The Changing Political and Socio-Economic Environment in The Caribbean and Latin America - Prospects and Challenges Ebook

The changing Political and Socio-Economic Environment in the Caribbean
and Latin America: Prospects and Challenges
Organização
Paulo Gustavo Pellegrino Correa
Raymond Mark Kirton
Marlon Anatol
Nepan Editora
Rio Branco - Acre
2022
Editora do Núcleo de Estudos das Culturas Amazônicas e
Pan-Amazônicas
www.nepaneditora.com.br | editoranepan@gmail.com
Diretor administrativo: Marcelo Alves Ishii

Conselho Editorial: Agenor Sarraf Pacheco (UFPA), Ana Pizarro (Universidade
de Santiago do Chile), Carlos André Alexandre de Melo (Ufac), Elder Andrade
de Paula – (Ufac), Francemilda Lopes do Nascimento (Ufac), Francielle Maria
Modesto Mendes (Ufac), Francisco Bento da Silva (Ufac), Francisco de Moura
Pinheiro (Ufac), Gerson Rodrigues de Albuquerque (Ufac), Hélio Rodrigues da
Rocha (Unir), Hideraldo Lima da Costa (Ufam), João Carlos de Souza Ribeiro
(Ufac), Jones Dari Goettert (UFGD), Leopoldo Bernucci (Universidade da Califór-
nia), Livia Reis (UFF), Luís Balkar Sá Peixoto Pinheiro (Ufam), Marcela Orellana
(Universidade de Santiago do Chile), Marcello Messina (UFPB/Ufac), Marcia Para-
quett (UFBA), Marcos Vinicius de Freitas Reis (Unifap), Maria Antonieta Antonacci
(PUC-SP), Maria Chavarria (Universidade Nacional Maior de São Marcos, Peru),
Maria Cristina Lobregat (Ifac), Maria Nazaré Cavalcante de Souza (Ufac), Miguel
Nenevé (Unir), Raquel Alves Ishii (Ufac), Sérgio Roberto Gomes Souza (Ufac), Sid-
ney da Silva Lobato (Unifap), Tânia Mara Rezende Machado (Ufac).
Dados Internacionais de Catalogação na Publicação (CIP)
C456
The changing political and socio-economic environment in the Caribbean

and Latin America: prospects and challenges / organização Paulo Gustavo
Pellegrino Correa, Raymond Mark Kirton, Marlon Anatol. – Rio Branco:
Nepan Editora, 2022.
239 p. : il. col.
Formato em E-book-PDF
ISBN: 978-65-89135-66-1
1. Economia. 2. Politica. 3. América Latina e Caribe. I. Correa, Paulo
Gustavo. II. Kirton, Raymond Mark. III. Anatol, Marlon. VI. Título.
CDD 22. ed. 338.1
Bibliotecária Maria do Socorro de O. Cordeiro – CRB 11/667
T able of C ontents
Introduction.. ................................................................................ 7
Section I
The contemporary state of regional integration in
Latin America and the Caribbean - its challenges
and prospects in a complex environment
The Venezuela – Guyana Border Controversy:

Brazil and the Regional Responses.................................................. 9
Raymond Mark Kirton
A decade of the Community of Latin American and

Caribbean States: Assessing CELAC’s contribution
to regional integration................................................................. 26
Jacqueline Laguardia Martinez
Section II
Contemporary challenges to regional security -
transnational organized crime, citizen security, illegal
migration, human trafficking and related issues
New Perspectives on Policing in Trinidad and

Tobago: A Model for Community-Oriented Policing....................... 51
Marlon Anatol
Amanda Anatol
Sacha Joseph-Mathews
The Challenge of Talking and Practicing Citizen Security .............. 72

Ashaki L. Dore
Section III
The Socio-economic dimension – resilience building
and recovery from the health pandemic and natural
disasters; social security maintenance; challenges
and contemporary perspectives related to domestic
violence, youth and gender issues
Human Trafficking, Transnational Organized Crime

and Undocumented Migration: The impact and
Implications for Security in Trinidad and Tobago........................... 93
Wendell C. Wallace
Transnational Crimes and Citizen Security in the Caribbean..........111

Clement Henry
The economic implications of COVID-19: Critical

perspectives on the Caribbean road to recovery and rebuilding . . .....135
Ruben Martoredjo
Fair and Just Governance in the Caribbean: The

Case for Social Dialogue.............................................................168
André Vincent Henry
Energy Security in the Caribbean: An analysis of

policies, players and perspectives on renewable energy ..................192
Julianna Vanessa Davis
Diaspora Engagement Strategies in the Era of the

Covid-19 Pandemic: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago..................215
Michele Reis
Biographies. . ..............................................................................234
Introduction
A s the third decade of the twenty-first century unfolds, the chang-

ing global and regional political, social and economic environ-
ment has prompted a new focus on the Caribbean and Latin America as the
region confronts the challenges to the environment, climate change, resource
depletion, economic downturn, increasing poverty, transnational crime, and
the Covid-19 pandemic, among other common problems
Scholars and practitioners from Brazil, Suriname, Guyana, Trinidad
and Tobago, Cuba and the United States have combined in a collaborative
and collective effort to provide evidence-based presentations in this publica-
tion “The changing Political and Socio-Economic Environment in the Caribbean and
Latin America: Prospects and Challenges.”
This seminal publication provides analyses of a series of contemporary
issues including twenty-first century regional integration initiatives, current
border controversies, citizen security and regional public safety issues includ-
ing human trafficking, community policing, energy security, migration and
refugee management. These chapters offer a range of perspectives and offer
recommendations which can reshape the region’s approaches on the com-
mon challenges in this new regional arena. Further, the importance of these
issues goes far beyond the geographical confines of the Caribbean and Latin
America and the chapters provide both regional and international scholars
and the wider global community with fresh perspectives on current issues for
further consideration.
This publication reflects a strong commitment to knowledge-produc-
tion and knowledge-sharing by both the young scholars and their experienced
colleagues and together, they offer readers both information and data-driven
analyses which will undoubtedly generate fresh debate and discourse on the
issues.
Section I
The contemporary state of regional

integration in Latin America and the
Caribbean - its challenges and prospects in
a complex environment
The Venezuela – Guyana Border
Controversy: Brazil and the Regional
Responses
Raymond Mark Kirton
Introduction
T he view has been advanced that since the beginning of the twenty
-first century, robust and sustained efforts to enhance economic,
political and cultural integration in South America have been prioritized,
even with the presence of unresolved border and territorial controversies still
visible. At the same time however, these border controversies have remained
a major concern for South American states primarily due to the view that
contested borders constrain the development of mature integration efforts.
An on-going claim to a significant part of Guyana’s territorial space by Vene-
zuela and recent developments in relation to the issue have combined to lead
to an analysis, in this chapter, of the emergence and development of the con-
troversy, its potential impact on regional integration as the juridical process
proceeds, potential mechanisms for compliance with the juridical outcomes,
and Brazil’s role in these processes as the largest and most influential country
in the region. In order to place the issue in context, it is important to present a
historical overview of border demarcation and border controversies in South
America, the emergence and development of the integration movement in
the region, to trace the history and current developments in the border con-
troversy between Venezuela and Guyana and assess Brazil’s engagement with
its South American neighbors.
South American borders have been the subject of controversy since the
1800s and inter-state conflict has traditionally constrained the emergence of
full and harmonious relations. Patterson and Flynn (2013)1 have observed
that ‘tensions over territorial boundaries festered since the era of Latin Amer-
ican independence. Some resulted in the mobilization of military forces, a
dangerous escalation that can cause combustible relations among countries.’
Indeed, though frequent, these controversies have rarely escalated into full-
scale war and regional initiatives have been pursued, with some positive out-
comes, even in the midst of border conflicts. In the case of Brazil, the largest
country in the region, the establishment of its borders has been largely final-
ized through diplomatic engagements and legal agreements.
According to Recupero (2021)2 the historical foundations of Brazil’s
international action, which included the settlement of its borders were based
on, ‘pacifism, knowledge diplomacy, and confidence in international law’,
which led to its consistent position of the inviolability of settled borders in
the region. It is also of note that, in the recent past, disputes between and Ar-
gentina and Chile, Ecuador and Peru, Chile and Peru, Chile and Bolivia have
been deescalated, while the Venezuela-Guyana border controversy, the focus
of this chapter, remains one of the most active in the region.
In the twenty-first century, the advent of ‘new regionalism’ in South
America influenced the emergence of new strategic networks. Hettne and
Sunkel (1999)3 have posited that new regionalism emerged in a changing glob-
al environment of multi-polarity and sought to embrace state and non-state
actors and argue that new regionalism could be described as new issue - areas
including the creation of common policies and institutions, cooperation in
non-trade areas as a ‘multidimensional form of integration which includes
economic, political, social and cultural aspects and thus goes far beyond the
goal of creating region-based free trade regimes or security alliances’. Soder-
baum4 (2003) suggests that new trends in regional cooperation which emerged
at the beginning of the twenty-first century were characterized by ‘multidi-
1 Patterson P. and R. Flynn (2013) Border Disputes in Latin America. Washington, D.C. Perry Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies.
2 Ricupero, Rubens. História da Diplomacia Brasileira – Do Império ao Século XXI (Aula 01), Introdução
à diplomacia brasileira: os valores diplomáticos que desenharam o mapa do Brasil e ajudaram a definir a
identidade nacional, 2021.Disponível em: https://cebri.org/media/docs/HistoriaDiplomaciaBrasileira.
pdf ?ltclid=. Acesso em 0101/2022.
3 Hettne, B. and O. Sunken, 1999. Globalism and the New Regionalism. London: Macmillan Press.
4 Soderbaum, F. and T. Shaw, 2003. Theories of New Regionalism. Basingstoke, Palgrave.
10
mensionality, complexity, and fluidity’. Riggirozzi and Tussie5 (2012) present
the view that the twenty-first century regional agenda places emphasis on the
creation of new policies and institutions, and the consolidation of regional
architecture oriented towards greater engagement among the states. Brazil
has been in the forefront of South American regional initiatives in the twen-
ty-first century Regrettably, however, in recent times, regional cooperation
has lost its momentum, but regional integration efforts must be rekindled in
order to overcome the current challenges, including transnational organized
crime, climate change, environmental degradation, health concerns including
the Covid-19 pandemic, and equally significant, rising tensions among South
American states.
The Venezuela-Guyana Border Controversy- History and Current
Status
In order to place South American border demarcation issues and the
challenges and prospects for settlement in context, it is important to review
the history and current status of the Venezuela -Guyana border controver-
sy. After a series of disagreements between Great Britain and Venezuela in
relation to the boundary between then-colony British Guiana, now The Co-
operative Republic of Guyana, the Anglo-Venezuelan Arbitral Tribunal was
established under the Treaty of Washington in 1897, in order to settle the
boundary between the two countries. Under the terms of the Treaty, Britain
and Venezuela agreed “to consider the results of the proceedings of the Tri-
bunal of Arbitration as a full, perfect and final settlement of all the questions
referred to the Arbitrators”. Significantly, a panel of internationally recog-
nized arbitrators was selected including, the then-Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, a former President of the United States, Benjamin
Harrison and Professor F. de Martens, an eminent scholar of internation-
al law. In October 1899, in a unanimous decision, the Tribunal described
the boundary which was established as ‘a line based on equity and law’. It
was clearly noted that at that time, both parties were in full agreement with
the award and Venezuela’s Ambassador to Britain, in supporting the award
noted, “Greatly indeed did justice shine forth. We were given the exclusive
dominion over the Orinoco which was the principal aim we sought to achieve
through arbitration”. Additionally, in a report to the United States Congress
5 Riggirozzi P. and D. Tussie 2012. The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism: The Case of Latin America.
London: Springer.
11
in December 1899, President McKinley reported that ‘the decision appears to
be equally satisfactory to both parties’.
The boundary which was determined by the Tribunal was surveyed
and the markers defining the boundary were put in place by a mixed British/
Venezuela Boundary Commission and thereafter was reflected in the 1905
Boundary Agreement between Britain and Venezuela. It is also significant to
note that in the 1930s, Venezuela, Brazil and British Guiana met and marked
the point where the British Guiana/ Venezuela boundary line established in
1899 meets the boundary with Brazil. This area was then named ‘the Tri-Junc-
tion Point’, and this action also indicated full agreement by all parties.
Based on this defined and accepted boundary, both countries exercised
full rights of jurisdiction in their respective territories until 1962, with Guy-
ana approaching independence, Venezuela unilaterally declared the arbitral
award to be ’null and void’ and revived its claim to the territory west of Guy-
ana’s Essequibo River. It is instructive that Venezuela raised the territorial
claim in the context of Guyana’s nationalist struggle for independence from
Britain and to vigorously pursue it before the country gained its indepen-
dence. The Venezuelan decision to pursue the claim was conveyed to the
United Nations in early 1962. Venezuela’s major argument as the basis for
the claim of invalidity was a memorandum written by a junior lawyer, Severo
Mallet -Prevost, who appeared as part of the Venezuelan legal team during
the sittings of the Tribunal in 1899 in a memorandum in 1944, which he in-
structed to be published posthumously. It was claimed that the Award was the
result of a political deal allegedly made by some of the judges of the Tribunal.
Significantly, no evidence has ever been presented by Venezuela in support
of this claim. In November 1962, Britain, in collaboration with the relevant
authorities in British Guiana, agreed to afford Venezuela the opportunity to
have its contention examined by a tripartite study of the relevant documen-
tation by experts of the three countries which took place between 1963 and
1965.
The work of the experts disclosed that there was no evidence to support
Venezuela’s contention of nullity, but Venezuela remained unconvinced even
in the face of clear evidence. However, just four months before independence,
the governments of Britain, having identified the controversy related to Ven-
ezuela’s claim of nullity, Great Britain, British Guiana and Venezuela signed
12
the Geneva Agreement, which had several major features and stipulated the
process which the Parties would follow to resolve the controversy. As part of
the menu of measures under the 1966 Geneva Agreement, a Mixed Commis-
sion of Guyanese and Venezuelan representatives was established. Article IV
of the Geneva Agreement clearly stipulated that:
“If, within a period four years, from the date of this Agreement, the Mixed
Commission should not have arrived at a full agreement for the solution of
the controversy, it shall, in its final report, refer to the Government of Guy-
ana and the Government of Venezuela, any outstanding questions. Those
governments shall without delay, choose one of the means of peaceful set-
tlement provided in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.”
This effort to resolve the controversy was largely unsuccessful and was
seen to result from the diametrically opposed positions presented by the two
parties. Further, the work of the Mixed Commission was also constrained
during this period since there were acts of aggression by Venezuela which
threatened the territorial integrity of Guyana which included the occupation
of Ankoko Island, the signing of a Decree by President Leoni to annex part
of Guyana’s maritime zone, acts of economic aggression and Venezuela’s al-
leged involvement in encouraging and promoting acts of revolt among Guy-
anese citizens, as well as public statements by Venezuela objecting to any
developmental activity or concessions granted by Guyana in the Essequibo
region. These actions undermined confidence in the process and clearly vio-
lated Article V of the Geneva Agreement which clearly stated:
“No acts or activities taking place while this Agreement is in force shall
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial
sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela or British Guiana or create the
new rights of sovereignty in those territories, except insofar as such acts or
activities result from any agreement reached by the Mixed Commission and
accepted in writing by the Government of Guyana and the Government of
Venezuela. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial
sovereignty in those territories shall be asserted while this Agreement is
in force nor shall any claim whatsoever be asserted otherwise than in the
Mixed Commission while that Commission is in being.”
As a result of the lack of success of the Mixed Commission, the second

major attempt at resolving the controversy came in 1970 when Trinidad and
Tobago brokered the signing of the Protocol of Port of Spain by Guyana
and Venezuela. Under the terms of the Protocol, it was to remain in effect
13
for twelve years, renewable for successive periods of twelve years each by
agreement of the governments. The fundamental objective was outlined in
Article II (I):
“So long as this Protocol remains in force, no claim whatsoever arising out
of the contention referred to in Article I of the Geneva Agreement shall be
asserted by Venezuela to territorial sovereignty in the territories of Guyana
or by Guyana to territorial sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela.”
It was envisaged that for a period of twelve years, efforts would be

made to promote friendly relations between the two states. While the Proto-
col of Port of Spain was a valuable mechanism in that it provided an oppor-
tunity for lowering the tensions between the two countries and allowed for a
‘freezing’ of the claim, it also meant that the fundamental issues related to the
borders were left unresolved and deferred to another period. Several analysts
have argued that the Protocol opened breathing space for Guyana that led to
a bold demonstration of preventive diplomacy to protect and maintain Guy-
ana’s territorial integrity. During this period, efforts were made to seek higher
levels of rapprochement and these included visits to Venezuela by Guyana’s
Prime Minister Forbes Burnham to Venezuela and Venezuela’s President
Carlos Andres Perez to Guyana.
When the Protocol of Port of Spain expired in June 1982, Venezuela
had already indicated its unwillingness to renew it and this period coincided
with a period of renewed tension between the two countries. Significantly, at
that time, Venezuela used its international influence to block World Bank fi-
nancing for Guyana’s hydroelectric power development programme, and also
influenced the exclusion of Guyana from concessionary oil arrangements
which were offered to other CARICOM and Central American states. At the
same time, Guyana moved to strengthen Its relations with Brazil and Colom-
bia as it sought to develop strong alliances to limit Venezuela’s actions which
could negatively impact Guyana’s economic development pathway.
The expiration of the Protocol and the failure of the two countries to
agree on the means of peaceful settlement to the border issue, meant that an-
other effort at conflict transformation had to be sought. Article Iv (2) of the
1966 Geneva Agreement states:
“if after three months of receiving the final report, the Government of Guy-
ana and the Government of Venezuela should not have reached agreement
regarding the choice of one of the means of settlement provided in Article
14
33 of the Charter of the United Nations, they shall refer the decision as to
the means of settlement to an appropriate international organ upon which
they both agree or, failing agreement on this point, to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.”
Both countries decided therefore to refer the issue to the United Na-
tions Secretary-General. It must be noted that within the framework of the
1966 Geneva Agreement between the two countries, the Secretary-General
was empowered to utilize what is termed his ‘good office’ (generally mean-
ing his prestige and the weight of the world community he represents) in an
effort to prevent international disputes from developing, escalating or spread-
ing. Under the terms of the appointment, the United Nations Good Officer
was tasked to monitor developments in the border controversy, brief the UN
Secretary-General periodically, sketch out a work program, and meet with a
representative or facilitator appointed by each country on a periodic basis to
examine ideas on the method of settlement of the controversy.
The Secretary-General conducted the Good Offices process from 1990
to 2017, aimed at securing a solution to the border controversy. One notes
that during this period, there were four Personal Representatives of the Secre-
tary General, who closely collaborated with the parties to seek a resolution to
the controversy. In the absence of a resolution, the government of Guyana, in
March 2015 approached the Secretary-General to act in accordance with his
obligation under the 1966 Geneva Agreement and to choose another of the
means of settlement to the controversy which is stipulated in Article 33 of the
UN Charter. Guyana articulated its preference for a judicial settlement at that
time, and called for a final and binding decision in relation to Venezuela’s
contention that the 1899 Arbitral Award is null and void. The then- Secretary
General Ban Kai Moon indicated to the parties in December 2016, a frame-
work for the resolution of the controversy. In particular, he indicated that the
Good Offices Process would continue for one final year until the end of 2017,
with an expanded and strengthened mandate of mediation.
It was noted however, that if there was no significant progress made by
that time towards reaching a full agreement for the solution of the controver-
sy, the Secretary-General would choose the International Court of Justice as
the next mechanism for its settlement, unless the governments of Venezuela
and Guyana jointly presented a request for the Secretary-General to refrain for
initiating that process. In January 2018, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres,
15
after a comprehensive analysis of the of the developments in 2017, chose
the International Court of Justice as the mechanism for the solution of the
controversy. At the same time, the Secretary- General concluded that Guyana
and Venezuela could benefit from his continued ‘good offices’ through a com-
plementary process based on his authority under the United Nations Charter,
which seeks to support both states in an effort to overcome their differences.
Based on the decision of the Secretary-General, Guyana filed an application
to institute legal proceedings against Venezuela with the International Court
of justice in March 2018. In June 2018, the International Court of Justice
received communication from the government of Venezuela that it would
not participate in the matter, even though the Geneva Agreement provided
the Secretary-General with the authority to choose the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) as the means of conclusive settlement in this matter. Venezuela
also presented the argument that the ICJ has no jurisdiction in the matter.
In considering Venezuela’s position, under the circumstances related
to the case, the ICJ sought to determine the question of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion before it began any proceedings on the merits of the case and sought the
presentation of pleadings from both countries. In November 2018, and in ac-
cordance with ICJ’s prescribed timetable, Guyana presented its Memorial on
Jurisdiction to the ICJ. The Court’s timetable provided for the presentation of
a Counter-Memorial in April 2019. However, Venezuela did not adhere to the
timetable and subsequently submitted a Memorandum to ‘assist the Court’.
In a decision delivered in December 2020, the ICJ ruled that it:
“Has jurisdiction to entertain Guyana’s claim concerning the validity of the
1899 Award about the frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela and
the related question of the definitive settlement of the dispute between the
territories of the Parties”.
In February 2021, following a ‘case management meeting’ convened by

the ICJ, the Court issued an order which placed a specific time limit ending
on 8th March 2022 for written pleadings in the form of a Memorial to be filed
by Guyana and 8th March 2023, for the written pleadings in the form of a
Counter- Memorial to be presented by Venezuela. On March 8th, 2022 in ac-
cordance with the order of the ICJ, Guyana officially presented its Memorial
on the merits in the case to the Court.
16
While the judicial process unfolds, it is important to observe that since
1966, acts of aggression by Venezuela have significantly impacted the eco-
nomic development of Guyana, even while practical efforts have been un-
dertaken to find satisfactory solutions to the controversy. In fact, in 1966,
an incursion by armed Venezuelan soldiers and civilians took place on the
Guyana side of the island of Ankoko, which is located at the confluence
of the Cuyuni and Wenanu rivers. The group erected and installed struc-
tures, including an airstrip, post office, military and police outposts which
currently remain in place. These acts of aggression have also included, but
are not limited to, incursion into Guyana’s territorial space, the seizure of
Guyanese fishing vessels, the arrest of a vessel conducting seismic studies
in Guyana’s Exclusive Economic Zone by Venezuelan naval forces, as well
as threats against international companies engaged in economic partnership
arrangements with the government of Guyana in the territory under claim.
It is noteworthy that, in spite of treaty obligations and judicial limita-
tions, Venezuela has consistently displayed a pattern of aggression and in-
timidation which has extended over fifty years. Especially in the 21st century,
they have been new dimensions added to the claim by Venezuela. In 2013,
the Venezuelan Navy intercepted a seismic survey vessel, the Teknik Perdana,
which was engaged by the government of Guyana and an international com-
pany, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, to undertake seismic investigations
in Guyana’s waters. While this incident did not escalate into armed confron-
tation, it further raised tensions in the both countries. In May 2015, at the
time of the first discovery of oil in Guyana by Exxon Mobil and its joint ven-
ture partners, the government of Venezuela issued Decree No. 1.787 which
declared Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana’s maritime space adjacent to
the Essequibo coast and proclaimed an Atlantic Operational Maritime and
Insular Defense Zone, with authority given to the Venezuelan army to secure
and protect the area. According to Griffith (2021)6, the decree also threatened
the sovereignty of several neighboring countries including Suriname, Trini-
dad and Tobago, Barbados and Colombia. Amidst international pressure, the
government of Venezuela withdrew Decree No.1.787 and issued Decree No.
1.859 which removed the specific coordinates related to the maritime zone.
Of equal significance, is that on 7th January 2021, the government of Venezu-
6 Griffith, I. 2021. New Dynamics in Northern South America’s Political Neighborhood. Washington,
D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies. www.csis.org
17
ela issued Decree No. 4.415, which established a zone “The Territory for the
Development of the Atlantic Façade’, which would cover a significant part
of Guyana’s maritime space. This Decree has moved to incorporate Guy-
ana’s maritime space at a time of increased exploration and production of
petroleum products, with increasing economic benefits accruing to Guyana.
President Maduro, on the other hand, noted that the decree was aimed at
‘protecting and safeguarding Venezuela’s territorial jurisdiction.’
As Griffith (2021)7 observes, “Decree No.4.415 has nevertheless been
the most provocative in recent memory, given the magnitude of its repudi-
ation of Guyanese sovereignty represented by Venezuela’s stated desire to
incorporate such a significant amount of Guyana’s maritime territory’. Fur-
ther, in another aggressive act, on 21st January 2021, the Venezuelan navy
arrested and detained two Guyanese fishing vessels - the Lady Nayera and
the Sea Wolf- along with more than twelve Guyanese seamen who were op-
erating their vessels within Guyana’s Exclusive Economic zone (EEZ). This
action by Venezuela brought about high and sustained levels of regional and
international condemnation, which resulted in the release of the vessels and
crew members in February 2021.
Brazil-Regional Integration, The Inviolability of Borders And South
American Leadership
It has been observed that, since the mid-1970s, Brazil sought to initiate
greater collaboration among South American states and led the establishment
of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation in 1978 which later was trans-
formed to become the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO).
The initiative was in part a response to the international environmentalist
discourse that was consolidated by looking at the Transnational Amazon as
the “lungs of the world”. This Amazon region assumed systemic importance
that sought to uphold the principles of territorial sovereignty and at the same
time, contain the desires of the United States for the development of the re-
gion.
Indeed, signatory states to the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, the
republics of Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname
and Venezuela “were inspired by the common aim of pooling the efforts be-
ing made, both within their respective territories as well as among themselves,
7 Griffith, I. 2021. New Dynamics in Northern South America’s Political Neighborhood. Washington,
D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies. www.csis.org
18
to promote the harmonious development of the Amazon region, to permit an
equitable distribution of benefits of said development among the contract-
ing parties so as to raise the standard of living of their peoples and so as to
achieve total incorporation of their Amazonian territories into their respec-
tive national economies”(TAC,1978)8.
It is also important to note that at the beginning of the 21st century,
Brazil promoted a foreign policy agenda based on enhancing regional co-
operation and hosted the first meeting of the Presidents of South America
in Brasilia in 2000 which represented the beginning of the new relationship
among countries of South America. This summit meeting was seen as a piv-
otal event since, in this period of democratization in the region, it allowed for
the creation of fresh opportunities for meaningful cooperation in areas such
as infrastructure, health and security. As the Communique of Brasilia clearly
indicated ‘this meeting, a historic trailblazing event for the region, imparted
a major impulse to the organization of our shared experience in a common
South American setting. It also demonstrated the continued support for the
shaping up of South America as a unique environment of democracy, peace,
mutual cooperation, integration and shared economic and social develop-
ment.’
It is also significant to note, that the meeting highlighted the need for
peaceful settlement to territorial controversies, and as the Communique fur-
ther stated “the definitive end to differences over territorial boundaries, as ex-
emplified the 1998 agreement between Ecuador and Peru is a recent example
of the prevailing spirit in South America, which has made and will continue
to make this part of the world into an area of peace and cooperation, free of
territorial conflicts. The South American Presidents have taken this opportu-
nity so reaffirm their allegiance to the principle of a peaceful and negotiated
resolution of disputes, as opposed to the use of force -or the threat there-
of-against any other sovereign State, pursuant to the applicable rules of Inter-
national Law.” In addition to the shared commitment to peace, this statement
in itself provided a level of satisfaction that the process of international law
would be allowed to play a central role in territorial controversies, including
the border controversy between Venezuela and Guyana.
8 Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation,1978, Brazil
19
After the Presidential Summit in 2000, President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso pursued a foreign policy which sought to increase global interaction
with international organizations including the United Nations and the World
Trade Organization, as well as regional and hemispheric initiatives such as
MERCOSUR and the Free Trade Area of the Americas in a strategy which
was known as ‘autonomy through integration. (Vigevani and Oliveira,2004)9.
During his presidency, from 2003 to 2010, Luis Ignacio Lula Da Silva built
on his predecessor’s foreign policy platform through a strategy which clear-
ly articulated ‘autonomy through diversification’ which sought to contribute
to a greater international balance and to mitigate the unilateralism of the
post-9/11 world, strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations in order to
increase Brazil’s standing and influence globally in international political and
economic negotiations.
The strategy was also aimed at strengthening diplomatic relations in or-
der to take advantage of the possibilities of greater economic, financial, tech-
nological and cultural exchanges. President Lula da Silva introduced a robust
and activist foreign policy with MERCOSUR gaining significant prominence.
Additionally, President Lula Initiated the emergence of the South American
Community of Nations (CASA), which later was transformed to become the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The Constitutive Treaty of
UNASUR (2004), which presented the objective of creating an integrated
collaborative arrangement among the peoples of South America clearly stat-
ed its aim “to build in a participatory consensual manner an integration and
union among the peoples in the cultural, social and political fields prioritizing
political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing
and the environment among others with a view to eliminating socioeconom-
ic inequality…to strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries within the
framework of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of the states.”
Further, one of the major pillars of UNASUR was a firm commitment
to stability and the rule of law with its aims directed “towards the strength-
ening of multilateralism and the rule of law in international relations… a
culture of peace in a world free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass
destruction. UNASUR’s establishment was also based upon the guiding prin-
9 Vigevani, T; Oliveira, M. F. A política externa braslieira na era FHC: um exercício de autonomia pela
integração. Trabalho apresentado no 4º Encontro Nacional da Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política
(ABCP), Rio de Janeiro, 2004
20
ciples of unlimited respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and invio-
lability of States; self-determination of the peoples; cooperation; peace; de-
mocracy; citizen participation”. It was clear that the Brazilian agenda favored
a maintenance of settled borders in an environment of peace and stability, the
advancement of common interests and the regionalization of South America
and also had as an objective, the formulation of an integrationist project not
limiting it ‘to economic and commercial issues, expanding its scope to polit-
ical, social and security aspects; consolidation of the idea of South America
in the foreign policy of the countries of the subcontinent that presents the
potential for a greater level of unity in the political economic and security
areas than the idea of Latin America’ (Cervo,2008)10. During the first decade
of the twenty-first century, Brazil promoted the consolidation of the integra-
tion effort in the subcontinent as the development of a transnational politi-
cal entity with an institutional framework based on common principles and
macro-objectives in international relations. As Wanderley Messias da Costa
(Costa, 2009)11 asserts
“Considering the basic characteristics of its initial format and its current
development, this model of regional arrangement constitutes the only mod-
el on this scale that seeks to reproduce in its general aspects, the European
experience in which the greatest ambition of its member states has always
been that of combining maximum economic integration with a transnation-
al political - institutional macro arrangement. In this sense, it is far from the
conventional model that has been adopted by most of the other regional
blocs, in which the limits of consultation between its member states previ-
ously defined and the objectives are explicitly limited to the economic and
trade matters. For this reason and mindful of the respective and obvious
particularities of these two current experiences, South American integra-
tion tends to reproduce the path being followed by the European Union, in
which the broader strategic horizon which its framers have in mind, is the
construction and consolidation of a comprehensive and indigenous trans-
national regional governance system.’
It must be noted that this model, initiated in the beginning of the 21st
century by Brazil, included the presence and participation of Venezuela in
10 Cervo, Amado Luiz. Inserção Internacional: formação dos conceitos brasileiros. São Paulo: Saraiva,
2008.
11 Costa, W. M. O Brasil e a América do Sul: cenários geopolíticos e os desafios da integração. Confins
(Paris), v. 7, p. 7, 2009.
21
regional projects, even though it continued to lay its claim to two-thirds of the
territory of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana.
In recent years, and the election of rightwing governments in the re-
gion, the pace and progress of the South American integration movement
have declined significantly. The unfavorable international economic context,
the drop in oil prices and the end of influential governments in the region
changed the scenario of approximation and of the relationship between the
States of South America”.12
At the same time, in Brazil, the election of an extreme-right govern-
ment led by Jair Messias Bolsonaro in 2019 significantly shifted the objectives
of previous governments with regard to regional integration, international
institutions and strategic partners. The Bolsonaro government dismantled
the activist foreign policy of its predecessors and sought to remove what the
government termed ‘globalism’ and ‘cultural Marxism’. In a fundamental
ideological shift, the Bolsonaro government began to deconstruct the legacy
of the Workers Party (PT) and its inclusive regionalist efforts and its actions
included the expulsion of Venezuelan diplomats from Brazil, the participa-
tion in meetings with the United States government to discuss the crisis in
Venezuela and possible support from Brazil as well as the creation of a new
regional organization “Forum For the Progress and Development of South
America” (PROSUR) with the participation of Juan Guido, Venezuela’s
self-proclaimed interim president recognized by Brazil. It is also important to
note that the current government has withdrawn from UNASUR, which has
significantly weakened the organization. In this new framework, some ana-
lysts suggest that the Bolsonaro government operates within the perspective
of destruction and chaos creation ‘as a strategy and this has led to fragmen-
tation within the South American integration movement. In fact, this new
foreign policy platform by Brazil has shaken the foundations of Brazilian
foreign policy traditions, even though it is anticipated that the Bolsonaro gov-
ernment would maintain the classic stance of support for the maintenance
of borders established in South America, especially since this controversy
involves Venezuela as a claimant.
From a military point of view, Bolsonaro’s government would face a
lack of civil and even military support in Brazil if it embraces any military
12 Zucatto, G. E.. A ascensão da direita na América do Sul. BOLETIM OPSA, v. 15, p. 0
22
action. It is worth remembering that Brazil has not been involved in a war for
over 150 years. From a political point of view, the actions of the Bolsonaro
government have been dedicated to weakening Venezuela’s positions, and
Brazil’s support for Guyana could also be considered to be essentially derived
from its rivalry with Venezuela rather than on Brazilian diplomatic traditions.
However, we must also analyse a possible Brazilian posture that has a
perspective based on two issues: the possible change in government and the
end of the Bolsonaro administration in 2022, and the traditional diplomatic
structures of Brazil’s regional and international influence which can sustain
compliance with the juridical outcome in relation to the controversy between
Venezuela and Guyana. Since the Venezuelan claim has already been sent
for a final settlement at the International Court of Justice and will still be de-
bated in these instances, if any, Brazil’s position should be more linked to its
foreign policy traditions rather than those of the current government of Jair
Bolsonaro. Despite the foreign policy of the current government in Brazil,
national, regional and global influences can ensure that the Brazilian position
is consistent with the traditional international norms related to compliance
with legal court judgements on border issues.
The Brazilian diplomatic tradition has already been discussed, but it is
of importance to reiterate that the history of the confirmation and settlement
of Brazilian borders led by the Barão de Rio Branco, and the structuring of
Brazilian diplomacy was based on respect for international rules and arbitra-
tion. Peace among the states of the region was also constantly on the Brazil-
ian agenda and, the initiatives led by Brazil, demonstrate this value.
Brazil’s positive performance in international organizations has been
in general, a strategic rule of the country’s international action, which is ev-
idenced by its involvement in the establishment of United Nations, and re-
spect for the decisions of the UN has been the ethos adopted by the country.
Finally, we emphasize that at a regional level, UNASUR was weakened
and fossilized by Brazil due to the position of the current government. PRO-
SUR was built as a candidate to replace UNASUR. However, PROSUR has
a fundamentally economic framework and its elaboration has a fragile and
fleeting history. This new South American organization is still in its embry-
onic stages and is characterized by a lack of vigor, in contrast to UNASUR,
which was built by ties and initiatives based on a perspective of deeper re-
23
gional development and cooperation. The rightist “blue tide” has weakened,
and in this direction, initiatives such as UNASUR should gain new strength.
If this is the path taken regionally, issues such as the border controversy be-
tween Venezuela and Guyana will be present in a space such as the South
American Defense Council, part of UNASUR, a space that will seek to en-
sure compliance with international rules and legal considerations on borders.
In this way, it is posited that even if the current foreign policy of the
Bolsonaro government presents possibilities to sharpen the conflict between
Venezuela and Guyana and, at the same time, leave the country incapable
of articulating peaceful solutions to regional conflicts, it must be a passing
moment that cannot compromise a Brazilian history and attitude linked to
international compliance, even with Bolsonaro’s unlikely re-election in 2022.
Conclusions – The Way Forward
The acts of aggression and intimidation described have pointed to the
economic, diplomatic, political, geostrategic, legal and military dimensions
of the border controversy which is taking place in increasingly complex re-
gional and international environment. As noted, the ICJ has indicated that
it will proceed with the case, while Venezuela has consistently displayed an
attitude of ambivalence in relation to a judicial settlement of the issue. In that
context, even before the ICJ’s proceedings are completed, it is important that
regional mechanisms be established to promote sustained levels of multilater-
al engagement, and to engage South American states, to collectively advance
the imperative for adherence to the principles of international law, and the
recognition of South America as a zone of peace.
Given the complex nature of the border controversy, Venezuela’s po-
sition in relation to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and Guyana’s preference and
strong commitment to a juridical settlement, the resolution of the controversy
cannot be linked solely to the Court’s decision but must include compliance
mechanisms, guided and supported by both state and non-state actors. The
need for a multi-dimensional approach arises mainly due to the deteriorating
state of the traditional regional arrangements. As Merke et.al (2021)13 assert,
‘the popular narrative is that regional cooperation is practically nonexistent
because its heads of state have insurmountable ideological differences and be-
cause the region’s dominant diplomatic institutions have failed to fulfill their
13 Merke F. et al. 2021 Reimagining Regional Governance in Latin America https//carnegieendowment.
otg
24
purpose.” The view has also been advanced that domestic issues have also
constrained the sustained promotion of regional cooperation and as Merke
et.al (2021) further posit, ‘in addition, domestic turmoil is fueling rising isola-
tionism and “antiglobalism”, most prominently in Brazil.’
The view, however, is even though there may be ‘push back’ from some
of the current political directorates, like Brazil, there is the presence of re-
gional capacity to ‘reimagine regional cooperation’ and that even where there
are ideological differences which significantly constrain cooperation at the
highest political level, different pathways to collaboration must be promoted
through ‘second track’ or ‘citizens’ diplomacy, which may be broadly defined
as the coming together of professionals, opinion leaders and other segments
of civil society from the communities currently engaged in the controversy,
working together to better understand its dynamics and to transform and build
a collaborative process for peace building, confidence and trust enhancement
and sustainable development, at the level of the citizenry, even before the
legal processes are completed.
As commentators argue, there is an urgent need to ‘depresidentialize’
regional cooperation and focus on subnational actors, and efforts to build
mutual confidence and trust among the citizenry of Guyana and Venezuela
must be the focus of this engagement in the immediate future to ensure mu-
tually beneficial outcomes, As the government of Guyana continues to focus
on its preparations for the hearings at the ICJ, it is also important that region-
al actors work to ensure that mechanisms for compliance with the juridical
outcomes be established to ensure sustained peace and stability in the region.
25
A decade of the Community of Latin
American and Caribbean States: Assessing
CELAC’s contribution to regional
integration
Jacqueline Laguardia Martinez
Latin American and Caribbean regionalism in the 21st century
B efore analyzing the Community of Latin American and Carib-

bean States (CELAC)1 as a regional mechanism, it is important to
present an understanding of regionalism and regional integration. Accord-
ing to Ibáñez (2002)2, regionalism is understood as the ensemble of political
projects propelled, in most cases, by governmental initiatives to amplify and
deepen economic, political and cultural cooperation among state and non-
state actors within the same region. Regionalism is a project –or a group of
projects– which can be impacted by political trends, types of leadership and
visions of development.
Regional integration refers to the process of strong and sustained
cooperation within a region, resulting from increased interactions among
political units through different actors that share common ideas, set object-
ives and define strategies. Such cooperation could materialize not only in
economic relations but in political or other types of social relations. Regional
1 Comunidad de Estados de América Latina y el Caribe in Spanish.

2 Josep Ibáñez, “El nuevo regionalismo latinoamericano en los años noventa”, Revista Electrónica de
Estudios Internacionales, no. 1 (diciembre 2000), Madrid. http://www.reei.org/index.php/revista/
num1/agora/nuevo-regionalismo-latinoamericano-anos-noventa.
integration’s success and sustainability lie on long-term commitments and
robust institutions which make it difficult to reverse integration dynamics.
In order to clearly discuss CELAC as a project of Latin American and
the Caribbean regionalism, it is important to make such a distinction to avoid
equating regionalism and regional integration, or assuming economic rela-
tions as the dominant type of relations in regional integration processes. At
the same time, we depart from the positions that differentiate regional inte-
gration and regional cooperation, since we consider cooperative relations as
the basis for regional integration. It is the nature and depth of the cooperation
links - economic, political, cultural, environmental - which define the type of
integration. When assessing the difference between regionalism and region-
al integration, and the antagonism between integration and cooperation, we
subscribe to the views of Vivares, Torres Lombardo and Cvetich (2014)3 and
the perspective for breaking the “conceptual iron cage” (jaula de hierro concep-
tual) imposed by the experience of the European integration model after the
Second World War in most analysis about LAC regional integration projects.
In the case of CELAC, a regional mechanism officially constituted in
December 2011 in Caracas4, it is not the economic relations which define
successful integration. It is the goal of advancing inter-governmental coordin-
ation and cooperation and having a regional forum to facilitate political dia-
logue which constitute the fundamental reasons that inspired the creation of
CELAC.
CELAC is part of the 21st century wave of Latin American regional-
ism that emerged after the crisis of the Open Regionalism (1980-2000) based
on neoliberal and export-oriented models aiming to promote international
competitiveness and integrate LAC in the global economy (Ayuso and Vil-
3 Ernesto Vivares, Paul Torres Lombardo and Kristina Cvetich, “Enfoques y cárceles conceptuales en el
entendimiento de los nuevos Regionalismos latinoamericanos”, in Desafíos estratégicos del regionalismo
contemporáneo: CELAC e Iberoamérica, eds. Adrián Bonilla Soria and Isabel Álvarez Echandi (San José:
FLACSO, 2014), 21-46.
4 There is a debate related to the dates of creation and celebration of the inaugural CELAC Summit. Some
authors defend the date of February 23, 2010, during the Latin American and Caribbean Unity Summit
that merged the XXI Summit of the Rio Group and the II Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean on
Integration and Development, as the moment when CELAC was created. At this multi-summit CELAC’s
creation was proposed. However, its definitive foundation took place in Caracas, in December 2011
during the III Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean on Integration and Development and the
XXII Summit of Rio Group when the Declaration of Caracas and the Caracas Action Plan were agreed.
27
lar 2014)5. According to ECLAC (1994)6, Open Regionalism seeks growing
interdependence at the regional level fostered by preferential agreements with
the goal of increasing competitiveness in a context of a more open global
economy where the major role is played by the private sector. Open Regional-
ism aimed to improve national competitiveness in a free trade environment as
pillar of an outward-looking integration strategy committed to the Washing-
ton Consensus vision that championed for trade openness and privatization.
Open Regionalism followed Developmental Regionalism or Structur-
alist Regionalism (1950-1980) that, in a dissimilar way intended to accom-
plish inward-looking industrialization through import substitution. It was
the first wave of Latin American regionalism after the Second World War
and most LAC economies adopted the Import Substitution Industrialization
(ISI) model in the belief that they would benefit from larger markets once
economic diversification and technological modernization would have been
achieved. Developmental Regionalism implied strong state intervention and
protectionist policies to discourage excessive import rates. The motivation
was to create a larger regional market inspired by the European experience
which understood economic integration as the key to regional integration
that occurred as the result of a succession of stages (van Klaveren 20187; Ay-
uso and Villar 20148; Tussie 20149).
The early 21st century wave of LAC regionalism has also been identi-
fied as Post-(neo)liberal, Post-hegemonic or Strategic among other character-
izations 10. It aspires to build an economic and politically independent region
capable of solving internal conflicts without external interference. The inte-
5 Anna Ayuso and Santiago Villar, Integration Processes in Latin America, Gulf Research Center
(October 2014), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184537/Unity_Anna_Ayuso_fin_9127.pdf.
6 Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL). El regionalismo abierto en América
Latina y el Caribe. La integración económica al servicio de la transformación productiva con equidad,
LC7L.808(CEG.19/3), January 13, 1994, https://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/22634.
7 Alberto van Klaveren, “El eterno retorno del regionalismo latinoamericano”, Nueva Sociedad, no. 275,
(mayo-junio, 2018), www.nuso.org.
9 Diana Tussie, “Reshaping Regionalism and Regional Cooperation in South America”, Pensamiento
Propio, no. 39, (2014).
10 According to Perrotta y Porcelli (2019) the map of characterizations about the type of regionalism that
has been developing in Latin America since the 2000’s presents a distinctive variety and creativity which
has not been observed when analyzing other experiences. To the post-liberal, strategic and post-hegemonic
Regionalisms other adjectives have been added such as: productive, social, inclusive, solidarity, regulatory,
segmented, modular, declarative, superimposed, á la carte, among others.
28
gration logics exceed the restrictive agenda of Open Regionalism focused on
trade promotion and supports the reinstatement of the State as a key econom-
ic actor and infrastructure developer. Post-liberal Regionalism emphasizes so-
cial policies and sustainable development, the rejection of the global govern-
ance model dominated by international financial institutions and the accent
on South-South cooperation and complementarity instead of competition.
CELAC is one of the regional integration projects heavily inspired by
Post-liberal Regionalism. The regional mechanism stresses the importance
of achieving “unity in diversity” beyond the mere pursuit of trade expansion
and the intensification of economic links. Such a vision is shared by CELAC
with other regional initiatives as ALBA-TCP and UNASUR. These initiatives
place the accent on accomplishing higher levels of cooperation, strengthening
negotiation positions when dealing with extra-regional actors, holding com-
mon positions in multilateral fora and working in favor of guaranteeing peace
within the region. They constitute clear examples of LAC moving towards a
new kind of regionalism driven by the impetus of progressive governments
with ambitious social agendas (Sanahuja 2009)11. According to Tussie 201412.
“The new balance of interests has injected a different flavor to the regional
relations. The hallmark is the emergence of regional cooperation dynamics
in new areas. Trade integration is the neither the objective nor trade lib-
eralization the main policy. Regionalism has gradually changed its focus,
shifting from trade liberalization to a renewed emphasis on cooperation.
The two main features of regional projects are thus the fact that they are
political projects: “political” since state political actors are the drivers of
cross-national cooperation; and “projects” because they involve an articu-
lated idea of creating a region.”
The constitution of CELAC results not only from these new areas in
LAC regionalism but also from the crystallization of various initiatives of
political cooperation starting in the early 1980s to bring together Latin Amer-
ican countries which were concerned with the unstable situation in Central
American. The Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group were
pioneers among regional initiatives with consistent political and security con-
11 José Antonio Sanahuja, “Del ‘regionalismo abierto’ al ‘regionalismo post-liberal’. Crisis y cambio en
la integración regional en América Latina y el Caribe”, Anuario de la Integración Regional de América
Latina y el Caribe, no. 7 (Buenos Aires: CRIES, 2009), 12-54.
12 Diana Tussie, “Reshaping Regionalism and Regional Cooperation in South America”, Pensamiento
Propio, no. 39, (2014):115.
29
tent beyond economic goals13. The groups merged into the Group of Eight
in 1985. It enlarged the agenda to include other relevant issues for regional
stability as foreign debt, the fight against poverty and the promotion of dem-
ocracy. In 1986, it became the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and
Agreement Politics, later known as the Rio Group in 1990.
The Rio Group served as a forum for political consultation among Lat-
in American presidents interested in finding peaceful resolutions to armed
conflicts in the region. Since its inception, it was a strictly Latin American
space joined by different countries at different moments. It acted as a mech-
anism for political coordination that functioned as a regional interlocutor in
the face of other international actors and succeeded in articulating a regional
voice. The Rio Group supported the establishment of a democratic clause at
the Organization of America States (OAS) in 1991, an agreement that paved
the way for the adoption of the Inter-American Democracy Charter in 2001
(Portales 2012)14. After a period of relative stagnation, the Rio Group started
recovering in 2007.
The progression of Latin American integration was also possible
thanks to the contributions made by the Summits of Latin America and the
Caribbean on Integration and Development (CALC)15, whose purpose was
to articulate regional integration. CALC Summits were held in Costa do Ser-
gipe (Brazil, 2008), Cancun (Mexico, 2010) and Caracas (Venezuela, 2011)
and culminated in the formal constitution of CELAC. Since CELAC is con-
sidered the successor of the Rio Group and the CALC Summits, both mech-
anisms have ceased to function.
CELAC’s creation was inspired by Latin American aspirations for
unity dating from the early years of independence. The forum recognizes
the dreams of Simón Bolívar who advocated for a united region outside of
the United States’ influence. Except for the United States and Canada, all
33 independent countries of the Americas joined CELAC. At present, all 33
13 In 1983, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela met at Contadora to establish a regional grouping
to face the crisis in Central America and the United States’ intervention in the area. In 1985, the initiative
was supported by Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay creating the Contadora Support Group (Sberro
2001).
14 Carlos Portales, CELAC: A Voice for Latin America and the Caribbean. Norwegian Peacebuilding
Resource Centre (NOREF), 2012, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/noref/0026082/index.html.
15 Cumbre de América Latina y el Caribe sobre Integración y Desarrollo in Spanish.
30
States apart from Brazil participate in the regional forum. Brazil, the South
American power suspended its activity in CELAC in January 2020.
Creation, evolution and evaluation of CELAC: ten years in the
making
Initially proposed during the Unity Summit of Latin America and the
Caribbean on February 23, 2010, CELAC formalized its creation with the
signing of the Caracas Declaration in 2011. Its principles and purposes are
to make CELAC “a representative mechanism for political consultation, in-
tegration and cooperation of the Latin American and Caribbean States and
as a common space to ensure the unity and integration of our region” (Ca-
racas Declaration 2011)16. Its main goal is the creation of a common inter-
governmental space that enables dialogue, cooperation and the reduction of
asymmetries in the defense of democracy, peace and security, and to enhance
regional integration. According to Ayuso and Villar (2014)17, CELAC’s three
pillars are political consensus, the promotion of a deeper regional inter-
dependence, and the increase of interconnections. CELAC advocates for the
principles of complementarity, solidarity and inclusive development without
overlapping or duplicating other regional and sub-regional initiatives.
The Caracas Declaration defines the common values and principles
that should govern CELAC’s processes of dialogue, exchange and political
negotiation such as: respect for international law, self-determination, sover-
eignty and territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; the prohibi-
tion of the use and the threat of use of force; non-interference in the internal
affairs, and the protection and promotion of human rights and democracy
(Caracas Declaration 2011)18. CELAC advocates for the respect for human
rights, both civil and political, in their universal, indivisible and interdepend-
ent character, including the right to development. It seeks to be a space for the
vindication of the right to the existence, preservation and coexistence of the
cultures, races and ethnicities, considering the multicultural character of the
peoples and pluri-national character of many LAC countries.
16 Caracas Declaration, Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC),
December 3, 2011, http://www.pnuma.org/forodeministros/19-reunion%20intersesional/documentos/
CARACAS%20DECLARATION.pdf.
31
CELAC is also defined as a forum whose very existence constitutes
a powerful instrument to bring together the various political, economic and
social realities that coexist in the region. Its founding is the materialization of
a vision of cohesion in a region characterized by a vast array of cooperation
and integration initiatives (Grabendorff 2014)19. Decisions are taken by con-
sensus and are considered political agreements. They may assume the form
of declarations, joint communications, special announcements, resolutions,
among other formats with no legally binding force.
CELAC is configured as a non-institutionalized forum for dialogue
and cooperation, with an eminently political scope. It is neither a constitu-
tive treaty nor an international organization. As the Caracas declaration indi-
cates:
“CELAC must move forward in the process of political, economic, social
and cultural integration, based on a wise equilibrium between the unity
and diversity of our peoples, so that the regional integration mechanism
can become the ideal space to express our rich cultural diversity and also
the forum to reaffirm the Latin American and the Caribbean identity, our
common history and our ongoing struggles for justice and liberty” (Caracas
Declaration 2011)20.
A clear sign of the spirit of unity in diversity and respect for self-deter-
mination was the designation of Cuba, a Socialist State that was suspended
from the Organization of American States (OAS) in 196121 as the second
country to host the CELAC Pro-Tempore Presidency and therefore, to be the
host country for the second Summit.
In the foundational Summit, it was established that the highest deci-
sion-making forum for CELAC is the Summit of Heads of State and Gov-
ernment, followed by the meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, meet-
ings of the Pro-Tempore Presidency, meetings of National Coordinators,
and the mechanism of Special Meetings in cases of extreme circumstances
19 Wolf Grabendorff, “Realidad y Ficción en las Relaciones entre la CELAC y la Unión Europea”, in La
CELAC en el Escenario Contemporáneo de América Latina y el Caribe, eds. Adrián Bonilla Soria and
Grace Jaramillo (San José: FLACSO, 2014), 175-192.
21 On June 3, 2009, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS member states adopted the resolution
AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09) by which the resolution from 1962 that excluded the government of Cuba
from its participation in the OAS remains without effect. Cuba’s return to the OAS will be possible after a
process of dialogue that has to be initiated at the request of the Cuban government and in accordance with
the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS.
32
or events and the Quartet of countries responsible for overseeing the activ-
ities of CELAC22. The summits are organized by the country that holds the
Pro- Tempore Presidency. The Pro-Tempore Presidency is the institutional,
technical and administrative support body of CELAC. It plays the executive
and coordination role and is responsible for organizing meetings, circulat-
ing information and coordinating CELAC activity. The State appointed as
Pro-Tempore President is responsible for CELAC’s financial support since
there is no regional budget.
The Pro-Tempore President works closely with the other members of
the Quartet which is comprised of the outgoing, incoming and upcoming
Presidents together with the Caribbean state holding the chairmanship of
CARICOM. The establishment of the “Troika plus one arrangement” was
decided during CELAC’s first year23, and at the Havana Summit, the “Troika
plus one arrangement” was formally established as the Quartet of countries
overseeing CELAC.
The Summit of Heads of State and Government, as the supreme forum
of CELAC, is a clear example of summit diplomacy that dominates LAC
regionalism. During the summits, leadership is directly exerted by Presidents
and Prime Ministers. At the summits, directives, guidelines, priorities, strat-
egies and working plans are defined. Ministers of Foreign Affairs also play
a key role since they are tasked with producing resolutions and pronounce-
ments, as well as the adoption of work plans, among other duties. In terms
of political positions, CELAC rejects the application of unilateral coercive
measures contrary to international law. While expressing its willingness to
contribute to the consolidation of a multilateral order, CELAC has advocated
for the end of violence and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
22 “La CELAC está conformada por los siguientes órganos:

1. Cumbre de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno
2. Reunión de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores
3. Presidencia Pro Témpore
4. Reunión de Coordinadores Nacionales
5. Reuniones especializadas
6. Troika Ampliada”
(Procedimientos para el Funcionamiento Orgánico de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y
Caribeños, 2013).
23 “8. Dejamos constancia del importante acuerdo alcanzado durante el primer año de funcionamiento
de CELAC, de incorporar al Estado que ejerce la Presidencia de CARICOM como miembro pleno de
su Troika, en reconocimiento a que su visión amplía y fortalece la pluralidad de nuestra comunidad, así
como en reconocimiento al rol histórico que han desempeñado los países del CARICOM en el desarrollo
integral de la región de América Latina y el Caribe.” (Declaración de Santiago 2013).
33
of the Syrian Arab Republic, and for a comprehensive and lasting solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in accordance with the United Nations reso-
lutions.
As part of its global positioning on behalf of LAC, CELAC supports
United Nations efforts at solving the global drug problem, rejects terrorism in
all its forms and manifestations, advocates for the rights of Afro-descendants,
indigenous peoples and local communities, supports the World Zero Hunger
Challenge, highlights the importance of technology transfer and the facilita-
tion of access to scientific knowledge, supports efforts to restrict the illegal
flow of small arms and light weapons and shows commitment to the achieve-
ment of internationally agreed goals such as the Millennium Development
Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).
On regional issues, CELAC recognizes the Latin American and Carib-
bean identity of Puerto Rico. It has supported the dialogue process between
the Government of Colombia and guerrilla movements and the national dia-
logue process in the Venezuela between government and opposition (Díaz
Galán and Bertot Triana 2017)24. The regional forum has expressed firm op-
position to the U.S. embargo/blockade against Cuba as well as supported
Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the
South Sandwich Islands25. During the second Summit in Havana, CELAC
proclaimed Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace. This means
that differences between LAC nations are to be solved through dialogue, ne-
gotiation or other forms of peaceful solutions established in international law.
The first year of CELAC consisted of a preparatory period devoted
to put in place its governance mechanism and to identify relevant common
interests to be included in CELAC’s work agenda, a task that involved a high
degree of flexibility and thematic plurality. Between 2013 and 2017, CELAC
developed an intense activity outlining sectorial areas and Working Groups.
The focus remained on agreeing on agendas rather than on defining a set of
concrete actions.
Among the main topics identified for CELAC’s thematic agendas are
economic matters (financial crisis, trade, energy, infrastructure, science and
24 Elena Carolina Díaz Galán, and Harold Bertot Triana, “La Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos
y Caribeños (CELAC): un enfoque desde la perspectiva de la integración”, Cuadernos de Política Exterior
Argentina (Nueva Época), no. 126 (julio-diciembre 2017).
25 Islas Malvinas, Islas Georgia del Sur y Sandwich del Sur in Spanish.
34
technology); social development (social programs, eradication of hunger and
poverty, food and nutrition security, education, health and public services,
culture, migration, gender, native peoples and afro-descendant communities);
sustainable development and environment (climate change); security issues
(illicit drugs and addictions, terrorism, nuclear disarmament); and South-
South cooperation.
When examining the broad issues in CELAC’s deliberations and de-
bates, the broad thematic diversity becomes clear. While CELAC’s agenda
is aligned with the purposes of its immediate predecessors –the Rio Group
and the CALC–, it has also embraced contemporary issues and the concerns
of the wider membership. Some examples are strategies to cope with inter-
national financial crises, assisting Caribbean Small Island Developing States
(SIDS) negatively impacted by climate change or supporting the CARICOM
Reparations Commission. Many of these issues have been addressed in
Special Declarations. On the other hand, certain matters highlighted dur-
ing CELAC’s foundational summit or CELAC’s first years did not resonate
enough to be kept at the center of discussions or were incorporated into larger
sectoral areas.
The thematic diversity within CELAC’s work agenda raises doubts on
its implementation capacity considering its limited resources, loose govern-
ance, ideological and cultural differences and economic asymmetries within
its member States. Besides, the short period allocated to exercise the Pro-Tem-
pore Presidency leaves a reduced time frame for exercising decisive leader-
ships. Concrete actions are slowed since most agreements have been shaped
to be acceptable to all LAC nations, becoming very general and containing
ambiguous content that may lead to various interpretations.
Asymmetries within LAC have been addressed in several CELAC
meetings and summits. Within CELAC, there coexists regional powers as
Mexico and Argentina together with Caribbean Small Island Developing
States (SIDS) such as Saint Lucia and Dominica. In recognition of the sig-
nificant disproportion of size, resource endowment, population, economic
and social development, political stability, and climate exposure, Caribbean
SIDS receive special attention due to their high vulnerability to external eco-
nomic shocks and environmental events. A significant step in this direction
was the enlargement of the Troika to a Quartet to ensure that a Caribbean
35
perspective is always present at the higher CELAC coordination level. An-
other important feature in CELAC’s work is the continuous support to Haiti,
the first LAC country that broke with colonial oppression, freed the slaves
and declared itself a Republic.
CELAC’s efforts in delivering LAC positions in international, regional
and bilateral negotiations constitute one of its distinctive features. As part
of the key objective of making LAC a key player in the multilateral system,
CELAC has declared to be:
“Determined to promote and project a unified voice for Latin America and
the Caribbean in the discussion of the principal issues, and in the positions
of the Region on the relevant global events at international meetings and
conferences, as well as in the dialogue with other regions and countries”
(Caracas Declaration 2011)26.
To make such an ambition a reality, CELAC members engaged in dis-

cussions about the post-2015 Development Agenda and became active pro-
moters of the formulation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
CELAC has also assumed the interlocutory role on behalf of LAC States
when dealing with global powers as the European Union (EU), China, India
and Russia.
China-CELAC relationship
In terms of CELAC’s bilateral engagements, the relationship with China
has progressed more than the others. For the People’s Republic of China, the
dialogue with CELAC is an important element in its rapprochement to the
region. However, given CELAC’s loose institutional arrangements, China has
not fully consolidated its links with the region beyond political declarations
and cooperation initiatives. China’s objective towards a deeper economic ar-
ticulation through CELAC has not been achieved since the regional forum
does not pursue economic integration as its main goal. Besides, there are
seven CELAC members that do not currently have diplomatic relations with
China but with Taiwan. They are Belize, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Saint Lucia,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Haiti.
Despite some LAC nations maintaining diplomatic relations with Tai-
wan, and the economic dependence of most LAC countries on the United
36
States, China’s policy towards the region has gained in coherence and has ex-
panded to numerous cooperation areas. In 2014, at the time of the announce-
ment of the establishment of the China-CELAC Forum, President Xi Jinping
laid out the 1+3+6 cooperation framework. The “1” refers to China – Lat-
in American and the Caribbean Cooperation Plan 2015-2019 that envisions
cooperation in various areas as security, trade, investment, finance, infra-
structure, energy and resources, industry, agriculture, science, tourism; the
“3” represents trade, investment and finance as engines for cooperation; and
the “6” prioritizes energy and resources, infrastructure, agriculture, manufac-
turing, scientific and technological innovation, and information technology
as cooperation areas.
China has published two policy documents on LAC in 2008 and 2016
respectively. In both, the central role of cooperation as an articulating mech-
anism of bilateral relations is emphasized. In the 2016 policy paper, it es-
tablished the importance of the China-CELAC Forum and other associat-
ed sub-fora as: Forum of Ministers of Agriculture, Forum of Scientific and
Technological Innovation, Forum of Political Parties, Forum of Cooperation
in Infrastructure, Young Politicians Forum, Academic Forum, Friendship
Forum between the Peoples, and the Forum on Legal Affairs. Key mechan-
isms of the China-CELAC Forum are the Dialogue of Foreign Ministers of
the CELAC Quartet and China, and the Meeting of National Coordinators.
Among the positive features of the China-CELAC Forum for LAC
countries are the absence of political-normative elements and the promotion
of economic links and cooperation. China does not play a divisive role in the
region and seeks to consolidate a pattern of South-South cooperation. De-
spite the internal difficulties that CELAC has gone through, China persisted
in maintaining the Forum as a privileged space for regional dialogue without
the interference of the United States (Saltalamacchia Ziccardi 2020)27.
In 2018, the CELAC and China Joint Plan of Action for Cooperation
on Priority Areas 2019-2021 was launched. The document establishes a set of
activities to “promote sustainable development of the China-CELAC Forum
countries and to encourage cooperation in various areas of common interest
and, taking into account the presentation made by China on the possibil-
27 Natalia Saltalamacchia Ziccardi, “La CELAC y su vinculación con actores extrarregionales”, in Los
Actores Globales y el (Re)Descubrimiento de América Latina, eds. Wolf Grabendorff and Andrés Serbin,
(Icaria Editorial y CRIES, 2020), 59-68.
37
ities offered by the Belt and Road Initiative” (CELAC and China Joint Plan
of Action 2018)28. The fundamental areas for cooperation included politics
and security (including cyber-security); infrastructure and transport; trade,
investment and finance; agriculture; industry, science and technology; en-
vironment; and cultural exchange. It is important to note that the areas of
cooperation are not exclusive and that the Plan is to be implemented under
the principles of flexibility and voluntary participation: “Its implementation
will not affect any agreed bilateral cooperation program, nor will it replace
the agreements, decisions or bilateral commitments already established, and
its effectiveness will be assessed.” (CELAC and China Joint Plan of Action
2018)29. The Plan of Action 2019-2021 gives particular attention to the chal-
lenges and needs of the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Countries,
Small Island Developing States, Middle Income Countries and countries in
conflict or emerging from conflict situations.
China and CELAC countries, as developing nations, share common in-
terests in preserving and endorsing a free trade regime, advocating for multi-
lateralism and promoting South-South cooperation. The current stage of dia-
logue and cooperation centers around the expansion of the Belt and Road
Initiative, particularly the “Online Silk Road” and the “Digital Silk Road”
considering China’s advances on data, artificial intelligence, 5G and other
high-technology fields. China has also expressed its willingness to cooperate
on programs for poverty alleviation and pollution control.
In 2021, the First China-CELAC Forum on Poverty Reduction and
Development was held. Additionally, the Third Ministerial Meeting of
the China-CELAC Forum China. The meeting was held online due to the
COVID-19 pandemic and adopted the Declaration of the Third Ministerial
Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum and the China-CELAC Joint Action
Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas 2022-2024. The Plan is divided in seven
main sections corresponding to: Political and Security Cooperation; Prag-
matic Economic Cooperation; High-Quality Infrastructure Cooperation;
Cooperation in Social, Cultural and People-to-People Matters; Sustain-
28 CELAC and China Joint Plan of Action for Cooperation on Priority Areas (2019-2021), January
22, 2018, https://celac.rree.gob.sv/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Joint-Action-Plan-II-CELAC-China-
Forum.-22-01-18.pdf .
29 CELAC and China Joint Plan of Action for Cooperation on Priority Areas (2019-2021), January
22, 2018, https://celac.rree.gob.sv/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Joint-Action-Plan-II-CELAC-China-
Forum.-22-01-18.pdf .
38
able Development; International Affairs and Subregional and Interregional
Cooperation; and Implementation (China-CELAC Joint Action 2021)30.
Both parties agreed at the meeting to deepen cooperation, particularly
in the area of public health and for the joint development of vaccines and
drugs. China ratified its commitment to continue supporting LAC countries
in their fight against the pandemic through the China-CELAC Special Loan
for Combating COVID-19. Other relevant matters refer to China-CELAC
cooperation in the Global Development Initiative, an idea proposed by Presi-
dent Xi Jinping that aims to foster international synergies to tackle the pan-
demic challenges and speed up the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. To
this end, China decided to establish the China-Caribbean Development Cen-
ter for Cooperation. The digital economy was also a central issue, particularly
in areas of developing e-commerce, electric vehicles, artificial intelligence,
smart agriculture, smart cities and 5G. China reiterated the goal of building
the China-CELAC Digital Silk Road and announced the setting up of the
China-CELAC Special Loan for Cooperation on the Digital Economy.
EU-CELAC relationship
Another important bilateral engagement of CELAC is the Dialogue
Mechanism formalized with the European Union (EU). The relationship
between LAC and Europe runs deep since the 15th century, and in the 21st
century, both parties have agreed to build stronger cooperation links based
on historical and cultural ties and mutual interests, guided by the principles
of respecting international law, human rights and the promotion of democ-
racy31.
The EU-CELAC dialogue mechanism was established in 2013 during
the First EU-CELAC Summit in Santiago de Chile. It addresses three key
topic areas: political dialogue, global governance and technical cooperation.
The meeting approved the EU-CELAC Action Plan 2013-2015 that identified
eight cooperation areas: science, research, innovation, and technology; sus-
tainable development, environment, climate change, biodiversity, and energy;
regional integration and interconnectivity; migration; education and employ-
ment; world drug problem; gender; and investment and entrepreneurship
(Council of the European Union 2013)32.
32 Council of the European Union, EU-CELAC Action Plan 2013-2015, 5748/13 Presse 32, Santiago,
January 27, 2013. https://intranet.eulacfoundation.org/es/system/files/E2%2BEU%20CELAC%20
ACTION%20PLAN.pdf .
39
At the Second EU-CELAC Summit in 2015, the topics discussed in
2013 were maintained and deepened. Two novel areas were added to the
discussion - higher education and citizen security. The theme of the meeting
was “Shaping our common future: working together for prosperous, cohesive
and sustainable societies for our citizens” (Council of the European Union
2015)33.
The institutionalized relations between EU and LAC, particularly be-
tween the EU and CELAC have advanced in cooperation initiatives while
political dialogue and global governance debates have produced declarations
without achieving concrete actions. The Third EU-CELAC Summit, planned
for 2017, had to be cancelled due to the divergent positions on the Venezuelan
crisis. However, the crisis was not the sole element behind the deterioration of
the relationship. Other factors associated with the reduction of momentum
of the initiative included the challenges to European regionalism, expressed
in the Brexit and the migration crisis, as well as the absence of a concrete
EU strategy towards LAC which has led to a freeze in the relationship. The
difficulty of articulating common interests from about sixty States, many of
which have a limited understanding of the diversity and complexity of the
bilateral relationship, is a crucial obstacle for relaunching the EU-CELAC
relationship (Diaz-Rodriguez 2019)34.
Beyond China and the EU
In addition to CELAC’s formalization of the bilateral dialogue with
the EU and China, the forum has attempted to engage other countries and
multilateral organizations on behalf of LAC. In 2012, when BRICS were
popular, the regional forum held meetings with representatives from Russia
and India to establish formal discussion and working channels. In August
2012, the First India-CELAC Troika Foreign Ministers Meeting was held in
New Delhi. The India-CELAC Joint Statement at this meeting addressed the
establishment of a Business Council, a CEO Forum, an Energy Forum, a Sci-
ence Forum and an Agricultural Experts group. Main areas for cooperation
identified were energy, agriculture, science and technology, transportation,
33 Council of the European Union, Shaping Our Common Future: Latin America and the Caribbean
– European Union Strategic Partnership, European Union, 2015, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/30031/qc0415217enn.pdf .
34 Joel Diaz-Rodriguez, “20 years of bi-regional summits of EU-Latin america: Is it time for a turning
point?”, Centre d’études juridiques européennes, April 29, 2019. https://www.ceje.ch/fr/actualites/
action-exterieure/2019/04/20-years-bi-regional-summits-eu-latin-america-it-time-turning-point/.
40
and infrastructure (Seshasayee 2012)35. Four years later, the Dialogue Mech-
anism India-CELAC was launched during the Meeting of the India-CELAC
Quartet Foreign Ministers in New York.
In the case of the Russian Federation, CELAC and Russian Ministers
have agreed on several occasions to collaborate on issues related to the re-
spect for international law, the reinforcement of the international financial
institutions, the promotion of democracy, human rights, international peace
and security, environmental and energy, among others (Montoute 2014)36.
In 2015, the Permanent Mechanism for Political Dialogue and Cooperation
with the Russian Federation was established.
With South Korea, CELAC has initiated cooperation initiatives as
the Workshop on Capacity Building for the Internationalization of SMEs in
Latin America and the Caribbean in December 2016 resulting of the South
Korea-CELAC-ECLAC Tripartite Academic Seminar “Exploring Strategies
for Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean” in April 2015 (Declaración de Punta Cana 2017)37.
CELAC Quartet Foreign Ministers met on various occasions with rep-
resentatives of the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States, the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), New Zealand, Australia,
Norway, Turkey, Japan (Declaración de Santiago 201338; Declaración de La
Habana 201439; Declaración de Belén 201540; Declaración de Quito 201641 ;
Declaración de Punta Cana 201742).
35 Hari Seshasayee, “India-CELAC: Beyond commodities?”, Americas Quarterly, August 28, 2012,
https://www.americasquarterly.org/blog/india-and-celac-beyond-commodities/
36 Annita Deloris Montoute, “New paradigm, greater collaboration? The Caribbean and Latin America
in a globalizing world”, in Anuario de Integración, no. 10, (Buenos Aires: CRIES, 2014): 12-54.
37 Declaración Política de Punta Cana, V Cumbre de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y
Caribeños (CELAC), January 25, 2017, http://www.sela.org/es/prensa/notas-de-prensa/n/27781/
declaracion-politica-de-punta-cana-v-cumbre-celac.
38 Declaración de Santiago, I Cumbre CELAC, January 28, 2013, http://www2.aladi.org/boletin/
espanol/2013/EneroFebrero/documentos/03%20Declaraci%F3n%20de%20Santiago%20I%20
Cumbre%20CELAC%20Version%20final.pdf
39 Declaración de La Habana, II Cumbre de la CELAC. January 29, 2014, http://www.revistas.unam.
mx/index.php/archipielago/article/view/55639
40 Declaración Política de Belén, III Cumbre de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la Comunidad
de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC), January 29, 2015, https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/
sites/default/files/1declaracionpoliticadebelen2015es.pdf .
41
Declaración Política de Quito – Mitad del Mundo, January 27, 2016, http://s017.sela.org/
media/2088261/iv-cumbre-celac-declaracion-politica.pdf
42 Declaración Política de Punta Cana, V Cumbre de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y
Caribeños (CELAC), January 25, 2017, http://www.sela.org/es/prensa/notas-de-prensa/n/27781/
declaracion-politica-de-punta-cana-v-cumbre-celac.
41
CELAC’s interactions with various regional and multilateral fora on
behalf of the LAC community seeks to operationalize its main work pro-
grams which focus on cooperation between regional and sub-regional integra-
tion mechanisms to deepen dialogue, coordination and integration initiatives
to articulate common projects. In CELAC Summits, the importance of en-
gaging with the African Union, ASEAN, League of Arab States, Movement
of Non-Aligned Countries, Pacific Forum, BRICS has been recognized. Sim-
ilarly, CELAC has acknowledged the importance of working together with
the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), Latin American and the
Caribbean Economic System (SELA), Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO) and especially with the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Despite relative success, particularly in its relations with China and
with ECLAC, CELAC has not risen as the representative grouping for LAC
at the international level. In the case of the EU and India where promising
starts gave hope for a closer relationship, the absence of political clarity re-
garding the nature of the relationship has slowed the progress. On the other
hand, the political shift to the right in various LAC countries, the Venezuelan
crisis and the negative effects of the global economic recession reinforced by
the COVID-19 pandemic practically froze CELAC’s activity and, therefore,
its capacity to act as the major organization for LAC to advance issues related
to LAC. Other elements, also associated with the current stagnation of LAC
regionalism, contributed to the decline in intra-regional trade and econom-
ic deterioration of most LAC economies. Weak institutional frameworks in
regional integration initiatives manifested in the adoption of non-binding de-
cisions and a low level of compliance, along with the absence of solid leader-
ship, the preference for consolidating bilateral relations and the overlapping
and segmentation of regional initiatives. The crisis of LAC regionalism has
affected most of those projects associated with post-liberal or post-hegemonic
principles such as Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Bolivarian
Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA-TCP) and CELAC.
The factors mentioned above have negatively impacted Latin Amer-
ican regionalism, particularly the initiatives of post-liberal organizations as
UNASUR, ALBA-TCP and CELAC. In the case of CELAC, clear signs of
42
such stagnation were most perceptible in 2018 and 2019 when no high-level
summits were held. At the fifth Summit in the Dominican Republic in 2017,
CELAC’s loss of momentum was already evident since only ten Heads of
State and Governments attended: Jocelerme Privert (Interim President of
Haiti), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Raúl Castro (Cuba), Rafael Correa (Ecuador),
Salvador Sánchez Cerén (El Salvador), David Granger (Guyana), Andrew
Holness (Jamaica), Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua), Nicolás Maduro (Venezuela)
and the host Danilo Medina (Dominican Republic).
In 2021, amid a complex and unforeseen global reality resulting from
the COVID-19 pandemic, Mexico, a traditional campaigner for integration,
emerged again to bolster regional unity and re-engineer the CELAC mechan-
ism. The Mexican government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador
decided to reinvigorate LAC regionalism and, as Pro-Tempore President of
the regional forum, organized the CELAC’s VI Summit.
CELAC’s 6th Summit
The 6th Summit of Heads of State and Government of CELAC on Sep-
tember 18, 2021, marked the resurrection of the regional forum. The meet-
ing occurred in Mexico City with the attendance of 17 Heads of State and
Government43 and ten Ministers of Foreign Affairs44, a clear signal of the
reinvigoration of the regional forum. The President of the European Council
and Executive Secretary of ECLAC attended as high-level guests. Chinese
President Xi Jinping delivered a video speech to the summit.
President López Obrador assumed the challenge to reconfigure CELAC
as a viable organization. To do so, López Obrador focused the discussions
on cooperation in challenging times, while putting aside political differences.
The move to revitalize the community during the pandemic and the absence
of support from traditional partners was a critical element in reviving the
regional vision proposed by CELAC as part of the set of actions needed to
overcome the crisis.
At the 6th Summit, LAC countries committed to renew efforts to work
together in a spirit of unity in diversity in a sense of urgency to achieve ef-
ficient management of COVID-19 impacts including timely, equitable and
43 Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Paraguay,
Peru, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela and Mexico (host
country).
44 Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panamá, St.
Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago.
43
affordable access to vaccines. The Executive Secretary of ECLAC, the Mex-
ican economist Alicia Bárcena Ibarra, presented the “Guidelines and propos-
als for a health self-sufficiency plan for Latin America and the Caribbean”,
a document that was approved at the Summit (Marín Suárez and Regueiro
Bello 2021)45, and the plan aims to reduce the region’s pharmaceutical de-
pendency and includes the establishment of a platform for regional clinical
research, joint ventures for the development and production of vaccines, a
regional mechanism to purchase vaccines and flexibility to access intellectual
property.
The fight against COVID-19 was at the center of Mexico’s respons-
ibility as Pro-Tempore President of CELAC. Main achievements included
the Mexico-Argentina agreement for the production and packaging of the
AstraZeneca drug, the Comprehensive Health Self-Sufficiency Plan prepared
at the request of CELAC and the meeting on the theme “Technological De-
velopment of CELAC vaccines against COVID-19”. Additionally, there were
two meetings of CELAC Specialists for Coronavirus Monitoring, and the
celebration of the Meeting of Ministers to analyze LAC access to vaccines
against COVID-19 (Romano and Lajtman 2021)46.
CELAC’s revitalization was also prompted by the failure of the policy
of maximum pressure against President Nicolás Maduro propelled by the
Trump administration with the complicity of several LAC countries in the
Group of Lima. Paradoxically, the movement to influence regime change
in Venezuela served to strengthen the Maduro administration. The growing
deterioration of the Organization of America States (OAS), exacerbated by
the questionable performance of its Secretary General Luis Almagro and the
role of CELAC as a critical regional interlocutor in relation to China have re-
inforced the relevance of CELAC. At the same time, the Summit, supported
the idea of a profound reform of the OAS and the increased presence and
salience of CELAC.
Since the inception of CELAC, debate on two positions emerged in re-
lation to CELAC vis-à-vis the OAS. One position argues that CELAC would
45 Claudia Marín Suárez and Lourdes María Regueiro Bello, “Un nuevo momento para la CELAC”,
Cubadebate, October 3, 2021, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2021/10/03/un-nuevo-momento-
para-la-celac/.
46 Silvina Romano and Tamara Lajtman, “Cumbre CELAC 2021: renovada apuesta por la integración
latinoamericana”, Centro Estratégico Latinoamericano de Geopolítica (CELAG), (September 18, 2021),
https://www.celag.org/cumbre-celac-2021-renovada-apuesta-por-la-integracion-latinoamericana/.
44
replace the OAS since it has been discredited over time due to the hegemonic
role of the United States that has made it “inefficient and unreliable” as for-
mer President Rafael Correa declared at the opening session of the Caracas
Summit in 2011. The other position envisages the possibility for the OAS
and CELAC to coexist as complementary fora without colliding or oppos-
ing each other. As former President Juan Manuel Santos indicated at the
Caracas Summit, CELAC’s foundation is not an act against the OAS or the
Ibero-American Summit, but a step towards LAC integration. While most
of the LAC nations preferred that CELAC not supplant the OAS, members
such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua have consistently supported the re-
placement of the OAS by CELAC as a mechanism to exclude the political
intervention of the U.S. and Canada in LAC matters (Segovia 2013)47.
There has been no definitive conclusion to the debate in relation to
CELAC’s role and presence as against that of the OAS. Considering CELAC
principles that oppose Pan-Americanism, it could be possible for CELAC
to act as a political and diplomatic counterweight to the OAS. By doing so,
CELAC would be operating consistently with its foundational principles of
allowing LAC nations to make effective and autonomous decisions according
to its interests and needs without the intervention of extra-regional powers.
Among the important advances made by CELAC during the Pro-Tem-
pore Presidency of Mexico are the creation of the Latin American and Carib-
bean Space Agency48 and the establishment of CELAC Fund for Integral
Response to Disasters49 with an initial fund of USD 15 million (Marín Suárez
and Regueiro Bello 2021)50. CELAC also agreed to present a joint position
before the International Monetary Fund demanding access to short-term re-
sources and the reduction of the burden of indebtedness (Declaración de la
Ciudad de México 2021)51.
47 Daniela Segovia (2013). “Latin America and the Caribbean: Between the OAS and CELAC”,
Explorations | Exploraciones, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies /Revista
Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, no. 95 (October, 2013), 97-107.
48 Agencia Latinoamericana y Caribeña del Espacio (ALCE) in Spanish.
49 Fondo de Respuesta Integral a Desastres in Spanish.
50 Claudia Marín Suárez and Lourdes María Regueiro Bello, “Un nuevo momento para la CELAC”,
Cubadebate, October 3, 2021, http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2021/10/03/un-nuevo-momento-
para-la-celac/.
51 Declaración de la Ciudad de México, VI Cumbre de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la
CELAC, September 18, 2021, https://www.sica.int/documentos/declaracion-de-la-ciudad-de-mexico-
vi-cumbre-de-jefas-y-jefes-de-estado-y-de-gobierno-de-la-celac-18-de-septiembre-de-2021_1_128373.html
45
Another important issue addressed was climate change. Environmental
and climate change discussions have usually been promoted by Caribbean
SIDS. However, given the impact of recent meteorological events in Cen-
tral America, most attendees addressed climate change as one of the central
threats to LAC societies and a key obstacle for sustainable development in
the region. At the summit, it was agreed to present a common position at the
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) - COP 26.
Significantly, “Environment and Climate Change” became one of the
major action areas included in CELAC Working Plan for 2021, which also
included Regional Economic Reactivation; Relationship with extra-regional
partners; Equality, gender and diversity; Innovation; and Latin American and
Caribbean integration (Plan de Trabajo de la CELAC 2021)52.
The 6th Summit allowed CELAC member States to collectively recog-
nize the relevance of the regional forum beyond political ideologies and as
a tool to find solutions for common problems through cooperation. Even
when the subject of the OAS, democracy and human rights reflected polit-
ical polarization, the meeting revealed an unprecedented growth in CELAC
members’ capacity to promote diversity and deferred the discussion of sensi-
tive issues to the bilateral sphere. During the Summit, political tensions sur-
faced from Uruguay and Paraguay’s objection to the presence of President
Nicolás Maduro, the criticism of the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments
by Uruguayan President Luis Lacalle, and the open declaration by Nicar-
agua not to favor the Argentine candidacy for the Pro-Tempore Presidency
in 2022. At the end, the recognition of the importance of having CELAC as
a forum for collective discussions at the highest level outweighed the option
of non-dialogue.
Challenges ahead
As part of the State-led, post-liberal regionalism that favors South-
South cooperation, CELAC has emerged as a regional forum aimed at bring-
ing together LAC independent States. Under the motto “unity in diversity”,
its fundamental purpose is to become the forum for political dialogue, cooper-
ation and negotiation for the LAC region. It represents a new opportunity to
52 Plan de Trabajo para la PPT 2021 de la CELAC, January 21, 2021,
h t t p s : / / p p t - c e l a c. s r e. g o b. m x / e s / c o m p o n e n t / p h o c a d ow n l o a d / c a t e g o r y / 8 - p l a n e s - d e -
trabajo?download=16:plan-de-trabajo-2021.
46
foster LAC integration and to improve the region’s capabilities to influence
the multilateral agenda and successfully perform in the global arena. CELAC
aims to be recognized as the regional LAC voice when interacting with the
international community.
A decade after its creation, CELAC’s work balance is unequal.
CELAC is still in a process of finding its own identity and ensuring that there
is no overlapping with other regional initiatives. There have been important
achievements such as the Declaration of Latin America and the Caribbean as
a Zone of Peace and the recognition given by China and the EU to CELAC
as a valid counterpart. CELAC managed to shape a regional space based on
consensus in a scheme of solidarity and complementarity. Instead of pur-
suing deep economic integration relying on lifting trade barriers or creating
a monetary union, CELAC has reconfigured the process of LAC political
dialogue and provides a space for debate, coordination and cooperation em-
bedded in an emancipatory spirit, out of the US tutelage (Lo Brutto and
Crivelli Minutti 2017)53. However, several obstacles and insufficiencies are to
be overcome for CELAC to achieve its maximum potential.
One of CELAC’s main challenges is to move forward the rhetoric sur-
rounding its goals and commitments. CELAC has a multidimensional agen-
da and after six summits it is evident that there is a range of thematic areas
in its Action Plans. A key challenge for the regional forum is to avoid failing
to comply with the agreed decisions, but to meet high expectations and di-
vergent interests of thirty-three independent States into feasible agendas and
concrete actions.
The COVID-19 pandemic reminded LAC about the importance of
regional cooperation to face transnational threats that do not distinguish
borders or ideologies. The 6th Summit in Mexico City allowed the region to
recognize CELAC’s relevance and meaningful purposes. LAC nations found
themselves practically abandoned during most of 2020, having to struggle
to receive medical supplies and vaccines. The evolution of the health crisis
revealed the necessity of renewing regional alliances beyond political differ-
ences. Mechanisms such as CELAC contribute to place LAC in a better pos-
53 Giuseppe Lo Brutto and Eduardo Crivelli Minutti, “La Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y
Caribeños (Celac) en la reconfiguración de la integración regional post-hegemónica”, Revista Internacional
de Cooperación y Desarrollo, vol. 4, no. 1 (2017), 126-136.
47
ition to face the global crisis and to negotiate within the framework of the
international relations system.
Even though the 6th Summit served as the relaunching platform for
CELAC, the regional forum now has serious homework to do to consolidate
itself as the LAC regional forum for dialogue and cooperation. The regional
intergovernmental forum has decided to function through the mechanism of
summit diplomacy and consensus. The LAC region, strongly linked to this
type of presidential diplomacy, benefited from having CELAC as a high-level
forum for direct dialogue but, on the other hand, has become highly depend-
ent on the leadership capacity of the Pro-Tempore Presidency and govern-
ments’ sympathies towards CELAC. Since CELAC member States opted for
a loose governce mechanism in tune with the flexible approach required to
operate in the spirit of “unity in the diversity”, the forum suffers from a lim-
ited institutional framework expressed in the lack of a permanent headquar-
ters and professional staff, the absence of a compulsory mechanism to ensure
the implementation of the decisions, an endemic funding constraint and the
impossibility of assuming any position or taking any action without consen-
sus. The absence of robust institutionalism gives little room for non-govern-
mental actors to have any impact on the agenda or decision-making process.
Analysts that present perspectives that differ from LAC politicians and
national bureaucracies’ visions54, recommend building a stronger institution-
al arrangement. The establishment of a permanent headquarters could be a
first step towards this goal. The forum could also benefit from a machinery to
accelerate the implementation of the decisions taken and the operationaliza-
tion of concrete objectives. These adjustments would bring more recognition
to CELAC as the regional bloc, granting it prestige within the member coun-
tries and at the international level. The obstacle to surmount would be the
lack of disposition of LAC nations to fund CELAC on a permanent basis, to
implement mechanisms to ensure the compliance of the signed agreements,
its enforcement at the national level and a larger involvement of citizens into
CELAC activities.
54 In the Troika meeting held on December 6, 2012, it was agreed that this is not the time yet to agree on
the structure of a Permanent Secretary of the CELAC, action which can be counterproductive and divert
attention. In relation to the decision-making system the Troika agreed to keep the decision-making of
the agreements of the Forum by consensus. However, it was not ruled out studying such initiatives in the
future and discussing these issues when CELAC is consolidated (Troika de Coordinadores Nacionales de
la CELAC, 2012).
48
Another key area for CELAC’s work in order to advance regional inte-
gration is to shape its own architecture to stimulate intraregional trade, finan-
cial and monetary integration and cooperation initiatives, gradually reducing
dependence on the international institutional framework that does not re-
spond to the requirements of developing countries and SIDS economies (Ál-
varez Figueroa 2014)55.
The diversity within Latin American countries is amplified by the
participation in CELAC of Caribbean nations, some of which keep Queen
Elizabeth II as their Head of State. Such subordination, although symbolic,
creates a distortion in CELAC regionalism that defends autonomy, independ-
ence and self-determination. At the same time, it should be recognized that
the regional forum needs to act more decisively to address specific problems
of Caribbean SIDS and their economic and environmental vulnerabilities.
Further, the less than enthusiastic participation of Caribbean SIDS,
specifically the CARICOM member States, is another of CELAC’s challen-
ges. CARICOM member States have secured a permanent representation in
CELAC’s Quartet. Nevertheless, none of the CARICOM states has agreed
on assuming CELAC’s Pro-Tempore Presidency.
CELAC needs to gain effectiveness as a political instrument. However,
this is not merely the forum responsibility per se since its inability to coordin-
ate common positions, implement decisions or solve regional problems are
due to the lack of political will and the presence of ideological divergences
among the governments of its member States. Since CELAC is based on the
intergovernmental principle, it is largely exposed to changes in the political
administration at the national levels. This is evidenced in the case of Brazil,
formerly a major regional power and former champion for regional integra-
tion. When Jair Bolsonaro assumed as presidency, Brazil suspended its par-
ticipation in the regional mechanism.
The consolidation of CELAC as a regional mechanism is also threat-
ened by the preference for LAC states to secure bilateral agreements and to
reinforce links with extra-regional actors that play a decisive role on trade and
investment. The trend to dismiss neighbors and look outside the region has
proved a feeble strategy in times of worldwide crisis such as COVID-19 has
shown. If LAC considers the many lessons left by the pandemic, there could
be an opportunity for CELAC and for LAC regionalism.
55 Oneida Álvarez Figueroa, “La II Cumbre de la CELAC: recuento y nuevos desafíos”, Revista Cubana
de Economía y Sociedad, no. 1 (2014).
49
Section II
Contemporary challenges to regional

security - transnational organized crime,
citizen security, illegal migration, human
trafficking and related issues
New Perspectives on Policing in Trinidad
and Tobago: A Model for Community-
Oriented Policing
Marlon Anatol
Amanda Anatol
Sacha Joseph-Mathews
Introduction and definition
S
ir Robert Peel rationalised that “the police are the public and the
public are the police”1, and according to Fridell, community poli-
cing must be based on the premise that the “police should not be separated
from, but rather joined in partnership with, the community”.2
Community-Oriented Policing (COP) — often referred to as com-
munity policing — is generally a new concept in the history of policing in
Trinidad and Tobago since independence. According to Cordner,3 although
the concept of community policing is not new, its philosophy, principles and
operational practices have been present in various degrees within policing
for centuries. It can be argued that in the past the Trinidad and Tobago Po-
lice Service (TTPS) has attempted to engage with citizens in communities to
reduce crime and maintain social order. At present, the police are no longer
viewed as the sole guardians of law and order in Trinidad and Tobago, and
there is a recognition that all members of communities need to become active
1 Cited in Lorie Fridell, ‘The Defining Characteristics of Community Policing’ in Community Policing:
The Past, Present, and Future, eds Lorie Fridell and Mary Ann Wycoff, (Washington, Police Executive
Research Forum, 2004), 3-12
2 Ibid.
3 Gary Cordner, ‘Community Policing’ in The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing, eds. Michael D.
Reisig, and Robert J. Kane, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2005).
allies in the effort to enhance public safety and security in their neighbour-
hoods.
Community-Oriented Policing
As a sub-set of police-community relations, the concept of Commun-
ity-Oriented Policing (COP) has emerged in recent times. COP is a relatively
new philosophy which transforms traditional police management and oper-
ational strategies through collaborative relationships between the police ser-
vice and the communities they serve. This approach contemplates the ap-
plication of problem-solving strategies which are sensitive both to the needs
of the community and to the challenges faced by police officers in the per-
formance of their duties. Through the creation of conceptual and physical
spaces for effective communication and interaction between the police and
communities, there is a greater possibility for the development of empathy,
trust, and respect between them which in the long run will facilitate the cre-
ation of effective solutions to public security and safety issues.
COP advocates at its core for the police to interact with neighbourhood
associations, community groups and leaders to mobilize support and resour-
ces to solve problems and to enhance the quality of life for all members of the
community. In this model, all stakeholders are able to voice their concerns,
provide advice, and engage in activities to address their communities’ secur-
ity and safety concerns. This process is usually time-consuming and requires
degrees of dedication, commitment, creativity, patience and understanding.
The literature has identified community policing as a popular contemporary
policing approach responding to the general decline in public confidence in
the police, and there is growing evidence that the police do not have the cap-
acity to fight crime by themselves.4
The literature indicates that the complexity and diversity of crime and
its manifestations, along with the limitations related to the availability of hu-
man and financial resources have led to a clear agreement that alone, law en-
forcement agencies acting in silos cannot implement effective crime-preven-
tion strategies, and as a result there is justification for increased engagement
and input from communities in partnership relations with the police.
4 Wesley Skogan and Susan Hartnett, Community Policing Chicago Style, (New York, Oxford University
Press, 1997). /Sirpa Virta, ‘Community Policing’ in The Sage Dictionary of Criminology, eds. Eugene
McLaughlin and John Muncie, (London, Sage: 2001)./ Fridell.
52
It is generally agreed that in the absence of constructive police-com-
munity relationships, especially in socially disorganized communities such
as those that exist in East Port of Spain in Trinidad, public confidence and
trust in the police is limited. To act as a counter-measure to this, COP is seen
as a philosophy that can be catalytic in reshaping traditional police manage-
ment and operational strategies through collaborative relationships between
the TTPS and citizenry. This effort will necessitate a re-engineering and re-
formulation of capacity-building in the police force, and will involve new and
extensive training structured to promote the mission of COP.
While community policing has gained increased recognition over the
last few decades, it has proven to be a concept difficult to define and, as evi-
denced by the literature, there does not exist a single definition — neither is
there any mandatory set of community policing schemes. This is not neces-
sarily a negative observation, as increased introspection and analysis may
lead to a more comprehensive approach with a high local content to deal
with the issues of weak government policy, lack of political will, corruption,
non-understanding of community police relations, and a host of other vari-
ables that have all contributed to the rise in crime in Trinidad and Tobago
over the last two decades.
While the philosophical component of community policing is usually
explained as the promotion of a problem-solving approach to public safe-
ty involving partnership with the community, the strategic component refers
to involving members of the community in the provision of public safety.5
One author notes that community policing has been used as a catch-all
term associated with other descriptors and strategies including ‘partnership,
problem-solving, problem-oriented, proactive, responsive and reassurance’6.
Similarly, the literature identifies numerous definitions of community poli-
cing internationally, but they all have certain commonalities, including the
decentralization of police powers to allow decision-making at the community
level, support for partnerships with stakeholders, increased community en-
gagement, encouragement of problem-solving, and the creation of a network
of community-based personnel resources for collaboration.7
5 Ikuteyijo Olusegun Lanre and Ayodele James Olabisi ‘Nigeria’, in Community Policing in Indigenous
Communities, eds. Mahesh K. Nalla, and Graeme R. Newman (Boca Raton, Florida, CRC Press, 2018).
6 John Casey, ‘Implementing Community Policing in Different Countries and Cultures’, Pakistan Journal
of Criminology, Vo. 2, No. 4, 55-70.
7 Simon Mackenzie and Alistair Henry, ‘Community Policing: A review of the Literature’ (Web only
53
For the purpose of this paper, Oliver’s definition8 will be utilized:
‘A systematic approach to policing with the paradigm of instilling and fos-
tering a sense of community within a geographical neighbourhood to im-
prove the quality of life. It achieves this through the decentralization of the
police and the implementation of a synthesis of three key components: (1)
… the redistribution of traditional police resources; (2) … the interaction of
police and all community members to reduce crime and the fear of crime
through indigenous proactive programmes; and (3) … a concerted effort to
tackle the causes of crime problems rather than to put Band-Aids on the
symptoms’.
Another consideration is normative sponsorship theory — a theory

which postulates that most people are of goodwill and are positive about
cooperating with the police for the benefit of the community — which sug-
gests that community members should be seen not as a passive audience, but
rather as agents and partners in the quest for promoting peace and security
in their community. The foundation of this approach is the belief that the
community’s safety cannot depend solely on the police, but is dependent on
input from a wide range of partners; this is known as ‘partnership policing’
in the literature.
Rosenbaum9 argues that research conducted since the early 1970s iden-
tifies the limitations of the “professional law enforcement” model of policing.
As a result, there has been a move towards a style of policing that encourages
community members to participate with the police in identifying and solving
the root causes of crime and social problems, and this has evolved into the
concept known as “community policing”. In fact, during this era of the 1970s
the jargon of policing evolved to include phrases like “community-oriented
policing” and “problem-oriented policing”.10 It is clear that these concepts
cleared the way for the current philosophies of policing which rely less on the
enforcement of law and order, and more on partnerships and joint ventures
with communities to address problems of crime and security.
Publication). (Edinburgh, Scottish Government Social Research, 2009).

