluate it and
pass it along to those who need it. Such a
complete system-rather more complete than
that of any other agency within the division
should not be overlooked by G-2 in planning
his search for information. The limitation
upon its use is that G-2 lIIL1st not overload
the >ll'tillel'Y intt'lJigc'lce systt'm to a point
whl're it cannot carry dut its primary mission
of furnishing the necessary to
provide adequate arti!!lel'y support,
The Burmese Defl.'nse
From a British source.
THE Burmese Defense, which is fighting
side by side with the Fourteenth num
bers 10,000 men. Its operations are heing
facilitated politically by the Burmese anti
organization, and by the manner in
which Karens, Kachins, Nagas, Shans, and
similar hill tribesmen have stood by the
British, Some of the officers have been en
v,aged in similal' guelTiIla operations in other
theaters, notably among' the l\Iaquis in
, France. Some were recent arrivals' in Burma
who did not know the native tong'ues, and
others were old-timers familial' with many
They organized a procedure by which small
teams were parachuted from aircraft, pref
erably by moonlight, in pre-al'l'anged isolated
spots in the jungle; they wOltld often drop
blind onto hilltops and into gullies, in treach
erous weather in apparently inaccessible
country, The,' were equipped with arms and
food supplies, and they carded radio sets ttl
maintain touch with the directing staff, Offi
cer" on the ground organized working parties
and constantly chang'ed their situationt', ob
taining intelligence by harassing the Japanese
communications by organizing sudden coups.
Seyeral Bdtish officers were captured and
execute(l by the .Japanese, One majol' gave
himself up to pl'event the Karen tribesmen
from being' subjected to savag'e reprisals for
harboring him. The casualties, on the whole,
however, were 1ight compared with those
inflicted on the Japanese. Some of the officers
curried on jungle warfare for ten months
before emerging to safety or being rescued
by advancing Cohtiilns,
Why Command Inspections?
Instructor, Command and General Stall' School
NE of our foremost armored com
manders has said: "l\Iaintenance in a
division is only ag good as the commanding
general wants it to be." But is that the whole
answer? Based on ]Jt'rsonal ohservation and,
we hopl', a logical analysis, the answer is

On this SUbjl'ct, like many other rather
vague things in our military system, we
sonorously intone, ":\laintt'nance is a respon
bibility of comlllaJH\," and usually let it go at
that. Some have even gone so far as to say
thut maintenance is the responsibility of
everyone concerned and is placed in the COIll
manti channel for control. Obviously, then,
th<:re is somewhere a missing link, for the
job is not too well done, a fact on which we
(xpeet little ctisagl'eenwnt. We think that
missing link is the same one that occasionally
causes good fields ordl'l's and tactical plans
to go amiss-failUl'C' to execute the final step
--supervision of the C'xC'l'ution and results by
commander amI staff.
Nolle of us fails to recognize the intercst
and responsibility of the commander, but in
an armored divi.sioll, for instance, he does not
have time to inspect over 2,000 vehicles very
often. Often the question is raised: "Other
than the G-4, what interest has the general
staff got in this mattl'l'?" The problem is sup
posedly delegated to an assistant G-4, hope
fully appointed as a specialist, who harasses
us by sending out spot-check teams, stopping
our vehicles on the road, and sending down a
scalding buckslip asking for an explanation
of deficiencies. This stops our progress on
unit training or what-have-you and requires
possibly an agitated conference with the unit
motor officer to frame a reply, the major
purpose of which is to quiet down the wrath
from above. Frequently the process results in
correcting the individual defect-then ob
livion again.
Let us take a look at the points that might
interest some of the general staff officers on
the division level. Probably one of the first
apparent loopholes is that brain-truster, G-2.
How could he conceivably be concerned with
automotive maintenance, for instance? Ac
"('ording to the book, he does little actual
executing, but should sit back in a rathl'!'
detached manner, pcrmitting his assistants to
do the mechanics of information collecting'
while he analyzes, sifts, and interprets. But
he also has a mission of developing; training
for, and sHpervising the execution of intL'l
lig-ence and counterintelligence plans. 1m
proper handling of motorize,1 equipment can
quickly shoot those plans to pieces. For
instance, a part of the preventive maintenm}('e
on all armored combat vehicleR is the proPCI
care of radios and intercommunication equill
ment. Has he checked the radio equipment of
the reconnaissance units rpcently? If their
equipment is not how is he going to
get his information from them in time tu <lei
OIL it? Now about thig counterintclligl'ncc. 011
every vehicle issued to combat units there
should be painted the lettel' "S" following the
registration number on the hood. It indicates
that the vehicle has certain spark SUPpl'l'S,
SOl'S, honding straps between major units, and
grounding washers installed by Signal COl'll"
personnel. The purpose is to prevent inte!'
ference from static electricity with radio
reception on Fl\I channpls of our own sets.
But if this interference occurs, will not an
interceptor in the hands of the enemy pick up
this same static discharge and by the use of
direction finders possibly disclose our pObi
tion? It is agreed the latter contingency is
somewhat remote. A good G-2 never over
looks the remote chances. Some of the ques
tions he might ask himself include: Have unit
maintenance detachments been instructed on
the importance of these suppression devices,
the necessity of replacing them exactly as re
moved, or replacing the frayed and broken
bonding straps? Have drivers been given that
same instruction and impressed with the
importance of reporting trouble promptly?
Since they do not affect the operation of the
vehicle, some drivers Jet it slide. Sure, we
know. This is a job of the maintenance officer.
!yns, th
c v Similarly, they report that performance of
Illanner the execution of cathouflage and
dummy installations is (\ tinit onc. Where
these matters so vitally concern the ,collection
of information for combat intelligence as well
an the problem of counterintt'lligence, dMsn't
the G-2 have a missioll?
What about the G-::? A lack of knowl('dge
of the stan<ial'd of maintt'nanc(' in units of
the division 11I'ecludcs the possibility of intel
ligent assignmcnt of lllis,ions. During the
fighting in FnlllCt' it wus most t'ncouraging
to see son1<' of the fiehl Ol'ders of the 6th
,Armored Divi,;ioll in which thl'rc fj'cquently
appeared an order l'onll'thing' thi,;: " __th
Tk Bn join til!! Div at _____ on cOlllpletion of
maint('nul1cc." TIll' rc,;ults of such a policy
have bCl'n cleul'ly shown in that division's
c('lllbat l'('cor<1.
Take anothel' t'>.ampk, the opl'ration of tht'
:ld Armored from til(' St. to hnak
throug-h to the Ciennan flonticr. TIll' co!'ps
romlluwd"('r has beclI ,!uott'd uo; saying- that
the ad Armored 1t'(1 all tl1<' a distance
\wll ovcr 200 milt'';, ncvel' g-iving the encmy
any rest. He was further quoted as saying
that the ;ld threw all ru"', of armored llluin
tenanc(! out tIl(' window and simply pushed to
Ill" limit of en(lurance of men and vehicles.
It is undoubtedly true' that 'many g-arrison
type rulcs were bl'oken, hut tank crcws
lost no to service am\' check their
v('hicles whenever the situation permitted.
The d{'cision so to ('mploy this division was'
a calculated risk. Both division and corps
romnwnders had to kllow the maintenance
standards of that diviRion hefore thi:'y could
take that risk. It is true that the American
tanker will keep his v<:>hicle opCl'ating longer
on bailing wire and sheer "know 'how" than
other soldier in the world, but that is
not the whole stOlT. He must have a solid
foundation on which to start. It has been
emphasiz('d repeatedly by observers and staff
officers of ar111ies and army gTOUpS that
vetf'ran tankers do a job, but replace
ments, not too well grounded in the impor
tance of preventive maintenance, almost im
mediately send the deadline for second and
higher echelons of repair skyrocketing.
25- and 100-hour checks is almost impossible
under combat conditions. The performance of
50- to 200-hour checks is considered fortunate.
Under such conditions, proper first echelon
maintenance by drivel:' and crew is all the
more essential.
This is not altogether an armored division
problem either; the G-:l of the infantry divi
sion needs an eye and ear full. One of the
most frequent complaints from separate tank
battalions as well as observers, partial and
impartial, is that infantry divisions do not
allow tank battalions attached to them suffi
eient time for maintenance, and the same
applies to self-propelled artillery. Since
almost every infantry division now has a
tank battalion semi-permanently attached, it
a continuing. problem. A G-3 who has
learned that problem apd its requirements
through eommand inspections, properly con
ducted, cun readily insure that one of his most
impOl'tant close-support weapons will be ready
when he nel'ds it most. Failure to take it into
consideration could possibly bring catas
The first time I mentioned my beUef that
the G-l was likewise concerned with vehicular
maintenance I got a guffaw for a reply. Let
me ask some questions which the G-l can best
gllSWt'r for himself. The military police
platoon is his most important agency for
control. Does he !mow whether or not
thl'ir vehicles are in c')ndition to permit the
mobility necessary for this control? Another
unit whose maintenance standards he should
know is the medical battalion. He might ask
himself: What will be ,the effect on morale if
the medical evacuation equipment is not in
condition to stand the grueling "round-the
clock" driving required in mo<1,ern battle and
results in the failure of our personnel evacua
tion plan?
Even more important to the G-l is a state
ment which I do not believe can be success
fully challenged. Show me the outfit with
poor maintenance standards and I will show
you olle with low morale and a high AWOL,
rate. On the other hand, show ,me an outfit
with good maintenance which has been reCQg
l(ized by its l'oIHmam/ers and I will in turn
show you one with high morale and an
inevitahle and just pride in itg arrolllplish
The connection of the G-4 and hi"
<;istal)ts is clearly outlined in l't'g'ulati<llH< ,\11,1
need not be expanded here, hut hl'
mugt know the story to coo1'dinnte pl'opel'ly
the related functions of the gpl'rial ami
How can the staff officeI' Rain thl' kn<l\y\(ot!g'l'
l'('qui1'et! for thest' The'l'c al'l'
ways, FOl' many month" thl' Ol'dnancl'
Depar'tnwnt has conducted a onl'-wl'ek
in automotive prev(mtive mainknanl'e at l1w
Atlanta and Fort Crook Ol'dnance
These rOlil'St'S al'l' cOllducte,1 for t he ]'PI1l'
fit of statr olfieel's. Tlll'Y arc eflicil'llt and they
get thl' suh,iPct
Laddng a \vpp1.. ':; thne to lll'vntl..' to :--ul..'h a
Buhjc-ct. an oflil't'l' ('an Po'ain a :--nlid wOJ'killg'
foundation throuj:dl a fe'w h,llI!', ,,1' illtl'lleive
work and on actl1;ll V('llll'il'S undt'r till'
rJil'llction of n p:ood InotOl' offie... l' Ol'
One now-famous eOllllllnn<il'\' took
0\'('1' nn ;U'lllOI'"d rcg-illlC'nt at tilt' ,tart of tilt,
Wa!' when he knew little if anrthilll!: "l,nut
maintaining Brll,hillg up qUIckly Oil
what IiUh' Ill' kn,'w. he hore ,lo\\'n Oil thost,
things so hnl'd that no olle hat! (1111,' to It'arn
his lack of lmow]("\g'e on other jlOlll(' until
hE had hrldgl'rl the gap, Offit'(' I , who "'l'ved
under him still relate with a ,lluddl'!' of
anxiety till' stnrit's of hi, rOlllllland
and a moment latcr tell you \Viti! pride tilt'
record that outfit has had of kt'cl'ing
vehicles rolling ill cOlllhat under till' ,,';"pre:-t
extremes of wl'ath('r Ht' had
another neat trick wlwn inspP('\lng a 1,at
talion: he took at her battalion
in the regilllent with him. as \l'dl as till'
company commanders within the hattnlioll hl'
ing inspected. The intl'l'change of ideas and
methods as well as the element of I'ivalry paid
Unfortunately there is another extrl'llH:. In
one of Ollr al'll1ored divisions. the staff with
monotonous regularity sent down a nwmo
randum every Friday that the commanding
general would make a command inspection of
on Saturday morriing, With equal
regularity the gen('ral went only 1.0 the motor
parks of tank regiments. leaving offiCers
and mpn of other units 'standing by futilely
lOl' hour" until that he was not comin)):.
Tlw mninlL'nancl' bta!1(iardR of the divisi'ln
Wl're high in the heginning' and the tank
regiments improve,l; but those of the infantl','
unitF, the artillery. and the trains steadily
declined and never recovered until combat
had l'xaeted a high CORt. A vehkular crew is
proud of work weJl done and commendation
of it iR as Ill'ce"ary as is condemnation
of poor \Vork, So far as is known. no staff
otlil'er (except G-4 at very rare intervals)
l'Vl'r appeared in the motor parks of the
nnits. Ha,l the general staff been
togl'thcr with (h" comhat command and
( ntins cOl11mandl'I's on a rotate,l system of
illspecl ions, the story might have been ron
ditfl'rl'llt. Thl' lllen would have heen
satbtied that th"ir efforts were recognized,
and thosl' otlieers would have bpnefited ill1
ll,e,,,urahly hy thl' knowledg'l' of condition,;
ill till' nnits for whom tlwy planll('d training
and c()lllhat opl'I'ations,
Recently I aecom}Hlni(',\ the eommanlling
ot1il'er of an alllphihiouR arlllored group on a
POlllllland inspection of the v"hicles in his
The cOll,litioh of' vehicles w.\s cxcl'l
lent: the lllen were alert and smartly
l'oui'teou,: the oil lind grease houses as well
as t ht' equipmellt w<'r(' unbt'lievahly
ckan, Yet he raisl"l nnmitig'att"\ "ned" about
'lll" grain of sand he found on the underside
of a g'l'('ase drulll top, Petty? Pl'rhaps. But
lwf"r" w(' jlldg'e. let us 1001< at the record,
TIll' vehi('ks \\.(' ,aw had lwcn u"ed to train
Illorl' than a dozen amphihian tank and tractol
and op('ratl'd more than th_ree
thpi!' normal expected life. As to the neai'
fanatitism on dean gt'ease-dispensing equip
111('nt, the repair records show that out of
those vehicles only two bogies had been lost.
du(' tn lwal'ing failure, in over twelve bat
talion training p('riods and lllOl'e than a yeaI'
of olll'ration, SU('h a rerort! would be most
l'nviable for a land tank battalion disl:egal'd
ing entirely the hazards and headaches of salt
water and sand operation,
" The effectiveness of this trainin&" has heen
! amply in 8011111 of ouI' toup;ht'st
amphibious landings to date. Kwaja\ein, Eni
wetok, Saipan, Guam, Palau, Leyte, anti Luzon
all WCl'C among the invasions fn which hat
talions trained therc hit the beach<'S lirst or
l>mgug' tJw !h'>L At S;l.ipan lhes contitwl!d to
ojll'l'ate for two Wc'.:k" a>< land tallk;;.
The pe1'ccntag'e of vehicll's kl'pt in "Pl'l'l1tiull
ulld<'l' such arduous usag'l' w"uld lift l'ye
b1'OW8. Theil' presence and effectiveness paid
oft in tC1'ms of shortencd bampaigns and lives
of American troops saved.
A hallPY medium is the ideal answer,
i{c'quire execution of good maintenance and
it will he forthcoming. It is as cssential to
mod,,!,!) wl;J'J'm'2 t1>2 sllj}j}ly d ammani
thm. Tlw l't'fiults'? The title of Captain luger
book answel'S it beautifully: "The
Buttle is th.., Ptlyoff,"
ShiPl)ing and the War Effort
Lieutenant Hay :\1. Strllupe, IlIffli/try, Staff' and Faculty, Command <\1111
(;elH'l'l11 Stafl' School I,
daily Allil'd aircraft and
submariltes, Japan'" operable merchant Heet
-her economic lifeline--i, now cotimatt'!\ to
be lesR than half the ,ize I't:!juired to lllain-
I, -tain he!' armed forceR and sustain basic in
I dUotl'ial production at the early UI4j level.
With estimated sinkin!.!:s exceeding' new
at the rate of 150,{)OO to 200,000
I tons pel' month, the shipping' situation io
" growing' wor":,.
Lack of sufficient shipping' ha,; cur
tailed steel production by about one-third of
factory capacity. It has prevented the main
. tenance of stockpiles of l'ritical raw materials
at safety levels. For instance, the backlog of
bauxite, essential for aluminum production,
was. estimated at a one-yeal' stlpply in the
spring of 1944. Bauxite is now believed to
have all but rlisappea I>ed rewlt of'
I heavy demands f01' aluminulll from the ex
panded aircraft production program.
". Factors related to shipping losses arc the
cutting of sea communication lines and the
, !shrinking of Jap-held territory throl1g-h Allied
action, :\Iore and more, the Japanese are
forced into economic depenllence on the re
of the Inner Zone-:\Ianchuria, Korea,
and North China. This fact will accentuate
the weakening because of the lack of
stich e"C'ntial war materials as oil, chrome,
mung-anc,e, and nic'kel in the remaining
territor,' .
. The .Japanese manpc'we1' is already
and there is a 'Iack of workers for
a greatly expanded industrial program. In
conv'Cniences caused by evacuation of families
from the principal cities, as well as aerial
attacks which force workmen into shelters
and destroy their homes, create all appre
ciable loss of man-hours. One problem asso
dated witn tne manpowet' snol'tage is the
question of an adequate food supply for the
working classes. The drafting of men fron)
farlll dbtricts, the curtailment of activities
of the Japanese fishing fleet, the difficulty of
importing' rice, hoarding, and increased con
sumption by the military forces have caused
a serious scarcity of food in the homeland,
The Prevention of Trench Foot
Fl'IlIll The [1111/('(;11 lif tl,,' [IS. Army Medical TJ"l)(l)'flllf'Jlt, April IllHi,
Hr; Surg'coll Gelleral urg-ently recom
mends that every effort continue to be
made by platoon and hig'her unit commanders'
to acquaint their troops with the factors in
volved in the calise of trench foot, and the
preventive measures which arc purely de
pendent on the individual's care of his feet.
Proper footg'ear is highly important but alone
will not solve the problem. The intelligent UlW
of his footgear coupled with proper foot care
falls on the individual soldier after he has
been g-iven the necessary instructions. It 'ap
pears inevitable that, under the same climatic
conditions, more casualties will occur in troops
forced into relative immobility by heavy
enemy fire for severn! days than in troops
less heavily engaged. Etl'el'tive measures can
be taken eVt'n then by the soldier to ameliorate
thp causative factol's of trench foot, poilltcd
out in WI) Circlilar No. 312, 22 July HJ44,
and War Department Techni('al Bulletin TB
i\lED 81, 4 August J!l44.
Instl'uetion of the individual >,oldier in the
eal'e of his feet whell under thl'se conditiOlb
shou!,1 be repeated often. an additional
remilHler, The Surg'eon Gelleral's OtTIee has a
poster entitle,! "This is Trench Foot." Thl'
wide distribution of posters should make
tmops foot It is suggested that
such pOi<ters be placed in suitable locations on
trucks calTyin!!: in combat al'eas in
addition to the normal plaepment of such
postels. If placed in the interior of trucks on
a bulletin board on each side attache(1 to the
upper framework neal' the tail gate, all pel'
sonnel will see them.
Although Army personnel carriers have not
been extensively used to transmit remin,lers
on health, the exploitation of this means i:<
highly desirable. In this 'way the posters will
reach those who are in most need of the re
minder-combat troops going into action.
Posters' on other health subjects from time to
, time can be brought to the attention of combat
troops by this means, thereby leading to better
c.onservation of health when preventive
measures depend in large part of the indi
vidual and unit commander.
In the matter of footg-eal', nllHlificati"lIs
have been Illade in the 1'hoe pae to imprmc
'its "ground-g;l'ip" alld to afford better support
for the foot. It come,; in full sizes and three
wi,iths. This shoe pac J10W is being issued
against requisitions received by the quartel'
master. These shoe pacs should be fitted
properly when worn with one or two pairs
of socks, wool, ski. The same applies to the
combat boots which are usually fitted to be
worn with onq pair of socks. When sock com
binations al'e worn, a larger size wil! be
necessary to prevent constriction of the cir
culation. Socks must fit comfortably loosely
but uot loosely enough to permit wl'inklinf';,
The socks or sock combinations for combat
boots advbed in order of preference are (1)
wool, cushion sole, two pairs; (2) socks,
\vol)l, cushion sole, and so"ks, wool, light, olle
pair each; (:l) soeks, woo!, light, two pairs;
and (4) soeks, wool, heavy, OIl<' pai I'.
In keeping' with similar pamphlets on heal! II
from The Surgeon Gt'lleral's OtTI"l',
anotht'r method of instruction is used in
the European theater, It is a thin cardboard
folder, 4 :'. by 6 Ii inches, pl'inted for issue
to enlisted men of the 26th Infantl'y Di\'isioll.
The fold"!,, l'ntitlC'd FOIII' Enelilies: Gerll1ans
((ud T,'cncl1 Fuot, reads as follows:
"1. The German and treneh foot are you!'
most dang'en>us enemies during the winter
months. You have been trained to protect
youn,e]f ag;ainst the German and you must
learn to pr{\tect your"elf against trench foot.
If do not, you will become a casualty ami
suffer pain and discomfort. Ask some of the
old men who have seen tren<,h foot.
";2. The principal causes of trench foot are
sitting, standing', or lying with colt!, wet feet.
Lack of exercises of the feet and shutting
off the blood supply to the feet by wearing' too
tight shoes, socks, and leggings are other
causes. Trench foot can and does happen with
out freezing weather.
"8. You can pl'e,:elll treni'll foot by taking
care of your OWl! fect. Not once every week
or two or three days: do it every day. There
may be an occasional im;tanee when you can't
,h' all the things to help, but you can still do
most of them Rel11clhbet' the fol
lowing' silnpl(' thing's nnd tin thenl. N'o onc
c]'e can ,In thcm for
"II, At least a ,hly, and ,;eveml timcs
if pn:-;sihlc, and get
font ])()",del' J'l"Olll you r "'111lld leader :tn,1 rub
yll\II' I'<'c't wit h your hal"k If' powd"I'is nol
antilable, rub ,'OUI' f!?C't without it.
"h. At "lice a day to a pail' of
,Iry, deall "0' ks, If thi" is not possible an,1
Y')\II' socks and ,;hoes arc wet, do thC' next
bt'Rt take oft' the "hoes and socks, rub
Y<lUI' fl'!?t, wring' out the Rocks, and put them
back on if h;1ve to. You have, 01' will he
ihut'd, tw,) pairs of ht'avy \\'ool('n socks and
two ]lairs of Ib.rhl wo"len. One pair of thc
11<':1\)' \\,,,)kn ,,,,,lone pair of thc light wonlen
arc III h" W,)]"11 with th(' Jig-hl wonl next to ynur
ft'l}t; tlw othl'l' two pail'S Hl'P to be kept on
ynll1' ]1('1'''111, The Ikht \\'()oll'n can be kept
IIlIdCI" the 1il'IIIH't lilll'r; the ht';tvy \\,oolen
(,Ithc!' pilllH'tl in ..... idp you,' tield jal'Iu't.
tIll' -hir!. 01 ill the pocket of Ihe lie\\, typP
lIPId int'kl't. You will l'(icl'i\t' ollC pail' of clean
litd1t woo}{n ;0.(1<.'1\:-; daily with YOU}'
o'<lU IIlU,t turn ill H dil pail' ill !?xehallge. '
\\"a..:h thp wllole-Il sock:-=. youn"elf; it can
bt' <lone, I f you have to continue \i'earinp: wet
,hoe", I'emov(' them sC\'cral till1t's flaily to I'ub
youI' feet. I f you do not have the ask
)'our ,quad l('ader to help get them,
"r. Exerci,,' feet. This is very im
pOI'tant when ,'uu are not able to move about
freel,. It 'can be done even in a foxhol" or
Illlg'out b,' wig-g-ling' of the toes 01' placing' thc
feet' agall1st the end of the trcilch and pushing
against It. Keep it up until the feet become
\,"<lrl11cr and the circulation of blood to thc
fpet is good. This should be done at least
once ellelt houl',
"d. VUI/'t ,leep with yOUI' shoes on if it
tan be .h(>lped, particulal'ly if they arc wet.
"c. You have, 01' will be'issued, a pair of
<hoc l'HCS (boots with rubber lowers) with
tlf"O pairs of fcIt inner "ales, One pair of the
felt innCI' soles must always be worn with
the shoe pac, the other pair will fit under
the helmet linel'" The felt inner sole will be
come damp from sweat and must be changed
daily when the light socks are changed, Be.
sure that the shoe pacs are big enough to
ac-eommodate the heavy woolen sock and
still not cut off the circulation to the feet,
Remembol' the shoe pacs will cause the foot
to swcat and it is still very necessary that
daily care be I\"iven to the feet in the same
way as Jlreviously described, The heavy
woolen socks should be changed daily if pos
and at least every other day,
"4. Treatment of trench foot.-If you see
a soldier whlll has not taken care of his feet,
will probably see a case of trench foot.
You can recognize it by his complaints that
his feet feel heavy, woody, and numb, and at
first not painful. On feeling his foot with
your hand, it is cold, looks swollen, is the
white color of wax, with blue places like rash
especially around the toes, When his feet are
\\'armed, the color changes to red, the swell
ing increases, the feet feel hot to the touch,
and are very painful. If you see this, it is
t "elleh foot and it is important to know what
to do as well as the things that can not be
don(': Don't ,'ull 01' 1I11lssage feet after trench
foot has del'eloped, Don't placc soldier with
feet ;ICa/' fi/'f or try fa' warm feet rapidly,
DOll't let soldiel' walk if it cun be helped. Do
II/lice soldia all back with feet raised about
fifteen inches IIbot'C Test of body, Do keep feet
dry and cool, Do call medicos so that soldiel'
{'flU be treated,"
As a fmther means of constantly reminding
troops, the suggestion has been made that a
label, printed with brief and concise state
ments and directions regarding trench foot,
be pasted on each ration packet at point of
storage. In this mannel' the soldier would
receive repeated reminders of what he can do
to protect himself against trench foot, Com
ments on thi& suggestion and information
('oncerning' any trial of these mediums of in
struction should be addrel'sed to The .Surgeon
heneral, U,S, Army,
Auxiliary Propellants
Sectiun, Hf'atl'lWlr1t.TS 'I'\:.'1'\th At"lo\
While the }"lliey oj th" i\lILlTARY RE
VIEW is, !1"lIrrall!l, to k,,"e Ilu/Jjccts oi
8HCh (I tccllllical ,wltl,.c i,,,' the SCl'I'i<'C
jourlialH, Ihi. ghurt articlr '11 ill be ill/el
cstiHg rcudiu!J til JIIrtnll (fntl muy feltd 10
MII/r it/cas that will /", HI' bel/efit to tlu'
l(,rl/' ct/'ort.-Tll[, ED/TON,

tIle' (lis('u"ion of rockets

Hnd long-rangt> whi<:h appearf'd
in the :\In.lTARY Hr;nEw rnr S<'ptemhl'r 1\)1-1,
pag-e J 10, to a "nllsid'l'ation .. I' all'.;ilialY l\l'o
(] 4 {lit
pulsion O[ standard ,he]]" e('rtain
interesting CUll ue ,!l'awll.
\vith the long-rung'c gUll, an enol'
mously hig-h initial is necessary to
impart the lH'ces!'ary to the projectile,
Since air resistance is dircetly prl)pol'tional
to the square of the velocity, at hi:,:'h
initial velocity an excessive amount of
is requireu to this nil'
Further, thiR high velocity places an
strain on the gun and on the gun barl'l'l. With
the German long-mng-e guns whil'h ,,1lC'lled
Paris, it was found neces"ury to calculate the
, wear on the bore for each round, and to eOll1
Marks. ME Handbook. 4th Ed, (1941), page 1232_
pute <,ueh round sepnrntely. Even so, the use
ful life of the bal'l'el was very :;;hort.
Second, with the rocket, as with a gas
ol'el'flt<',[ turbine, efficiency varies dil:ectly
with the rutio of the hpeed of the rocket to
thl' "peed of the escaping- The efficiency
of impulse and l'eaetinn type steam turbineR
i;; showll in Fig-llre 1.
Sillce th(' of the (',;caping g-as is hig-h,
ii,OOO tv [fect pel' 1 and higher, it
('an be ,cell that at low speeds the
// I"

