Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154

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Energy Research & Social Science

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Original research article

Towards a sociology of energy and globalization: Interconnectedness,

capital, and knowledge in the Brazilian solar photovoltaic industry
Luiz Enrique Vieira de Souza a,∗ , Alina Mikhailovna Gilmanova Cavalcante b
a
School of Electrical Engineering—Beijing Jiaotong University, Nr. 3 Shangyuancun, Haidian District, Beijing, China
b
Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences—University of Campinas, R. Cora Coralina 100, Cidade Universitária Zeferino Vaz, Campinas, CEP 13083-896,
São Paulo, Brazil

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Brazil has enormous silicon reserves and solar irradiance levels, but the participation of solar energy in its
Received 27 January 2016 electricity mix was inexpressive until recently. However, the current policies of the Brazilian government
Received in revised form 8 July 2016 have been responsible for an increasing deployment of photovoltaic (PV) systems and thus provided more
Accepted 16 July 2016
favorable conditions for the emergence of a national PV industry. This article analyzes the development of
the Brazilian PV sector in its “interconnectedness” with the global renewable energy market and therefore
Keywords:
is presented as a contribution for the energy studies, as well as an empirical case for the “sociology of
Photovoltaic energy
globalization”. The Chinese policies for photovoltaic energy are taken as parameter for the discussion of
Brazil
China
the Brazilian experience in order to highlight the growing importance of renewable energy investments in
Renewable energy industry emerging economies and the decisive role played by the national States in pushing forward the renewable
Sociology of globalization energy industry as a strategic sector for their privileged insertion in the competitive global order.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Mainly due to the contribution of sugar cane products (7.3%) and
hydropower (65.2%), the share of renewable sources accounts for
74.6% of the Brazilian electricity mix, thus placing the country above
the international renewable energy (RE) average [1]. However, in
the field of solar energy the country performed poorly until 2013,
when the on-grid installed capacity for photovoltaic (PV) genera-
Abbreviations: ANEEL, National Agency of Electric Energy; BNDES, National
Bank for Socioeconomic Development; CDB, China Development Bank; CNY, Chi-
nese Yuan; CO2 , carbon dioxide; EU, European Union; FCO, Midwest Development
Fund; FDI, Foreign Direct Investments; FDNE, Northeast Development Fund; FIT,
feed in tariff; FYP, Five-Year Plan; GW, gigawatt; GWh, gigawatt-hour; IEA, Interna-
tional Energy Agency; kWh, kilowatt-hour; LCOE, levelized costs of electricity; MW,
megawatt; NDRC, National Development Reform Commission; PADIS, Program for
the Technological Development Support of the Semiconductor Industry; PRODEEM,
Program for Energy Development of States and Municipalities; ProGD, Development
Program for Distributed Power Generation; PROINFA, Incentive Program for Alter-
native Sources of Electricity; PV, photovoltaic; R&D, Research and Developmen; RE,
renewable energy; SWH, solar water heater; WTO, World Trade Organization.
∗ Corresponding author. Permanent address: Center for Environmental Studies
and Research—University of Campinas, Núcleo de Estudos e Pesquisas Ambientais
(NEPAM), Rua dos Flamboyants 155, Cidade Universitária Zeferino Vaz, Campinas,
CEP 13083-866, São Paulo, Brazil.
E-mail addresses: lenriquesol@yahoo.com.br (L.E.V. de Souza),
alinthik@yandex.ru (A.M.G. Cavalcante).
tion was restricted to only 5 MW. In Brazil, PV energy was usually
deployed in remote areas without access to the transmission lines,
but even if we consider the capacity of 30 MW registered in 2011
for off-grid systems, the total participation of PV was still very
modest. The main reason for that was associated to the fact that
other renewable energy technologies presented lower costs than
PV. Therefore, PV was not listed in the PROINFA (Incentive Program
for Alternative Sources of Electricity, decree n. 5025, 2004), which
established minimum deployment targets and a complementary
tariff for small scale hydropower stations, wind power and other
plants fueled by biomass in order to compensate the disadvantages
of such technologies in relation to the more competitive prices of
the electricity generated by conventional power plants.
In spite of that, Brazil is currently undergoing a major turning
point in its policies for solar energy. The government assigned the
PV industry as a strategic sector and also established a set of mea-
sures to promote more investments in this area. The institution of
the net metering system enabled the independent generators to
feed the grid with their exceeding electricity, using it as a battery,
and compensate with the same amount of electricity in the periods
when solar irradiance is not enough to supply their consumption.
Besides, the National Agency of Electric Energy (ANEEL) has pro-
moted several exclusive auctions for solar energy. As a result, the
registered number of small generators rose from 189 in June 2014
to 1232 in October 2015, and the stakeholders in the PV industry
estimate that 3.5 GW of solar energy might be deployed in the next

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.07.004
2214-6296/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
146 L.E.V. de Souza, A.M.G. Cavalcante / Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
four years [2]. Moreover, the government provided the auction win-
ners with low interest rate loans on condition that they purchase
local assembled PV panels. This local content rule incentivized the
establishment of PV factories, although with uncompetitive prices
comparing with the imported Chinese PV panels.
Consequently, the purpose of this article is to analyze the emer-
gence of the PV industry in Brazil and the importance of the
measures implemented by the government to boost the national
PV market. Nevertheless, a comprehensive view on this process can
only be achieved if the Brazilian scenario is analytically situated in
the framework of the global energy markets. First of all, because the
discourse of climate changes to which the deployment of renew-
able energies is associated, constitutes an international narrative.