8 Willard M. Oliver, Community-Oriented Policing: A Systemic Approach to Policing, (New Jersey,
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1998), 51.
9 Dennis P. Rosenbaum, ed., The challenges of community policing: Testing the promises, (California,
Sage, 1994).
10 Jean Paul Brodeur, ed, ‘Tailor-Made policing: A conceptual investigation’, in How to recognise good
policing: Problems and Issues, (California, Sage, 1998).
54
As previously noted, Community-Oriented Policing (COP) has be-
come somewhat fashionable over the past decade, both regionally and inter-
nationally, yet it can be argued that the term is often misunderstood in terms
of police management. COP should be seen not as a programme, but as a
value system which permeates police departments/forces/services, where
the primary organizational goal is working cooperatively with individual
citizens, groups of citizens, and both public and private organizations to
identify and resolve issues which potentially affect the liveability of specific
neighbourhoods, areas, cities or the country as a whole. This approach comes
from the realization that problems in the community cannot be dealt with by
one agent/stakeholder alone, but need to be approached on multi-tier and
multi-partner levels, so cooperation and coordination with other stakeholders
who share the responsibility for problem-solving is essential.
At its core, COP focuses on a number of issues including early identi-
fication, timely intervention, and prevention. To work effectively, the agents
of this community policing effort — the police officers — need to function
as general-purpose practitioners who have the ability and credibility to en-
gage and call upon different stakeholders, including the public, private, faith-
based, and non-governmental organizations serving the target community.
This is necessarily a time-consuming activity as relationships need to be de-
veloped, maintained and tested with these stakeholders as well as with other
actors such as schools, hospitals, social services, the judicial system, busi-
nesses, community organizations and other stakeholders. Understanding the
concept of COP allows the actors to get involved, which increases the chance
of success of any initiative which is implemented in target communities, and
deepens the relationship between the police, stakeholders and the community
at large. It is this relationship-building process that ultimately increases the
levels of communication and confidence in not only the community police,
but in the process itself, which will serve to reduce resistance to programmes
in the future.
Operationalizing the Concept
Basically, policing must be seen as more than simply law enforcement,
and in fact, studies have shown that dealing with crime consumes only 10%-
20% of police workload. Community-oriented police officers must take on
board the fact that many of the functions they will be adopting are those of
55
a social worker, and many of the solutions to the problems in the commun-
ity will be solved only with the ‘soft’ approach to problem-solving. This ap-
proach allows the officers to see all these ‘other’ social tasks as part of the job
so that they are able to see the ‘big picture’ which is ultimately to make the
community more liveable and safer. It is this paradigm change that is critical
to developing the police officer who is oriented to COP.
Rosenbaum posits that the concept of community policing exhibits a
degree of theoretical impression which may not be universally agreed upon;
he argues, however, that there is a common set of guiding principles and
assumptions that support the concept: namely, “the broadening of the def-
inition of police work; the re-ordering of police priorities to place empha-
sis on [what he terms] ‘soft’ crime disorder problems; a shift of focus away
from incident-driven policing towards problem-solving and prevention; the
recognition of the critical role communities can play in neighbourhood prob-
lem-solving; and the understanding of the need for restructuring of police
organisations in order to be responsive to these demands”.11
Logistically, the police service’s division of labour is based on geog-
raphy, with each station or precinct responsible for a specific geographical
area. When considering community policing, the officers in charge must be
cognizant of the fact that the ‘patrol officers’ or ‘community police officers’
are required to ‘adopt’ specific locations and feel a sense of responsibility
for those areas and the people who inhabit them. In the execution of their
duty, they must get familiar with the community members, develop effective
rapport with all segments of the community, and integrate themselves into
the daily lives of the community. Based on this approach, it is operationally
prudent to ensure that community police officers are allowed sufficient time
to bond with the community, and efforts should be made to discourage their
removal from/rotation through these communities.
Further, in this approach, community policing officers’ understanding
of the community, coupled with strong interpersonal relationships should
give those in charge the necessary confidence to increase the discretionary
powers of these officers. This approach will allow for operational policies to
serve as broad guidelines for professional practice (rather than detailed rules
and regulations), and encourage community police officers themselves to get
11 Rosenbaum, ‘The changing role of the police: Assessing the current transition to community policing’,
in How to recognise good policing: Problems and Issues, ed Jean Paul Brodeur (California, Sage, 1998).
56
involved in the decision-making process, a privilege that was once reserved
only for officers in charge.
This approach also encourages elected officials to consult with com-
munity police officers when making decisions about the specific communities
in which they work, in order to increase the likelihood of initiatives’ success.
Police-community relations then, refers to a type of partnership be-
tween the police and the community, where resources are mobilized, net-
works developed, and problem-solving strategies or tactics are developed. It
can be argued that the operationalization of this approach requires a compre-
hensive transformation of the police organization’s culture, both formal and
informal.
The change in culture will serve to reduce tensions between the po-
lice and community members, develop a positive image, and increase trust
between them, thus solidifying the legitimacy of the relationship. It is this
legitimacy that creates and sustains the dialogue between parties and increas-
es the level of confidence in the police so that all community members feel
safe and believe that they will receive just and fair treatment from the police.
Challenges
While the motto of many police services is to ‘serve and protect’, po-
lice-community interactions often make it difficult to perform these tasks.
The literature has identified one of the major obstacles to be overcome is
poor communication between the police and the communities they attempt
to serve. Social control in a free and democratic society is a tenuous concept,
and for it to be effective there needs to be an understanding between the po-
lice and the community of the behaviour that is expected of, and acceptable
from, each group.12
It is posited that the intimate knowledge of the community and its
issues which will be garnered from the community police will allow for great-
er understanding of the community and ultimately lead to better responses
to incidents when they occur. This approach also seeks to constantly gather
data, unite stakeholders, identify emergent problems, and implement specific
strategies targeting the problems that arise. While community police are fo-
cused on, and concerned with, the liveability of the community and its safety
and security issues, the officers must also be concerned with their response
12 Louis A. Radalet and David L. Carter. The Police and the Community (New Jersey, Prentice Hall Inc.,
1994).
57
to on-going or emerging problems and issues, keeping an eye on the ‘big pic-
ture’, as the perception of safety and security is vital to encouraging increased
interaction between all parties. As a result of these new requirements of po-
lice officers, it will be necessary to review the measures used to evaluate their
performance, as their evaluation must now take into consideration their roles
and functions in communities. This approach, to be most effective, would also
necessitate decreased emphasis on numbers of arrests, filing of paperwork,
incidence response times and the like, and increased emphasis on assessment
of the public’s satisfaction with levels of service, and of the confidence and
trust that community members have in these officers. Further, other areas to
be considered for recognition and reward should include showing initiative,
creating innovative solutions, and planning for the community.
It must be noted, too, that different groups in the community have dif-
ferent agendas and priorities, and as such the approach of the police must
be flexible and adaptable. Different community groups will have different
viewpoints of the police, diverse relations with them, and varying notions of
the police’s priorities and objectives. It may also be damaging to the police-
community relationship if police lack basic understanding of the commun-
ity’s problems, goals, and desires. This is exacerbated in communities that
experience high rates of crime, poverty, frustration and social exclusion, as
they often perceive the police as an occupying and out-of-touch force, which
does not have the community’s best interests at heart. Further, in such com-
munities, the absence of pro-active and constructive police-community rela-
tionships, and lack of consultation with community leaders before operations
are carried out by the police, can lead to a further breakdown in the relation-
ship, and impede community building efforts as the police may be viewed as
indifferent to the specific issues of the community.
This supports the view that the efforts and work of the police need
to shift from the traditional approach to a more community-centric one: to
move beyond the ‘serve and protect’ mode to one that is proactive and inter-
active at all levels in the communities in which they serve. This new and
flexible approach requires a re-training of police officers to ensure that they
engage with all stakeholders and members of the communities they serve.
Goldstein posits that measures of success for COP include the reduced fear
of crime among citizens, increased trust on the part of the public, and the
58
willingness of the public to cooperate with the police to solve crime and com-
munity problems.13 This shift involves an expansion in role from enforcement
to problem identification and problem-solving, which requires adjustments
in the training curriculum, and new methods to empower police personnel to
fulfil their widened areas of responsibility in communities.
This new approach to policing and to police-community relations
requires a retooling of the police service, infusing new philosophies, skills,
methods and techniques, and understanding of the issues and concerns of the
community, while not reducing the roles of the police, but rather increasing
its involvement with the community on multiple levels. Jackson argues that
the new information technology revolution has brought with it the need to
simultaneously strengthen police-community relations and use the technol-
ogy available to add new forms of training which must accompany techno-
logical advancement.14 It must be acknowledged that a comprehensive train-
ing approach is critical in order to ensure the development and sustainability
of a strong police-community relationship: training must be structured so
that it promotes the mission of COP and is the catalyst for institutionalizing
the shift to this new form of policing. In order to reduce the fundamental
constraints to trust between communities and police, continuous and targeted
training of police officers is critical in order for them to effectively participate
in a structured relationship. This training will ensure an organized roadmap
and the development of efficient and responsive tools to enhance police-com-
munity relations.
The need for investment in continuous police training and cap-
acity-building has also been observed by the World Bank, which indicates
that training is a major mechanism to ensure consistency in the services it
provides.15 The World Bank also posits that formalized training is a major
aspect of repositioning police officers to move from “a purely crime attack
policing model to one emphasizing community-oriented and problem-ori-
13 Herman Goldstein, Problem-oriented Policing, (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1990).
14 Brian A. Jackson, Strengthening Trust Between the Police and The Public in an Era of Increasing
Transparency, Testimony presented before the House Republican Policy Committee Law Enforcement
Task Force on October 6, 2015, (RAND Corporation).
15 Heike P. Gramckow, Jack Greene, Ineke Marshall and Lisa Barão, Addressing the Enforcement
Gap to Counter Crime: Investing in Public Safety, the Rule of Law, and Local Development in Poor
Neighbourhoods: Options for World Bank Engagement with Police, (Washington D.C., World Bank,
2015).
59
ented policing”.16 In order to assist the police in this new approach, it essen-
tial to equip them with the tools that will empower them with crime-fighting
strategies that do not necessarily lead to increased arrests or incarceration,
but utilize approaches that involve the participation of the community mem-
bers. Police-community relationships are built on trust, and this requires high
levels of interaction between the two parties; to achieve this, formal and in-
formal programmes need to be developed to foster the dialogue needed to
build confidence and trust between them.
In relation to police-community relations, Sutton and Baxter advance
that mechanisms to improve the capacity and performance of the criminal
justice system must be established, and they advocate improved capabilities
“and training on community relations”.17 The World Bank study also indi-
cates that robust police-community relations and COP derived from creative
training programmes, can ‘strengthen public trust in the police, while at the
same time, help to stabilize neighbourhoods, increase neighbourhood bonds,
and strengthen social cohesion and civic integration’.18
The World Bank study also implies that non-engagement or limited
police-community relations, especially in those communities prone to crime,
violence and other forms of deviant behaviour, threaten all other development
investments. Indeed, it is advanced that changes have to be made to redress
the relationship between the police and the public, and the measures include
“to open police organizations to civic input, transparency and accountabil-
ity, ensure adherence to the rule of law, restructure the internal workings of
police organizations to facilitate a new external focus, broaden the role and
function of the police, particularly in community settings, and create assess-
ment systems that include community support dimensions”.19
Analysts have presented the view that enhanced police-community
relations must emerge from interventions which seek to “engage the com-
munity and the police in a public safety co-production relationship”20. The
literature highlights the fact that there is no path to building safe communities
that does not involve the police in a direct manner. This approach also advo-
16 Ibid.
17 Heather Sutton and Sasha Baxter, Understanding and Combatting Crime in Guyana, (Washington
D.C., Inter-American Development Bank, 2017).
18 Gramckow, Greene, Marshall and Barão.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
60
cates the view that the police should not be the community’s only response to
crime: although they need the police to be a part of the process, communities
have a part to play in eradiating crime and discouraging criminal and anti-so-
cial behaviours.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) specifies
that “police engagement involves many different actors representing differ-
ent layers of modern day democracies, including government representative,
parliament, judiciary, civil society actor and independent oversight bodies
such as national human rights institutions as well as the general public and
citizens”.21 Their study indicates that these various actors do not constitute
a single entity sharing the same needs and do not necessarily share the same
perspectives on the role and function of the police. In fact, the report suggests
that “in most countries the public is a conglomerate of ethnic and religious
groups, and within these groups there are specific sub-groups such as the
media, women, the elderly and children, who may have specific concerns.
Also, groups representing different socio-economic strata tend to have dif-
ferent opinions of police priorities”.22 This implies that police forces must
be geared for interaction with varying ‘publics’ and it means, therefore, that
training to effectively cope with their different demands is critical to strong
police-community relations.
Trinidad and Tobago
Trinidad and Tobago, like most other countries across the globe, rec-
ognizes the need for increased police-community relations as a means of re-
ducing crime and increasing citizen safety and security. This is highlighted
by the fact that traditional policing methods may be less than effective in
addressing the needs of communities. This has been recognized since the
1960s when Arnstein suggested that contemporary policing in Trinidad and
Tobago may be approaching the ladder of citizen participation, characterized
by increased community collaboration with the police on social and security
issues that affect them.23
21 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and
Integrity, ( New York, United Nations, 2011).
22 Ibid.
23 Sherry R. Arnstein, ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation’, Journal of the American Planning Association,
35: 4 (1969): 216 – 224.
61
As a consequence of this recognition, the Hearts and Minds pro-
gramme was established to increase interaction between the police and the
communities they serve, and “stems from a worldwide shift towards a more
horizontal model of governance and toward a more organized, diverse and
empowered civil society with the capacity to assist in the determination of
a wide range of issues which affect them”.24 This initiative was deemed ne-
cessary as the colonial model of policing was ineffective and served largely
to alienate communities.25 Deosaran and Harriott have suggested that due to
these deficiencies, there were several attempts to reform the operations of the
TTPS.26
Police-community relations now involve dialogue between parties in
an attempt to increase understanding, confidence and trust, with the ultimate
aim of enhancing public safety and national security. While some commen-
tators have censured this as ‘soft’ policing, it does not negate the fact that
when the community and police work together there is a higher tendency for
initiatives to be successful as they have community ownership and ‘buy-in’.
In the case of Trinidad and Tobago it has been argued that “effective
citizen involvement not only promotes the direct participation of individuals
in policy processes, it also encourages the development of strong associational
networks with active, democratic memberships. These serve as intermediary
sites of deliberation and as vehicles for ownership, that is, collective action
that link citizens to policy processes”.27
To further promote police-community relations, the Inter-Agency Task
Force (IATF) was established as a specialized unit within the TTPS, mandat-
ed to increase interaction and communication with communities. The agency
was established in 2004 and has since then intensified its engagement with
communities. This approach adopted by the TTPS was dubbed the ‘Hearts
and Minds’ programme. As part of its mandate, Hearts and Minds has dedi-
24 Wendell C. Wallace, ‘The Social Impact of The Hearts and Minds Programme As A Component Of
Hot Spot Policing On Communities In Laventille, Trinidad And Tobago’, Journal of the Department of
Behavioural Sciences, 45: 3 (2014).
25 Stephen Mastrofski and Cynthia Lum, ‘Meeting the Challenges of Police Governance in Trinidad and
Tobago’, Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 2: 4 (2008): 481 – 496.
26 Ramesh Deosaran, Community Policing, Organizational Transformation and Benchmarking
Initiatives, Paper presented at 2nd Caribbean Conference on Crime and Criminal Justice, February 14-
17, 2001, UWI, Mona Campus, Jamaica. / Anthony Harriott, ‘Policing Styles in the Commonwealth
Caribbean: The Jamaican Case’, Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, 3:1/2 (1998):
60 – 82.
27 Wallace.
62
cated significant time and resources to engaging community members, and
exposes them to different initiatives to foster a sense and spirit of collabora-
tion and cooperation, consistent with its motto; ‘Changing Hearts and Minds
to form better communities’.
With the aim of greater effectiveness and increased communication
with communities, in 2008 the IATF further intensified its focus on com-
munity relations and changed its focus of policing from a reactive to a more
pro-active approach and began pursuing the Hearts and Minds programme
with new vigour.28
Since then, Hearts and Minds has worked with Project R.E.A.S.O.N.
(Resolve Enmity – Articulate Solutions – Organise Neighbourhoods) to
successfully continue to build trust in communities in East Port of Spain.
This partnership between Project R.E.A.S.O.N. and Hearts and Minds has
increased the levels of communication and trust between the police and
the community. While there is still overall distrust and scepticism concern-
ing the Citizens Security Programme which was generally ineffective in re-
ducing crime in the East Port of Spain area until the insertion of Project
R.E.A.S.O.N., community-police relations have been increasing in these
communities. The continued development of the Hearts and Minds initiative
has led to sustained interaction with some communities in Trinidad and To-
bago and can be viewed as another approach which may be adapted in other
troubled, challenged or disorganized communities.
Internationally, there are on-going debates with respect to how police
are engaging with the communities they serve, and this leads to a focus on the
training police officers receive to cope with the demands of public safety and
security issues. Indeed, enhanced police-community relations imply some
fundamental strategic changes which can only be implemented as a result of
training programmes which address the current operational philosophy and
provide the tools for active collaboration and problem-solving in collabora-
tion with the communities in which the police operate.
Changes in communities demand that the role of police officers be ex-
tended to areas including: conflict management and transformation; crisis
intervention; problem-solving skills; police engagement with youth; ethics
and professionalism in policing; police-community relations; effective com-
28 Ibid.
63
munication techniques in enhancing police-community relations; policing
multi-cultural environments; creative engagements with depressed commun-
ities; and gender issues in community-police relations. Training for the TTPS
must also include practical components since it is generally agreed that adults
acquire new knowledge, understanding, skill, values and attitudes most ef-
fectively when they are presented in the context of application to real life
situations.
Community-Oriented Policing and Problem-solving (COPPS) is quick-
ly becoming the philosophy and daily practice of progressive police agencies
around the world, it has been argued that COPPS lies at the heart of con-
temporary policing. In simple terms, COPPS’ problem-solving approach is
to identify and eradicate the roots of crime rather than to attack its branches,
which will ultimately grow back. It seeks to provide police officers with a
more comprehensive understanding of issues through in-depth analysis and
guides them in the development of tailored and collaborative response strat-
egies.
Indisputably, incident-driven policing has proven ineffective in mod-
ern society, and as rapid response is only reactive to immediate incidences,
this does not necessarily constitute effective policing. It has been argued that
many of the greatest discoveries in crime fighting occur when time-honoured
strategies fail. As such, contemporary police tactics and initiatives rely on
forward-thinking strategies that have input from the community. In an effort
to minimize mistakes, reduce isolation of the communities, and reduce mis-
trust and scepticism, the police have to provide a higher quality of services to
community members and aid in increased perceptions of safety and security
in these communities.
Undoubtedly, problem-solving is a valid and important policing func-
tion in the community. It is assumed that as police become familiar with
community members, their concerns, crime problems and available resour-
ces, they will develop the capacity to identify the root causes of community
problems and apply appropriate and effective solutions. As evidenced by the
Hearts and Minds programme along with Project R.E.A.S.O.N. in Trinidad
and Tobago, the development of trusting police-community relationships
is achievable, where the community will expect to take active roles in help-
ing the police to prioritize their concerns, identify the causes of crime prob-
64
lems, and develop sustainable solutions. The effectiveness of this project will
mean, in the long-run, that community members and organizations will trust
the police, facilitating cooperation in providing information necessary for
crime-solving in the community.
The value of this approach is that, as opposed to traditional forms
of policing, it focuses on the community rather than on the state, in effect
minimizing institutional and political obstacles by directly empowering com-
munity members to address problems before they lead to crime, reorienting
policing from repression to prevention, and improving criminal justice by
strengthening evidence collection and fostering non-abusive witness cooper-
ation.29
Within the state, conditions such as corruption, inefficiency, and “bias
in the distribution of resources in favour of higher levels of the system” can
also impede real transformation. In this regard, the literature suggests that the
levels of autonomy, centralization, and political division within the state, po-
lice, and community and societal organizations together determine the level
and nature of their support30.
While it is recognized that Caribbean states are among the most vio-
lent globally, that the regional homicide rate is at least three times the global
average,31 and that citizens here register a heightened sense of insecurity,32
effective COP can be a solution to this problem.
Historically, in the late 1990s and into the new millennium, Latin
American and Caribbean governments, multilateral and bilateral donors, and
non-governmental organisations and private groups, realizing the problems
associated with crime, initiated a number of innovative citizen security initia-
tives under the banner of citizen security programmes.33
These programmes encompassed a host of activities with the intent
of preventing and reducing violence in depressed communities, promoting
public security for community members, and creating access to justice, while
29 Enrique Desmond Arias and Mark Ungar, ‘Community Policing and Policy Implementation: A Four
City Study of Police Reform in Brazil and Honduras’, Comparative Politics, 41: 4 (2009): 409 – 430.
30 Ibid.
31 United Nations Development Programme, Regional Human Development Report 2013/2014: Citizen
Security with a Human Face, (accessed on 1 June 2018), available from http://hdr.undp.org/sites/
default/files/citizen_security_with_a_human_face_-executivesummary.pdf
32 AmericasBarometer Survey, 2012, Latin American Public Opinion Project, (Vanderbilt University, 2012).
33 Robert Muggah and Katherine Aguirre, Mapping Citizen Security Interventions in Latin America:
Reviewing the Evidence, NOREF Report (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2013).
65
strengthening social cohesion and reinforcing the mutual rights and obliga-
tions of states and citizens. These intentions recognize that successful long-
term public security and safety initiatives are the ones that potentially guar-
antee the rights of individuals in the communities. Further, there is data to
support the claim that investments in the prevention of violence are more
cost-effective than evidently unproductive expenditures on public or private
security.
Active citizenship is a concept that is central to this approach. This
concept advances that while the police have a part to play in the safety and
security of community members; citizens play a key role in their own secur-
ity. While citizens hold the police accountable for their failures to adequately
deliver on their obligation to provide security for the community, they must
also accept that part of the responsibility lies with them, both as individuals
and as a group. It is generally acknowledged that the success of many public
safety policies is predicated on positive engagement between the police and
the population, and it must be recognised that this also dictates that the com-
munity be actively involved in the process.34
Basically, this perspective is ‘rights-focused’. It is generally framed and
supported by the state but guided and shaped through active public engage-
ment between the police and the communities in which they serve. In addition
to specific policing strategies and tactics developed by the TTPS, citizen sec-
urity policies have also incorporated a host of activities that seek to improve
the security and safety of community members, prevent violent incidents and
retaliations, and reduce the incidences of crime, as has been successfully done
by Project R.E.A.S.O.N., notwithstanding institutional obstacles created by
the management of the state’s Citizen Security Programme.
In relation to the specific officers involved in COP, there is strong anec-
dotal evidence suggesting that community policing has positive effects on of-
ficers through increased job satisfaction and improved interaction with, and
confidence in, the community.35 Further, it has been generally accepted that
COP increases perceptions of safety in the community while decreasing per-
ceptions of endangerment from criminal activity. Skogan contends that there
34 Mark Ungar and Enrique Desmond Arias, ‘Community Policing in Latin America: Innovations and
Challenges’, Policing and Society, 22: 1 (2012): 1 – 13.
35 Andy Mayhill, Community engagement in Policing: Lessons from the literature, available from http://
police.homeoffice.govt.uk/news-and-publications/community-policing/community_engagement_lit_
review.pdf ?view=Binary
66
is evidence to suggest that increasing community-police interactions are asso-
ciated with lower levels in fear of crime.36
It has been argued that COP has been impeded by social distancing
reinforced by technological developments in recent times, similar to the
times when the expanding role of automobiles effectively ended the era of
the friendly foot patrol officer. Further, computers have played a significant
part in the decrease in police contact with the community, and statistics have
become in many instances more important in policy formulation than actual
evidence from interaction with community members. It is also generally ac-
cepted that regular patrolling has produced less than expected benefits to poli-
cing, and has done little to inspire confidence in the community in relation to
crime-reduction or crime-solving. Both of these issues have led to a perceived
isolation of the police from the community, which has negative effects on
police-community relations, giving community members the impression that
the police still hold on to the ideology that they know best and that input from
the community is not essential in police work.
This approach is consistent with Goldstein’s, who developed and ad-
vanced the concept of ‘Problem-Oriented Policing’ (POP), which encouraged
the police to rethink their functions.37 Goldstein postulates that real police
work is informed by problem-resolution strategies and advocates that the po-
lice identify and address the root causes of problems in communities. In es-
sence, POP requires a reorientation away from a reactive, incident-oriented
approach to one that seeks to actively address the problems that continually
drain police resources by needing immediate attention. This is similar to the
concept of reassurance-policing utilized in the United Kingdom which is con-
cerned with increased community involvement in reaction to issues related to
crime.38 Reassurance-policing has been defined by Dalgleish and Myhill as:
“the intended outcome of actions taken by the police and other agencies to
improve perceived police effectiveness (mainly confidence in, and satisfaction
36 Wesley G. Skogan, ‘Advocate - The Promise of Community Policing’ in Police Innovation: Contrasting
Perspectives, eds. David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2006).
37 Herman Goldstein, ‘On Further Developing Problem-Oriented Policing: the Most Critical Need, the
Major Impediments, and a Proposal’, in Crime Prevention Studies, 15: 1 (2003): 13 – 47.
38 Ursula Smartt, Criminal Justice, (London, Sage, 2006)
67
with, the police) and to increase feelings and perceptions of safety (including
reducing fear of crime)”.39
This paper posits that COP consists of two basic components; namely
community partnerships, and problem-solving at the community level. This
approach seeks not to presuppose that the police service no longer has the
authority to execute its mandate of preserving law and order or that it should
pander to the whims of the community, but rather acknowledges that by util-
izing the expertise and knowledge residing in the community, it has a greater
chance of achieving its ultimate goals.
Assuredly, effective community partnership and problem-solving be-
tween the police and the community requires that the TTPS work on the de-
velopment of new skills and responsibilities for their officers and the adoption
of a flexible style of management. As opposed to the old dispensation, the
new community-policing focuses on the values and discernment of individ-
ual well-trained police officers in communities. This requires a shift from the
old model to one that places the community police at the centre of relation-
ships and demands a more humanistic approach. Communication, contact,
decision-making, and responsibility are now critical tools for the police of-
ficers who work with and in the communities. While it must be acknow-
ledged that this is a departure from traditional policing, the philosophies of
inclusion, service, camaraderie, dedication and results-orientation must be
engendered in the ethos of these officers. Every officer must be cognizant of
the needs, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and possible solutions present
in the community.
While community-policing has been seen as popular reform, some
commentators have highlighted the fact that scant attention has been paid
to the challenges of its implementation.40 Authors like Patterson believe that
implementation is challenged by the incremental nature in which COP is
often introduced as a matter of policy, and this usually results in increased
resources allocated within short timeframes with little time for planning to
direct real implementation.41 Further, authors like Mastrofski et al. suggest
39 David Dalgleish and Andy Myhill, ‘Reassuring the public: a review of international policing
interventions’, Home Office Research Study 284, (London, Home Office, 2004).
40 Stephen D. Mastrofski, James J. Willis, and Tammy Rinehart Kochel, ‘The Challenges of Implementing
Community Policing in the United States’ in Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 1:1 (2007): 223
– 234.
41 Jeffrey Patterson, ‘Community Policing: Learning the Lessons of History’, (2007) Lectric Law Library,
68
that the traditional barriers to organisational change – scarce resources and
a resistant police culture – persist and continue to jeopardize the successful
implementation of any COP initiative that may emerge.42
Another barrier identified in the literature is that of the inability to
endure a sustained commitment from the community and other external
agencies in the support of COP. Sustainability is a critical issue here, as the
communities in question cannot risk ill-considered attempts at progress, and
the community members’ willingness to commit to the process is predicated
on predictability.43 Residents, unlike the agencies involved, commit their time,
energy and goodwill to the process, and in order to participate they must take
time away from work, family, friends, daily chores, and personal interests.
Conclusion
Lessons from Project R.E.A.S.O.N.
Community-Oriented Policing works, and the larger the number of
community members, organizations, leaders and businesses convinced to
communicate and work alongside the state and municipal agencies with the
common aim of reducing crime and violence and increasing the feeling of
safety and security in the communities, the more effective it will be.
Association of the TTPS with Hearts and Minds has been invaluable
to the success of the programme, but it should be noted that most of the work
done by the TTPS through Hearts and Minds did not include traditional poli-
cing. It involved activities such as providing transport for community mem-
bers to go to the beach or to peace marches where they would have the oppor-
tunity to interact with other vulnerable youth without fear and intimidation.
Heart and Minds also provided logistics for football matches and sports days
where these at-risk youth, would be able to interact in a friendly and safe
environment. These activities were also attended by parent and elders and
served to increase the credibility of Project R.E.A.S.O.N., allowing the initia-
tive to operate safely in the communities with increased levels of interaction,
trust and confidence, which had been lacking with their past experiences with
the Citizen Security Programme.
available from http://www.lectlaw.com/files/cjs07.htm

42 Mastrofski, Willis, and Kochel, ‘The Challenges of Implementing Community Policing in the United
States’.
43 (Skogan and Hartnett, Community Policing Chicago Style.
69
It is based on the philosophies espoused by COP, that Project
R.E.A.S.O.N., along with the TTPS’s Hearts and Minds, was extremely suc-
cessful; reducing shootings and increasing levels of safety and security in
the east Port of Spain area, where previous initiatives had gained only lim-
ited success. At some level, community members seem to know that dealing
whether with regular TTPS officers or with Hearts and Minds, the police
service is the only agency with the legal authority to use force in their com-
munities, and when force is not used or is clearly used only as a last option,
it increases levels of community confidence and trust in the police. As such,
it is suggested that COP initiatives have a greater responsibility to engage the
community in the process of socialization to encourage voluntary compli-
ance to the law, and in time, to seek to become almost indistinguishable from
community members in their activities and approaches.
The literature has stressed that the institutional capacity for developing
effective COP policies and structures need the institutional and intellectual
support of the police service and the national agencies charged with imple-
menting this change. In instances when these support mechanisms are lack-
ing due to any number of reasons such as under-qualified politically appoint-
ed management; lack of training available for the agencies; lack of funding
at critical times in the programme; and mismanagement of funds by the lead
agency, the success of COP is at risk.
Further, success indicators to measure the progress of programmes
aimed at increasing trust between law enforcement and the community need
to be developed as a matter of priority. Similarly, continuous efforts need
to be made in the areas of joint development of violence-prevention plans,
and increased and expanded communication between the police and different
sectors of the community inclusive of leaders, organizations, businesses, re-
ligious representatives, sports and women’s groups and youth groups. There
needs to be additional support, financial and human, for the development
of strategies aimed at the promotion and maintenance of active commun-
ity-police interface. This can be done on the institutional side by providing
the requisite training to police officers so that they can acquire the new know-
ledge, understanding, skills and attitudes to effectively enhance their capacity
to engage the communities which they serve; and by adjusting the rewards
70
and recognition systems to allow community work to be included in the
evaluation of their performance.
These issues are important, as weak COP is possibly one of the greatest
obstacles to safety and security in many communities, and leads to deterior-
ation in the already tenuous relationship between the police and community
members ins many communities.44 In essence, the relationships between the
police and community members will ultimately determine the levels of effect-
iveness of police strategies to reduce crime and increase safety and security
in these communities.
Strategies utilized in Trinidad and Tobago have suggested that COP can
be a critical tool in integrating the TTPS into communities, increasing levels
of trust, confidence and mutual respect between the police service and com-
munity members, and significantly contributing to stability in these commun-
ities by reducing incidences of crime while increasing perceptions of public
safety and security. With the achievements of Project R.E.A.S.O.N. and the
TTPS Hearts and Minds officers, there is documented success in these ap-
proaches and it may be wise to intensify them in the East Port of Spain area,
as levels of crime have increased since the exit of Project R.E.A.S.O.N. from
the area in 2017.45
44 Etienne Marais and Janine Rauch, ‘Policing South Africa: Reform and prospects’, Paper presented at
IDASA conference, Policing in South Africa in the 1990s, Van der Bijl Park, October, 1992
45 Edward R. Maguire, Megan T. Oakley, Nicholas Corsaro, Evaluating Cure Violence in Trinidad and
Tobago, (IDB, 2018).
71
The Challenge of Talking and Practicing
Citizen Security
Ashaki L. Dore
Introduction
T he citizen security approach emerged as a direct reaction to na-

tional security paradigms that had dominated during the dictator-
ship era. In the years preceding the transition to democracy, most countries
1
in Latin America advanced national security paradigms which emphasized

the role of the military and policing institutions; with considerable assistance
from the United States. Investment was geared towards promoting security
in the region, ensuring that crime did not spill across its own borders, main-
taining a foothold in the security establishments of regional partners. How-
ever, the citizen or democratic security paradigm which stressed the central
role of civic culture and coexistence began to gain traction, in which the
objective was the promotion of state accountability and citizen participation
in security governance.2
The concept of security has evolved… Today democratic States are espous-
ing law enforcement models that encourage citizen participation and as a
result, security not only refers to fighting crime but also refers to creating an
environment that is conducive to peaceful coexistence.3
1 Robbert Muggah, “How Citizen Security is changing in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Sin Miedos.
Blogs.iadb.org (Accessed July 17 2015).
2 Robert Muggah and Ilona Szabo de Carvahlo, “Changes in the Neighbourhood: Reviewing Citizen
Security Cooperation in Latin America,” (Igarape Institute 2014), 12.
3 Organization of American States, “Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights,” (Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights 2009), 7.
Most Latin American societies have experienced an increase in crime
rates and perception of insecurity, which has seen the issue of security be-
come a central component; not only in government agenda but also in the
broader public agenda.4 The concept of citizen security emerged as an al-
ternative term to public security which originally referred to physical security,
it increasingly became synonymous with activities that focused on addressing
the interrelated issues involved in addressing citizen safety and increasing a
sense of citizenship.5 The concept purposefully broadens how governments
and societies conceptualize security from a narrow preoccupation with trans-
national priorities and threats to account for more parochial ones.6 Interest-
ingly, an examination of the citizen security literature reveals that most of
the discourse on citizen security derives from the reports and plans of multi-
lateral and bilateral agencies rather than the State, and as such it has been
conceptualized as an appropriation and ‘technicalization’ of the concept of
citizen security; due in part to its wholesale adoption by international organi-
sations such as the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
or United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)7 which have become
heavily invested in the citizen security agenda.8
A link has been established between security and development where
security is conceptualized as a developmental issue and as a result, efforts are
concerned with strengthening the legitimacy of institutions and their ability
to reduce violence more effectively.9 However, the relationship between the
citizen and the state seldom resembles the kinds of deliberative democratic
models of citizen participation promoted by donors and NGOs which has
been described as a “pedagogical exercise” which attempts to “civilise the
unruly masses where the citizen is someone who can be disciplined into what
is best for society.10 Ultimately, citizen security advances two fundamental
4 Smulovitz, “Citizen Participation and Public Security in Argentina, Brazil and Chile: Lessons from an
Initial Experience,” 206.
5 Inter- American Development Bank, “Citizen Security Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence,”
Institutions for Development. (Discussion Paper no 1 IDB DP 232 2012), 7.
6 Robbert Muggah, “How Citizen Security is changing in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Sin Miedos.
Blogs.iadb.org (Accessed July 17 2015).
7 Dennis Rodgers, “New perspectives on Citizen Security in Latin America,” 12.
8 Robert Muggah and Katherine Aguirre, “Mapping Citizen Security Interventions in Latin America:
Reviewing the Evidence,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (2013): 1.
9 Rodgers, “New perspectives on Citizen Security in Latin America,” 12.
10 Robins, Cornwall and Von Lieres “Rethinking ‘Citizenship’ in the Postcolony,” 1084.
73
ideas: responsible state and active citizenship. The first pillar is associated
with the concept of human rights. During the 1970s and 1990s, the debate on
human rights and the systemic abuse of those rights became prominent at the
recognition that the State has the ultimate responsibility to protect its citizens,
thus a more concerted focus on the citizen rather than the state emerged. This
period also coincides with the broadening of the security agenda at the end
of the Cold War. The second pillar of citizen security, speaks to a general ac-
ceptance that the citizen plays a fundamental role in ensuring its own security
and that the success of public safety policy depends on positive engagement
between the police and the population.11
Defining Citizen Security
Citizen security has been defined as a social situation in which all per-
sons are free to enjoy their fundamental rights and public institutions have a
responsibility to guarantee the exercise of those rights, which is in keeping
with the view that security has always been seen as one of the main functions
of the State. However, citizen security is promoted only among the poor or
marginal sectors, perhaps as a way of making up for the lack of resources
resulting from a notable absence of state presence in the disadvantaged urban
and rural areas; particularly military, police and penal institutions.12 Citizen
security has also been defined in terms of an expansion of cooperation fo-
cused on security and development which has led to an increasingly diverse
array of sub regional organizations which prioritize public security; this is as
a result of a need to take on a wider treatment of security that recognizes the
international and local factors that shape safety. Moreover, political elites and
civil society are constantly seeking ways to stem the accelerating rates of vio-
lence across the region. In addition, countries in the Latin American region
are displaying independence and even opposition to traditional powerhouses
like the United States, and as a result have become emboldened to solve their
own problems in their own ways. Thus, there is a conscious effort to re-con-
ceptualize citizen security by calling for alternatives to the status quo and
citizen security policies which are tailored to their own domestic realities. 13
11 Muggah and Szabo de Carvahlo, “Changes in the Neighbourhood: Reviewing Citizen Security
Cooperation in Latin America,”6.
12 Muggah and Szabo de Carvahlo. “Changes in the Neighbourhood: Reviewing Citizen Security
Cooperation in Latin America,” 6.
13 Muggah and Carvalho “Changes in the Neighbourhood: Reviewing Citizen Security Cooperation in
Latin America,”2.
74
Citizen Security entails the delivery of effective public safety measures
in the context of broader democratic norms which privilege the interests and
protection of the collective citizenry over the interest of the state.14 As a re-
sult, it incorporates a complex set of interventions at the point where secur-
ity and development intersect, and is intended to mitigate transnational and
local threats to personal safety. It is premised on changing the relationship
between the State and the society by making institutions more interactive and
accountable to the citizenry. It is a concept that is grounded on the principles
of democracy; which include participation and accountability. In functional
terms, it consists of a wide array of primary and secondary violence pre-
vention, community and proximity policing, rehabilitation of at-risk youth
and innovative justice mechanisms.15 As a set of discourses and practices, it
emphasizes preventive approaches, risk reduction, and enhancing protective
factors in crime-affected areas. It promotes community-oriented models, cit-
izen participation, and data-driven interventions.16
It focuses on a concern for quality of life and human dignity in terms
of freedom, access to the market and social opportunities and living with-
out fear of suffering a violent attack. It encompasses a movement from trad-
itional security debates towards a concern with threats to public, social and
political order posed by the rising crime, violence and public fear of crime;
which have been characterized as the three key dimensions of citizen insecur-
ity.17 Citizens are expected to be actively involved in problem-solving in their
communities and make greater demands of accountability on state agencies
thereby preventing the perpetuation of a voiceless and rights-less security in
which the state is not accountable to its citizens and where citizens are forced
to trade-off their rights in exchange for the provision of security by the state.18
The promotion of an active citizenry signals the importance of participation
14 Muggah and Aguirre, “Mapping Citizen Security interventions in Latin America: Reviewing the
Evidence,” 1.
15 Dos Ramos and Robert Muggah, “Making Brazilian Cities Safer: A Citizen Security Dialogues Special
Edition,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1) no. 17 (2014): 1. DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/ 10.5334/sta.dn.
16 Dos Ramos and Muggah, “Making Brazilian Cities Safer: A Citizen Security Dialogues Special
Edition,” 1.
17 Inter- American Development Bank, “Citizen Security Conceptual Framework and Empirical
Evidence,” Institutions for Development, Discussion Paper no. 1 (2012) 7. IDB DP 232.
18 United Nations Development Programme, Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: Human
Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security, 8.
75
as it relates to the engagement of publics and its impact on the promotion of
dialogue, debate and accountability in public actions.
It also highlights citizen responsibility as an important element of cit-
izen security “in the end, citizens in collaboration with the police, must take
ownership of their own security”, it is a way of building a sense of commit-
ment between the police and the population; which is crucial in delivering
information, and sustaining effective policing policy. As a result, it advocates
citizens working together with the police to ensure security in their own set-
ting; be it at home, the community or the workplace.19 However, the emphasis
on active citizenship and collective action in citizen security does not refer
to support for vigilantism, which has become very common in some parts
of Latin America such as Peru where the practice of citizen patrol was once
characterized as vigilantism or “policing on the cheap”.20 Consequently, it
recognizes that the action of citizens cannot replace the efforts of the state in
tackling citizen insecurity, nor replacing the resources that should be devoted
to this task.21
Across the Caribbean and Latin American region, the adoption of
regional and national plans and policies emphasizing citizen security are
inspiring states to re-examine their short term strategies of repression and
instead introduce preventive strategies aimed at empowering citizens to pro-
mote resilience, thereby restoring and repairing state-citizen relations. Con-
sequently, there are a set of actions in the field of citizen security which
highlight the growing recognition of the need to carry out multidimensional
programmes combining both control and preventive measures in a number
of programmes.22
Over the past decade, legislative frameworks and new police and justice
units have been introduced by a number of countries such as Argentina, Bra-
zil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela.
A number of hard measures have been employed to control gangs, reduce
illicit arms transfer, counter human trafficking, and money laundering, and
cybercrime. However, on the other hand, softer measures such as police and
20 Crawford, The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to community and Partnership, 50.
21 Arriagada and Godoy, “Prevention or Repression? The False Dilemma of Citizen Security,” 124.
76
judicial reform, community and proximity policing, youth and gender vio-
lence reduction and preventative measures have also been advanced.23 Thus,
it highlights a superimposition of contradictory policies given that on the one
hand, the policies are geared towards correcting deficiencies in the State’s
punitive system; which has been countered by a policy to increase the repres-
sive capacities of the security forces which has been further contradicted by
police reform efforts.24 Consequently, contradictory meanings of security and
citizenship coexist under the umbrella of citizen security. 25
Furthermore, regional organizations across the region have created
commissions and have issued citizen security declarations which are evi-
denced by the Declaration of San Salvador on Citizen Security of 2011:
That the individual is at the center of Citizen Security, understood as a
component of public security and should therefore be a partner in the def-
inition and implementation of ways to build more secure and sustainable
communities and societies that conform to their aspirations for democracy
and for socioeconomic and cultural development… That public security
policy requires the participation and cooperation of multiple actors, such
as individuals, government at all levels, civil society, communities, the mass
media, the private sector, and academia in order to reinforce promotion of
a culture of peace and non-violence and respond effectively and in a partici-
patory manner to the needs of society as a whole.26
Citizen Security Actors

There are a number of actors involved in promoting citizen security;
where it has been described as a “crowded market” which includes national
and local governments, multilateral and bilateral agencies, civil society enti-
ties, foundations and private actors. However, the most important funding
agencies in the region include multilateral agencies and financial institutions
such as the IADB, World Bank and EU and bilateral agencies such as U.S. aid
agencies, the US State Department and the U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID). Notably, while multilateral agencies dominate the field
25 Guillermina Seri, Seguridad: Crime, Police Power, and Democracy in Argentina (New York:
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012), 76.
26 Organization of American States General Assembly, Declaration of San Salvador on Citizen Security
in the Americas, Forty-First Regular Session, 2011, 4. (Accessed: July 1 2015) http://www.oas.org/
consejo/GENERAL%20ASSEMBLY/CPREPGT41AG.asp#Doc.
77
of citizen security and the various initiatives; their mandates do not allow for
their engagement in defence and intelligence related matters. 27 Multilateral
and bilateral agencies have been financing citizen security initiatives through
grants and loans since the 1990s. There have been more that 1300 interven-
tions across the region since the late 1990s, and up to 2013, multinational
and bilateral co-operation and development agencies together represented 71
percent of total spending. However, “in spite of the apparent appetite for
investing in citizen security, there is a surprising lack of clarity about what it
is and what it is not.” 28
These organizations have been defined as being the members of a “well
intentioned cartel”29 who maintain a near monopoly relative to the power-
less poor; which explains why global foreign aid bureaucracy has been un-
restrained for some time now. Policymakers seeking aid dollars must be able
to carry out a number of actions which can range anywhere from ambitions
of establishing a democracy to achieving peace on earth. Consequently, under
these conditions, governments seeking aid money, work exclusively with the
particular agency’s bureaucracy and agree to coordinate their efforts. How-
ever, “the international aid bureaucracy will never work properly under the
conditions that make it operate like a cartel.” As a result, states have even less
opportunities to find alternative aid suppliers and the entry of new suppliers
is difficult since large aid agencies must be sponsored either by an individual
government such as the case of U.S. Agency for international Development
or by an international agreement as in the case of multilateral agencies such
as the world bank. Consequently, most NGOs are too small to make much
of a difference.
The participation of multiple actors also highlights the existence of
multiple conceptions of citizen security; as each agency prioritizes different
issues such as in the case of the OAS which prioritises the strengthening of
norms and policies, evidence generation and sharing and technical assist-
ance; or in the case of IADB which in addition to institutional strength-
27 Muggah and Aguirre, “Mapping citizen security interventions in Latin America: Reviewing the
Evidence,” 10.
Cooperation in Latin America,” 7-8.
29 According to William Easterly, the cartel is constituted by the U.N. International Conference on
Financing for Development, World Bank, U.S. Agency for International Development, International
Monetary Fund, United Nations, and the Inter-American Development Bank.
78
ening, prioritises social and situational prevention, preventive policing and
rehabilitation. Moreover, in the case of the UNDP, the organization prioritis-
es policy framework, capacity support, and best practices, while in the case
of the World Bank, priority is placed on secondary and primary risk preven-
tion, capacity development, and knowledge brokering. While, the foreign aid
community maintains that better coordination is required, the difficulties of
organizing parties with diverse objectives and interests render such coordina-
tion forever illusive. As a result, each agency often duplicates services; given
the absence of a central planner to tell each agency what to do, and the lack
of market pressure from customers to reward or discipline agencies for their
success or lack thereof. 30
Consequently, this has led to overlapping and competing conceptions
of citizen security, given that the different institutions mobilize different vi-
sions and methodologies. As a result, they tend to interpret citizen security
differently in spite of some agreements on broad concepts, which generates
contradictions, given that there is no consensus on how it is defined which
leads to an uneven application of the concept “The fact is that different en-
tities; whether federal ministries, police and judicial departments, mayors’
offices, international financial institutions, development agencies or citizen
action groups, understand citizen security differently.”31 Consequently, it is
against this backdrop that the study examines the various approaches to cit-
izen security; taking two different State perspectives into account. While this
is not a comparative study, similarities and differences will be highlighted
when they present themselves. Moreover, in many cases, security was and
continues to be perceived as the sole responsibility of the State, however, the
study highlights the important role of the citizen, and observes the extent to
which the various conceptions of citizen security fail to recognize the role
of citizens which instead frame citizens as mere beneficiaries of the various
services.32 Consequently, this results in tremendous emphasis being placed
on producing outputs in the form of projects and loans which can be easily
30 William Easterly, “The Cartel of Good Intentions,” Foreign Policy, no. 131 (2002): 40.
31 Muggah and Aguirre, “Mapping citizen security interventions in Latin Amer
ica: Reviewing the Evidence,” 4.
79
observed by a certain audience comprised of politicians and the public of rich
nations.33
Citizen Security Initiatives
The Trinidad and Tobago approach to citizen security is program ori-
ented given that the government embarked upon the creation of a citizen
security programme with the objective to contribute to the reduction in crime
and violence in twenty-two (22) “high needs” pilot communities in Trinidad
and Tobago through the financing of preventative interventions addressing
the most proximal and modifiable risk factors. However, it was noted that
in spite of the number of initiatives which have been implemented in these
communities, and the central role of the participants, the initiatives appear
to be more focused on keeping the participant’s entertained or occupied for
a specified period of time rather than forging in the citizens a culture of par-
ticipation and a sense of civic responsibility where the citizen is part of the
solution to problems they encounter every day.34
Another finding, following an examination of the primary data col-
lected, reveals that how citizen security is understood is influenced by donor
agencies. This supports the assertion regarding the dominance of foreign aid
organizations that provide funding and coincides with what has been termed
the tecnicalization of citizen security. This is evident in the definition which
governs the Citizen Security Programme in Trinidad and Tobago; which is
said to be an adaptation of the Citizen Security Programmes that are being
funded by the IADB and as a result seeks to achieve the objectives outlined
by the donor agency:
The truth is that we as an organization… we kind of adopted the definition
the IADB shared with us, which is essentially, that it is a programme that
focuses on the youth, crime and violence, but we recognized that within
the umbrella of national security and within the umbrella of human secur-
ity; having to do with personal and community security as well, [there is a
focus] on the individual, within that process.35
This implies that while the organization adopted the definition provid-
ed by the IADB as a donor institution, the citizen security programme as an
33 William Easterly, “The Cartel of Good Intentions,” 44.