..--'1l'f f"'\

rocket is inefficient and an cxcessive
amount of ruel b requi red tn accelerate It to
an ('tlki(nt operating- spce,]. Since with the
impu],'e type tUl'bine (in which the steam
fully ('XjHllHled in the nozzle before gtriking
the the j1eak of efficiency reached
when the hla,k is one-half thut of the
impinging- g-a"es, and in the reaction
the peak of effieiency is l'eachet! when the
blade appl'oaches that of the imping-ing
gas, it can be "l'en that for a g-iven speed of
exhaust gas, the impulse type rocket can op
erate most efficiently at one-half the
of a reaction type rocket. Refel'ring again to
the fact that the ail' resistance increases with
the square of the speed, it follows that the'
impulse type rocket would be in the ordel' nf
fOUl' times more cllieient ,thun the I'l':lctioll
rocket. 1'1'0111 the '\'j? ran (h'aw
two conclusions:
1, That the rocket bL' UL'l'l'll'l'u\pd to
it ... efficient operating' h,' ,OIlIC' l'xt{'rnul
.!. That the L'xhau"i nozzle (It' the r'lck'N
Iw that the ht'atl'd ga ..... e:-.
pounds wouItI be required. Using it maximum;'
specific of 1,5 io[' this IH;opelIant,.'
it would a volume of 4,549 cc and could'
hl' loaded illto a cylinder 13,5 ell1 in diameter
,,1111 :::!.:! Cll!, or l:Ul inches, 4n length_
('1l11"i<!erillg that increased effieiency may
I ('<tilt fl'om the lowered initial velocity of the
"hPlI. ('oHlpal'l'd with the !ong-l'Unge gun, and
f"olll the laek of loss in accelerating the
t.!.! III III
f 'I d"l.lr, 111< I!
I 1I<111
l'n.I" !\'!ll' ," I! l"
to""..! I'l
a,'e fully l'xpunrlcd Ill,!'oll' hpi'lC! d",'!Jal'C!"d
illt,) the atmospherc.
Continuing'. if a Illopellallt call h" dl':-ie:lll'd
to giVl' a gas of appIOXlmatl'ly 5,000
ft.:-l'c. a rocket with such a pl'opdlant would
have a maxillluill l'flicien",' at ft
Thi,. strangcly, is the illit lal \'l'l"(,I(,' (If th,'
,hell :'1-101 fired frolll a InS-1ll1ll gun,
.:'-J"O\V, Stettb:whpt"s on plO
puIsi\e for long-l':ll1t!,e guns,
:!OO kg [kilograms] of propellant (If a jlll\\'PI'
of 1,100 kca!. kg [kilol'alol'ie< pL'l' kilogram]
provided sufficiellt force to hurl 105 ke: a
distance of 120 km [kilollll'ter'].
, That is, 200 kg :.; 1,100 kc"l PCl' k:.o: "-
220.000 keal :.:: 105 kc: X 120 km 0[' 12,GOO
kg-kin. 220.000 -0- 12,GOO ::: 17.46 kenl I'cCjuirc(1
to hurl 1 kg a distance of 1 km,
Now, a 15S-mm shell HE 1\1-101 \\'eie:hs
roughly 95 pounds Ol' 43 kg" To inCl'Cahe the
range of this shell by 10 km, roughly 10.000
yards, would I'cCjuire 4:) X 10 X 17.46 kcal
of energy or 7,507,8 kra!. With a propellant
of 1,100 kcal pel' kg, 6,82 kg 01' roughly 15
..- SC'e MILITARY REViEW September 1944. p_ 110 ff.
l\Jekel hettel' perfol'lnance than that
illdieate'd above' may be expected,
Al'eUrllcy of such a ,hell would be influencerl
h,' three main factol''':
First-The normal dispel'sion of the 155
IIIl11 gUll, increased in .accordalice with the
increase in range.
in the burning rate of
the auxiliary propellant.
Third -Variations in the path of the pro
due to huming or pitting- of the
The first factor is always present; holding
the second and thil'r! to a minimum should
preM'nt 110 more of a problem than any other
problem in ballistics, The new alloys which
have made possible the jet-propelled plane
ma:.' well provide a nozzle with a mini
mum of pitting- and dispersion. In any event,
the order of accuracy, because of the absence
of fins, and the direction and rotation pro
vided by tHe gun, should be far higher than
from any 'present rocket.
Fig-ure 2 illustrates a rocket shell designed
in, accordance with the foregoing, A practical
test would be interesting.
Attack Through Woods
N the attack through woods by n division
ob"l'l'v(',1 in the wuoded t(,lTain
in the vicinity of St. ni(', Franl'C', in Octobcr
1944, it \\'a" ]1l'c('ssary tn <ldvancc along'
roads through nart'l.\V V:I Ihys with hig-h hills
and thick woods all either ddt, all 1'<lads
bcing milwt!,
The \\'C'n' l'lllphasizc.J in
issued f(H' t h0:-:0 ol)f,.lrat ilHl:-;:
(I. Control is paranll.unl. 1'11(,,,'1'01'(', ('\('1',',
tbing' Blust be done ttl maintain it.
b. Special attl'lllitlll I11U-l ht, p:!id tn
an(l combat fOl'lllati()lls,
r. Pha....:e lilll'S he Ulh
I,oon apart rOl' all furl\'ll)'!1
:lH.VCnll'nt', Th"'l' pha
" lim', lllay h,' h:l'cd
on prominenl terrain ol' or
in ahst'lll'l' of ''\It'h, he maintained h,'
C0l1lltiW2: ..... t(p:-:. ll'-'c' (If t'IH.!.lllt'Pl" t:lpe. or a
time clIP"k,
d. Troop.... III' .... " {'llIplll,\ Id that t
llOt ''''IIWlly in l"ntad IIlth tit" ('lIl'Ill,' \\'ill
pu"h on lo the tie-igllatl'd "Jllt-c Iinc,
('. \'pon arrival at ph",,, lill"', batt.,!J"ll
will I'''I''>! t thpil' arrival I,)
f. Battalions will llWV(' for\\'anl on order.
y. Leading nlPn, when fired tllt by cnemy
MG's or i\IP's, immediately opcn fire in the
gcneral direction from whieh fire is coming,
firing from the hip 01' shouldel' as they mon',
Thcy do not stop unless hindered by enClllY
effective fire, at which time ,they conduct a
vigorous assault tn knock out the re,;istance
and then continue on.
It. Enemy resistance bc containe,l
by the troops that first contact it and all other
troops should push by the resistance and
move rapidly toward final objectives. The
bulk of the force, in thi" manner, by unit,
should have infiltrated past any enemy that
might be engaged by other troops,
i. [r the Plll'my'" resistance is such that
this intiltratioll eannot be dOlle, then his
po"itioll>; he den'loped and neutralized
as in any other attack.
j, \Vhen the elll'my is c(l\ltactl'd in woods,
it can be assul1lc(1 that he is 1110l'e or less
lix"tI in that his ohscl'vation is limited and
any 11l0Velllcnt on his part from one point
will nllow om' t I'OOP5 in contaet at that point
tIl pu:":h 011.
1;, SI'I'('t\ and thereforc, if it
i, applied, tht' t'ncmy in all probability will
n,.t 11:'<' hi, l'l'sen'es until he knows dcfinitely
"tI,' dircl'li"n of ((,Ivance.
1. In \\ ""tis it can be assumed
that the' l'1l(,lllY will his n',Cl'VCs I'M
hl''''king' miO:'ions rathc!' than rOi' countel"
tttta.:k Therefolc, ag'ain ('111
pllaoiz,'l' the importance of ;,peed in al'l'iving
at ..hjectiH", ('ven though only part "t' you!'
1'0' (,l' e:cts there
III. In l'olnhatin!..!.' Cl1l
1ny road hltH.'k..;, plnns
,houlc! bl' lllatIC' to aliack the
hut not on thc roads. As in a night operation
,n' alllphihious tljlcration, we sl'pk in
<>111' planning to attack terJ'ain :tnd tenain
features a';'UllliIlg' that jloints will hl'
,wcupipc! tl1(' ('neIllY.
iI. Hoad" shoulc! not be use,1 '1., boundaries
Ill'twccn nnits. A unit be given the
of moving ?btride the road,
It was impossible for tanks to acIvanee
aloll,,' any uf these roads until the mines were
I'cmoved by engineers. The ul'ual procedure
was (01' the infantry to <lttack thl'ough the
on both sides of tne road, employing
tIll' methods stated above. After the infantry
"pinched off" a section of the road, enginec!'
tl'OOPS (usually a platoon) cleared that
of mines; then the tank platoon'
moved fOl'ward and assistcd in the establish
ment of a I'oad block.

Tlu' ".llc(('o}'," lJl :tish .11/
l'ro/,dled Ail'('I'(ljf:
Evidell<'(! indieutl's that the 1(,\ F's ";\!,,
tt'or," tin,t jCl-p,'opl'lled ,ail'
<'l'aft build by OIl<' of thl' lTnitl'd "'ation.,
lll'ov()d a the (il'llnull fly
ing; bom]" Orig-inally l'lIJpln:,t'd a sfjuadl'!Hl
(If the IL\ F Fig-ht,,,, COllJmand tIll'
Pl'oj('l'lilcs in thl' Hllll1n,'1' of 1!I,\.1.
the fll111Hl to pn:-:-sp... ...; :-:pl,\'d :--tl
p,'rior to that of the Lomh.
The l\IetctJl' a twin-(lngiul'd Il1nll0phllll\
of very clean c!l'sign, It was first flown ex
Iwrimentally in ;'.[areh 19..1:), sinee which datc
jlrodttetioll typl's havl' Lt'cn l'on.idl'l'ahly im
The lig-ht, easily-scrvil'l'd l'ng;ine of the
:lIcteol'-callell the "Squirt" by its
sucks in hundreds of pounds of ai" which b
compressed, Iwated with hUl'n,'d kCl'Osene,
and ejected throug-h tlw tU1'hine. TI]('n('l' it
escapes throug-h a 1'l'al' noz;d". The t Ul'
bine emits no f1alllC', and only rarely does a
smoke trail follow the plant'. The of
a jet plane on the groun,1 leaves in wak,'
a smell similar to that given off hy a hot
1,erosene stove or a stOl'1lI lanh'1'n.
Pilots praise the :\[eteol'8 llIal1l'llverahility,
its facile handling, and thc simplicity of its
contl'ols. Its landing speed is not exccssive,
and the vibration attributp(} to 1ll0,t aircraft
appears to he absent.
Pilots the "Squirt" when warming- up
or taxiing makes a noise like an 'Oversized
vacuum cleaner, but at full throttle the plane
sounds about as does a normal aircraft. Am
ple armor gives the pilot a sense of security
from hostile fire,
The MeteD!" i, I'l'odtteed by til<' (ilostp,' Air
(','aft Co,npuny,
(lhiti,h .\ir l'el,'a,,"
/:,'ifh.. h TaNk.') leif" fJ.>-1IIHl [loll'itzel':
R,'plal?ing- the thr('c-in"h howitzer which
1;,,,\ previllll>ly heen llsC'd U1H\ was hecoming
,.h>olesl'Plll, the howilzer shown in th,:
illu>-l1'ation ha' j,l'l'll mOllnted on British
tanh, Till' !J5-11l111 tlrc,; a sllPll of high capac
ity filll,d with eithl'!' hig'h explosive or smoke,
and I>' capahl" of "Iobhing" it over buildings
ant! hill> \\ hich obSCUl'e the target from the
dirf'tl vi"w of the tank gunner.
(Th,' SI'''CI'(', Great Britain)
U. S. So R.
[Joll/b",' RcVill/clli:
UnrIer the command of Lieut('nant Colonel
Evdokia Bershanskaya, a light bomber regi
ment composed of women volunteer fliers
fought its way from the Caucasus thl'Ough
the Crinwa, Byelorussia, and Poland illtO
G('rmanr, Thit,teen of it,: mt'lllhel's \\,pre
awarded the titk' of Hero of the Sovi,'! l'nion,
and 200 j"'eeivl't! val'ious <ll't'ol'al ions,
ColOlwl Bel'>,hunskayu \\'l'tll's the' Ol'<lel' of
thy }{p,l Bannt'1' and till' Onl<:l' of SUVOl'u\',
(/lllfll'lIlIIfillll !loll"fill, \\'a,hillgt,lll
Ell]ha,.:,y of tll,' T;SSH)
One type of Soviet foothridge is illustl'atl,d
in the 'sketch above, This s(')lli-tlnating; sus
pension bridge consists of a "edl'S of small
boards fastened to two rO]1"s of sumcient
length to span a small riVl'r. Two piles are
driven into each bank and thc ropes arc tied
to these, When crossed by soldiers, portions
, of tilt' hri'lgc have a tendency to submerge
"lightly, although the water should have
SOlll" ('IIvct in tig'htening' the rope cables, Dill'
gl'C'at at!Vl\ntagl' of this foot
hrid."" i, that it b nol to transport.
It Is lwliev"d that bridgl' has been car
l i"d in sl'ctions on the backs of infantrYlllen,
(FI'OIll all article by :\[ajor Robe]'t B,
lUg-go iJl The .1JiiitUTY Enville,,/')
illriirU/ ,11/,[1, ry:
The intr(lduction "f lIlt'diulll hatterie:;
marl,s I h.. la!l"l c1evl'lo!>llll'nt in the growth
of th,' Indiall AI,till .. ry, \\'iuch since the war
h,," expand,," fr011l a fl'W Illountain reginll'nts
til a )a n.!'(' and puwl'l'ful force pnlbl'aeing' aI
Illo,t all typ.." of :II,tillel';",
Th" IiI"! of thp n('\\' Indian ]]]",jiuJll gUll
Yll" .... Ill:tillly and arlO no\\"
t milling hard ,,'Illl'wiwl'l' in India am] bein"
iJllti,llc'd illto till' "'I'vicL' of the :i.ii-inch gun,
The I ",,'illll'llt PI' Indian A] tillL'I'Y ('anw into
a r,,\\' llefol'l' tlw present war, hut
at til" of the Wllr tilt' Indian Artiller;"
('on,hl. d of one ll'ulian field aJ'tilll'l y
J'v"ill],'nl, The leal streng-th of the Indian
gUllll"I" lay in tile' ]'('nowned mountain art il
kr;', whi,'h at that timc formcd part of tIll'
Ic"yal Itl'gin]l'nt of Artillel'y an,l was only
lat,'r tran,f"!Tl'd to thl' lll'\\' regiment of
Illdian ,\ l'tilll'1';"
Th" Indian Artilll'IY ]lOW ha>' it, own moun
tain, ]]]edium, lig'ht and untiaiJ
l raft. antitank. 11lol'tal', :-:Ul'vey, coast, and
,,,:1I'C'hlig'ht hattcl'il's,
Todny, all pel'!'onnel of the Indian Artillery,
('xC'P]>t fo]' a pl'opol'tion of British "meers and
XCO im,tJ'u('\ol's, arl' I1dianl', Larg'e artillery
training have b('en and
t!lo(l-und" of lirst-class gunnL'rs have he('n
turned out from these centprs at Ambala,
)[uttm, and :'Ilehgaon,
(file/ian IlIfol'l1Wtioll)
Oil JUI' Chil1l1;
Aftel' two ycal'S of secl'('cy, American Army
headquarters in Delhi, India, announced
that the main portion of a fuel pipe line which
ultimately wi1l l'('ach from Calcutta to China
Burma has been completed. Already
th(> pipe line, the longest military o]lerational
line in tIll' worl<l, use,] to fiJI the gigantic
tunl<s of Superfortre>-ses in India, anfl one of
ib mujor is to fec,l gasoline into the
plant" felTying flll'l to the Fourt"enth Ail'
Force in China.
(A /'Ill!! O"r!//(I/I<'<'j
After til{' captun of ill(' tiyillg-bomh
during' tIl(' latter half of last Yl'ur, the hom
lHll'<itnenL of England was taken OVPI' by the
W(>hrmacht throu)dl the llll'diulll of the V-<!
1'II"k"t with "llasll1o<lit" Iwlp from the
Luftwaffe whit'h launched a fl'w V-I's from
Ildnkel He 111 aircraft. Much Sllt'culation
has h"(,11 advanced on thC' nwthod of carrying'
theH! bOlllhs, but it is nnw fairly certain that
each He III can'i",1 a V-I und,'r th, port aI'
i. starhnal'!l wing'. ",rth an "quivall'nt halance
! "pighL und"l' the opposite wing, I'l'l'sumably,
, tIll' Y-l is l:1un"lwd at tIl!' sanw time aR the
is dropp('(I.
(;1'; })lUll Spl,t'dhoaf'{:
In along' the of Europe where
enemy v .. on accollnt of (hpj l' proximity
(0' tilt' tou],1 not he comhatted with
Inava.l and :-.uhnutrinl':--. operations 'vcl'c
carried on with I'xplo,iv(' speedhoats like
in the llictur{', In appearance.
these small, light wooden boats differed but
little fl'cl11 a well-huilt racing boat. They pos
grent speed. w{'l'e not (le]lenclent on
harhor installations, alnd ('ould he rolled into
th.. water on any coast.
Around tht' upper edge of theil' bow they
ha(1 a spring-supported framework electrical
ly connected with the detonating .charge.
When th(' boat was ready for the attack and
Uw detonating (IPvicl' was Rt't, a hump against
the framework sufficed to set off the explosive
charge, which weighed several hundred
pounds and filled about a quarter of the boat.
The force of the explosion was more than
('v en the heaviest ship's armor eould with-'