Secondly, the energy market is highly globalized, as the research
and development of RE technologies and the manufacturing value-
chain of energy equipment are geographically distributed in several
countries [3]. Finally, we argue in this article that national States
seek to promote the internal development of the renewable energy
industry because they consider this sector fundamentally strategic
for the good positioning of their respective economies in the global
market.
There is a tendency to take the existence of global energy
markets as a given, a function of the power of transnational corpo-
rations and the guidelines of national energy agencies. Nonetheless,
a sociological inquiry needs to go beyond givens and attributes and
examine the making of these conditions, as well as the dynamic
rules according to which the involved actors design their strategies
[4]. Hence, our research is situated in the intersection of energy
studies and the sociology of globalization: We will shed some light
on the global circuits for capital, knowledge, investment and trade
in the PV industry and thoroughly discuss the initiatives of the
Brazilian government to insert the country in the transnational PV
production chain.
Because China represents the gravitational center of the global
PV manufacture, it will be taken as a reference for the analy-
sis of the Brazilian case. However, rather than merely comparing
these countries’ policies for the solar sector, we intend to high-
light the worldwide interconnectedness of production and markets
that constitutes the basis for the local development of the Brazil-
ian industry. In other words, the concept of “interconnectedness”
aims to clarify those international links that function as causal
implications for determining the dynamic contexts in which the
national States and energy enterprises define their plans. We will
also demonstrate that in a globalized economy the interconnected
features of the PV sector must be dialectic identified as both coop-
eration and competition. Brazil is favored by the international
research and development of solar panels, and its industry will
initially begin as an element of a transnational chain of the PV man-
ufacture, but the telos underlying the governmental solar policies
was conceived according to the goal of progressively upgrading the
Brazilian participation in the global RE markets. On the theoretical
level, this article investigates the emergence of the Brazilian PV
industry in order to shed some light on how nation States are pro-
moting the local renewable energy industry in the context of global
interconnectedness and competitiveness.
2. Theoretical framework and methodological approach
The evidence of globalizing dynamics in the energy sector
demands a corresponding theoretical view. It means that instead of
following the mainstream approach in energy studies—according
to which the “nation State” is regarded as a closed unit and the
energy policies analyzed in the context of its limited territorial
jurisdiction—we intend to highlight the transboundary flows of
capital and know-how in the renewable energy sector in which
the current Brazilian solar policies are embedded. In line with the
“methodological cosmopolitanism” required by the object of this
research, the present article aims to contribute for the investiga-
tions on renewable energy deployment in emerging economies and
also investigate the emergence of the Brazilian PV industry as an
empirical case for the social studies of globalization [4].
The sociology of globalization has largely emphasized that an
important set of phenomena—climate changes, migrations, finance
market, identity—can no longer be understood in reference to the
analytical framework of the national States [4–7]. Local transfor-
mations are due to more complex causal chains that cannot be
circumscribed within national territories—and the more compact
dimension of the global instances that followed the technological
innovations in the transport and communication infrastructures
has reconfigured the idea of national sovereignty in the sense that
changes in the local contexts might be associated with processes
that are not completely under the legislation of national authorities.
The emergence of the PV industry in Brazil will be thus analyzed
in consonance with the principles of “methodological cosmopoli-
tanism”, such as developed by Ülrich Beck [7–9]. This theory is
relevant because it radically questions the division between the
“inside” and the “outside” of social phenomena in relation to
their national borders. In the field of energy studies, it is espe-
cially important because it offers an alternative reference for the
widespread research pattern that defines the problems of inves-
tigation by focusing on the deployment of a certain technology
in a given country (e.g. the prospects of nuclear power in France,
hydropower in China, wind power in Argentina). In short, one can
hardly provide comprehensive studies on national energy policies,
unless they are presented in connection to the dynamics of the
global energy markets in which they are embedded [10]. That is
why, rather than insulating the emerging Brazilian PV industry
from the international arena, we will focus on the process by which
the Brazilian government is developing measures to contribute for
the endogenization of the global dynamics in the national solar
industry.
Thus, we will consciously avoid treating the nation State as a
closed unit, as well as any sort of rigid conception of the “global”
and the “local” as dualistic analytical categories. The theoretical
divergences with the “methodological nationalism” do not imply,
however, any underestimation of the actions taken by national gov-
ernments to place their countries in a favorable position within the
competitive world economy. Rather, we demonstrate that national
States played a decisive role in enabling the capabilities for global
operation and coordination of the renewable energy market and
were also responsible for the policies that internalized the specific
rules of the globalized PV market in national energy planning with
the purpose of strengthening the local manufacturers and their
competitive insertion in the international arena.
In regard to our methodological approach, we based the argu-
ments developed throughout this article both on primary and
secondary data. The secondary data were obtained in scientific
articles on the perspectives of PV energy in Brazil and China.
The existing literature raised a number of questions, though,
that demanded the gathering of original information. Hence,
our primary data consist of five semi-structured interviews con-
ducted along 2015: In China, we interviewed Shi Jingli, an energy
researcher from the Center for Renewable Energy Development and
Research Institute/National Development and Reform Commission.
In Brazil, we interviewed the director Carlos Mattar and regulation
specialist Daniel Vieira from the distributed generation department
at ANEEL, Professor Rafael Shayani from the University of Brasilia,
as well as two representatives of the PV manufacture company:
Thatiane Roberto from Globo Brasil and Abdias Pontes from Mina-
sol, both listed in the BNDES (National Bank for Socioeconomic
Development) catalogues of local manufactures. We also requested
 L.E.V. de Souza, A.M.G. Cavalcante / Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
Fig. 1. Cumulative global PV deployment and c-Si module selling prices, 2000–2014.
Source: [15].
interviews with representatives from BYD, S4 and Pure Energy, but
since the requests were not replied, data about these enterprises
were collected from their respective websites.
