IBP 1101-09

MANAGING CHANGES IN LOCATION CLASSES OF GAS PIPELINES

Sérgio B. Cunha1, Antônio Geraldo de Souza2

.
Copyright 2009, Brazilian Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels Institute - IBP
This Technical Paper was prepared for presentation at the Rio Pipeline Conference and Exposition 2009, held between September,
22-24, 2009, in Rio de Janeiro. This Technical Paper was selected for presentation by the Technical Committee of the event
according to the information contained in the abstract submitted by the author(s). The contents of the Technical Paper, as presented,
were not reviewed by IBP. The organizers are not supposed to translate or correct the submitted papers. The material as it is
presented, does not necessarily represent Brazilian Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels Institute’ opinion, or that of its Members or
Representatives. Authors consent to the publication of this Technical Paper in the Rio Pipeline Conference Proceedings.

Resumo
A maioria das normas para projeto e construção de gasodutos utiliza um sistema no qual diferentes classes de locação
são definidas de acordo com a densidade populacional nas proximidades do duto e os fatores de segurança e de teste
hidrostático são determinados conforme a classe de locação. Conseqüentemente, se um operador desejar manter um
gasoduto em conformidade com a norma de projeto precisará abaixar a pressão de operação ou substituir tubos por
outros de parede mais espessa sempre que ocorrer uma mudança de classe de locação. Este artigo apresenta uma nova
metodologia para gerenciar mudanças de classe de locação em gasodutos. Inicialmente, as principais normas que
utilizam sistemas de classes de locação são revistas. A seguir, medidas para prevenir a ocorrência de danos causados por
terceiros são apresentadas. Na seqüência, um modelo matemático para a área afetada por um vazamento de um gasoduto
seguido de ignição é descrito. Finalmente, uma metodologia para determinar a pressão operacional e medidas
mitigadoras de danos por terceiros para gasodutos após mudanças de classe de locação é apresentada.

Abstract
Most of the gas pipeline design codes utilize a class location system, where the design safety factor and the hydrostatic
test factor are determined according to the population density in the vicinities of the pipeline route. Consequently, if an
operator is requested or desires to maintain an existing gas pipeline in compliance with its design code, it will reduce the
operational pressure or replace pipe sections to increase the wall thickness whenever a change in location class takes
place. This article introduces an alternative methodology to deal with changes in location classes of gas pipelines.
Initially, selected codes that utilize location class systems are reviewed. Afterwards, a model for the area affected by an
ignition following a natural gas pipeline leak is described. Finally, a methodology to determine the MAOP and third part
damage mitigation measures for gas transport pipelines that underwent changes in location class is presented.

1. Introduction
Most pipeline codes, as [1, 2, 3, 4], specify the design and pressure test factors for design and construction of
gas pipelines according to the population density along the pipeline route. The population density is classified in
different categories that determine the pipe wall: the higher the population density, the thicker the pipe wall required.
The main reason for adjusting the pipe wall according to the location class is to prevent failures caused by third
part action, since a thicker wall increases the pipe resistance to external impacts. Moreover, the use of a thicker wall
pipe reduces the probability of failure for most of the failures mechanisms, thus it tends to maintain the risk at an
acceptable level in areas of high population density.
While for a new construction adopting a thicker wall does not pose a major problem, this is not true for a
pipeline that is already operating. A more detailed study of the problem and alternative solutions are justified in such

______________________________
1
Ph.D., Mechanical Engineer – PETROBRAS - TRANSPETRO
2
Mechanical Engineer – PETROBRAS - TRANSPETRO
 Rio Pipeline Conference & Exposition 2007

situation. Many different measures for preventing third part damage can be employed. Although they probably would be
unreasonably costly for a new construction, they can be a sound choice for existing pipelines.
The pipe diameter and the operational pressure determine the area affected by an eventual pipeline failure.
Therefore, the evaluation of the population density concerned to the failure consequences should be governed by these
parameters.
The determination of the proper design factor is an engineering decision governed by the uncertainties on the
loading, the uncertainties on the part strength and the consequences of a failure. It can be argued that for a pipeline that
is already in operation, the uncertainties on loadings and strength at the present MAOP are smaller than on a new
construction. This justifies the use of larger safety factors, as long as the MAOP is not increased.
This paper introduces a methodology to deal with the increase of the population along the route of existing
pipelines avoiding the reduction the MAOP or the replacement of pipeline sections. To maintain the risk at an
acceptable level, third part interference mitigation measures are required. The design and test factors might be
determined according to a secondary measurement of the population density, which considers the pipeline diameter and
pressure.