The e"plosive boats, whose main forte was
their speed and low visibility at night, were
always operated in packs in order to render
it difficult for the enemy defense to achieve
concentration of fire and to make it difficult
for target to escape them.
They were accompanied by a command boat
with an officer or technical sergeant who was
in tactical charge of them, and who designated
the targets and gave the orders to attack.
When the boat was headed for the target, the
pilot set fhe detonating device, locked the
"teel'ing gear in position, and let the boat
drive at top speed toward the target, while
he himself leaped backward into the water to
be fished Qut by the CQmmand ooat which was
following'. II ndl'r his leathel' coveralls he
wore a gm'nH;'nt which l<eneratc<\ warmth in
water. and he was also prO\'ide<i with a night
lantern. a one-man ]lIl('unHltic raft, a life
jack"t. and emel'g'l'ney rationf'.
(Digested from Si[Jllal,
Berlin. No. :.!. 1945)
f;11I1''''''( jo/' Li[Jht
Field Hon'ifzcl's:
Expcrit'nce has shown that when a gun is
partly dug' in to about the height of the
barrl'l. tl1l' enrth uSl'd a protective wall
dOl'S not Offt'l' allY effpdivl' protl,etion against
heing' rolled over hy enl'llly tanks. Such protec
tion is afforded. however. when the gun em
placpmpnt is built in the lllanlll'r shown in the
sketches. The g'un remains on the natural
l.ARTIi H!.AP[I) uP
surface of the' ground while around it an anti
tank ditch is dug, and the excavated earth is
used for protection against shell fragments.
The:entrance for the gun must be a's narrow
as p'ossible, In case of a threatened tank at
tack, this entrance is to be blocked by means
of mines.
(A),tille)'isti,sche Ruudschall)
O)lcrational Technique of thr
Jlc 16S Komet:
The Messerschmitt Me 163b Komet employs
a unique operational technique. It is intended
primarily to oppose large formations of day
light hombers, although it has likewise been
l'ncoLmtered night-flying Lancasters and
A liquid-rocket unit with a duration of
ahout seven to ten minutes. believed to burn
liqui<\ oxygen. hydrogen peroxide, and calcium
pel'lnanganate. propels the Me 163b at a
maximum "peed in excess of (i00 miles per
hour. Such an exceptional velocity is only
employed in dire necesRity.
As homlwr fonnatiom; approach the Komet
the little oddities take off. jettison their
undercarts, and proceed to climb at rates
of ahout 10.000 fect a minute. Once above the
humbers, pOWl'r is stopped and gliding com
mences. When in a favorable position, each
employs power to attack the bombers.
AccUl'acy of aim and destructive shooting are
almost impossible at such high speeds, with
the l'('sult that the new technique has to a
large extent failed. Any considerable multi
plication of the numbers of attackers might,
however, prove serious.
Tactical conditions inevitably influence the
form of interception described above, and on
occasions the Komets prefer to attack at the
top of their climb. using power throughout.
The danger in this method lies in the likeli
hood of exhausting all fuel while still in the
vicinity of a lively fighter escort. Allied pilots
usually attempt interception as soon as the
Me 163 's are observed so that they are kept
on the run. As their brief duration aloft nears
its end, the German pilots usually attempt a
rapid withdrawal, and thus fail to hamper
seriously the hombing attacks.
Only men of unusual physical stamina are
capable of flying Komets. To accustom them
to such an unusual mount, a special training engined fighters before the rocket unit is
version, known as the Me 163a, is used. Often
it is towed into the ail' by Me 110 twin- (Til,: Acrol!lnni', Great Britain),
..TONy ..
"Tony" was the first Japanese airplane to
have an inverted-Vee liquid-cooled engine
and built-in armor plate. It is an Army
single.seat fighter type 3 by Kawasaki. Be
cause of its DB-type engine and its resem
blance to the Me 109, it was probably respon
sible for .the report that German airplanes
were operating with the Japanese. In fact,
there has been no authentic incident of any
German airplane operating with the Japanese
in spite of the fact that code names were at
one timc given to the mnill Gcrman opera
tional types in anticipation of their being
met with in this theater.
"Tony!' has two 7.7-111m 01' 12.7-mm guns
firing fr0111 the engine cowling, and two
12.7-111111 011 20-mm cannon in the wings.
i\Iaximum sreed; 350 miles pel' hour (309
knots) at 17,000 feet. Span; feet
four inches. Length ; thirty-eight feet nine
(Ail'craft Recognition, Great Britain)
,tnn Splint from A1nllmnitiolt Coniainel's;
The l05-mm shell container is well suited
for improvising splints for the temporary
splinting of fractures of the arm and fore
arm. The materials are available in any
forward area; adaptation of the shell case
is simple; the container is rigid enough to
protect the injured member during evacua
tion; the splint is light in weight; the arm
does not need to be c"radled in a muslin
bandage as with the ring splint; the length
is readily adjustable; and being expendable.
it is one less item on property exchange. The
metal and plywood retaining rings in the
center of the case can be loosened by a sharp
blow, freeing either or both lining cylinders
from the outer shell of the tube, and the
rings can be removed. Either lining cylinder
can be fixed at any desired position in the
outer cylinder by a single turn of adhesive.
To apply this splint is no more tedious than
to apply the arill splint.
(Bulletin of tlte l'.S. A.rIllY
lIledieal Department)
Waterpl'oof JIn/e/"'N:
Water-rcsistant matchps. which not only
light in damp weather but which can be im
mersed in water for as long as six hours and
still light, have been procured by the Quar
termaster COlPS.
The match resembles the stan<lard kitchen
match, but its tip and part of the wooden
stem have been dipped in a waterproof lac
quer. The new matches are a boon to soldiers
in water-soaked foxholes and humid jungles.
(Army and Na!'y Register)
Protection against Flashbul'ill(:
Soldiers using bazookas and flame throw
ers, as well as tank an' protet'ted
against flashburns by a new cream issued to
them by the Quartt'rmaster The en'am.
which comes in a pocket-size container. <iOl'S
not possess any medical properties and will
not cure Its prime function is to pro
vili(' a "1irepl'oof" Pl'otcction for exposcd
parts of the body against hurn" fl'om sml
den flaslH's of flame.
Xew i55-mlll Holt'itze,,:
The tiew 155-mlll howitwr !\Il is Sll\ll'l'jor to
the World Wat' I tYlh' in illljlnl'tHnt rt'
spects, It still fires a 111'o.ic'dilt, \\'l'Ig'hing'
THF \1 Iltl\\'IT/EH t...; AT
approximately nilwty-five l'ollncb, but the
form of thc projectIle' has been improvl'c! bal
listically. This change in forlll, togeth,'!' with
other ballistic improve'ments, has innl'asc,1
the accuracy at all ranges. The maximum
range of the nt'W howitzer is approximately
nine and a half miles, or ahout one-third
greater than the earlier types. The corre
sponding German and J howitzers
are outranged by suhstantial margins.
The new howitzer has a split trail, permit
ting a forty-nine <Iegree traverse as compared
with the single trail on the Worl,l War I type
with only a six degree traverse.
The> elevation has heen increa,;ed from
forty-two to sixty-five (legrees to clear
obstacles and to secure the maximum ad
vantage from plunging fire on the relatively
soft overhead covering of dugouts, pillboxes,
.and bunkers, Stability has been improved by
use of a variable type of hydropneumatic re
coil mechanism which permits longer recoil
and 1ll0l'e gl'<ldual absorption of firing stres:'es
at tire lower angles of elevation.
The Ill>W I55-mlll howitzer was designed for
high-SlH',d tran"port !loth on highways and
across country. The gun, recoil mechani:;!11,
and clIl'l'illg'e arc locked together for traveling
as onp intf>gral unit and transported as a
selllitrai1c>d load behind a high-speed prime
j'II:-.ITW:-.' "'IJO\\ J:\"!; HIP. ,:.ll'LIT TIt \u.s.
mowl. .-\nothe1' novel feature of the fire
lontrol system is a dl'vil'e i'm' lighting the
"call's and reticle of thJ tell'scope for night
firing. The light source is a tiny bulb opera
ting from a small dry-etell battery,
(A n)l y On/lI(wed
Ncll' Il.'az'y Tank, JJ-.!fi:
The Tank, Heavy, :'II-:2G, the 4:l-ton Gel1L'ral
Pershing', b armed with a \JO-l1ll1l gun, two
.:lO-calihel' machine guns, and one .50-caliber
machine gun. The pO\\'l>r plant consists of a
500-hors('power. V -8, liquid-cooled gasoline
engine. which carries it at a highway speed
of miles per hour. Frontal armor
is four inches in thickness, the angle at which
it is placed resulting in an actual head-on
thickness of 6.9 inches.
(Army and Navy Journal)
Japanese Morale
Digl'stcd at the Command and General Staff School from Supplemcnt No, to
A,'m!! Tm;lIillU Menw/'allda 1944 (Great Britain),
TilE object of this article is hi show tIll'
nature of J apam',e morale and fie:hting spir
it, how they have been establishecl, and what
can be done about them, The Japanese
much less wcll efjuippe<i than we aI'e, and he
has no chan!?c whalc\'cl' the cOlllbined
resources of th<! Brili,h Empire and the
lrnited Statcs. \\'hat makes hllll a trouble
S01ne erienlY that, !lin')1 fht' ri.'lht cin'lIl11
.. Iallccs, he is a very toue:h and dptcrmined
fig'hter. The whole art of' fiu'hting" him lil'"
in knowing: how to avo\(l hi, ,..trenc,ths and
exploit his weaknesses,
In general, til(> .TapaneH' has th!' ,..lllll!'
basic inborn "imitinct,.." as th" British, the
Americans, and all other human beine:s,
Beyond a certain point. however, the effect
of our upbringing and cllucation upon i)ur
adult ideas is laq:;ely accidental. The West
ern ehild is taught c"rtain rigid rules of
conduct and thought - for example, that ll(>
must not steal; but a great <leal of scope is
left for the deyelopmenl of individual opin
ions and of life, The education of th('
Japanese, on the othel' hanel, isa dpliberate
attempt to produce certain exact and
the 1'reatp5t possible uniforlllity, Rie:id rules
of conduct are lair! (lawn ewn in the 1110st
detailed matters-for example. ho\\' to
sit and how to speak to va dous classes. of'
people: Above all, how and what to think, and
even what to feE'l, are !)lost pre
scribed and taugbt. The whole object is to
produce an adult who confor111s to the
prescribed pattern of Japanese life, and any
sign of "difference" from this patterll, or of
ll1ar1;ecl inclidlluality, is rig-idly suppressed,
This early training' i:< not only c:,tl'l'ied out
with the greatest thCll'ollg'hness but also with
thl' gTeatest of aim. j'rom the time
when he to b", a baby until he bel;omes
so old that the ntll'mal rules of conduct no
10ngPl' apply to him, the ,Japanese is always
being' taug-ht the same Herein lies
much of tIl(' ,t rength of the 8,v,..tell1, The rules
of "(11ltln"t within tbe fmnily circle or at
,,,houl are a reflection, in miniature. of the
rules of conduct within the State. The J ap
anese know, with far more pl'erision than
mORt \\'estern races, exactly what results
theil' e<lucatitln anrl upbringine: are seeking
to produce, and the whoTl' is unswerv
ingly directed to the same en(1.
The virtues most allmired and taught are
implicit obedience anll loyalty ttl superiors
in all circulllstances; devotion to duty, to
country, and to Emperor; and complete will
ing'ness on the part of the individual to lay
down his life not only willim!,'\y but joyfully
for these concepts. From childhood
the Japanese is taught that aR all individual
he is of no importance whatever. His impor
tance lie, in being a member of his family
unit, and through that family .unit, a drop
in the eternal stream of Japanese life. He
is taught that country was divinely cre
ated and w.jJJ endure for ever; that Em
peror is a direct of the gods;
and that the Japanese race and way of life
<Ire unique and incomparably superior to
any other. His death is of no importance,
since his spirit will continue to live among'
his anel his people, and, if he has
died worthily, to be revered by them.
\Vhen the \\'esternization of .Japan starte(1
and she beg-an to enter world markets, her
contacts with the Western worlel inevitably
brought with them newer and more liberal
ideas which cut aero,s the traoitional doc
trine of obc(lienee and submissiveness, and,
in doing so, threatened the position of the
militarists. The poorer class Japanese beC';lme
restless undel' their poverty and lack of lib
and thE'r!' wen' ]lNlsant riots and
It W<lS then that thl' militarist>; took the
Hng'f\l' antI and turned
it away from thelllsl'lves alHI towards othel'
nations. They tIng' up and refurbished all
the old traditions of Japan; they glorified
the old Japanese virtues; ano they
taug'ht the people of Japan that their t!'Oubles
were brought about by the Western nations,
who were denying Japan her natural rights.
There is a cleal' parallel between this
tendency alHI that of the Nazis. But one
vital point shoul(1 be J'cmcmbel'ed. To the
German, much of this <ioct-rine is, in many
ways, lIew and expcrimcntal. To the J apa
nese, most of it, in gene!'al principle if not
in all its detail,;, is a doctrine with centuries
of tradition an(1 behind it. Its main
principles are not a political theory
which has been foisted on him in recent
years, but an extension and intensification of
the beliefs of hundreds of years,
It will be spen, therefore, that in lIlany
respects, all Japanese education is "military
in so far as it and teaches
the military virtues, and, indeed, includes
training' at school in military subjects. At
'home and at school, privately and publicly,
by both lay and relig'ious authorities, the
Japanese has been taught by every means of
persuasion, suggestion, and propaganda to
follow a line of conduct that is essentially
"soldierly," and to value virtues that are of
great military importance. The pE'rsistence.
thoroughness, and care of tnis teaching have
g'iven him an unquestioning belief in
correctness, and have made the following' of
it almost second nature.
It is prim!lrilr these facts which make the
.J apanese a dangerous opponent. FI'OIJ1 thc
technical military point of "iew he if( often
quite inferioJ. Iff' is fal' le"s well equipped
than we are. though tough, he
is by no means a SUpenll:ln. He is, on the
whole, s)l1alier and less powerfully built than
the Westerner, and the stories of his ability
to live and fight on U a handful of rice a day,"
or to march enormous distances without
fatig-up, are nonsense. The .J apancse 'is lin
more immune to hungel' and fatigue than
anyone If he displays g'reat endUrance'.
it is not because of anr physlt'al peeuliaritr.
but because he has the will to cn(lure..Japa
nese military strength lies in the morale of
the Japanese service man; an(1 that morale ill
turn is founded on what he has b('en taug'ht
from childhood.
Fortunately. h,)\\'ev('r, tlw .J apaneiie
has two marked limitations and, SOUl'C(,S of
First. the .J apanese is a human being', and
however carduJlr he may be taught anti
indoctrinated, the results are hable to be
imperfect. If he really absorbe(1 and com
pletely accepted everything' that the 8)'stem
set out to teach him, his morale woulo be
unassailable. But in fact, m: with
most systems of indoctl'ination, there may be
a more or less considerahle difference be
tween what the Japanese is officiaJl,- sup
posed to think and (10, amI what he thinks
and does in practice,
Secondly, although what the Japanese i,
taught ten(Is to make him an excellent sol
dier in sOlJle ways, it is liable to be some
thing' of a handicap in others. The very fad
that he is taught to l'cspond unquestioningly
and almost automatically to many set,,, of
circulllstances tends to mean that when COll
fronted b
' the lmusual. to which he has bel'n
taught no automatic resp,)nse, he is liable to
be disconcerted. The suppression of his indi
viduality and initiative have left him with
little flexibility or capacity for rapid imprn.
In short, the weaknesses of the
system of indoctrination. are, .first, that the
system may sometimes denlallli more from
the man than flesh and blooc! can or will
bear; anc! serondly, that while it makes him
an excellent soldier in celtain more or less
'.formal" circumstances, it does so at the
expense of making him rather a ba,1 and
inflexible soldier in others less formal. What
follows is an attempt to show how these
weaknesses may appeal', am! may be exploited
in practice.
One of the main failing'S of the Japanese
system is that it tends to ask too much from
the individual. both lind mentally,
(md to refluire him to aet as though the
//'f'J'e a Sl1pCl'll1an, instead of a ]1H?l'e
lIIan to be olle. There is a limit beyond
which his body ami mint! will not go, even
with the most thorough trainin)!. The in
ahility of his commlllHle,'s to recog'lIize this
limit is all exploitable ,,"('Ilk ness.
l\lany . times in the> present war the ,Japa
nese rommand has more from its tl'OOPS
than 111cn could g:iVt\ and exhaus
tion, ant! .1bease have then clone more to
I\('f..at tht> .Japanest than any mere force
of arms could hav(' dOlle; for example. in
1I0llandiu and otht'!" arE'lIS ill New Guine>a.
It is important to realize. however. that
thollgh the ,Japanese, like eVPI'yonE' else, may
h,' defeated by having' his supplies cut off, he
rannot. as 11 rule. be defeated by a mere
1111'('(11 of being ellt off. The intention must
be the completely realbtic olle of starving
him and exhausting his ammunition supplies.
ancl not merely putting him in a position
which, in theory, is untenable. \\,ith the
J\lpaneSe, lines of communications tend to
be an Achilles: hE'el; he is often somewhat
careless ahout!' them, and liable to try to
operate on a sketchy supply system. as
though trying' to make morale and fi.e:hting
spirit a substitute for food and ammunition.
Like> everyonp else, he b depre;;set!
fhlding' himself always lighting' 'It a <lisa<J
vantage as touchinl!" the amount ant! quality
of his equipment. Beneath his superficial
of superiority over the 'Vest
erner there lies, in fact, a deep sense of in
feriority and uncertainty. His leaders have
worked very hard to overcome this feeling, 1
and to impress on him that to fight at such'
a disadvantage should be a source of pride.
The Japanese, it is implied, is not dependent '
upon mere machines and material resources; l
he has the far more important asset of su
perior spirit. This is one of the directions
in which propaganda has been asked to ,do
too much. The Japanese may repeat these
sayings, and even write them obediently in
his diary. But they do not save him from
being depressed when he finds material re
sources overwhelming him. The effect is
cumulative. He will probably fight weIl for a
time-perhaps a long time-against greatly
superior equipment. But gradually the fact
that all the soldierly spirit in the world
won't bring down an enemy aircraft with
out the help of an antiail'craft l,('un or a
fighter becomes more and more apparent.
Like any other human being brought up
under a system in which there is little free
dom of speech and criticism. the Japanese
is a chl'onic )'umo),'ll1ongcI'. The wildest
rumors often spread among Japanese troops
-usually of a hopelessly over-optimistic
kind. It is questionable whether these rUIl1Ol'S,
are not often officially propagated to raise
morale. But whether are or not, the
Japanese is human enough to be disappointed
and angry when they turn out to be untrue;
and they undoubtedly do a good deal to
corrode his strongest weapon-his faith.
The Japanese, like everybody else, dislikes
rain; but that does not mean that he will
not carryon operations in rainy weather.
On the contrary, he is extJ>emely proud of
his willing'ness to do so, which he regards
as a particular sig'n -of high morale. and
there is evidence that it is a considerable
shock to his confidence to find that we, too,
are not purely fine-weather soldiers. This is
an example of the ways in which Japanese
confidence be diminished merely the
falsification of the picture that propaganda
has jll'esented to him.
Contrary to statements that have fre
fluently been made, the Japanese is /lot "at
home" in the jungle. The Japanese are not
a tropical people, and as a race they are no
better fitted for jungle fighting thun we are,
They were better jungle fig-htel's than we
were at the beginning of the Fal' Eastern
war because they had been betteI' trained
for the job.
Finally, the Japallese is a chronic sufferer
from that very common disease of military
nations, which g-rows from ovel:
confidence, The insiHtence of JapaneHe tea('h
ing on the sup<'l'iority of the J(lpanese soldier
is SUIll'rimIHls('d on a sense of inferiority Hl1<i
a rather chil,]ish dl'Hil'e to :lchil've the spec
tacular, As a result, the from a
military point of view, is rntht'I' apt to
sight of what is HlIII what is not a praetieal
proposition, allil to placl' altog-t'llll'r too Illueh
faith ill what l'an he' aehi,'vl'tl hy Illl'I',' will
<ingnes,; to hard,
: Thus, the Japanl"" tends tn "vl'lratt'
ahilitil's, hoth ahsolutC'ly and r<'lat iv,' to hb
enemy, and hC'n,'(' to OVl'l'l','ac!l hillls"If. TI1l'
OJ,',linary diIlil'ultil'H, ,lang{'rs, and disl'olll
torts of a e,ulll',lign are ('l\1phatkall,< lI"t
enough to have a sig-nificant l'Il'"t't lIl1 .J ap
anesc moral<', It is only when a ",lllllp s<'I'i,";
of evpnts happPll to fill,;if:; all 11<' h'b hpc'n
taught al,out 01' tIl(' <,II ('Ill,' that Ill'
may hegin to Io:'e his faith,
Statel1lents that tlll' .Ja\l:llll'oc' "call't ,tallt!
lllortars," or \\"hen Shl1llpd." lll' "won't
face the bayonN," 01' is unu,ually alfl'ctc,d by
some particular weapOlI, should he al'l'eptet!
only with the g'l'eatC',;t l'PS,'l v,,, It eHllllot be'
stated too strongly that thel'<' i, no (,OllVinl'
ing evinC'nc(' of n genC'I'al, UI1lI'llal. and ,ig
nificant fear of any particular \\'C'Hplln that
is peculiar to the ,J The' point is
rather that hi" "likeH and dbllkps" al1lonp>t
U'capons appear to be fairly nOl'mal. and
only what onp would pxpect f1'ol1l any troop,;
of high morale,
On the other hand, his reaction, to certain
circumstances are definitl'ly not "l1lll'mal"
our standards, and most rC'ported
of unduc spnsitivl'ness to the UR" of cl'ltain
weapons prove, on eX(l1l1ination, to he rl'
actions to the ei rcumstances of the attack.
<Thus, when we hear that tIl!' JalHlllese is
liable to panic if mortar fire is brought-down
on him suddenly, the operative part is not
the fact that it was mortar fir(', He ,viii put
up with that well ('nough in other circum
btance,;, The important point is that it wa,;
suddclI, The canlinal fact that emerges is
that the if he is physically capabl,'
of doing- so, will u,ually tight with the great
est stubblll'nness and tenacity in any "s, t
j,icce" f"rlll({1 b(lttl,', ill whit'h his job, how,
",',',' ri'tjiCII/t, is ('/rlll'-(,lIt (lild obl'ioHs, It will
usually apply howevel' much he may be out
llumlll'l'l'd, amI hOWl'Vl'1' hopelC'ss his tactical
l'o,itioll, But, ii
"{'flllf/hf Ojl 011(' Icy," or i1l lIUlI }}(Mifion thot
{all...;; lur !ul.'dy dt'ci:{iou. itil}>i'OI'iRatiol1, OJ'
,I'({IIV" lit 1,Iall, he will oft,'n pl'rfol'1l1 quite
hadly, Thus, a < ]llatoon of Jap
in a dug-in po,ition will often tig-ht
to the ,l,'ath again>'t ovc'l'wl1l'lming odds, l'vC'n
if ('ompl('tel,< cut 011'. Bllt the same platoon,
if alllbusl1l'd, lIIay panic 01' rC'act vel'y
stupidly and "",,,'Iy, This telll",ncy can be
tral'ed to eal'ly lrainint:, This rigidity is the
pl'i ..'t that hl' ha:-. ttl fol' l't'liunee upon
>l't oe cOlldud; and it I','prl'sents the
ehal ai'l"l'lstie fl'at of morale_
Th" ,Japan"",' tl'ail1l'd to all ,'xU','ml'ly high
:--('ll:->l' of duty, and <l:, lung' a:-; he \vhat he
i, l'alled upon tll dn, 11<' will do it. But wl1('11
th{ll't' j ..... tn :-:ppak. "llothing in the hook"
to coY"r tlw l'in'llmstam','s in whieh he' find,
hin"l'lf. he gl'lll'rally at a
It mllst nllt 1Il' th(,llght, how,'vl'I', that hl'
aUH' of l'haract('I'istie th" ,Japanes(' al
Iack:-. entC'}'I)}'i:-;(', cunning. and initia
tiVl', \\,11I'n individual I'nt"l'l'rbl' b
al'pl'opriatl'-for example, in an infiltrating
<Jtitlll--he lila>" 1I1llch of it, It ill
Hllf',"!I' etf'rt ('/1 (HI hi'H
,,!! t/'" "//I'/II!! that his weakneHs appears,
III l'onn,'c( ion with the us,' of surprise an,1
the unexpC'l'tl'(1. a wo1'l1 i,; about
thl' tlS(' of hluff alld <I<>c']Jtion. He is not a
very gOlld subject for a straightforward hluff,
If<, is far 1I101'e lik'ly to make mistakl'8
through ip;nol'ing' a real danger than throulrh
hluffed hy an (,lllpty threat. The poillt
is well illustrate(l by his reaction (oJ' ab
s(,lIce of rl'Hction) to the operations of ait'
transported troops aCI'os,; his lines of com.
munications during his advance on Imphal.
His mistake was not undue nervousness, but
overconfidence and refuRal tq alter plan
when there was a genuine \"l'ason for doing
This in a plan that
has g'one wrong is chal'acterh,tic not only of
his ,.;tratl'g'y hut of minor tactic", It
he htll'llc' in mind, howevel', if ;1<1
\ antag'C" to lw tal(()J1 of tht""' tl ClIH-lI11)Sl)
to att<.'lllpt tIll' impMsihle, that hath
tIll' Japalll'Sl' l'ommHlIlI and thl' individual
>ohlie!' will lllak" e"ll'ao!'dinm'y to
Hl"hil'vl.' an ohjl'd.
It bl' l'l'IllCllll'l'l'lll that the
i" not willing' to "die for the Emlll'rol'"
llut a' g'l'l'nt vnlue on dying' with
tacular, glory and self-sacrifice in some sui
cidal"'David and Goliath" exploit. Although
this S('Ml' of glory may cause him heavy
Inssl's, it' Illay abo cause considerable trou
bll' to his opponent.
In genel'al, the concept of war is
a COlllpul'Htively simple and l)l'imitive one.
His strength lies in his belief that war is
simply the working out of a divine pattern,
with a ,Japanese victory as its inevitable con
clusion. He panic when surprised and
di,t'olll'erted, but otherwise it is only when he
b"gilh to see a flaw in the pattern which is
r:ot onl>' local but unmistakably general that
his iig'hting spirit is likely to be ;;.eriously
Military Doctrine of the Red Army
Tratblaled and dige,ted a't the Comlllan,l an,l General Staff School from a
article,hy Brigaflier General N. E. Chibisov in
KmRllllia X,'czda (Red Star) 12 November lD44.
0;0.;,1:: ehal'aetl'ri,ti" of SlIvi<.'t milital'y sei C
l'nce consist, in thl' r:let that it maintains a
dose' contact with practic,' :1n,l emhodies the
}ll'og'l'c"ivc of ideas. Any innovation de
veloped during' thl' course of operations
"tudied, in aetion, alltl l1ultle
the C01mnon }ll'l)}lerty of Olll' al'llwd force,.
search for the suitahll' forms
of comhat an,1 fol' the ht'st of utiliz
ing our technical n1<'ans, an,l inculcation of
ncw tactical nH'thods-the",' al'e activities
that ar(' characteristic of OUI' officers.
The effectiveness of our tactics is deter
mined by many factors, esp<.'cially by th,'
fact that they are bused on a cureful study
of "the weak and strong points of the enemy.
Suvorov's legacy, "Know your enemy thor
oughly; be acquainted with weapons and
the ways in which hI' makes use of tht'm;
know his strong and his weak points," has
acquired a still greatt'l' significance in om'
times. With the mobile warfare that pre
vails ,today,: it is difficult to gain a victory
without t1\<'1\ ability to foresee the course of
events. As lis also well known, foresight is
not guesswork or reliance on a lucky break,
It requires a careful consideration of all the
l LI1H'nt.< of a situatiol1, aud particularly the
of complete information of the
There have heen den'loped, in the course
of the present conflict, important principles
governing the organization and conduct of
reconnaissance, which essentially may be
summed up as follows: always operate in
an active manner; bear in mind that only
hy means of action is it possible to COI11
}wl th" <.'l1elllY to reveal his strC'ngth; conduct
unillt<.'rrupted reconnaissance day and night
,.ver a wide extent of the front, concentrating
the greatest effort in the direction of the
main attack.
In th<.' application of these principles it has
heen necessury to conform to the basic re
quirements of our tactics. namely, of in
flicting simultaneous blows over the entire
depth of the enemy's defense. For this rea
son, our first task has been the search for
new methods of obtaining information about
the enemy when his combat dispositions are'
deeply echeloned. On the other hand, it has
hecoine more clearly evident than ever that
reconnaissance missions in present-day oper
ations cannot be taken care of by the reeol1
naissance elements set forth in our tables of
organization, Our motto, "Not a step withollt
reconnaisI<anee," IHIR come to requil'e a more
careful organization of reconnais
sance operations, more skill in effecting pene
trations into the enemy's rear areas, proper
employment of radio and of grotmd :Uld air
photography, well-organiz"d ohservation, re
connaissance in force, etc,
The results of this revamping of ollr sys
tpm havl> not be('n slow in manif('sting them
The numbel' of prison(>r8 taken by
our reconnaissance elen1l'nts has incl'eased
[.nd, as a result, Imowlerlge of the {'nemy has
become more compll'l" at regimental and
divisional headquarters, This is what the
command,'r of the Ge\'IlUlll Infantry Di
vision had to say ahout our scouts in one of
his ordprs: "The Russian possessf'X the ('yes
of the the stealth of the mart,'n, the
sense of sl1wl1 of the wolf, tIlt' ears or the
fox, lIe doeB not nttllc!, as Wt' '\0, breaking'
his way thl'<>ugh obstacl,'s by the ('mplo,'
Illcnt of 'blitz' metho(is, hut advant'c8 unseen,
trawling' huntlrt'tls of nwt,,!,s on the ground
alI<I waiting for hours for his opportunity
to stril.;:e,"
The basis of our military uoctrine is that
victory ('an onlj' be ohtained by the resolute
attack culminating in the encirclement anu
destruclion of' th" ('neillY's manpower and
materiel. This doctrine has bepn successfully
embodied in the opl'rations of the present
war, "Only by hlows of constantly increasing
intensity can the elH>my's resistance be
hroken and final victory be achieved"
(Stalin) ,
In military science, especially in matters
pertaining to pursuit operations, there are
certain fundamental principles that remain
constant throughout the course of the cen
turies, Even Epaminon(las at Leuctra ap
plieu a tactical principle-the unequal
distribution of forces over a front with a
view to' concentrating' them for the main at
tack in the decisive direction, Hannibal, hy
meallS of a skilful grouping of his forces,
was able even with weak forces to encircle
the enemy at Cannae, Brilliant examples of
the regrouping of forces were shown by our
great military genius, Suvorov, But, as is
well known, never in the history of wal'
there been hattles in which stich enormous
fm'ces participated as in the pre,ent wm..
In addition to this, attack operalions develop
over vast l'XIHIl1Sl'S of front Hnd continue
without a hreH), throughout the course "f
many months, Under such conditions, only
he can win who knows how to huild up the
.'trpllgth of his blows, how to mall('uver hi,
I'l'serves skilfully, allli how to make COITt,,'t
usc of his technical equipl11C'nt. Be strong,,!,
thall the enemy wherc the blow b stl'llek and
at the moment when it is stl'uck-this is a
fundamental principle both in the planning'
of Itll'ge operatinns and in the ol'ganization
of tho,<, of a taetieal mag-nitud(',
This effo!'t alway,; to he' st!'onger than the
ellClllY at the 1110n\Cnt when the blo\\' is stnll'k
is usually clearly evitknt in our hreak
throug'hs of Gl'rlllan d"f,'nses, In sL'vl'!'al in,
stances, the (Iensity of eOll(','ntl'atiun of our
forc(', and ('quipment l'l'aehed the' following
figu!'es: in the hl'l'al;lhroug'h ,p,'I,)]', th"l"
Wl're ('onc,>nlrat,'d O\'l'!' ::110 artilll'I'Y piec,',
Hlld lllorturs un<l a:-i BlrtUJ-' :--ixty talll...R aut!
,,'Jf-lll'OIll'lled g'lIns ove!' Olll' kilometl'r of
front. TIll' fOl'l1I"]' n01'l11 of a thrcefold SUII,'!'
iority of t he forces of the attack"I' ov,'r tho,,'
of th,> defend,']' was fa]' surpassed, Sullicl' it
to recall that'in the first \vorl,j \Val' thl'n'
were never mOl'" than lGI) gUllS ]l"l' kilollwtl'l'
of front.
III spite of this, there is one importanl
I,oint that should be (al,,'n into account. This
overwhelming sUIlL'riority ill a breakthrough
sector is attained under the conditions of a
general parity of forces 01', at times, eV"!1
I)f numerical inferiority over th" front as a
whole, for it is a holt! conccllti'ation of forces
in the decisive direction that ])('rmits OU!'
commanders to deliver irresistible hlows on
the enemy and shattl'r his mo,t fOl'l11idable
The Gel'll1anS, attempting' to stabilize thL'i1'
defense positions, have hl'CIl obliget!, during
the course of the \Val', to make substantial
changes in their tactics; The fact is that
their defense system, having been based in
the main 011 centers of resistance [localities],