3. The scaling-up and reduction costs of photovoltaic
manufacture in the north Atlantic-East Asia axis
In 2008, China reached the worldwide peak of solar panels
export, and out of the 26,000 MW shipped, nothing less than 90%
were destined to Europe and North America [11]. On the demand
side, the main explanation for the considerable increase in the
purchase of solar equipment was the approval of supportive laws
for renewable technologies in European countries aiming at the
accomplishment of their respective CO2 reduction targets. Ger-
man, Spain and Italy were in the avant-garde of this process and,
even though the specific regulations followed different strategies in
each country, they consisted basically in providing financial incen-
tives so that renewables could overcome their cost disadvantages
in relation to the conventional technologies.
In Germany, the Renewable Energy Law (2000) offered large
subsidies and government loans for RE producers, besides institut-
ing the obligation for electric utilities to purchase all the electricity
generated by alternative sources. These measures were responsible
for increasing the German solar power generation from 64 kWh in
2000 to 28,060 GWh in 2012. The USA followed a different path and
presented varied policies according to the legal framework of each
State. The Investment Tax Credit (ITC), for instance, encouraged
investments in solar energy by reducing the tax liability for indi-
viduals or businesses willing to acquire solar technologies. Along
with fiscal incentives, power purchase agreements and residential
solar leases also contributed for the United States to reach a PV
cumulative capacity of 7.2 GW in 2012 [12].
Therefore, the political interventions of some Northern coun-
tries appear as the first causal element for the observed reduction in
the levelized costs of PV electricity (LCOE)—per-kilowatt hour cost
of building and operating a generating plant over an assumed finan-
cial life and duty cycle [13]. The “visible hand” of some developed
nations created incentives that pushed up the additional demand
for solar energy and the prices of PV panels decreased substantially
in the course of a few years (see Fig. 1). The growth in cumulative
147
installed capacity of solar PV from 1 GW in 2000 to 180 GW in 2014
provoked the decline of the PV module cost due to the increase in
the volume of production. The second element in this causal chain is
the concentration of PV facilities in China. Indeed, the Chinese gov-
ernment has stressed the relevance of its RE industry at least since
1987, when it set up special interest-free loans for the promotion
of solar energy [14].
More generally, the accession of China to the World Trade Organi-
zation in 2001 has also contributed for increasing the Foreign Direct
Investments (FDI) in the energy field and facilitating the transfer-
ence of some key renewable energy technologies along with the
purchase of production equipment [16]. Siemens Solar, Sayo, Sharp,
SEC, among other international companies, promptly grasped the
business opportunity and started manufacturing solar panels in
the Chinese territory—and the volume of capital flows grew to
such extent that, in 2009, China had attracted about one third of
the global FDI in the PV industry. Meanwhile, a new generation
of Chinese solar companies was grounded and their aggressive
recruitment strategies complemented the technological learning
from the previous commercial exchange with foreign companies.
According to Tour et al. [3], some highly skilled executives from the
Chinese diaspora built the pioneer PV firms and managed to fill the
leading positions within their enterprises with other Chinese engi-
neers and executives who, like themselves, had previously received
foreign training.
These processes were in consonance with the governmental
mid- to long-term economic goal of gradually restructuring the
country’s position in the international division of labour (NDRC,
2012). China would be supposed to abandon its condition of “fac-
tory of the world” to assume the historic opportunity of presenting
itself as a major technology and innovation hub in East Asia. In other
words, it would imply moving the emphasis of its industrial policies
from the pollution intensive manufacture of low value-added prod-
ucts towards the scaling-up of high value-added renewable energy
equipment and other low-carbon technologies [17]. Therefore, the
central government identified the PV industry as a key element
in this strategy and included solar panels in the Catalog of Chi-
nese High-Technology Products for Export (2006), commercializing
them at preferential rates.
148 L.E.V. de Souza, A.M.G. Cavalcante / Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
The easy access to finance is certainly one of the reasons why
China became such an auspicious place for the development of the
PV industry. However, another decisive factor for the competitive-
ness of the Chinese solar panels in international markets is the
inexpensive price of the electricity consumed by local industries.
The PV value-chain is energy intensive, and electricity consump-
tion is responsible for about 35% of the costs of polycrystalline
silicon [18,19]. In this sense, the low prices enabled by the large
predominance of coal-fired thermal plants in the Chinese energy
mix provided a major contribution for the reduction costs of locally
produced solar panels [20]. Of course the reduction of costs derived
from the gains in scale and learning curve are in the core of the mar-
ket hegemony of Chinese-made solar panels, but such factors were
actually enabled by the comparatively low prices of the electric-
ity consumed by local industries. Thus, the environmental paradox
of the local PV industry is becoming competitive due to the price
advantages of coal power. In other words, the advantages of PV
deployment in terms of reducing greenhouse gases emissions are
diminished when the solar panels are produced with electricity
from highly pollutant coal plants, but competitiveness in the world
market is measured by prices and not by life-cycle assessment cri-
teria.
However, the decisions from Northern countries to interpose
commercial barriers against Chinese solar panels were not based
on any life-cycle assessment consideration. Rather, it was an ini-
tiative to protect their respective national industries against the
cheaper prices of made-in-China solar cells. Indeed, the Chinese
PV sector succeeded in following the “go global” directive pre-
sented in the 10th FYP. Suntech, Trina Solar, Solarfun, Yingli, JA
Solar and China Sunergy were listed either in the Nasdaq or in the
New York Stock Exchange, enabling the attraction of international
capital, enhancing its international public image and highlighting
these enterprises’ international competitiveness. All these factors
together helped Chinese companies to increase the volume of pro-
duction, while some European or North American companies were
going bankrupt. Some of those who managed to escape bankruptcy
were merging with their Chinese competitors, like the example
of KSL Kutler (Germany), which was partially acquired by Suntech
Power in 2008 [21]. The statistics of International Energy Agency
(IEA) [18] testifies this process showing that about one quarter of
the 88,000 existing jobs in the German PV industry in 2012 has
since been lost—either because the companies were driven off the
market or because they moved to East Asia in order to catch up the
competitiveness trend.