2. Brief Review of International Code Requirements

The American code ASA B31-1-8 introduced, in 1955, the concept of classes of location for gas pipelines,
defining four different classes according to the population density in the vicinities of the pipeline right of way and
establishing design and test factors according to the location class [5]. It established a ½ a mile corridor with the
pipeline in the centerline to assess the population density simply because this was the typical width of the aerial
photographs at that time, not based in any evaluation of the hazardous zone in the event of a pipeline failure. Eventually,
the use of location classes to guide gas pipeline design became widespread around the world. In this section the
provisions of the American code ASME B31-8 [1], the international standard ISO 13623 [2], the Canadian regulation
CSA Z 662-89 [3] and British code BSI PD 8010-1 [4] with respect to gas pipelines location classes and their associated
design and test factors are presented.

Table 1. Location Classes Definition on Selected Standards

ISO (1) BSI (2) ASME(3) & CSA (4)

Typical Environment
Class Population Class Population Class Population
deserted areas 1 --
sparsely populated 2 < 50 persons/km2 1 = < 10 buildings
country or industrial areas 3 [50, 250] persons/km2 1 < 250 persons/km2 2 [11, 45] buildings
urban and suburban areas 4 > 250 persons/km2 2 = > 250 persons/km2 3 = > 46 buildings
cities 5 multi story buildings 3 multi story buildings 4 multi story buildings
(1)
Assessed on a width of 400 m along 1500 m.
(2)
Assessed on a width dependent of the pipe diameter and pressure along 1600 m
(3)
assessed on a width of ¼ mile (402 m) along 1 mile (1609 m).
(4)
Assessed on a width of 400 m along 1600 m.

Table 2. Design and Test Factors

ISO BSI ASME CSA

Typical Environment
Class F design F test Class F design F test Class F design F test Class F design F test
deserted areas 1 0.83 1.25
sparsely populated 2 0.77 1.25 1 0.72 (0.8) 1.1 (1.25) 1 0.72 1.25
country - industrial 3 0.67 1.25 1 0.72 1.25 2 0.6 1.25 2 0.6 1.25
urban - suburban 4 0.55 1.4 2 0.3 1.5 3 0.5 1.4 3 0.5 1.4
cities 5 0.45 1.4 3 NA 1.5 4 0.4 1.4 4 0.4 1.4

With respect to the population density that characterizes each location class, the ASME and CSA
methodologies are very similar. Although ISO uses different units for assessment of the population density, the typical

2
 Rio Pipeline Conference & Exposition 2007

environments are equivalent, as shown in Table 1. The BSI code replicates the ISO classification, eliminating classes of
low human occupancy.
For classes that represent similar population density, ASME, CSA and ISO requirements for design factor and
test factor are equivalent, as shown in Table 2. The BSI recommends factors that are somewhat dissimilar from the other
standards.
Although it seems reasonable that the codes should foresee some population growth along the pipeline route,
only the ASME code has specific provision for existing pipelines. The ASME guidelines are reproduced, with some
simplifications, in Table 3.

Table 3. ASME Requirements for Changes in Location Class

Original Class New Class

Class # Blds.
1 0-10
2 11-45
3 > = 46
Class # Blds. MAOP
1 11-25 previous MAOP
 P 
2 26 – 45 Min 0.72 Sy, test 
 1 .25 
2 46 – 65  P 
Min 0.6 Sy, test 
3 => 66  1.5 
 P 
4 multi-story Min 0.5 Sy, test 
 1.8 
2 46 – 65 previous MAOP
 P 
3 => 66 Min 0.6 Sy, test 
 1 .5 
 P 
4 multi-story Min 0.5 Sy, test 
 1.8 
 P 
4 multi-story Min 0.5 Sy, test 
 1.8 

As can be seen in Table 3, the ASME admits some population growth on sections of classes 1 and 2 without
changing the location class. This flexibility is not given for class 3 sections. Moreover, the requirements for change in
location class will, in a rough sense, allow one location class upgrade without changing the MAOP, if the section was
tested at 90% of the yield stress.