wag not ahl, to hold out againRt our
which had develoj)(>Il great' skill in maneu
ver, Our infnntry hohl1;: penl.trated between
tlwir fannell out to the flanks
of the enl'my and into his l'ear, and attackell
hi" at their vulnenlble pointH,
During the (il'rllUIIlS began to
give their jlreferencl' to det'cllRCg bURed on
of tn'nches, Let us note that, firgt,
thl' Gl'l'mans had attelllpt"d to huil<! up a
continuous front in 01'11,'1' to rl'duce the op
portunities for ollr wl'dging' into tht'i1' de
f,'nse dispositions, S(('llI111. thl'y tlgtll'ed that
ollr forces would he cOlllpplled to\
thpir firl's OVPI' hroad an,l deeply echelonC'd
targets, whil'h would l'l'duce their intensity.
,\,; OUl' forces approaclll'd (;('rnu\I\ soil. the
stl'l'ng'th of the (;crlllan positions gradually
illl'l'eas('(L In the vicinity of the Rast Prus
.ian frontiel' alII I in Poland, thl'Y hurriedlY
cn'atl'd fortit1ed ZOIll'S eon,tl'tlctpd in ac
cordancl' 'wit h the specifications for p(,l'ma
nt'nt f!' rt i fica t
The hreakthrough of del'ply l'chelonl'd
liPI'nuin hased on n of
tn'lwl1l's and pl'l'manent fOl'tifications reo
quit,,'d tl1l' dl'vdopment of new battle forma
tions and new in the utilization of
our materil,L The important principle hen'
is to disrupt the front of the de
f('nse and et'l'ate opcn Hanks in his disposi
tions. This pl'l'mils the attacker to employ
,ueh forms of maneuver ag ('nvelopment.
turning mnv('n1l'nt. disruption of the enemy's
communications, and l'ncirclcment.
The 'UCl'l'% of a br,'akthroug-h is assured
coopenlti()n nn th(' part of all partit-ipat
it1g' arms. In this l'(,SPl'ct, Soviet .tactics also
emhody a larg'l' numhel' of new methods, Up
to the time of the prpscnt war, the theory
that it sufficed, fot' assuring' the suc
of the attack, mel'l'ly to disrupt the
of fire, Practical experience,
howevl'r, has reveale!1 the fallacy of this
theory. l\lodl'rn dcfense possesses great te
nal'ity, arid the ahility of our forces to hreak
through it is due mainly to the fact that our
artillery and aviation oeJivel' a simultaneous
blow on the enemy's fortifications, neutraliz
ing or c6mpletely destroying all the
,'mplat'ements in the tactical .one of ,his de
At the time of the artiJIej'y preparation,
all the attention of the vario s commanders
b centel'ed on the task of av iding the dan
gel0Ul' gap lll'tween the end f the artillery
preparation and the heginnifg of the in-,
assault. Toward the nd of the ar
tillery [ll'eparat;on the intlns,'ty of the fire
ipn,ases, culminating' in an out hurst of fire
d utmost intensity. ,\t moment, the
tanks and the infantry approaching the
wall of the artillery fire (the tanks at a dis
tancC' of eighty to a hUn!lret'l meters; the
infantry at a distance of 150 0 200 meters),
.\ considerable number of piec, s using <Il'ect
fire" including' large-caliber 1artillery, rnd
also 120-mm mortar>', arc employ('d for, the
dpstruction of the various of
and concr('te and t>!lrth-and-tlmber weapon
emplacements. The fil'e of tneg'.' guns and
mortars, directed at the junction points of
trenches and communication passages, cre
ntC's ohstructions which hamper con
c('ale!l maneuver by the enemy
We may unqualifiedly state that in no
army have direct-fire pieces ever possessed
such broad application as with us. Suflice it
to say that in certain br('akthrough sectors
as many as ninety per kilometer of front have
been employed. The further perfection of
this mode of employing artillery' opens new
persp('ctives in the dev('lopment of clo$e
One of the most important missions con
fronting the fOl'ces fighting in the depth of
a moclC'rn defensivp position is the repulse
of counterattacks by the enemy. The experi
ences of many battl0s reveals that the Ger
man:.., in the efrort to r('estahligh thE'lr
defense, thrO\ into th" fight all the forces
and means available to them, including even
specialized units and personnel of the serv
ices. Their infantry countel'llttacks are sup
ported by Large numbers of tanks and by
powerful artillel'y and mortal" firt', and are
covered by their air force.
The main factor ,the success
of breakthrough operations is rapidity of
tempo in the attack. It is assur,ed, first of,.all,
by t11P r>lel1wnt of surprise in the blow aimed
at the of the entire
depth of the defense. Thb b followed by
unbroken alII I lllu"seci aCCollllHl11iIn('nt of the
infallt\'y by the fire vf the and
tanks. The ('ol1l111itnwnt of till' ':('eon,1 and
succl'eciing echelons, when the of the
fighting- fo\' t11l' lir,t p,,,ition has been as
cCl'taillcd (with tlw cllmpldl' liquidation of
the ,'n('my in tlw of thb
eliminntes paU,es and fal'ililates till' im
pl'tuo"ity of the I'o I'\\, a 1'.1 mOVt'llll'nl.
\V" shaul,] "all nttl'ntinn to Olle lIIOl'e point
that b clw\'actl'l'btic of the operations of
the val'iow; lmits of thl' Hl'd Army. It is well
krown that the tactics ,,1' 0\11' alta"king'
forces indude the lltiliwlion nf w,'ak spob
in the enl'IllY'" dl'f,'n""" following- by
hlows 011 hi, nank,: and !'l'ar. WIth !'l'g-"nl
to mode of action, it is ,'nlIllllolIly sai,l:
"If YOIl ('allllnt hl'l'ak npvlI tllv dO\lI"-l'rawl
throllgh a window," But .iu,:l a,: in a hOIl'l'
there lIlay be stuI'dy '" abo in hi>'
the ('IH'Ill\' mat con,lrlld fOl'luitlahl<>
an;1 (,I'l'at" the threat of
fl'OIll ditl'el'l'lll <II !'pet ions, In
addition to iu the "'\"" of naITo\\' \\,'dgc"
UHIl1l'UVel' imped,',j' and tIle employnl('ut
of Iwavy t''lUiplllent i" l'l'nd,,!'t'd ,Iitlicult, and
the )1101'(' :-;inl'C' thll "wt'ak" ..'t{ll':-; of th('
rlefense an' located, a rule, in hurdly nc
cessible Our (,Ollll11Hl1(Il'l have a high
estcem for manellV('r, but never do they
maneuver for lllaneUVpl'" ,aI"" If .I1cl'd bp,
a blow is delivl'l'ed not on a \\','uk point hut
on the strongcst point. For this purpose a
g'1'l'at quantity of mat6riel i,: conccntrat",l.
As und,'r thl' blows of a hanll1lPr the
of a hOUSl} are hroken do\vn, sn
also under tl1<' pO\\'l'rful action of mod"rll
technical equipment the. otur,ly ('('ntp!,,, of
Ger'man dl'fense arc destroyt'rl.
Since ancient times it has hp,'11 known
that complt'te destruction of the enemy fol
lowing a attack is achieved in
Inll'suit. One must not give the enpmy wht!
hao bt'l'n defl'ated in the phase of the
action an opportunity to ol'ganize his forct's
on nnothl'I' position. Heuvy use of mobik
rOl'c,''; pl'rmits til(' elll'IllY to intensi,fy his
,ITOI'!, in tho"e sectors in whieh a considcr
able thl'l'at has developed for him. If thl'
attacker the of even an insignifi
cant amount of time, he will tinci himself
fa(,l'd again with a fOl'lniLlah1l', though hur
I i"dly organized, defens(' line,
The Hc,l ArlllY ('urri"s out its pursuit opl'r
ations in ,'xtl"'IIwly rapi,1 t('mpo, utilizing'
mo,krll tl'chnicul c<juipment to thl' maximum
(,,,telll. Avoi,lillg' pl'Otraete,i actions with thl'
!'l'ar guards of the cnl'my. aliI' mobilc fOl'ces
for!!;e ahea,l to t Ill' of tht' elll'my's main
body of fO!'(,l's nnd penctrate through to his
!'l'ar Sovipt fOI'C(>, also cOlHluct parallel
pUl':-;uit. dtIIivl1l'ing: hlo\vs on 1'(:'
t I','at ill!!; en"lllY ,'"Iumn,:, I n the final cOllnt.
this u'unlly 1,'<\,1s to ('llcirekment of the
"Ill'llIY, A l'ln,:sie ''',ample of thi:; is to b,'
found ill the ojlpratiolls which oecurrerl dur
illg tIll' pu,t ,UlIlnll'r ill Whitl' Itussia. Hl'l'<'
0\11' fol'ccs antil'ipatl'L! thc, ('ncm;' at all the
.lef,'n,,' lin,,:; which 1)(' had "stahlishe!J far
in thl' rpar aI'pa" allli totall;' L!(>featl.'rI tlw
(,(,Ilt gl'OUI' of C1H'l11y fOl'CCS,
In th,' ,tacties of OUI' annie". there exi""
IHl st"I'l'otyped pattern. ,;ince all our officl'rs
HI'<' Tlwy skilfully conduct opera
t iOlls in aCl'ol'<lance with cstahlishe,l metho(h
01' cast them asirle when the:;e metho!ls
ltl'gin to ham!",!, forward llIov,'ment.
('on,tant gl'llcralization of modern (>)0;,
pl'ri,'ncc, and its resolute application-thi'
('om:titutc;; the seeurity for th(> fUI'ther rle,
v('lopment of thl' of tIll'
i{l'rl Army,
It is as unfair to lavish recognition as it i., to den) it til tho"e that deserve it.
-Gencral Jose de San :\Iartin, <juotL'd ill
RC!'isla .lJilital', Argentina
The' Air War in Southeast Asia
Digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article in
The Royal Ai)' Fo)'ce Qual'fel'ly (Great Britain) March 1945.
'rUE campaigns which on land have
witne'sscd the d,'f('al of an J apa
l1e'" allC'mpt to ill\1ade India and the return
of Allicd armies over the Burmese frontier
. te the gates of Mandalay (><ec sketch) have
not pa><sed without momentous ,]cvelopments
I in the ail' war. Indeed. the Pt'O)!,TeSS of the
! war in the nil' m'cr the Burma front has
: been intimately connected with the land
campaig,tl, one I'l'acting' upon the other a><
mutual cause amI en'ed. a pt'Ugt'ess l)f which
, 'omp explllnation will bl' offl't'l'd in the follow
[Illg pages, C<lnditinlb vary greatly from
i those usual in EUI'dpe. Airct aft in op('ra
r tional service al'e in typt.\ to tWllv0
" month, behind thost' of tIll' metropolitan air
furce, awl in numher vl'ry much Il'ss; thej'
\ npet'ate ft:ollt widely Sl'uttcl'cd that
I with great labor have bC('tl in a
countryside that hnt'dly frotll Amkatl
to As,;am in unfavol'aLle climate and
tenuous cOllltllutlil'ations by land and water
alike, For purely lo:.:-isti.c t ca><ons it might
be doubted whcther, e\'en if unlimited rein
forc"I11l'nt!' were tIl(' numhcrs of
aircraft actually operating- could be propol'
tiullally incl'en,ed; of thi" also something
will be sai,1 latcr.
conditions also have something new
to offer, Navkational aid" though 'increasing,
are still compal'lltiv('ly few; maps are often
skil11l'Y and unreliable, and landing grounds
are by no means so convcniently numerous
as at home, For the g-reatcr part of the year
there is indeed a sky which ovcr the
is rarely clouded; but most operational flying
takes Allied aircraft eastwards from their
bascl< in Bengal and Assam over the wild
jungle-clad hills that rise to eight and ten
thousand feet and separate India from
Burma. Cloud may be met here at all times
of the year, but during the four monsoon
months in particular these mountains are a
home of violent storpls and squalls that"
constitute a considerable flying hazard to
crews, and not the least achievement of 'the
present campaign is the aCfl1.iisition of ail'
bases on the Burmese plains ,beyond them.
What follows should in no way be judged
as a summary of events; it ,is merely, an
tlttempt to spied from the pattern of devel
opments thl' most significant strands in a
period marked by a notable degree of co
operation between the RAF and the U.S.
AAF, whose units have mingled under
I!!utual operational control to meet the chang
ing needs of the tactical situation. The co
ordinating authority for Allied air operations
on the Burma Iront rests with the Eastern
Air Command under Air Command, South
east Asia; the headquarters of each is an
integrated unit comprising both' British and
American personnel.
During the campaign of 1942-43, and for
a fl'W weeks at the close of the monsoon in
1943. Allied air superiority over the Burma
front' was contested on not very unequal
terms by the Japanese, whose Oscars proved
tough opponents for the Hurricane to tackle
and whose Dinahs outflew the latter to make
reconnaissance flights over OUr forward
areas with impunity. The final establishment
nf Allied air supremacy was mark\!d by two
milestones, The first in point of time was the
advent of Spitfires at the beginning of
November IH4:J. Within a fortnight they
had shot down three successive Dinahs, and
during the n<'xt four months not one J apanes<!
reconnaissance aircraft succeeded in cover
ing our forward bases, A series of air battles
subsequently developed in which the Japa
nese scored one success by a daring daylight
raid on Calcutta on 5 Decembet;, as a result
of which the timorous coolie pop)llation could
not fully be induced to resume work at the
docks for some weeks; but before the end of
January 1944' the Spitfires had accounted
for forty-four aircraft with another
thirteen probably destroyed and forty-nine
damaged, for the loss of seven. These figures
require no comment, ' : "
The second milestone was reached in the'
opening of Ifl.!.! whcn long,range
tightel'g of the 10th V.S. AAF and of the
Igt Ail' Cnllllll'IlHlo Gruup-Lightning'R tP-38)
and (P-51 )-Lcgan to operate in
forcc. TIl(> Spit tires ha[1 taught the cnemy
seyerely to riet the usc of
aircraft and he had praetieally as a
result to mab I"C by day of his bombers
oyl'J" our while tight,!"" ,el[lom at
tC'lllpted to llIake [IP"I' penNIations. The
wel'e no\\" able to f.;cek
hitn out on hi:-\ (Hnl and, owing to
the embryonie nuture of the .Japanese warn
in:.!'. :-.y:-;tl'lll. they Wt'rt' oftt.'l1 in a po:->ition to
attal'k hb air('l'aft b,fore they ("uul,1 become
airborllc. nuring a of over the
HUlin l')lt'111Y ail' hast'S in llol'thel'll BU1'1)141 in
:'.Tareh a11<1 A. pril [1 fl44J they destrnyeu or
<lP,t I'OY"<I w,,11 ovcr a hnndrc,1 air
craft l'HlH!,'ht on th.\ gToUllIl, ill to
anotlle,' sP\'pnty- ..;j" in aprial ('ombat. It is vcry
that t hI' thus
handled had bpcn brollc'ht lip spceialJy to
,..upp0l't thl' ground otf,n,..ive then being
aimed at (mphal and Dima]lur, It was in
any ea..:;p a hlow tt) the enenlY, who
dispo:"',,<1 of ahly I"", than thrce
hundre[! airt'nlft for operations in Burma at
this time, A lIIajol' l'"sult was that be was
forced to withdraw his fightcrs to the
Rangooll H1PU, :--,0 tIl(' ail'
operations [luring the sil'ge of Imphal were
'conducted f,'olll base, snnll' five 01' six hun
dred miles distant fmlll the front; his for
ward airtitl<ls-which ha<l h"l'n constructed
in abundullce-\\,PI'e uspd under covel' of
elahurate camouflage and dispersal arrange
ments merply us advance[1 refuelling- sta
tions and landing grounds,
Frequent and regular swel'ps continued
throughout the year ovcr the enemy forward
airfields with gcnerally a mal'ke<l absence
of em'my ai I'(,!'aft to I'PJ)OI't. I n October and
Novembcl' a fu rthel' stage in the enforce
l1lent of Allied ail' Sllprl'll1Uey was reached
whtn a of IUI'ge-scall' tightcr attacks,
in of which up to ninety long-range
fighters took part, was <lil'ecte[\ against the
main base airfields of the. enemy in the
Rangoon area; in the course of these oper
ations some three dozen enemy aircraft were
destroyed or probably destroyed in the air or
on the ground, for the loss of four. While
the Japanese still attempt sporadic raids,
g'enerally by small elements operating under
cover of cloud or darkness against the most
advanced Allied outposts, nevertheless the
Allied forces in the field fight with the
assurance that the enemy interference is
unlikely to be more than momentary and
From the air point of view, the Allied
air superiority has made it possible to deploy
and operate to maximum advantage the other
weapons in the Allied air armor-bomber,
transport, and direct-support aircraft. To
the achievements of these, some attention
will 1I0W be given.
Although such direct support as was pos
sible with the available aircraft had from
the beginning- been afforded to the ground
troops, it was not until the campaigning
;.eason of 1fl.JS-44 that the Allieu air forces
wpre in a position to afford that measure of
aid required by contemporary developments
in the art of war anu by the nature of
telTain across which the contending armies
faced each other. Operations in the field were
thenceforth invariably preceded by the at
tacks of fighter bombers. The squadrons
engaged in this work developed ac
curacy of aim, their targets being 'known
in the case uf the most Rkilled to have' been
set as close as thirty yards from Allied out
posts. and they secured evidence as to the
efficacy of their attacks from both sides
from the Japanese. by the
which they evacuated positions that had been
bombed and by the dread with which they
COl) {eRsed in thei r dia ries to be filled by these
assaults, and from our own forces by the
frequent signals of appreciation that they
subsequently received from forward units.
During the operations to clear the enemy
from Manipul', when their bases were close
behind the front line, their work was specially
effective. On one solemn occasion the com
mander of a Gurkha battalion formally
presented to a supporting fighter-bomber
squadron two trophies-as a token of gl:ati
FOREIGN DIGESTS .. 1 . 95 .."
Air transport operations developed el10 - port in the Arakan. The decisIon was taken
mously during 1944; they proyided the AI'i. d to effect the supply and ultitvate relief of
answer to the usual Japanese of 7th Indian Division ,\ir. De!;1pite ,Japanese
infiltration and envelopment amI enabled the efforts to intel'l'upt the procesf of delivel'Y,
Allies to exploit their" economic and technical which was decisively defeatedl by our Spit-
100 0 100 ZOO MI
1.1.' " .... " ..... ' ....... ' _--',_--..I'
100 0 100 lOOK", .
" I !
c H
superiority to overcome the m6bility and
endurance of the Japanese soldier. The fail
ure of the Japanese Arakan offensive in
February provided the first demonstration
crf the tactical value of transport aircraft.
A whole division was completely cut off br
the Japanese, who aimed at nothing less
than the capture of Chittagong, our major
fires, the division was enabled :to resist and.
then to counteratta(lk the enemy, who thereby
suffered his first major defeat on tand in this
History itself on a: much larger
scale during the following mo'nths, when a
complete army corps together substan
tial RAF elements was on the
, Imphal plain, From March to June this be
'leagured garl"ison was maintained by air
supply until it too was able to turn the
tables upon an ene,my who had rashly com
mitted his fOt'ce:; to an operation which his
supply lines, seriously \\'orsene(l by the
monsoon rains and halTica continuously and
effectively along thcir whole length hy the
Allied ail' forces, were inadequate to sustain.
Transport aircraft operating' throughout
the monl'oon braved the WOl'st pos:;ihlc
weather 0"(,1' the mountains to fulfil missions
whose urgency allowed no delay. Apart
from the possibility of meeting Japanese
fighters on their way-such encountel'S were,
however, rare-they aiR" had to face lirc
fl'om ground troops when, as was frequently
the case in the 111'st six of the year,
they were required to (lc,livt'r their freig'ht
in areas distant only a fc'w hundn'd Y:lnio;
from positions, In 1!)l-l a grand total
of neal'ly a quarter of a million tOI1,<
of supplit's was conveyt',l to lighting units h,'
crews who in some month" were workt'd to
exhaustion; in addition, over a hun,lred and
sixty men were moved from plat'c'
to place and more than sixty thousand eas
uaIties were evacuated to hospitals outside
the zone of battl .... Tht'se lig-ures lIn.!PI'!i" the
operation,; which wrl'sted vidOl',' fl',llll the
Japanese otl'en;;ives in Arakan and :\1anipul'
in the earlier patt of the yeal' an,1 which
made possible the Allied ad\'lll1ee upon 1\1yit
kyina and the later thrusts which carried
Allied forward troops to and beyond Bhamo,
Wuntho, and the lower Chindwin,
Long-range attacks upon the enemy supply
lines and kindred in BUl'llla and
Siam as elsewhere are cumulative in effect
and their results can only be ass1essed after
some passage of time, It has re<!ently come
to light that the Japanese "upply deficiencies
materially contributed to weaken resistance
to the- Allied advance into North Burma,
and, to take another instance, that some
Japanese reinforcements entering Burma
from Siam have been reduced to doing so
on foot or by cycle. Only oceasionally is it
possible to learn that, for example, some
six hundred Japanese casualties were caused
by a single heavy bomber raid upon Bang
kok, and only now and then do Allied air
craft have the opportunity of so spectacular
an exploit as the two-day attack on !l and
10 Septelllber uy Beaufig-hters upon supp!),'
t'<>llVOy8 moving; up the Tena8sel'im coast
As a' I'l'sult of this attack. Rome three th,;u
sand tOllS of shipping; were left beached and
blazing; and as much and mOl'e damag;ed.
Gl"'un(l-attack fighters operateJ over
communications in BUl'llla from Janu
<lIY l!l-I3 onwards, and by the beginning of
1 hall dl'veloped to a nne al't the abi],t,.
to dett't't their targets l)('hind the elaborate
eamolltlag'(' in whit'h the' t'nt'my was It'arning'
to them. Durin" the year, despite
the I't'[uctallee ()f the enemy to
move in the open, our tig'htt'rs madl' by day
anll ni,l!'ht n('al'ly -!,iiOO
upon river {'raft indudillg' over 110 :-;tl':'UlH'r..;
and pO\\".'l'pd aplll't:x:mutl}y ::5u
upon lO(Oll1otiVP!-'. anti not far :-;hort of a
Hplln lllutor tran:-;plll't. :\Iediulll Hllil
lig'hl homht'r>, abo t'ontrihlltt'd to the intl'l
didioll of thc' ,Japan('"t' lim's of thli!
Inalll tal'g'l't;o; heinl!' in nll, the
hundred \\'CI'C n1' (lalnug'ed
during IlIlt. It i, an illuminating COmml'll'
tm'y upon the enemy reactinll tn these at
(aeks that the year he built no ll'"
than thirty-nine emerg'ellt'Y bypass bl'i,hre,
of wood for u,e when the neig'hbOl'ing main
"truetu,'e should have been out of eOl1ll1li,
by Allied ail' attaek.
During the lnttpr part of I the Stra
teg-ic Air Force increased rapidly ill size
Its heavy bomhers, operating by both nig-ht
and <lay, lIew SOl1lP sorties during the
These inclUded twenty-two attacks
upon targets in the metropolitan areas of
Rangoon and Bangkok and other upon cer
tain supply centers elsewhere, notably at
Taungup and Prome in southel'n Burma, But
a considerable pl'O[lortion of the effort was
Jirected against enemy lines of communica
tions, particularly the railway linking Burma
with Siam, on whose construction many thou
sands of Allied prisoners of war labored in
1942 and 1!l-!a. The twin termini at Moul,
mein, where the line is broken by the mouth
of the River Salween, were frequently -in
cluded among the targets.. The muin north
line of the Siamese State Railways,
from Ba:ngkok to Chlengmai and gerving the
Japanese as a subsidiary line of supply,
also been attacked on numerous occasions
as part of the same strateg-ic plan.
Mining opel'ations were carried out
the ports used by the .Japanese to
ment overland coml11unicationg;
were on the Tenasserim and Siamese
coasts. One operation involved a round flight
of over a,ooo miles-a record trip for Liber
ators in any theater of war. Very long dis
tances over mountainous an,j poorly mapped
country wCre also covered in attacks on
tm'gets in the neig-hbOl'hood of Hanoi and
elsewhel'e in French Indo-China.
The long-rung'e Offensive would not have
been possible but for the work of the Photo
g'raphic Rc('onllaissan('e Fnrc('. nnothel' mixed
formation of RAF and V.S. AAF
H1Uadl'on:; o]ll'rating- lIl1d,'r Eastern Ail' Com
The Allied achie\'l'll!ent in the air over
the Runlla fl'unt, of which sOl11e indicatioll
has now bel'li gin'n, should be judgoed not
by the :;tancianls applieable to the Eul'tlpean
lhpatcl' of war but in !'t'lation to the ti'opical
wildel'lless which has [><'(,11 its setting-. The
Burma f!'Ont in leng'th (olllparahle to the
Russian front, though owing to the
able nature of the country, there are wide.'
stretches of territory in which contact be
tween opposing forces has been ;;light or
nonexistent. The Allied bases in Bengal and
Assam to the west have been sited and
painfully developed in a countryside served
by a single one-track railway which may
have sufficed for the needs of the local
peasantry but which in Europe would have
been considered a poor source of supply for
a battlefront one-sixtieth the length of the
Burma front; waterways are a hin
drance than a help to communications, and
such third-class roads as existed were nor
mally quagmires for the four months of the
monsoon, while nowhere did they reach
completely to the battle line.
It is in such country, where until 1942
the only ai rcraft ever visible were the air
liners calling at Calcutta on their waY' from
Europe to Australia and the Far East. that
airfields have been built, installations erected,
and supplies provided for the squadrons,
British and American, which are at present
helping so powerful-Iy in the reconquest of
Burma. Theil' aid has been such that, it can
fairly be claimed, in no other theater of
wal' are the operations of ground and ail'
forces so intenelaterl, lIor the aehievements
of each Sen'ice acconled better recognition
the other.
The Value of Permanent Fortifications
at the Command and General Staff School from an al'tiele in
Tcrhui8Chc JIitfeiillllgen fiir Sap)lCllre, POlltollicre. HJ/rl
.lfin(,III'c <Zurich. Switzerland) December 1!l44.
WHEN on 6 June'1944 the landing of Allied
{'ombat forces began on the French coast
between the mouth of the Orne and the
Cotentin peninsula, the question of the value
of fortifications again moved into the fore
At t'he first hlow struck, a wide breach was
tl'eated in the Atlantic WaIL Since the]l,
discussions have arisen here and there con
cerning the value or worthlessness of forti
fications and "walls," As in 1940, when
France went down in a military sense in spite
of the Maginot Line, those persons who
declare that the constl'uction of fortifications
is senseless again have the upper hand in
the arguments. Is this really so?
Indeed, on the face of it, it does appear
a questionable undertaking when. at the
cost of an enormous expenditure of labor,
one spends years in the construction of a
system of fortifications only to see the.m
hroken through in the course of a few days'
time, or so outmaneuvered within a few from their number is recruited now the mass
weeks, that they no longer play any role of those who refuse to ascribe any. value
whatsoever. whatsoever to fortifications.
Certainly, the person who bases his judg
ment on the thtlt a fortification or
a wall in itself is all absolute guarantee of
safety, bases his opinions on fundamentally
false assumptions. 1"01' never has a for
tress or a fortifiet! zone been absolutely in
destructible, insurmountable, or impregnable.
In the end, the attacker, when possessed
of the mcans and the necessary
time, has thus fal' always been able to destroy
fortifications or so damage them that they
were no longer able, or fully able, to perform
their functions. Repeatedly, too, the constant
race bctwepll the pa,si\'e po\\'er of resistance
of proteeting' walls, eitht'l' mohile (battleship
or tank) or nllt! the de,tructive power
of the projectile ha, hl'l'n \VOIl h,' the latter.
'Vhoe"er, thl'l d'on', IS eonvillL'cd of the
impregnability of 11 wall Il{'eausp of oolely
material cOll,ideratioll' has ('itlwr failerl to
understand the purpt)'" alld capabilities of
fortified "I' ha, bl'l""IH(, a victim of
propaganda tle'llitl' hi" ol'iginal which
may have h('(,11 l's,t'lIti:dly "0) rect. Up tll
1940 the Fl'(,IWh :'Iagintlt Line' pl'opav:anda
was aiInerl at III the Frt'lleh nation
anti the Frellch A the ""Ilvietion that
another enl'my attack lik,' that "f Inl4 eould
not anti "",,uld IIt,t 1'("'111'. '1'11<'11, dtll'ing- the
last few Iw1'0 I'l' til<' war, the :'Iaginot
Line jll'opllg-llnda was joillt'd hy the (iel'llJaIl
\Yall pr"paganr\a. It attempted to at
tain the SaHlt' objective alld \\ a, quite
cessfuI in this I'l'garrl "llcce"sful, in fact.
that no se'rious attempt made tn
Poland in her dpfensi\e in 10:lD,
After H)40, ill pInee of the West \ValI
propaganda, there appeared that of the At
lantic \Vall. FOl' a long period of time, as
surance of its illlpreg-nability was g-iven
expression by persons of the greatest prom
inence.. Picture and mill and this
was often overlooked-- 1I0t a continuous wall
but separate yet mighty fortificatiuns. But
.the impression was cn.'ated of a mighty,
continuous wall. Very many persons in very
many lands fell for this propaganda, and
To begin with, these men forget completely
certain historical facts. Among other things,
they no longer recall that the Maginot Line
was overcome, essentially, by envelopment
and was tactically breached at a few points
only. It was breached, for instance, in the
Kehl sector, but in this case tile attack oc
cured at a moment when the defender, be
cause of the despatch of strong forces to
other points, was greatly weakened, and, in
addition to this, defeatism had already cre
ated great havoc in his ranks. They have
already forgotten how relatively great the
power of resistance of the Maginot Line had
been in the winter of 1939-1940, and that of
the Metaxas Line [in Greece] in the spring of
1!loll. And when they call attention to the
quick fall of the Mannerheim Line in May of
1944 as a proof of their theory of the worth
lessness of fortifications, they overlook the
fact that seemingly at this time (judging
from reports from Finland) matters were
not in such good shape as regards watch-
fulness anti preparation for defense as they
had been four and a half years before.
The same persons, also, fail to see the true
purpose of fortification. This is a combat
means, only one of many, and nothing more
and nothing less. Furthermore, it is a combat
means that is employed by the numerically
weaker for the purpose of compensating,
within certain limits, for this numerical in
feriority. It is employed for the purpose of
compelling the adversary to effect a time
wasting concentration of his forces, placing
him in a position in which he can expect
success only at the cost of committing great
numbers of men and great quantities of
materiel. They also overlook the fact that
fortification, as a result of the protection
which it affords, certainly reduces losses of
men and materiel (a thing the foxhole also
does in a more modest measure); that a
certain numerical equalization is produced,
though the protection we mention can never
be anything more than relative, never
For instance, frontier fortifications, as they
are known to many nations, are never con
structed with the expectation of providing
absolute protection and security for the areas
back of them. Their purpose is mainly to
guard against surprise attacks. They have
fulfilled a very considerable part of theil'
mission already when they compel an at
tacker to effect a concentration of his forces
of such magnitude that it can be detected
with sufficient promptness to render impos
sible a simple surprise attack across a
frontier. And then, when the attack does
come, border fortifications fulfil the other
part of their mission which is to hold their
own a few days longer than would havc been
possible without organization of the terrain.
The fortification of certain sectors by nations
which arc basically aggressive also a
favorite practice much employed at those
points where one desires to remain passive
for the purpose of being able to get along
with as few troops as possible in order to be
as strong as possible at the points where a
decision is sought in aggressive action. The
Maginot Line was, of course, concE'ived as
part of a fundamentally defensive type of
warfare, and as little as it was able to
protect France in the end, it nevertheless_
fulfilled its mission in a certain sense. It
was definitely on account of the Maginot
Line that the German drive was directed
through Luxembourg, Belgium, and HoIland
in 1940. It forced Germany, also, to make
enemies of these nations, a matter which was
of no consequence at the beginning of the
western campaign but which perhaps will be
of much weight in the final reckoning that
will foIlow the war.
The German West Wal! existed simply for
the pUrpose of providing as great security
as possible in the rear for the period of the
German expansion to the east, in Poland and
the Ukranian region. Its existence would
deter the western powers from entering the
war, or the. German armed forces would be
able to make out with weak forces in the
west to the advantage of their operations on
the eastern front during the Polish campaign.
Later on, in place of the West Wall, there
appeared the Atlantic Wall, which was de
signed for the pUl"pose of playing the same
role during the Hussian 'campaign that had
been played during the Polish campaign by
the West Wall. And it this role well.
This fact is not altered in the least by its
having been breach!)!1 in .June of l!l44. Anyone
judging the matter otherwise completely
overlooks the gigantic and time-wasting prep
arations that were necessary on the part
of the Allies before they were able t\> risk
an attack. This wall gave Germany almost
three years of freedom in the west. The fact
that Russia could not be crushed during this
time and that the eastern fl'unt. on the
contrary, developed into an open wound for
Germany that drained he,' of her and
wore down her he,' nerveS', and
her materiel has nothing' to do with the
Atlantic Wall. It is very lilwly that without
it the west would have become active at a
much earlie,' period than Ii June 1!l44, since
the attack of the Anglo-Saxons would have
started sooner. H pnce, the Atlantic \\'all
rendered Germany g,'eat services from the
operational point of view. existence
greatly influenced the of operations.
That the German Wehrmacht on the eastern
front was not able to fight through to opera
tional freedom, execute a complE'te about face
with the main body of her forces, and then
take care of the situation in the we"t, consti
tutes no proof whatsoevcr of -thE' worth
lessness of the Atlantic Wall or of forti
fications in general.
The particular reason for the failure of the
Atlantic '.Vall when the attack finally oc
cun'ed is a matter which cannot be con
clusively ans\vcred till later. At present only
a few suppositions can be eXI' ..
To begin With, attention must be called
to the fact that false ideas have been very
prevalent concerning the nature of the At
lantic Wall. From the northern tip of Jiit--'
land to the Spanish frontier is a good 2,500
kilometers. Even with hundreds of thousands
of laborers and constl'uction enC'inecrs and
four years of time at one's disposal, no actual
wall, that is, no continuous wall of this kind
could be built with tl1.e depth and capacity
for defense in three dimensions required in
the case of modern fortifications of'
the possible envelopment froni the air. So
enormous a task simply could not be ac
complished by the Todt Organization, which,
it should be understood, also had other gigan
tic tasks to handle (the organization of the
communications zones behind all the fronts,
the North Sea Wall, the Mediterranean Wall,
the East \ValI).
We have already explained that fortifi
cation is a means employed by the numeri
cally weaker for the purpose of partially
compensating for his inferiority. This is
possible, naturally, only within certain limits,
for with fewer than a minimum of com
batant,; and gun crews it is impossible for a
defender to make out even with fortifications.
Even if for the defense from Jutland to
Biscay one hundred divisions were available,
that is so little that there would certainly
exist danger of breakthrough before troops
had time to arrive from other sectors. This is
especially true in case the attacker
through at some point where he is not ex
pected and where, on this account, the gar
rison is small. That was possibly true for
Normandy. Yet, in spite of this, the Atlantic
Wall may have had its significance not only
from the operational but also from the tac
tical point of view. It is well known that
a number of the works held out for days after
the fighting front had rolled on over them.
\Vhether this rollinu might not have been a
mad 1'ush if it had not been for the fortifi
cations is still an open question.
Weare therefore convinced that even to
day the construction of fortifications is fully
justified. They are an aid, and as such are
able to render excellent services. The construc
tion of fortifications, however, for which
!,arl'iSOllS of sufficient strength or of suffi
< ciently high quality are lacking is useless.
There is always one danger in the con
struction of fortifications, namely, that they
may lull cOll1manders and tt'OOps into a faIst,
sense of safety-safety for the individual
who, perhaps, is led to the assumption that
the fortifications free him from the necessity
of complete cOlllmitment of his own person,
that they offer him protection from injuTY an<1
death; safety for the command who may be
led to commit the mistake of estimating the
defense powet' of their scctor principally on
the basis of the number of cubic meters of
concrete and tons of iron and steel that have
gone into their construction instead of on
the basis of the living strength of the garri
son. This danger is probably best eliminate,l
by training the various types of crew,; who
man the fortifications, and by no means last,
those of the artillery emplacements, in the
employment of mobile weapons outside the
works. This is useful for the reason that in
this way the idea of exterior defense, as well
as that of continuation of defense after the
destruction of firing- ports, is automatically
given the emphasis that it should have. It is
also essentia\ for preventing the bond be
tween the heart an,l brain of the defenders
and the concrete an,l steel of the works from
leading to a state of immobility and fixerlness.
which, when it occurs, constitutes a
menace to successful defense. Where this
fixedness exists, fortification becomes ,;ens!'
less and dangerous. If, however, because of
this a wall is breached without excessive
difficulty, it proves the lack of worth of the
defenders but not of the fortifications.
Attack on a Fortified Zone in East Prussia
Translated and digested at the Command and General Staff School from a
Russian article by Colonel V. Burtsev in Kmsnaia ZCCZrlll
(Red Star) 14 March 1945.
IN our campaign in East Prussia, our of our advance the terrain favored the Ger
division-I commanded one of the regiments man defender. They always occupied heights,
-fought its way westward under a variety villages, streams, and private estates, convel t
of conditions. Everywhere along the routes ing them into formidable strongpoints. Many
such sh'ongpoints were separated from
other by streams and canals, bordercd
wide and swampy lowlundg. Not infrl'qlwlltly
the terrain hI front of their was
abo swampy, All impeded our lllovelllcnt
ann particularly the movement of our hcavy
lllHteriel, such as artillery Hnd tanl,s. 1'11
fortunately, the of the enemy
bu"ed on stont' buildingg com'crled into
pcrmancnt t'twtification5 that could be .1('
stroyed only by means of gill"
u"ing' direct tircR at rang'l's,
The Germans disposed their '<'
that all areas separating' these stl'ong'jloints
were well covered by fire. If, a gap betwel'n
two "trctched onc liilolllctcl' 01'
more, the cnemy built additional
in between, ereeled pt'rmanent
and dug' trenches, wpH-camouflaged
works and field fortiticatioll' werc really
dangerous if the attacker Ilegk'cted to r('enn
!loiter the uPlll'oachps be1'orchallll an(llimitctl
hig activities to so-callcd dccbivc ,hl'cction"
This will be ill grpa(er dl'laiL
All our OlliCCl'S ]{ncw that the
occupied lIlul stubbornly defl'n,l.e,l not only
their specially cquipped fOl'tifkati,)Jts hut
also houses, the basenwnts of which \\"'1',,
converted into :;;turdy ,,'capon l'mpla('cnwnts,
When there were popuiatld pl,,('cs in tl1l'
attack zone of a regilllcnt or a division. you
could be sure that thc enemy woul,l hc there
ready to defcnd each an,1 every building',
This reasoning was 'luite corl'e('t, but becausc
of this reasoning', our reconnaissance officel's
often concenti'ated their rcconnaissalll'c
activities only on the dedsive direction"
neglecting the rest of the areas,
Our scouts worked, as a gelle\'al rule. aloll!!'
main roads and attempted to detel'llline tlll'
strength of the enemy occupying
populated places or ]ll'eviou5ly di;;covercd
fortifications. The gaps between these forti
fications and the areas between the rnads
the so-call eo secondary directions--wcl'e often
disregar,ded. The result was that the com
mander, when making his decision to at
tack, looked for favorable routcs for
ing the enemy ano found it extremely difficult
because his reconnaissance had not covered
theSe areas.
SUJlPose we are "tan,ling before a German
The tCl'l'ain in front of it ili
To ,"h,<tnc,' straight ahead, at
t :leking t h(, ,b'lllig'point frontally; is really
!,oolbh, And til<' COlllllllllHlt'l' IDol,s for a
plan', to th( Jt>fl 01' t(1 the right of the
sl rongpoin t. which ('all be ust',! to bypuss
t 11\' All ).mps bet\\'l'('n the strong-
point;;, covcre,l by "hrub,,' alHI forests
and b\- canals an,l streull1s, attract
the cnllllllander"h attentioll becm;se
in tHlvlInl'ill'" through sueh lIrea;; the "ttackel'
llllll'h bette I' conceal(',} frolll the enemy,
For this when l-eeolllloiterillg' sec
olidary <Ii rel'tions, we should note how the
('nclllY df'ft'llds at'l'a' between strollg'
points, peculiaritics of the tenain. and any
arlditillnal fOl'tific(ltiulls within the zone
dl'sig'llutccl rOJ' advance,
;\;ot illfl'l''1tlC'utly, the German:; delibC'rutely
leavp 'sUl'h al'l"las uBoC't'upie<i, hoping' to cover
[hem by til e, Any e"lIlnHlnder trying' to pene
(I alc thcse areas without ,recon
,,"i;.sant'e lila.\' ti,,<l himself in an extremely
dink-lilt sitllation- -a weak point
of the enelllY d('fcnsp lIlay callse excessive
I""e, and expenditure of effort.
\\'Ill'1l separate settlcl1H'llts al'e eonvel'ted
by til(' enelllY i"tn stl'olll!:points and when
thl'f:C con?l' the entire area jn
front "I' thPlll, it i,.; to penC'trate
(0 the rear areas hy infiltlation, For this,
>!nall gTOUps arllled with automatic
\\'t'apons lllal earrJ'inl'.' a sufficient supply
of hand gl ('!lade:; arc bl',t,
Such penetrations of the Gel'llH\I1 fortifi
cations, c\en in slllall numbers (this is
,,:-;pccially effective at night), force thc enemy
ttl I('ave his "hcltel's ull,l to ,}etail special
f",'('cs fOl' the d('fenge of these areas, thus
llilcovering the lIlain direction, This means
that the attack on the strong-point will be
facilitMe,l, and it will be much easier to
al'colllplish the mission,
This was fully proved in "UI' campaign in
East Prus"ia.. in which regiment par
ticipated, Advancing toward the city of
Kreutzbul'g', we had to fig-ht our way through
several positions, These positions had con
crete pilI boxes and trenches ancl contained
several buildings adapteo lor defense. In the
attack zone of our division, there was one Ger
man armo\'ea division deprived of its tanks
and compelled to fig'ht as infantl'y, In ad
dition to this, the Germans had several
Volksstul'lu battalions, The retreating enemy
defended every terrain line and tried to holr!
our advancing infantry wherever he had
previously prepared positions. Fighting- every
\1ot oflzed UnIt
inch of the way and steadily moving for
ward, my regiment forced the crossing- of the
River Frishing and approached another
German position. This position stretched
through several settlements, private estates,
and villages.
Our regiment, cooperating with the adja
cent unit on our left, was to capture the
sector of the enemy position based on the
buildings of Karplauken's estate (see sketch).
The Germans defended their position in
numerous fortifications and in the stone
basements of the buildings. The approaches
to this strongpoint, the valley of the river, and
the intervals between the adjacent strong
points were defended by uninterrupted fire of
artillery and mortars. Our regiment had
eighteen artillery pieces. Together with the
three artillery battalions of direct support
artillery, our mortars kept the enemy defense
under a concentl'ated fire, paying particular
attention to the fortified stone buildings of
the estate, Tanks did not participate in this
engagement. OUl' att'empt to encircle 1
strong-point from the north an<l south \\a,
unsuccessful: flanking fir>'" of automatic
weapons pinned our infantry to the ground,
Utilizing the highway passing to the north of
the river and another road rUllning along
the front, the Germans skilfully maneuve!'ed
their manpower and fire means, concentrating
them in the direction threatened by our
It was necessary, therefore, to lllodify oU!'
plan of battle, which had been worked (Jut
while marching, and to h'y, fit'st, to gplit
the German position, and then to enwlop
each isolated part. This calle,{ for
the highway north of the river. In order to
immobilize the enemy, it was necessary to
reach the road to the west of the estate and
to capture a few buildings, thus starting
the encirclement of the German
It was getting dark when one of our in
fantry units set out to accomplish the first
mission. The unit advanced unnoticed the
enemy, keeping not far from the river and
concealing itself in the shrubs. It lllanag'eJ
to cross the road running to the south frnm
Johannesburg and to approach the ben,l of
the river.
It should be noted that both banks of the
river were very steep, These escarpments
contained German rifle pits and emplace
ments for submachine guhners and machine
guns. Our men compellee the Germans to
leave the trenches and, employing chiefly
hand grenades, f<'rced them to withdraw
to the north-to the highway, The river was
covered with ice. Having pagsed the ri\'er.
our unit again engaged the enemy in the
vicinity of the highway. Again they used hand
grenades and again the Germans had to with
draw. They occupied the other side of the
road, The commandel' of the unit decided to
stop the advance. He had accomplished his
mission: the highway was cut.
The success of this unit heJped solve the
next mission, which was the occupation of
several buildings of the estate. "We decided
to f091 the enemy by a bold and quick action.
We obtained foul' large trucl(s and loaded
on them foul' guns and a' group of sub
machine gunners. The artillerymen were
commanded by 1st Lieutcnant Kopylov. and
the submachine j!;unnel'S were under 2d Lieu
tenant l{onovalov. The entire group was
commanded by the 'lctinj!; battalion com
mander. 1st Lieutenant Antonenko. At night.
the group quickly occupied the road. then
turned to the south and captured a small
building west of the estate. The German
soldiers and officers occupyinj!;
of the main building heard the' ring in
their rellr and the noise of t c motors,
emerged from their shelters, and opened un
organized fire. By frontal attack. we routed
the enem.\' in all the buildings. Having
'organized recllllnuissnnee, the reg'iment
continued its advance.
The of the East
Pl'iIssiHn defensi\'c fortifications called fOI'
special tactics on our part. Disposed in
checkerboard fashion, the German fortifica
tions stretched almost continuously over the
entire area covered by the advance of the Red
Army. There was not a single stretch where
our advancing troops battling their way from
one breakthrough of the Germap position to
another did not encounter formidable German
fortifications or did not have to fight the Ger
mans occupying separate strongpoints. The
whole advance through East Prussia consisted
of uninterrupted and stubborn engagements
under conditions where the enemy fought
back from solid and previously prepared
fortifications. Having broken through one
series of fortifications in one place. our troops
again encountered new German positions
equipped with trenches, pillboxes, and stone
buildings. and it was only because of the
uninterrupted assault action of troops
that we managed to overcome this formidable
fortified zone.
The 'Renaissance of the French Air Force
Digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article
by L. Graham Davies in The Aemplane (Great
Britain) 16 February 1945.
FRF.KCH pilots and ground-crew men have
heen operating alongside their allies since
1940, when Great Britain fought alone. To
day, however, the French Air Force is in
full renaissance, aJHI a array of
French squadrons operates o.n the Western
Front under a combined Franco-U.S. com
mand which functiong with remarkable har
mony. French combat units make up nearly
one-half the strength of the Tactical
Air Force.
At the time of the North African landings
in November 1942. there were two French
fighter based in this country
[Great Britain 1. one light bomber squadron
in the Middle East, and one reconnaissance
squadron in French Equatorial Africa.
Apart from these complete units. many
French pilots were already flying with the
RAF and were held as reserves for the
squadrons in question. By this time, there
was a regular monthly intake of Frenchmen
into the RAF for training. All had escaped
from France in one way or another.
With French North Africa cleared of
enemy, the ground-crew problem became
easier, as quite a large number of regular
Armee de l'Air men who had been stationed
there joined up. The British Air Ministry in
creased the number of French fighter squad
rons and added heavy bomber units. while
French personnel was put under training for
the formation of two Coastal Command
squadrons. This steady build-up enabled the
French to participate in the Allied invasion
of Europe on D-day. The effort made by
Great Britain to lay the foundations of a new
French Air force was a matter of extreme
difficulty, for we ourselves were more than
fully occupied in maintaining and increas
ing RAF first-line strength.
Meanwhile, the United States had entered
the war, the t: .S. Ail' Fm'ce ha",'d in this
Coulltry harl grown to an enOl'lllnu,.; ,.;ize, and
Ollr North American allies took a hawl ill
assi><ting French air J'ecovCl'y.\t the time
of our North Afl'ican landing,;. the few
French tightel', homhel', and reco!\nai:;sance
squadrons which had hp('n allowed to cnll
tinue their exi:;tl'IlCe Hnder Yieh)', which
was another lJame I'm' German ru!E', had
fallen into a morihund condition, The hl'M
French material dated from 1938 OJ' 19:1!l. and
then' was very little of it. The llilil .-\ rllli,,
tice Commi,;sinn hat! ,jpmiJital'izet! alm",t
everything' French. hut the morale of Frl'IlCh
ainnen l'en1i.dnfld exc(:tllpnt