34 Interview with a Special Technical Advisor to the Minister of National Security of Trinidad and
Tobago, interview by author, Ministry of National Security of Trinidad and Tobago, June 18 2014.
35 Interview with a Staff member of the Citizen Security Programme of Trinidad and Tobago 1, interview
by author, Citizen Security Programme Trinidad Headquarters, June 2015.
80
organization recognized that citizen security involved more than just a focus
on the youth, crime and violence, but it involved looking at the individual as
a whole. As a result, when asked to explain citizen security, respondents de-
fined citizen security in the context of the citizen’s perception of safety, trust
and freedom in the community “feeling safe, trust in police officers and the
ability to traverse public spaces.”36 However, the respondents criticised the
current approach as it pertains to how citizen security vis-à-vis national sec-
urity are distinguished and how this in turn affects their ability to achieve cit-
izen security. Consequently, they argue that the current approach to security
utilizes “a muscle memory approach” which is guided by “armchair policies”
in which there is no differentiation between the National Security and Cit-
izen Security approaches. This is critical because citizen security emphasizes
prevention rather that enforcement, whereas national security is based on en-
forcement.37 However, while citizen security is not an exclusive enforcement
issue,38 it relies heavily on policing and surveillance and as a result, it is said
to be a regressive approach which fails to empower the community.39 Con-
sequently, respondents highlight the difficulties they experience as a result of
the duality and complexity of citizen security.
A possible explanation for the existing multiple meanings may be as
a result of the different realities each state faces and as such; the approach
advocated by each institution may take these different realities into account.
Furthermore, this is evidenced by the fact that while there is no consensus
among the respondents across different cases. Trinidad and Tobago and El
Salvador, there is a consensus amongst the respondents within each case
study as it relates to how citizen security is defined. As a result, citizen secur-
ity relies on a network of stakeholders and interventions40 at different levels
37 Interview with a Special Technical Advisor to the Minister of National Security of Trinidad and
Tobago, interview by author, Ministry of National Security of Trinidad and Tobago, June 18 2014.
by author, Citizen Security Programme Tobago Headquarters, June 2015.
40 Major international donor agencies such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the
World Bank have started supporting city-, state- and federal-level partners using the lexicon of Citizen
Security. A recent assessment by the Igarapé Institute counted no less than 1,350 Citizen Security programs
and projects across Latin America and the Caribbean since 1998.
81
and their commitment to understanding the problem.41 It involves the popu-
lation more fully into the problem of security and the search for effective
solutions, by promoting the creation of networks of relations and organizing
the community itself to improve the prevention and reporting of offences and
even achieve some degree of control over them. It promotes closer relations
between the community and the police and State institutions, since greater
confidence of the population in those institutions is considered essential for
improving the perception of security and heightening the legitimacy of the
political, police and judicial system in the fight against crime.42 Consequently,
it emphasizes various dimensions and levels; especially the intangible and
subjective nature of citizen security. Consequently, in the case of Trinidad
and Tobago while there is a general perception of a lack of state commit-
ment which has resulted in frustration, low levels of civic involvement and
social cohesion and in spite of the level of investment in these communities
in the form of infrastructural development, government housing, pensioner
quarters and recreational spaces which focus on unification exercises to allow
rival communities to engage in organized recreation.43
While national crime debate has focused on punishment, prisons and
criminal justice, a new complex has been asserted at the local level that ad-
dresses insecurity distinctly, which is comprised of a network of loosely co-
ordinated practices and discourses which have as their objective, the cultiva-
tion of community involvement, partnership arrangements and interagency
working agreements designed to foster crime prevention and enhance com-
munity safety. This arrangement straddles the lines between the public and
the private spheres and goes beyond the institutional boundaries of the state,
which goes against a long history which has privileged the security specialist
through traditional practices, policing, prosecution and punishment of indi-
viduals and which now embrace a development that brings different actors
into the field.44
41 Lucia Dammert, “Citizen Security and Social Cohesion in Latin America,” Collection of Studies into
Local and Regional Public Policies on Social Cohesion, URB-AL III Programme. https://www.1diba.
cat/uliep/pdf/52257.pdf.
42 Arriagada and Godoy, “Prevention or Repression? The False Dilemma of Citizen Security,” 123.
43 Citizen Security Programme. http:// www.csp.gov.tt//
44 David Garland, “Review Work: The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and
Partnership by Adam Crawford. The British Journal of Criminology 30, no. 3 (1998), 316-519. http://
www.jstor.org/stable/23638704
82
The Trinidad and Tobago’s State-led CSP initiative commenced in
2008 with the objective of using preventative interventions to reduce violence
and increasing the perception of safety in the 22 pilot high-risk commun-
ities. It involved collaboration between the government, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), and community based organizations funded by a loan
from the Inter-American Development Bank for the implementation of the
initiative. Its execution was based on the financing of three components: 1.
the reduction of crime and violence through community-led collaborative in-
itiatives, 2. capacity building within the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service
(TTPS), focusing on their policing for people initiative and 3. capacity build-
ing within the Ministry of National Security in the area of evidence-based
policy building.45
Crime and violence reduction entailed collaborative initiatives such
as the establishment of Community Action Councils (CAC) as an initiative
geared towards improving community participation and providing guidance
to the CSP on community issues. CACs were a broad group comprised of
representatives from many sectors of the community; including traditional,
non-traditional and emerging leaders. CACs also included local NGOs, activ-
ists, representatives from churches, schools, businesses, trade unions, civic or-
ganizations, children, parents, elders, persons with disabilities. Furthermore,
it favoured the participation of local residents who worked in that commun-
ity rather than that of professionals given that it was believed that community
leaders who participated in the CACs played a significant role in the trans-
mission of values and norms, associated with peaceful coexistence.46 More-
over, it promoted social inclusion and coexistence, by promoting recreational
activities, sports, educational support in a number of areas. The programme
had at its core the desire to integrate the community. Consequently, the case
of Trinidad and Tobago placed great emphasis on changing the perception of
insecurity and improving trust at the community level. As a result, the (CSP)
programme sought to increase community involvement in citizen security
and to improve cooperation between communities and the government by
financing activities aimed at improving the public’s perception of the police,
45 Ibid.
46 Citizen Security Programme. http:// www.csp.gov.tt//
83
increasing positive police-public interaction, and strengthening the Ministry
of National Security as an institution.47
In the case of El Salvador, according to the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme, the actions taken to prevent insecurity were centred around
six (6) areas; violence against women, the youth, urban spaces, risk factors,
civic virtue and citizen participation. In keeping with this multidimension-
al approach to addressing insecurity, among the principles highlighted in El
Salvador’s National Strategy for Violence Prevention, are three fundamental
principles which underscore the importance that is placed on organized cit-
izen participation in the citizen security framework. Firstly, it entails involv-
ing those sectors of the population which have traditionally been excluded
and greatly affected. Secondly, the promotion of a culture of peace in terms
of the values, attitudes, traditions, behaviours and lifestyles that are based on
three key elements: denouncing violence, promoting dialogue and addressing
the root causes of conflict. Thirdly, participation and shared responsibility,
which entails the participation of the widest sector of the population; which
would require the creation of spaces, forms and concrete mechanisms to
encourage involvement with a sense of shared responsibility.48 Consequent-
ly, fostering a culture of civic virtue is highlighted as an important element
which is evidenced by the activities which were implemented to modify the
behaviours and attitudes by adopting shared norms and values; particularly
as it relates to citizen participation in the formulation, implementation and
evaluation phases of the projects.
Consequently, in the case of El Salvador, rather than a citizen security
programme, the government created the National Council. The council is
composed of representatives of the business sector, churches, the municipal
sector, people with ability and experience in the field of security, media and
the attorney general with the support of the United Nations development
Programme (UNDP). Its main objective is to promote and facilitate dialogue
and to help boost consensus necessary to develop an adequate public security
strategy for citizen security and coexistence. It is a mechanism of assistance
for the coordination and promotion of collective action in order to solve the
47 The International Security Sector Advisory Team, “Trinidad and Tobago Country Profile,” The
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource…/Trinidad-
and-Tobago-Country-ProfileTrinidad and Tobago Country Profile (accessed 11 April, 2016).
48 Gobierno de El Salvador, Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública, Estrategia Nacional de Prevención
de la Violencia Gabinete de Gestión para la Prevención de la Violencia (2013), 28-29.
84
problems of insecurity, violence and criminality in the country “it intends to
unleash energies, activate wills”.49
The citizen security approach of Trinidad and Tobago entailed the
creation of a programme, while El Salvador created a National Council for
Citizen Security and Coexistence. The similarity lies in that they targeted
populations that were and continue to be characterized by high levels of so-
cial exclusion, the convergence of risk factors, restricted access to public ser-
vices, and cultural trends that reproduce violence. As a result, in the case of
El Salvador, while it is meant to affect the entire state, it initially targeted 50
municipalities which were identified by the council as a result of the concen-
tration of violence and insecurity. Consequently, two main themes stood out
in El Salvador’s citizen security approach; firstly, facilitating dialogue and
secondly, gaining citizen consensus. In the case of dialogue, the literature
states that consent is generated by dialogue and is premised on the belief that
people should want to have a say in issues that affect their lives. Moreover,
it provides a means to iron out differences. In the context of consensus, ac-
cording to securitization theory, a policy course of action is the result of an
intersubjective process which seeks to gain the consent of a community.50
This is also explained using the lenses of citizenship and its link to the theory
of consent, which highlights a link between citizenship and securitization,
in that the citizen shares in the making of laws. Consequently, these findings
highlight the significant role played by engaging the citizen to participate in
citizen security initiatives.
Community Policing
Community policing programs emerged as a popular practice through-
out Latin America and the Caribbean region which brought the protectors
and the protected closer in an attempt to decrease crime and improve citizen’s
perceptions of personal safety. It is considered the most promising and popu-
lar approach to crime reduction which contrasts other forms of policing on
the basis that it focuses on the causes of crime by empowering citizens and
building police-community partnerships. Consequently, community policing
is characterized as a philosophy and a management strategy that promotes
49 Organismo Promotor de Exportaciones e Inversiones de El Salvador (PROESA), Gobierno presenta
al Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana y Convivencia www.proesa.gob.sv/novedades/noticias/
item/738-gobierno-presenta-al-consejo-nacional-de-seguridad-ciudadana-y-convicencia (accessed
September 29, 2014).
50 Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” 179.
85
a new partnership between people and the police for community safety. It is
based on the premise that the community must work together to identify, pri-
oritize and solve contemporary problems such as crime, drugs, fear of crime
social and physical disorder with the goal of improving the overall quality
of life in the area. Moreover, it is an approach that is based on the idea that
society is the first line of defence against crime and insecurity, and as a result,
helps citizens to assume that role by introducing them to programs that focus
on anti-crime activities and cooperation with the police given the view that
programs that prioritize engaging society are likely to lead to positive chan-
ges. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, this has manifested in the moderniz-
ation of the police service through training the police to deal with young of-
fenders, policing practices to engage the community as a whole and improve
public confidence in the law enforcement apparatus.51
However, these initiatives are hindered by contradictory policies and
as a result the chances of bringing about the necessary conditions needed to
successfully implement community policing are unsuccessful. This view has
been echoed in the citizen security literature where research indicates that in
spite of the widespread implementation of community policing around the
world and in spite of the increases in community policing practices, there
have been no improvements in citizen-police trust, no increases in cooper-
ation with the police, no reduction crime. Moreover, its positive impact is
only evident in rich countries and there is no systematic evidence about its
ability to generate trust and reduce crime in the global south. This is further
compounded by a lack of buy-in from police leadership, the frequent rota-
tion of officers and a lack of resources to respond effectively.52 Consequently,
in spite of the measures that are designed to increase citizen participation;
based on the premise that security can only be achieved through cooperation,
measures are also undertaken to frame security as the sole responsibility of
the police. This results in the reinforcement of the adversarial relationship
and lack of trust between the police and citizenry. Consequently, contrary to
being an alternative approach for achieving citizen security, community poli-
51 Raymond Kirton et al., (2010). The political culture of democracy in Trinidad & Tobago: Democracy
in action. Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine. 55
52 Blair G., et al.,”Community Policing does not build Citizen Trust in Police or Crime in the Global
South’” Science 374, no. 6571 (2021). doi: 10.1126/science.abd3446
86
cing is seen as a mere tool for improving the increasingly poor reputation of
the police by attempting to change the public image of the police.
Challenges in Talking and Practicing Citizen Security
While citizen security became increasingly fashionable and continues
to gain greater attention; given that virtually every government in the region
has established national, state and city plans, policies and programs advo-
cating citizen security goals, citizen security is not a universally accepted
concept “Indeed, citizen security has rapidly come to mean all things to all
people.” This is as a result of its relative newness as an approach, in which
there have been some challenges in defining its parameters. Although Cit-
izen Security as an approach, emphasizes prevention of crime and violence
over intervention and involves institutional and social action to preserve the
civil liberties of people, the approach to citizen security conflates a host of
activities which range from counter-narcotics, community-oriented policing
to strategies which promote more citizen engagement in proximity policing
and urban renewal as a result of the different meanings held by the multiple
actors in different contexts.53 For example, the UNDP, defines citizen security
as a “comprehensive and multifaceted strategy for improving the quality of
life of a population”, while the IADB proposes the implementation of citizen
security to “consolidate and integrate multi-agential knowledge and action”,
and the view that all security is “glocal” (global and local) and that “security
is a public good that is coproduced through the participation of civil society
and the responsibilization of state actors.”54
As a result, there have been attempts to re-focus the discussion towards
a more meaningful and critical reading of the concept of citizen security.
Consequently, while the inclusion of a wide array of actors is lauded as a
result of the cooperation opportunities it presents, by the same token the pres-
ence of multiple actors is also criticized given that it is argued that the notion
of citizen security has become technicalized to the extent that it is defined
and discussed in “extremely vague and vacuous terms” in which proposals
for its regional implementation include what has been termed “meaningless
platitudes.”55
53 Muggah and Szabo de Carvahlo. “Changes in the Neighbourhood: Reviewing Citizen Security
54 Ibid., 12.
55 Rodgers, “New perspectives on citizen Security in Latin America,” (2003), 12.
87
Consequently, the literature highlights four major short-comings to cit-
izen security debates: firstly, most studies of citizen security policy formu-
lation focus on the issue without examining the political relationships that
determine reform design and operation. Secondly, citizen security literature
tends to portray security as a technical problem to be solved, rather than as
a part of governance to be developed and managed.56 This point could be
linked to the broader debate regarding the provision of foreign aid in which it
is argued that the bureaucratic cartels supply too many goods for which there
is little demand and too few goods for which there is much demand.57 Con-
sequently, greater efforts could be geared towards funding what states deem
necessary to manage their respective citizen insecurity reality, rather than
adopting a coordinated approach to solving crime. Thirdly, policy change de-
pends on effective relations among different state and civic actors, with social
opposition to policies often undermining state-supported programs. How-
ever, scholars and policy-makers tend to oversimplify state-society relations
in reform efforts; which involve top-down forms of implementation. Final-
ly, most studies examine individual country cases and neglect cross-cultural
comparison. Previous studies have focused on what accounts for the success
of some reforms, and the findings reveal that the success of reform policy;
measured by crime rate, police abuse and citizen participation, is determined
by political commitment, police cooperation and societal incorporation.58
The end of the Cold War signalled the expansion of the security agenda
to accommodate new threats.59 However, part of the power of securitization
lies in stressing the insulation of security issues from the process of public
debate, thus operating in a realm of secrecy in spite of the discursive char-
acteristic which exists between the securitizing actor and the audience. It is
based on an understanding of National Security which is characterized by ex-
clusion and dominance, and which is governed by “professionals of unease”
where the current security processes generate restrictive ideas and this helps
to shape the way actors approach security issues.60 Thus, this understanding,
56 Enrique Desmond Arias and Mark Ungar, “Community policing and Latin America’s Citizen Security
Crisis,” Comparative Politics 41, no. 4 (July 2009): 409.
57 William Easterly, “The Cartel of Good Intentions,” 48.
58 Arias and Ungar, “Community policing and Latin America’s Citizen Security Crisis,” 409.
59 Ivelaw Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege, (Pennsylvania State
University Press 1997), 4-5.
60 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,”
88
argues that National Security matters require secrecy and that it cannot be a
part of public debate. Consequently, while security is a public good with the
potential to foster solidarity, prolonged periods of violence and insecurity
tend to erode and destroy the individuals’ will and capacity to act.61
Moreover, the literature argues that the practice of security has the ten-
dency of engendering the idea that security should be defined by elites and
their concerns then hold priority over those individuals who do not tradition-
ally belong to that audience; that is, those who are socially positioned outside
of the recruiting networks. Consequently, there is a normative dilemma in
which the power of the elite remains unchanged regardless of the rhetoric
of discursive exchange. Consequently, elite influence remains a prominent
debate in the security literature; in terms of who defines the problem, and as
a result the policy option which emerges is often that of the elite imaginary.
62
This is as a result of the view that the actor who controls the frame draws
on other assets as well.63 Security is articulated from a specific place, in an in-
stitutional voice, by elites and as a result, risk, insecurity, anxiety and unease
are the factors which define the nature of the political community, the way
states govern and the way citizens govern themselves. Consequently, State
power continues to be exercised in defense of narrow elite interests and as a
result, these are the tendencies which proponents of citizen security seek to
reverse.64
It is argued that the discursive and institutional strength of the security
tradition is such that any attempt to expand the referent object of security re-
sults in enlarging the jurisdiction of national security practices. Thus, in spite
of the addition of other dynamics to the conceptual field of security the state
remains at the centre. Moreover, National Security policy entails a process of
reinforcing political order rather than initiating social change. There is also
the tendency to prefer policies which are tangible and offer immediate reward
in which the elected elite are given authority by the public’s mandate.65 It is
International Relations Quarterly 47 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 2003): 527.
61 Ian Loader and Neil Walker, Civilizing Security (Cambridge University Press 2007), 7.
62 Catherine Charrett, “Taking on the Normative Dilemma of Writing Securitization: A Critical
Approach,” 13-14.
63 Paul Roe, “Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision to
invade Iraq,” 622.
65 Pearl-Alice Marsh, “Grassroots Statecraft and Citizens’ Challenges to U.S. National Policy,” in On
89
this unease which affirms the state’s role as provider of protection and secur-
ity. This signals a double movement to security, given that it simultaneously
produces and contains insecurity.66 Thus, paradoxically, it undermines the
very liberties it is meant to protect.67 This is further compounded by the firm
support for the retention of the original state-centric focus of security and a
concern about the loss of analytic usefulness as a result of the broadening of
security.68
While Citizen Security and National Security are at times considered
distinct realms, the current security threats at the national and individual lev-
els continuously merge and are linked in complex ways and as a result, the
dichotomy cannot be sustained.69 Moreover, security as a concept is able to
promote subjectivities of fear, given that while securitizations seek to provide
protection from danger, freedom from doubt and relief from anxiety, the acts
also encourage fear and feeds off the nervousness in the population.70 This
is problematic given that fearful individuals “do not make good democratic
citizens” but rather, they become inactive, unconcerned, unsympathetic, and
even become enthusiastic for the erosion of basic freedoms as they seek ref-
uge in private security solutions while supporting iron fisted policies against
crime and terror.71 This leads to the adoption of individualistic attitudes as a
result of their retreat from public life.
Conclusion
Citizen security is geared towards building relationships between the
state’s security apparatus and society, engendering peaceful coexistence, and
emphasizing crime prevention and control. Notwithstanding, an examina-
tion of the citizen security literature highlighted a challenge as it relates to
how the concept is defined and by whom; whether it entailed the expansion
of cooperation and the national and regional levels, capacity building at the
institutional level, the delivery of safety measures and interventions that pri-
Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, (New York: Columbia University Press 1995), 137.
66 Peter Nyers, Securitizations of Citizenship (New York: Routledge, 2009), 3.
67 Loader and Walker, Civilizing Security, 7.
68 Seri, “National vs. “Citizen” Security: Two Doctrines, the Same Casualties?” 12.
69 Tulchin and Ruthenburg, “Security and the Rule of Law in a Democratic Society,” in Toward a Society
under Law: Citizens ad their Police in Latin America, 320.
70 Catherine Charrett, “Taking on the Normative Dilemma of writing securitization: A Critical
Approach,” International Catalan Institute for Peace, Working Paper no.7 (2009), 15.
71 Ian Loader and Neil Walker, Civilizing Security (Cambridge University Press 2007), 7.
90
oritize the citizen, the improvement of the quality of life, the inclusion of
citizens in problem solving in their communities, the development of respon-
sible citizenship, accountability and commitment between state and society
or all of the above.
This study looked at the citizen security approaches of Trinidad and
Tobago and El Salvador to highlight how the varying definitions and practi-
ces of citizen security posed challenges to its implementation and successful
outcomes. Consequently, greater efforts should be made to foster dialogue be-
tween State actors and donor agencies which have become heavily invested in
the field of citizen security to ensure that they address what each state deems
necessary to manage their unique citizen insecurity reality, rather than adopt-
ing a coordinated approach to solving crime and violence. Effective solutions
to the challenges to citizen (in) security in the region may entail states clearly
articulating how they understand citizen security, increasing citizen security
cooperation at the national level between state and civic actors, and involv-
ing citizens in addressing the problem of security in order to engender trust
at the community level in light of the view that the State’s overly intrusive
or extremely neglectful nature may have contributed to the erosion of civic
responsibility at the community level.
91
Section III
The Socio-economic dimension –

resilience building and recovery
from the health pandemic and
natural disasters; social security
maintenance; challenges and
contemporary perspectives related
to domestic violence, youth and
gender issues
Human Trafficking, Transnational
Organized Crime and Undocumented
Migration: The impact and Implications for
Security in Trinidad and Tobago
Wendell C. Wallace
Introduction
D espite regional and global efforts to combat and eradicate trans-

national organized crime (TOC), human trafficking (or traffick-
ing in persons (TIP)), and undocumented migration, the triple scourge is
rampant in many parts of the world and the Caribbean is not exempted from
the deleterious impacts of the aforementioned ‘triple scourge’. Instructively,
a host of individual research have been conducted on transnational organized
crime, human trafficking, and undocumented (illegal) migration in the Carib-
bean, including Trinidad and Tobago1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7.
1 Marlon Anatol and Quinnelle-Marie Kangalee, “Crime in Trinidad and Tobago: the possible impacts of
increased crime due to migration from Venezuela,” Migration and Development 10, no. 2 (2021): 260-72.
2 Mauricia John, “A critical approach to understanding human trafficking in the Caribbean,” The
International Journal of Human Rights 24, no. 10 (2020): 1666-80. DOI: 10.1080/13642987.2020.1762577
3 Kevin Peters and Bennie Berkeley, “A phenomenological study of the experience of tribal stigma among
documented male Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad,” Migration and Development 10, no. 2 (2021): 273-
93. DOI: 10.1080/21632324.2020.1809282
4 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment
(Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012).
5 Wendell C. Wallace, “Organized crime groups as threats to democratic governance structures and
national security in Trinidad and Tobago,” International Police Executive Symposium, Geneva Centre for
the Control of Armed Forces and Coginta – For Police Reforms and Community Safety 50, (2015): 1-28.
6 Wendell C. Wallace, “An exploratory study on the impact of organized crime on societies in Small
Island Developing States: Evidence from five (5) Caribbean countries,” Perspectivas, (2017): 1-31.
7 Wendell C. Wallace and Natasha K. Mortley, “(De)constructing our migrant neighbours: regional and
international impacts of the Venezuelan crisis in the Caribbean,” Migration and Development 10, no. 2
Without a doubt, the studies highlighted above are important as they
have facilitated knowledge creation and transfer, expanded the available
scholarship on these issues and have enhanced our understanding of trans-
national organized crime, human trafficking, and illegal migration in the
Caribbean. The author of this chapter argues that while there is a plethora
of research conducted on transnational organized crime, human trafficking,
and illegal migration in the region as evinced above, the research has been
conducted on the topical issues in a disjunctive, and not in a conjunctive
manner. The end result of the disjunctive research on transnational organized
crime, human trafficking, and illegal migration is that even though they are
inexplicably intertwined, there is a dearth of scholarly literature examining
the three issues in a conjunctive manner and this is a gap in the research from
a Caribbean perspective.
A renown Caribbean scholar argues8 that when transnational organ-
ized crime, human trafficking, and undocumented migration converge in the
same time and space (as is quite common), they create an ‘unholy trium-
virate’ (to be discussed later in this chapter) with deleterious impacts and
implications in many jurisdictions, inclusive of Trinidad and Tobago. The
deleterious impacts of transnational organized crime, human trafficking, and
undocumented migration include, but are not limited to, prostitution, slavery,
exploitation, violence, drug use, economic under-development, weakened
governance and negative social outcomes in host countries9, 10. Despite the
deleterious impacts of transnational organized crime, human trafficking, and
undocumented migration, most of the available research in the Caribbean
have focused on this ‘triple scourge’ from individualized perspectives, rather
than as a collective threat. As a result of the individualized focus on trans-
national organized crime, human trafficking, and undocumented migration,
this chapter focuses on the collective impact of the ‘triple scourge’ to the sec-
urity of persons residing in Trinidad and Tobago.
(2021): 173-80. DOI: 10.1080/21632324.2020.1809276

8 Wendell C. Wallace, “Land-based Policing: Implications for Safety and Security in Trinidad and
Tobago,” Presentation at the 21st Annual SALISES Conference, Mt. Irvine Bay Hotel and Resort, Mt.
Irvine, Tobago, 10-13 December, 2020.
9 Livia Pomodoro, “Trafficking and sexual exploitation of women and children,” in Combating
Transnational Crime. Concepts, Activities and Responses, eds. Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis (London:
Frank Cass, 2001), 237-50.
10 Raimo Väyrynen, Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking, and Organized Crime. No. 2003/72
(WIDER Discussion Papers/World Institute for Development Economics (UNU WIDER), 2003).
94
The author of this chapter submits that the lack of research on trans-
national organized crime, human trafficking, and undocumented migration
as a collective is an egregious omission as well as a lacuna in the academic
literature in the Caribbean. With this in mind, the author of this chapter aims
to close this gap in the literature from a Caribbean context by conducting
a dedicated study of the threats that transnational organized crime, human
trafficking, and undocumented migration, pose to the security of residents in
Trinidad and Tobago, a Small Island Developing State (SIDS) in the Carib-
bean. Instructively, this chapter is premised on the notion that scholars have
always sought to document, examine and interrogate the Caribbean experi-
ence11, 12 and this includes the author of this chapter.
Without a doubt, it is important to understand and enhance our under-
standings of the impacts and implications that transnational organized crime,
human trafficking, and undocumented migration hold for the security of
residents of Trinidad and Tobago as security is the most primordial of hu-
man concerns13 as well as a key contributor to perceptions of Quality of Life
for citizens in any country. Further, from time immemorial, humankind has
always demonstrated the need for security in its various iterations and Burke14
submits that security is one of the most fundamental human needs, an irrefut-
able guarantee of safety and well-being, economic assurance and possibility,
sociability and order of life lived freely without fear or hardship. Security is
also a fundamental human value15, a central human concern16 and the most
primeval of all human concerns. Importantly, the first obligation of the state
is to ensure citizen security, and when it fails to do so, people take matters
into their own hands17. Based on the elucidation of the UNODC18, this chap-
11 Kenneth Hall and Denis Benn, eds., Contending with Destiny: The Caribbean in the 21st Century”
(Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2000).
12 Aaron Kamugisha, “Introduction: The Responsibility of Caribbean Intellectuals,” in Caribbean
Political Thought, ed. Aaron Kamugisha (Jamaica: Ian Randle, 2013), xvii-xxii.
13 Tyrone Ferguson, “Shiprider revisited: Security and transnational crime in the Caribbean,” Caribbean
Dialogue 8, no. 4 (2003): 29-48.
14 A. Burke, “Aporias of security,” Alternatives 27, (2002): 1-27.
15 Ken Booth, “Global Security,” in The Handbook of Global Security Policy, eds. Mary Kaldor and
Iavor Rangelov (Chichester, West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2014), 11-30.
16 Milton H. Saier Jr. and J. T. Trevors, “Global security in the 21st century,” Water, Air, and Soil Pollution
205, (Supplement 1), (2010): 45-46.
17 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat
Assessment, (Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012).
18 Ibid.
95
ter is important as it is a dedicated study on how criminal activities (trans-
national organized crime, human trafficking, and undocumented migration)
can impact the security of residents in a nation state.
Conceptual Analysis of Terms
In academia, many terms pose definitional conundrums as there are
no clear definitions for these terms due to the availability of a plethora of
academic definitions for these terms. Without delving into an in-depth elu-
cidation of these terms, it is important to note that in the context of this
book chapter, Human Trafficking, Transnational Organized Crime and un-
documented (illegal) migration, for example, are terms that convey differ-
ent meanings to different people. The end result is that evaluations of trans-
at the regional and international level are notoriously difficult as the concepts
themselves are susceptible to various analyses.
In spite of the difficulty in conceptualizing the terms mentioned above,
it is important to conduct a conceptual analysis of the terms. This conceptual
analysis is not concerned with testing of hypotheses or constructing theories,
but is concerned with clarifying the meaning of the concepts. Some scholars,
researchers and academics may liken this conceptual analysis to ‘linguistic
semantics’ or ‘pure logomachy’19, however, without a clear understanding of
the concepts, there is the propensity for the readership of this chapter to mis-
understand each other20. Added to this, it is important to define the concepts
so as to indicate their essence and fundamental limits.
The foregoing discussion on the need for clarity of the terms, trans-
national organized crime, human trafficking, and undocumented migration is
in line with the view that “the elucidation of the language of political science
is by no means an idle exercise in semantics, but in many instances a most
effective way to solve substantive problems of research”21. The definition and
operationalization of the key terms in this chapter are also aligned to the view
of 18th Century writer and philosopher Voltaire who stated ‘If you want to
converse with me, first define your terms’. Additionally, keeping in mind that
that words can be interpreted differently depending on the jurisdiction, it was
19 David A. Baldwin, “The concept of security,” Review of International Studies 23, no. 1 (1997): 5-26.
20 Ibid.
21 Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds. Handbook of Political Science, I: Political Science:
Scope and Theory (Reading: MA, 1975), 284.
96
deemed important to operationalize the key terms in this chapter so that they
are neither mysterious nor esoteric to the readership.
In their work on transnational organised crime,22 the US government
submits that transnational organized crime refers to those self-perpetuating
associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of
obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or
in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of
corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through
a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational
commerce or communication mechanisms.
Human trafficking, otherwise known as Trafficking in Persons (TIP),
is defined as ‘the recruitment, transport, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a
person by such means as threat or use of force or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud or deception for the purpose of exploitation’23. Essentially,
human trafficking is comprised of recruitment or abduction, transportation
and ultimately exploitation of victims, whether male or female, old or young,
and irrespective of ethnicity, religion or other demographic characteristics.
Based on the definition of human trafficking outlined above, victims of hu-
man trafficking do not consent to the transaction. Further, it is argued that the
human trafficker acquires long-term gains from the extended exploitation of
trafficked individuals. Instructively, human trafficking is a crime against the
trafficked individuals and a fundamental abuse of their human rights as the
trafficker treats the trafficked individuals as commodities for profit by moving
them from one locale to another within their national borders or abroad for
the main purpose of exploitation broadly defined (sexual, financial etc.).
The term immigrant is used to describe foreign nationals who enter
a country for the purpose of permanent resettlement24. Instructively, when
referring to immigrants, three broad categories of immigrants are generally
identified, namely: (1) voluntary migrants – those migrants who join relatives
22 The White House, “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging
Threats to National Security,” (Washington DC: The White House, 2011).
23 United Nations, “United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
especially women and children, supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organisational
Crime. The Palermo Protocol Article 3,” (United Nations, 2000).
24 Omar Martinez, Elwin Wu, Theo Sandfort, Brian Dodge, Alex Carballo-Dieguez, Rogeiro Pinto,
Scott D. Rhodes, Eva Moya, and Silvia Chavez-Baray, “Evaluating the Impact of Immigration Policies
on Health Status Among Undocumented Immigrants: A Systematic Review,” Journal of Immigrant and
Minority Health 17, no. 3 (2015): 947-70. doi:10.1007/s10903-013-9968-4
97
already settled in the receiving nation or to fill particular jobs for which ex-
pertise may be lacking among nationals; (2) refugees and asylum seekers or
individuals who enter a receiving country to avoid persecution and prosecu-
tion in their home country; and (3) undocumented immigrants who enter the
host country using illegal means25.
Undocumented migration is a global and yet elusive phenomenon26
that generates fierce debates, is placed at the top of the political agenda27 and
receives hostile media attention due to its perceived negative effects and im-
pacts. Additionally,28 Reed (2018) points out that undocumented migration
(also known as irregular migration and illegal migration) includes any migra-
tion that is not regulated or documented by the nation-state, and may include
anyone residing in a nation without legal status or with a tenuous legal status.
On the other hand,29 Oucho (2006) describes undocumented migration
as referring to “immigrants who are not in possession of the required docu-
mentation authorising their stay or residence in the host country or those who
have overstayed their authorised duration of stay and who are determined to
evade law enforcement agencies”, while it is submitted that the term ‘undocu-
mented migrant’ (illegal migrant or clandestine migrant) describe migrants
who clearly do not meet the criteria for legal entry, residence and work30.
As demonstrated above, studies on migration are hampered by definitional
hurdles, obfuscating terminologies, such as, the interchangeable usage of il-
legal, irregular and undocumented migration and a lack of conceptual clarity.
Irrespective of this conceptual conundrum discussed above, the term undocu-
mented migration is the preferred term of this book chapter author and is
used in the context of the postulation by Oucho31.
25 Ibid.
26 Roberto G. Gonzales, Sigona, Nando, Martha C. Franco, and Anna Papoutsi, Undocumented
Migration: Borders, Immigration Enforcement, and Belonging (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2019).
27 Ibid.
28 Holly E. Reed, Forced Migration and Undocumented Migration and Development. United Nations
Expert Group Meeting for The Review and Appraisal of the Programme of Action of the International
Conference On Population and Development and Its Contribution to The Follow-Up and Review of The
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations Secretariat, New York, 1-2 November, 2018).
29 John O. Oucho, Cross-border migration and regional initiatives in managing migration in Southern
Africa, in Migration in South and Southern Africa, eds., Pieter Kok, Derik Gelderblom, John O. Oucho
and Johan van Zyl (Pretoria: HSRC Press, 2006): 56.
30 François Crépeau and Delphine Nakache, “Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada – Reconciling
Security Concerns with Human Rights Protection,” IRPP Choices 12, no. 1 (2006): 1-42.
31 Oucho, ‘Cross-border migration in Southern Africa’.
98
In Trinidad and Tobago, the term undocumented migrant is used to
refer to persons who fall into one of the following categories, namely an in-
dividual who has: (1) legally entered the jurisdiction, but who remained in
the country after their visa/permit expired, (2) experienced a change in their
socioeconomic position and could not renew residence permit, yet remained
in the country, (3) used fraudulent documentation to enter and remain in the
country, (4) received a negative decision on their refugee, asylum, or resi-
dency application, yet remained in the country, or (5) unlawfully entered the
country and this includes individuals who are smuggled and/or trafficked.
The term security is a very wide and elusive concept32 and includes a
host of subfields, including, but not limited to, environmental/ecological sec-
urity, personal security, cyber-security, and national security. Security is also
related to different types of social subjects, namely, individuals, social groups,
organizations, society, and mankind as a whole33. In spite of the different
conceptualizations and notions of security, this chapter focuses on security in
the context of individuals and social groups within a named society, Trinidad
and Tobago, with security being conceptualized as the condition of feeling or
being safe from threats34.
The Research Context
The twin-island Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is often referred
to as the gateway to the Americas and a transshipment centre for the sur-
rounding islands35 as the island sits between the transit routes to North and
South America. Trinidad and Tobago is a small, two-island, Caribbean na-
tion that is densely populated, with a landmass of 5,131 square kilometres.
Trinidad and Tobago is also the southernmost island in the Caribbean and
is located close to the continent of South America, northeast of Venezuela
(about seven miles off the northern coast of Venezuela) and northwest of
Guyana. Trinidad and Tobago became a Republic in 1976 after obtaining
independence from Britain in 1962. The country’s approximate population
is 1.4 million people36. The majority of the population identify with one of
32 Segun Osisanya, National security versus global security. UN Chronicle. Department of Public
Information, 2015.
33 Vihren Bouzov, “On the conception of security: A philosophical approach,” Analele Universitatii din
Oradea, Fascicula Sociologie-Asistenta Sociala-Filozofie IX, (2010): 9-17.
34 Booth, ‘Global Security’.
35 Matsangou, The Caribbean gateway of Trinidad and Tobago.
36 Central Statistical Office – Trinidad and Tobago.
99
two ethnic groups (Africans and East Indians), with less than 1.3 per cent
identifying as of European, Chinese or Indigenous heritage37.
Trinidad is the larger of the two islands and has an area of about
1,850 square miles (4,800 square km). Tobago is the smaller island and has
an area of about 115 square miles (300 square km), lies 20 miles (30 km)
to the northeast of Trinidad. As Trinidad and Tobago is an island state, it is
surrounded by the Caribbean Sea to the North and West and by the Atlantic
Ocean to the East. As a result of being surrounded by the Caribbean Sea
and the Atlantic Ocean, there are many unmanned ports of entry and this
serves to facilitate the illegal entry of undocumented migrants, human traf-
ficking and illegal trafficking in arms and ammunition, wildlife and people
by transnational organized groups. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Ser-
vice (TTPS) has the responsibility for the civil affairs of the island, vis-à-
vis, the maintenance of law and order (internal peace). On the other hand,
the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF) is the military arm of the
state with responsibility for the protection of Trinidad and Tobago from
external threats. When combined, the TTPS and the TTDF are responsible
for the overall security of the island from internal and external threats.
Review of Literature
According to the US government38 there is no single structure under
which transnational organized crime groups operate and that their structures
vary from hierarchies to clans, networks, and cells, and may evolve to other
structures. They also argue39 that crimes just as the structures of transnational
organized crime groups varies, so too are the crimes they commit. Trans-
national organized crime groups conspire with other criminal enterprises
in their criminal activities and possess certain characteristics which may in-
clude, but are not limited to:
• In at least part of their activities they commit violence or other acts
which are likely to intimidate, or make actual or implicit threats to
do so;
37 Ibid.
38 The White House, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging
Threats to National Security (Washington DC: The White House, 2011).
39 Ibid.
100
•
They exploit differences between countries to further their object-
ives, enriching their organization, expanding its power, and/or
avoiding detection/apprehension;
• They attempt to gain influence in government, politics, and com-
merce through corrupt as well
• as legitimate means;
• They have economic gain as their primary goal, not only from pat-
ently illegal activities but also from investment in legitimate busi-
nesses; and
• They attempt to insulate both their leadership and membership
from detection, sanction, and/or prosecution through their organ-
izational structure40.
As it relates to Trinidad and Tobago41, some authors point to the exist-
ence of local organized crime groups on the criminal landscape of the island,
while42 some others that transnational organized crime groups have infiltrated
Trinidad and Tobago and are operating ‘under the radar’ in most instances. In
sum, there is academic evidence as well as conjecture regarding the presence
of transnational organized crime groups in Trinidad and Tobago. According
to Green and Grewcock43, the increased presence of transnational organized
crime groups in human trafficking has moved states to develop new security
strategies to manage this crime. These authors also posit44, the view that these
new governmental strategies, while well-intended, have the effect of increas-
ing the vulnerability of individuals by restricting their legitimate avenues of
applying for asylum.
As it related to undocumented migration, recent research points out
that “the movement of people across country borders in violation of the mi-
gration laws of those countries is not a new phenomenon.”45 Continuing, it
40 Ibid.
41 Dianne A. Williams and Randy Seepersad Retribution vs. Reintegration, in Prisons in the Americas
in the Twenty First Century: Human Dumping Ground eds., Jonathan D. Rosen and Marten W. Brienen
(New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2015): 93-114.
42 Wallace, ‘Organized crime groups as threats to democratic governance structures’.
43 Penny Green and Mike Grewcock, “The War Against Illegal Immigration: State Crime and the
Construction of a European Identity,” Current Issues in Criminal Justice 14, no. 1 (2002): 87-101.
44 Ibid.
45 Florence Masajuwa, Olufemi Abifarin, Jessica E. Imuekemhe, Hauwa C. Abiri, James Uzualu and
Idemudia E. Oaihimire, Illegal Transnational Migration: Implication for Human Rights and Dignity of
Nigerians. Paper presented at the Faculty of Law, Edo University Iyamho 51st Annual Conference of the
Nigerian Association of Law Teachers. Nigerian Law School Headquarters, Bwari, Abuja (1st to 6th July,
101
was also noted that “The causes of illegal migration are many and no coun-
try is exempt from its occurrence within its borders. Both conventional and
unconventional routes are used by migrants to cross international borders in
search of safety and greener pastures.”46 The academic literature also high-
lights that undocumented migrants are frequently perceived as threats, by
governments and by the general public, who perceive that their presence con-
tributes to a lack of, or weakened security47.
Further, there is an existing view that irregular (undocumented) mi-
grant as being outside the circle of legality48. Therefore Crépeau et al (2007),49
submit that the rights of these individuals in host countries have deteriorated
due to the connection made between immigration and criminality and the
notion of negative impacts on security of citizens in host communities.
According to Global Detention Project50, it is estimated that at the end
of 2015, there were 49,900 undocumented international migrants in Trini-
dad and Tobago. It is also reported51 that there were 40,000 undocumented
Venezuelan migrants residing in Trinidad and Tobago in 2019 and that the
country has not instituted an official asylum policy or legislation protecting
migrants and asylum seekers. In light of the inordinate number of undocu-
mented migrants residing in Trinidad and Tobago, in May 2019, the gov-
ernment embarked on a nationwide exercise to register mainly Venezuelan
nationals who are in the country illegally. This registration process began on
31 May and ended on 14 June, 2019.
In Trinidad and Tobago, human trafficking is referred to as trafficking
in persons and is a serious offence which is punishable by law. The offence is
covered by the Trafficking in Persons Act, Chap.12:10 which seeks to prevent
trafficking in persons and the punishment of offenders. Under the Trafficking
in Persons Act, Chap.12:10, trafficking in persons refer to the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by means of the
threat, deception or abduction for the purpose of exploitation. It is also the
2018): 1.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 François Crépeau, Delphine Nakache, and Idil Atak, “International Migration: Security Concerns and
Human Rights Standards,” Transcultural Psychiatry 44, no. 3 (2007): 311-337.
49 Ibid.
50 Global Detention Project, ‘Trinidad and Tobago Immigration Detention Data Profile’.
51 Ibid.
102
giving or receiving of payment or benefits to achieve the consent of child’s
guardian for the purpose of exploitation. According to a study by May52,
human trafficking is one of the most profitable illicit markets as it generates
more than US$150 billion in profits each year. It is also contended that while
most victims are trafficked for labour exploitation, trafficking for sexual ex-
ploitation generates the greatest profits53.
The ‘unholy triumvirate’
It has been argued that human trafficking or trafficking in persons is
in many cases closely connected to transnational organized crime. The legal
framework of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Or-
ganized Crime (UNCTOC) has conceptualized human trafficking as being
driven by organized criminal groups and networks. The chapter refers to the
convergence in time and space of transnational organized crime, human traf-
ficking, and undocumented migration as an ‘unholy triumvirate’ (See Figure
1). In referring to the convergence in time and space of human trafficking,
transnational crime and undocumented migration as an unholy triumvirate,
this chapter is not alone in this regard. Knox and Pierre (2020)54 submit, “Hu-
man trafficking in the CARIFORUM region seldom exists by itself. However,
it forms part of a wider nexus of Transnational Crimes which involves the
following: drug trafficking, gun smuggling, money laundering, the smuggling
of migrants…”
Quite notably, in some Caribbean jurisdictions only one aspect of the
‘unholy triumvirate’ is present, while in other jurisdictions, for example,
Trinidad and Tobago, all three aspects are present with deleterious impacts
as well as implications for the jurisdictions involved. Instructively, not only
are there impacts and implications for the jurisdictions involved in trans-
as non-state actors, innocent individuals (trafficked individuals), residents in
host, transit and point of origin countries as well as state infrastructures are
impinged upon by this ‘unholy triumvirate’. Further, the literature on trans-
suggests a multiplicity of impacts and implications. The following analyses
52 Channing May, Transnational Crime and the Developing World. Global Financial Integrity, 2017.
53 Ibid.
54 Vicky Knox and C. Justine Pierre, Report on the study of Human Trafficking in Trinidad and Tobago
(Dunn, Pierre Barnett & Company Limited: Canada, 2020): 14.
103
highlight: (1) the impacts of transnational organized crime, human traffick-
ing, and undocumented migration on the security of residents in Trinidad
and Tobago, and (2) the implications of transnational organized crime, hu-
man trafficking, and undocumented migration for the security of citizens in
Trinidad and Tobago.
Impacts and implications of transnational organized crime, human
trafficking, and undocumented migration
Measuring the impact of any social phenomenon is difficult55, and this

is especially so for criminal activities, for example, transnational organized
crime, human trafficking, and undocumented migration. The problem associ-
ated with measuring the aforementioned activities is even more pronounced
for Caribbean jurisdictions with weak data collection and measurement sys-
tems when compared to Western jurisdictions. Despite this weakness, it is
nonetheless imperative to have an understanding of the impacts that trans-
have on persons residing in Trinidad and Tobago.
As it relates to undocumented migration, it is argued that all migrants
want to improve their lives and they are willing to take risks to attain this goal
even though many of them cannot fulfil the administrative requirements to
migrate legally. The result of this inability to satisfy the legal requirements is
that many of them breach the law and so become undocumented migrants. Il-
legally crossing (undocumented migration) Trinidad and Tobago’s maritime
borders is somewhat difficult, but certainly treacherous, and the result is that
many undocumented migrants employ traffickers, either in the departing or
destination country to move them into the island. In many instances, there
are fatal consequences of attempting to enter Trinidad and Tobago’s jurisdic-
tion as the journey (especially from Venezuela) is dangerous as well as con-
ducted at nights, however, the desire for a better life coerces many migrants to
use the services of human traffickers to move them into Trinidad and Tobago.
Impacts and implications of transnational organized crime
With porous borders, weak governance structures and limited finan-
cial and human resources, most CARICOM states, inclusive of Trinidad
and Tobago, are particularly susceptible to the operations of transnational
55 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean.
104
organized crime groups, including human traffickers56. According to57 Trini-
dad and Tobago faces extreme violence that is inflamed by transnational or-
ganized crime groups. Instructively, transnational organized groups and their
illicit activities present major challenges to Trinidad and Tobago (and the
wider international community). For instance, criminal networks and their
activities disrupt stability, undermine democratic institutions and hinder the
economic activities that are critical58 and all of the aforementioned issues are
apparent within Trinidad and Tobago.
For Trinidad and Tobago, transnational organized crime (TOC) poses
a significant and growing threat to national and international security, with
dire implications for public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and
economic stability. Instructively, transnational organized crime groups and
their operations are a threat to individual nations and the international com-
munity59. In sum, for Trinidad and Tobago, transnational organized crime is
a reality and this reality is further compounded by the many possible threats
emanating out of organized criminal activities which includes impacts on,
and implications for democratic governance structures as well as the national
security infrastructure of the island60. The impact of transnational organized
crime is also felt in the domain of policing as transnational organized crime
in its more violent forms, serves as challenges to the state’s monopoly on the
use of force. This is evident as transnational organized crime groups, act-
ing singly or in conjunction with their local counterparts, offer protection to
communities and individuals where the state cannot offer such protection61.
These transnational organized crime groups also impact the efficient func-
tioning of the financial system by illegally laundering their returns and this
serves to convolute the system as well state actors within the system.
The impacts and implications of transnational organized crime organ-
ized crime are pernicious for innocent individuals as it can destabilize soci-
eties and undermine development. Further, organized crime groups usual-
ly work with local criminals and this often leads to corruption, extortion,
56 John, ‘A critical approach to understanding human trafficking in the Caribbean’.

57 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean.
58 Ibid.
59 May, ‘Transnational Crime and the Developing World’.
61 James Bergeron, “Transnational Organised Crime and International Security.” The RUSI Journal 158,
no. 2 (2013): 6-9.
105
racketeering and violence. When established, transnational organized crime
undermines human rights standards, increases the general level of criminality
and insecurity in society, heightens fear of crime and weakens governance
structures. Peace and human security are threatened, human rights are vio-
lated and the economic, social, cultural mores are also undermined as a result
of the presence of transnational organized crime and these are applicable in
Trinidad and Tobago’s context. Without a doubt, the danger to Caribbean
societies [including Trinidad and Tobago] posed by transnational organized
crime has significant implications for the security of the region and citizen
safety62 and this is evinced in the works of the scholars such as63, 64.
Impacts and Implications of human trafficking
In Trinidad and Tobago, conjecture, empirical evidence and media
headlines point to the existence of human trafficking on the island. For ex-
ample, media headlines often state “Beheaded man linked to human traffick-
ing”65, 66, 67. Concomitantly,68 analysts submit that human trafficking (Traf-
ficking in Persons) is a feature of the criminal landscape with a prevalence
rate of 3.0 victims per 100,000 persons, while John69 argues that due to weak
political structures, poor governance, and heightened levels of poverty, crime
and illiteracy, Caribbean nations are among the transit and destination coun-
tries for human trafficking, and this includes Trinidad and Tobago. Further,
recent research conducted in Trinidad and Tobago indicated that in 2019,
4,000 persons were victims of human trafficking in Trinidad and Tobago70.
The results of this study also indicated that human trafficking is a highly
organized and well-resourced enterprise in Trinidad and Tobago that can be
considered an industry.
It is important to note that there are impacts and implications of traf-
ficking in persons for every nation state that is touched by the phenomenon
62 Curtis A. Ward, Caribbean Security Integration, Threat of Transnational Crimes, and implications
of Budget Cuts on Caribbean Security. Presentation at Rayburn House Office Building, June 8, 2017.
Washington, D.C.
63 Ibid.
65 Susan Mohammed, ‘Beheaded man linked to human trafficking’.
66 Joshua Seemungal, ‘CARICOM report: T&T officers involved in sex trafficking’.
67 WIC News, ‘2 Venezuelans arrested for human trafficking in Trinidad and Tobago’.
68 Knox and Pierre, ‘Report on the study of Human Trafficking in Trinidad and Tobago’.
69 John, ‘A critical approach to understanding human trafficking in the Caribbean’.
106
and this includes Trinidad and Tobago. Human trafficking is a more lucra-
tive trade than the related scourge of human smuggling, due to the fact that
human trafficking can be an ongoing process. Human trafficking is also a
global scourge which is increasing in intensity, and negatively impacts the
economies and security of states71.
It is argued by May72 that with twenty-one million victims, human traf-
ficking has the greatest impact on human rights and security, especially for
developing countries. The impacts and implications of human trafficking for
Trinidad and Tobago are not limited to what has been outlined in the previ-
ous paragraphs as labour and sexual exploitation due to human trafficking
can cause countries to lose human capital, remittances, and tax revenues, and
thus create obstacles to development. Instructively,73 May posits that human
trafficking drives insecurity as proceeds of criminal activities are sometimes
used to support terror and insurgent groups and that in recent years, terror-
ist and insurgent groups have been engaging in human trafficking to finance
operations, and to recruit and/or reward their jihadists. As a nation state that
has witnessed an outflow of jihadists, it is not farfetched that these impacts
and implications for safety and security are present in Trinidad and Tobago.
According to UNODC74, there are impacts and implications for safety
and security of nation states. It is also argued that human trafficking has ser-
ious security impacts on individuals, communities, and countries as human
trafficking is a growing transnational crime and efforts at combating it oc-
currence stretched the resources of countries75. Instructively,76 UNODC also
submit that countries where human trafficking is present also lose overseas
remittances, human capital, and tax revenues due to trafficking and forced
labour. Another insidious impact of human trafficking is that criminal activ-
ities and corruption associated with human trafficking undermines domestic
stability and rule of law and this is one of the stark realities as a clear and
present danger facing Trinidad and Tobago. Human trafficking also impacts
and has implications for the legitimacy of the business sector in Trinidad and
71 May, ‘Transnational Crime and the Developing World’.