The competition with Chinese manufacturers had been severely
aggravated by the economic crisis of 2008. Fiscal concerns pushed
Germany and Spain to review the Feed in Tariff (FIT) mecha-
nisms, under which the system generators receive the fix amount
that added to the electricity price or generation cost. Many coun-
tries reduced the FIT payments, while the British government
announced that it would cut 50% of the subsidies given to the solar
industry [22]. In order to avoid the collapse of native PV manufac-
turers, the European Commission approved in 2013 anti-dumping
duties on imports of solar panels of 47% on Chinese solar goods
in response to the complaints of dumping posed by the Germany-
based SolarWorld [23]. Something similar had taken place in the
USA in the previous year, when the US Department of Commerce
imposed anti-dumping tax rates of 18.3%–249.9% on Chinese solar
cells, besides a final countervailing tax rate of 14.7%–15.9% [24].
These protectionist interventions revealed a double contradic-
tion. On the side of Northern countries, it highlighted that the real
obstacles for the achievement of a new energy paradigm go far
beyond the argument that blames the higher prices of the electricity
generated by renewables. It suffices to say that Chinese PV prod-
ucts were 30% cheaper than US solar panels before the approval
of the anti-dumping tax rates, but strictly nationalist industry
policies succeeded in displacing the more cosmopolitan envi-
ronmental concerns. On the Chinese side, they exacerbated the
“overcapacity crisis” in the PV sector, which by its turn made it clear
that the renewable energy policies designed by the Chinese cen-
tral authorities had been driven by the “growth imperative” rather
than by the “green imperative” [25]. Before the commercial restric-
tions in the overseas markets, China exported more than 90% of its
solar panels, while domestic PV deployment was not particularly
relevant.
In face of this scenario, the next section discusses how the
Chinese government managed to prevent its national PV sector
from breaking down. We will show that new incentive policies for
domestic deployment were issued and, as a consequence of that,
the installed capacity experienced an exponential growth in the
country. We will also argue that, even though such policies were
responsible for increasing the participation of solar energy in the
Chinese energy mix, they were not fully efficient in coping with
the “oversupply” in the PV sector. This pushed the solar industry
once again to foreign markets and, since the “overcapacity crisis”
contributed for a further reduction in the prices of solar cells, China
could turn its production and commercialization strategies towards
Southern countries, among which Brazil is also included.
4. Strategies for coping with “overcapacity”: domestic
deployment and diversification of the Chinese photovoltaic
market
The restrictions imposed by Northern countries do not config-
ure any peculiarity of the PV field; rather, they exemplified one of
the patterns in the trade relations between North-Atlantic coun-
tries and China. Neither the United States nor the European Union
remains among the ninety-seven nations who had granted China
“Market Economy Status” until 2009. North-Atlantic countries are,
actually, those responsible for a large part of the dozens of anti-
dumping investigations and countervailing duties faced by China
every year in the World Trade Organization [26]. According to the
terms of its accession to the WTO, China will automatically be qual-
ified as “Market Economy Status” in 2016. This assured promotion
helps us to understand the non-confrontational approach adopted
by Beijing towards the accusations of “unfair trade”.
However, it is important to have in mind that the PV industry
generates employment and income in more than 300 out of 600 Chi-
nese cities, accounting for 1.6 million employees in 2014 [27]. Total
production value for the manufacturing side of the sector exceeded
200 billion Yuan (approx. US$31.5 billion) for the first three quar-
ters of 2015 [28]. Therefore, the potential negative impacts in terms
of job and social stability have led the central government to com-
pensate the vertical drops in the total value of PV exports with
massive programs for domestic deployment [29]. Previously, only a
small fraction of the production output was destined for the gener-
ation of electricity within the Chinese territory—usually in remote
rural areas where the installation of solar panels was more cost-
effective than the extension of the grid lines: “Brightness Program”
(1996) and “Township Electrification Program” (2002) [30].
This scenario has drastically changed since 2008, when PV
solar capacity in China consisted of merely 140 MW. The cen-
tral government issued a set of measures destined to relieve the
PV industry from its setbacks in the international market. The
China Development Bank (CDB) gave 250 billion CNY (Chinese
Yuan) of extension credit to the sector and opened a line of credit
of US$ 30 billion for Chinese solar cell and module manufac-
turers [17]. Along with the subsidized loans, the State was also
responsible for the further acceleration of the demand through
ambitious solar programs—“Golden Sun Program” and “Rooftop
 L.E.V. de Souza, A.M.G. Cavalcante / Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
Fig. 2. Global Horizontal Irradiance in Brazil.
Source: [39].
Subsidy Program”—and the implementation of a nationwide FIT for
PV electricity [24].
The incentives resulted in exponential growth of the PV installed
capacity. The initial target set in the “12th FYP for Renewable Energy
Development in China” was 5 GW, but in 2012 the national statistics
had already registered 8 GW of cumulative installation. Hence, the
deployment goals for the period were rediscussed and increased
several times, until the government finally set up the purpose of
reaching 35 GW by the end of 2015. In interview with the authors,
a professor from the Center for Renewable Energy Development
Energy Research Institute (NDRC) informed that the target had been
achieved six months before the schedule and that policy-makers
were considering doubling this number in 2017. In case such trade
is confirmed, China will rank not only as the main PV manufacturer,
but also as the hugest market for solar panels worldwide [31].