'."hat they l'cl'ded was up-to.da\l' aircraft
and eqnipment to hell' us eha"t' the (;"1'
mun,; and Italian" out of all K", lh Africa.
At the time of 0111' lalHlings. tIl<' FI'PI1l'h
werl' that tl1<'Y would be r":ll'llll'd
as as po>,ild" with an aPIll'olll'ialc'
Air ForN', In .!,\IIWllY IH13 a "llladr{)n
of Cllrtiss P-,lIl', \\;\' g'iven to til" Fl'l'llCh
from U.S. eqllil'llll'nt all'l'ady a\:ll).lhl" III tl1<'
l\lediterralll.'an lh,'alpr. That '<Jll:ltiron.
namel! the after it, ramOIl'
prototype of IHI.J-18, has a Ill",t di>(in
g'uishe(l H-'l'onl ill thi ... 'Vit 1'.
Latet. the Fl'c'neh I{'('civet! B"lI
p;l!)'s to form threl' ''Ill:u1ron,- \\ ith :!lI 111[>
vaI'ic,1 e'luipllll'nt IP'Iuill.'d to kp"p thl.'<' air
emft SuhnHl ri nc" and (;"I'lll:ln ai r
el'aft wert', at that tllll(.', a con,tall!
of danger to Allil,d cOllV,'YS in 1II,' :'\!cditr'I"
ranean, and the;.(' Fl'l'nl'h unib did 'pl0ndid
work on cow;tal dntil's when t h,' ,uJlJll)'
problem for Allied troop' in :';o,th .\frica
was critical. III S"ptt'mber 19-1::, the Allipd
ail' authorities tlrp\\, UJl a cllmhllll'ti p!an for
and armln!.!: the FrPlll'h Anne','
oe l'Air, taking' into al'COllllt matl'l ",I all P:ll!y
ordel'ed and delivered, The inl elpllll'nt" .
of a tactical air fO!'e,' In thi, pla11,
and. the key factor C'o\'<.' I 11 ill!:.!' it;.; :-'(."I\IH' \\'<1:-.
the potential a\ ailability of FI'PIl{'h
nel to man thl' ''Illa<l!'011', Th(' whole ,('h('lll<:
was designed to makp the 1o'r(,lIch
self-sufficient am! abll' both to ojlel'a(l' and
service their aircraft alone.
The rearmament plan approved by Gen
era! Eisenhower in September 1!l43 called
for squadl'Ons of Spitfires, Bell P-39's, 'and
Hcpuhlk together with Jlhoto-recon.
and long-range' reconnaissance
medium-homber units, in sUPPnt't
of the French First Army. All the new
squadrons wet'e equipperl with British or
L.S, aircraft. and 11 comprehensive schedule
of trainill!! fO!' ).':l'uund and flying personnel
\\ as d,'awn up. Training units were set up
hy the French in :'I1o}'O('co and Algeria, and
lllany French trainees were sent to the
l'nite,l Stall'S an,1 Grpat Britain, including
Hh,dlt radio lucn, fH'11101'erS
b" rdi,'!',;. and so forth. as well as pilots. In
A n1l'!'il'a , mOl'e than 0,000 Frenchmen were
(l'nille,1 on airdromes and U.S. Ail' Force
",(nhlbhments in Flol'ida, Alabama, Georgia,
('"l"rado. Texas, Illinois. and Louisiana,
TIll' {' ,S, Twelfth Ail' Force also set up
Fl'l'lleh :dr traiuing schools in North Africa
(II train pi10b Oil Curtiss P-40, LockheeJ
Hepublie p-n, and :\Iartin B-26 air
era ft. AII I'ueto,'s at t hpse tiring tJ'altl- t
ing' ""hoob Wl'l'l' comhat pilots who had'
,',llll'jplP,j their operational tour, and thu;
had I,'ally up-lo-datp information to' pas>
p" t(l thc'ir Fl'l'nl'h pupils, Latet on; these
t ralll1llg- l'l'ntCl'S \\'(,1'e turned over to tne
Fl'l'lll'h. l'olllplete with all equipl1lpnt and
'"l'craft, {',S, i,,"truclors and maintenance
,l'('II', remaining on loan to the Arl1lee de
I'Air ulltil the were able to function
Large ,kliveries of United States and
nritl"h ,\I rcraft were made to the French
Air [-'(II ce during' 194,1. mill Republic P-4;
tn"" \\ ell as Spit Ib'es were sent to the
tightl'l squadrons, while bomber units reo
l'eiVl'd :'ola,tin B-2(; Marauders. In addition,
Illany (,-78's, \' ulteEc' BT13's, Douglas
C.j,'" Beechl'l'aft C45's, and Lockheed P-:lS's
11:1\'<' heEc'n delivered. General de Gaulle',
l'l'l'l"nt Visit to Englane! was particularly
frllitful in obtaining' equipment and clothing
f")r th" Fr,'nl'h Air Force.
In additioll to the equipment and supply re,
qui!'!',l by French combat squadrons and serv
icing units operating on the Western Front,
the United States has also maintained in
North Africa, since 1943, a number of French
Air Force depots and stations staffed hy
some 20,000 personncl of t!-le Arlllee de l'Ail',
Uutil j'rcentIy, therc were about twenty
French ll\,SCS in the N,'rth Afl'ican lJl'ovincL'''
maintailled with U,S,
them b("I\g' ten repair depots statTe,l rO!' th('
most pal t hy French Ail' FOI't'e J)(,I'8OI1lI(,1.
About' 5:,0 old French ail'plnnC's and OV(,I'
1,500 French have het'j; maintained
in operation at the African
When, after the vital set'ne of we, t<'l'll
wal' shifted frolll the :\leditel'l':\l1ean (0 r'\, "
mandy and thenc(' to Belgiulll :11111 Abatt'
Lorraine, the reborll French Arl1lee ,1<: rAil'
at last got to grips with the
it was incorporated with the l' ,S, First
Tactical Ail' Force, of which force French
f01'1ll ahllOst half, as already mentioned.
FI'\'IH,h and IT,S, pC'l'sollnel work together
in a <If cordial cOInradeship and mutual
til French Ail' Force squadrons
are 111)\\ based in their o\\'n country, and
"'Ille are "I ('rating- against the German Pock
,till holding out on the Atlantic coast.
F.t'llch >I'lundl'ons in Alsace with the First
1,\ F art' Spitfires, and
Thlllld"l'bult,. Hec]'uiting- for all categ-ories
i, statL'd to be mORt
The rebirth of the French Ail' Force is
with sllloothness and astonishing
, ]I('('d, d"'11Ite ohstacle, which might have
"P]ll"lll'd almost insupel'able,
Modern Trends in the D.eyelopment of Armed Forces
Translated and at the Command and (it'll('ral Staff Sehoul from a Spanish
al,ticle Ly Li('utenHnt ('olon('1 (ionZltI" FCI'nlllHlez de CIIl'doba
y Parrella in Ejcl'('ito (Spain) February 1945,
AI.L in out
the, I'nemy, .inflicting hlows Oil him, and
attempt'llg to avoi,l delivl'l'e,1 by him,
both in ,,!tack a.ld dlfpTlse, \\'Ith til(' :\llvent
of the first weapon" the Jll'ohlem ;;till }'e
maim'd the -the intlktion and avuidance
of 'Vith the t'l'eation of the fil'st armies,
the problem did not vary in the lc'a,t, and
today in total and mechanized war the prob
lem continues to he exactly the same, althollg'h
harder to solve,
This problem has led to til(' organization,
training, and equipment of special g'l'ol1pings
of troops, charged, ench of them, with some'
one of the operations which go to mal' up
the battle, That is to say, the vadou,;
of the service wCl'e create, 1, eHch of which,
at one time, had clear and wC'lI defined mis
The cava]'ry hatl its definite mission (t'X
ploration, security, the ('harge, the
artillery had its own mission (hreaching' the
enemy's lines 01' the walls of the bdeagllel't'd
city), and the infantry hat! own (attacl,
with cold steel, assault), Later on, a fourth
arm came into existence-the engineers, with
a definite mission in mine warfare,
And had, of fOlll' anns \\'t'I'e the serv
iet's whi,'h made it fOl' tht'l11 to exist
and tight and which continued to grow in
"ompll':-,it;,' .and nUlllber,
Thll :,pparatl' Wl'apons alBo at
(hat timl' clear and definite mis,;ions: the
('old oteel fol' the act of the combat,
t 11<' aosHult; the firearll! fOl' the protection of
1 h(l advancC'.
!Jut tillle went hy, with the' advent of
automutic an,l the matter
lll't'lIllH' ,'olllplicat,',l, an,l all types of
no\\' the douhle mission of
attack and protection, Thus, the rifle and
machine g'lIn jlrotect the infantry as it
a<lvanl'l'S to attack, artillery protects
t ht' automatic weapons, being itself p},otected
by th,' counterbattery fire of corps and army
That is to say, in the same way that mis
.,ions and weapon, gave rise to the various
arll!S, the ]lrofusion and varh,ty existing in
the lath'I' is,. paradoxically, giving rise to a
zone of fusion-or confusion-between the
various branches of the service.
As a matter of fact, this variety and profu
sion of the branches of the service has led
to a gamut of attack fires of such variety
that for each situation in an attack there is
a special weapon that will produce the fire
best suited for the occasion. The reverse is
also true-the defender possesses at each
moment a weapon suitable for replying to the
one emploYNI by the attacker. And in this
interplay of attack and defense, of offensive
and defensive weapons, such simultaneity of
action is achieved that any weapon at any
moment, through the mere fact of its being
in operation in an offensive manner, provides
protection for another ,of a different category.
Thus the combined Ikes of the attacker are
today, as in the past, a protection to the
infantry, and the combine,! fires of the
defendel' con8titute an effort aimed at pre
venting the attaeker from dl'!iVl'ring his final
There iH no doubt that battles would be
conducted with the maximum. of efficiency if
at all timcs and places and in every situation
the various branch!';; of the service had at
their disposal the weapons best suited for the
occasion. And this has led to specialization
within the limits of the various branches
and. in turn, to more and more profound and
d!'cisive changes in their organization.
As in all human activities, technical perfec
tion is accompanied by increased complica
tion in the matter of employment, and by a
breakdown into specialties which at times
acquire characteristics that give rise to doubt
and even argument as to the arm or branch
of the service to which they belong, and even
within the limits of the same branch
(tactically, what is a gun? what is a howit
zer?) there is uncertainty in the matter of
their classification. Naturally, these doubts
and uncertainties produce a negative influence
on organization, which is impaired by lack of
clarity, with consequent loss of efficiency.
Let us note, for instance, the case of
infantry and artillery. It is undeniable that
within the confines of the ground forces, the
infantry is the decisive arm and all others
merely its auxiliaries. In the early history of
these two arms, their respective operations
were entirely independent of one another.
The artillery opened the breach; the infantry
carried out the attack. But as the technique
of firearms was the infantry felt
morc and more need of protection and, a:; a
result of this, the artillery created new types
of guns and organized itself in such a manner
that it could pl'epare the attack first and
accompany and support the infantry after
ward. That is to say, the basic element of the
battle has become the binomiul-infantry
The former indlpendence has lal'gely dis
appeared, and in its place there has developed
so intimate, sO intpnse a mutual penetration
thtit there has been created an obscure zone
in which they overlap one another. The
famous phrase, "The artilkry conquers; the
infantry occupil's," is a clcar expression of
this and encroachment.
The creation of gun compunil's commanded
by infantrymen and forming part of the in
fantry regiments of many countries is a clear
demonstration of the fact that the over
lapping between the two m'ms has resulted
in a total and absolute fusion. Th(>re no
longer exists any separation between the two
Another case of uncertainty and confusion
is offered by the infantry and engineers with
their assault platoons. In 80m(> places tbese
belong to the engineers, in others to the
infantry, and in still others they are found
in both. There does not appl'ar, therefore, to
exist any clear and well definecl line of
demarcation between these two arms which.
to add the more to the haziness of the zone
in which they overlap one another, frequently
offer us the spectacle of infantrymen handling
the pick and shovel and engineers fighting
with fire arms.
To follow this matter to its lair, let us
examine the case of the one branch of the
service we have left-the cavalry.
Its romantic ancl heroic mission. the charge
at the critical moment, has disappeared. It
continues to have and will continue to have,
missions that are specifically its own-as is
also the case with the other three arms-but
it also posssesses its nebulous zone where it
overlaps in its activities with the infantry.
There exist infantry units attached to large
eavalry units; there exist large cavalry units
that secure some sector of a stabilized front.
Is this, thl'n, not a mission that is propel' to
them? Yes-but it is a new (kmonstration of
These might, perhaps, give
the impression that the ground forces arc an
entity of too great homogeneity to Iw spoken
of with propl'iety as being composed of foul'
indl'p<'ndent arms.
As is apparent, up to the present we have
referred almost l'xc\usivC'ly to what might be
termed the ground forces of H118. But in the
presC'nt conflict, mechanization hl\s assumed
an intpnsity that many never anticipated,
and along with it man)' ideas and many
methods have undl'rgone changes, and the
concept of war has undt'I'gone a complete
The principal ,,]Pml'nt of mechanization in
the ground forces is t he armored vehicle
which. tholl!l'h it may represent a gigantic
I stl'P in military technique, rcpresl'nted at the
Sa111e tinlC un enOl'mOUH incl'e(lf'(, in the conl
, pll'xity of the prohlems of organization-and
they \\'l're alrC'ady C'xc{';;siv{'.
To begin with. the al'll1ored vehicle means
the motor, ani! thi>', apllliecl :u; it is to the
foul' arm8, "aeh of them exactly the
same specd, and all of thC'm greater Rpeed
than that of hor8e cavalry.
Nevertheless, classical type infantry divi
sions on foot are called normal. That is to
say, they arc the most numerous and they
still have clearly defined and definite missions
such as combat of the normal type, occupation
of terrain, etc. And the same is true of the
cavalry. However great the mean speed that
may be attained by military forces as a
'whole, they will always require special, fast,
light units for reconnaissance and pursuit
that are able quickly to break off combat and
engage in it afterward at some
other point 01' in another direction.
We have said befol'(, that the different
branches'of the service, 01' arms, were nothing
more than the specialization of armed groups
in one of the elemental phases of combat, and
since the phase which gave rise to the cavalry
still exists, the need for this arm also con
tinues to exist without other change than that
of the means employed for the attainment of
agility and speed which its mission re
quires. But a part of the classical missions of
the infantry and cavalry of the 1918 type is
now absorbed by the armore(l units, in con
sequence of which the zone of confusion .has
grown still darker with the appearance of
this third element of discord.
And since artiU('ry also now enjoys the
of wearing armor plate, and the
tank, which is its sublimation, is armed with
artillery the hazy dividing lin2 be
tween infantry and art'lkry has become more
complicated than it was, giving origin to new
,tnd anlbig'uous \vhich far fronl
cJa:'ify the fuch as the term "as
;;ault artillery," in whirh the wOI'd "artillery,"
awakening ideas of immobility and power,
forms a strange union with the word "as
sault" which is typical of an:] almcHt ex
clusively descriptiVe of
In conseqtl('Uce of all this, the following
suggestive question al'iseH in the mind of the
organizer: "Armor in motion-ought it to
fOI'111 a new arm or should it he divided appro
priat('ly among the anns already in ('xistcnce
in accordance with their needs and missions?"
One additional arm-the ail' force-com
plicates the exercise of command, and its dis
tribution among those already existing
renders difficult to an unbelievable degr('e the
employment and handling of everyone of
Already in the United States a solution
appears to have been found which, though not
yet sanctioned by experience, will perhaps
prove the correct one. It is the creation of
the "o-called "combat groups," a type of large
unit formed of units of all sorts in the propor
tion required by the mission to be fulfilled.
Now the classic pincers has three jaws in
place of two; two on the flanks and one over
head. No fortiJjcations are able to keep the
enemy back, and fortifications have lost, in
consequence, ala'l'ge part of their value. There
is no material obstacle with which the ail'
force can be opposed. But it has one great
drawback-it is necessary for it to return to
its starting point and, once on the gt;ound, it
is defensl'Jl'';s. It then requires helong
ing to its own !'ide fOt" it., and. in
addition, the of awl
and \'urie(l in otht'l' it
requires a profu"p an,l ('oll1plkatLt! organiza
tion for.it,; operation.
Let us havt' a look. nn\\'. at (Ill' indl'pl'ntknt
lllh'si"l1s that H\'iatioll I' "hit to Culli! ill
udditi()ll ttl it:-- COOp('l'Htitltl with tllP
Among' t11l'Ill. thl' prilleipal Oil"" HI,' tho,,'
of alltl j,olllhin<.:- al ill
th,> enemy'" r('al'. Hut lip to \\'hat point alt'
indl'pl'ndl'llt '?
..-\.Pl'iul l'ct'onnai:--.t-!Hllt't', a pl'nlnllg.'dt it'll of
that prOI)(,I' to the 1"'1' th, PIIl'I"'"''
of'}oenting'. and v\'alt1Ht illg' l'lh'lny
(roop" 01' g'l'ollntl dL,f,'n",,. lI,'Ill"t'. in tIll' final
thl' g'l'tHllld fol'{,(';-' will lH' thp
hell' fieiari0,. Ilt1)I1I,;n).!' I "lib. ailllvd at tIlt'
of i'a('tol'ip-., (ll' e!lIHlllllnieat ion
hav(' tlwil' ol,.i<-d Ih!, hamp,'rillg'
of tlw manu('a('IIII!' (If \Val' mal!'1 ial, antlllll'il'
delivt'ry 10 tIll' 11'001". 1l<'1l("0 a).!'ain it i, tlw
gl'ound foree:-. who bl'lH'tit h:.; thvlll.
Of of {'()opcl'at inn. tlll'l''\. art" t \\'0
principal on,". 1'h,' 111',( " th" tlan,p"I'tati,,"
and t'itlll'r 1I1t':\II, or
para('hut", 01' dil't'l'Ily PII tIlt' ).!1"IIIHI. "f
\vhit-h. nIH't' t)}1 thp !,!.'Iolllld. oil
foot and ill conlhinalioll with "th"I'
gl'oun(\ fOI'('e'. for it ha" h"L'1I pl'ovt'd that at
thl' time aviation 11,,1 ahIt, hy
to l'ngag'(' in ,(nd fl'C!1 a halt lv. and ('I't't" is
the ('xc('ptioll \\'hi"h thp I'll],., I'CI',
bpcau:-:.e tllllJP \\:1, ilO .\l1i(d aviation.
The second that of pn'pal'illg. ac
companying'. and th.. action, of
the gl'ountl which i, the
mission a' that of the arliller,- with r(',.pcct
to thc infantry. Alld since mis,ion ll1w.t
be thl' ,'Iassical hinolllial. infnlltl'Y
al'till('ry, has 1I0\\' bet'n ]"'1'la('e<l hy (hal of
If the op('ratiolls are against a country
situated on the other of the oc,'all. naval
, forces will be the principal factor in the be
ginning, but always accompanied, ,upported,
and protected by land or planes,
!'Ind this navy wUI fulfil three principal mis
fire support, and pro
tt'ctioll of the line of communications over
which the battle will have to be fed. Thus, it
will operate in favor of the ground
fol'("(,s in the fame way that, within the
],o\llld" of th" lett,'r. nil arms will operate in
fayol' of the infantry.
lIent"'. in the' san)!! way that up to the
tilll(, of tilt' Worl,l War all combined
were carric>d on hy the differ('nt
1.l'aJl!'llt's <If tht' ground fOI'Cl'S, in the modprn
Ioattle and in tIlt' battle of the neal' future all
c"lIlhilled opel'ation" will be carried on by the
ditl't'I't'lIt [Ol',(,s. an,1 in the combination, which
Illay he dual nl' tripk. the g'round forces will
"lway, have a part.
W,' SPl' now tIll' influenct' of these considera
I illll" on the organization of a mo,l('rl1 army.
III the lil,t place. unity of command is the
\.a,ic pl'inciph' of all org'anization_ Hence,
the 11I'opcr log'ic, it seems natural
I hat a ,ing'it' Illlnistry-with whatevl'l' title
>t'l'lll, 1ll0,t suitable (:\iinistry of \Var, for
ilblullt,,) -,houl,l elllbrace all the fighting
rfll'CCS of a nation, g'l'ouping them in three
01' s(,l'l'etaryships if it .is
,i",ired to givt' the'lll n higher rating.
Thi, IllinistJ',- should determine the propor
tit"'" of 1l1('1\ and material that each of the
IIII (,,' is to have. within the limits of
thl' n\SOU1'Ces that have been 111ude
"yailahl!' hy the g'overnment. It should also
hay!' charge of the training of the forces for
war. g'iving' minute attention to the instruc
tional asped. both that which is peculiar to
('al'h of them Hnd that which is general and
I to cooperation between any two of
thelll all!l amnng' the three-a task exactly
t he as that calTied on today by the
:llini,tl'Y of thl' Army with the diffel'ent arms.
But pl'inciple of unity of command
C'ontinm>" tn hol!1. and just as up to the
III ,'o-<'nt time in thl' ground forces, army
"roujl:; hHv!' 1>('en organized which combine,
under a ,ing'lc command. large and small
unit" in the pl-oportion required by the mis
sion and th(' terrain (there are already large
Hrtillcl'Y units), so in the future, those large
Ul'Il1Y groups, with whatever designation ap
pears most suitable for them, will be made up I
of large ground, naval. and ail' units, each
of them made up. in turn, of their distinct
specialties or arms.
All this requires commUlHlel's. who, coming
from some one of the three foi'ces, have been
rendered of commanding the other
two by means of suitable preparation. al
though log'ieally, as a result of their origin,
they an' more capahl" iii. one of the three
than in the other two. But it be borne
in mind that, judging frum the exp('riences
ot' the present war, there will be operations
in which it will be necessary to know mOl'e
about one of the three forces than about the
other two, and there may even be cases where
opel'ations will start with one command, con
tinue with another, an(I ('n(1 with a third
command, These chang'('s will not he neces
sary at the time when there exist perfectly
competent universal commands.
The problem of command hrings up that
of staffs, of which there must exist one gen
('ral in addition to those belonging to
('aeh forc('.
Hence, we see that in the army of the
future this matter of command and staff is
simply an amplification of the present ground
fOJ'ce where a general coming from any of
the foul' arms has comman(1 of a large unit
in which thel'c arc ('Ipments of al! of them,
aided by other generals coming from 'the
various 'other arms, the first seconded by a.
general staff for all the arms, and the second,
by staffs proper to their respective arms.'
We have perceived, as we have followed
these lines, the undeniable par;tllelism. that
exists hetween the three forces of the present
day and the three arms of yesterday, a paral
lelism that is ,0 obvious and 'complete that
one is inclined to wonder whether the term
"army," denoting a grouping of all the
combatants' of each of the three elements, is
not a little vague and lacking in significance,
LiI<ewise, the word "arm" is a little in
adequate and outmoded in view of present
And as an ultimate and definite consequence
of all these considerations, one is inclined to
ask himself whether the term "army" as
interpreted above should not express the
totality of all the fighting forces of the nation,
and the word "arms" refer exclusively to
the ground, sea. and air forces, regardless of
the numbel' of specialties it may be necessary
to divide them into, which, unfortunately and
the more to distress the military organizer,
will be more and more numerous and com
plicated as time goes on, In conclusion, it
might be stated that something would also
he gained if the services ,for this new army
were unified,
RAF PhotogTaphic Reconnaissance Unit
Digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article
by Charles Graves in The Sphere (Great Britain) 10 March 1045,
FOR years the Photographic Reconnais
sance Unit of the RAF was so that
even initials (PRU) were deleted by the
censor. Today the Photographic Reconnais
sance Cnit has been allowed to shed much
of its cloak of
It often happens that aerial photographs
taken' by the PRU inadvertently produce
valuable information, Almost any photo
graph taken behind the German lines can
produce some lucky-dip l'esult.
There are various forms of luck, in con
nedion with the reconnaissance photogr!lphs,
When one of our aircraft, following a tip,
went to Peenemunde to take photograph's
on the off-chance of revealing information
about V-weapons, it happened to take a
photograph at the exact moment when one
of the V-weapons was exposed to view for
11 few moments on the ground 20,000 feet
below, If the photograph had been taken
nn hour late'r or earlier, it might not have
disclosed the actual existence of England's
future scourge. Equally, the German air
drome decoy fires were discovered acciden
tally by PRU, Other examples of good luck
'have oftl'n been pl'oYitled br aerial photo
graph" takell of n specific "target," For in
addition to the aetual spot deliberately pho
tOg'raphed, the t'ye has disclosed
yaluHble information within a few hundred
yards. Thus a l'hot,)graph tal;cn of a
of l'Oadway might an t'llemy airdrome
hOlbillg- tIl(' lat.;st and unidentified German
ai,'C'!'aft nllt ,\"l't u>"d operationally, Our ex-
Out in Belgium, PRU is working for thE'
Second TAF [Tactical Air Force] and,
therefore, for the armies in the field, who
are their main responsibility. It is their
business to provide damage assessment, fu
ture targets, and advance information about
enemy movements. They even work for the
Admiralty, providing information about
E-boats, midget submarines, block 'ships, and
!;-';:--lItl \l" ..... I \\'. IUd-!,:. III' 'Tift: IL-\F TI'..,Tl:-..,. V.\IUOLS TYl'FS A:-;l1 SrZES OF CAMEltA:5 BEFORE TnEY ARE INSTALLEfl
! "I. \l" .... q! 1'1\1 AIIII h \F'T ]o:Xl:.\(;r.o 1:-;' HEC<lXNAI5SANCE FLIGHTS.
perb oil tlw t'ontinl'llt and in London know
about man:, ouch tYPl'S f!'lHll t'arly photo
All this i, g!'i,t til the mill. For
])hotog:!'aph-to ehang:e the Hll'taphnr-is
milked by pllOtog:raphie interpreters, The
procedure is that as soon thl' reconnais
sanee ait'craft has landed at its base, RA F
mechanics hurry to remove the mag
azines, whieh arc in tUl'll handel] to a des
patch rid,,!'. Thl' latll'j' roars off the
airdrome to the :\lobile Fidel Phot()g'raphic
Section,' whel'e the Jilms al'e immediately
developed, If the muttel' is ul'g:ent, the photo
graphic interpreters look thl'oU!:'h them while
,the negative>; are still wet. If they see any
thing of vital importance. they mark them
with a ;.:ellow pencil antI have copies rushed
, able officers,
mine-laying activities. Many of their tasks
are "laid on" through Second TAF and
Al'lllY liaison officers. These tasks-of pro
viding special photographs of special areas
lead to other photographs being'
'flown (PRU jargon for "taken"). The orig
inal photographs may have been flown to
enable some tank commander to know which
way to go, but they provide vital
information in addition to their original
purpose, which needs further investigation,
PRU photographs go through three phases
of examination. They are first examined ster
eoscopically by RAF photographic interpre
ters for their immediate operational value.
The second phase is when they are exam
ined for the daily report on rail movements
and enemy airfields. Simultaneously the
ArmY examines them for ta'l f ro ds
and enemy, defenses. The third phase occurs
when the1 are handed OVllr to research
specialists, who nlay discover anything from
the spoil left by an underground factory to
a new type of jet plane.
Photographic interpretation is a fascinat
ing study. Fortunately, the Germans were
not track.conscious for the first three years
of the war. They did not realize that English
photographic lenses could be so perfect that
they could show the footsteps of a si11lde
soldier who had walked over a meadow 20,000
feet below. The fact rema'ins that the lenses
are so good that they will show whether
the blades of grass have been bent by the
weight of a man. In this way, the Germans'
affection for putting f1al< guns in hedges
was revealed on innumerable occasiong. Mind
you, the photogmphic interpreter needs to
know the country the facets of which he is
interpreting. To the man who does not know
France, a, French conical haystack can look
like an Army tent. For a long time the local
method of storing potatoes in silos was mis
taken for networks of trenches. In Norway,
the method of drying hay over a rack was
confused with barbed wire. The German
habit of spl'eading manure in small piles
on the top of a field, thus leaving white
;pots when dug in, originally fooled the
photographic interpreters into thinking that
mine fields had been laid.
Since D-day, over 17,000,000 prints hm e
been developed as a result of photographic
.reconnaissance by the RAF. The photo
graphs have been taken by day and by night;
by an almost endless sequence of aircraft.
PRU aircraft have in some cases no pro
te'ction at all except speed. In spite of this,
more than one pilot has been able to claim
an enemy destroyed. On one occasion a
PRU aricraft was jumped by two !\less'er
schmitts: He jinked round the sky until both
had apparently run out of ammunition, and
one ha4 run out of petrol. Anyway, the first
Messerschmitt went off home; the other flew
alongside th" English aircraft, the pilot of
, which made rude signals at the Hun twelve
yardS away. This so infuriated the Hun that
he pulled away and made a final attack on
. '
the English aircraft. The English pilot, his "'l
patience exhausted, swung al'ound to meet,
the attack, knocked geveral feet off one of the 1
Hun's wihgs, and had the satisfaction of see- 1
ing it dive btraight into the ground. The Eng- 1
!ish aircraft on this occasion was a Mosquito.
On another occasion a Spitfire pilot was
chasl'ti by a G<:rman jl-t pIUlll', The Spitfire
rolled over at :21.0UO feet and (lived straight
tow1.\rd8 the deck. The jet plane followed
impetuously, its pilot thinking that he could
pull out of his (live just n, wl-ll as the Spit
fire. That is where he was \\TOIlg', The Spit
fire returned happil:, to 1>a,e after witnessing
the jet plane's headlong' nash into the ground.
Yes, in spitc of theil' frequcnt lack of
armament, pilots have liltle feal' of armed
enemy ail'craft. The;, kllow that they can
remain aloft longer aI1!l, in the case of jet
plant'S. have much grcater maneuverability.
PRU pilots often have to rely largely on
their wits for survival. They have fewer
aids to navigation. Lnfortunately. too, there
is no way of making a hole in the bottom
of their aircraft so they can be sure
that they are really covering their target
when taking photograp(1s. What they have
to do is to tip up the wing as they approach
the area to be photographed, gO as to make
quite sure that they have lined up the target
In the early days, the cameras were placed
in the wings at points where the cannon
used to be. It was soon found, however, that
there was not Rufficient depth to house the
thirty-six inch focal length of the cameras
there, anti RO the cameras are now placed
in the fuselage behind the head of the pilot.
These eamems weigh, with their ancillary
gear, over a hundl'e<!weig'ht, and it iR a tre
mendous tribute to the design of a Spitfire
that it will so brilliantly when modified
so drastically fOl' its PR'l' role,
Spitfire pilots like to fly 30.000 feet, but
if there is any risk of trail condensation,
or if there is high priority on a small target,
they may fly several thousand feet lower.
But once they gC't Ul1<IC'1' 11<,000 feet they
can expect a vety short lif!" even if they
duck in alld out of the douds.
Olle of the disatlvtllltages of lJeing a PRO
Vilot is that enemy ail'craft see from
at least 400 yanb away wlll'1l all Endish
aircraft is U1U\I'me,1. 011 the other hand, if
there is II lack of armanlt'nt. this Jll'ovides
all extra twenty miles per hour, as well as
an extra hour or so of !lying time.
PRU cameras have two types of jlUlg'a
zines, containing respectivt'ly 125 and 250
films. as well as five kinds of suit
able fo}' photog'l'aphing' targets at different
heights. There too, an oblique camera
used for at noug'ht feet, when
it is vital to know if. for example, the mc
dium bomhers have really I>lown a bridge or
have near-missed it. This "dicing" with
death is only demander! of PRU pilots on
rare occasions.
It will be noticed that all this photographic
reconnaissance is done mechanically by cam
eras which are set in motion by the pilot
or navigator when he reckons that he is
over his chosen target. Visual reconnaissance
is evidently impossible from 30,000 feet even
by day: At night, Mosquitoes use photo
flashes (two feet long, four or five inches,
in diameter, and capable of exploding at pre
determined heights). Spitfires only flying by
day, Wellingtons, by contrast, only fly by
night, but whereas the :\Iosquitoes fly 8,000
01 more feet above ground, the "'ellingtons
are ,lilly a few hundred feet up. Their
reconnaissanef' is largely visual. In other
words, the air crews watch what they can
see in their target area when they drop
their twenty-five pound tlares. One would
have thought that the Wellington would be
regarded as obsolescent, if not obsolete, by
the RA F, in view of its now comparatively
low flying feet. The fact remains that the
Wellington crews like their aircraft. They
regard them as sedate and gentlemanly, with
much more endurance and toughness of con
struction than and Spitfires.
Nig-ht reconnaissal1('e by PRe aircraft is
always tactical. seldom strategic as it is by
day. A pilot will be briefed to tly along ten
or fifteen miles of enemy roads, will reach
his point and drop bundle,s of flan's
l'\'el-y two 01' three lIlinutes to >ee what call
he seen. Each bundle will illuminate a cit,
cular mile as clearly as daylight. One Wel
ling-ton pilot told me that the best sight he
ever saw was a convoy of over forty enemy
lorries. On another occasion he saw a whole
tJ'ainful of ,'nelllY tanks. Normally, the
bomb-ahnet -or, ruthel', the man who wou:d
be the bomb-aimer if the aircraft carried
bombs-is the chief spotter. The pilot can
only look out of his side win,low, while the
tail-gunner's eyes are usually looking up
wards to anticipate enemy aircraft reaction.
Somltimes the Wellingtons only fifty feet
above the ground.
PRU aircraft have ,done numbers of in
valuable jobs since D-day. They have pin
pointed the exact spots for airborne land
ings at places like A 1'llhcm; they discovered
the V-I sites; they founa the Bisma)'ck near
Bergen and the Scharnhorst at
They first reported the jet plane on the
Western Front. They are continuously having
"press-on" days when vital information has
to be secured.