3. Third Part Damage and Mitigation

Third part damage is the prevailing cause of pipeline failures. Table 4 summarizes the participation of this
mode of failure in different regions of the world. The population density seems to be the generator of this mode of
failure: in the low populated areas of Canada, third part damages are responsible for 4% of the failures, while in highly
populated areas of USA and Western Europe its participation ranges from 20 to 50%. Furthermore, this mode of failure
is more pronounced in gas than oil pipelines. This is probably due to the fact that gas pipelines need to be connected to
distribution systems, and thus must get closer to highly populated areas than oil pipelines.
The system of location class for gas pipelines was introduced in the USA in the 50’s to prevent failures caused
by human activities [5, 10]. The ASME code [1] makes clear that intent:”840.1 c .... A pipeline designed, constructed,
and operated in accordance with the requirements of Location Class 1is basically safe for pressure containment in any
location; however, additional measures are necessary to protect the integrity of the line in the presence of activities that
might cause damage”.
The use of thick wall pipes to prevent third part damage is sensible for new constructions. For pipelines that are
already in operation, other measures to prevent damage by external action might provide identical or even grater
protection at a lower cost. Muhlbauer [11] collected, from different sources, the benefits of the third-party damage
mitigation measures presented in Table 5.

3
 Rio Pipeline Conference & Exposition 2007

Table 4. Percentage of Pipeline Failures Caused by 3rd Part Interference

Region Fluid 3rd Part Damage Period Reference

W. Europe Gas 50 % 1970 - 2004 EGIG [6]
W. Europe Oil 42 % 1971 - 2006 CONCAWE [7]
EUA Gas 31.1 % 1984 - 2001 DOT [8]
EUA Hazard Liq. 20.3 % 1986 - 2002 DOT [8]
Canada Oil & Gas 4% 1991 - 2000 NEB [9]

Table 5. Third Part Damage Mitigation Benefits [11]

Mitigation Measure Reported Reduction in Failure Frequency

increase wall thickness from 0-5 to
5-10 mm 70%
10-15 mm 97%
increase soil cover to
1.5 m 25%
2.0 m 50%
3.0 m 90 %
Reinforced Concrete Barrier 99 %
Underground Tape 60 %
Increased ROW signage 40 %
Increased ROW patrol 30 %
Public Education 5%

The database from the United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators’ Association (UKOPA) was employed [12,
13] to determine frequency of failure reduction factors for different third part mitigation methods. The values obtained
might be slightly different from the ones presented in Table 5. The American Petroleum Institute [14] indicates the
possible methods to prevent third part damage, but the possible benefits are not quantified.
It becomes clear, from the quoted references, that increasing the pipe wall is not the only solution to avoid
pipeline failures caused by external action. Other mitigation measures can provide identical or greater protection.

4. Ageing and Failure Frequency

Most industrial equipments present an almost constant failure rate throughout its operational life. A somewhat
higher rate of failures is expected at the early stages of operation and when the equipment becomes aged. Figure 1
presents a bath-tube curve that illustrates this typical behavior. The break-in period is characterized by an abnormal
number of failures caused by undetected manufacturing and assembling flaws. The wear-out phase may be caused by
time dependent failure mechanisms as corrosion, fatigue, wear and abrasion, etc.