However, the increment in PV installations also presented some
deficiencies and exacerbated the structural overcapacity of the
Chinese PV industry. In the past, the main problems were associ-
ated to the lack of supervision on PV systems. As we mentioned
above, the government sought to use solar panels for provid-
ing electricity to millions of people living in remote areas of the
impoverished Western and Northwestern provinces, but it did
not offer training programs to qualify the local workforce for an
adequate maintenance of those systems. More recently, the large-
scale deployment of solar panels was not accompanied by an
equivalent increase in the use of solar electricity, for in provinces
like Xinjiang nearly half of the electricity output was curtailed in
September 2015. The reason for the “idle capacity” of PV plants is
associated with the reluctance from grid companies to purchase
an amount of solar electricity above the quotas determined by
149
the authorities [31]. Besides, the provinces located in the west of
the Gobi desert—Qinghai, Ningxia, Gansu, Xinjiang—concentrate an
important proportion of the country’s solar plants, but they are very
distant from the biggest cities and the insufficient grid coverage is
a barrier for transmitting the large surplus of PV electricity to the
main consumption centers [32].
In other words, the large-scale deployment of solar energy in
China was enabled by a set of measures taken by the central gov-
ernment to compensate the adverse scenario in North-Atlantic
markets after 2008 and create demand for the PV industry in face of
its overcapacity crisis. On the one hand, these subsidies constituted
the turning point for domestic deployment and thus contributed for
further reductions in the costs of solar panels. On the other hand,
such policies followed an erratic pattern, inflating the “overcapacity
crisis”, instead of successfully managing it [17]. The crisis is partic-
ularly acute in the downstream sectors of the PV value-chain in
virtue of their comparatively lower technological and investment
entrance requisites—and the consequences are seen as some enter-
prises suspend the production entirely, while others operate with
a capacity utilization of only 20–30% [33].
The further accelerated growth of the Chinese PV sector has
implied that many producers registered very low or even negative
balances. According to the government’s strategy, the resolution
of the overcapacity crisis will necessarily push several manufac-
turers into bankruptcy, but at the same time will qualify the
remaining ones for a more competitive position in the international
market. On the global level, this strategy also implies the diversi-
fication of Chinese exports towards Southern countries. Although
the Japanese share increased six-fold between 2011 and 2013, thus
becoming the main importer of Chinese solar goods, the declining
150 L.E.V. de Souza, A.M.G. Cavalcante / Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
Fig. 3. Share of renewable and non-renewable energy sources in the Brazilian energy mix.
Source: [42].
prices have reoriented the international flows of PV equipment,
augmenting the portion of developing countries from 6% to 23% in
the same interval [34].
The destinies of Chinese solar panels are mostly concentrated
in East and Southern Asia, but Africa and Latin America have also
gained importance. Taiwan, Vietnam and Indonesia developed local
factories that have close interactions with Chinese producers and
became part of a regional value-chain. They manufacture solar com-
ponents that will be assembled in China and from there reexported
to dozens of countries. Due to the implementation of “feed-in tar-
iffs”, South Africa imported US$ 456 million out of the US$ 531
million PV cells and modules shipped to Africa in 2013, but other
countries like Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya were gained by the Chinese
solar market as well [34].
Latin America still occupies a peripheral position in the inter-
national flows of solar investments. In the total balance of Chinese
FDI to the Brazilian electricity market, only one project is related to
the PV sector—US$ 50 million are announced to be invested by BYD
to establish PV manufacture facilities. Chile is the forerunner of PV
energy in the region, while Mexico appears as a strategic partner
for the potential role that this country can play as a pivotal basis
for Chinese exports to the United States [2]. Due to zero tariffs for
solar cells import established in Mexico, the Chinese manufactur-
ers install their production and assembly of solar panels and then
export the final product to Americas with zero tariffs [35]. Brazil
figures only at the 27th position in relation to Chinese PV exports
to developing countries, but it may also be considered strategic to
the PV market due to its huge solar resources and silicon reserves.
In the next section, we will focus on the emergence of the Brazilian
PV industry as a result of the policies implemented by the federal
government to increase the share of solar electricity in its energy
mix and to position the country among the global players of the PV
sector.
5. Brazilian policies on solar energy: catalyzing the internal
demand as a primary step for “going global”
Similarly as in China, the first PV systems in Brazil were installed
as part of the guidelines to provide access to electricity in remote
areas. In 1994, the national government created the PRODEEM (Pro-
gram for Energy Development of States and Municipalities), which
was intended to promote energy services for communities distant
from the conventional grid, mainly in the North and Northeast
regions [36]. The program “Light for All” (decree 4.873, 11.11.2003)
might be seen as a development of PRODEEM, but its goals are more
ambitious in the sense that it aims at the complete universalization
of the access to electricity. Solar energy was included as part of the
program both in its PV and solar water heater (SWH) variants and
in different types of applications, such as lightening, water heating
and water bumping.
However, the cost-effectiveness ratio that provided the initial
impulse for the deployment of solar energy in the country was also
responsible for excluding PV technology from the PROINFA. While
in the first case the installation of solar systems disobliged the gov-
ernment from building transmission lines, in the second case the
price of PV electricity was considered disadvantageous in compari-
son to small hydro power plants, biomass and wind energy. Hence,
the lack of incentive policies has created a situation in which—in
spite of Brazilian’s huge solar resources (see Fig. 2)—PV energy
barely provides any contribution to the national energy mix [37,38].
From the sustainability standpoint, promoting the further diver-
sification of the Brazilian energy supply through PV deployment
would not only be convenient in face of the recent “carbonization
trend” of the country’s power sector (see Fig. 3), but also due to
the seasonal complementary nature of solar and hydropower [40].