Victory in the Pacific
])ig-e,;ted at the C0I11111all<! and GenC'ral Staff School from an article
hy Fl'IIIlriB }lc}Imtrie, AINA, in Til' .\'ary (Great Britain)
March ID45,
IF there ig one 10,son that the \\'al' with
:Japan has driven in up to tilt' hilt it is the
importance of tl1(' nircraft l'al'\'icl' ill llwllel'lI
naval warfare', \VithO\lt sueh it would
have b<'IPl1 to (lXI)cct rapid
the widest ocean in th,' world, interrupted
('nly occasionally by blands.
This haR again bel'll illibtrntell the ("I>'l'
with which a task f,wce ('ompri,inl< a In1'!!l'
pumhcl' of aircraft l"\I'l'icl's ull,kl' \,ie<'
A,lmil'al l\!itsch,'r 1m,; diverit'll th(' attl'ntion
of the lall,l.j,a,ed ail' f01'<'l" while
the main hOlly uf the Fifth Flvet Ulldl'I'
Admiral Spl'ualll'<' has lll'l'n ,tol'lllin!! the
island of Iwo, soon to be('ollH' all Allied base
from which furtlw1' attaeks call Il<' launel1l'If.
That the Japan"'" \l'el'<' th"
til'st to appreciate the ahove fad th('re is
little douht. Quick to learn froll! the
experience of others, they hall ca I efully note.l
the gaine.1 b,j the Royal at
Taranto and at ;\latapah thr<Jueh the ,.:kilful
employment of cal'l'it'rb<Yrne airl'raft, Ilotwith
>tallding the disabilities imllO,ol'cl hy tl1<'
elwlllY's 1'0sFession of pll'ntiful airfhlds on
hoth sides of the narrow }lediteITanean, In
the Atlantic the c{)utl'ihution of the Fle('t
Ail' Arm to the dp"tl'uction of thC' liiRm(lI'ck
been equally rlmarkahlt,
Thus when the bolt from th" blue fell at
Pearl Harbor on Sunday, 7 December 1941.
aircraft carriers were the speal'lwad of the
attacking force. It is !lOW known that these
included the new 29.000-ton S!lpkalw and
Znikuku; the slightly smaller and much older
Almgi and KaYII; and the lighter but more
modern Hi),Yll and SOI'lJlf, of 10.OfiO tons,
Together, these six ships would he able to
accomodate about 400 planes, a proportion
of which would naturally be fightel's, Thus
the original egtimate of "between 150 an,l
, 300 miders" may not have been so exag
gerated as at one time thought.
It was the enemy's hope that the three
1aircraft carriers which at time
part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have
hC>Cll lying in their herths at Pearl Harbor
on that fatal Sunday. Actually, one at least
of them, the USS Ellfel'lH'iso, was with a
detached force which ha,\ left Pearl Harbor
011 28 November to deliver tt nUlllber of new
tight0r to Wake Island. The program
of this force envisaged returning to base
oefol'e dark on (j December, a faet that was
possibly within Japanese cognizance.
I nsteH'], a gale which caused a destroyer's
seams to open delayed the force's return by
tWl'nty-folll' hours; and in the meantime the
1'l'lIluilling part of the carrier division had
he('11 dispatched in some other direction. Thus
lIot a single Amcrican carrier remained in
port to hecollle a tal'get for torpcdo or bomb
at ,iaybreak on 7 December.
Still, the blow was heavy enough in all
c(>nsci0Ilce. The United States Navy sustained
a major defpat at trifling cost to the enemy.
battle"hip "trength for the time being
WaS reduced to bare equality with that of
Japan, Almost simultaneously the only two
Driti"h capital ships that could he spared
for sl'rvice in the Far Ea"t fell victims to a
concl'ntrated ail' attack in the absence of
Amed carrierborne fighters.
Had the enemy been prepale.\ immediately
to follow up their success with a combined
0p<'ration against Hawaii, the duration of
the war might have been extended very COIl
Fortunately for the Allies, Japa
nese was governed by the Army,
Ilul'tured on German ideas; and the attrac
tions of East Indies oil combined with a
frantic urge to etose the Burma Road to
China to prevent the Pearl Harbor stroke
being followed by the landing of enemy
troops in Hawaii:
I t is also possible that the Japanese naval
authorities were reluctant to risk their few
but precious aircraft carriers in view of their
failure to destroy those of their opponents.
At this stage in the conflict they possessed,
begideg thp'six aln'ady mentiolled, a couple
of otherg too "mall to be of vulul' ex<:ept for
training: log'dhl'r with tin' 1lll'<Iilll11
sized carril'l''' ju"t cOllvprtl'<1 from depot ship,;
or seaplanl' lplltll'r,;, :'Ilol'eov,'I'. und,'r ('oll
stniction 0[' ronvl'r"ion wel'<' half a <Inzell
larg'er tl('d can'i"I''', For the lllOI1l<'llt, t hl'l','
fore, therc was little to ('h(\o,e hl't\,",','n thc
Ul1ite,1 Statl''; lind .Tapan in ('ai'l'il'['
Everything' woul,1 ,,'('111 to hav,'
del1l'n<iC',1 on g'etting' the It-ad ill thb 1I11pOI'tant
category of wUI',;hip as (]uil'kly a, IH)"illl,',
and kel']'ing it. In "lleh l'Il'CUII1't:llll"''; tIl<'
bol<lel' course would all1l1),t "l'rtailll,' havp
heen the safl'r one,
Ind,'e,1 the d"'lll'!'all' plig'ht ill whi('h tl",
JapanC'"c: Flel't find" it,;"lf t()<Ia\' lila,' hp
largC'ly attrihutl'd to ih IH'l1ul'i()u: 1)(,ji:'Y of
ll"il1g' only limit"tI with IOl'al ol,jel'tivl''':,
In pradil'p, this ml'alll that at I",,!
\VPl'C intlictl1d a.ll} :-.u .... laillt'd till a
hasis, \Yhpn thl' ",'uthwal'll adval1"" ,'f til!'
enemy toward, .\u,tralia ell""I,,'d at tlw
Battlc ()f the Coral Sl'a ill th,'
. tlw Hlt,diulll- ..... izt,d (:al'l'il'I' Sf/ohn,
and at Ipa:--t uHE' l'J'tti ... l'l'. 11l1t :--lIt'l'l'l'th,d in
011(' of tht two
th<: Lt.,';u!lflJlI.
Too latl', all p:o.pl'<iitl()1! :W::till't lIaw:lIi
nt Ia:--t Pll'}HlIPd. 11 \\itb tlldl"-
to takl' :'II idway I,land "II I'()ll Il', TIl<' \' ,S,
Pacific Flp('\ ,tood in thl' !ll\th si<ie,
fle\\' ntf ail' fol'l't'" til<' t()l'l'('t!Ol" and
of whieh th" ,Iap:III("'"
.....It;(fffi, /{U!llI. Ili)'!!II, and SIJI !III,
\\'hil(' the AIlH'l'icall" lost only ont', thl' )-,,,'1;
((111'11, of 1(l,!lOO ton,. Ha\\aii w:t- tlwl1('('[ol'th
free fron1 feal' of i)1\'u..... inn; and thl' ,'{du{'tioll
in ,Japanl'''' raniPl' ,t !'l'ng'th {,lltitlt-,; thi,:
hattie to rank til" turning pl\int 111 the
Pac,ific \\"ar,
For the next "ig'htet'n
\\'('I'e l'olldudrcl in the :-':e\\' (iuillC'a
Solomons al','a, wlw\'(' th,' rlung'
tenaciotlsly to the islan,b in which the,' hat!
establishl'c1 themsdvC's, In adion, known
the of Savo ]"Iand, thl' Ea,tel'll
Solomons, Cap{' E>pt'ranl"', Santa Cruz, (;U:I
dalcanal, and Kula (;llIJ, .Japa
nese losses ineluded the battleship;.; Hiri ane!
/{i}'i"ilJlfI, the carl'ier RYIIZYO, and an
ullcl'l'tain 1ll11llhel of cruiscrs; whilc the
l'nit,'d Statl's lost the Cal'riel's Horncl;
of lH,HOIl and Was)), of 14,700 tOI1S, wilh
vig'ht CI'Ui't'I''', Slowly but the
\\ '" d I'i\,l'n from onl' bland after the other,
and fal'lhC'l' wc"twan\ alollg' the New Guil1l'a
With ';!I't'ngth, in ail'
nafr CHl'I'iC'l'<, th(' U,S, Navy was enabled to
,t rik.. at ncw and more diRtant objectives,
in the Gilbert and
:'If ar,hall g'I'(\UI" wc're oVL'I'whelmed after
lig'hting', Trllk bombed and by
Saipan, ('hivf Japanl'"e ba;;e in the
:'>{ariana" wa" tatcn after a stiff strug'gle,
alld (;ualll, fOl'llll'l' Allll'rican in
t IH.) Hllllt' e:l'tlu}J. 1'0conqucl'('d.
.-\ lhl'eat to thl' Palau nl'arC'st of
tIll' gronp" to the Philippines, at
I:"t th,' .Japan,',l' Fleet into the
I'il'llll'l', Iktl'cll,t! by ail' l'cconnai,;,ance off
tlu' ('u...,t t'oa--t of Luzon, it \\'as hl'avily
1w.:kvd hy (T .S. c.:arriel'hOl'lll) airel'aft and
,!llf,'n't! till' I,,,, of the 2!J,OOO-ton Syokakll
and :1I111thl'I' hig' l'al'l'iel' ('onvl'l'tl'd frolll an
pi t' .. pa:--':-'l'llj.!.'l'l' linl"I" prohably either thp
[fi!lll or tlIt' .lIfO!IIl. Thb action is kno\vq as
tl.,' Hattl,' of th,' Ea,t('1'Il Philippines,
FtlUI HhHlth=-- latt.r the Alnel'iean
.. I' lil',t "tep of
tIll' l'hilippinp", ag'ain stung thC' Japanese
Illto al'livil,', In order to be within
I ,'at'll l'f oil and I'elil've the strain
01\ thl' ,[0"1,, in .Iapan, lh(' lal'gC'r part of the
('lll'IIl,' IIt'd had !,pcn in the waters
(If !lOI'IWD and Indo-China, To effect a con
,,'nt rat ion, Ihn'e ,epal'ate con
\('I'g'"t! on till' PhilippinC's arC'a, Long before
a ,iunet ion coult! Ill' effected. thC' s(]uallron
(omlng' from .Japan it>;elf \HIS attacked to
t 11(> 1101'1 hwal'd of Luzon aircraft of the
1..',S, Third FIl'N untler Admiral Halsey,
In nn,laug'ht, the ZlIilwlw, of 2(l,OOO
to!!'t'lllC'1' with thl'C'e smaller cal'l'ier", the
Tit"",', Ti!l"du, :lIHI hllil/(), all conversions,
\\"'l'l' dl'stl'oyetl, Three (if these \\'('re torpedoed
01' homlll'd to hut the ZlIiho was
sunk by gunfire of AmC'rican cruisers and
destroyers after being hy the air
l\Teall\vhilc the two l'nemy 'rtuad)'oll" from
the, southwestwar,1 had also hl'l'll undl'r Iwavy
ail' attack. Olle, including' thl' old
HI/NO and }'(1II1(1Hil'o, ]1l'actil'ally anni
hilated, but the other, which incltllkd the two
bi!!" new battkships and }'omrtlo,
pu,hed its way through to thl' l'tlstWH1',! of
Leyte and succeedl"! in ,inking' thr"l' AIllCri
can carriers, attache, I to tIll' S('vl'llth Flt'ct
under Vice Adlnil'al Kinkaid, thl' l'ritl('f'foll.
Gambit". /Juy, and St. Lo, all vl's:-.pb of