Figure 1. Typical Failure Rate x Age Curve

4
 Rio Pipeline Conference & Exposition 2007

Both Muhlbauer [11] and Hopkins [15] indicate corrosion and cracking as the only time dependent failure
mechanisms of pipelines. As a matter of fact, pipeline failure statistics [6, 7, 8, 9] do not register other time dependent
failure mechanisms. Therefore, since cracking and fatigue failures are not usual on gas pipelines, it is unlikely that an
increase of the failure rate will take place as the pipeline ages, if an adequate corrosion inspection and monitoring is
enforced.
The absence of the increase of the failure rate for ageing pipelines is confirmed by the failure statistics. EGIG
[6] concluded that “The first conclusion … is that early constructed pipelines have indeed a higher failure frequency
than recently constructed pipelines. The second very important conclusion is that all failure frequencies irrespective of
the age category are slightly decreasing with time”. CONCAWE [16] observed that “There is clearly no increase (of
the rate of corrosion related spills) with time and, if anything, the frequency has been on a downward trend over the
years. We conclude that there is no direct correlation between age and corrosion-related failures...” and “Oil pipelines
in Europe are indeed becoming older but this is not seen as a serious problem for the foreseeable future...”
Therefore, the pipeline failure statistics indicate that no increase of the failure rate with age is expected for
pipelines if an integrity management system is enforced. On the other hand, a higher failure rate at the initial stages of
operation is expected. Table 6 presents the percentages of failures attributed to constructions and materials. These
modes of failure typically appear at the equipment break-in period.

Table 6. Percentage of Pipeline Failures Caused by Faulty Material and Construction

Region Fluid Percentage of Failures Period Reference

W. Europe Gas 16.7 % 1970 - 2004 EGIG [6]
W. Europe Oil 28.0 % 1971 - 2006 CONCAWE [7]
EUA Gas 11.9 % 1984 - 2001 DOT [8]
Canada Oil & Gas 15.0 % 1991 - 2000 NEB [9]

The age of the pipeline failures due to faulty construction or material registered at the DOT [8] database was
checked against the pipeline age at the moment of the incident. Only events on pipelines constructed after the data
gathering started and before 2000 were computed, to ensure the results are not biased. Table 7 presents the outcome; it
confirms that material and construction failures are prone to appear at the early stages of the operational life of a
pipeline.

Table 7. Reported Construction/Material Failures x Pipeline Age

Hazard Liquid Gas

Failed Pipe or Weld (1) Construction/Material Defect (2)
Age # Failures Age # Failures
0 3 0 1
1 3 6 1
2 3 9 1
6 1 14 1
9 1
10 1
11 1
(1) (2)
Pipelines constructed after 1986 and before 2000. Pipelines constructed after 1984 and before 1996.

It follows that, in general, a decrease in the failure rate can be expected after the break-in period, if the
operational and environmental conditions did not change. Consequently, certain increase in the design factor can be
undertaken without increasing the risk of failure, after few years of operation.

5. Consequence of Failure – Hazard Radius

A study conducted by C-Fer for GRI [17] concluded that of the rupture followed by ignition of a gas pipeline
affects a circumferential area which radius is proportional to the pipeline diameter and to the square root of the
5
 Rio Pipeline Conference & Exposition 2007

operational pressure. An expression for the safe distance (hazard radius) to the point of failure of a natural gas pipeline
is proposed:

R [ft ] = 0.685 φ p ∴ R [m ] = 0.21 φ p

where R stands for the distance from de point of failure, φ for the nominal diameter (in) and p for the operational
pressure (psi). This formula is explicitly adopted by ASME B31.8 S [18] as the radius of impact of a failure of a gas
pipeline. This equation is also considered by ISO 16708 [19].
At the calculated distance, the heat intensity caused by an ignition following the pipeline failure is 5000
Btu/hr.ft2 (15.77 KW/m2). At this heat intensity:
- the mortality in 30 s is 1%;
- a wooden structure will not burn;
- people protected by a wooden structure are indefinitely protected.
In areas of higher population density, the safe distance from a gas pipeline might be defined using a lower
probability of fatality. Computer simulations indicate that a heat intensity of 3500 Btu/hr.ft2 (11 KW/m2) would result
in a mortality of 0.2 % in 30s. For this heat intensity threshold, the safe distance is:

R [ft ] = 0.834 φ p ∴ R [m ] = 0.25 φ p

6. Managing Changes in Location Class

A three level methodology for dealing with changes of location class in gas pipelines is proposed in this
section. The first level is simply the application of the design code; the ASME B31-8 [1] was chosen as example. At the
locations where a change of pipes or pressure reduction would be required, the second level evaluation is applied. If the
desired MAOP is not reached yet, the third level assessment is applied. The second level utilizes slightly less rigorous
test factors and requires third part damage mitigation measures. In third level assessments, the design and test factors are
determined according to a secondary population density measurement, which is based on the hazard radius. The second
and third level assessment should be applied to classes two and three only; class four shall obey the design code. Figure
2 presents the three-level management flow-chart.
When changes of location classes are identified in a gas pipeline, it is often the case that in some of these
locations the pipes are found to be not in compliance with the design code anymore. Nevertheless, if the pipeline has
been operating with a good performance for a reasonable time, if it is not subjected to conditions suitable for
development of fatigue, SCC or other time dependent cracking, if an internal and external corrosion monitoring and
mitigation program are in place and if the pipeline has been in-line inspected not too long ago, the capability of the
pipeline to withstand its current MOP can be assumed to be satisfactory. Less stringent test and design factors can be
employed if these requirements are fulfilled and third part damage prevention measures are adopted. It is suggested as
requirements that the pipeline has been operating at the desired MOP for at least five years and that its last in-line
inspection has taken place no more than five years ago. For pipeline sections that are re-classified to class 4, no
relaxation of the design code requirements should be allowed.
Table 8 presents the level 2 test and design factors adopted by TRANSPETRO. By comparing with Table 3, it
is readily identified that the changes with respect to ASME B31-8 are the test factors and the adoption of third part
damage prevention measures. This is justified by the reasoning presented in sections 3 and 4.
For the determination of the third part damage prevention measures, Table 5 can be taken as guideline. It is
recommended to consider some reduction of the indicated protection. Several mitigation measures can be applied
simultaneously. In this case, the combined protection is:

n
(
Combined Re ducion = 1 − Π 1 − i th Re duction
i =1
)
If the desired MAOP was not obtained by the second level assessment, the third level can be employed. The
principle behind the third level assessment is that the third part failures are controlled by the mitigation measures
established at the second level, therefore the design and test factors can be determined envisioning an acceptable
potential of the consequences of failure.

6
 Rio Pipeline Conference & Exposition 2007

Figure 2. Flow-chart of the Proposed Methodology

Table 8. Suggested Requirements for Changes in Location Class - Level 2 Assessment

Original Class New Class 3rd Part Damage

Class # Blds. Class # Blds. MAOP Mitigation
1 11-25 previous MAOP --
 P 
2 26 – 45 Min 0.72 Sy, test  --
 1 .25 
1 0-10  P 
2 46 – 65 Min 0.6 Sy, test  40%
 1 .25 
 P 
3 => 66 Min 0.6 Sy, test  70%
 1 .25 
2 46 – 65 previous MAOP 40%
2 11-45  P 
3 => 66 Min 0.6 Sy, test  70%
 1 .25 

7
 Rio Pipeline Conference & Exposition 2007

The third level assessment requires a secondary evaluation of the population density, carried out in an area that
can be affected by a pipeline failure. For simplicity, the standard length of population evaluation is maintained and the
width is changed to twice the hazard radius. The expression proposed by C-Fer for the hazard radius is adopted in areas
of location class two and a more conservative formula is employed for location class three. Table 9 presents the width
utilized for the secondary measurement of population density.
.

Table 9. Suggested Width for Secondary Population Measurement - Level 3 Assessment

New Location Class Hazard Radius (m) Width w (m)

2 0.21 φ p 0.42 φ p
3 0.25 φ p 0.50 φ p

The results of the secondary population measurement are to be used to determine the safety and design factors
that determine the re-classified pipeline MAOP. Table 10 presents the suggested formulae. The numbers of
constructions are the ones presented in Table 8, corrected according to the new width of evaluation. The design and test
factors are also based on Table 8.