The remaining potential for large-scale hydropower is located in
the Amazon basin, turning it into a politically controversial issue
because of the ecological impacts of flooding parts of the rain forest
and the social impacts resulting from the relocation of traditional
populations. Besides, one must consider that the current change
in climate patterns has caused severe droughts in the Southeast
region, where a considerable portion of the operating hydropower
units are located. This has affected the power supply and the energy
shortages are being compensated with coal- and gas-fired plants
[41]. Finally, the participation of RE in the Brazilian electricity mix is
considerably higher than the international average, which implies
that the production of solar panels in Brazil would result in lower
emissions of greenhouse gases than in China. However, as we state
below, a major problem for the Brazilian PV industry might be the
expensive costs of electricity and taxes, meaning that local solar
panels might be less competitive in the world-market in spite of its
more environmentally beneficial life-cycle assessment.
The domestic solar PV industry in Brazil is still fairly undevel-
oped, with actors missing along many stages of the value chain.
Despite the ample availability of silicon, no solar cell manufactur-
ers exist yet. There are some big companies like RIMA or Minasligas
that are leaders in the silicon metal market and have the technical
conditions to produce solar grade silicon. However, the commercial
production would be possible only with the reduction of electricity
prices for the industrial sector (as it is an electricity intensive pro-
cess) or subsidies in order to scale up the production to the export
 L.E.V. de Souza, A.M.G. Cavalcante / Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
level [43]. Otherwise, the solar cells produced in Brazil will not be
able to compete with the Chinese ones.
Moreover, Brazil lacks to date an adequate industrial policy that
could promote a competitive PV manufacture and local produc-
ers face a much higher tax burden than in other countries. While
the wind sector enjoys tax exemption for its components (towers,
blades and some of the electrical components), PV raw materials
and fabrication equipment face from 40% to 60% taxes, mostly due
to ICMS tax (value-added tax on sales and services). The Brazilian
government had a tax incentive program PADIS (Program for the
Technological Development Support of the Semiconductor Indus-
try) for the semiconductor industry that ended in May 2015. The
program permitted the reduction of certain federal taxes in order
to encourage the production of microelectronic goods. Nonethe-
less, the PADIS could provide tax exemption for only 20% of inputs
and machinery of the solar industry, like PV panels and solar cells
[44].
In spite of that, the Brazilian government has recently estab-
lished the objective of promoting a “turning point” in its policies
for the development of the PV sector. In 2014, ANEEL carried out
the first exclusive auction for solar energy with the sale of almost
900 MW and guaranteed price for twenty years [45]. This approach
was reinforced in November 2015 with a new exclusive auction in
which 1115 MW of PV generation were negotiated at the average
price of BRL 297.75/MWh (US$ 78) [46]. Thus, the reservation of
a certain quota for solar energy was successful in overcoming the
competition between PV and other RE technologies, as well as in
providing the investors with signals that the government will play
an important role in creating a massive demand for solar cells and
modules. The perspective is that at least 3.5 GW of PV electricity
will be deployed in Brazil until 2021 [47].
Another important similarity with the Chinese case is that the
Brazilian government intends to use the public financial sector
as a tool to boost the national PV industry. More specifically,
the National Bank for Socioeconomic Development (BNDES) will
concede loans at preferential rates for the projects in which the
local content clauses—also known as nationalization factor—are
observed. Indeed, the strategy consists of a roadmap for reverting
the underdevelopment of the Brazilian PV industry so that national
manufacturers can progress to all stages of the PV production chain
and consolidate a relative autonomy in the sector [48].
According to the “Progressive Nationalization Plan”, the condi-
tions for being benefited by the financial incentives given by the
BNDES in the period between 2014 and 2017 require that the mod-
ules should be assembled in Brazil and its frame must be sourced
within the country. It is also expected that the electrical compo-
nents and the support of the system will be locally manufactured.
From 2018 to 2019, the junction box and the inverter must be added
to the previous list. From 2020 onwards, the national production of
solar cells is also a requisite for public financing, completing thus
the evolution of the Brazilian industry to all stages of the PV produc-
tion chain. In order to accelerate this process, those manufacturers
who add locally the items not yet required by the schedule will
receive a bonus, if they are sourced in Brazil [49].
The Brazilian government expects a gradual increase of the local
content in the PV value chain during the next few years. Hence,
the national features of the emergence of the PV industry in Brazil
are noticeable both in regard to the importance of the State inter-
ventions in creating a set of new rules destined to promote the
increase of PV energy through the compensation of its current
higher levelized costs of electricity, as well as in the stimulus for the
progressive upgrading of local manufacturers along the PV value
chain. However, another remarkable characteristic of this process is
its “global interconnectedness”. Even though the reasons underly-
ing the incentives given by the Brazilian government are associated
to the interest of promoting the national economy, the formation
151
of the Brazilian PV sector is intrinsically global in the view of a) the
transnational flow of components to be assembled as a final “solar
good”; b) the potential interest of foreign investors, since compa-
nies from different countries are investigating the possibilities to
establish solar factories in Brazil and c) the domestic deployment
of PV energy as a necessary step for scaling up the production in
order to make the Brazilian industry an international player in the
PV sector.
As a matter of fact, the Brazilian industry is represented only at
the extremes of the PV value chain. The fabrication of solar panels
is a quite verticalized process—and besides the above mentioned
RIMAS and Minasligas, which supply a large volume of metallurgical
grade silicon—the national production consists basically of module
manufacturers (e.g. Tecnometal and Globo Brasil). That means that
the local companies at the downstream level of the PV value chain
are responsible for assembling the components—polycrystalline
silicon, ingot, wafers, solar cells—imported from other countries
[40]. In its infancy, the Brazilian industry is situated in a periph-
eral position of the existing international PV circuits of research,
production and market. According to the government’s strategy,
the acceleration of the national demand and the clauses of local
content for public financing are going to support the spreading of
the Brazilian industry towards all segments of PV production and
compensate its current underdevelopment.