With the retul'll of the Third FI('l't and
its ail'cl'uft, this forcl' \\'as in turl! drivl'n otr.
and during' its !'l'U'pat ,utt'erpd the los, of
the .11118((,'; and otlwr ,hips, F01' thl' Japan",,'
:\avy to ret'OVer from ,ul'h a dl'l'i,IVl' dl'f'ltn
b l'k'hrly illljlos>iible, .
In all theoc opemtions, with the exception
of Cl'l'tain of the night actions in the 8010
IllOns, tIll' novd featlll'C' has heen the laading
IJUl't takell 'b;' airl'l'aft cnrl'ier" Superiority
in of this ha< heen a vital'
"I l'llll'n: i.n A Ilic(! vidor:, OVCI' ,Japan, Thus
the air arlll p:iv(,l1 'a weapon of
)'ange to tit't.'t:-; \vhich
fOrmt'I'ly dcp<'lul(',l on the g:llns and
ni their ,hips to hring' about a dl,d,don,
I t not follow from that the day
of thl' dnlh'. Oft('n threatened,
tht' Inltt\co,hip has !leVel' yl'l lwen eclipsed
anI] still its l""ition thi' strongest
and heaviest-hitt ing' type. That the trepd of
Ilt' infiuelll'l'd h;' the events this
\\ ar i< illt'vitahle, but m()(lifiJ"ation rather
than elimination is tl) bl' lookl'd for as the
lillt, to he followed,
Smoke Screens in T!1nl{ Operations
Tralblatl'd and dic;estt'd fit the Command and General Statf School frolll a
Hu,sian urticle by Lieutenant C"lonel G, Khanatskii in f{"08IWiu
Zcczda (Red Star) 4 January J!l45.
SCl'l'ens for concl'aling' the move
ments ,of tanl,s on the ImttJefiel<l are used
very wi<lely. They help exccute tank ma
neuvers unnoticed by the ellt'lll;' and l'L,ltwC'
losses caused hy cnt'lllY antitank weapons.
The uoe of for this howevl'r,
is not so as it Inay
More often than not, the nel't! for a slllohe
screen arises quite suddenly and unexIH'etedl:,
aftel' the tanks havp been fircd upon, To be
of any use, thl' smoke screen should be laid
dowrl in a matter of The >,oonel' the
tanks arc protected hy smoke, the smaller
will be their losses. To wait fol' "lieeial
chemical warfare units uncleI' thc circum
stances is senseless, and lwsides, thcy cannot
always operate ahead of the tanks, Conse
quently, when the tanks arc in the'immt'diate
vicinity' of the enemy, the laying of a smoke
screen can be done only hy a fast and fairly
invulnerable vehicle, or a tank,
It is, of course, desirable to have for this
purpose a specially equipped tank, We know,
ho\\,pv,'I', that a smoke "l'ree;l can be laid by
ol'djpal'Y tanks sUjJplicd with a >,ufficient
amount of sl1loke-g't'nel'atil1g: chcmical. The
Illohile charaetcl' and the short duration of
tallk l'ngag:ellll'nts do not hamper hut actually
facilitate'the use of smoke >'cl'pcns,'for smoke
"'l't'(,lh ill fa>'t-moving l'ng'ag'ements need not
1",t a long' time, All that may be required
to >,ecure a tank maneuver. for t'xampll? is a
last ing' tC'1l 01' tiftl'cn minutes, which
i, sufficient fol' completing the
l1HlllC'UVl'r 01' leaving the al'('a under enemy
al'tillery fin' and conccntrating elsewhcre for
a new attack,
The experience in using screens in
tank eng'agC'ments has shown that the diffi
cultil's and the risk tallen b, 'the snioke-Iay
ing tanh m'e fully justified by the advantages
derived fl'om fl't!e lllanl'uver under the protec
tIOn of the smok!", One of our tank companies.
for ('xample, w;is ordered to reconnoiter the
cllt'my's dispositions neal' a railroad station.
The country around the station was open and
flat. when the ('\\lnpany wa' tal,,'n
under enemy artillery fire 011 way to the
station. the situation sud(lenly Ill't'ume ditli
cult. Th('re was an ambush in tl1l' orchard of
n nearby furm located on a hill, nlHl tIll'
enemy coule! easily hit our machinl'" from
that position. There was no covel' anywherc
around, nnd to hYl'a% the heip:ht was nnw
too late, hl'cause from thl'ir
position the Germans could kt'l'P our tanl(s
under fire for a long time. For thb l'l'ason
the commander decide,l to prot,'d the Lattle
formation of his l'ompany a
He lit. and threw oft his tank a
('rating stick and ol'<!erl'd tIl<' l)1' tIlt' tanl"
to follow his example.
In half a minute the ,mllke had all
the tanks concealell from l'lll'my obervatioll.
The Germans stopped tiring_ Thl' wind
ually bll'w the smoke c\ow! toward the ,'ncIlIY.
Keeping- behind thl' sllIoke. the' cOIllIIHlIlli<-r
led the cOlllpany pandlpl to the IllIlVt'nlt'nt of
the sllloke scret'n. A nd as tlll'Y pl'og l'l'sse(l.
additional ,;moke sticks to maintain tlw "llIo;,e
screl'n we\'(' thrown 011 the gTOUll<l. SoOil till'
tanks were on the flallk of the ('lWIllY ambush
and ahout 800 nwt"rs frol1l thl' farlll. '1'\\ 0
tanks Wl're left in the bushl's, while thl!
of the machines nlOvl'<I around the smoh,
screen at full spee!1 in order to attack tlw
ambush from the flank and real'. The tall];s
in the buslws opened til'e from their
positions, for the smoke was beg-inning' to
thin out. The enemy noticed the111 ami con
centrated all his guns 011 these two lanks. An
unexpected attack by the remaining tanks
suddenly emerging from the smoke caught
the Germans unawares. They di,! not have
enough time to turn their guns. The enemy
ambush was 1I(':<tro),ed and ou!' tanks went on.
In usillg smoke screen:<. tanks seldom l'ntl'r
the smoke but "trive to I(el'p it b,'lwel'n them
selves and the l'nemy as a sort of concealing
obstade. The 1 cason fOI' this is that ;;moke
considerahly limib the ohservation fro111
tanks, and a moving tank can easily fall into
a hole in the ground. Lowered visibility is
likely to result in some loss of control. That
is why the commander of the tank company
in the foregoing example led his company
not lhroug'h the' smoke but around it and
paraIll'l to its movcment. Although his 111a
neu \'er took 1Il0l"(' time, it definitely helped to
reduce und in the end enabled the COlll
III l1IHll'1' to his mission
full: .
Pndpr no circuBlstances should the enemy
he n11,)\\'('d to utilize our sCI'een for re
grouping' his antitank guns, When screened
by the ,moh', out' tanks cannot observe the
enl'IlIY. and if the 511101,(, screen is not large,
the JlUl-pose' of the is easily detcr
Illin,'.! hy till' l'n\'my. Knowing this, he will,
of coUI,P. t to dis)llaC(' his weapons to
n1l'l'l Ill\' nl'\\ ,ituation and prepare for firing
il' till' lll'\\' dirl'ction. How cun we prevent
-til h :t l'ountel'maneuvc'r'!
Fir,[ Ilf all, do not let the enemy get out
of y()ur ohservution. To prevent this, tanks
\\ ith observers U\'l' ol'llinarily sent out to the
of the smuke >,en'en. Firing froll1 con
l't"ull"d I""itions, th,'se tank" try to pl'event
thl' ,'nl'I1IY frol1l displacing to new positions.
In addition, tiwy divert till' l'lll'l1IY'S attention
to thl'l1I"elvc,.;.
In the l'ng:lI.(l'l1Il'nt described above, the
('OlllnHln<iel' had his two tanks in the bushes
f()r this purpose. Thl'iI' fire facilitated
the nHlI1eUVer of the company and prevented
the cnemy from Jll'l'paring to repulse our
llank countl'l'attack.
Wlll'nevl'r a slIloke scr<'en is laid before
tIll' bcginlling of the advance-and not in the
cou}",-" ,)f a maneuver-care should be taken
not to hlind our own men. In such cases it is
vettl'1' to fi re smoke shells on the encmy anti
tank artillNY and ohservation posts. The
ndvnntagl's of this method are obvious: our
tanks do IIOt have to go through or drive
around the smoke screl'n. And besides, blind-,
ing sllloke marks very well the location of
the to lw fir,;t tal(en under fire of our

enfol-tunall'!Y, the use of smol(e shells by
tIl(> artilkry or mortars at the request of
tank cOlllmanders is not always possible, for
<luring the artill,'ry preparation the smoke
rising from the enemy'" main line of resist
ance interferes with aimed fires. Later, how:
cver, when our tanks penetrate the position,
til(' urtiJIel'Y is with lin'
mbsions in the depth of tIll' enemy
Under such circumslallt't's, the tankmen are
cOlllpelled to use their own nlt'ans of smoke
laying. In doing' so, ho,,"<,\:(')', can' shou]'1 be
taken not to blind the tank drivers.
When the impt'ndin)!,' numem','r b frontal
and the wind blow,", along' tIlt' front 01' toward
us at a sligJll ling]" 10 tilt' fl'lllll, "lIoke gen
erators should ht, placed as close to the enemy
This type of SHIUkl
OUl' tanks only ,luring the approach to tht'
main line of rl'si"tanct', Sueh silloke screens
aI'" laid sillo!;,'-laying' tanl;s. To
do so, they 'luickly \",.,ak throug'h at high
'pl'cd toward tIlt' line ,It'signal!'.! fur the
smoke screen,
Here is an illustrativl' t'xamplc', The I\'th
Tank Ih'giment, operating' with an infantry
unit, \vas to attack a \vell-Ol'g'<\llizet! pu;-;ition.
The tCl'l'uin was not ditlicult (01' OUl' tanks,
uut the way"t" the po,itioll \l'a" n),-Irueted Ly
an antitank ditch, Path" OVl')' the ditch were
to be mude by Ollr ,;aplll'r, during' tIll' attack,
for the ditch was well clIv('red hy artillery ant!
machine-gun J;res, There \\';h nnt suiTIcient
time for thorough preparutions" To make the
sappers' C'H!Sicl', the <':olllIlHtndl'l"
(lccided to use smoke. Sevl'l"al tanks carry
ing submachinc gunners Wl'l! trailll'd in
smoke laying were tll'lailed for tIll' job, Five
minutes before the Leginning ,Jf the artilll'l'Y
preparation, this group was to approach the
dilt-h and lay a slllok.. screen utilizing the
wind hlowing alollg' the frollt. The smoke
>,'rv,'11 was jntl'll,k'd to last only a short time.
Thl' tanl(s I1IOV(',1 ah(>atl at top speed with
ill t('I'vals of frum to :]00 meters, Three
of the IIULchines sueceeded in reaching the
ditch, The fourth tank hit a mine near the
ditch an(1 had one of its tracks damaged.
)\cvcrthl'le>s, all the tanks participated in
'Ilwkc laying. Smoke-generating devices werE!
quickly thrown into the ditch, and the result
ing sllloke quickly covcred the tanks and the
men riding on thelll, Because of this protec
tion, the enemy was unabll' to prevcnt further
action of the smoke-laying' tanks. The suL
machine distributed smoke pots all
along the ditch, and the smoke curtain
thickellL'<! hy another slUoke wave. Under
thl' protl'ction of this sllloke, the tank break
through eehelon allproachcd the ditch. The
"appl'rs came with this echelon, Paths through
the ditch were soon prepared, anti thL' tanks
],l'gan (,I'ossing over. When the last tank had
cI'os>e.l "the ditch, the smoke was sufficiently
displ'l':,e<l and did not interfcrt' with the action
of Olll' tanks again:,t the Illain line of resist
anee, The attack was crowned by a successful
Ln'akthl'ough, and we had practically no
in tanks.
Ll't 11' Ill,te, by'the way," that a drifting
>lllOk" '('n'cn is Iikl'ly to Llind adjacent units
opl'rating' on the !t'e ,ide, To avoid this, it is
I1l'Ct'"ar,' to cOOl',linate with your "neighbors
t 1](' time and se'1lwnce of ;,0111' smoke screens,
Turning the Siegfried Line
Digested at the Commanu and General Staff School from an article
in The Times (London) 13 :llarch 1945,
WHEN the last German positions within
the bend of the Rhine west of Wesel were
cleared, British and Canadian forct's undet
General Crerar, commanding the First
Canadian Army, stood in strength along the
left bank of the great German river all the
way dowJCIstream from \Vesel to Nijmegen
" (see sketch). But they had had to tight for"
virtually every mile of the way they had come
since the morning of 8 February vlhen they
('ustwanl throllgh the little frontier
toWll of Bt'ek, awl Gl'opsLeek, in Holland, a
few ruiles to the south,
The purpose 'of this operation was to turn
the right flank of the Siegfried Line and
secure the regi6n between the Maas and the
Rhine southeastward to a line running
)'oughly through Geltlel'n to the river bank
opposite Wesel; and to destroy as much as
possible of the' German military strength in
doing so, General Crerar's Canadian com
mand was fir"t strongly reinforced by British
divisions, including Scottish, We"t
English, and Welsh infuntl'Y, with one forma
tion of mixpd British infant ry battalion,;, and
a rmored formations composed of units of th,'
Guards, thl' Royal Tank Rl'giment, and Brit
i:;h and Yl'omanry, One way anti an
oth"l' thl' British l'l'prl'sl'ntation heavily out
weighEcd the C'anadian element, which, even
so, included more than a division of armor
and two infantry divisions, besides troops of
all other arms and servie"s, It was thus a
very tine mixed force, in gl'l'ut h,'art, which
wpnt over the start lines an ,Hlgmentl'd
corps under the comman,l of the
Lieutenant (;cncral Horrocks, after a pre
liminary bOlllbnrdnH'nt one of the mo"t
powerful concpntratiolls of g-uns-h"avy and
as well as field and nlt'<iium
pil'res-so far Lise,! in this war, There were
in fact about 1,400 guns, The Gl'rlllan towns
of Cleve and (;och, vital communication
centel'S ncar the nOl'thpast0rn and
ern edgl's respectively of the Reichswald, the
gTl,,,t ckfpnderi stnte forest which was the
immediate objective of our assault, had been
practically oblitcrated oVl'rnig-ht by RAF
Bomber Command,
The Canadian infantl'y took thl' extreme
left flank and :;truck due eastward towards
the Rhine at Millingt'n; the British divi<it'd
and went eastward for Kranenllllrg' and
southeastward to Bruk and the western tip
of the Reichswald, There was little mol','
than the 180th Infantry Division of scarcely
first-class troops, with eJ('ments of the very
good 2d Parachute Division, in front of them
at the tiult', and those Germans in the
Reichswald, whl're a grim had heen
anticipated, were largely surprised and
"bounced" out of their positions before they
could do much, But that was only during
the first day or two, and around the northern
part of the forest. Thereafter, foul weather,
coupled with the already flooded state of the
.Rhine and an extension, through German
demolitions, of the floods north of Nijmegen,
made progress on the left flank unimaginably
The roml to Kranenburg and Clevl', the
Olle available highway for all purposes, \\'a.;
soon awash, so the engineers and pionecl's
marie the parallel railway track serve for
wad vehicles, till that too became !loaded.
l'hl'll the main burden of transport had to h"
taken over by fkets of amphibious vehicles
with such zoologkal IHlllll'S as "buffalo"s"
and "ducks" and the littll' "weasel" swim
llling carriers, Northward to the Rhine the
land was like ,I lake, and on this the Canu
,lians put out in amphibians ami a variety
of watl'r craft to keep themseiv(', moving on
the Ipft !lnnk towards the Cleve-Emnll'rirh
Briti"h infantry on the axi" of the GI'<Jl'S
hl'ek-ekve road nmde excellt'nt initial pru
gress, Pa"ing thl'ough Klanenburg they
l'arril,d the :-':utterden feature and on the
fourth day the:, capturl'd Cleve, The boating
Canatlians then having reached Griethausen
on the railway running northward out of
Clev,', the left !lank of Olll' advance bC'gan
to wbeel al'oun,l to the southl'ast. In the
nwantime the enemy had pulled
together nfter the shock of the
prt']Jaratory hombardment and the surprise of
OUI' first Of his ovel'l'UIl IBOth Infan
try DIvision, the bulk of the e!l'ectives wel'e by
then our 01' had been othcl'\vi:;e
"writtl'n o!l'''; but the inevitable glowing down
of moVeIlll'(1t by the floOl!s an,! the masses of
mineo he had placed in ou!' path had given
the ent'my time to reinforce around the e'bt
ern and southern edgl's of the Rcichswald,
The 1110th Infantl'y DiVIsion had pushed
of its elements up from the front
farther south, and whole divisions of the First
Parachute Army wert' in the field. There was
soon no doubt aLout thl' fighting quality of
the parachute troop" who are probably the
best still remaining in the (;erman Army, and
they were quickly backed up by the Panzer
Lehr Division, the Illith Panzer Division, and
the 15th Panzer Grell,tdit'rs, :-':ine divi"sions,
mostly of good troops, with an increasing
weight of artillery which in a few days
amounted to about 400 guns, were all too
quickly ranged against General Crerar's men,
when, but for the accidents of bad weather
ant! flooded ground, they might have made strong positions in the ochwald as a hinge,
and exploited with armor a breakthrough to he gradually swung his center and left back
Xanten. anti-clockwise to form , bridgehead covering
There was no bl'enkthrough, then or later. the Xanten, Wesel, andl Rheinberg crossings
The first ,urprise had carried us of the Rhine.
through tlH' outer ,lefcllses of the northern All this was done, as our commanders
end of the Sicg-fril'(1 Line around the Rcichs- admit, with well-nigh periecteontrol on the
Ilald. hut thereaftl'1 tilt' thing Ilt'came for
both ,ides mainly all outdght battle of in
fantJ-y and arti11pry. Tanh. in which we
were vastly ."up('riol'. ha,l fl'w chancps. Our
ait'rl aft. too. in the unfavorahle
weather wc're rarl'lY allle to give the full
weight of their support to the troops. It waf;
a mattel' of pushing relelltlessly forward.
often at no light cost. The ehemy employed
every conccivabk trick of weapons anti tht'
use of ground in calTying out a fighting with
drawal by which, holding his immensely
German part. At no time could we "nish him
off his feet." After our capture of l\laterborn
and Cleve his resistance along the southern
part of the Reichswald stiffened and persisted
until finally broken by a noteworthy old
assault with the bayonet by Scot
tish. Welsh. and English infantry. Southeast
of Cleve he made a seri('s of counterattacks
and attl'Jl1pts to cut our supply lines which.
though they cost him dearly in tanks and
men, did much to check our advance to Goch
and Calcar.
At different times all the formations
becllme engaged in hloody battl(';; and suffered
grievous losses; but to the Canadians fell the
grim tllsks of clearing- th<.' Hoch\\'ald, the "lay
b/lck" of the Siegfried <1t,I'(,I1>{,5 and the
1'1'01l'C1l'll hinge al'l'a for the cnl'll1Y's
anI] latcl' of ckarin" the :,outh
to Xant"ll, Th"'l' Wel'e in']('l'd
tl'l'rihl'e st rup:gles, til I,,' C'omnlc'1110ratl'd in
the annals of Canmli:m hcroislll with thost:'
"f ('at'n and 1'al"i,.;e and al'ound tIl<' Scheldc'

But wlll'll all is "aid alld dOlle', it is to the
('ngineers, British all,I Canadian alike, not
forgl'ttillg' tIll' British piOlll't'rS who wOl'kl',1
alongsidl' tl1('111 , that till' majo!' trilmt(> lll1l:'t
be paid. Withnut tlwit' nnfailing' deknnina
lion ant! inlplovi"illl.': ,kill tIl\' ,it'IaYl'd adV:ll1l'l'
could lll'V('I' hm'," gOIH' I'ven at tIlt' r:ttl' it did,
Bridging'. by day alHl Hig'llt. nfttll1 lIndpl' firc'j
the tllainh'l1<1lh'l' and rtpair n1' O\'('I'-ltsed
1'oa<ls (inl'lnding- "on",t adapt 1
tracks for road IlalIic); tl1L' 01'
filling of cratl'I':' and antItank dil<'I1l'''; fillding'
and lifting' {,'Jllnlle>", mine..; thc,(' \\'cre
among lhe taql" dOl1l' hy a \\'oll<krtlll hody of
soldiers who at times labored amid all the
dsk,; of lmttle without the stimulus of taking
part in it with at'ms. The men of the armored
formation who wot'ked the troop- and
snppIY-l'(llTying and the mine
('xploding" "flail" tanks and flame-throwing
"ernco,\ill's," hud tlwit, full share in the suc
ecss of tIll' operation; a1111 llone forgets the
[I chil'V"IllL'll Iq of the RASe [Royal Army
Sl'rvic,' Corps 1llavigating their "ducks" with
sU)lpli<.'s OveI' the walen;, 01' the constant
Ill','St'IlI't' up at t hl' frollt of the devoted RA!lie
rHoyal .\t'my :'l"dical Corps] with their
[lmhulant,(>s [lJl(1 drp;.sing' stations and field
opernting' thl'atc'r", 01' the unl'esting ubiqui
tnUR lilll'llH.'ll of thQ Signals.
.\ll ann..; and havc wot'l,<.'<! SUPl'I-hly
as a ftH' thl' of a carnpaign
which, amolH,' oth<.'r things, h'b; resultl'd in
tIll' captul'" of allout of the hest l;er
mall trollp,,;, with the de"trul'tion as effeC'tives
of at !t-a:'l as lllallY lllll!'t'; the tUl'lling of the
Sicgi'l'it,d LillI' alld a "tl'ong junction with
the l'nilt'd :\inth Army along the left
\':111k of th(' Rhine,
mal,,, up quieknes and observation
YOUI' vi,ion lacks in range, teach you to move
and quietly, and how to keep touch,
A little l'xperienee, and will realize-a
I'''ht ehepl'illg' thought-that YOUI' beastly
little yell "\\' enemy more jittery than YOll
The .Jap is an insect. Picture yourself tight
illg' man-size red ants and you\'e got it. He
pas all the qualities and faults of the fighting
ant. Ill' ib toug'h, l1lohill', industrious, disci,
plinc,l, callons, and vic ions, He goes on till
you stamp on him am] kill him, But, like the
[lnt, 1](' is not very well equipped to be a
world-heatcl', He is 'stupid, He does the same
things in the same way ancl goes on doing
them; he acts by instinct rather than reason;
the unexpected confuses him terribly. He is
.Tung'le Fighting in Burma
.\n :lrticlL- J.i('lIlL-ll:lnt Gl'lwral Sil' I\'illiam Slim, COl1l111alldcl' FourtPCllth
Army, III .I!t", a ()f the Brit i,h :\1 iddlc Ea"t Command,
:\0, :18, :'larch 1\115,
FEW of ll", \\hl'lht'I' frotll til" ('iti"s amI
open of Britain alit! t hl' j)"ll1inions,
from th' plains of In,lia, or frum the of
:\ppaI, arc ll",'d til tIl\' jllllg'k, At first it
be\\ ildC'r::-, al1d LIven fl ij.!ht(n'" us.
Tn the Fourtp,'nth A wC' have fOlllld t\\'o
remedies for and pxpt'ril'ncc-
and of thl'S", trainillg' Ctlmcs fir"t,
nnlcss eXjlerience is ha,('d on livc training' it
is apt to be costly,
The strangl'n.."", tht' ,tlt'Ill'C broken hy a
sudden Ul1l'xplainl'd lloi"l', thc limited visi
bility,' the appalling' of move
ment. the Imowj"d,<.:'(' that lwrc thl'l'l' is 110
"front," and, abovl' all, lhl' i,olalion that you
feel only a fl'w yal'lb from youl' cOll1l'adl's
will all affeet you ill the jungle at first. But
training will tell you what the noise mcans,