Table 10. MAOP - Level 3 Assessment

# Blds.(1) MAOP

[0 − 25]. w 

 P 
Min 0.72 Sy, test 
 400   1.1 

[26 − 45]. w 

 P 
Min 0.72 Sy, test 
 400   1.25 
 w   P 
≥ 46  Min 0.6 Sy, test 
 400   1.25 
(1)
Assessed on a width “w” (Table 9) along 1600 m.

Under no circumstances the assessment on levels two and three might be used as justification to raising the
pipeline MAOP.

7. Conclusions

The growth of population along gas pipeline routes is a common problem for pipeline operators. The existing
codes and regulations envision primarily construction and design, and do not address changes of classes of location of
existing gas pipelines adequately or not at all.
This paper presents a methodology to deal with changes of location class of existing pipelines and its
theoretical and statistical foundations. This procedure requires the implementation of third part damage prevention and
assumes an adequate pipeline integrity evaluation and management.
The application of this methodology to TRANSPETRO gas pipeline network points to very satisfactory results.
The operational conditions can be maintained and the safety of the nearby population ensured without changing the
constructive characteristics of the pipeline.

8. Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank PETROBRAS/TRANSPETRO for supporting this research and enabling the
publication of this manuscript.

8
 Rio Pipeline Conference & Exposition 2007

9. References
[1] ASME B 31-8 – Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems – American Society of Mechanical Engineers
2003.
[2] International Standard ISO 13623 - Petroleum and natural gas industries —Pipeline transportation systems -
International Standards Organization, 2000
[3] CSA Z 662-89 – Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems – Canadian Standards Association, 1999
[4] PD 8010-1:2004 – Code of Practice for Pipelines – Pipelines on Land – British Standards Institution, 2004.
[5] E. Michalopoulos, S.Babka - Evaluation of Pipeline Design Factors - Gas Research Institute, Report GRI 00/0076,
2000.
[6] 6th EGIG Report 1970-2004 – Gas Pipeline Incidents – European Gas Pipeline Incident Group,
http://www.egig.nl.
[7] J-F Larivé, P. M. Davis, J. Dubois, G. Levi, F. Uhlig, M. Frediksson - Performance of European Crosscountry Oil
Pipelines Statistical Summary of Reported Spillages in 2006 and since 1971 – CONCAWE report 7/08,
http://www.concawe.be .
[8] United States Department of Transportation (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration
(PHMSA) – http://www.phmsa.ops.dot.gov.
[9] National Energy Board of Canada - Comparative Analysis of Pipeline Performance 2000 2003 – March 2005,
http://www.neb.gc.ca.
[10] Q. Chen - Class Location Criteria for Gas Pipelines – Pipeline Research Council Interantional , Report L51995,
2004
[11] W. Kent Muhlbauer – Pipeline Risk Management Manual, 3rd Ed – Elsiever Ed, 2004.
[12] A.Cosham, J. Haswell, Neil Jackson - Reduction Factors for Estimating the Probability of Failure of Mechanical
Damage due to External Interference - IPC2008-64345, International Pipeline Conference, 2008.
[13] C. Lyons, J. Haswell, P. Hopkins, R Ellis, N. Jackson - A Methodology for the Prediction of Pipeline Failure
Frequency due to External Interference - IPC2008-64375, International Pipeline Conference, 2008.
[14] API 1160 - Managing System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines – American Petroleum Institute, 2001.
[15] P. Hopkins – High Design Factor Pipelines: Integrity Issues – Journal of Pipeline Integrity 4(2), 2005.
[16] Focus on Pipeline Ageing and Third Part Interference - CONCAWE Review Vo, 15 N 2, Autumm 2006
[17] M. J. Stephens - A Model for Sizing High Consequence Areas Associated With Natural Gas Pipelines - GRI-
00/0189, C-FER Report 99068, 2000
[18] ASME B 31-8 S– Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines (Supplement to ASME B 31-8) – 2004
[19] International Standard ISO 16708 - Petroleum and natural gas industries — Pipeline transportation systems —
Reliability-based limit state methods- International Standards Organization, 2006.