The global interconnectedness of the Brazilian PV industry is
also remarkable in what concerns the building up of its infrastruc-
ture. Inasmuch as Brazil represents a huge potential market for PV
energy, foreign companies from North-Atlantic and Asiatic coun-
tries are currently evaluating different investment approaches that
would enable them to take their profit shares in the Brazilian mar-
ket. One possible path is taking part in solar auctions with projects
developed in cooperation with Brazilian stakeholders. That is what
happened, for instance, when Canadian Solar won three solar PV
projects totaling 144 MW in the state of Minas Gerais in partner-
ship with Brazilian PV developer Solatio [50]. Another modality
of “global investment” was exemplified by the Chinese industrial
group BYD that recently announced the intention of expending US$
50 million for setting up a manufacturing facility in Campinas [51].
The German Solar-Cluster is pointing out to a similar direction, con-
sidering the feasibility for the establishment of a PV manufacturing
plant with annual capacity of 680 MW in the state of Paraná [52].
Pure Energy—the filial of Italian holding aRegran, declared a very
ambitious plan not only of building a factory to produce PV pan-
els, but also to construct a pilot PV and concentrated solar power
plants [53]. Furthermore, one must also consider the links with
foreign capital through the import of the equipment and the corre-
sponding technology transfer for the manufacture of solar panels
(interview with Abdias Pontes, representative of Minasol). Although
Globo Brasil is a company founded exclusively with national capital,
its machineries were imported from China and Switzerland, among
other countries [54].
Finally, it must be highlighted that in the very core of the incen-
tives given by the Brazilian government lies the objective of pushing
forward the competitiveness of the national PV industry so that it
might catch up with its international competitors and “go global”.
The reason for that is the current rate of expansion of PV sys-
tems worldwide. Solar panels have been deployed much faster than
expected and the total global capacity overtook 180 GW in early
2014. According to the IEA [18], PV energy might achieve 4600 GW
of installed capacity and respond for 16% of the world consumption
of electricity by 2050. Although a latecomer in this field, Brazilian
recent energy policies aim at reproducing the successful experi-
ences of biomass and wind energy and turn the country into one of
the international poles of the solar industry.
In this sense, the Brazilian experience in the manufacture of
wind turbines presents a valuable example for the comprehension
152 L.E.V. de Souza, A.M.G. Cavalcante / Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
of the direction pursued by the solar policies. In August 2012, Brazil
had already surpassed the milestone of 2 GW of wind generation
with perspectives for the further development of 7 GW and 16 GW
by 2016 and 2020, respectively. The domestic escalation was a con-
sequence of the national incentives given by PROINFA and resulted
in a large volume of exports of wind turbines. In 2013, more than
a dozen local manufacturers were employing high qualified work-
ers and supplying wind turbines for the domestic, as well as for the
Argentinian, North American and European markets [55]. However,
the Brazilian policies were focused on creating a market for wind
energy, missing out on technology policies and the stimulation of
technology learning that seems to repeat with PV technology [56].
Along with the exclusive solar auctions, the regulation of net
metering systems seems to be a far-reaching measure announced
by the Brazilian government to enlarge the contribution of PV
electricity in the national energy mix and thus catalyze the local
PV industry. In the Brazilian case, net metering systems tend
to be particularly effective for the distributed generation of PV
power—small scale technologies to produce electricity close to the
end users of power—because of the high electricity prices charged
in the residential and commercial sectors of urban centers. In
2012, residential tariffs averaged 0.17 D /(kWh), reaching as high
as 0.27 D /(kWh) in Belo Horizonte, compared to 0.15 D /(kWh) in
the European Union [57].
In Brazil, residential tariffs vary according to the consumption
level, and the more expensive tariffs are paid by the higher income
dwellings in order to subsidize the energy supply to the lower
income dwellings [42]. Actually, 67% of the residential consumer
units are not included in the social category benefited by subsidized
tariffs, and the possibility of exchanging the exceeding PV electric-
ity with the grid provided by the net metering systems has created a
scenario in which PV distributed generation already achieved parity
price with grid companies in some Brazilian big cities. Grid parity
price is a stage of development of the PV technology, at which it is
competitive with conventional electricity sources [58]. PV installa-
tions will become even more advantageous in the following years
due to the combination of a) rising of the average electricity con-
sumption in the residential and commercial sectors, b) building up
costs of long distance transmission lines and c) higher participation
of gas-fired plants tends to create further pressures in the electricity
price [41].
A further step into the creation of incentives for the large-scale
production of national solar panels was the recent announcement
of the “Development Program for Distributed Power Generation”
(ProGD). The Ministry of Mines and Energy predicts an invest-
ments of BRL 100 billion (US$26 billions) for distributed generation
projects until 2030 [59,60]: due to the work that will be done by
various working groups in charge to resolve financial, regulation
and many other barriers for distributed generation. Solar energy is
intended to be one of the main focuses of the program inasmuch as
PV systems occupies 90% of distributed power generation in Brazil
and could be easily installed on the rooftops of public buildings
such as hospitals, schools and universities.
However, the current political and economic situation brings
uncertainty for the PV market: The interest rates are increasing,
the devaluation of Brazilian Real is continuing and many devel-
opers who won the previous solar auction could not deliver the
PV plants at the winning price anymore. Only around 25% from
the total amount of PV installed capacity contracted on the first
auction has been delivered, mostly due to speculation on the mar-
ket because some developers win the auction planning to sell the
projects to the potential investors [59].