not difficult to kill if you go the right way'
about it,
To oeal with the jUllg'l!' all.\ the Jap, the
ba"ic necds are infal}tr,. and ail'
supply, \Ve ne{'d also. of course. !!:unH. tanks.
' sig'nals. air support, and the rest. but infantry
and air sup!lly ar!' tIl(' foundation of ",uccess
in c.>tmtry whl'}'e tig'hting is dose "Iut dis
tmwes g't'C'at, Hlld l'ni1\\"ay:-o and l'dads! dl) 11llt
Don't go in for ('Iaboral,' hI il!'ade and ,divi
sional ,'xet'eb"s until the individual an.1
section trainin!!: is ril!'hl. We havl' to producp
.. a tough. self-rdiant hUllt,'r. who is out to get
up to his aml kill him. Ph:,sical fit ness
COlllE'S first, not the old litnes,.
but !'nduran(e. tht' pO\\,E'r of IH'olnng'l,.1 ,:teady
cl\('l'tion, day aftlr day, and all on your own
feet. Next, discipJillc- IHI ullit that h'h not
got the hig;l1l'st standard of dbl'iplillL' will
keep going: in the jungk. For OJle thing;, it
will not "hey antimalaria anti that
will he the end of it. T1ll'n weapon training'
thl' quick shot at close The ,J ap is a
rotten shot; you'll get hilll every tillle if you
are' quick on the urnw. Fire (lisciplillC' C'lnllot
be too much in"isted on in training;. The ,Jap
will do nll hc can to mak(' you w,,,te :lll1ll11llli
tion sO that you give ll\vay your position and
he can attack you whell you have
weapons. Don't shool at noi,('s. Shoot only
when you can sec to kill. Train in ob",} vation.
Bettpr a third-class who keel''' hIS 'pyes
and ears open than a nwrl(Sman who .lol'sn't,
Survival depen.J" Oll olbcrvati,m; learn rcall:;
to see what you look at. Spend tillle teaching
your administrative personlll,l, ll}('(lical, >.up
ply, tmnspoi't, welfare. to he basic infantry
even at the "xlwns,e of thdr V;>chni'cal trnin
illg. There arc no nOlH'Oll1hatanti" in the
In jungle fighting more than in any other'
[ol'm of war, succ"ss depends on the junior
It'ao..r. II!' must b!' trained to be tougher than
even his men; evcl'ything th!'y can 00 he must
do hetter and do langel", He must use first his
('ye, nnd ears an,1 then to outwit
anu fox the Jap. He dming training,
accustom to the icil'a that thc enemy
will be behind him and that
is no n!'ed to panic ahout such a normal thing.
He will trnin himself and his men to be past
masters' in patrolling because in the jungle
pall'oHing' lllllet be and superiority
in thi, gives that aggre;;siv" contid"nce which
is the VQry soul of an army.
It b compurntively easy to know wbat you
wunt to do in any kinel of war. Leadership
consists 'in knowing whE'ther 'You can do it
the risks you ought t,o take. In the jungle the
chid risks for th!' highel' commander, the
hI iga.lier and upwards, nrc administrative.
He must learn to be a judg'c nf administrative
risk. He lllu,t be air-minded in the' s('nse that
he 1 lllak('s others regard-air
transportatioll. air supply. an.1 air close sup
port as an integTal part of normal operations.
He must tpaeh his formations to be as ready
to put themselve" into airplanes and gliders
as t1H'Y a1'(' to get into trains und 101'l'ies. In
uIl training' he should l'e'member thut to
advanl'e on a nano\\' front and attack the
Jap is to invite a bloody nose, He
use inst"ad the hroadest front possible
and cpn,tallt "honking" to get bE'hind. K!'ep
pre,sing. The initiative is all-important in
jungle tlghling'. Lastly. during training all
cOllllllan.l('rs should expcrinH'nt in )lew tactics,
new 111etho.l" of admini,tl'atioH anti trans
portation. Don't get into a rut, evpn in the
Artillery Support of Infantry Attack
Translated at the Command and Gcnel'lll StalT School from a Russian
unit'le by Colonel E. l<1el80n ill Zl'c:tiu
(Red Star) 20 Febrbary 1045. '
THE importance of precise and uninter- must be thoughtfully and carefully organized
rupted cooperation between the infantry and during all phases of the battle and based on
theartiIlery cannot be overemphasized. It a thorough knowledge and understanding of
the sequenet' 'of events ,IUI'ing the artillery
'Vhile it is going on, the ('m'my's machine
g'un lH.lsts antl his nearest IHOl'tars l'culain
silent. His hatt"ries open fire not earlier than
five or ten minutes aftel' tIll' beginning of
our artillery actioll, If OUl' countl'rhattl'ry
an' condul'led en,'rgetically an,1 accu
rately. the' elll'my l'l'plies much later, Since
ahility to is limited, his
artillel'y in nHl,;t caRes only a stan,l
ing balTagl' over our u"'lwh('s or ah('ad of
th"Ill. If our forwanl d,'ments leave their
Jlositions of departUl'l' at the Ill'olwr time,
enemy shells will in cas"s hurst behin,l
the advancing \I'aV"S, with a few shells
exploding' among tIll' attat'kers, But ,hould
the bl' lalt', it i,; to mel'! II
dense curtain of tire,
SOllletillH'S thl' laullt'he, tl1l' as
,ault right frolll its po"itions of ,I<>parturl',
11 IllOV,'S forward without halting anywherl'
and tirl''' as it advances, using all tYIll'S of
i.nfantry In vi"w of the' long dis
tances covl're,l hy the attackers, they reach
enemy tn'lwhl's rath,'r fatigued, To avoid
this, it advisahle to halt thl' mov,'ment
within the a,;sHulting' distann', Each man
take's a little rest, relmub hb weapon, alld
gets bettl'r instructions as to the mission,
From this position the llll'n can fire several
times in the dirl'etion of tht' Plll'my, Tht'se
fires not affect the <'ncmy hut Sl'rve as
a psychological Jll'('paration for the impC'nd
ing assault,
If planned for, this delay on the assault
line [Hussian term meaning line of departure
for assaUlt) is an impol'tant link in the
organization of cooperation, for it enables
the command better to coordinate the Illow
of the infantry and tanks with the end of the
artillery preparation ami with the transfer
of fire into the depth of the enemy position,
Th;e 'pause on the line should not
be long; an exc('ssive delay will result in
unjustified losses, for the men will not have
enough time to dig in, As experience has
shown, the infantry should reach this line
ten or twelve minutes before the time sched
uled for the !lssault. If the terrain feature
"hosen for the lint' runs along an
vpen slope of a l'i<igl' or along a swamp, the
time the is to remain hl'rt' should
be dl'cl'eas<:>d, Umlel' all eircl1mstances, the
b<:>ginning of the assault Blust coincide with
the end of the urtillery jll'eparation,
The assault itsl'lf shoul,l last five minutes
at mm,t. The importance of thl' impetuo,ity
of the assault can b" judged from the follow
ing l"xample. A company iaunche,1 the as
sault following a two-holl!' artillery pl'l'pal'a
tion and in three and a half minutes reached
tIll' tirst enemy trench, Th,' enl'my was caug-ht
unpl'Cpal'Ld, nlany (iel'll1anS \VCl'C killed, ant!
the next tl'()lJch, too, was OVel'l'un without
halting, Thl' adjacent l'ompany, however, was
ddayed sonll'what and took two lllon' minutes
(0 reach the' a":tult line, but thl'se two min
utes \Vl're sutlieil'nt for the ,'I1('IlIY to org'allize
a strong- tire n'sistanct' ill tIll' tirst tn'uch,
Thl' l'ompally was pinned to thl' gToUIHI.
III thb ca,e the enemy infantry wa, ready
to repube "ur assault within foul' or fiVe
minutes aft,'I' the ('nd of th(' al'till,'ry !ll'l'IHtI'a
tion, OJ'(linaniy this hapPl'ns mueh latl'l'
the r,'('ove!'s the' ahility to tire ",Ill,
within ten tn twelvl' minute,;, But eVl'n th",e
hg-un's confirm lhe fad that ,;pt'ed oj' '''
:-.ault. OJ its tempo, is of dtt:i:-.ive inl}JOl'tancL'.
To inslll'(' thl' of thl' t'OOPl'}'U'
tion 1letwe,'n thc artill<'l'Y and the infantry,
the infantry !t'llV,' its line of departure
at a ct'rtain dl'lt'rlllined time, rl'aeh the as
sault lint' at a l'ertain time, get pI'cparl'd for
furthcr action on this liue, an,l launch the
ssault at thl' tim(' when our artil
It>ry its fi re into the d"pth of the
enelllY position, This Il1Puns that the infantry
should he allowed a ,l"finitt' amount of tune
fo)' thc ahove actions,
This time dt'pt'nds, tir,t of all, upon the
distane(' from thl' line of departure to the
assault line. Thb di,tance vari,", but seldom
exceeds, in practiee, fiOO 01' 700 meters, )lot
our trcnch"" al.:e so close to the
enemy (lOa l11('t('rs or' clo,e1') that the line
<'If departul'(' coincides with the aclsault line,
Experience shows that it takes about fifteen
vI' sixteen minutes to co\,er 200 meters, Thus,
if the distancc between the line of departure
!Movement of Infantry
during I\rlil1ery prepa
ration up to H mlOUS
IUld the assault line is 500 meters, the time
n'quil'ed to eovel' distnncQ thirty-five to
furty Add to it the' ten 01' twelve
millut"s spent (Ill the linl' in prepara
tion for the next move and y.ou will have a
total of from fol'ty-tive to fifty-five minutes,
Consequently, tIlt' has to leave the
lilll' of departul'e fifty-tin' minutes hcfol'e
til" time och"c/uled fOl' (ht as,ault. 01' at H
minus 55,
The oVc'rlay repl'oliUl'Cll in the ,keteh elt'arly
shows that this time' should hf' cumputed
Sl'p,il'atl'ly for l'Vl'ry cOlUpany, The 2<1 Com
pany, for installl'e, is to COW'I', moving' by
bounds, ni.out on(> hundl'{'d mNel's, which will
l'cquil'e about eight minute, With the twdve
minutes on the line and four minutes
allowl,.l to covel' th(' a"flulting distance,
company It'uvl' its p",;ition of dl'pal'turl'
!\w'nty-fo\lI' minute>- hefort, the en,l of the
nt'tilll'I'Y (lrl'puration, or at H minus
It is that the regimental l'nm
mundel' 01' the hattalion IllUgt
rOllllllill' Vl'l'Y accurately 11Lforehand a tinll'
"howing the tinlL' each company is
to It'ave its position of departure, So far as
the al'tillery is concerned, the plan for artil
lel'y preparation should he hasc'd not on
the tillle rl'quired to dl'stroy and neutralize
certain targ'ets in the position hut
also on the tim(' will he needt'el by the
infantry to reach the assault line, In the
foregoing the 'artillery preparation
('annat possibly last less than fifty-five. min
t;(es, Othel'wisl:! the infantry will not have
enough timE' to get ready fOl' the 'assault,
The selection of the as>lault line is also
important, The clo,;e\' it is to th" cncri1Y'S
main line cf the more uavanta
it is for the employment of the
of suqn'ise al,d for the etf('ctivenesR cf the
It lUld be so that our
infantry cannot be affected by th(' shell
intended for th( enemy line of resistance,
7th Go
l'nfortunately, this is often
neg'll'cted, and many commanders do not take
the terrain into account. The assault line is
(,ften ,jpsignated two hU1HIred nwtel's 01' more
from the objective, even when thl' terrain
cannot he ohserved by the enemy' and allows
the' attacker to the ('nemy t)'enche"
much ('loser, All this increaRl's the time I'e
quil'ed for covering the assaulting distance
an,l deprives the action of thf' ell'l1lent of
Considerable importance attaches to the
problem of the coordination of the artillery
fire with the movement of the infantry during
the period when the former supports the at
tack, It should he emphasized that the artil
lel'Y fire previously planned for cel'tain enemy
,,,eapon emplacements and centers of resist
ance is very effective when transferred to
these tal'gets at the proper time, Some weapon
emplac('nl<:l1ts. however, may survive the artil
len' preparation anti the artillery fires of the
next pha;;c, and becon1l' s,'riolls
for the advancing' infantry, TIll'sl' empla<;e
mentti should he suppressed "it her ,tired
or in,lil'ect fires of onr artilkry.
The initiative' on tIll' part of till' arlill,'ry
ofticel's here an important part. Tlwy
must carefully folio\\' th(' ('oU1',,(, of tlw hatth-,
maintain dose conlad with thl' enlllllland,'r
of tIlt' unit tlwy Slipport , and knn\\" at all
timcs plans alld intent iOIl", Bpt h the ill
fanllT battalioll (,OIllIlHlII,jpr and tl1<' ""tilkr).'
battalioll (,lfl1llllandpr sl1l>uld ''''''U]!Y th,' ,alll('
ubservation jlo"t. But (hi, i, IH,t ('noll."h, for
one Illay often ob,e1'vp that. alth'HH,dl thp
artilll'l'Y CPl1l111:lndl'r u"",, 111<' t \'('n!'h o"(,lIpi('(1
the C,lIl1llwll<I" .. , liP a,,1 nal ,'olllad
(lxists hl't\\'l'{,ll thl' t\\O t)tnl'l' 1'''''.
Thll'. tIll' a!'tll!t- .. y l'ollll11andl'1' lir0 <Ill
tal'l.rl't, \'l'ry lIlli" to d,) with till' Illi-
:::.ion of thl' infantl)-' or llt'l-',iect to reqne.... t tht
Latlalioll "Ol11m'lll,IP.. III inform him ,,1' til"
('ollllnandl.l';-.' The infantry
battalion enl11lltall,lel', nil thl' othel' hand, do..
not oft,'n try to fig\llc out "hat illlp,'de,; till'
1ll0Vl'IlH'llt of hi, "I>mpalli('''; lIP falb 10 a-
allY up\\, 1l1i-.., ..... !Olh to thl' 10
arlill{,I:; fir!', 1>1 10 h,'lp tIl<' adillel'Y
"me"l' to l!'d a Illll' pidlll'" of till' situatioll,
DlIrillg tIll.' IH'l'i"d wh(,11 Illl' a .. ,111'
porb tilt' alld th,' al'twll in Ihl' d,'pth
of tllc IHhiti<lll, [h,' Il'l'hniqul' "I' targl'l
1 pportillg ,11I,nld hc a" w..J1 \\,<lrk"d out '"
Thi" rl'porting is gl'pall:, f,[('!Iil atcd
when the terrain is skilfully coded, that is,
wlwn all terrain features are given code
ant! when a sufficient number of good
I'cferenee is ,;l.'Iected, Needless to say,
allcommandl'l's of infantry and artillery units
shoull! know all these code names and l'ef!'l'
('IlCl' points. t'nfllrtnnatE'ly. this is not always
t he
}Iany young' ,,1lirers think that giving code
;lalll<" to various objects and using them in
IIw Ill'at of hattie i, not practicable. They
"I" ,,'long', of ,'"urge', It is well known that
11,,1 all ,Il'naill features shown on our maps
ha\(' You will lind on any -map a
11I1I1tilll<ll' of nalllekss grov('s, heights, etr,
Ttl t:'IVl' ;tIl the"e llllm!'1c,s objects nameo
nl"an, to ('0,](' the tcrrain,
Th,'I'<' b nothing' lIew in this, During 'World
\\'ar I, Ht""ian division headquarters issued
""I i,'lIlalion pl"ns" whirh ('omplcmented the
Hl:1p;-. \\ itb tpl'l'uin fea
I til',,,, ,\ 1I,' <impll' and l'!:liahle n1('thod of
'\ ndiIH!"" the t<'l"l'uin cll'H'rvC':--
ill th,' illt!'r",t' of' hpttpr targ'ct reporting,
I.!'t 11" I'cpeat in conclusion that un,ler all
(,II','lIlll,talH','g and during all pPl'iotis of the
"tl'c'n"i\'l' the mu,t take advantage
"f' "rtilll't',. fires. Thb nwans avoiding ('ven
th" "light,'"t pange between the' end of the
tlrlilkrr preparation and the beginning of
the it mcalls the ,'xecution of the
,it the tinw when the fire weapons of
tIll' enelllY a 1'(' I'l'covel'ing' frol1l the eife'et of
at the Command alld General Stall' Sehonl from all artiel('
by Flight Lieutenant Lorel Ventry in The ACI'O}J/IlII(,
(Great Britain) Fl'b1Llal'Y 1!),15,
AT thc beginning of the pl'(',enl W<lI', the nlHl'ine Ofh'l'atioll!-- and and air-land
U.S. Naval Airship Servi<'e had sOllle pight I ,',ell" .. rvi,'" and. until recently. 110 ship
non-rigid airships in commi>sioll, all at has ever bpcn 'lll1k when a "blimp" has been
LakC'hul'st, Jer:'ey, ;:-';ow, l'lll'ly in 1t! 15, with a convoy,
there are some 150 ships and, at a ('on'l'rva Experience has shown that surface ships
tive estimate, round about tiftc"ll ail',hil' are pcculiarly tempting to U-boat captains
stations, when they are l'ithcl' forming up for a convoy
The ainhips have been used 011 antiglliJ- 01' dispersing, ant!. naturally. these operations
, t/lke plaee in coastal wuters. As a result, the
airships aro in particular demand wll"re
coastal convoys and shipping un' ('onet'rn('u.
Here the value of a chain of air,hip ,tations
ir. evident. With these in lJt>ing, the airships
of one station can pass a CUll voy OVer to
those of the next.
Tn addition to the coastal eonvo,''', the K
ships of today huvt'!, around thl' outwanl amI
inward-bound convoys, for thesl' ships are
capable of flying at crubing "pl'('d fOl' ,ixty
hOllrS O!' more if he, EXI'l'l'il'nCl' has
showll, however, that th('s(' 10llg' air,hip Hio'hts
are not of great military valm', and that they
should be looked upon as eXl"l'ptional. Twenty
hours he taken as a 1}101'(,
figure, for th('n tht' crew of frolll l'ig'ht to
ten can keep an "ftici('nt lnokollt. On the
otl1<'r hand, it would he a mbtakl' not to lilah,
proper tH,e of the air'hip's I'o\\('r of l'ndllr
ane-c; and thpl'c was another pl'obll'111 tn
the nat mal fall in lift dup ttl l'edlll'ed
of nil' in hot elimat('s, The am;\\,('l' to hoth
th('s(' pl'obIC'll1'; was, of COUl',".', the same, to
built! a larger ,hip, an,l '0 the fine :II e1""
came into heinl', 1'h(',e ,hips are of
e.f., and are the lan.. hU('t'c:-;, ... ful ..dd:-
pvpr constructed, anti, like the K ,hip" aI'''
dl'iv('n by two outrig'g'('d moto!', of quitl'
moderute horsepower con,idc'!'ll11': thl' ,,i701' ,\f
the As a large!' (,l'l'\\', working' Oll thl'
watch system, is carried, the :II ship,", thank,
to their long artie-ulate!1 ('aI'S, arC' ahle to g'i""
their crt'w reasonable comfort, with
bunks, good messing arrangemcnts, and
space to stretch their legs, At the same time,
the piloting and navigating portions of the
car arc roomy, and all this makes not only for
efficiency but the possibility of very long
flights, and there is none of that feeling of
being overcrowded which is apt to make long'
hours in the air very tiring,
For training, and more restricted patrol
ling, the G and L class airships are availahle.
The G,! was the ex-Goodyear
Defender of 178,000 c,f.,. driven by two 165
horsepower motors which gave her a full
speed of sixty-five miles per hour. G.1 ,vas
acquired by the Navy in 1937, and until the
advent of the L,l was the smallest ship_ at
Lal,ehurst. She proved very useful as a
s..hool ship, both for teaching airship piloting
and for instruction in navigation and
ehutin(r, During the war, fUl'thel' large G
have been constructed for advanced
training' and for limited operational purposes.
In addition to the G, K, and l\l ships, there
are the L class of 123,000 e,f., which are
il1lprov('d editions of the famous Goodyear
"hlimps" Elite/'IIi'isc and PHdt(w, whicl) al
I houg'h conhtrul'ted in 19:14, Werl' 'still going
"trong' in 1 !140,
'I'll<' L's a!'" sehool ,hips, and they are
to handle and extremely maneuverable, Therr
p(',rcNime handling pm'ties only numbered
1"1:1(\11 ul1(lpl' 1101'1lH..tl
stancl's, an,l when making' advertising and
IHlssellg'('r fiig'hts th(' crew would con
"bt of the pilot amI his assistant, and possibly
an cng'ineel'. ;\Iuch mooring-out was done,
!1m,., making these airships to a large extent
indc'pelHlent of sht::ds, anrl thb now applies to
tIl(' K ,hips, As the future of airships was
1t1l'gel)' (jppmdent on the solving of this prob
km, the Cnitl'd States, like Great Britain,
have gone all out, an!1 a result the present
day llOn-rigids have survived
many a gale whil<: moored to a mast,
TIll' .. hiPf dangers to airships are sever('
II ing', and, ahove all, ('Iectric storms and line
"IUlllk \'i"ihility hardly matters, for the
,til',hip" have often left under "zero" condi
tions, The main risk of flying throug'h a patch
"f thundery weather is the risk of being
caught in the powerful vertical currents. If
such an area has to be flown through, the
airships are kept as low as possible, for the
vertical air currents naturally damp out near
th(' ground,
So far as wind is concerned, its strength
and direction in relation to the ship's course
would, of course, affect the range of an air
ship, but provided that ground handling is
possible, there is no particular risk in flying
in strong winqs so long as there is plenty of
fuel in the tanks.
United States airship crews have developed
a most successful method of refueling from a
passing surface ship. A suitable craft having
been contacted, the airship is brought close
tIP U11d halloon". OIl<' inflated
by ail., the other empty.coI1lH!c'ted hy a h'ng:th
of I'ope, Thc air-inflateci hallooll !louts Oil thc'
watt'r and tl1<' steaml'l' 01' wan,hip pulls them
011 board. tilling t1w Plllpty one with fm'l.
Then they ill'(' lowered hacl, into
the Sf-'n and H g'l'apnl'l i:, dl'OPP(,ltl on a linl'
from till' whieh b hookl'll on to tl1<'
('Olllll'cting' lin .." and thl' two :'H'(.'
pulled up into t he ear and till' I ll'tl'(l I is soon
]lOured into till' tanh" Th\l' 1'01' I l'flwling
\vllilt in tlig:ht. Onl' \\ ay (If l't'tlllOIHizing' ill
fU(l1 and gCl'" i..:. to kpC'p tlll' ...;hip twar
(>quilihl'iulll during a flight. Bal'nllwtl'i,' at,,1
ttlnpel'utltl'" ('hang'l" both aired t1w lift. :llId
as the on h(,l'oIlH.', li::hll'l' <III
the tilllt' owing: to .tht' (,PtbtIlllptitHl oJ fuv1.
Thl'I'C' ai'" tilll<" wh,'n :In ail',hip ha, tn
n'lnail1 hovl'ring- O\'(I)' nIH' :-.}hlt fot' Ulan,\"
houl:-; 011 t'nd. Tllt'll a :--t'tl ClII('l1ol' Ill' dl'ptrul'
lowl'l'l'<! and, provid,'d that tl'l11pvl':ltlll'l'
l'ontiitiol1:-- Hl'l' not ton tlllvVt'll. the ail'!'-hip
('an do thi ... an,1 \\'ithuut Il:.;jll.tt hl\l' Hlntn!'..:,
to ,tup a drift. end.. r l'l'a'!lnal,l(' eun
t"l't'\\';--. ('an IH.' ftlud pil'l,(ld up.
and l'Vt'n fi:-.hitl,L!' ha:-- ill,t'n induhrcd in. Th<.'
gl'lll'l'al handiIlP;-':-- of tIH';-'v ail':-.hip!'-! ha... IHadl'
it to 11:--l' tbl'1ll on ail':-,'.'a alld air-land
'(,l'viC'l', Althulll:'h, nf ('UUl',P, tl1l'Y are
in l'f.'ilC'hing' thlir .. tal'1!'(t ... ." l11akt
up for this IH'in).:' ,,1,1.. tn I'Plllaill in tlll'ir
... icinit:: and, of euul',,', a ,mal! oh,ic'Ll Ii!; ..
a raft is lllol'<' likely to Ill' piekl'd lip hy tIll'
erew of an airship than that ,.f a hcavier
than-ail' lTaft, for thl' latt,'r', ,pl'l'd i,
Although thl' llwd"l'll {',S, ail',hip "ftC'n
off Iii", an ail'pla11l' with tl1l'
of a al1<1 l'an land on its whl'pl and
taxi up to its handling pal ty, it ('an abo hC'
put down in l'Pstl'il'tc>d areas and land
in hOll\ whit'h no airplalll' eould
ever take off. BCl'au'e of Ih(>,,, valnah]" prop
the K ,hips haw till1l'>' l'C'sl'll(>d
hil'ancle(1 airplam' e!'l'W, fnllll tIll' jung](', of
South A 1ll(,l'inl , ineiudinl.!.' iIIl'n of tIll'
Canadian Ail' Foret', Thanks. tlll'n, to tho'l'
who built and flt,\\ thc non-I'igi,ls in p(>llCetime
and theil' fine record on active tlwRe
airships have once again IH'OV(>(\ their worth.
The' airshi has a otcntial endurance
greater than a cOI'l'esponding neavier-thall-,
air craft, It affords much greater comfort to
ib crew, and the lutter have far'better facili
for dl'tailed l'(>connaissance than the crew
of any airplane 01' fiying-boat, The one draw
back is their vulnerability, and so they can
not Ill' without strong escort within
rangl' of lilwly ail' attack,
Th"l'<' all', howev(>)', great areas where no
aircraft can be found. but where encmy
un' b:; no means inactive, and it
j, against that the non-rig-ids should
h" for whl'n hunting these slow
IllOving' c'l'aft, which can now spen(\ long
jJl'l'i(lIb in the twilight of the 'ocean depths,
,p,'c'd i, a hindrance. and the ability to fly
and to hovc'r is everything-, Indl'cd,
lIOW that the t'-hoats at'p capahle of remain
1I,t!' undl'l' ! h" watel' for \ong(>r periods than
l'WI' I.l j\1I'<', t hl' impOl'tanee of the airship
w!ll inl'I'p:bl',
.\ >uj,llIHl'ine may l'clllHin 1'01' days in the
'an1(' loeality, 01' sp<'lId long creeping'
"long Ill'low the wavef', An airplane detailed
(II hUllt >l1<:h a U-boat must have something
,,1' ti1l',e ,an1(' qnalitil's, HII,i thl' ail'",hip alone
them, :\0 oth(>1' fOl'lll of aircl'aft
l'lIllll>inl" all thl' nC'c'lkd, for the ail'
,hip, tno, c'all hovel' O\'l'1' an al'ea for long
pl'l'iod". 01' can CI'l'C'P alollg- with only just
l'nongh 011 Iwr to k(>(>11 steerage" way,
That thl' hl>aviel'-than-air craft should be
lmploYl'II. indl'pclldently whl'l'e their great
"I'pc'<I ('an he used with u<lvantag-e in sweep
ill).:' Jal'!!'l' ahead, for exampl(>, of a
('OIl\'OY i, .,uvious, The on the other
hand, is ]'l'l(l'r employed in acting as a watch
dog OVl'l' th,' convoy itself. for this would
normally neVl'r "team faster than fifteen
knots, and th" normal cruising- speed of some
f"rty of the airship leaves plenty in
hand fOl' advl'1's(> winds, alHi so on. A convoy
gu:tl'llc>d is a difficult nut to crack for-the
wilie", of L'-hoat commanders, and if we wil
flilly neglect to use the convoy airship. ;ve
lire merely making' life a littl(> more pleasant
fcn' thc''''' V(>l'y clevcl' and potentially dan
enemiC's, The U-boat is still our great
t'"t menace, a fact which we forg(>t at our
peril, and the non-rigid airship is of the
beRt wea ons with which to counter it:
Montgomery's Tactics
at the Command ami Gene!'>11 Statr School ,from Ull article
by Brigadier General H. S. Se\\"ell in J!ritaiJl
Infonnntion Sl'rv!ce>;) April W45.
FIEl.D in tbe two
and a half he Wtl, to till'
eOllunand of an ul'nly. hat; pailled a repu
tation for planninp: and
As COlllllHuHler in the hattIe whil'h wa,
in Felll'uary betW('l'n tIll' :\Iaas and
tbe Hhine, :\!ont\!'oll1eJ'\' hael lmel"I' hi, dll'<:c
tiOll tbe'First Camldia'n. Second and
Ninth Americall Armies, anll as lead,'r of
this international force his technique in
battle has again been of in(,I'(".;t and con
celn to Illany people out,iele bj,; own country
in just the Rame way it durin,"' t be
critical tiny,; of the battle of !\: ol'l1landy,
;llontg'om(>ry'" plans for battle haye al
ways been based on and he
invariably followed the important prineiple
of war, maintenance of the objeetiyl'-'
01' to put it simply, he has b'pt his ">'P on
the main object. He tells his ll1pn what he
intends to do, as he consider:, tbat tb(, ad
vantage p:aillCu by the tlOOPS kno\ving' hi:-.
general intentions far outweil.!hs any eon
sidel'lltion of security,
It would be diffieult to tind l)ptter exampI",
of "tbe maintenance of the oh,iective" than
the opel'lltions in XOl'lIIllndy nne! tbe battl"
for the Rhineland, In Xormandy, lIlont
gomery intended frolll the stnrt to make
the German cOIIIIll:lndel'- Ronllnl'l, :\Iodel.
and Rundstedt in turn-bl'('ak hi:.; head
. against' the and Canadian fOI'ce,; on
the left above ('aell, so as to give the Aml'I'i
can!; on tbe rig'ht a better ('hanee of makin\!'
a clean breakthrough neat' AVI <lnch",s,
The 'Same thing' has happened in the Hhine
land, til'st muye was t-l
strengthen the Canadian Fir"t Army b,'
the transfer tu it of an a l'IllY eol'ps fl'UIII
the Br,itish Second Arl1lY. I'einfol'l'c
ment was in addition to tbe Bl'itlsh divisions
all'emly serving with tbe Canadian army,
and it gave General Crerar as strong' u fOl'ce
as eould be employed on the niu'I'ow front
between the lvIaas and the Rhine, The at-
tad" <lUl'ing stH\!"S, \va, pressed
hy three British and one Canadian division,
"lId the which it lll'esented to the
(;prlllan m'm)' dl'fenlling the approaches
to the nuhl' "';IS too great to be kllOl'ecl. The
point of attack was a]"o on the shOl test road
into Germany anel the one 1II0st lacking in
lHttllr,\l dden>es, and Runlhte.dt was forced
to in to meet it. The two
diyision:.; PI iLdnally holding this sectol' were
IH'ogl'('ssiwly I'cinforced til! elements of no
tban el,'ven Gel'111an divisioll". including
of. the panzer and parachute
weI e ('ventnally ,Il'awn into the
hattle against Crerar'" anny, There was lIO
division of poor quality in this battle,
B,Y the tint(' tbat all was ready for tbe
b)'C'akthl'tHlgh IH) the Rocl', there wel'e nearly
thn'" liml's as man>' (;crl11;(n battalions fight
hl'tween tlw }laas and Hhine as were
the AI1lt'rit'ans on the HocI' from
Hoerllloll<1 In Duren, 'The R()cl' \\,a,. still In
[jood anll Hnnlblcdt o!','iously did not expect
that a of tbe river would be pos
:-.ihle flH' tillH'. The Anlel iean assault,
u,' ll1ooIl1i."bt tb" br(md watel' balTier,
]ll'rfedly l'x('cuted h,' tbe ;-':inth A rillY,
with the cO\'l,ring its rig'ht and
protel'tijlg' in on that :.;ide by a 'h'ive directlY
to\\" nb ('olol!ne,
opel'lltiuns by thl' American Third
A !'lny Bnuth <'If Colog'ne abo <;,ontl'ibuted' to
the of the northern arlllY group by
the and pinning' down his
resel'ves. The action of the Fir:.;t and Third
,-\l'l11ie:.;, under Gem'ral Bradley's command,
lpft the Ninth Army free to exploit the situa
tion, which had heen created :\Iontgomery,
in tbe north. Covel'ell by the action of these
armies, General Sil11]1>,on had nothing to fear
from the enemy 011 his flank when he raced
nOl,th through an area' that ha,l, to a great
('xtent, bel'n drained of troops by the battle
that for t\\ () weeks had been !'aging on the
Canadian army's front. Each move, in the
. battle for the Rhineland was made as planned
and was pel'fectly timed. Throughout the
'operation, l\1ontgomel'y kept his on the
main object.
The two factors which :\Iontgomery l'ates
. as having the most important bearing- on war
in general and on battle in particular are
(1) use of ail' power al1<\ (2) administration.
The air battle is a necessary preliminary to
the land battle, and with ail' supremacy \\'on.
Montgomery's method 1'01' the employment Ill' ,
the air force operating with his armies has I
been to concentrate full force on sl'\Oete.1
targets. The flexibility of ail' power is
greatest asset and enables it to be "witchl,.1
quiekly from one objective to another.
Montgomery's use of aI,tillery. which hao
played such an importnnt part in all hi,
battles, is similar to his elllployn1('nt of the
tactical ail' arm, He .'v"l\'.,d an ('I1'ee(i\'"
system of (I'ainill;(' ant! .'onnllllni, in hi'
armies by which a great concentration of
fire power from widely dispersed batteries
can be directed, at almost a 'moment's notjce,
(111 to anr selected point.
The illlpnrtanee of administration is fully
appreciated by :\Iontgomery. Without the
prepamtion of administrative sel:vices on
an adequate scale, an army is likely to fail
in tactical objective, and may find itself
in a vel'V precarious condition. Montgomery',
maxim ;s thi,; is that a COIll
nHlllder IllU"t in"urc that his administrative
at'l'HlI!!'enJents in real' are commensurate with
what he intends to do in front.
:\[tll'ale the factor of all in war.
\\'ithout a hil':h morale nothing can be
Hl'hic\(',l. :\[nlltgollll'l'Y'R advice to his leaders,
\\ hl'll t Ill' of a battle may hang in the
bala,,,',,. i, to Illdillte confidence in the plan
:llld ,II. t h,' ojlPl'at even if i nWllrdly tllL'Y
fl'tl ltUI {'('rtaiu of the uutl'Ullle.
Red Star
The fol/oll'illU aecylillt of RetI Stal'
(Krasnaia Zvezda). thr daily lICIVSjllll'''''
of the Red Army, is taken fl'om an 11"80
ciated Press diS/latch from Moscow. The
milita)'y (ll'tic/c8 that fljl}'CW' in .Red Stnr
aI'e {(monu the best to be fO//II(1 in mili
tary litemtnrc today. Po)' mallY yelll's
the Militu)'y Reuicw has been l>Hb/ishiIlU
digests of these articlcs, tmlls/Illcd (It the
Command and Genem[ Staff SChOIlI, in
its "Foreign Milita)'y scrtion,.
MAJOR General Talensky, the lIlall who
edits Red St(lI', newsp'aper organ of the Rm;
sian Army, has one of the most responsible
in the Soviet Union, for Red StUI' iR
more than a neWspaper. It is practically the
.Bible of the huge Red Army and is distributed
and read daily from the bOI'der of Greece to
the Pacific and from Amur to the Baltic.
Red St({ I' b an "mcers' ne,,;spaper and is
written lIlOl e to instruct than to entertain,
The out,ide jlages naturally carry :\Iarshal
Stalin's onlcrJ of the day, his cOl1gratulatiolls
to l'Oml1Hllldcrs who have achieved the latest
.. They also display conlll1uniques
from the Soviet Info1'1I1ation Bureau.
Special articles Oil military tactics are a
'n1l1sf' iten).
In addition to technical al'ticles, much
space is j!'iven to political instruction, because
the officers pass on information to their men.
Rer/ Stf//' carries dispatches from front-line
correspondentR, fiftcen of whom have been
killed 01' capturpt! Rince the beginning of the
war, The cOlTeSjlondents have access to the
commanders and generals in the field and fre
quently the commanders themselves write
for the paper.
Red StUI' is twenty years old ..

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