72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 UNODC, An Introduction to Human Trafficking: Vulnerability, Impact and Action, (Vienna: United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008).
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
107
Tobago. For as Knox and Pierre77 in a study on human trafficking in Trinidad
and Tobago point out, trafficking in persons in Trinidad and Tobago can now
be considered a part of normal business activities in some business sectors,
such as, in the adult entertainment, restaurants, nightclubs, hotels, leisure
places, and factories.
Impacts and implications of undocumented migration
For Trinidad and Tobago’s government, within the past five years, un-
documented migration, especially by individuals from Venezuela, is a con-
tinuous problem and a nebulous concern that is often voiced in the local
media. For instance, media headlines often scream “Trinidad a hub for illegal
immigrants”78 and “Crackdown on illegal migrants”79. Migration, wheth-
er, documented, undocumented, illegal, or irregular, has both positive and
negative impacts and implications for destination countries. However, in the
context of this chapter examining the impacts and implications for the safety
and security of residents in Trinidad and Tobago, only the negative aspects of
undocumented migration will be examined.
Undocumented migrants entering into a country without following the
regular immigration procedures undermines its sovereign right to control the
people crossing its borders80, 81 and therefore has negative impacts and impli-
cations for safety and security as citizens may perceive the country’s borders
as being porous due to the influx of persons who are unauthorised to enter
or remain in the jurisdiction. For, as82 Global Detention Project suggests, ‘the
rate at which undocumented foreigners are migrating to the country, national
security could be seriously compromised in Trinidad and Tobago’. It is also
submitted that transnational organized crime groups are well-established in
the human trafficking landscape. Without a doubt, the involvement of trans-
national organized crime groups in undocumented migration means that this
form of migration usually leads to human trafficking which leads to victim-
ization of trafficked individuals and the violation of human rights, including
78 CNW, ‘Trinidad a hub for illegal immigrants’.
79 NationNews, ‘Crackdown on illegal migrants’.
80 Khalid Koser, Irregular Migration, State Security and Human Security. Paper prepared for the Policy
Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration (Geneva, 2005).
82 Ibid.
108
prostitution and slavery83. Importantly, this has implications for the safety
and security of nation states84 and this does not exclude Trinidad and Tobago.
Undocumented migration is commonly understood as a security ‘prob-
lem’ and many countries feel the need to protect against the ‘threat’85. Other
impacts and implications for undocumented migration include job loss, dis-
crimination and racism, social pressure, possible increase in diseases and
breakdown of culture and traditions. Undocumented migrants may cause
pressure on the job market as the locals may lose their jobs to undocumented
migrants who are willing to work for much longer hours at lower wages than
locals. This in itself can cause labour exploitation of the migrants and unwit-
tingly cause a flood of further undocumented migration as migrants send re-
mittances back to their homeland. Undocumented migration can fuel racism
and discrimination. For instance, undocumented who cannot speak the local
language or do not behave as locals do, may find themselves not accepted.
As long as people move from place to place, there is a risk of a conta-
gious disease outbreak and this is further exacerbated with undocumented
migrants who may be fearful of attending local health institutions due to their
status as undocumented migrants. Additionally, undocumented migration
can lead to social and civil pressures that have the potential to negatively im-
pacts the security of a country. Instructively, housing, health, education, and
other infrastructures run the risk of becoming overburdened and may also
suffer from the pressure of overuse by more people than they were designed
to take. This can force prices of such amenities to increase, thereby causing
hardship to local residents as well as undocumented migrants.
Conclusion
This chapter set out to explore the impacts and implications for sec-
urity in Trinidad and Tobago as a result of human trafficking, transnation-
al organized crime and undocumented migration, which the author of this
chapter submits ‘converge in the same time and space’ to create an ‘unholy
triumvirate’. The attraction of Trinidad and Tobago to human traffickers,
transnational organized crime groups, and especially undocumented migra-
83 Raimo Väyrynen, “Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking and Organized Crime”, in Poverty,
International Migration and Asylum eds., George J. Borjas and Jeff Crisp (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005): 143-70.
85 Masajuwa et al., ‘Illegal Transnational Migration’.
109
tion is premised on the notion that the island is a welcoming destination ‘as
it is one of the wealthiest countries in the Caribbean and its people enjoy an
above-average per capita income for the region’86. Further, it is also surmised
that the relatively prosperous status of Trinidad and Tobago has made the
country both an important transit and destination country for trafficked in-
dividuals and the groups that facilitate their movement87. Instructively, this
chapter has achieved its goal of highlighting human trafficking and its rela-
tionship to the broader subjects of undocumented migration, transnational
organized crime, and human security with a dedicated focus on its impacts
and implications for the Small Island Developing State (SIDS) of Trinidad
and Tobago that is located in the Caribbean.
87 Ibid.
110
Transnational Crimes and Citizen Security
in the Caribbean
Clement Henry
You would have seen the amount of firearms on our streets and the effect
that is having on our safety and our security, your first line of defence is the
nation’s first line of defence.1
Dr Keith Rowley, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago
T here are justifiable global concerns with regards to the threats posed
by transnational crimes. Picarelli (2008) has observed that the last
three decades have witnessed an increasing number of international experts
regarding transnational crime as a rising security threat.2 Albanese (2012)
characterises transitional crime as a phenomenon encompassing criminal
violation of law in more than one country with regards to its planning, execu-
tion, or impact.3 As defined by the United Nations Convention against Trans-
national Organised crime, transnational crime involves any criminal activity
that is carried out in more than one country, or is executed in one country but
a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place
in another country, or is executed in one country but has substantial impact
in another country. Thus, a distinguishing feature of transnational crime is its
multinational configuration. Among transnational criminal activities are the
1 Sharlene Rampersad. 2021. “PM tells Coast Guard—Go after gun, human trafficking trade.”
https://guardian. co.tt / news/pm-tells-coast-guardgo-after-gun-human-trafficking-trade-6.2.1420269.
d4ed1d4519
2 John Picarelli. 2008. “Transnational Organised Crime.” In Security Studies: An Introduction, edited by
Paul Williams, 453-467. London: Routledge.
3 Jay Albanese. 2012. “Deciphering the Linkages between organised Crime and Transnational Crime.”
Journal of International Affairs 66 (1): 1-16.
production and trafficking of narcotics, human trafficking, small arms traf-
ficking, cybercrime, piracy, and trafficking of illegal wildlife products.
The necessity of addressing the issue of transnational crimes is linked
to its devastating impact globally. Worldwide, victims of human trafficking in
2016 were estimated at 40.3 million people with women and girls accounting
for 71% all victims and children 25% of all victims.4 In 2019, among people
aged 15-64, the estimated number of past year users of any drug globally
was estimated at 275 million persons. As one would expect, there are adverse
health risks associated with drug use. An estimated 36.3 million people world-
wide suffered from drug use disorders in 2019. Moreover, in the same year, an
estimated 494,000 deaths were attributable to the use of drugs.5 Likewise, in
2017, criminal activities were responsible for more deaths (464,000 victims)
than armed conflicts and terrorist violence combined (89,000 victims). In the
same year, more than half of the homicides associated with crime globally
(238,804 victims), were committed with the use of firearms. In the Americas,
approximately three quarters of all homicides for that year involved firearms.6
Moreover, in the Caribbean, a recent survey found that an average of 40% of
people in the region perceived crime and security-related issues as the main
problem facing their country.7 In the Caribbean region, crimes fuelled by traf-
ficked firearms reflect significant increases when the rates for 2000 and 2015
are compared. For instance, homicide per 100,000 population for Jamaica in-
creased from 33.4 in 2000 to 41.8 in 2015. Likewise, the rate for The Bahamas
rose from 24.8 to 39.0, Belize 16.6 to 33.0, Trinidad and Tobago from 9.5 to
30.6, Guyana from 10.2 to 19.4, the Commonwealth of Dominica from 2.9
and 12.5, and Barbados from 7.4 and 10.9, for the comparative years 2000
and 2015 respectively.8
In the main, the effects of transnational crimes worldwide include the
tragic loss of innumerable lives, violence to subjugate victims and neutralise
rivals, physical and mental health problems, human rights violation, disrup-
4 International Labour Organization. 2017. Global Estimates of Modern-Day Slavery: Forced Labour
and Forced Marriage. Geneva: International Labour Office.
5 UNODC. 2021. World Drug Report 2021. Vienna: United Nations.
6 UNODC. 2019. Global Study on Homicide 2019. Vienna: United Nations.
7 Heather Sutton and Inder Ruprah. 2017. Restoring Paradise in the Caribbean: Combatting Violence
with Numbers. Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.
8 UNODC. 2022. International Homicide Statistics database. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
VC.IHR.PSRC. P5? locations=ZJ
112
tion of family life, child abuse and neglect, deterioration of community co-
hesion, undermining of peaceful co-existence in societies, challenges to the
rule of law, corrupting of institutions, distorting of local economies, loss of
productivity, and political instability.
It is this context that has motivated the current analysis on transnation-
al crime. Overall, the chapter explores the link between globalisation and
transnational crimes, presents the argument for a citizen security approach
in assessing transnational crime as a security threat, discusses the main mani-
festations and consequences of transnational crimes on citizen security in
the Caribbean, and examines the challenges encountered in responding to
transnational crimes in the region. Additionally, the chapter recommends
multilateralism as an effective approach to addressing transnational crimes.
It seeks to answer the following questions: What are the main manifestations
of transnational crimes in the region? What are the main challenges related
to transnational crimes for Caribbean states? How have transnational crimes
affected citizen security in the region? What approaches should be adopted
to address transnational crimes in the Caribbean? The overarching propos-
ition is that controlling transnational crimes in the Caribbean region is best
attained through multi-level, multi-agency approaches at the community, na-
tional, and international levels.
In terms of geographic scope, this chapter defines the Caribbean as the
fifteen full members comprising the Caribbean Community and Common
market (CARICOM).9 In light of this refined scope, the region’s population
is just over 18 million inhabitants.10 Despite the variation in population sizes
among the Caribbean countries included in this analysis, all member states
are considered Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Accordingly, chief
among the region’s challenges are small populations, and susceptibility to
external shocks such as natural disasters and precipitous decline in inter-
national commodity prices, economic vulnerability, and fiscal and capacity
constraints.11 The economies of the Caribbean states are primarily founded
on tourism, financial services, and primary commodity exports.
Globalisation and Transnational Crime
This global upswing in transnational crimes is linked to the sustained
integration of the world economies, referred to as globalisation. The increas-
11 Caribbean Community Secretariat. 2014. CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy 2013: Securing the
Region. Turkeyen: Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat.
113
ing globalisation of economic activities and advances in transportation and
communication technologies have afforded significantly more opportunities
for transnational crime than in the past. Globalisation has caused dramatic
increases in the flows of goods and services, people, and ideas across bor-
ders. Criminal actors have exploited the expansion of communication, trans-
portation, and trade afforded by globalisation in the conduct of their illegal
activities. So, by eliminating previous barriers in trade, finance, travel, and
communication, globalisation has unintentionally resulted in the growth of
illicit markets beyond the confines of any one jurisdiction. As Held and Mc-
Grew (2000) affirm, globalisation has expanded and accelerated world-wide
interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life including the
cultural, financial, and criminal.12
Unsurprisingly, crime is becoming more international in its scope, caus-
es, and consequences. The 2018 estimates of the proceeds of transnational
crimes placed it at 1.5% of global gross domestic product (GDP), or roughly
US$1.3 trillion.13 In 2019, available data indicate that there were 40,017 indi-
vidual seizures of drugs (119 countries reporting) with a combined weight of
1,104,561.7 kilogrammes. Cannabis made up the plurality of quantity seized
in both 2018 (when it was 59.4% of the total quantity seized) and 2019 (when
it made up 48.9% of the total). Additionally, in the same year, there were
10,469 seizures that resulted in the recovery of 716,217 pieces of ammuni-
tion and 264,332 pieces of weapons or weapons components, ranging from
firearms to slash-and-stab weapons.14 A recent World Bank study reports that
the global trade in opium, cocaine, and other illicit drugs had reached a 30-
year high.15
The Caribbean has also experienced its fair share of trade in contra-
band. The generally accepted view is that the Caribbean region is an im-
portant transit area for cocaine originating from South America primarily
destined for North America and Europe. For instance, as recent as November
2021 there were two major drugs busts in the Region. The Jamaica Defence
Force Coast Guard Unit seized an estimated 907 kilograms of cocaine after
12 David Held, and Anthony McGrew. 2000. The global transformations reader: An introduction to the
globalization debate. Cambridge: Polity Press/Blackwell.
13 World Bank. 2020. Violence without Borders: The Internationalization of Crime and Conflict.
Washington, D.C: The World Bank Group.
14 World Customs Organization. 2020. Illicit Trade Report 2019. Brussels: World Customs Organization.
15 World Bank. 2020.
114
intercepting a vessel on its St. Elizabeth coastline. The estimated street value
of the seized drugs was US$6.5 million.16 In the Bahamas, a joint operation
involving the Drug Enforcement Unit, Drug Enforcement Administration,
and Operation Bahamas America Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) discovered 250
kilograms of cocaine during a search of an apartment in Grand Bahama. The
value of the seized drugs was estimated at US$5 million.17 In addition, the
authorities in the Netherlands unearthed 499 kilograms of cocaine in a ship-
ment of rum originating from Guyana.18 A further two seizures of cocaine in
Germany and Belgium during in the year 2020 also provide evidence of the
magnitude of drugs flowing through the Region. In Belgium the authorities
unearthed 11.5 tons of cocaine in a container of scrap metal from Guyana19
and law enforcement in Germany found 1.5 tons of cocaine in rice from
Guyana.20 The estimated street value of the drugs was €900 million and €300
million, respectively.
Clearly, the global expansion in transnational crimes is mirrored in
the Caribbean. A CARICOM Risk and Threat Assessment identified trans-
national crimes involving illegal firearms and illicit drugs trafficking as the
pre-eminent security threat in the region. Risk and threat scenarios were
assessed from fatalities, human and health injuries, social disruptions, eco-
nomic damage, and psychological impact, inter alia. Experts defined Tier 1
threats as high-probability, high-impact events. These events are deemed as
the main drivers of criminality with potential to cripple the already fragile
socio-economic developmental progress in Caribbean States. These threats
are considered clear and present dangers and the main cause of fear and
insecurity among citizens.21 For this reason, the current analysis will focus
on illegal firearms and illicit drugs trafficking. These two manifestations of
16 Jamaica Gleaner. 2021. “JDF Coast Guard makes major cocaine bust, three arrested.” https://
jamaica-gleaner.com/article/news/20211123/jdf-coast-guard-makes-major-cocaine-bust-three-arrested.
17 Eyewitness News. 2021. “$5 MIL. DRUG BUST: Police discover 638lbs of cocaine in apartment
complex.” https://ewnews.com/5-mil-drug-bust-police-discover-638lbs-of-cocaine-in-apartment-
complex.
18 Loop Caribbean News. 2021. Over 1,000 lbs of cocaine from Guyana found in the Netherlands.
https://caribbean.loopnews.com/content/over-1000-lbs-cocaine-guyana-found-netherlands.
19 Stabroek News. 2020. “Guyana linked to historic scrap metal cocaine bust in Belgium.” https://www.
stabroeknews.com/2020/11/06/news/guyana/guyana-linked-to-historic-scrap-metal-cocaine-bust-in-
belgium/.
20 Stabroek News. 2020. “German police seize 1.5 tons of cocaine hidden in Guyana rice.” https://
www.stabroeknews.com/2020/08/11/news/guyana/german-police-seize-1-5-tons-of-cocaine-hidden-in-
guyana-rice/.
21 Caribbean Community Secretariat. 2014.
115
transnational crimes were selected because of their inextricable link to each
other and their severe consequences for citizens in the regions.
Definition of the Concept - Security
This chapter stands on two key assumptions, which must be clarified.
Firstly, the state is not the only unit of analysis in security. Secondly, secur-
ity is not only about military issues. What then is security? It is important
to engage in the discussion of some of the basic concepts which need to be
grasped if one is to understand the threat posed by transnational crimes to
citizen security.
There is a lack of consensus as to the meaning of the term security, and
this situation is probably because the term is used in many different contexts
without any precise explanation. This situation has led Haftendorn22 (1991)
to conclude that the academic pursuit of the subject of security has suffered
from the absence of a common understanding of what security means and
how the term should be conceptualised. Likewise, Wolfers23 (1952) contends
that using the term security without specification generally leads to more
ambiguity than science can afford. It is important then, that the term security
is specified in the current discussion. The English term security is believed to
have originated from the Latin se cura which when translated literally means
free from care, risk, danger, or threat. The term security therefore correlates
with threat, risk, and danger. Accordingly, security can be viewed as a condi-
tion where the object of security is not exposed to adverse events, thus, from
an existential perspective security can be seen as protection from threats to
the survival prospects of some referent object.
Paul Williams24 (2013) advises that at a minimum, there must be four
essential elements in security-talk, namely, a referent, cherished values/asset
to be protected, a threat to the cherish values, and a protector. Griffith25 (2004)
concurs with Williams, insisting that a key feature of the many definitions of
security is the protection and preservation of cherished values. Notwithstand-
ing, international relations theorists differ in their understanding of security
22 Helga Haftendorn. 1991. “The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline Building in
International security.” International Studies Quarterly 35 (1): 3-17.
23 Arnold Wolfers. 1952. “’National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol.” Political Science Quarterly 67
(4): 481-502.
24 Paul Williams. 2013. Security Studies: An Introduction. 2nd. New York: Routledge.
25 Ivelaw Griffith. 2004. Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change. Kingston: Ian
Randle Publishers.
116
in terms of its referent object. Realists are the traditionalists in international
relations who believe that the state is the only referent object of security. In
realism, states are concerned mainly with protection of their sovereignty
from external military aggression. Security then, in realist thinking, is the
ability of states to withstand aggression from abroad, or as “relative freedom
from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a
consequence of any war that should occur”,26 or as “protection and preserva-
tion of the minimum core values of any nation: political independence and
territorial integrity.”27 Simplistically, security in realism is life without wars.
The recognition of the various limitations of realist understanding of
security has resulted in a fundamental shift towards a broadening and deep-
ening in defining security, mainly because global realities indicate that state
security does not always correlate with the security of citizens. Owen (2013)28
is in step with this reality when he suggests that state security is not always
analogous to the security of individuals in that state. Furthermore, it is now
difficult to ignore the heavy toll that threats from non-state actors have inflict-
ed on human survival prospects. Because security challenges from non-state
actors have caused so much death, morbidity, indescribable sufferings, height-
ened fear, and immiseration far beyond those associated with inter-state war,
scholars have begun to question the utility of a strictly realist understanding
security. More definitively, the new understanding of security seeks to deepen
the concept to include other referents such as communities and individuals,
and broaden it to encompass a wider range of potential threats such as those
affecting economic wellbeing, health, and personal safety. Scholars seeking a
widening in the way security is conceptualised included Ullman29 (1983) and
Buzan30 (1991); while Tickner31 (1992) and Kolodziej32 (1992) emphasised a
26 Ian, Bellamy. 1981. “Towards a Theory of International Security.” Political Studies 29 (1): 100-105.
p. 102.
27 Talukder Maniruzzaman.1982. “The Security of Small States in the Third World.” Canberra Papers on
Strategy and Defence, No. 25, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. p. 15.
28 Taylor Owen. 2013. “Editor’s Introduction: Human Security.” Vol. 1, in Human Security: Concept and
Critique, edited by Taylor Owen, xxv- li. London: Sage.
29 Richard Ullman. 1983. “Redefining Security.” International Security, Vol. 8 No 1 129-153.
30 Barry Buzan. 1991. People, States, and Fear, 2nd ed.: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-
Cold War Era. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
31 Ann Tickner. 1992. Gender in international relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security.
New York: Columbia University Press.
32 Edward Kolodziej. 1992. “Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!” International studies
Quarterly 36 (4): 421-438.
117
deepening of the concept. Kolodziej declares that the realist understanding
of security, prejudices discussion on the concept in favour of the state at the
expense of satisfactory empirical and normative theories of international re-
lations and rules out by omission, those security threats posed by states to
citizens and groups. In fact, contemporary realities require a metamorphosis
in the conceptualisation of security with emerging paradigms paying particu-
lar attention to analysing security of the state and its citizens as two distinct,
albeit related phenomena.
Liberalist international relations theory offers opportunities for broad-
ening and deepening the understanding of security. The milieu in which lib-
eralism was born was characterised by extremely violent and widespread civil
and religious wars in the global arena. These conditions seriously threatened
the lives, liberties, livelihood, and economic interests of individuals. As such,
early liberalism placed a high priority on the protection of individuals in their
social, political, and economic life. In this context, early liberal thinkers as-
signed governments’ role as protecting of individuals and property and main-
taining a stable political, economic, and social environment so that individuals
can fully enjoy their rights.33 In classical liberalism, the individual is posited as
the most important unit of analysis and the claimant of rights.34 Liberals feel
that individuals can identify and pursue their interests without infringing the
rights of others. They believe that any external interference is bound to affect
actors’ pursuit of their interests and will result in discordant interactions and
conflict. Notwithstanding, liberal theorists embrace a varied range of units of
analysis. Chernoff (2007)35 informs that liberalists are known to focus their
analyses at the individual, state, system, and global levels. Liberalists contend
that all actors including those at the sub-state and international levels are
important in international relations. This liberal understanding of security
offers the theoretical foundation to consider citizens as the security referent.
Security, broadly speaking, is a condition where current and potential
threats to the survival prospects and freedom of a security referent are effect-
ively mitigated or prevented. This conceptualisation of security includes the
33 Beate Jahn. 2013. Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan. p. 62.
34 Paul Viotti, and Mark Kauppi. 2009. International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy,
Identity. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. p. 132.
35 Fred Chernoff. 2007. Theory and Metatheory in International Relations: Concepts and Contending
Accounts. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
118
essentials presented by Williams (2013) 36in that it includes referent, threats,
prevention/protection, and cherished values (survival and freedom). Security
in this context is also multilevel and multidimensional. This understanding
of security creates the analytical space for security to be evaluated at different
levels, for instance, individual, community, group, state, regional, and global
level; and in differentiated dimensions such as economic, health, environ-
ment, physical violence, and military. From a multilevel perspective, citizens
too are security referent. Citizen security in this analysis is a condition where
nation states and global governance institutions have sufficient capacity and
the political will, against a backdrop of the rule of law, to protect citizen from
threats to their survival and freedoms.
Prescriptively, the citizen security has four (4) dimensions from the
standpoint of survival and freedoms. These are physical safety, economic
wellbeing, health, and safe environment. The figure below expands on the
various aspects of each dimension of citizen security. Physical safety encom-
passes physical integrity which speaks to prevention of injury or death and
psychological safety refers to absence of fear or perception of insecurity. Eco-
nomic wellbeing covers uninterrupted opportunities for learning and skills
building and opportunities for economic insertion. Health involves harm re-
duction which includes policies and programmes to minimise negative health
consequences associated with violence or drug use. Community safety in-
volves collective efficacy understood here as communities working together
to combat crime and solve neighbourhood problems and rule of law which
refers to the presence of robust, effective, and accountable public institutions
that protects human rights and prevents violence and conflict in communities
by providing a fair legal system and disincentives for crime and violence.
36 Williams, Paul. 2013. Security Studies: An Introduction. 2nd. New York: Routledge.
119
Figure 1: Citizen Security condition
The citizen security approach sees transnational criminal actors as non-

state actors with potential to threaten the four dimensions of citizen security -
the actor with responsibility for protection is the state and, in the multilateral
context, global governance institutions. From a human rights perspective, it is
within the scope of obligations incumbent upon national and global political
institutions to protect citizens’ right to freedom and security of person. The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights underscored the normative
responsibility of states to protect citizens rights particularly those vulnerable
to criminal or violent acts. The group of rights referenced includes the right
to life, the right to physical integrity, the right to freedom, the right to due
process and the right to the use and enjoyment of one’s property.
It is important to proffer a meaning of the term ‘security threat’ in this
analysis. A security threat is as an action or a sequence of actions that affects
the survival chances of a referent or drastically narrows the real opportunities
to realise its freedoms and rights. Transnational crime is a threat to citizen
security because it can result in the loss of lives and severe human suffering,
undermine citizens quality of life, weaken the rule of law, and has had dire
implications for economic, social, and political stability worldwide.
120
Transnational Criminal Threats to Citizen Security in the Caribbean
While it may be argued that the threats from transnational crimes do
not currently have serious consequences for national security in Caribbean
states, they have pernicious effects on citizen security and undermine soci-
ety’s social fabric contributing to a host of social ills. This situation led to
CARICOM Heads of Government at their Twenty-Second Meeting, in 2001,
to commission a Regional Task Force on Crime and Security in response to
increasing concerns over crime and violence which was resulting in escalating
fear among citizens in the region. The Task Force was tasked with examining
the major causes of crime and identifying recommendations to address crime
in particular illicit drugs and firearms. The Task Force identified the trade in
illegal drugs and firearms among the leading security threats in the region.37
Firearms trafficking
The reality of illegal firearms can only be approximated because of the
clandestine nature of their ownership. Notwithstanding, there are number of
sources and experts that provide insight on the extent of the problem these
include The Small Arms Survey, GunPolicy.org, Taylor Owen and Alexandre
Grigsby (2012)38, and Aaron Karp (2018).39 These available estimates offer a
window as to the magnitude of illicit/unregistered firearms in several Carib-
bean states. Available data for ten Caribbean states listed in the table below
point to Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, The Bahamas, and Guyana as countries
with the most illicit/unregistered firearms. The use of rates in the table
(Table1) allows for meaningful comparison of countries with different popu-
lation sizes as in the case of Caribbean states. Based on rates The Bahamas
stands out with a rate of 143 unregistered/illicit firearms per 1,000 popula-
tion, next is Suriname with 105 unregistered/illicit firearms per 1,000 popu-
lation, Jamaica and Guyana 71 with unregistered/illicit firearms per 1,000
population and Belize 70 unregistered/illicit firearms per 1,000 population.
37 Caribbean Community Secretariat. 2002. Report of the CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime
and Security. Turkeyen: Caribbean Community Secretariat.
38 Taylor Owen and Alexandre Grigsby. 2012. “In Transit: Gangs and Criminal Networks in Guyana.”
A Working Paper of the Small Arms Survey. February. Accessed May 8, 2012. httpwww.smallarmssurvey.
org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP11-Guyana.pdf.
39 Aaron Karp. 2018. Civilian Firearms Holdings. 2017. Estimating Global Civilian-Held Firearms
Numbers. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
121
Table 1: Estimates of Unregistered/Illicit Firearms in Selected Caribbean Territories
Estimates of Per 1,000
Country
Unregistered Firearm population
Antigua & Barbuda 3,551 38
Bahamas 56,890 143
Barbados 7,000 24
Belize 26,245 70
Guyana 55,000 71
Haiti 270,621 25
Jamaica 200,085 71
St Vincent & the Grenadines 1,135 10
Suriname 58,000 105
Trinidad and Tobago 32,450 24
While the data on rates of illicit/unregistered firearms to population is

evidence of the gravity of the situation in the Caribbean, it is also important
to capture the perspectives of regional policy makers and practitioners. In
fact, concerns over the dangers posed by the inflow of guns from outside the
region was highlighted in the Communique issued at the conclusion of the
39th Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) in 2018.40 Individually, Caribbean leaders have
been outspoken about the security threats associated with the proliferation
of guns and ammunition in their respective territories. In the beginning of
this chapter, reference was made to Dr. Keith Rowley’s message to coast-
guards. More recently, Government Minister Obie Wilchcombe of The Ba-
hamas lamented over the proliferation of guns in his country after a brazen
daytime shooting of a man. The Minister stressed the need for his country to
seriously address the smuggling of guns into the country.41 Another, Carib-
bean public official contends that illicit weapons flow is an enduring factor
in undermining security and human wellbeing in the Caribbean Community.
An unflattering analysis of the situation has resulted in the evolution of the
metaphor “weapons of mass destruction operating in slow motion”42 to illus-
40 CARICOM. 2018. Communique Issued at the Conclusion of the Thirty-Ninth Regular Meeting of the
Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community. https://caricom.org/communique-
issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-thirty-ninth-regular-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-
of-the-caribbean-community/
41 Denise Maycock. 2021. “Concerns Over Guns After Daylight Shooting on Bimini.” The Tribune,
November 19. http://www.tribune242.com/news/2021/nov/19/concerns-over-guns-after-daylight-
shooting-bimini/
42 David Baines. 2014. “The Third Border: American Guns in the Caribbean.” The Police Chief 81 (8),
26.
122
trate the existing realities in Caribbean countries and communities spurred
on by externally sourced firearms. In other circles, emerging terms to describe
Caribbean such as pistolisation43 or weaponisation44 are similarly pejorative.
The consequences and severity of the firearms problem in the Caribbean
is most readily seen in gang and interpersonal violence. Firearms trafficking
has resulted in a violence epidemic that has impacted the entire Caribbean.
This has impacted all four dimensions of citizen security and is resulting
in rising fear and insecurity in Caribbean states. The rise in crime and vio-
lence and consequent fear is undoubtedly linked to the increase availability
of firearms.45 Even though the pattern is not uniform across the region, it has
been observed that firearms are associated with the majority of homicides
and injuries resulting from assault in Jamaica, The Bahamas, and Trinidad
and Tobago.46 INTERPOL estimates that 70% of murders in the Caribbean
are committed with firearms.47 It would appear that firearms are now the
weapons of choice in interpersonal and gang conflicts.
Using data for the period 2000-2010, Seepersad (2013)48 brings atten-
tion to alarming levels of violence in the Caribbean. He classifies Caribbean
states with regard to their murder rates into four groups based on the severity
of the violence problem. The growing magnitude of the problem during the
first decade of the twenty-first century is attributed to gangs and guns. In the
first group, Jamaica stands all by itself with an ‘extremely high’ murder rate
of 51.7 per 100,000 population. In the second group, ‘very high’ murder rates
are found in Belize, St Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago with mur-
der rates per 100,000 population of 35.8, 29.2, and 26.0 respectively. In the
third group, countries with ‘high murder’ rates are St Lucia, The Bahamas,
St Vincent, and the Grenadines with murder rates per 100,000 population of
43 Biko Agozino et. al. 2009. “Guns, Crime, and Social Order in the West Indies.” Criminology and
Criminal Justice 9(3):287-305.
44 Dianne Williams. 2016. “Citizen Insecurity in Trinidad and Tobago and the Applicability of the
Concept of the Mafia State.” In Contemporary Security and Defence Issues in the Caribbean. Eds. Pat
Paterson and Walter Earle. William J. Perry Centre for Hemispheric Defence Studies, 63-82.
45 Heather Sutton and Lucciana Alvarez. 2017. “Guns − The Tools of Violence.” In Restoring Paradise
in the Caribbean. Editors Heather Sutton and Inder Ruprah.
46 Heather Sutton and Lucianna Alvarez. 2017.
47 INTERPOL. 2019. Fighting Gun Crime in the Caribbean: CARICOM IMPACS and INTERPOL
Training. https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2019/Fighting-gun-crime-in-the-
Caribbean-CARICOM-IMPACS-and-INTERPOL-training.
48 Seepersad, Randy. 2013. “Crime in the Caribbean.” In Gangs in the Caribbean, edited by Randy
Seepersad and Ann Marie Bissessar, 2 - 35. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholar.
123
21.5, 21.2, 19.1, and 17.8, respectively. The fourth group of countries com-
prise Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, and Barbados with murder
rates per 100,000 population of 12.9, 10.4, 10.1, and 9.7, respectively.49 The
high incidences of murders regionally is indicative of increased risk of violent
death to inhabitants.
Focusing on the mechanisms used in the commission of intentional
homicides offers penetrating insights into the consequences of firearms traf-
ficking in the region. For the period 2011-2016 Jamaica averaged 30.5 fire-
arms related intentional homicides per 100,000 population. The Bahamas
(25.6), Belize (22.4), and Trinidad and Tobago (22.3) all had alarmingly high
rates of intentional homicides where firearms were used. Comparatively, the
global rate for all in 2017 was 6.1 per 100,000 which is five times less than
Jamaica’s average rate for the period 2011-2016, four times less than the sta-
tistics for The Bahamas, and three less than the statistics for Belize and Trini-
dad and Tobago.50
Figure 2: Average number of Homicides with firearms per 100,000 population for selected
Caribbean Countries
Shootings statistics for the period 2000-2010 also portray the serious-
ness of the impact of firearms in the region. For the period 2000-2010 Ja-
maica averaged 1401 shootings per year, Trinidad 653, Barbados 105, and
49 Randy Seepersad. 2013. “Crime in the Caribbean.” In Gangs in the Caribbean. Eds. Randy Seepersad
and Ann Marie Bissessar. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholar.
50 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2022. International Homicide Statistics database.
124
Bahamas 86. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago had average rates of shooting
of 53.7 and 51.7 respectively. Barbados 39.1, St Kitts & Nevis 35.9, St Lucia
35, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 26.3, The Bahamas 28.2 Antigua and
Barbuda 23.0 and Dominica and Guyana 5.6 and 3.0.51
As noted in a collaborative study by the World Bank and the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, transnational crimes exacerbate violence
in the Caribbean.52 Survey data expose serious consequences of violence in
Caribbean societies with 45.7% of Jamaicans reporting losing someone to
violence. The corresponding figures indicate the Bahamas with 38.8%, Trini-
dad and Tobago with 30.7%, Barbados with 26.7%, and Suriname with 8.1%.
Further, 40.3% of Jamaicans, 34.2% of Bahamians, 31.2% of Barbadians,
29.9% of Trinidadians, 12.4% of Surinamese reported witnessing a violent
attack ending in injury or death during their lifetime. Further, 40.3% of Ja-
maicans, 34.2% of Bahamians, 31.2% of Barbadians, 29.9% of Trinidadians,
12.4% of Surinamese reported witnessing a violent attack ending in injury or
death during their lifetime.53
The continuous flow of illicit weapons is as the result of the work of
transnational criminal actors which are believed to be supported by permis-
sive gun laws in manufacturing countries since the region does not manu-
facture or import small arms and light weapons on a large scale.54 However,
undermanned borders, seaports, and airports provide fertile grounds for the
movement of illegal weapons across borders.
The high levels of crime and violence, and the proliferation of illicit
firearms have generated a situation of fear and unease among citizens in re-
lation to their personal security. Conflicts are now deadlier because they are
now settled with the use of firearms. Violence is driving families into poverty,
resulting at times, in the loss of the breadwinner, disrupting learning and
skills-building, and through fear negatively affecting collective efficacy.
51 Randy Seepersad. 2013. Crime in the Caribbean.

52 World Bank and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2007. Crime, Violence, and Development:
Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean. Washington, DC.: World Bank.
53 Inter-American Development Bank. 2022. Caribbean Economics Lab. http://www.caribbeaneconomics.
org/ crime.
54 UN. 2021. “Rapid Spread of Small Arms, Light Weapons Still Threatening World Peace, Exacerbating
Plight of Civilians in Conflict Zones, Disarmament Chief Tells Security Council.” https://www.un.org/
press/en/2021/ sc14656. doc.htm
125
Drug Trafficking
Available evidence suggests that the primary illicit drugs that feature in
the Caribbean are marijuana, cocaine, amphetamine type stimulants (ATS),
and heroin. Even so, marijuana and cocaine are the illicit substances driving
the drug market in the Caribbean. Drug seizure data for the region provide
insights into the types and magnitude of illicit drugs flowing through the
region. There are limitations to data on illicit drug supply and demand in
the Caribbean mainly because drug information networks in most of the ter-
ritories cannot produce consistent time series to support analysis of trends.
Notwithstanding, available data on marijuana seizures indicate that 225,700
kilograms of the drug was seized in The Bahamas (year 2019), 24,000 kilo-
grams in Jamaica (year 2019), 6,463 kilograms in Suriname (2017), 4,513
kilograms in Barbados (year 2018), 3,371 kilograms in Grenada (2020), 2,890
kilograms in Trinidad and Tobago (year 2019), 1,322 kilograms in Haiti (year
2019), and 1,076 kilograms in Guyana (year 2019).
Table 2: Marijuana Seizures in Selected Caribbean Countries
Country Quantity of drugs in Kg Year Data Source
Bahamas 225700 2019 UNODC
Barbados 4513 2018 UNODC
Belize 421 2019 UNODC
Grenada 3371 2020 GRENDIN
Guyana 1076 2019 GUYDIN
Haiti 1322 2019 UNODC
Jamaica 24000 2019 UNODC
Suriname 6463 2017 UNODC
Trinidad & Tobago 2890 2019 UNODC
In so far as production is concerned, only marijuana is produced in

the region, with even some of the smaller territories of the Eastern Carib-
bean having significant numbers of marijuana plants eradicated. For instan-
ces, 37,385 marijuana plants were eradicated in Antigua and Barbuda (year
2017) and 26,636 marijuana plants were eradicated in Dominica (year 2019).
In 2019, 409525 marijuana plants were seized by Trinidad and Tobago au-
thorities. It should be noted, though, that marijuana cultivation in most of
126
the Caribbean countries are predominantly for local consumption and the
amount grown varies from country to country.
Table 3: Seizures of Marijuana Plants for Selected Caribbean Countries
Country Number of Plants Year Data Source
Antigua & Barbuda 37385 2017 Antigua & Barbuda 2017 Drug Report
Bahamas 8439 2018 UNODC
Barbados 3487 2018 UNODC
Dominica Alcohol & Drug Information

Dominica 26636 2019
Network
Grenada 3657 2020 GRENDIN
Drug Information Network Trinidad &

Trinidad & Tobago 409525 2019
Tobago
According to the data, cocaine is the second most prevalent illicit drug
identified in the region. In Jamaica 1,630 kilograms of cocaine was seized in
2019, 1,369 kilograms in Belize, 1,000 kilograms in The Bahamas, 334 kilo-
grams in Trinidad and Tobago.
Table 4: Cocaine Seizures for Selected Caribbean Countries
Country Quantity of drugs in Kg Year Data Source
Bahamas 1,000 2019 UNODC
Belize 1369 2019 UNODC
Jamaica 1630 2019 UNODC
Trinidad & Drug Information Network Trinidad

334 2019
Tobago & Tobago
In most of the territories, apart from Suriname and Trinidad and To-
bago, very small quantities of amphetamine-type substances were found. In
Antigua and Barbuda 104 tablets were seized in 2017 and 299 tablets were
seized in Dominica in 2019. In Trinidad and Tobago 5,702 tablets were seized
and in Suriname 194,655 tablets were seized. Additionally, there were very
small amounts of heroin seized in The Bahamas (4 kilograms in 2018) and
Belize (kilograms in 2019).
127
Table 5: Seizures of Amphetamine-type Stimulant (amphetamine, methamphetamine, and
ecstasy-group substances) for Selected Caribbean Countries, 2019 or nearest year available
Country Number of Tablets Year Data Source
Antigua & Antigua & Barbuda 2017 Drug

104 2017
Barbuda Report
Dominica Alcohol & Drug Informa-

Dominica 299 2019
tion Network
Suriname 194,655 2017 UNODC
Trinidad & Drug Information Network Trinidad

5702 2019
Tobago & Tobago
The direct health consequences of illicit drugs in the Caribbean have

not been as severe as the presence of illegal firearms. The mean rate for drug
related mortality was 1.1 per 100,000. The rates ranged from 0.5 deaths per
100,000 population in Belize to 1.5 deaths per 100,000 in Dominica, Gren-
ada, and Guyana (see table 6). Furthermore, recent research reveals that il-
legal trafficking of firearms from the United States to the Caribbean is more
challenging to citizen security in the region. The results of the research point
out that illegal firearms trafficked from the United States to the Caribbean are
driving and perpetuating a culture of gun crime in the region.55
Table 6: Death rates due to drug use disorders, 2017
Country Deaths per 100,000 population
Antigua & Barbuda 1.0

Bahamas 1.2
Barbados 0.6
Belize 0.5
Dominica 1.5
Grenada 1.5
Guyana 1.5
Haiti 0.6
Jamaica 0.6
St. Lucia 1.0
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1.2
55 Mary Young and Michael Woodiwiss. 2019. “Organised Crime and Security Threats in Caribbean
Small Island Developing States: A Critical Analysis of US Assumptions and Policies.” The European
Review of Organised Crime, 5(1), pp. 85-117.
128
Suriname 1.4
Trinidad and Tobago 1.2
Caribbean Average 1.1
Source: OECD iLibrary
Notwithstanding, it has been observed that the trafficking and use of

illicit drugs in the Caribbean contribute to a variety of serious criminal activ-
ities and social problems such as violence associated with trafficking, wide-
spread availability of illegal guns and the proliferation of gangs, increased
criminality through addiction, diversion of criminal justice resources from
other activities, corrupting of social institutions, and undermining of the
legal economy.56
Major Challenges in Protecting Citizen Security
The main challenges combatting illicit firearms and drug trafficking
include weak border controls and infrastructure, making contraband detec-
tion and interdiction efforts difficult, resource constraints due to insufficient
fiscal space leading to vulnerabilities at ports of entry and inadequate air and
marine domain awareness, sparsely populated coastal regions and isolated
jungle interior limiting natural surveillance, regional tourism and festivities
that offer cover for traffickers to move illicit substances, as well as a permis-
sive environment created as a result of corruption and the under-resourced
public safety security sector.
Moreover, it has been observed over the last decade that drug traffickers
have been using the sea to traffic cocaine utilising multi-million-dollar, cus-
tom-built drug boats that are difficult to detect. The vessels have evolved from
the slower semi-submersibles and the speedy ‘go fast’ speed boats of a decade
ago, to more sophisticated low-freeboard vessels and have an extraordinary
range of more than 2,000 miles.57 Drug traffickers, additionally, have over
the years used their vast illegal resources accumulated to create a very active
surveillance network involving regular people to give them information on
activities of law enforcement, making it more difficult for the authorities to
detect traffickers.58

57 Sam LaGrone. 2020. “Destroyers Continue to Prowl 4th Fleet as Coast Guard, Navy Rack Up $1B in
Drug Seizures.” USNI News. https://news.usni.org/2020/07/02/destroyers-continue-to-prowl-4th-fleet-
as-coast-guard-navy-rack-up-1b-in-drug-seizures
58 Sam LaGrone. 2020.
129
The importance of laboratories for the detection and analysis of emer-
ging drugs cannot be exaggerated. Currently, the world is witnessing the rapid
spread of dangerous new psychoactive substances such as methoxyacetyl
fentanyl, fentanyl tetrahydrofuran, and cyclopropylfentanyl which are associ-
ated with significant numbers of deaths in the U.S. The region’s propinquity
to the United States means that these dangerous drugs can reach Caribbean
shores. This highlights the need for well-equipped forensic laboratories in
Caribbean states to detect and alert other states of the new threat. The chal-
lenge here is that many Caribbean forensic laboratories lack the equipment to
detect new psychoactive substances. Moreover, the potential for drug traffick-
ing transaction to occur over the dark web poses enormous challenges for the
authorities to detect and counteract these illegal activities.
Multilevel Responses in combating Illicit Firearms and Drug
Trafficking
Transnational crime is an intermestic issue that require multilevel re-
sponses in addressing its threats to citizen security. Transnational crime is
intermestic in the sense that globalization has created the condition where
contemporary security policy cannot ignore the interrelationship between the
domestic and international contexts. Thus, preserving citizen security from
transnational criminal threats demands multilevel responses at the commun-
ity, national, and international levels. At the community level, actions required
to protect citizen security include restoring collective efficacy, sensitising cit-
izens of the harmful effects of contraband, offering economic empowerment
and economic insertion activities (employment or entrepreneurship) especial-
ly for youths, and providing conflict resolution services at the community
level. At the level of the state, measures should include strengthening crim-
inal justice institutions, border security and rule of law, promoting inclusive
growth, incorporating alternative development programmes in areas that
have been linked to drug cultivation and other illegal activities, and devising
early warning system for identifying, tracing, and sharing information on new
psychoactive substance. Other measures should include creating mechanisms
to share data and intelligence on criminal network and their activities across
national agencies, ensuring mechanisms are in place to confiscate the pro-
ceeds of crimes, establishing or strengthening agencies for the administration
and disposition of seized and forfeited assets, and strengthening community
130
resilience against criminal groups. Further, states should enact or strengthen
legislation on money laundering, firearms, ammunition, explosives, pharma-
ceuticals and controlled chemical substances.
Given that transnational crimes involve criminal violation of law in
more than one country, it means therefore that effective multilateralism59 is
also essential in addressing this phenomenon. Viotti and Kauppi60 (2009) sug-
gest that multilateralism has now become the preferred approach of dealing
with some of the most challenging issues on the global agenda. Attina61 (1997)
has long intimated that interconnection resulting from globalization, means
that governments are unable to fully supply citizen security unless they re-
sort to international cooperation. Granted this is the case, governments must
seek to coordinate their strategies and policies with other countries which
would require working through robust bilateral arrangements and competent
multilateral institutions and finding the means to insert their priorities unto
the bilateral and multilateral agenda. Nothing short of a multilevel, unified
strategy will disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal networks. At the
international level, then, states should pursue international cooperation in-
cluding international police cooperation, agreements for mutual assistance
on firearms and drug trafficking and related crimes. They should ensure legal
provisions and internal procedures to provide mutual legal assistance and
extraditions of nationals on drug trafficking and related matters.
Caribbean states have recognised the need for regional approaches in
responding illegal firearms and drug trafficking. In seeking to considerably
improve citizen security in the Caribbean, the region’s Ministers responsible
for national security and law enforcement commissioned a process to deliver
a strategy to address security risks and threats. A menu of approaches for
implementation was recommended, including targeting of criminal assets
and the proceeds of crime, tackling the causes of crime and insecurity and
enhancing public awareness of related risks, the establishment of relevant
legal instruments and ratifying existing agreements, increasing trans-border
59 Multilateralism refers to coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain
principles of conduct.
60 Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi. 2009. International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy,
Identity. New jersey. Pearson Prentice Hall.
61 Fulvio Attina. 1997. “Globalisation and crime: The emerging role of international institutions.” Jean
Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics. Online: http://aei.pitt.edu/389/1/
jmwp07.htm.
131
intelligence and information sharing, enhancing law enforcement and sec-
urity capabilities and strengthening Regional Security Systems, improving
maritime and air domain awareness, strengthening border protection and
the effectiveness of criminal investigation using modern technologies and
scientific techniques, and engaging in intra-regional and extra-regional func-
tional security cooperation to tackle and manage shared risks and threats.62
Currently, a collection of agencies and networks has been working towards
the achievement of the objectives of the security strategy for the region. Es-
tablished in 2006, as the premier multilateral security agency in the region,
the Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security
(IMPACS) coordinates a joint response to the crime and security priorities of
the region. IMPACS has two sub-agencies the Regional Intelligence Fusion
Centre (RIFC) and the Joint Regional Communications Centre (JRCC). The
former provides support to Member States in intelligence gathering, sharing
and analysis and the latter pre-screens and profiles passengers and cargo using
risk management techniques.
The Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network for the Caribbean (ARIN-
CARIB), founded in 2017, is another such actor. This is an informal network
of law enforcement and judicial practitioners specializing in the recovery of
the proceeds of crime and the prosecution of related criminal offences includ-
ing money laundering and the trafficking of drugs, firearms and people.63 An-
other key agency is the Regional Security System (RSS) comprising Antigua
and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines and represents a collective secur-
ity organisation. Its responsibilities include combatting illicit arms and drug
trafficking and regional law enforcement training. Additionally, through a
Treaty on Security Assistance (TSA) the Regional Security System has addi-
tional responsibilities to the wider Caribbean region.
Another useful international cooperation initiative that Caribbean
States are involved in to protect citizen security from transnational crimes,
includes the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) which is a United
States-Caribbean security partnership that primarily seeks to build the law
enforcement and interdiction capacities of Caribbean states to prevent illicit
flows and protect citizen security. Recently, Caribbean countries have received
63 ARIN-CARIB. 2019. ARIN-CARIB – Our Establishment. https://arin-carib.org/about-arin/.
132
support from the European Union under the Cooperation Programme with
the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC) to forge
drug policies that are supported by objective monitoring instruments and on
effective strategies. The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of
the Organisation for American States’ Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism
supports states’ capacity in drug control and make periodic recommenda-
tions, contribute to strengthening states capacity to confront the drug prob-
lem, stimulate the development of technical assistance and training, as well
as the exchange of experiences and best practices based on individual state’s
needs. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been
working with Caribbean partners in responding to transnational crimes in-
cluding drugs and firearms trafficking and support Caribbean states in build-
ing fair, inclusive, and resilient societies that leaves no one behind. Finally,
the Inter-American Development Bank has been instrumental in bringing
attention to citizen security issues in Latin America and the Caribbean. The
Bank’s interventions generally cover institutional strengthening, education
and empowerment of at-risk youth, promoting prosocial behaviour among
the youth, building community efficacy to respond to crimes and violence,
and supporting rehabilitation and social re-integration for ex-inmates. Citizen
security programmes have been implemented in Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad
and Tobago, Belize, and the Bahamas.
Conclusion
In summary, the citizen security approach provided a valuable plat-
form to discuss transnational crime as a security threat. The chapter noted
the limitations of traditional realist understanding of security in analysing
current security threats and invoked a broader understanding of security. In-
deed, recognition that current and past global realities were inevitably lead-
ing to a new organising principle in security conceptualisation and analysis
prompted an examination of an emerging paradigm that is focused on the
security of citizens apart from the state. Undeniably, recent trends occasioned
by globalisation is resulting in serious threats to citizens’ survival and free-
doms and has instigated discontent with international relations paradigms
that failed to address the differentiated experiences of people and states.
The chapter gives attention to two manifestations of transnation-
al crimes in the Caribbean, specifically, drugs and firearms trafficking. An
133
important perspective presented is that controlling transnational crimes in
the Caribbean region is best attained through multilevel cooperation at the
community, national, and international levels. Moreover, security should be
reconceptualized in terms of protecting citizen security.
134
The economic implications of COVID-19:
Critical perspectives on the Caribbean road
to recovery and rebuilding
Ruben Martoredjo
Introduction
T he Caribbean region has just emerged from its fourth wave of in-
fections dominated by the Delta variant, and now prepares itself to
embrace the fifth wave, dominated by the Omicron variance. Although most
of its member countries comprise island states, being an inherent part of the
global community, the Caribbean1 has not been isolated from the COVID-19
pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 detected in China in December of
20192, that has rapidly spread across all regions of the world, and declared a
pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on March 11th, 2020.3
At the time of writing this chapter, the virus with the dominance of the
Omicron variant is continuing to spread at an unprecedented pace, resulting
in record-high daily infections in Europe and the United States of Amer-
ica, forcing governments to implement stringent measures. Globally, there
have been 305,914,601 confirmed cases of COVID-19, including 5,486,304
deaths recorded by World Health Organisation (WHO), as of January 2022.4
1 Caribbean is defined in this chapter as CARICOM member states and Aruba (observer status); some
other Caribbean countries may be included in the statistics depending on the source.
2 WHO-China Joint Mission., Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19), WHO, 2020 <https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-
mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf>.
3 World Health Organization, COVID19 Strategy UpDate - 14 April 2020 (Geneva, 2020).
4 https://worldhealthorg.shinyapps.io/covid/
The table below gives an overview of the total cases and deaths in the
Caribbean, with Jamaica recording the highest cases, while Trinidad and To-
bago registered the highest total number of deaths as of January 10th, 2022.
Table 1. Overview of Cases, Deaths and Population by Jan 10th, 2022
iso_code Location Total_cases Total_deaths Population Population_density
AIA Anguilla 1942 6 15125
ATG Antigua and Barbuda 5058 120 98728 231.845
ABW Aruba 27891 182 107195 584.8
BHS Bahamas 28968 717 396914 39.497
BRB Barbados 32228 266 287708 664.463
BLZ Belize 36983 607 404915 16.426
BMU Bermuda 7880 110 62092 1308.82
VGB British Virgin Islands 4207 40 30423 207.973
CYM Cayman Islands 10618 12 66498 256.496
DMA Dominica 7394 47 72172 98.567
GRD Grenada 7699 200 113015 317.132
GUY Guyana 45340 1070 790329 3.952
HTI Haiti 26807 780 11541683 398.448
JAM Jamaica 102505 2499 2973462 266.879
MSR Montserrat 114 1 4981
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis 4216 28 53546 212.865
LCA Saint Lucia 15101 306 184401 293.187
VCT Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 6247 84 111269 281.787
SUR Suriname 58714 1198 591798 3.612
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 97354 3082 1403374 266.886
TCA Turks and Caicos Islands 4011 27 39226 37.312
Source: Compiled from Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-deaths
The COVID-19 vaccine was welcomed as a promising light at the end

of the tunnel and expected to provide the relief from the health and socio-eco-
nomic challenges posed by the pandemic. Through the COVAX facility and
its quota for the Region, the Caribbean would cover fifteen per cent of the
population, making resources to obtain more vaccines a priority. 5 Individ-
ual countries were able to mobilize vaccine donations from bilateral partners
such as India, China and the Netherlands, and additionally, the Government
of the United States of America donated Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccines to sev-
eral Caribbean countries.6 The availability of vaccines and the number of
people vaccinated is presented in Figure 1, showing Bermuda Aruba and An-
guilla as countries with the highest number of vaccine doses available while
St. Lucia, Jamaica and Haiti are among the lowest.
5 CARICOM. Annual Report of the Secretary General 2020. Guyana. 2021. https://caricom.org/wp-
content/uploads/SG_AR_2020_WEB_Final.pdf
6 Miami Herald. U.S. sends nearly 1 million COVID vaccine doses to Caribbean nations. By Jacqueline
Charles, August 11, 2021 Miami Heraldhttps://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/
americas/article253414785.html
136
Figure 1: Status of Vaccination in the Caribbean
Countries that have made the least progress on vaccination are experi-
encing challenges securing vaccines, delays obtaining the vaccines they have
secured, and, in some cases, difficulty administering vaccines due to capacity
challenges and logistical constraints, as well as vaccine resistance. 7
It is evident that the COVID-19 pandemic is greater than a health
crisis, and is adversely affecting societies and economies all over the world.
The magnitude of the impact depends on the duration of the pandemic, its
spread, and the countries’ prevention and response measures to contain the
shock. It also depends on the structure of the economies and their exposure
and vulnerability to global transmission channels, such as commercial ties,
integration into global value chains, role of the tourism sector, dependence
on raw materials, financial integration, among others.8
The World Bank (2021) 9 reported that the world economy is still reel-
ing from the once-in-a-generation crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic, which
7 World Bank. 2022. Global Economic Prospects, January 2022. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:
10.1596/978-1-4648-1758-8. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.
8 Inter-American Development Bank. 2020. The Impact of COVID-19 on the Economies of the Region.
https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/The_Impact_of_COVID-19_on_The_
Economies_of_The_Region_Caribbean.pdf
9 World Bank. 2021. International Debt Statistics 2022. Washington, DC: World Bank. © World Bank.
137
has affected every part of the globe in 2020 has challenged economic activity
to a large extent. Hopes for a quick recovery were shattered when the second
wave of the pandemic hit the world’s major economies in October 2020, ac-
companied by subsequent waves of new variants and new challenges.
Caribbean scholars posited that countries in the Caribbean region
were already plagued with issues of smallness, vulnerability, sustainability
and survival, and COVID-19 pandemic has served to highlight the fragility
and health, as well as economic insecurities.10 The International Monetary
Fund (IMF, 2021) 11 warned that many Caribbean countries risk becoming
COVID-19 economic long-haulers, as the pandemic’s economic fallout might
be felt in the region long after the health emergency is controlled globally. 12
The impact on growth is dependent on the evolution of the pandemic inter-
nationally, and within each country the levels of vulnerability and response
capacity. Fiscal space and access to financing will be decisive for the response,
as well as ensuring and providing liquidity to the banking sector and the rest
of the economy. 13 Due to their small size and limited room to maneuver,
Caribbean economies are among the most affected by the pandemic accord-
ing to the IMF. 14
In its efforts to address the pandemic, the objectives of CARICOM
are to achieve the delicate balance of ensuring the health and safety of the
citizens of the Community on the one hand, while facilitating economic ac-
tivities on the other; and as such, the vaccine provides the possibility of relief
from the health and socio-economic challenges posed by the pandemic. 15
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36289 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO

10 Kirton, Mark and Marlon Anatol. “Introduction Contemporary Issues in Caribbean and Latin
American Relations”, In Contemporary Issues in Caribbean and Latin American Relations, edited by
Mark Kirton and Marlon Anatol, vii-ix, London. Lexington Books. 2021.
11 IMF. How the Caribbean Can Avoid Becoming a COVID-19 Long-Hauler. By Krishna Srinivasan,
Sònia Muñoz, and Ding Ding. March 12, 2021. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/03/11/
na031221-how-the-caribbean-can-avoid-becoming-a-covid-19-long-hauler, cited 01 September 2021
13 Inter - American Development Bank. 2020. The Impact of COVID-19 on the Economies of the
Region. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/The_Impact_of_COVID-19_on_
The_Economies_of_The_Region_Caribbean.pdf
138
This chapter assesses the prospects of the Caribbean region on its road
to economic recovery from the COVID-19, with specific attention to the
structural aspects of high levels of indebtedness and the relevance of func-
tional cooperation as a mechanism for survival.
Economic Impact of the pandemic
As COVID-19 continues to spread worldwide, it is crucial to collect
and analyse data on the socio-economic determinants as well as to identify
the impacts on high-risk and vulnerable economies and populations.16 Most
literature and publications with data and analysis of the economic implica-
tions of the COVID-19 pandemic and prospects to recovery are produced by
multilateral or regional institutes, in which Latin America and the Caribbean
are mostly treated as one unit of analysis. Data and trends from the larger
economies such as Brazil, Argentina, Columbia, and Mexico with enormous
economic bases and market sizes, are overshadowing the predominantly tour-
ism-dependent small economies of the Caribbean in terms of international
economic studies and analysis. This warrants more in-depth studies and an-
alyses dedicated specifically to the Caribbean, which could contribute to in-
formed policies and decision-making on how the Caribbean could emergence
stronger after the pandemic.
As Goha et al (2021)17 noted, the COVID-19 pandemic is a reminder or
‘wake-up call’ of how a more equitable distribution of money, power and re-
sources at global, national and local levels can benefit all. León and Cárdenas
(2020)18 posited that several aspects of the SARS-CoV-2 crisis are different
from the last 21st century’s economic crises. In particular, this pandemic has
caused significant and unprecedented changes in society, opening up new
opportunities for structural changes as part of recovery strategies that avoid a
returning to the old model of economic growth.
16 Khalatbari-Soltani, Saman, Robert C. Cumming, Cyrille Delpierre, and Michelle Kelly-Irving.
“Importance of collecting data on socioeconomic determinants from the early stage of the COVID-19
outbreak onwards.” J Epidemiol Community Health 74, no. 8 (2020): 620-623.
17 Goha, Ahmed, Kenechukwu Mezue, Paul Edwards, Kristofer Madu, Dainia Baugh, Edwin E. Tulloch-
Reid, Felix Nunura, Chyke A. Doubeni, and Ernest Madu. “Indigenous people and the COVID-19
pandemic: the tip of an iceberg of social and economic inequities.” J Epidemiol Community Health 75,
no. 2 (2021): 207-208.
18 León, Diana Carolina and Juan Camilo Cárdenas. Lessons from COVID-19 for a Sustainability
Agenda in Latin America and the Caribbean. UNDP LAC C19 PDS No. 14ª. UNDP. 2020
139
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC, 2021) 19 the pandemic sparked the
biggest crisis that Latin America and the Caribbean’s labor markets have ex-
perienced since 1950.20 In responding to the crisis, countries in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean were faced with the lack of fiscal space enjoyed by
advanced countries, where many were facing economic crises even before the
Covid-19 outbreak. Economies in the region are also characterized by higher
levels of informality, which makes many of their firms and households much
more difficult to reach through instruments such as tax deferrals and wage
subsidies. 21
In the Caribbean, the COVID-19 pandemic began at a time when coun-
tries had already been affected by various economic shocks and natural dis-
asters, including hurricanes and other extreme weather events, high levels of
indebtedness, and limited access to concessional funding while facing the an-
nual hurricane season. Tourism had been one of the hardest hit sectors of the
economy with international travel coming to a grinding halt.22 23 The region
was confronted with annual hotel stays plummeting by 70 percent, and cruise
ship travel completely halted, and tourism-dependent countries contracted by
9.8 percent in 2020; while the commodity exporters in the region (Trinidad &
Tobago, Suriname, and Guyana) were less affected and saw a mild contrac-
tion of 0.2 percent.
The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2021)24 reported massive
employment losses which affected certain service sectors, such as hospital-
ity, culture, and tourism, while other sectors (such as information and com-
19 UNECLAC. Latin America and the Caribbean Will Grow 5.9% in 2021, Reflecting a Statistical Carry-
over Effect that Will Moderate to 2.9% in 2022. Press Release. 31 August 2021.https://www.cepal.org/
en/pressreleases/latin-america-and-caribbean-will-grow-59-2021-reflecting-statistical-carry-over-effect
20 Mirage news. 2021. Latin America and Caribbean Will Grow 5.9% in 2021, Reflecting Statistical Carry-
over Effect that Will Moderate to 2.9%. https://www.miragenews.com/latin-america-and-caribbean-will-
grow-5-9-in-623259/, cited 1 September 2021
21 World Bank. 2020. The Economy in the Time of Covid. Semiannual Report of the Latin America and
Caribbean Region. World Bank. April 12, 2020
22 Werner, A., Ivanova, A., and Komatsuzaki, T. (2021). Latin America and Caribbean’s Winding Road
to Recovery – IMF Blog. https://blogs.imf.org/2021/02/08/latin-america-and[1]caribbeans-winding-
road-to-recovery/
23 N. Mulder (coord.), “The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the tourism sector in Latin
America and the Caribbean, and options for a sustainable and resilient recovery”, International Trade series,
No. 157 (LC/TS.2020/147), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
2020.
24 International Labour Office. World Social Protection Report 2020–22: Social Protection at the
Crossroads – in Pursuit of a Better Future. Geneva: ILO, 2021
140
munications, and financial and insurance activities) actually benefited great-
ly. Similarly, the crisis had a disproportionately severe impact on low- and
medium-skilled workers and on self-employed workers, threatening greater
labour market inequalities in the future.
The pandemic also exposed and exacerbated deep-rooted labour mar-
ket and structural socio-economic inequalities within and across countries,
evidenced by the unevenly distribution of the crisis-induced labour income
losses and compensatory arrangements across workers and sectors.25 The de-
cline in labor participation among women in Latin America and the Carib-
bean reached 46.9% in 2020, reaching an estimated 49.1% in 2021 similar
to 2008 levels. 26 The impact of the crisis on the economies of the region
in 2020 caused poverty in sectors of the population traditionally belonging
to the middle class. Poverty rates and extreme poverty rates grew to 31.9%
and 19.1%, respectively. In a single year, the number of individuals living in
poverty grew by 25 million (to 206 million), and the number of individuals
in extreme poverty rose by 20 million (to 124 million). The percentage of the
population in the middle class dropped from 33.4% in 2019 to 32.1% in 2020,
and the Gini coefficient of income inequality grew by almost 2 percentage
points, reaching 0.501.27
At the other end of the income scale, booming asset prices are boost-
ing the wealth of richer segments of the population and adding to inflation.
The increasing divergence of government’s narrowing fiscal space, house-
holds suffered severe employment and earning losses (mostly among women,
the unskilled, and informal workers) while booming asset prices boosted the
wealth of richer segments of the population and adding to inflation, is espe-
cially troubling given the possibility of social discontent in countries. 28
According to the World Bank (2020) 29 the channels through which the
adverse external shocks affected domestic economies also varied from coun-
25 International Labour Office. World Social Protection Report 2020–22: Social Protection at the
Crossroads – in Pursuit of a Better Future. Geneva: ILO, 2021
26 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC).2021. Economic Survey of
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2021 (LC/PUB.2021/10-P/Rev.1), Santiago, 2021.
27 Marco Stampini, Pablo Ibarrarán, Carolina Rivas, and Marcos Robles. Adaptive, but Not by Design:
Cash Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean Before, During and After the COVID-19 Pandemic.
Inter-American Development Bank. TECHNICAL NOTE Nº IDB-TN-02346. November 2021.
141
try to country. Countries across the region had been trying to manage the
tradeoff between health costs and economic costs which required assessing
both the health impact and the economic impact of the measures adopted to
contain the spread of the epidemic. Yet, in the midst of the pandemic, the
global wealth grew by 7.4% in 2020 (mostly in USA, Canada, Europe and
China), due to escalating stock markets, rising real estate values, low interest
rates and unplanned savings resulting from the lockdown periods. In contrast
wealth declined by 1.4% in Latin America and the Caribbean, resulting part-
ly from adverse exchange rate movements. The pandemic pushed the Latin
America and Caribbean region into its sharpest GDP contraction since 1900
(6.8%), the most severe among developing regions. A growth of 5.2% was
forecasted for the Latin America and Caribbean region in 2021 and 4.1% for
the Caribbean, which would not be sufficient to regain the level of output
recorded in 201930
Table 2. The Caribbean: GDP growth rate in 2020, projections 2021 and for 2022
(Percentages)
2020 2021 2022
Latin America and the Caribbean -6.8 5.2 2.9
Latin America -6.8 5.2 2.9
The Caribbean -7.5 4.1 7.8
Antigua and Barbuda -16.0 1.0 2.9
Bahamas -14.5 2.3 8.5
Barbados -17.6 3.0 7.5
Belize -14.3 2.7 6.4
Dominica -16.7 4.3 3.6
Grenada -11.2 4.7 4.3
Guyana 43.5 16.0 32.0
Haiti -3.3 0.1 1.1
Jamaica -9.9 4.0 5.7
Saint Kitts and Nevis -10.7 3.3 3.3
Saint Lucia -23.8 3.6 11.9
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines -2.7 3.0 3.2
Suriname -14.5 -1.0 0.1
Tinidad and Tobago -6.8 2.5 1.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
The region is witnessing larger portfolio outflows than at the time of

the Global Financial Crisis. At the domestic level, many debtors were unable
142
to service their obligations and called for renegotiations, or simply defaulted.
At the country level, the position of countries varies ranging from steep de-
cline in growth, increasing public debt levels, recovery from hurricane Maria,
budget deficits and severe cuts in capital investment programs. Guyana stood
out with oil production projected to boost GDP growth to unprecedented
levels as presented in below diagram. 31
Figure 2.GDP Growth in 2020 and projections of 2021 and 2022 (Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Remittances proved to be resilient during the COVID-19 shock and de-

spite the fear that it would be significantly reduced, data indicated that it was
maintained partly due to the recovery in advanced economies, particularly
the United States. Among the countries with annual remittances exceeding
5% of GDP, including Belize and Jamaica, the annual growth rate of remit-
tances fell to 4.9% in the first quarter of 2020, down from 7% in 2019 and
8.9% in 2018. However, they recovered to an annualized growth rate of 6.2%
in the second quarter and 7.8% in the third quarter of 2020. For the whole
Latin America and Caribbean region, remittances were reduced by only 0.2%
in 2020, which is less than the decline in other regions and better than ex-
pected given the severity of the shock. Currency devaluations and expanded
143
financial inclusion may also have played a role, not only in Latin America
and the Caribbean but across the globe.32
In the case of trade, exports from Latin America and the Caribbean
have recovered from the initial shock of the Covid-19 pandemic. Export
values are already back above pre-pandemic levels in most countries in the
region. This recovery was due to mainly improved prices for some of the re-
gion’s main export commodities, while volumes recovered more slowly. The
evolution of exported values was volatile throughout 2021. The increase in
export values in 2021 is estimated at between 24.8% and 27.8%, which is 13%
to 16% above 2019 levels. This is consistent not only with a rapid rebound in
the wake of the pandemic, but also with net growth in external sales. 33
The individual country trends revealed that exports from Barbados fell
by 3.1% in 2021, as opposed to the 12.1% contraction of 2020. After con-
tracting by 11.3% in 2020, exports from Belize increased by 11.8% in 2021.
Exports from Guyana grew by 44.9% in 2021, building on the positive per-
formance of 2020, where they increased by 89.9%. This performance was
explained by a significant increase in sales to the United States (300.5%),
the country’s main destination market, which offset the downturn in sales to
China (–95.4%), Jamaica (–90.3%), and Canada (–47.2%). The main product
that influenced this growth was oil. The trade prospects depend mainly on
the new factors of uncertainty that are affecting markets, the path that the
global economy follows out of the COVID-19 crisis, and how short-term and
structural factors affect the real and nominal determinants of the region’s
trade flows.34
The dynamics and persistence of growth from 2021 onwards are sub-
ject to uncertainties arising from the uneven vaccination processes, and the
ability of the different countries to reverse the structural problems underlying
the slow growth of their economies prior to the pandemic. An average growth
rate of 2.9% was projected for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2022,
which represented a slowdown from the previous year’s rebound. Interesting-
32 Cavallo, E., and Powell, A. (2021). Opportunities for Stronger and Sustainable Postpandemic
Growth. https://flagships.iadb.org/en/MacroReport2021/Opportunities-for Stronger-and-Sustainable-
Postpandemic-Growth.
33 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 2021. Trade Trends Estimates Latin America and the
Caribbean. 2022 EDITION. IDB. Washington. 2021.
34 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 2021. Trade Trends Estimates Latin America and the
Caribbean. 2022 EDITION. IDB. Washington. 2021.
144
ly, a steep growth increase of 7.8% is forecasted for the Caribbean in 2022,
which is almost double the percentage of 2021 (4.1%). The Bahamas, Ja-
maica and Guyana seem to have achieved exponential growth, with Guyana
spiking above all. Actually, the structural problems that weighed on the re-
gion’s growth before the pandemic had worsened and hampered the recovery
of economic activity and labour markets beyond the growth rebound in 2021
and 2022. With limited resources and constrained instruments, a proper de-
sign of the policy response become crucially important. 35
Economic Outlook
The outlook to recovery is overshadowed by downside risks, including
simultaneous Omicron-driven economic disruptions, further supply bottle-
necks, a de-anchoring of inflation expectations, financial stress, climate-relat-
ed disasters, and a weakening of long-term growth drivers. This underscores
the importance of strengthening global cooperation to speed up economic
recovery, foster rapid and equitable vaccine distribution, calibrate health and
economic policies, enhance debt sustainability, and address the mounting
costs of climate change. Resurgence of the pandemic caused by new vari-
ants, widespread supply constraints, and rising inflation have slowed the pace
of economic recovery. Growth is expected to be moderate and debt levels
which are already at record highs in many emerging market and developing
economies (EMDEs), are likely to rise further due to sustained revenue weak-
ness.36
Global economic recovery centers around a delicate balance of new
waves of COVID-19 infections, persistent labour market challenges, lingering
supply-chain constraints and rising inflationary pressures. 37 The world econ-
omy is projected to grow by 4 per cent in 2022 and 3.5 per cent in 2023. Global
recovery in output in 2021 was largely driven by robust consumer spending
and some uptake in investment; and trade in goods bounced back, surpassing
the pre-pandemic level. 38
37 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). The World Economic
Situation and Prospects 2022. United Nations. New York. 2022.
145
Macroeconomic imbalances have reached unprecedented proportions.
Government spending, deficits, and debt in several advanced economies have
reached record highs relative to GDP. 39 Spending surged to support econom-
ic activity during the crisis, but many countries are now facing record levels
of external and domestic debt. Adding to these debt-related risks is the po-
tential for higher interest rates. It is therefore difficult to predict how rapidly
interest rates will rise as advanced economies slow down their expansion in
monetary policies. With unclear fiscal and monetary policy, the implications
for exchange rates, inflation, debt sustainability, and economic growth are
unlikely to be favorable for developing countries. 40 Supply bottlenecks have
also hit developing countries hard as these countries are often the last in the
global supply line, outbid by countries with greater financial resources and
larger orders. 41
Recovery has been especially slow in tourism-dependent economies,
and small island developing States (SIDS), including the Caribbean. Reduced
or even halted tourism flows have pushed down activities in tourism-reliant
economies while rising inflation presents additional risks to recovery; and
the tightening of global monetary conditions represents another major chal-
lenge for these economies. Employment levels are projected to remain well
below pre-pandemic levels during 2022–2023 and possibly beyond. The pace
of job creation has been largely inadequate to offset earlier employment loss-
es although the picture varies across regions. For the majority of developing
countries, a full recovery of GDP per capita will remain elusive and the gap
between what they will achieve and what they would have achieved without
the pandemic will persist well into 2023. 42 43
Governments around the world will need to continue accommodative
fiscal stances and avoid the temptations of premature fiscal consolidation.
This will help ensure a robust, inclusive and sustainable recovery. For many
146
countries with unsustainable debt levels, a comprehensive approach to debt
relief is needed. Unsustainable external debt burdens, additional borrowing
during the pandemic and increasing debt-servicing costs have put a rising
number of countries on the verge of a debt crisis. Excessive external bor-
rowing, especially from private creditors, has exacerbated debt sustainability
concerns for many developing countries. 44
Many countries also hesitate to join the Common Framework due
to the fear of triggering technical defaults or sovereign rating downgrades,
which would in turn raise borrowing costs and limit their access to financial
markets. Reinvigorating multilateralism will remain critical to contain the
pandemic and accelerate a robust and inclusive global recovery. Multilateral-
ism is instrumental in addressing unequal access to vaccines and inadequate
commitments to addressing debt challenges. Stronger and more ambitious
international cooperation is an imperative to beat the pandemic, put the
world back on track towards sustainable development and pursue bold cli-
mate action. 45
Latin America and the Caribbean’s recovery is losing traction amid
fading external tailwinds and tighter macroeconomic policies. Those econ-
omies would rebound from the COVID-19 crisis with favourable external
conditions, successful vaccine roll-outs and strong domestic policy support.
After contracting by a record 6.8 per cent in 2020, the region’s GDP grew
by an estimated 5.2 per cent in 2021; but the pandemic threatens to leave
lasting scars on the region’s economies, including higher unemployment and
poverty, greater inequality and larger debt burdens. Regional GDP growth is
projected to slow sharply to 2.9 per cent in 2022 and 2.7 percent in 2023 as
tailwinds from higher commodity prices and buoyant demand from China
and the United States are expected to fade. At the same time, tighter mon-
etary and fiscal policies will weigh on domestic demand, with central banks
raising policy rates to combat soaring inflation and governments increasingly
shifting from fiscal stimulus to the consolidation of public finances. 46 47 UN-
147
ECLAC (2021) 48 proposed channeling investment into sectors that would
promote a new development pattern and that can boost competitiveness and
employment while reducing the environmental footprint. These include the
transition towards renewable energy; sustainable mobility in cities; the digital
revolution, to universalize access to technology; the health-care manufactur-
ing industry; the bioeconomy and ecosystem services; the care economy; the
circular economy; and sustainable tourism. 49
In the Caribbean, growth is projected to be 7.8 percent this year and 5.9
percent in 2023, though the aggregate reflects a large contribution from Guy-
ana, where offshore oil production recently began. Growth in the Caribbean
excluding Guyana, most of which is highly reliant on tourism, is projected to
be substantially weaker. In most tourism-reliant economies, however, growth
in 2022 is projected to accelerate relative to 2021 rates, on account of the
timing of the expected recovery in international arrivals.
For the Caribbean, disruptions caused by extreme weather, related
partly to climate change, and other natural disasters are a significant source
of downside risk for the regional economic outlook, and for the lives and
livelihoods of individuals. Island states in the Caribbean, and coastal areas
on the main land states, face rising sea levels, more frequent extreme storms,
coastal flooding and erosion in the future. 50 In regard to global trade, com-
modity prices soared in 2021 with prices of several commodities reaching
all-time highs. Energy and metal prices generally move in line with global
economic activity, and this tendency has strengthened in recent decades.
Global macroeconomic developments and commodity supply factors will
likely continue to cause recurring commodity price swings and rising com-
modity prices, coupled with pandemic related supply-demand mismatches,
have contributed to a jump in headline inflation rates. 51
48 https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/latin-america-and-caribbean-will-grow-59-2021-reflecting-
statistical-carry-over-effect
49 Mirage news. 2021. Latin America and Caribbean Will Grow 5.9% in 2021, Reflecting Statistical Carry-
over Effect that Will Moderate to 2.9%. https://www.miragenews.com/latin-america-and-caribbean-will-
grow-5-9-in-623259/, cited 1 September 2021
148
Indebtedness and Debt Relief Mechanisms
Debt levels are another consideration through which the COVID-19
crisis could have a durable impact on the future growth of the region. While
the monetary policies of advanced economies have kept interest rates at re-
markably low levels, sooner or later this debt will have to be serviced. Either
in 2022 or in the years that follow, countries in the region will have to chart
a path toward fiscal consolidation, to ensure that their debts remain sustain-
able, noting that higher taxes or lower government spending will exert down-
ward pressure on economic activity. 52
Even prior to the pandemic, rising public debt levels and heightened
debt vulnerabilities were already a concern in many low- and middle-income
countries. 53 Caribbean countries have been among the most indebted, and
many were severely lacking in terms of financial and technical resources after
gaining independence, amplifying existing vulnerabilities to economic and
other shocks. Caribbean countries are small, open, and in most cases island
economies, making them particularly dependent on external demand and cap-
ital flows, as well as susceptible to financial shocks from abroad. Their small
size and limited economies of scale have led to narrow production bases,
leaving them highly dependent on individual sectors for export earnings and
foreign exchange, economic output, fiscal revenues, and employment.54 The
pandemic increased financing needs and thereby public borrowing, while
weakening individual countries’ economic fundamentals and capacity to ser-
vice and repay public debt. 55
External debt ratios have deteriorated over the past decade, but this
trend was exacerbated by the global pandemic when the pace of external debt
accumulation outstripped growth in most low- and middle-income countries,
with many experiencing a decline in export earnings. The risk now is that
too many countries will emerge from the COVID-19 crisis with a large debt
obligation that could take years to manage. The external debt stock of low-
and middle-income countries in 2020 rose, on average, 5.6 percent to $8.7
52 World Bank. 2021. Renewing with Growth. Semiannual report of the Latin America and the Caribbean
region– March 29, 2021. Washington.2021.
54 Inter American Development Bank (IDB). 2021 Economic institutions for a resilient Caribbean. Edited
by Moisés J. Schwartz and Diether W. Beuermann. IDB. Washington D.C. 2021.
149
trillion. There were, however, significant differences in the size of the shock
among low- and middle-income countries, with those in Latin America and
the Caribbean hardest hit. World gross domestic product (GDP) fell by an
estimated 4.3 percent in 2020 - the sharpest contraction of output since the
Great Depression.
The COVID-19 pandemic also had a significant impact on Foreign Dir-
ect Investment (FDI) flows in 2020. Lockdowns around the world slowed
existing investment projects, and the prospects of a global recession deterred
investors and led multinational entities to reassess the viability of new pro-
jects. The fall in FDI inflows in 2020 in Latin America and the Caribbean
continued a downward trajectory, falling by one-third from the 2019 level to
$84.5 billion with a decline in inflows to all large FDI recipients. The impact
of the pandemic, and the primarily curtailment of tourism weighed heavily
on investment flows to the Caribbean region.5657
There were however, multilateral efforts to combat the virus, tackle the
looming global debt crisis and mount a sustainable economic recovery from
the pandemic. Rapid intervention and support from multilateral institutions,
led by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), raised
net inflows from multilateral creditors to $117 billion, the highest level in
a decade. The Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) was launched by
Group of Twenty (G-20) countries in April 2020 to assist the poorest and
most vulnerable low- and middle-income countries in managing the adverse
impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. It offered 73 International Develop-
ment Association (IDA)-eligible and least developed countries a temporary
suspension of debt-service payments owed to official bilateral creditors. The
suspension period was originally set for payments falling due from May 1 to
December 31, 2020 but was subsequently extended to end-December 2021
and endorsed by the Paris Club members, who remained fully committed to
implementing in a coordinated manner the Common Framework for Debt
Treatments beyond the DSSI to address debt vulnerabilities on a case-by-case
basis.58.The external debt stock of countries eligible for the Group of Twenty
57 Report captured details of the Latin American countries such as Brasil, Peru, Columbia, Mexico,
Argentina and Panama, and no Caribbean Countries---overview of Caribbean to be prepared based of
country data pages
58 Paris Club. Final Extension of the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI). April 13, 2021. https://
150
(G-20) Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) rose, on average, 12 percent
to $860 billion and in some of them by 20 percent or more. For most coun-
tries the rise in external indebtedness was not matched by the growth of gross
national income and exports. 59
The DSSI had been criticised for failing to compel all creditors to par-
ticipate. In April 2021, the G20 also developed a ‘Common Framework for
Debt Treatment beyond Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI)’ to facili-
tate negotiations over debt restructuring for low-income countries (LICs).
While the measures adopted by the G20 were regarded as unprecedented,
only Chad, Ethiopia and Zambia applied for the framework. It was found
that the DSSI should be expanded to cover any country teetering on the edge
of insolvency, even if they were middle-income countries (MICs).60 MICs,
which most of Caribbean countries are categorized, struggled from a lack of
fiscal and monetary space to combat the pandemic and support economic re-
covery. The Framework primarily envisions debt relief in the form of matur-
ity extensions and interest rate reductions rather than face value reductions.
The framework does not have a clear methodology to assess comparability of
treatment and lacks a mechanism to incentivize private sector participation.
61
The scope of the G20 DSSI should be broadened to include all relevant
stakeholders (the private sector and multilateral institutions) and vulnerable
middle-income countries.
A useful initiative to expand liquidity is the new allocation of special
drawing rights (SDRs) equivalent to US$ 650 billion, which envisages the
reallocation of SDRs to developing economies. The reallocation of SDRs
would be divided in three parts. 62 The first would be to increase funding for
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), which is already largely fi-
nanced by SDR borrowing from developed countries. SDRs channeled to the
PRGT would only benefit lower income countries. The second would consist
clubdeparis.org/en/communications/press-release/final-extension-of-the-debt-service-suspension-
initiative-dssi-13-04
60 William N Kring. The failures of the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative. East Asia Forum.
7 September 2021. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/09/07/the-failures-of-the-g20s-debt-service-
suspension-initiative/
62 The World Bank. 2021. International Debt Statistics 2022. Washington, DC.2021.
151
of a trust fund to finance efforts to combat climate change digital transform-
ation and health-related spending. The third part would support loans from
multilateral development banks through the creation of another trust fund.
Figure 3. Total holdings of special drawing rights (SDRs) as a percentage of reserve assets
following an SDR allocation equivalent to US$ 650 billion, April 2021
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis
of International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Data Template on International Reserves and
Foreign Currency Liquidity (IRFCL)”, 2021 [online] https://data.imf.org/?sk=2DFB3380-
3603-4D2C-90BEA04D8BBCE237. Note: Exchange rate US$ 1 = SDR 0.701499
The Caribbean could benefit from a new SDR allocation that would
strengthen the external position of some of the smaller and more debt-bu-
rdened economies, thereby lowering their risk premium and freeing up re-
sources for pandemic financing. The resulting increase in international re-
serves would provide an important financial cushion by reducing risk and
strengthening the balance of payments position for the countries.
The IMF Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT) which
was established in February 2015 during the Ebola outbreak, was modified
in March 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. CCRT grants com-
plement donor financing and IMF concessional lending through the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). The IMF transformed the Post-Catas-
trophe Debt Relief Trust to create the Catastrophe Containment and Relief
152
Trust (CCRT), broadening the range of situations covered by IMF disaster as-
sistance to include fast-spreading epidemics in 2015. In March 2020, the IMF
adopted a set of reforms to the CCRT to enable the Fund to provide immedi-
ate debt service relief for its poorest and most vulnerable members affected
by the current COVID-19 pandemic and any future pandemics.63 The CCRT
provides grants to eligible countries to pay debt service owed to the IMF and
free up resources to meet exceptional balance of payments needs created by
the disaster. The IMF Executive Board approved three grant tranches from
the CCRT totaling Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) 520 million (US$727 mil-
lion) covering debt-service payments by eligible countries falling due from
April 14, 2020, to October 15, 2021. 64 Haiti is the only CARICOM member
country enlisted as recipient of CRRT.65
There were regional and hemispheric initiatives or proposed frame-
works to address the economic and debt challenges caused by the pandemic.
The Government of Costa Rica proposed the establishment of the Fund to
Alleviate COVID-19 Economics (FACE) as a vehicle for international soli-
darity in light of the economic recession caused by the pandemic and an
instrument to drive a sustainable recovery. FACE seeks to provide developing
countries with the funds needed to cope with the pandemic’s socioeconomic
effects on the economy and on people, on concessional and solidarity-based
terms. It postulated that a fund of half a trillion dollars for one-off support,
financed with 0.7% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the world’s big-
gest and strongest economies should be allocated. Resources would be chan-
neled by one or several multilateral development banks, through a special
purpose vehicle, such as concessional loans to developing countries. FACE
would be equivalent to 3% of the GDP of beneficiary countries, a figure rep-
resentative of the drop in tax income plus the extrabudgetary costs of ad-
dressing the pandemic. The funds would be lent to countries under favorable
63 International Monetary Fund (IMF). Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust.April 9, 2021.
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/49/Catastrophe-Containment-
and-Relief-Trust#:~:text=The%20Catastrophe%20Containment%20and%20Relief%20Trust%20
%28CCRT%29%20allows,by%20catastrophic%20natural%20disasters%20or%20public%20health%20
disasters.
65 It was recommended that the IMF proposal should include a trust fund for middle-income countries,
similar to the PRGT that exists for low-income countries, for the purpose of financing projects linked to
the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.
153
conditions and on solidarity-based terms with a 50-year repayment period, a
five-year grace period and a zero percent fixed interest rate.66
Regionally, the UNECLAC proposed to swap Caribbean external debt
for annual payments into a resilience fund, which could be a source of fund-
ing for investments for the crisis response and the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). At the national level, Integrated National Financing Frame-
works (INFFs) provided a toolkit to better link planning and financing pro-
cesses. This includes a better assessment and incorporation of financial and
non-financial risks in financing policies. 67
Another regional initiative was taken by the Bolivarian Alliance for
the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) to establish the ALBA Humanitarian
Fund. The Bank of ALBA approved the creation of the ALBA Humanitarian
Fund on July 3, 2020, as a financial tool to strengthen and allocate resources
aimed at mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, including the
necessary financial support for economic recovery. The establishment of the
fund resulted from the decisions made by the leaders of the ALBA in June
2020 and the working plan for economic strengthening by the ALBA Political
Council and the ALBA Council of Economic Complementation.68 The Fund
was supported by an initial contribution from the Bank of ALBA, with the
aim of providing economic support to the member countries of the regional
platform in the event of any contingency due to natural or environmental
risks. ALBA is a regional integration initiative, in which Caribbean states
such as Dominica, Grenada, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, and Saint Kitts and Nevis also participated.69
Development banks can also help to increase liquidity by increas-
ing capitalization and flexibility in their lending criteria. Financing initia-
tives should be accompanied by greater use of innovative instruments such
as emergency clauses and state-contingent debt instruments, with a view to
66 Economic Comission for Latin America and Caribbean. Costa Rica Presents a Proposal for a COVID-19
Economic Relief Fund. Press Release. 25 September 2020. https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/
costa-rica-presents-proposal-covid-19-economic-relief-fund
67 United Nations (UN). A UN framework for the immediate socio-economic response to COVID-19.
APRIL 2020
68 Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela. ALBA Humanitarian Fund to face economic challenges posed
by COVID-19 pandemic. Escrito por César Torres el día 04/07/2020. Publicado en News. https://mppre.
gob.ve/2020/07/04/alba-humanitarian-fund-economic-challenges-covid-19-pandemic/
69 Últimas Noticias. ALBA Humanitarian Fund was created to alleviate the effects of covid-19. July 4,
2020.https://en.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/news/politics/dawn-humanitarian-fund-is-born-to-alleviate-the-
effects-of-covid-19/
154
avoiding excessive indebtedness and increasing the capacity of countries to
repay and service their debt. The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) ap-
proved a US$25 million loan to Antigua and Barbuda to counter COVID-19
fallout and support economic recovery. It has also approved US$7.5 million
to Anguilla. The two loans supported socially responsible policies, particular-
ly for the benefit of vulnerable people in Anguilla and Antigua and Barbuda,
while supporting the reform process in both countries to achieve greater re-
silience, aimed at strengthening health emergency preparedness and response
capacities, bolstering social safety nets for vulnerable citizens, and enhancing
economic and fiscal frameworks for recovery after the pandemic.70
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) launched its Carib-
bean Governors recovery programme, called Build Forward, a US$3.5 bil-
lion multi-year programme to help Caribbean countries sustainably recover
while making “technological leaps that will bring about a transformational
future”.71 Besides the multi-donor facility, Build Forward has several other
components which include advisory services and work with countries to im-
plement national investment plans, project banks and project prototypes. It
also provides advanced digital-based solutions in areas such as schools and
hospitals, grid systems, highways and fosters partnerships that link private
sector investors to smart resilient investments that will yield returns and solve
a development challenge. Build Forward can provide the requisite prepara-
tion countries need to better withstand the effects of natural disasters and
facilitate a smoother recovery process with reduced expenses for repairs and
rebuilding after those disasters. Overall, this initiative intends to minimise
related consequences as a direct result of investing in smart and resilient solu-
tions. 72
Reflections on debt reduction
The elevated risk of debt distress faced by many countries, alongside
the broader risks presented by current historically large debt levels, warrant
an examination of how large debt stocks in the past were reduced, both in
conventional and unconventional ways. All forms of debt reduction were
70 Antigua Observer. CDB approves US$25 million loan to A&B. 28 September 2021. https://
antiguaobserver.com/cdb-approves-us25-million-loan-to-ab/
71 https://www.stabroeknews.com/2021/02/26/news/guyana/idb-unveils-us3-5b-recovery-plan-for-
caribbean/
caribbean/
155
economically costly or politically challenging. Where debts prove unsustain-
able, debt default or debt restructuring, and relief are necessary. 73 The size of
fiscal and financial stimulus needed in each country is significant, and ranges
in the order of several percentage points of GDP, as seen in the table below.
Table 4: Gross debt in percent of GDP
Gross debt in percent of GDP
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Latin America and the Caribbean 67.1 68.0 77.7 72.7 73.3
Caribbean: Tourism dependent
Antigua and Barbuda 87.7 81.3 101.3 105.2 99.1
Aruba 75.0 72.9 115.1 117.5 114.6
Bahamas, The 61.8 59.7 75.2 102.5 94.2
Barbados 126.0 124.8 156.8 138.3 126.6
Belize 94.3 94.4 123.3 117.9 113.9
Dominica 84.6 94.7 108.7 107.8 103.1
Grenada 64.5 60.6 71.3 70.2 69.4
Haiti 21.6 25.8 21.3 24.9 25.1
Jamaica 94.4 94.3 107.4 95.8 87.3
St. Kitts and Nevis 53.6 51.4 56.9 61.7 57.7
St. Lucia 60.0 61.4 92.1 95.6 91.4
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 75.6 75.1 85.0 101.0 94.0
Caribbean: Commodity exporters
Guyana 47.4 43.9 51.4 47.0 36.2
Suriname 66.1 85.2 148.2 140.6 137.5
Trinidad and Tobago 42.4 46.5 59.3 70.4 72.5
Source: Imported from IMF https://data.imf.org/?sk=3E40CD07-7BD1-404F-BFCE-
24018D2D85D2&sId=1390030341854
All economies in the Caribbean need the fiscal space to finance re-
sponse measures. Yet, many developing countries, especially those that are
already heavily indebted will be unable to raise the resources needed. Forty-
four percent of the poorest countries were already at high risk of debt dis-
tress or under debt distress before the pandemic hit. Several tourist-dependent
countries, are at high risk of debt distress, and many middle-income countries
156
and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) will likely require debt restructur-
ing. 74
The Common Framework faces numerous challenges faced by earlier
initiatives, such as the reluctance of creditors to grant substantial debt relief
quickly, a lack of mechanisms to enforce private sector participation, and
uncertainty about the ability or willingness of borrowing countries to commit
to credible multi-year action plans. 75 The Common Framework also faces
new challenges, notably the increasingly complex nature of the creditor base
which increases the difficulties of coordinating and negotiating among credit-
ors. 76
The lack of measures to encourage private sector participation may
limit the effectiveness of any negotiated agreement and raises the risk of a
migration of private sector debt to official creditors. In the past, credit en-
hancements were one tool used to encourage private creditor participation in
restructuring. However, this could require significant financial resources from
the entities funding credit enhancements, and in a systemic crisis may still not
be sufficient. 77
A first step is to suspend debt payments (including principal, inter-
est and fees) and free those resources for the immediate crisis response for
any developing countries requesting it. In addition to bilateral creditors sus-
pending debt service payments from the poorest countries, as just agreed in
the G-20, they should also suspend debt payments from other developing
countries that request forbearance. Private creditors should join this mora-
torium on comparable terms to avoid the public sector bailing out private
creditors, and national legislation should be extended to include safeguard
against non-cooperative creditors. Debt to international financial institutions
(IFIs) should also be included, though IFIs will likely need support from their
shareholders to do so.78
APRIL 2020
76 Kose, M. A., F. Ohnsorge, and N. Sugawara. 2021. “A Mountain of Debt: Navigating the Legacy of the
Pandemic.” Policy Research Working Paper 9800, World Bank, Washington, DC.
APRIL 2020
157
CARICOM Regional Recovery Strategy
CARICOM countries, mostly comprising of small island economies,
and many dependent on tourism, are journeying through a long and winding
road to socioeconomic recovery from COVID-19 pandemic. The economic
afflictions caused by COVID-19, combined with existing economic down-
turns and structural hazards caused by hurricane seasons which normally
result in floods and undermines infrastructure and agriculture are daunting.
Some countries are still recovering from previous shocks such as hurricanes.79
The CARICOM Heads of Government hailed the Region’s success
in containing the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 as a result of the two major
approaches taken, namely the regional public health approach, and activa-
tion of the principles of functional cooperation, one of the core principles of
regional integration.80 During their 41st Regular Meeting in October 2020,
the CARICOM Heads of Government focused on the impact of COVID-19
on the region and on economic recovery and transformation.81 The Heads
also acknowledged that COVID-19 had exacerbated the existing development
challenges, including high deficits and debt, already confronting the region,
and agreed to the idea of a Caribbean Economic Recovery and Transforma-
tion Plan (CERT). They also agreed to prepare a joint tourism policy and, in
this regard, they established a Prime Ministerial Subcommittee on Tourism.
The CERT was inspired by and modeled to the Barbadian Econom-
ic Recovery and Transformation Plan (BERT) which focuses on mitigating
falling reserves and boosting economic growth, while attempting to protect
vulnerable groups through strengthened social safety nets. 82 The BERT plan
aimed at restoring fiscal and debt sustainability and increasing reserves and
growth.83 CARICOM established a high-level economic planning and ad-
vocacy Committee under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister of Bar-
bados to develop and deploy the CERT. The Committee also comprised of
79 https://today.caricom.org/2020/11/26/caricoms-economic-recovery-and-transformation-need-for-
serious-collaboration-and-coordination/, cited 31 December 2021.
80 2021 Caribbean Community Secretariat. Forty-fist Regular Meeting of the Conference of Heads
of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Video Conference 29 October 2020.
CARICOM. 2021. https://caricom.org/wp-content/uploads/Decisions-41-HGC-Oct-2020.pdf
81 2021 Caribbean Community Secretariat. Forty-fist Regular Meeting of the Conference of Heads
of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Video Conference 29 October 2020.
CARICOM. 2021.
82 shorturl.at/lBSZ3
83 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2021. Press Release PR21/182. June 2021
158
five Ministers of Finance or Economic Affairs, the Governor of the Eastern
Caribbean Central Bank, and the Secretary-General of CARICOM, and is
supported by some Caribbean economists and economic planners.84
Among the key objectives of CERT, include lobbying at the inter-
national level for an increase in the IMF’s SDRs allocation (to expand the
quantity of foreign exchange available to the countries); refinancing (at very
low, fixed interest rates) of all debt that Caribbean countries were forced to
incur because of COVID-19, and subjecting such refinanced debt to a 7 to
10-year moratorium on repayment; realistically revising downwards and ex-
tending the fiscal and debt reduction targets that the international financial
institutions expect countries to attain – thereby giving Governments more
financial breathing space; unlocking increased financing from international
and regional financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, IDB and
CDB; and establishing a Caribbean Recovery and Resilience Trust Fund
(CRRTF), that could provide developmental capital to be invested in mak-
ing member states more environmentally, economically and socially resili-
ent). Also, a Micro Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) should be
developed centred on Education and Training initiatives, Digitization, de-
velopment of Renewable Energy, Health programmes, Agriculture and Food
Security initiatives, and the development of a Medical Cannabis Industry. 85
The use of a Universal Vulnerability Index (UVI) to determine eligi-
bility for development assistance was also urged by the Heads of State. The
Community’s quota for vaccines shared through the COVAX facility, an in-
itiative to guarantee equitable access to safe and effective vaccines, only cov-
ered fifteen per cent of the population, making resources to obtain more vac-
cines a priority. Interestingly, the criterion of gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita was applied to the financing instrument for the COVAX facility
to determine which countries get access to vaccines on a concessional basis.
Therefore, the CARICOM expressed the urgent need to change the criteria
for access to the facility and for overall concessional financing and advocat-
ing strongly for the development and use of the UVI as the main criterion to
determine access to such funding. 86 The UVI is an international instrument
84 https://gisbarbados.gov.bb/csme/2021/01/19/caricoms-great-fight-back-in-2021/
159
to measure the economic vulnerability and needs of countries and to be used
to convince the international financial institutions that so-called “Middle In-
come Countries” of the Caribbean are indeed economically vulnerable na-
tions, and should therefore not be locked out of accessing concessional and
grant financing. 87 The UVI should be fine-tuned and vigorously marketed.
88
A follow-up study is needed to assess the process and determine to what
extent actions have been undertaken successfully and objectives achieved.
The Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) has a
critical role in the economic recovery and transformation, as it has direct
responsibility for the implementation of the CARICOM Single Market and
Economy (CSME), for other development and economic issues, and for ex-
ternal trade. At the fiftieth meeting of COTED, a strategy for the re-opening
of economies in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was approved.89
The strategy recommended a graduated model which sees governments re-
laxing restrictions in a deliberate, phased and incremental manner based on
the transmission risk profile of the pandemic in specified geographical loca-
tions, sectors or businesses. The framework suggested establishing a national
public-private consultative mechanism to govern the relaunch of economic
activity at the Member State level; minimum standards which must be at-
tained before relaxation of restrictions, and communications to build public
trust.
During the 51st COTED meeting, held in November 2020, the imple-
mentation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), trade in
goods and services, and the Community’s Multilateral Air Services Agree-
ment (MASA) were among the issues discussed. It was recognized that the
work in CARICOM on the economic recovery and transformation benefited
from proper collaboration and coordination and proposals were developed
for action within the region and active presentation to groups, such as the
G20, to bilateral partners and to global institutions. 90
88 CARICOM Today. CARICOM’s Economic Recovery and Transformation – need for serious
collaboration and coordination. 2 December 2020. https://today.caricom.org/2020/11/26/caricoms-
economic-recovery-and-transformation-need-for-serious-collaboration-and-coordination/, cited 31
December 2021.
89 CARICOM.CARICOM’S Trade and Economic Council Approves Strategy for the Re-opening of
Regional Economies. 7 May, 2020. https://caricom.org/caricoms-trade-and-economic-council-approves-
strategy-for-the-re-opening-of-regional-economies/, cited 3 January 2022
90 CARICOM Today. CARICOM’s Economic Recovery and Transformation – need for serious
160
Functional Cooperation
The value of functional cooperation within the Caribbean Com-
munity has been underlined by various regional scholars. Brewster (1992)91
argued that in the fields of functional co-operation, beside common servi-
ces whose origins were independent of Community arrangements, like the
University of the West Indies, co-ordination has widened in scope but not
in decisional depth. Foreign policy co-ordination had been a feature mostly
only of trade and economic negotiations with the EU and Canada though
common positions have been adopted with respect to a few isolated issues
in the United Nations, World Bank and IMF. Alleyne (2008) 92 argued that
functional cooperation reduces the unit costs of providing certain public ser-
vices by sharing the expenses through joint provision on a regional scale;
and exploits the synergies of combining efforts and resources of individual
member states. Its origins lie in regional institutions set up in colonial times
which were taken over as “Common Services” under the West Indies Feder-
ation and then under CARIFTA in the 1960s. Functional cooperation was
designated as the second pillar of CARICOM in the 1973 Treaty93 and has
continued as an enduring, and notably successful feature of the CARICOM
integration experience. Alleyne persuasively argued for its reconceptualiza-
tion in order to make it a more potent force for regional integration. Thomas
(2008)94 noted functional cooperation had become less appropriate with the
drive to create the Single Economy and a supporting regional development
strategy. Under the Single Development Vision and the Strategic Plan for
Regional Development, functional cooperation should be extended to subject
collaboration and coordination. 2 December 2020. https://today.caricom.org/2020/11/26/caricoms-