In case the national energy policies succeed in turning the coun-
try into an international center for the manufacture of solar panels,
Brazil will have followed the inverse path that characterized the
global emergence of the Chinese PV industry in what regards their
respective synergies between domestic and global markets. While
the Chinese PV sector emerged as a result of the demand from
North Atlantic countries and only in a second moment turned its
production flows towards internal deployment, the Brazilian expe-
rience is based on a set of measures to explore the huge domestic
potential for solar generation as a platform for the development
of the national industry as one of the international poles for the
production of solar goods.
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to investigate the emergence
of the PV industry in Brazil within the theoretical framework
of “methodological cosmopolitanism” [9]. For a comprehensive
understanding of the phenomenon analyzed, an approach that
encompasses the global dynamics of the renewable energy mar-
ket has proven to be more enlightening than a narrow insulation
of the national energy policies and their effects on the local solar
manufactures. Hence, we focused on the globally interconnected
aspects of the rising Brazilian PV sector and the transboundary
causalities that impelled the State to create incentive mechanisms
for the development of this strategic industry.
We demonstrated that the interventions of national States were
the leading factor in the creation of an international PV mar-
ket. In Europe, the German and Spanish governments approved
“feed-in tariffs” for PV electricity and this mechanism contributed
for an exponential increase in the demand for solar panels. In
China, the central authorities designated the renewable energy
industry as one of the priority economic sectors, which caused
the accelerated growth of the PV companies under the influence
of preferential loans, on the one hand, and the massive demand
from North Atlantic countries, on the other hand. Furthermore, the
State institutions assumed the task of safeguarding the interests of
their respective national solar industries. Northern governments
imposed protectionist measures against the more competitive
Chinese companies, while China reacted to the vertical drop in
international sales with large scale programs for domestic deploy-
ment of PV energy.
This process resulted in substantial reduction costs of solar
goods, allowing Southern countries to participate in the PV mar-
ket in spite of their tighter financial constraints. In this context,
the Brazilian government also reoriented its conservative approach
towards solar energy, announcing exclusive auctions for PV gen-
eration that mitigated the concurrence between solar and other
RE technologies. In view of the constantly increasing electricity
prices, the government also established a net metering system
in order to anticipate grid parity—turning PV installations into a
cost-effective possibility for distributed generation, which might
explore the huge potentials of the Brazilian market and thus boost
the production of local solar industries [61]. In line with this pur-
pose, the amount of BRL 100 billion that is expected to be invested
due to the results of ProGD program is another favorable indication
for the massive deployment of solar distributed systems in Brazil.
The Brazilian PV sector emerges in a global context in which
Asia is the gravitational center of the PV industry. However, the
current situation has also opened development opportunities for
other emerging economies. South-South trade is the most dynamic
segment of the international trading system and environmental
goods—products to measure, prevent, limit, minimize or correct
environmental damages—became an important component of this
growth [34]. This is also valid for the case of the PV market, for
the Chinese hegemony in this field is not entirely contradictory
with a geographic dispersal of solar manufactures. Actually, the PV
industry is still in its consolidation phase and there is a window of
 L.E.V. de Souza, A.M.G. Cavalcante / Energy Research & Social Science 21 (2016) 145–154
opportunities for the rise of new poles of manufacture along with
the simultaneous integration of global RE markets.
Nevertheless, the access of new global players to the PV field
does not constitute a spontaneous process. Such industry demands
high capital investments as well as Research and Development
(R&D) efforts for technological innovation. For this reason, the reg-
ulations and public policies developed by State institutions are
decisive factors for the assurance of a certain level of initial demand
that might ignite the investments on RE manufacture. Indeed, a
detailed analysis clearly shows that the countries with outstand-
ing performance in the international RE market are precisely those
in which the interventions of the State favored the technological
upgrading and the development of the local value chain. In the cur-
rent moment, Brazilian expenditures on R&D in the PV field cannot
be compared to the level of the German and Japanese investments,
which might affect the Brazilian competitiveness.
The consolidation of the Brazilian PV industry is still an ongo-
ing and unsettled process. We argued that the high solar irradiance
levels, the vast reserves of silicon and the enormous potential of
the internal market set up a positive constellation for the advance-
ment of local solar enterprises. However, uncertainty on political
and economic background, the expensive prices of industrial elec-
tricity and the impact of the high interest rates on the costs of capital
figure as the Achilles’ heel of the Brazilian PV production in its initial
phase [62]. Since the PV manufacture is an energy intensive pro-
cess, Brazil is unlikely to become a really competitive global player,
unless its energy prices are reduced. The clauses of local content are
intended as corrective measures for coping with such barriers and
placing the national sector in advantageous circumstances for the
operation in the internal market. Nonetheless, fiscal obstacles and
the relatively higher costs of production might indeed restrain the
development of the local solar industry to the downstream sectors
of the PV value chain. Especially in case insufficient resources and
incentives programs are destined to R&D, Brazil tends to continue
in a subordinate and dependent position in the global PV circuits,
mostly restricted to the assembly of components and thus limit-
ing its potential in terms of innovation, commercial balance and
creation of local qualified jobs.
Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the support of Jiang Jiuchun
(Dean of the School of Electrical Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong
University—China), Leila da Costa Ferreira (Full Professor at Uni-
versity of Campinas—Brazil) and Valeriano Mendes Ferreira Costa
(Assistant Professor at University of Campinas—Brazil). We are also
thankful to the energy researchers and stakeholders of the PV
industry who provided us with valuable information. The São Paulo
State Research Foundation (FAPESP) and the National Council for Sci-
entific and Technological Development (CNPq) contributed for the
accomplishment of this research.
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