economic-recovery-and-transformation-need-for-serious-collaboration-and-coordination/, cited 31
December 2021.
91 Brewster, Havelock R.. The Caribbean Community in a Changing International Environment:
Towards the Next Century. Eighth ADLITH BROWN Memorial Lecture. XXIV Annual Conference of
the Regional Programme of Monetary Studies in Nassau, The Bahamas Institute of Social and Economic
Research. 27 October 1992.
92 Alleyne, George. 2008. “Functional Cooperation in CARICOM: Philosophical Perspectives, Conceptual
Issues and Relevant Examples.” In The Caribbean Community in Transition: Functional Cooperation as
a Catalyst for Change, edited by Kenneth Hall and Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang, 11–26. Kingston: Ian Randle.
93 The Treaty of Chaguaramas (July 4, 1973) established the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) based
upon four foundations: economic integration, foreign policy coordination, human and social development
and security.
94 Thomas, Clive. 2008. The Urgency of Functional Cooperation: Priority Interventions in Selected Areas
(Disaster Preparedness, Health, Education and Security). In The Caribbean Community in Transition:
Functional Cooperation as a Catalyst for Change, edited by Kenneth Hall and Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang,
11–26. Kingston: Ian Randle.
161
areas that are part of the enabling environment. Furthermore, the economic
contribution of functional cooperation in social services is well established
and should be enhanced.
Girvan (2008, 2010)95 96posited that small economies have limited
scope for trade creation among themselves; and much to gain from sharing
the costs of public services where economies of scale and critical minimum
mass are important. He continued by stating that there was a need for studies
of the economic costs and benefits of functional cooperation; both existing
and prospective.97 According to Hall and Chuck-A-Sang (2008) 98 the region’s
institutions as identified within the Treaty of Chaguaramas and the many
others that have been established to serve the region’s interests can all be jus-
tified as useful instruments of functional cooperation. The real justification
however remains the extent to which these institutions contribute to molding
the people of the region into a more cohesive entity; the extent to which these
are perceived by the people to be serving their interests; and the extent to
which, within their respective articles of association, purposes and objectives,
the overarching focus is the creation of a Community for All.99
In its 2020 Annual Report, CARICOM (2020)100 confirmed that func-
tional cooperation, one of the core tenets of our regional integration, was
adopted from the very outbreak of the virus even before a pandemic was
declared. The Community optimistically acclaimed to have been relatively
successful in managing the health aspects of the pandemic across the com-
munity, recognizing the intellectual and technical capacity available, and the
hard work of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA), as the lead
Institution in the sector, with comparatively low figures in the global con-
95 Girvan, Norman. 2008. “A Single Development Vision.” In The Caribbean Community in Transition:
Functional Cooperation as a Catalyst for Change, edited by Kenneth Hall and Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang,
27–44. Kingston: Ian Randle.
96 http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/girvan-cdb-final-apr252010.pdf
97 http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/girvan-cdb-final-apr252010.pdf
98 Hall, Kenneth O., and Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang.2008. Introduction. In The Caribbean Community in
Transition: Functional Cooperation as a Catalyst for Change. Edited by Prof. Sir Kenneth O. Hall and
Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang.
Ian Randle Publishers, 2008
99 Hall, Kenneth O., and Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang.2008. Introduction. In The Caribbean Community in
Transition: Functional Cooperation as a Catalyst for Change. Edited by Prof. Sir Kenneth O. Hall and
Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang.
Ian Randle Publishers, 2008
162
text.101 The Prime Minister of Belize, the then Chairperson of CARICOM, in
a statement confirmed that throughout the pandemic, regional cooperation,
collaboration and solidarity have been at the centre of the national responses
which is a clear affirmation of the necessity and dividends of regional inte-
gration. 102
Functional cooperation in health has been a long-standing successful
feature of cooperation in the region. The Caribbean Cooperation in Health
(CCH) advanced the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) objective of en-
hanced functional cooperation found in Article 6 of the Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas, with the aim to achieve more efficient operation of common
services and activities; to promote greater understanding among its peoples
and the advancement of their social, cultural and technological development;
and to intensify joint activities in areas such as health, education, transpor-
tation, and telecommunications. The Caribbean Cooperation in Health IV
2016 – 2025 (CCH IV) provides a framework for CARICOM Member States
to efficiently and effectively address common health and development chal-
lenges through functional cooperation and joint action. CCH IV emphasizes
multisectoral action and Regional Public Goods (RPGs) to address common
challenges in areas where a regional approach holds the best potential to add
value to national efforts. It further reflects a greater understanding of the
need for a whole-of-society approach that harnesses the capacities of a range
of stakeholders across sectors and at all levels, to tackle the complex health
and development challenges facing Caribbean countries.103
Some initiatives have also been supported in CARICOM, to foster
cooperation and coordination to confront the pandemic and its economic
outfall in the area of tourism aimed to strengthen regional integration and
cooperation among governments, subregional, regional and international
organizations and industry stakeholders to improve the resilience of tour-
ism, as well as promote sustainable and inclusive tourism in the aftermath
102 CARICOM. 2022. New Year Statement by the Chairman of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Honourable Joh Briceno, Prime Minister of Belize. December 31, 2021. https://caricom.org/new-
year-statement-by-the-chairman-of-the-caribbean-community-caricom-honourable-john-briceno-prime-
minister-of-belize/
103 Caribbean Cooperation in Health Phase IV (CCH IV). Summary of the Regional Health
Framework 2016 – 2025 https://caricom.org/documents/16429-cch-iv-publication_rev-7_health_sector_
development.pdf
163
of this crisis. A public-private (including airlines, cruise operators, hoteliers
and labor unions) sub-committee was created to define protocols to ensure
safety for workers and visitors upon reopening of tourism, was created in
May 2020.104 A COVID-19 Caribbean Tourism Task Force, comprising the
Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA), Caribbean Hotel and Trav-
el Association (CHTA), Caribbean Tourism Organization (CTO) and the
Global Tourism Resilience and Crisis Management Centre (GTRCMC) was
established to coordinate the tourism industry’s readiness and response ef-
forts with the dissemination of support tools, training, and sharing of best
practices. 105
With functional cooperation, countries could also achieve a greater
voice in global negotiations in forums such as the G20 with a platform to
provide regional public goods (RPGs). Many public goods are negotiated
globally such as a balanced international financial architecture, debt relief
or a sustainable framework on climate change. Regional integration provides
incentives for jointly providing regional public goods such as macroeconomic
stabilization or regional policy coordination on health. Regional public goods
are key for integration processes. The progressive integration of goods, servi-
ces and factor markets generates growing interdependence and naturally cre-
ates externalities that lead to an increasing demand for RPGs. and functional
cooperation, which in turn reinforce integration process. 106
Conclusions
COVID-19 is a global problem and confronting the effects of the pan-
demic will require global and coordinated efforts supported by regional initia-
tives and regional institutions.107
The past two years have seen widening gaps in labour markets, and
escalating income and wealth inequality, within and between countries. The
recovery in economic output and the labour market remains uneven across
countries due to large differences in vaccine access and policy space, and as a
104 Caribbean News.2020. “The View from Europe: The way ahead for Caribbean tourism”, 6 May 2020.
https://www.caribbeannewsglobal.com/the-view-from-europe-the-way-ahead-for-caribbean-tourism/.
105 N. Mulder (coord.), “The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the tourism sector in Latin
America and the Caribbean, and options for a sustainable and resilient recovery”, International Trade series,
No. 157 (LC/TS.2020/147), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
2020.
106 http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35824823
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164
consequence, restructuring will face greater challenges than those in the past
due to a more fragmented creditor base. 108
The prospects for recovery hinge on the urgent acceleration of vaccin-
ations, which remains relatively low in the Caribbean Community. Further
delay in equitable access to vaccines will stress the region’s health systems
and delay the economic recovery.109
Due to the pandemic, global debt levels surged, which led to several
countries initiating debt restructurings, while many others are in or at high
risk of debt distress and may also eventually need debt relief. Debt relief is
a long process as it requires changes in the international debt architecture.
The heterogeneity of debt profiles and vulnerability in the region require the
design of a debt reduction strategy that does not adopt a one-size-fits-all ap-
proach. The region is in an urgent need of appropriate fiscal space to gear
up its engine of development and fire up economic activities to reduce the
chances of lasting socioeconomic effects. A multi-donor facility and other
financing mechanisms could help governments finance key resilient invest-
ments at a time of limited fiscal space. 110 While there are limited resources,
the issues of collaboration and cooperation should be high on the agenda for
the development of the region, particularly in a time when the external real-
ities are in flux, and the future of these states is unsure. 111
Going forward, there is need for better targeted and coordinated mon-
etary, fiscal, and labour market policies, supported by new technologies. The
international community needs to strengthen and reinvigorate multilateral-
ism to ensure equal and universal access to vaccines, and address debt chal-
lenges.112 Multilateral and regional cooperation should be stepped up in fa-
109 CARICOM. 2022. New Year Statement by the Chairman of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Honourable Joh Briceno, Prime Minister of Belize. December 31, 2021. https://caricom.org/new-
year-statement-by-the-chairman-of-the-caribbean-community-caricom-honourable-john-briceno-prime-
minister-of-belize/
caribbean/
111 Kirton, Mark and Marlon Anatol. “Introduction Contemporary Issues in Caribbean and Latin
American Relations”, In Contemporary Issues in Caribbean and Latin American Relations, edited by
Mark Kirton and Marlon Anatol, vii-ix, London. Lexington Books. 2021.
165
cilitating trade and strengthening logistics, especially fast-tracking customs
procedures for the import of medical supplies.
The Caribbean is in the same position as many developing countries
and middle-income and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which are
already heavily indebted, and will be unable to raise the resources needed and
will require debt restructuring. 113
Regional coordination is particularly relevant for regional cooperation
on trade policy to coordinate and harmonize trade measures that impact on
supply chains and connectivity must be prioritized for it could contribute to
lowering the cost of fighting the crisis and set the stage for a quicker econom-
ic recovery. 114 Each county has its own strengths and opportunities, but the
Caribbean as a region should indeed regain its focus on the purpose and ideal
of its regional integration body, CARICOM, and benefit of its potential and
the opportunities it provides. Functional cooperation, being one of the core
tenets of Caribbean regional integration, is alive and has proven its value as
a key contributing factor in the containment of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Functional cooperation could be strategically useful and in fact inevitable in
the process of economic recovery.
The proposed regional initiatives, intervention and policy measures
under CERT need to be closely monitored and analysed, to ensure that
policymakers are aware of policy trade-offs and that the desired objectives
are achieved and sustained over time without causing economic and social
instability and environmental degradation.115
The outlook is indeed subject to several challenges which include re-
newed surges in COVID-19 cases; financing and debt-related stress; disrup-
tions from extreme weather events and natural disasters. In the medium term,
failure to implement productivity-enhancing and other necessary reforms
will hinder growth. The durability of economic recovery in the Caribbean,
as elsewhere, is conditional to control of the pandemic. A resurgence in new
COVID-19 and new variants will disrupt the economic activities and hamper
the recovery process.
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Considering all the aspects and perspectives addressed in this chapter, it
could be argued that the road to recovery for the Caribbean is indeed long and
winding with uncertainties ahead. Closer regional collaboration, however,
can positively contribute to quicker, less uneven, and less costly recovery.
167
Fair and Just Governance in the Caribbean:
The Case for Social Dialogue
André Vincent Henry
The Discontents
T he countries of the Caribbean have not been able to keep up with

ever increasingly complex challenges of governance and there is
clear evidence of the dysfunction as seen the growing gap between citizens’
expectations and performance by the state. Matters have come to a head with
the Covid-19 global pandemic, which has highlighted weaknesses in govern-
ance systems throughout the region. In particular, there is concern that al-
ready vulnerable sectors of the society are falling even further behind and
trust in government is eroding. Rising crime rates and the resultant reduction
in citizen security, concerns about the breakdown in social structure, low trust
in the quality of leadership and the decisions taken by government, are just
some of the concerns that can be observed in traditional and non-traditional
media across the Caribbean. This phenomenon is not limited to the Carib-
bean, but the small size of the countries of the region and the other vulner-
abilities presents special tests for governance.
Working people across the world are concerned that they are being in-
creasingly disadvantaged. In 2017, the International Trade Union Confeder-
ation conducted a global survey to test the pulse of workers on developments
in the international economic system and how these were affecting workers
(ITUC 2017)1. The topline findings of the survey were that there was wide-
spread anxiety among workers who felt that the system was generally unfair,
and that globalisation was failing working people.
1 International Trade Union Confederation 2017 Global Poll https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/
global_poll_en_print.pdf)
This anxiety was based on the sense that the richest one percent’s dis-
proportionate influence on governments (71%) was a threat to democracy
and that governments were not responding adequately to the current challen-
ges, including climate change. There was also evidence of concern that there
was a job crisis in that there just were not enough jobs (half of respondents),
that working standards were being dismantled (63%), family incomes were in
crisis with people just getting by (80%), workers’ income had fallen behind
the cost of living in the previous two years (45%), some workers (9%) lacked
the money for basic necessities; and minimum wage was insufficient to get
by (80%).
It is also not surprising, considering changes to the structure of the
international economic system, which continue to accelerate. Writing at the
turn of the century, Hodgson noted that “It is assumed that there is a long-run
tendency in modern economic systems towards greater complexity, driven by
powerful economic forces and leading to the widening of markets and greater
product diversification”2. If anything, this prediction was understated.
Schwab notes the impact of this complexity on economy, employment,
the nature of work, business, governments, society, in particular, inequality
and the middle class and the nature of community, the individual, including
identify, morality, ethics, human connection and managing public and pri-
vate information. Of particular interest, from a social justice standpoint, the
fourth industrial revolution is “fundamentally altering our relationship with
work and the social fabric in which it is embedded”.3
Stiglitz, also writing at the start of the century noted the “discontents
of globalisation”. At the time he was focusing on the expressions of dissatis-
faction and the attempted push-backs against globalisation in the developing
world4. Twenty years later, Stiglitz revisiting this work, was to note that the
discontents had spread to population groups in developed countries5. The
commonality between the developed and the developing world was that these
discontents were evidenced mainly among working people.
2 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2000). Socio-economic Consequences of
the Advance of Complexity and Knowledge, in the Creative Society of the 21st Century, Paris, OECD,
2000, p. 89
3 Schwab, Klaus (2016). The Fourth Industrial Revolution, World Economic Forum Cologny/Geneva
Switzerland 2016
4 Stiglitz, Joseph E., Globalization and its Discontents, W. W. Norton 2002
5 Stiglitz, Joseph E. National Bureau of economic Research. The Revolution of Information Economics:
The Past and the Future. Working Paper 23780 (2017)
169
The proponents of globalization and trade liberalisation would point
to opportunities for countries that are conducive to entrepreneurship and in-
novation, and its effects on political and social dimensions which are worth
equal acknowledgement6 Particularly where developing counties are con-
cerned, fundamental issues, such as poverty and unemployment, persist de-
spite the development of more integrated economies under globalisation7.
International institutes argue that free market policies and globalisation will
lead to expeditious growth, prosperity, and employment. However, statistics
over the past three decades show that pursuit of such policies have instead
facilitated poverty, inequality, consolidation of economic stagnation and
increased vulnerability with a majority of developing nations (Zhou et. al.
2011)8. Other studies echoed similar sentiments, suggesting that globalisation
and technological changes resulted in increased inequality of incomes9. Pre-
vious researchers10 discovered an increasing wage gap between unskilled and
skilled labourers within developing countries. It was determined that where
inflows of capital increased in developing countries, there was an increased
use of technology which in turn creates a greater demand for skilled labour
Globalisation has been described as “the process of creating networks
of connections among actors at intra or multi- continental distances, medi-
ated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, cap-
ital, and goods” 11. The effect of globalisation is not limited to economics, but
additionally, its effects can be seen in areas such as culture and politics.
On the other hand, Barber, somewhat more darkly, notes that globalisa-
tion is a process in which “opportunities unfold for both new forms of liberty
and new forms of tyranny”12. Further, the author states that globalisation
6 Keohane Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So, What?)
Foreign Policy No. 118 (Spring, 2000)
7 Siddiqui, Kalim. ‘Financialisation and Economic Policy: The Issue of Capital Control in the Developing
Countries’. World Review of Political Economy Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter 2017), pp. 564-589
8 Zhou, Lei, Basudeb Biswas, Tyler Bowles and Peter J. Saunders. 2011. “Impact of globalization on
income distribution inequality in 60 countries.” Global Economy Journal, 11(1): 1-16. doi. 10.2202/1524-
5861.1628
9 Jaumotte, F., Lall, S. & Papageorgiou, C. Rising Income Inequality: Technology, or Trade and Financial
Globalization? IMF Econ Rev 61, 271–309 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1057/imfer.2013.7
10 Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou and Nina Pavcnik. ‘Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing
Countries’. Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 45, No. 1, March 2007(pp. 39-82).
11 Dreher, A. (2006). Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new index of globalization.
Applied Economics, 38(10), 1091–1110.
12 Barber, Benjamin R. (2003) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, University of
Califonia Press, 2003
170
“refers to an internationalization of goods, markets, crime, disease, poverty,
capital, drugs, weapons, and terrorism; it describes the malevolent and an-
archic side of sovereignty’s weakening”.13
The environment started to change rapidly, marked by the Marrakesh
Agreement in 1994 which established the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in 1995. Marrakesh was supposed to usher in a new rules-based international
trading system, marked by greater reciprocity. Ostensibly, provisions were
made to provide some relief for developing countries and, in particular, the
least developed countries. Indeed, the WTO itself appears to boast about this,
when it states, “The WTO agreements include numerous provisions giving
developing and least developed countries special rights or extra leniency —
‘special and differential treatment’. Among these are provisions that allow
developed countries to treat developing countries more favourably than other
WTO members”.
Assertions such as this, ignore the realities and their implications. The
Marrakesh Agreement made provisions for developed countries, but those
provisions were less favourable than what held before. More significantly, the
Marrakesh Agreement opened up areas of developing countries’ economies
that were previously not subject to international trade rule and governed
more exclusively by national law, chief among them services and investments.
These new rules had been resisted from the preparatory work leading to the
Uruguay Round of negotiations under the GATT. Developing countries saw
the liberalisation of services and investments as institutionalising advantages
in favour of developed countries.
In the same year that Joseph E. Stiglitz, wrote Globalization and Its Dis-
contents14, Kieran Allen, published a journal article with the same name. Allen
noted the dissatisfaction with globalisation in the developing world, but he
also noted the mobilisation at the time of a somewhat paradoxical character
of the anti-globalisation movement: “It promises the birth of a new global
solidarity but critiques the existing forms of globalisation”.15
Lavoie and Stockhammer, in addressing the financial crisis of 2008,
pointed to one explanation that cited the fact “that since the 1980s there has
13 Barber, Benjamin R. (2003) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, University of
Califonia Press, 2003
14 Stiglitz, Joseph E., Globalization and its Discontents, W. W. Norton 2002
15 Allen, Kieran, Globalisation and its Discontents, Irish Journal of Sociology, Vol 11, 2002
171
been a switch in economic policies, which have moved from policies aiming
to promote full employment to policies targeting low inflation”16. They go on
to note, in particular:
“a phenomenon which has been called financialization and which is asso-
ciated with a ‘downsize and distribute’ model, where firms make profits
by reducing the size of their workforce instead of increasing their invest-
ment levels. Both of these changes have weakened the bargaining power of
labour, leading in most countries to a substantial decrease in the share of
wages in national income, as well as to a noticeable increase in wage and
income inequality.”
This trend is marked by a decline in the labour income share as a per-

centage of GDP over the period. The available data are for the G20, but it
can be inferred that this represents a general trend that would be observed in
developing countries, including the Caribbean. Among the G20 the decline
in labour income as a share of GDP ranged from 0.19% in Mexico to 5.63%
in Argentina. At the same time Lavoie and Stockhammer note that share of
income of the top 1 per cent earners increased by as much as 10% among the
same group of countries.
If as asserted above, these trends are holding for developing counties
as well as developed countries the implications are that the relative situation
of workers and vulnerable groups is worsening. Country poverty assessments
were conducted in several Caribbean countries17 over the period 2005 to 2009
(see Table 1 below). Most of these assessments were completed before the
2008 financial crisis and therefore did not observe the effects of that disrup-
tion.
Table 1: Summary of Country Poverty Assessments for Selected Caribbean Countries
Indigent Living in Poverty Vulnerable to Poverty
Antigua and Barbuda 3.7% 18.3% 10.0%
Belize 10.0% 30.0% 13.0%
Dominica 3.1% 28.8% 11.5%
Grenada 2.4% 37.7% 14.6%
Saint Lucia 1.6% 28.8% 40.3%
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2.9% 30.2% 48.2%
These data show that in several countries in the Caribbean more than
fifty percent of the population was either extremely poor, poor, or vulnerable
to poverty. The vulnerability indicator is particularly telling, since most work-
172
ing people in the Caribbean live one pay period to the next and loss of a job
or a disability that prevents work for a pay period could be catastrophic.
Worker Protection Systems
Boutiller and Castilla-Ramos18 have referred to the “pauperization of
labour” and noted this has several dimensions including rising employment,
low wages, changes in collective bargaining. To these can be added decline in
the power of trade unions and government policies which are driven by a no-
tion that in the context of globalisation profit-led growth was the imperative
over wage-led growth and “the widespread view that growth should be in the
driver’s seat and distribution in the backseat”19.
This convergence of forces appears designed to heighten the vulner-
ability of working people. Boutiller and Castilla-Ramos20 note that one of the
manifestations of this convergence is the precariousness employment. Precar-
iousness should not be seen only in relation to security of tenure but also in
relation to the range of protections that should be enjoyed by a worker.
Access to an adequate level of social protection is recognized by the
United Nations and the International Labour Organization as a basic right
of all individuals. It is important to understand that this growing inequality
is being overlaid on already existing systems that expose segments of society
to social and economic vulnerabilities and marginalisation. Article 22 of the
Universal Declaration of human Rights asserted in 1948 that “everyone, as a
member of society, has the right to social security…”.
Reynaud21 noted that in 2006 (before the economic crisis of 2008) in
developed countries existing social protection systems that were already in
place were under stress as “the emerging services-dominated economy is cre-
ating greater inequalities... At the same time, the process of globalization is
bringing greater insecurity and is putting strong pressure on governments and
businesses to reduce labour costs, including social security contributions.”
18 Boutiller and Castilla-Ramos (2012). Pauperization of labor market: An analysis from Europe and
Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2012, Papeles de Población 18(71)
19 Lavoie, Marc and Stockhammer, Engelbert (2013), “Introduction” in Lavoie and Stockhammer (ed.),
Wage-led Growth: An Equitable Strategy for Economic Recovery, Palgrave Macmillan/ILO, 2013 p.7
20 Boutiller and Castilla-Ramos (2012). Pauperization of labor market: An analysis from Europe and
Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2012, Papeles de Población 18(71)
21 Raynauld, Emmanuel. Social Security for All,: Global Trends and Challenges. 27 Comp. Lab. L. &
Pol’y. J. 123 (2005-2006) Social Security for All: Global Trends and Challenges
173
Consider therefore, the situation in developing countries, many of
which did not have strong social security and social welfare systems to start
with and many of which did not have the economic wherewithal to establish
these systems. Reynaud notes, “the problem of inadequate social security
coverage is not a new one for the developing world…. Today, however, in the
developing countries, the traditional forms of protection provided by the ex-
tended family and the community have largely been eroded with the process
of urbanization and industrialization”.
Weak Governance Systems
Across the world, governance systems are under stress in the face of
this complexity and even some that one could have assumed could stand the
test of time appear to be faltering. There is an increasing lament about the
rise of racism, nativism, and ultimately authoritarianism. Matthew Mac Wil-
liams observing the rise of Donald Trump in 2016 noted that “People who
score high on the authoritarian scale, value conformity and order, protect
social norms, and are wary of outsiders. And when authoritarians feel threat-
ened, they support aggressive leaders and policies”22.
If, therefore, governance systems, which have stood the test of time for
centuries seem to be fraying, how much more countries which have systems
that were weak to start with and maybe even misconceived.
Archibald Singham23, in a comparative piece about Ceylon (now Sri
Lanka) in 1931, British Guiana (now Guyana) in 1953 and Grenada in 1959
described the politics of these colonial societies as cuckoo politics in which
“the imposition of an ‘advanced’ legal constitution on to another type of
authority system produced a peculiar type of politics which we describe as
cuckoo politics, which is the converse of real politics”. While Singham was
writing about pre-independence constitutional arrangements in these three
cases, he did note that the arrangements which were supposed to prepare for
the independence were “actually dysfunctional in that after independence,
the members of the elite class which assumes office find themselves incapable
of exercising real power”. It is interesting, if maybe coincidental, that the
22 Mac William, Matthew, (Research reported in VOX 26 February 2016, 2:30pm, https://www.vox.
com/2016/2/23/11099644/trump-support-authoritarianism.
23 Singham, Archibald (1965) Three Cases of Constitutionalism and Cuckoo Politics: Ceylon, British
Guiana and Grenada, New World Quarterly, Vol II, No.1 Dead Season, 1965, retrieved from https://
newworldjournal.org/volumes/volume-ii-no-1/articles-three-cases-of-constitutionalism-and-cuckoo-
politics-ceylon-british-guiana-and-grenada/, accessed 4 December 2021
174
two countries in the Caribbean assessed by Singham, were the two countries
that experienced the most significant challenges to the established order – the
violent racial strife in Guyana and the revolution in Grenada
The actual constitutional arrangements for British colonies were pat-
terned off of the British model itself and, more specifically, the “old domin-
ions” – Canada, Australia and New Zealand – where the model seemed to
work well. Suffice it to note that the differences between the old dominions,
on the one hand, and the non-white colonies, on the other, were never suf-
ficiently appreciated and their implications understood. It is the case even
more so in the case of Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana, which, in addition
to the other pre-existing conditions had the challenge of multi-ethnic divides.
One can observe that the system worked to some extent in the immedi-
ate post-colonial period, in which the real challenges of governance were
not as severe. Coming into independence the issues facing governments were
fairly straightforward: expanding education opportunities, expanding health
care, providing for citizen security in a fairly simple context of local crime in
communities, where everyone tended to know their neighbours.
All this in the context of an economic system that was almost a con-
tinuation of what existed before, first with the Commonwealth preferences
enjoyed as countries which were colonies of the former British Empire and
then as beneficiaries from preference from the Europe when Britain joined the
European Communities in 1973. In addition to these special relationships,
developing countries “enjoyed” a variety of preferential and differentiated
treatment in the international economic system as governed by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
These economic arrangements provided a shield for Caribbean econ-
omies and delayed governments having to cope with some of the harder
issues of governance. This reality is best represented by the preferential ar-
rangements that were in place for both sugar and bananas.
It has not the case that Caribbean countries did not try to diversify
their economies. Patterning after the US policy in Puerto Rico, “Operation
Bootstrap”, and following some of the writing of Arthur Lewis, countries in
the Caribbean implemented a policy of investment by invitation. Countries
set up industrial development corporations and went after foreign direct in-
vestment. Part of this process was to offer incentives to companies to invest.
175
The globalisation and trade liberalisation together with the fall of the
Berlin Wall, opened up the competition for foreign direct investment (FDI)
and now “the very success that now middle-income countries have had in
attracting FDI may have driven labour costs higher, and thus lowered their
ability to attract investment in this new, more competitive era”; and has led to
a “‘race to the bottom’ for FDI, in which the new supply of low cost labour,
unavailable until recently, forces developing nations to pursue policies anti-
thetical to development goals”
Broome suggests that “there is genuine concern that governments in
the region have taken over more functions than their resources can cover,
consequently overstraining the limited capacity of their state apparatus and
impairing their overall ability for governance.”24
The view that Caribbean Governments are overwhelmed cannot be de-
nied, but Broome is somewhat unfair to imply that Governments have much
of an option about most of the range of issues that they are presented. In
the globalised world, governments whether rich or poor, big or small, are
presented with imperatives which they have no choice but to accept. And
especially with the reduction of special regimes and the reduction of conces-
sionary facilities for Caribbean countries, options have become even more
challenging. Complexity is here to stay and will increase. The real issue is
how do the small, open and vulnerable countries of the Caribbean organise
themselves and drive a process to respond to reality of governance complex-
ity.
It is clear that the simple framework of the immediate post-independ-
ence period has given way to a convergence of home-grown complexity and
exogenous complexity; man-made complexity and natural complexity
It is fair to say that Caribbean governance systems were never designed
for complexity. They start with two sets of disadvantages that reinforce each
other. As Singham noted in the case of Grenada and Guyana, the systems
were built not for the exercise of real power but to serve the interests of the
colonial power at the time. The other is an objective resource constraint be-
cause of small population size.
The constitutional arrangements in the Caribbean are modelled on the
Westminster-Whitehall system of the United Kingdom. Indeed, it was active-
24 Broome, Pearson (2021) “An Ethical Turn in Governance: The Call for a New Development Narrative”
Lexington Books 2021. p.11.
176
ly embraced by the nationalist leaders at independence, as Kate Quinn notes
the comment from Eric Williams, the first Prime Minister of Trinidad and
Tobago, “after all, if the British Constitution is good enough for Great Brit-
ain, it should be good enough for (us)”.25 The question arises whether lead-
ers like Williams embraced the model as a means to secure independence;
whether they did not understand the implications of the system; or whether
they did understand its implications and embraced it for that very reason be-
cause it served their own agendas.
The first observation to be made is that the Caribbean version of the
Westminster system is that it is not one which inherently seeks out consen-
sus, but one in which the winner takes all. The effect of this was identified
quite early. David Hinds26 quotes Arthur Lewis who noted in 1965 that “to
exclude the losing groups from participating in the decision making clearly
violates the primary meaning of democracy”. This proclivity on the part of
Caribbean politicians could be observed even before independence and was
more fully indulged after.
Implications for Governance
Writing about governance, Francis Fukuyama acknowledges the issue’s
complexity and the confused state of current discussions.27 One dichotomy is
obvious. On one side, there are those who focus on outputs and outcomes of
the process. These tend to be “international development” intergovernmental
organisations, such as the World Bank (the Bank has an on-going World Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGI) project28. Not surprisingly, the Bank is concerned
with whether its resources are used in the most effective and efficient manner.
To a lesser extent other agencies in the UN system take a similar approach,
again with a view of communicating and satisfying donors.
25 Quinn, Kate (2015). “Introduction: Revisiting Westminster in the Caribbean”, Commonwealth
and Comparative Politics, 2015, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1-7, quoted from Eric Williams, Constitution Reform
in Trinidad and Tobago, Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 2, Trinidad Teachers’ Educational and Cultural
Association
26 Hinds, David (2008) Beyond Formal Democracy: The Discourse on Democracy and Governance
in the Anglophone Caribbean, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 46:3, 388-406, DOI:
10.1080/14662040802176558
27 Fukuyama, Francis. ‘What Is Governance?’ Governance and International Journal of Policy,
Administration and Institutions. Volume26, Issue3, July 2013
28 https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/).
177
On the other side, there are others, mainly the international non-govern-
mental organisation community and academics who believe that the process
itself is just as important, even if not more so, than outcomes and outputs.
Table 2 illustrates a sampling of the way in which governance is con-
ceptualised and treated.
Table 2: Examples of Governance Interpretation
Source Components Considerations
• Participatory corruption is minimized, the
• Consensus oriented views of minorities are tak-
• Accountability en into account and that the
• Transparency voices of the most vulnerable
United Nations
• Responsiveness in society are heard in deci-
• Effectiveness and efficiency sion-making. It is also respon-
• Equity and inclusiveness sive to the present and future
• Rule of law needs of society
• Participatory
• Fairness Assessed in six arenas: civil so-
• Decency ciety, political society, govern-
Hayden et al (2004)
• Efficiency ment, bureaucracy, economic
• Accountability society, judiciary
• Transparency
• Transparency
Political and institutional pro-
• Responsible
cesses and outcomes that are
UNHCR • Accountability
necessary to achieve the goals
• Participatory
of development
• Responsive
The manner in which the vest-
ed authority uses its powers to
• Accountability achieve the institution’s objec-
International Social • Transparency tives, including its powers to
Security Associa- • Predictability design, implement and inno-
tion • Participatory vate the organization’s policies,
• Dynamic rules, systems and processes,
and to engage and involve its
stakeholders
• Accountability The manner in which power is
Asian Development • Participation exercised in the management of
Bank • Predictability a country’s economic and so-
• Transparency cial resources for development
• Participatory
• Transparency
OECD (2006)
• Accountability
• Rule of law
• Effectiveness
• Equity
178
Source Components Considerations
Traditions and institutions by
which authority in a country
• Voice and Accountability is exercised. This includes the
• Political Stability process by which governments
• Absence of Violence/Ter- are selected, monitored, and re-
rorism placed; the capacity of the gov-
World Bank
• Effectiveness ernment to effectively formulate
• Regulatory Quality and implement sound policies;
• Rule of Law and the respect of citizens and
• Control of Corruption the state for the institutions that
govern economic and social in-
teractions among them
(Emphasis added throughout by the author)
Governance, like any other social processes, could only be effective

when it has taken into account both the context and the situation in the oper-
ating environment. As noted above, there is a confluence of history, inter-
national developments, and national phenomena (caused or exacerbated by
human activity) which has heightened the vulnerability of the countries of
the Caribbean, like other developing countries, and particularly, certain seg-
ments of the society.
Misguided and one-dimensional economic policy in these small open
societies has led to overdependence on one or just a few sectors in each coun-
try. Climate change has exposed the physical vulnerability of the countries as
exposure to more and more devastating storms, the threat of rising sea level.
There is a real risk that as temperatures increase, many island-states or other
coastal communities in island states could disappear (Global Americans
2019)29. Extreme weather events and rising sea levels also pose an immediate
threat to the livelihoods.
The changes are rapid and there are many small islands’ economies
struggling to stay ahead and afloat during these unprecedented times.30 The
National Climate Assessment reported in November 2018 that the Caribbean
was projected to incur an estimated annual cost of inaction totalling $10.7
billion by 2025; $22 billion by 2050; and $46 billion by 2100, representing 5
per cent, 10 per cent and 22 per cent of the region’s GDP, respectively (Global
Americans 2019). It should be noted that only three variables were used to
29 Global Americans. 2019. “The Caribbean’s Extreme Vulnerability to Climate Change: A Comprehensive
Strategy to Build a Resilient, Secure, and Prosperous Western Hemisphere.” In conference High Level
Working Group on Inter-America Relations and Bipartisanship 2019.
30 Petzold, J. & Magnan, A.K. Climatic Change (2019). Climate change: thinking small islands beyond
Small Island Developing States (SIDS). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2363-3
179
calculate these estimates: increased hurricane damage, loss of tourism rev-
enue, and infrastructure damage. The overall effect of this cost can lead to
permanent economic stagnation (Global Americans 2019)31.
Another phenomenon that must be factored in the current situation of
the Caribbean is migration. An example is the crisis in Venezuela which has
caused a significant influx of migrants into Trinidad and Tobago. Estimates
of the number of migrants from Venezuela into Trinidad and Tobago vary
widely. According to the Government’s migrant registration programme,
some 17,000 Venezuelans were given residence permits for a two-year period.
The implications for increased pressure on health and social services
and the administration of an already fragile labour market and labour ad-
ministration system, the importation of social problems, include crime, and
disturbingly, the demonstration of xenophobia are indications of what can
be expected if migration were to increase in the region as it is expected as an
additional consequence of climate change.
COVID-19 was an unforeseen stressor, which forced already strained
economies, some of which were just starting to see their driving sectors re-
cover, to go sharply into contraction. Countries, in an effort to save lives and
livelihoods, had to go into deficit financing to engage in emergency social
protection activities to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on citizens. One
of the implications of managing the pandemic was that regular policy initia-
tives which were seeking to address sustainability and resilience had to be
deferred.
All this has taken place in systems of governance that were weak both
in process and output. There are therefore new layers of complexity being
placed on already shaky foundations, all of this in a context in which there
is growing evidence that significant parts of the population are alienated,
disenchanted and disengaged.
As noted by Hinds32, when he quoted Lewis, the practice of elector-
al politics almost always excludes large swarths of the population. In most
countries in the region, a two-party system dominates. Populations tend to be
31 Global Americans. 2019. “The Caribbean’s Extreme Vulnerability to Climate Change: A Comprehensive
Strategy to Build a Resilient, Secure, and Prosperous Western Hemisphere.” In conference High Level
Working Group on Inter-America Relations and Bipartisanship 2019.
32 Hinds, David (2008) Beyond Formal Democracy: The Discourse on Democracy and Governance
in the Anglophone Caribbean, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 46:3, 388-406, DOI:
10.1080/14662040802176558
180
almost evenly divided with elections won at the margin. Two recent exam-
ples to the contrary were the swings in Trinidad and Tobago in 2010, and in
Barbados in 2018 and then again in 2022. It is the pattern in most countries
to see a turnover of personnel in the state sector as new governments seek to
reward loyalty and dispense patronage.
Changes in personnel are not unusual, nor should it be unexpected as
it happens in most countries that have popular elections. However, one could
argue it is not a luxury small states can afford. It has been noted repeatedly in
this chapter that the demands of government are becoming more and more
complex and at an increasing speed. In such a situation it is imperative that a
country can call on its best resources at all times.
Exclusion is not limited to persons in official positions. Persons or or-
ganisations that are deemed not sufficiently supportive of the government
in power may also be side-lined. This could effectively exclude significant
segments of the society as community-based and other organisations find
themselves not involved in the governance process, and often, consequently
relatively deprived of the benefits of society.
Inclusion, Participation, and Responsiveness
In small countries with small populations, the arithmetic of exclusion
does not work. The country with the largest population, in the English-speak-
ing Caribbean is Jamaica, while among the independent states, St Kitts and
Nevis has the smallest. However, there are the non-independent but large-
ly self-governing territories of Anguilla and Montserrat with populations of
15,000 and 5,000 respectively. Already, with these levels of absolute popula-
tion these countries would be hard pressed to find the human expertise to ad-
dress the governance requirements of the twenty-first century, far less when
in a winner-takes-all political culture, significant percentage of the population
is side-lined and ignored.
Table 3: Population of the Independent States of CARICOM
Country Population Country Population
Jamaica 2,961,000 Saint Lucia 183,627
Trinidad and Tobago 1,399,000 Grenada 112,519
Guyana 786,559 St Vincent and the Grenadines 110,947
Suriname 586,634 Antigua and Barbuda 97,928
Belize 397,621 Dominica 71,991
181
Bahamas 393,248 St Kitts and Nevis 53,192
Barbados 287,371
Further, in the contestation for scarce resources and a prevailing model

of development that idealises the role of the private sector with all of its im-
plications, the question arises as to who gives voice to the voiceless and the
vulnerable.
A review of the definitions of good governance almost always includes
the principles of participation, inclusion, responsiveness and equity. For
countries in the Caribbean with their already weak and almost certainly, not
fit for purpose systems and faced with all the threats to sustainability and sur-
vival, the imperative of these principles and integral facets of all governance
processes is critical.
The ILO (2017) advocates for the process of social dialogue, which
it defines as “all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of
information between, or among, representatives of governments, employers
and workers, on issues of common interest relating to economic and social
policy”.33
The preamble to the ILO Constitution states in part:
“… conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and pri-
vation to large numbers of people as to products unrest so great that the
peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of the
conditions is urgently required…”
Twenty-five years after, in 1944 in the waning days of the Second World
War, the International Labour Conference (the annual general meeting of the
ILO) meeting issued its Declaration of Philadelphia at the conclusion of it
meeting in that city. The Declaration (ILO 1944) restated the objectives of the
ILO. Of particular note was the restatement of the “fundamental principles”
that:
a. labour is not a commodity;
b. freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained prog-
ress;
c. poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere;
d. the war against want requires to be carried on with unrelenting vigour with-
in each nation, and by continuous and concerted international effort in
33 ILO, 2017. Social dialogue interventions: What works and why? Lessons learned from a synthesis
review 2013–2016
182
which the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status
with those of governments, join with them in free discussion and democrat-
ic decision with a view to the promotion of the common welfare.
It is important to note the link that both the ILO constitution and the
Philadelphia Declaration make to peace. While these two documents were
responding to contribution of injustice toward the vulnerable to war, that link
is a cautionary tale for the impact of the lack of social justice and the pres-
ence of social inequities and the discontent that they engender which would
negatively affect social stability and create a vicious cycle of retarding social
progress.
The ILO, from its unique position in the international system, has ad-
vocated social dialogue as a critical variable for contributing to the search for
solutions in this complex governance environment. The ILO’s initial focus
in its work on social dialogue was on the labour market and in the forms of
tripartite dialogue (government, labour and employer, mainly at the national
level) and bipartite dialogue (mainly labour and employer at the enterprise
and sectoral levels). However, in the face of globalisation, the ILO has re-
cognised the wider benefit:
“Contemporary national and international economic imperatives suggest
that to confine social dialogue to labour market issues grossly understates
the overwhelming influence of the macroeconomic environment on the
world of work. The reality of the matter is that the changes that are today
taking place in the labour market are generally just one phenomenon in a
much larger and complex macroeconomic policy framework.”34
Social dialogue is the ILO’s best mechanism in promoting better living

and working conditions as well as social justice. It is an instrument, a tool of
good governance in various areas and its relevance is not just related to the
process of globalization but in general to any effort to make the economy
more performing and more competitive and to make society in general more
stable and more equitable
The ILO has identified the following enabling conditions for social dia-
logue (ILO 2013)35
34 Fashoyin, Tayo. InFocus Programme on Strengthening Social Dialogue ‘Fostering economic
development through social partnership in Barbados’, 2001.
35 ILO, Advancing Social justice, Promoting Descent Work. https://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/areas-of-work/
social-dialogue/lang--en/index.htm)%20%20a
183
i. Strong independent representative workers’ and employers’ organisations
with the technical capacity and access to the relevant information to par-
ticipate effectively
ii. Political will and commitment to engage in good faith
iii. Respect for the fundamental rights of freedom of association and collective
bargaining
iv. Appropriate institutional support
v. The representatives of the social partners should be recognised as equal
partners by each other.
Prospects for Social Dialogue in the Caribbean

Social dialogue does not have a very strong practice in the Caribbean.
Four countries have attempted to institutionalise social dialogue – Barbados,
Grenada, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The best-known case is Bar-
bados, which starting in the early nineteen nineties, institutionalised tripartite
social dialogue. The Barbados experience has been hailed as an international
best practice and has been sustained for more than thirty-years with a ser-
ies of social partnership protocols. Some administrations have not placed as
much emphasis on the process as others. The present government, on taking
office in 2018, appears to have recommitted to the process in a very definitive
way as demonstrated by the creation of a Ministry of Labour and Social
Partnership.
If, as the ILO and others have asserted, participation and dialogue can
foster social stability and contribute to good governance and development;
two questions arise. First, why has the practice not been as widespread, and
second, what can be done to harvest the benefits of social dialogue more
effectively in the Caribbean, where based on the objective conditions, any
factors than enhance good governance are needed.
As noted above, the ILO (2013) identified five success factors for social
dialogue. It can be argued that four are particularly relevant for the Carib-
bean. The fifth, which is respect for freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining is not in question.
Political Will
The gatekeeper to social dialogue is political will. Without it there is no
process of social dialogue. Many social partners may express an interest or
even a commitment to the process, but in reality, they are not prepared to take
the risks inherent in social dialogue. One can argue that this might be par-
184
ticularly the case in the Caribbean as a result of the hierarchical, patriarchal,
winner-take-all approach to politics and government in the region.
Fashoyin36 notes that “research attention has also focused on an analy-
sis which presents tripartism as a form of corporatist interest intermediation,
whereby the State cedes part of its authority to legally recognized representative
organizations of employers and workers, the goal being to align these interest
groups with the state policy-making framework”. One suspects that this is a
part of the challenge on both sides.
It is arguable that social dialogue necessarily entails ceding authority
by the state. But there is probably a misconception on the part of both state
representatives and the non-state representatives that this is so. Accordingly,
governments are timid and hesitant in that they are unwilling to enter into a
process that might require them to relinquish any prerogatives of power. On
the other hand, non-state representatives have a tendency to approach the
process with unrealistic expectations that they would receive all they want
and decry the process as farcical if they do not.
It may be argued that the more significant vulnerability faced by par-
ticipants is the risk of loss of prestige that comes from the interaction. In
another place Henry 37, noted that one leadership requirements for a social
dialogue is risk to personal prestige and self-perception. Such risk-taking is
not consistent with the political culture of the Caribbean.
There is also the question of political will among the private sector.
The industrial relations climate in the Caribbean has always been adversarial.
This has been so from the time of slavery. Accordingly, one could argue that
there is a predisposition of low trust among social partners. Moreover, in the
context of the prevailing neo-liberal international system, which advantages
private sector as the “engine of growth”, in many respects members of the
private sector see little incentive to engage in social dialogue, except to further
institutionalise their advantage.
In the cases of Grenada and Barbados, political will has been demon-
strated by the direct involvement of the head of government in the processes
in both countries. In the case of Barbados, the structure allows the periodic
36 Fashoyin, Tayo (2004) Tripartite cooperation, social dialogue and national development, International
Labour Review, Vol. 143, No. 4
37 Henry, André Vincent (2010), Improving Labour Productivity Through Internal Corporate Social
Responsibility, Report prepared for the Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturers’ Association and the Inter-
American Development Bank
185
and ad hoc involvement of the Prime Minister. In the case of Grenada, the
Prime Minister chaired the monthly meetings of the social dialogue process.
In both attempts in Trinidad and Tobago, the Prime Minister was not
involved in the process. In the first attempt in the 1900s, it never even got
off the ground with the labour movement disavowing the agreement. In the
second attempt, the labour movement withdrew, thereby scuttling the process.
Capacity of Social Partners
Social dialogue is more effective when the social partners have the cap-
acity to meaningfully engage. Engagement requires well-considered positions
that have been developed using evidence-based and rigorous research. Al-
most certainly, the Government is best positioned in most instances, given
their call on national resources. The private sector in most countries in the
region is also able to mobilise resources. However, in the case of tripartite so-
cial dialogue, the labour movement is clearly the most disadvantaged. In the
case of tripartite + dialogue, the non-governmental community is very often
also quite disadvantaged.
As a result of these disparities, there is a heightened suspicion that
erodes trust among the parties and negatively affects the process. The situ-
ation has not been helped by the systemic decline in the power and pres-
tige of the labour movement in the Caribbean. Whereas, in the immediate
pre-independence period of the nineteen fifties, nineteen sixties and nineteen
seventies, the labour movement across the region was a force to be reckoned
with in terms of sheer numbers and resulting political power. In most coun-
tries, the powerful political parties have the word “labour” in their name. In
the case of St Kitts and Nevis at one point the Cabinet of the country was the
same as the executive of the St Kitts and Nevis Trades and Labour Union.
The situation changed.
Union density has fallen and even political parties that carry the word
“labour” in their names often have only the most tenuous relationship with
a union (and in some cases even hostile). Many once-powerful unions have
seen workplaces that accounted for large percentage (sometimes the majority
of the membership) closed as a result of international and national economic
dynamics. Examples are the closure of the sugar industry in Trinidad and
Tobago and St. Kitts and Nevis, the closure of the government-owned oil
186
refinery in Trinidad and Tobago and the closure of the steel mill in Trinidad
and Tobago.
As a result, most unions have been unable to maintain any education
and research capacity and therefore are unable to generate the evidence-based
positions that are required for effective social dialogue.
Mutual Respect among the Partners
The factors that negatively impact mutual respect among the partners
can be seen in the three relationship dyads: labour and management; labour
and government; and government and management. Labour views manage-
ment as exploitative; management views labour as ill-informed and its repre-
sentatives as anachronistic. Labour sees the government as a tool of the op-
pressors and government views labour and workers with a type of benevolent
negligence which at times approaches reciprocal antagonism and not a cred-
ible partner able to take the long view necessary. The private sector views the
government as inefficient, ineffective and out of touch and the government
views the private sector as parasitic.
Appropriate Institutional Support
Strong institutional arrangements can help to compensate for three
weaknesses identified above. Strong institutional arrangements can create
structure and predictability, which would engender trust and support the
development of confidence and mutual respect among the partners. Strong
institutional arrangements can also bolster and supplement the capacity of
partners who have deficiencies.
In the final analysis, it will fall mainly to government to ensure that
appropriate resources are put at the disposal of the social dialogue process. In
the case of Barbados, from the outset, the government provided resources to
support the process of social dialogue. In the initial stages of its own process,
the Government of Grenada was able to access development assistance to ad-
vance the process. In Trinidad and Tobago, after more than three years, there
was still no semblance of a structure in place that would provide the kind of
institutional support to make social dialogue meaningful.
Conclusions
Social dialogue is not a panacea for improving governance, but it is a
valuable tool that can contribute to a more wholesome search for solutions
to very challenging problems for small and vulnerable states. In its Revised
187
Plan of Action on Social Dialogue and Tripartism38, the ILO notes that there is
no one-size-fits-all approach to organising and strengthening social dialogue.
While this is true, however, given the similarities of the Caribbean countries,
there are some lessons that can be learned to make social dialogue processes
more meaningful and therefore more useful to these states. In this context the
following recommendations are provided:
Initiation
One of the drawbacks in many attempts at social dialogue relates to the
fact that often, governments initiate the process. In the political culture of the
Caribbean, this may not be the most appropriate or useful, since the initiation
may be informed by narrow political interest and be more symbolic than real.
It is noteworthy that the initiation of the long-running process in Barbados,
came from a combination of labour and the private sector. A process initiated
by non-governmental social partners (labour, private sector, NGO commun-
ity, faith-based community) could create a greater sense of commitment and
buy-in.
Seizing the Moment
A crisis creates the opportunity for social partners to recognise that in
any country, there is usually more in which they have common interests than
divides them. Again, in the case of Barbados, the economic crisis of the early
nineties was the trigger for starting that process. Trinidad and Tobago has an
attempt at an institutionalised social dialogue process in the second half of
the nineteen-nighties and another that, as was noted above, which started in
2016. Both of these failed. In the more recent one, the labour representatives
withdrew. Interestingly, simultaneous with the efforts in the National Tripart-
ite Advisory Council, which failed, there was a very useful social dialogue
process to develop responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic. This process led to
the Roadmap for Recovery, as a major policy tool and practical action plan.
Indeed, it would appear that national crises force social partners to re-
cognise that their objective common interests in survival are usually more
significant than the manifestation of divergent or conflict interests.
38 ILO (2019) Revised plan of action on social dialogue and tripartism for the period 2019–23 to give
effect to the conclusions adopted by the International Labour Conference in June 2018 https://www.ilo.
org/gb/GBSessions/GB335/ins/WCMS_672962/lang--en/index.htm
188
Leadership
In this chapter, it has been noted that political systems in the Caribbean
are hierarchical and even paternalistic. This leads to the perception on the
part of actors that the involvement of the highest offices are an indication
of the seriousness and importance of a process. Delegated authority or dis-
tributed leadership do not appear to be highly valued. Accordingly, the most
successful social dialogue process in the Caribbean, in this case Barbados, has
institutionalised the involvement of the head of government. Similarly, the
process in Grenada, which had some significant success, was also marked by
the intimate involvement of the Prime Minister.
In both unsuccessful efforts in Trinidad and Tobago, the head of gov-
ernment had delegated leadership of the social dialogue to other ministers.
By contrast, the very successful process which led to the Roadmap to Recovery,
involved the Prime Minister as Chairman.
As a rule, therefore, it is recommended that social dialogue efforts in
the Caribbean should involve the Prime Minister as head of government.
It should not be necessary for the Prime Minister to attend each and every
meeting, as was the case in Grenada; but there could be regularly scheduled
meetings, maybe determined by the agenda, in which the Prime Minister par-
ticipates. In the case of Barbados, the Prime Minister is scheduled to partici-
pate in quarterly meetings, although she could attend other meetings based
on the significance of the items down on the agenda for discussion.
Tripartite Plus
The ILO model of social dialogue is principally tripartite in nature.
Barbados’ process followed this format. Trinidad and Tobago also followed
this model in its two unsuccessful attempts. In Grenada, the process was more
inclusive and involved the non-governmental community and the faith-based
community. For the preparation of the roadmap to recovery in Trinidad and
Tobago, the participation was also extensive.
In the current context of the Caribbean, the more inclusive the process,
the more meaningful will be the discussions and the more robust will be the
outcomes. The issues of governance are touching all sectors of society and as
part of the problem analysis and problem-solving process, voice needs to be
given to the widest cross section of society. Indeed, many concepts of good
governance flag consideration of the interests of the vulnerable in society as
189
an important issue. The United Nations and the World Bank use the concept
of “giving voice” to their concerns in governance.
When the organisation of society in the Caribbean is examined, it
is clear that there is a major power and capacity differential among the tri-
partite social partners. The government and the private sector have the most
assets between them. They have access to resources for research and analysis
and for communications. The trade union movement on the other, as noted
above, has been in a steady state of decline for at least the last forty years and
is now only a shadow of itself in terms of numbers and commitment from its
membership.
The decline in membership in trade unions creates a second level of
exclusion. Many of the persons who would have been represented by a trade
union and who the trade union movement would have given voice in a tri-
partite social dialogue process are now no longer organised. Accordingly,
their voices are potentially excluded, unless the trade union movement act-
ively and deliberately seeks to canvass them. This is unlikely, because across
the Caribbean the trade union movement is in its own fight for survival and
therefore focused on the interests of their membership. As a result of the
foregoing, any social dialogue process should go beyond the strict tripartite
formulation that is the common practice.
Investing in Capacity Building
Related to the need for greater inclusion is the need to provide suf-
ficient capacity building and institutional support. As noted, in the power
distribution, government and, usually, the private sector have access to far
more resources than the trade union movement and the other civil society
institutions. As an act of leadership in the process, governments should be
prepared to invest in building the capacity of the non-state actors (with the
possible exception of the private sector which should be able to mobilise its
own resources) to ensure that they are well-equipped to participate in social
dialogue.
There is a sense that the present situation presents an inflection point
for the countries of the Caribbean, as it does for other regions. The negative
impact of Covid-19 has shone a light on the inadequacies of governance sys-
tems in the regions and the need to re-imagine how government “is done”.
This includes reassessing the systems and processes, institutions and policies,
190
transformation of public services, and the role of technology in all of this.
Digital transformation is now a buzzword with Trinidad and Tobago, the first
country in the region to actually establish a Ministry of Digital Transforma-
tion.
Such an undertaking requires a design that would allow for all sectors
of society to have a voice and this may well be a critical success factor.
191
Energy Security in the Caribbean: An
analysis of policies, players and perspectives
on renewable energy
Julianna Vanessa Davis
Introduction
C aribbean Small Island Developing States (SIDS) consist of a num-

ber of small island archipelagic states characterized by specific
traits. These include small populations, varying topographies, limited divers-
ification, high dependence on imports and environmental vulnerability to
name a few.1,2 This chapter focuses on energy security in Caribbean SIDS. It
begins by discussing what the term “energy security” means and how it has
evolved over time from the traditionally held threat-reduction approach to
currently held notions, the responsible factors including actors/stakeholders,
prevailing issues, energy market structure and governance infrastructure and
prevailing global risks, as well as their role in re-conceptualizing and redefin-
ing energy security.
It offers an overview of energy security in the Caribbean from 1970
to present, examines the various dimensions of energy security, interactions
between these and the renewable energy (climate change mitigation) agendas,
various actors and the consequences of these interactions on energy security
in the context of Small Island Developing States in the Caribbean.
1 Herbert, Siân. “Development characteristics of Small Island Developing States.” (2019).
2 Briguglio, Lino. “Small island developing states and their economic vulnerabilities.” World development
23, no. 9 (1995): 1615-1632.
A case study approach is taken using the Caribbean states of Trinidad
and Tobago, Barbados and Jamaica as examples. These states, while similar
in the context of traits which define Small Island Developing States, have
unique differences as it relates to energy which will enable a multi-dimen-
sional, deeper analysis of energy security in the region. Trinidad and To-
bago is the only net-exporter of natural gas, petroleum and petroleum related
products; Barbados produces crude oil but only enough for domestic uses;
Jamaica does not produce any hydrocarbons.
Defining Energy Security: Is There an Accurate Definition?
Throughout much of the twentieth (20th) century, energy security had
been viewed from the context of energy supply and through geopolitical
lenses, which coincides with the realist perspective of security.3 On the other
hand, at the 2012 Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil and in the outcome document, The Future We Want (paragraphs: 125
- 127), the increased use of renewable energy and low-emission technologies
was recognized as an important component to be included in the implemen-
tation of policies and strategies to meet developmental needs.4
Savacool (2011) identifies forty-five (45) definitions of energy security
in the literature.5 These definitions range from state-level actors such as the
US Congress, among others who defined energy security as, “a future where
abundant, reliable, and affordable energy is produced with little impact on
the environment and no dependence on the goodwill of hostile nations;”6 to
International Organizations such as the United Nations7 and World Econom-
ic Forum8 to non-governmental organizations such as Asia Pacific Energy
Research Centre whose definition is a follows: “Ability of an economy to
guarantee the ability of energy resource supply in a sustainable and timely
manner with the energy price being at a level that will not adversely affect the
economic performance of the economy, spread across the four As of avail-
3 Walt, Stephen M. “Alliance formation and the balance of world power.” International security 9, no. 4
(1985): 3-43.
4 UNCSD. 2012. The Future We Want Outcome document adopted at Rio+20. Rio de Janeiro: United
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development.
5 Sovacool, Benjamin K., ed. The Routledge handbook of energy security. London: Routledge, 2011.
6 Kessels, John, Stefan JA Bakker, and Bas Wetzelaer. “Energy security and the role of coal.” (2008).
7 ESCAP, UN. “Energy security and sustainable development in Asia and the Pacific.” (2008).
8 Risks, Global. “A Global Risk Network Report: A World Economic Forum Report in collaboration with
Citi, Marsh & McLennan Companies (MMC), Swiss Re, Wharton School Risk Center, Zurich Financial
Services.” In World Economic Forum, p. 3. 2009.
193
ability, accessibility, acceptability, and affordability.”9 to individual authors
such as Savacool himself who simply defines energy security as “Technical
feasibility, affordability, environmental protection, reliability, and security of
supply.”10 One may therefore ask what is the “correct” definition of energy
security.
There are various elements which policy-makers and/or energy prac-
titioners should consider when defining energy security. These include: the
actors, the prevailing pertinent issue(s), the current structure of the energy
markets, prevailing risks as it relates to energy supply and the desired policy
ambition(s).
The Actors
There are a number of actors and stakeholders in the energy security
conversation that must be considered since this offers a unique lens through
which the very concept of energy security can be defined. These actors and
stakeholders range from Government and institutions of State, to commer-
cial and non-government actors all of which have different prioritization of
interests and concerns. Government interests and those of State institutions
operate based on political history and culture, while commercial actors are
usually driven by economic and profit-seeking interests.
In the context of traditional non-renewable energy security actors, this
will include segments of government, energy-intensive industries and or fossil
fuel suppliers/energy companies (with limited interest in renewable energy).
On the renewable energy spectrum, this will include segments of government
and environmental groups with interests in climate change and/or the impact
of fossil fuels on the environment, and the renewables sector. Actors who
may be interested in both fossil fuels and/or renewables include national and
local governments, energy companies, consumers, conservational groups, en-
vironmental group (outside of climate change), property/land owners and
farmers.
Moreover, actors may vary by country (developed or developing) as
well as the prevailing issues at stake, all of which will redefine and reshaping
what it means to be energy secure. Based on this, energy security therefore
9 APERC, APERC. “Quest for energy security in the 21st Century: resources and constraints.” Asia
Pacific Energy Research Centre, Tokyo, Japan (2007).
10 Sovacool, Benjamin K. “Coal and nuclear technologies: creating a false dichotomy for American
energy policy.” Policy Sciences 40, no. 2 (2007): 101-122.
194
may not always be viewed or discussed as a rational or objective issue, and
the nature and urgency of energy security will therefore be based on the back-
ground, perception and interest of a particular actor or stakeholder.
Prevailing Issues
In the current energy environment, there are several interconnected
issues which illustrate the primary problem in defining energy security. Is
there an existing regional or international threat that makes one consider the
security of energy? What are the issues at stake? Is it the environment, a
political issue, an economic issue, security, a commercial issue? In traditional
international relations, the issue of threat reduction was at the center of sec-
urity policy. However, with the end of the Cold war, threat and its linkages
to security and energy security by extension evolved. Subsequent to the Cold
war, many writers (academics and environmental activists alike) sought to
re-define the term security. However, this was done in a security environ-
ment of contradictions, obscurities, and inconsistencies as it relates to the
use of the term security.11 Moreover most “threats” require a specific actor,
intent and/or a specific ability to do harm which can be measured; these were
non-existent. As such, there was a shift from direct threats to indirect risks
which leads to another question: how is risk analyzed?
Prevailing Risks
Energy security may also be defined and examined in terms of the vari-
ous risks which may jeopardize the sufficient and reliable supply of energy
needed to fuel economic activity. In terms of the physical availability of
energy, energy security may be affected based on the availability of energy
from natural resources or insufficient investment in upstream, midstream and
downstream energy sector activities needed to provide energy to final end
users, or natural disasters which may impair energy infrastructure needed to
facilitate the reliable supply of energy. Economically, increased energy de-
mand within a country can potentially increase its reliance on the energy
supply of an energy exporter either due to exhaustion of its own natural re-
sources or because of exponential economic growth also have implications
on energy security.
11 Dalby, Simon. “Security, modernity, ecology: The dilemmas of post-cold war security discourse.”
Alternatives 17, no. 1 (1992): 95-134.
195
Politically, the relationship between actors can also have implications
on energy security. In some cases, one actor may deliberately interrupt energy
supply to others for a political interest, or there may be political instability
in one state which inadvertently disrupts energy supply and compromises
energy security. In Venezuela for example, its political differences with the
United States have seen sanctions being instituted which continue to con-
strain international energy majors from doing business with or in the country.
This has led to major energy reserves remaining undeveloped without inter-
national investment which can potentially impact energy security. The polit-
ical risks therefore also need to be considered in energy security discussions.
The Energy Market Structure/Infrastructure
The market structure of energy products is also a crucial consideration
for understanding the definition of energy security, determined by the energy
product being traded in the market between producers and consumers. For
example, in markets for natural gas, contractual arrangements between gas
producers and gas consumers are usually stable for an extended duration of
time such as a 20-30-year arrangement or longer. This is different from mar-
kets for oil which are more dynamic and volatile on a day-to-day basis. Also,
oil and coal are usually transported in significant volumes by ships and pipe-
lines while gas is usually transported via pipelines across terrain as is the case
with Trinidad and Tobago’s cross-island pipeline (CIP). Additionally, while
energy security can be considered in an objective manner, other subjective
considerations also feature in the discussion including rules and norms of
multilateral agencies like the World Trade Organization, or the International
Energy Agency (IEA) or bilateral agreements which may be in place between
countries such as Government to Government (G2G) Agreements which im-
pact energy security research and policy.
Achieving Energy Security in The Caribbean: A Historical Overview
The Energy Security debate in Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
in the Caribbean including Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Jamaica is a
multi-dimensional issue. Achieving energy security in the Caribbean region
can be labelled as a very complex undertaking given that there is no singular
196
definition of energy security.12, 13 The issues of what factors determine a na-
tion’s level of energy security will be discussed in this section.
Energy security and its implications for the Caribbean SIDS can be
traced back to pre-colonial times when most Caribbean States were energy
independent.14 Today, all Caribbean SIDS including Jamaica and Barbados
are net importers of fossil fuels with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago.15
In 1972, this was the first time that the concept of Island Developing
States (IDS) was mentioned at the international level. This was during the
third and fourth sessions of the UN Conference on Trade and Development.16
At the time, it was believed that IDS were facing economic development chal-
lenges because of their remoteness which created successive challenges relat-
ed to communications and transport.17 However, at the time, little mention
was made of energy security even though many SIDS in the Caribbean and
Pacific were net energy importers and had adopted fossil fuels as their main
form of energy.18 The 1973 energy crises however catapulted energy security
to the top of the global agenda and this prompted authors such as M. Will-
rich (1976)19 to define energy security as “Assurance of sufficient energy sup-
plies to permit the national economy to function in a politically acceptable
manner.” As oil prices quadrupled in 1973, many countries that were heavily
reliant on fossil-fuel imports were negatively affected. In the case of Jamaica,
12 Ang, Beng Wah, Wei Lim Choong, and Tsan Sheng Ng. “Energy security: Definitions, dimensions and
indexes.” Renewable and sustainable energy reviews 42 (2015): 1077-1093.
13 Winzer, Christian. “Conceptualizing energy security.” Energy policy 46 (2012): 36-48.
14 For a detailed discussion of Caribbean Energy Security perspectives from the post-colonial era all the
way through to the industrial revolution, See: Niles, Keron, and Bob Lloyd. “Small Island Developing
States (Sids) & Energy Aid: Impacts on the Energy Sector in the Caribbean and Pacific.” Energy for
Sustainable Development 17, no. 5 (2013): 521-30.
15 Scobie, Michelle. “Fossil fuel reform in developing states: The case of Trinidad and Tobago, a petroleum
producing small Island developing State.” Energy Policy 104 (2017): 265-273.
16 Grote, Jenny. “The Changing Tides of Small Island States Discourse - A Historical Overview of
the Appearance of Small Island States in the International Arena.” Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee
/ Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 43, no. 2 (2010): 164–91. http://www.jstor.org/
stable/43239555.
17 Ibid.
18 Niles, Keron, and Bob Lloyd. “Small Island Developing States (Sids) & Energy Aid: Impacts on the
Energy Sector in the Caribbean and Pacific.” Energy for Sustainable Development 17, no. 5 (2013): 521-
30.
19 Willrich, Mason. “International energy issues and options.” Annual Review of Energy 1, no. 1 (1976):
743-772.
197
the cost of oil imports increased by 172 percent and thereafter the country
registered seven (7) successive years of negative economic growth.20
In addition to oil price shocks experienced by many SIDS, many also
had to contend with very expensive transportation premiums as SIDS by
their very nature are sometimes located in remote locations which are separ-
ate and apart from major transportation trade routes.21 In the case of Carib-
bean SIDs, while Trinidad and Tobago sought to ensure sufficient supplies
to the region, then Prime Minister, Dr. Eric Williams stated that he could
not accord “special rates for Trinidad oil to the suffering partners because
it was simply unworkable in a world oil market to have two-tier pricing.”22
This was stated in an environment where the Caribbean Community (CARI-
COM) was just created, and articulated aspirations to strengthen regional ties
amongst member states.
As States sought to grapple with the oil crisis of the 1970s, the discus-
sions pertaining to alternative forms of energy, more specifically, renewable
energy, emerged. The International Energy Agency (IEA) defines renewable
energy as “energy that is derived from natural processes that are replenished
constantly [such as] solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, hydropower, ocean re-
sources [tidal and wave], and biofuels, electricity and hydrogen derived from
those renewable resources.”23
In the Caribbean, attempts were initially made to develop renewable
sources of energy in response to the crises, but as energy prices dipped in the
mid-80s, these attempts were mostly abandoned.24 For Barbados however,
their response was to develop the solar water heating sector in the 1970s, and
by the 1980s, this sector had replaced the gas-fired and electric immersion
heaters that was previously in place.25
20 Clair, Matthew, Peter Blair Henry and Sandile Hlatshwayo. “Two Tales of Entrepreneurship: Barbados,
Jamaica, and the 1973 Oil Price Shock.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 157, no. 1
(2013): 32–57. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23558139.
21 Weisser, Daniel. “On the economics of electricity consumption in small island developing states: a role
for renewable energy technologies?” Energy Policy 32, no. 1 (2004): 127-140.
22 Binder, David. “Oil Crisis Disrupts Caribbean Development Plans.” The New York Times (New York),
February 18, 1974
23 IEA. 2019. World Energy Outlook 2019. Paris: International Energy Agency.
24 (Niles and Lloyd 2013)
25 Rogers, Thomas. “Development of innovation systems for small island states: A functional analysis
of the Barbados solar water heater industry.” Energy for Sustainable Development 31 (2016): 143-151.
198
The mid-1980s saw many Caribbean States return to the tradition-
al model of reliance on fossil fuel imports as their major source of energy,
however while fuel fossil prices fell, renewable energy remained on the
international agenda. This was due to two key factors: (1) the publication
of the Report “Our Common Future” in 1987 by the Brundtland Commis-
sion coupled with (2) the environmental justice movements of the 1970s and
1980s.26
In the 1990s as the Cold War and Gulf Wars ended and oil prices sta-
bilized, the issue of energy security all but waned for SIDS. Additionally,
with the formation of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), many
Caribbean SIDS increasingly focused on Climate Change mitigation and
adaptation issues which were viewed as separate from Energy Security.27
As the 20th century ended, in the year 2000, the United Nations De-
velopment Programme (UNDP) defined Energy Security as “the continuous
availability of energy in varied forms, in sufficient quantities at reasonable
prices.”28 Moreover the UNDP (2000)29 also defined Sustainable Energy as
“Energy produced and used in ways that support human development over
the long term, in all its social, economic, and environmental dimensions.”
This was a radical departure from previous notions of energy security and
sustainable energy which focused on the supply of energy as a means of
achieving energy security. Instead, the focus was on how energy is produced
and used and ensuring that these activities are consistent with human well-be-
ing and the environment in the long term. In the subsequent years following
Rio+20, a process ensued to draft Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to
replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as part of the post-2015
development agenda. The SDGs were formally adopted in mid-2015. Goal
7 proposes to “ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern
energy for all.”30 Taking into account the UNDP’s definition of Energy Sec-
26 Breukers, S. 2006. Changing Institutional Landscapes for Implementing Wind Power: A Geographical
Comparison of Institutional Capacity Building: The Netherlands, England and North Rhine-Westphalia.
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
27 Yergin, Daniel. “Energy Security in the 1990s.” Foreign Affairs. 67 (1988): 110
28 UNDP. 2000. World Energy Assessment: Energy and Challenges of Sustainability. New York: United
Nations Development Programme.
29 Ibid. p. 3
30 IISD. 2014. “Summary of the Thirteenth Session of the UN General Assembly Open Working Group
on Sustainable Development Goals.” International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://enb.
iisd.org/download/pdf/enb3213e.pdf.
199
urity and Sustainable Energy Security, it is clear that at its core, energy sec-
urity is a multifaceted, multidimensional issue. The next section will explore
these dimensions further.
Energy Security: A Multidimensional Perspective
Following the historical overview of energy security in the previous
section, it is clear that as energy security evolved over the past four decades,
it is closely linked to a number of considerations which will be discussed in
this section. The literature identifies several dimensions of energy security in-
cluding cost/finance, trade, diversity, social-cultural and governance, among
others.
The Energy Security-Finance-Nexus
The prevailing paradigm in the nexus of energy security, finance and
cost is centered on the cost of energy fossil fuel imports. When viewed in the
context of economy and end-users,31 for net importers such as Jamaica and
Barbados, lower energy prices may be deemed as favorable as it enables eco-
nomic growth, industrial consumption and energy consumption all of which
seems to enhance energy security. However, low energy prices can create a
false sense of “instant” energy32 security and does not consider changes in
the long-term which occurred in 1973 as discussed previously. On the other
hand, high energy prices engender creativity and encourages countries to de-
velop alternative/renewable forms of energy, however it also limits economic
growth in those countries that are reliant on energy imports.33
As it relates to producers of energy such as Trinidad and Tobago, when
energy prices are lower, the economy will experience lower revenues as was
the case for Trinidad and Tobago in 2016 when the price of West Texas Inter-
mediate (WTI) oil fell to US$37 per barrel from almost US$100 per barrel
in 2014.34 One can therefore assume that Trinidad and Tobago experiences
energy security when oil prices are high. While this may be the case to an
extent, energy security can be eroded when an energy producer, due to its
31 Valentine, Scott Victor. “The fuzzy nature of energy security.” In The Routledge handbook of energy
security, pp. 74-91. Routledge, 2010.
32 Lakić, Nikola. “Energy security of the republic of Serbia.” International Journal of Economics & Law
3, no. 9 (2013): 77-86. Harvard
33 UNDP, United Nations Development Program, UNDESA, United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, WEC, World Energy Council. 2004. World Energy Assessment 2004: Overview. New
York: United Nations.
34 See: (Scobie, 2017)
200
natural resources, overvalues its currency and/or neglects to develop alterna-
tive industries leading to problems in the area of “Dutch Disease” more aptly
referred to as “Resource Curse.” 35 Over time, when the natural energy re-
source declines with no alternatives sources of revenue in place, the country
the exporter economy will contract.36
Another factor as it relates to cost, is the finance required to secure
an energy system. These may include the initial infrastructure costs, cost
of maintenance, the cost as it relates to the environmental impacts, and for
global superpowers, it may even involve the cost of military deployment to
protect the energy system. The United States for example spends on aver-
age 50 billion USD per year on security in the Middle East.37 According to
the United Nations Environmental Programme (2014)38, by 2030/2050 the
costs of adaptation to climate change and the residual damages for Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) of which emissions from fossil fuels is a major
contributory factor, is estimated to be the same amount (50 billion USD) per
year.
In light of the above, much of the research is now centered on afford-
able solutions which boosts energy security via renewable energy and not
military deployment.39 Deploying a renewable energy system requires capital
expenditure however when compared to the operational cost for military de-
ployment described above, the operation costs for renewables are minimal.
Therefore, an energy system that requires initial costs and minimal operation-
al costs can be viewed as energy secure. Moreover, carbon emissions costs
from renewables are negligible which makes this option more environmental-
ly sound and more affordable.
According to the International Energy Agency (2021)40 four critical
actions are necessary to close the gap between current COP26 pledges and
35 Hosein, Roger. “Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease.” In Oil and Gas in Trinidad and Tobago, pp.
87-114. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021.
36 De V. Cavalcanti, Tiago V., Kamiar Mohaddes, and Mehdi Raissi. “Commodity price volatility and the
sources of growth.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 30, no. 6 (2015): 857-873.
37 O’Hanlon, Michael. “How much does the United States spend protecting Persian Gulf oil.” Energy
security: economics, politics, strategies, and implications (2010): 59-72.
38 UNEP. 2014. The Adaptation Gap Report. Available at: https://climateanalytics.org/media/unep_
ad- aptation_gap_report_2014.pdf
39 Balat, Mustafa. “Security of energy supply in Turkey: Challenges and solutions.” Energy Conversion
and Management 51, no. 10 (2010): 1998-2011.
40 IEA. 2021. World Energy Outlook 2021. Paris: International Energy Agency.
201
the 1.5 degrees required over the next 10 years. These include (1) a monu-
mental push towards clean electricity; (2) an unyielding emphasis on energy
efficiency; (3) an extensive push to decrease methane emissions via fossil
fuels; and (4) a massive expansion in clean energy innovation. At present,
many of the existing technologies required are available, but have only been
advanced to the prototype phase and requires further funding to move from
prototype to full deployment.41
Energy Security and Trade
As climate change becomes more ubiquitous, the development and
subsequent deployment of renewables and green technologies will be re-
quired. Jamaica’s “Vison 2030: National Development Plan” stipulates that
by the year 2030, 20 percent of the country’s energy requires will be renew-
able energy sources.42 Similar goals have been established by Barbados43 and
Trinidad and Tobago44. The distribution of clean technologies is rooted in
trade and the issue of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), the debate of which
is fraught with contradictions. On one hand, some argue that IPRs encour-
ages innovation and development of renewable forms of technology,45 whilst
others argue that IPRs makes renewable technologies needlessly expensive
which limits access to the countries and groups where it is critically need-
ed.46,47 This debate has critical implications for many Small Island Develop-
ing States. As many of the new technologies for energy efficiency and other
“green” technologies are created in the developed world, and as such, these
countries own the property rights. If the latter arguments ring true, Caribbean
41 Ibid.
42 Planning Institute of Jamaica. Vision 2030 Jamaica: national development plan. PIOJ, 2009.
43 Espinasa, Ramón, Christiaan Gischler, Malte Humpert, Camila Gonzalez Torres, and Carlos Sucre.
“Achieving Sustainable Energy in Barbados: Energy Dossier.” (2016).
44 Ministry of Planning and Development, Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.
n.d. Vision 2030: National Development Strategy 2016–2030. Port of Spain: Ministry of Planning and
Development, Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.
45 Noorollahi, Younes, Muhammad Salman Shabbir, Ahmed F. Siddiqi, Lubov K. Ilyashenko, and
Esmaeil Ahmadi. “Review of two-decade geothermal energy development in Iran, benefits, challenges,
and future policy.” Geothermics 77 (2019): 257-266.
46 Sovacool, Benjamin K. “Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How Intellectual Property Rights May
Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R& (and) D).” Alb. LJ Sci. & Tech. 18 (2008):
381.
47 Li, Jinkai, Oluwasola E. Omoju, Jin Zhang, Emily E. Ikhide, Gang Lu, Adedoyin I. Lawal, and
Vivian A. Ozue. “Does intellectual property rights protection constitute a barrier to renewable energy? an
econometric analysis.” National Institute Economic Review 251 (2020): R37-R46.
Harvard
202
SIDs can be vulnerable in a situation where they cannot afford the cost of
these new technologies. This can significantly limit the extent to which they
are able to respond to climate change and other environmental challenges in
the near and distant future.48
Energy Security and Diversity
Diversity is critical to energy security.49,50 There are two avenues this
can be explored including: diversity of fuels and/or energy sources (e.g.,
energy carriers, renewables versus non-renewables) and diversity of avenues
where energy can be made available to end-users.51
Diversity of fuels and energy sources
This area of diversity can be viewed in terms of the form of energy (oil,
natural gas, renewables). Solely relying on one form of energy, be it gas-only
or oil-only, can lead to energy insecurity particularly if the country is a net
importer of energy. Similarly, if an importer of energy has only one source,
souring oil imports from one country for example, this can also have implica-
tions for energy insecurity. For SIDS, this coupled with the effects of climate
change, makes the argument for renewables even more compelling.
At present, the renewables industry in many Caribbean states are the
embryonic stage. This is demonstrated in Table 1 and Figure 1 below which
outlines the share/percentage of renewable energy consumption in total final
energy consumption for Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica during
the period 1990 to 2020.
Table 1: Renewable energy consumption (as a percent of total final energy consumption)
Year/Country Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago LAC
1990 18.94 7.63 1.19 32.44
2000 14.32 9.37 0.76 28.21
2011 4.66 9.84 0.38 28.20
2012 4.21 11.94 0.37 27.55
2013 3.51 11.16 0.36 27.59
2014 3.43 11.56 0.34 27.43
2015 3.18 11.80 0.36 27.94
2016 3.50 10.76 0.42 ..
2017 5.16 10.72 0.41 ..
2018 5.84 8.67 0.45 ..
2019 .. .. .. ..
2020 .. .. .. ..
203
Source: World Bank, Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) database; International Energy
Agency (IEA)
Figure 1: Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago: Renewable energy consumption (as a
percent of total final energy consumption)
Source: World Bank, Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) database; International Energy
Agency (IEA)
Energy Diversity vs Energy (In)Dependence

The term “energy independence” was first coined by former US Presi-
dent Richard Nixon in his 1973 energy policy speech “Project Independ-
ence”52 at the time, energy security was often viewed along the lines of being
energy independent where a country did not require imports of energy. How-
ever, in today’s global world, some have argued that energy independence
should be viewed as meaning “not vulnerable” rather than focused on an
energy supply that is devoid of imports.53 Moreover, independence (especially
for small island developing states) cannot be attained as many parts of the
infrastructure required for an energy system to function has to be import-
ed.54 In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, development of the energy sector
required significant foreign investments from foreign energy companies over
52 See Yergin, 1990

53 Kanchana, Kamonphorn, and Hironobu Unesaki. “Assessing energy security using indicator-based
analysis: The case of ASEAN member countries.” Social sciences 4, no. 4 (2015): 1269-1315.
54 Ibid.
204
the years in order for the country to realize the full potential of its energy
supplies.55
Social-Cultural dimensions
Energy security, from social and cultural dimensions, takes on a new
shape. As threats are centered on issues of energy poverty56, pollution57 and
inequality of access58 to name a few. The social and cultural dimensions also
raise issues of environmental justice59 which is connected to climate change,
environmental pollution and degradation as a result of fossil fuel produc-
tion activities. Figure two below illustrates carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
measure in kilotons for Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Jamaica. These
emissions comprise CO2 produced due to gas flaring and fuels as well emis-
sions produced as a result of the consumption of solid and liquid fossil fuels.
As shown in figure 2, Trinidad and Tobago is the largest producer of CO2
emissions.
Figure 2: Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago: 1960 – 2020 Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
emissions (kiloton)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
However, the CO2 emissions of a state show only one side of story. For
more a more comprehensive picture, gases such as nitrous oxide and meth-
55 Boopsingh, Trevor M., and Gregory McGuire, eds. “From oil to gas and beyond: A review of the
Trinidad and Tobago model and analysis of future challenges.” (2014).
56 Nussbaumer, Patrick, Morgan Bazilian, and Vijay Modi. “Measuring energy poverty: Focusing on
what matters.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 16, no. 1 (2012): 231-243.
57 Jacobson, Mark Z. “Review of solutions to global warming, air pollution, and energy security.” Energy
& Environmental Science 2, no. 2 (2009): 148-173.
58 Simpson, Adam. Challenging inequality and injustice: A critical approach to energy security.
Routledge, 2013.
59 Oskarsson, Patrik, and Heather P. Bedi. “Extracting environmental justice: Countering technical
renditions of pollution in India’s coal industry.” The Extractive Industries and Society 5, no. 3 (2018):
340-347.
205
ane should also be considered (especially for countries with an agricultural
sector). Figure 3 below illustrates the methane emissions for Trinidad and
Tobago, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago conveyed in CO2 equivalents,
this enables the different gases (methane and carbon dioxide) to be compara-
tively compared for the three countries. Studies60 have shown that methane
is at least 80 times more effective at warming the earth over 20 years and 28
times more effective over a 100-year period. As shown in figure 3, since 1990
Barbados has emitted more methane than Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica
combined.
Figure 3: Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago: 196061 – 2020 Methane Emissions
(kiloton of CO2 emissions equivalent)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
What are the implications of the above for energy security? Some argue
that the environmental impact of climate change can create sea-routes for
trade, uncover more locations for traditional gas and oil and reduce the de-
mand for heat.62 Nonetheless, the destructive effects of climate change and
environmental degradation far outweigh any positive benefits with implica-
tions for energy supply which can affect the function of states and society by
extension. This was case with Hurricanes Rita and Katrina in 2005 which
delivered “the world’s first integrated energy shock” where gas, oil supply
60 Pinault, Jean-Louis. “Anthropogenic and natural radiative forcing: Positive feedbacks.” Journal of
Marine Science and Engineering 6, no. 4 (2018): 146.
61 Data for the period 1960 to 1969 was not available.
62 Luft, Gal, Anne Korin, and Eshita Gupta. “Energy security and climate change: a tenuous link.” In
The Routledge handbook of energy security, pp. 61-73. Routledge, 2010.
206
and electric power systems where all simultaneous and severely affected.63,64
More recently, the 2021 Texas snow storm halted most social, cultural and
economic operations within the state and left more than 10 million people
without power for weeks.65 Energy supply interruptions which leaves soci-
eties without the necessary energy to function can lead to dangerous social/
societal conflicts.66,67
While much of the world seems to only now be waking up to the ex-
treme weather effects of climate change, Caribbean SIDS have had to deal
with significantly more extreme hurricanes due to climate change on an al-
most annual basis, and what now looks like a vicious cycle of rebuilding after
each weather event.
Another thought-provoking view is that of the “enviro-economic” con-
cerns, for example, as stated earlier, Trinidad and Tobago required significant
foreign investments from foreign multinational energy companies to develop
its hydrocarbon industry.68 This begs the question, who benefits economically
versus environmentally? And what policies determine how these benefits are
allocated?
Policy dimension
The relationship between policy and energy security is a complex one,
including regulations, political systems and governance structures of a coun-
try all of which have implications for energy security. Some have argued that
energy security can only be attained through converging national interests.69
However, the types of political systems determine the foreign relationships
a country has which can range from absolute dependence on a single ally to
mutual cooperation and dependence. In democratic systems for example, the
63 Yergin, Daniel. “Ensuring energy security.” Foreign affairs (2006): 69-82.
64 Chow, Edward, and Jonathan Elkind. “Hurricane Katrina and US energy security.” Survival 47, no. 4
(2005): 145-160.
65 Doss-Gollin, James, David J. Farnham, Upmanu Lall, and Vijay Modi. “How unprecedented was the
February 2021 Texas cold snap?” Environmental Research Letters 16, no. 6 (2021): 064056.
66 Månsson, André. “Energy, conflict and war: Towards a conceptual framework.” Energy Research &
Social Science 4 (2014): 106-116.
67 Costantini, Valeria, Francesco Gracceva, Anil Markandya, and Giorgio Vicini. “Security of energy
supply: Comparing scenarios from a European perspective.” Energy policy 35, no. 1 (2007): 210-226.
68 Boopsingh, Trevor M., and Gregory McGuire, eds. “From oil to gas and beyond: A review of the
Trinidad and Tobago model and analysis of future challenges.” (2014).
69 Georgescu, Constantin. “Energy terrorism security of energy in Romania and European union
NATO’s role in security of energy endogenous and exogenous influencing factors.” Knowledge Horizons.
Economics 7, no. 2 (2015): 172.
207
state (representative of individual citizens) is responsible for energy secur-
ity.70 Conversely, as it relates to dictatorships, energy decision(s) are made by
single individuals or groups in power who theoretically do not represent the
interests of citizens and individuals alike.71 The political system of a country,
to a large extent, determines how that country is treated at the international
level, which in turn has implications for energy security. For developing and
less developed countries for instance, treatment at the international level may
be positive through energy agreements and treaties, and/or negative for ex-
ample sanctions and embargos both of which reduce energy security.72 A re-
cent example of this is the current US sanctions on Venezuela which make it
“impossible” at this time for Trinidad and Tobago to enter into commercial
arrangements with Venezuela for its natural gas resources which reside close
to the maritime border between both countries.
Regulatory systems of states also have implications for energy security
and these are determined by market system adopted by states. Some have
argued that firmer laws and policies make for a more secure energy system as
a liberalized system tends to focus on profits rather than the social wellbeing
of citizens.73 Whereas others have argued that a regulated system with many
subsidies promotes energy inefficiency which increases greenhouse gas emis-
sions, which leads to negative externalities and increases the societal costs in
the long-term.74 Studies estimate that several Caribbean SIDS provide fuel
subsidies which can be direct or indirect. Subsidies range from 0.1 and 0.8
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the case of Jamaica and Bar-
bados respectively to more than 2 percent of GDP in the case of Trinidad and
Tobago. Such subsidies can significantly reduce the price faced by consumers
(which can assist very poor individuals). On the other hand, it can also limit
the incentives of states like Trinidad and Tobago to switch to cleaner energy
sources.75
70 Barrett, Mark, Mike Bradshaw, Antony Froggatt, Catherine Mitchell, Yael Parag, Andrew Stirling, Jim
Watson, and Christian Winzer. “Energy security in a multi-polar world.” Energy Security in a Multipolar
World (2010).
71 Ibid
72 Pascual, Carlos, and Jonathan Elkind, eds. Energy security: economics, politics, strategies, and
implications. Brookings Institution Press, 2010.
73 Goldemberg, José. “World energy assessment. Energy and the challenge of sustainability.” (2001).
74 El Mahmah, Assil, and Magda Kandil. “Fiscal sustainability challenges in the new normal of low oil
prices: Empirical evidence from GCC countries.” International Journal of Development Issues (2019).
75 Di Bella, Mr Gabriel, Mr Lawrence Norton, Mr Joseph Ntamatungiro, Ms Sumiko Ogawa, Issouf
208
Energy Security and Governance Perspectives
It has even been argued that a concerted international effort is neces-
sary for the deployment of clean energy to address the challenge of climate
change.76 However, at the international level, no regime or “architecture”
exists to govern energy and renewable energy. As such, in the present en-
vironment, energy governance is fragmented amongst a number of state and
non-state actors.77 It has been argued by some that the outcomes of the most
recent Conference of the Parties (COP26) should provide the direction for the
implementation, and deployment of clean energy. However, if one were to
evaluate the outcomes from COP26 as an indicator78, the conclusion may be
that there is still a very long way to go.
In the context of Caribbean SIDS, at the regional level, while the Carib-
bean Community (CARICOM) is a key stakeholder, there is no one institu-
tion primarily responsible for regional governance. Instead, key stakehold-
ers including the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat’s Energy
Unit, the Caribbean Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency
(CCREEE) and the Caribbean Electric Utility Services Corporation (CAR-
ILEC) take responsibility for energy activities at the regional level.
National level actors and governance perspectives: Trinidad and
Tobago
The energy sector is the mainstay of Trinidad and Tobago’s economy.
The country has been in the hydrocarbon business for more than 100 years
and in the early 1990s shifted its focus from being an oil-based economy to a
gas-based economy. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago, via its Min-
istry of Energy and Energy Industries as the lead stakeholder in the energy
business, has expressed its commitment to the energy transition.
At the commercial level, the Government has attracted foreign invest-
ment from large energy majors like BP and Shell in long-term contractual
arrangements to develop natural gas as the cleanest hydrocarbon and “the
fuel of the energy transition”. The country’s integrated gas business also has
Samake, and Marika Santoro. Energy subsidies in Latin America and the Caribbean: stocktaking and
policy challenges. International Monetary Fund, 2015.
76 See the IEA World Energy Outlook 2021
77 Scobie, Michelle. “Global environmental governance and small states: Architectures and agency in the
Caribbean.” (2019).
78 See: Mountford, Helen, David Waskow, Lorena Gonzalez, Chirag Gajjar, Nathan Cogswell, Mima
Holt, Taryn Fransen, Molly Bergen, and Rhys Gerholdt. “COP26: Key Outcomes From the UN Climate
Talks in Glasgow.” https://www.wri.org/insights/cop26-key-outcomes-un-climate-talks-glasgow
209
other key commercial actors involved including the State-owned National
Gas Company (NGC) whose business includes the aggregation, purchase,
sale, transmission and distribution of natural gas, as well as a growing port-
folio of investments and activities in the space of clean energy as well as
Heritage Petroleum which focuses on exploration, development, production
and marketing of crude oil. For export, Atlantic is one of the world’s largest
producers of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) producing LNG from natural
gas delivered from fields in and around Trinidad and Tobago to the country’s
four-train liquefaction facility. The shareholders in these trains include the
Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Shell, BP and others.
As part of the country’s transition to renewable energy, two solar parks
are being built in Trinidad with a planned cumulative output of 112.2
MW, with the possibility of additional future solar projects in the coun-
try. Non-governmental organizations in the energy sector include the
Energy Chamber of Trinidad and Tobago (ECTT) which advocates
policy positions on behalf of its member companies across the energy
value chain, as well as the various Chambers of Commerce.
National level actors and governance perspectives: Barbados
In the Barbadian environment, the Government is the dominant stake-
holder in the ongoing energy transition. The Government has made a policy
commitment in its National Energy Policy to have 100 percent of its energy
consumption come from renewable sources by 2030. The primary Govern-
ment stakeholder in this effort is the Ministry of Energy and Water Resour-
ces with supporting secondary stakeholders to include the Ministry of the
Environment & National Beautification, the Ministry of Finance, Economic
Affairs & Investment, the Ministry of Transport, Works & Maintenance, the
Ministry of Education, Technology & Vocational Training.
At the commercial level, the Barbadian Government signaled its intent
to host a bid round for offshore acreage which is expected to attract par-
ticipation from global energy majors. Potential discoveries of oil and gas
are expected to be developed and exported and not utilized internally for
energy consumption. The Barbados National Oil Company (BNOC) is the
state-owned energy provider as one of the leading commercial entities along
with the National Petroleum Corporation (NPC) which is a statutory body
210
established to manage the distribution of natural gas supply in Barbados for
domestic, commercial and industrial uses. The NPC provides and maintains
an adequate, reliable, competitive, safe and efficient gas service to custom-
ers at a reasonable cost. The NPC has minority equity in the BNOC while
the Government of Barbados has majority equity. The Barbados Light and
Power Company Limited also features as a leading commercial stakeholder
as the country’s power provider.
Primary NGO stakeholder groups include the Barbados Chamber of
Commerce, the Barbados Renewable Energy Association (BREA) focused
on renewable energy and energy efficiency at the residential, commercial,
industrial and national levels, the University of the West Indies and other
educational institutions.
The Government, through the Ministry of Science, Energy and Tech-
nology, is the primary stakeholder in the country’s energy sector responsible
for, inter alia, encouraging private sector innovation in the science, technol-
ogy and energy; providing the legal and regulatory reform of the electricity
and gas sectors; improving the national energy efficiency and conservation;
and increase the percentage of electricity generation from renewable sources
to reduce the country’s dependence on imported fuels for energy security.
Other Government actors include the Ministry of Finance and the Public
Service and the Ministry of Transport and Mining. At the regulatory level
for the electricity sector, the Office of Utilities Regulation (OUR) is the main
regulator of service and rates.
National level actors and governance perspectives: Jamaica
In Jamaica’s case, the Government is a primary stakeholder in the coun-
try’s energy sector. The Petroleum Corporation of Jamaica (PCJ), a statutory
agency of the Government of Jamaica, was responsible for the implementa-
tion of Jamaica’s National Energy Policy and development of the country’s
energy resources until 2020. The PCJ promoted sustainable development, not
only in energy, but also in other areas of national importance with the aim
to fostering energy security, while also promoting initiatives that will harness
Jamaica’s local energy resources and renewable energy. However, in 2020,
the Government of Jamaica closed the PCJ and absorbed its functions into
the Ministry of Science, Energy and Technology.
211
The current Ministry of Science, Energy and Technology has over-
arching responsibility for the development of the energy sector in Jamaica.
The Ministry’s Energy Division facilitates the development of strategies, pro-
grammes and projects to ensure the successful implementation of the Na-
tional Energy Policy with a focus on the identification of new, renewable and
alternative energy sources and the promotion of energy conservation and
efficiency.
The country’s energy policy framework is articulated in the National
Energy Policy 2009 – 2030 which is aimed at ensuring that Jamaica achieves
“a modern, efficient, diversified and environmentally sustainable energy sec-
tor providing affordable and accessible energy supplies with long-term energy
security and supported by informed public behaviour on energy issues and an
appropriate policy, regulatory and institutional framework.” In this Policy,
key priority areas identified includes:
1. Security of energy supply through diversification of fuels as well as
development of renewables;
2. Modernizing the country’s energy infrastructure;
3. Development of renewable energy sources;
The Energy Division of the Ministry discharges its policy, legislative
and regulatory functions for Jamaica’s energy sector to enable the necessary
investments in the sector and thereby secure the country’s energy. One of the
Government’s foci through this Ministry has been securing low energy prices
and creating a diversified energy supply mix for sustainable energy security.
This is articulated in the countries National Renewable Energy Policy 2009
– 2030.
Other Government stakeholders include Petrojam Limited, Jamaica’s
only petroleum refinery; Petroleum Corporation of Jamaica (PCJ), a statu-
tory organization with the exclusive right to explore and develop the petrol-
eum resources of Jamaica, and its accompanying subsidiary and joint ven-
ture companies; and the Climate Change Branch of the Ministry of Housing,
Urban Renewal, Environment and Climate Change.
Commercially, oil and gas exploration commenced in the early 1980s.
However, these efforts produced no results, and cemented Jamaica’s depend-
ence on imported fossil fuels. The country’s energy system is heavily reliant
212
on imported fossil fuels, with petroleum imports comprising in excess of 80
percent of electricity production.
The Jamaica Public Service Company Limited (JPS Co) is Jamaica’s
electricity grid operator with Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to meet
the electricity generation needs of the country. Other players include the Na-
tional Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA), which is responsible for
environmental protection, natural resource management, land use and spa-
tial planning in Jamaica. The Office of Utilities Regulation is the electricity
regulator.
Conclusion
Examining the Caribbean states of Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and
Jamaica as the chosen examples, this chapter discussed what the concept of
“energy security” means, how the definition has evolved over time, and how
the concept may vary based on the various perspectives or “lenses” through
which one may examine it. Moreover, taking into account prevailing issues,
governance structure, risks (economic, political, physical for example) and
actors/stakeholders are important when one aims to define energy security.
As the world continues to change, and large and small island states
alike grapple with the issues of climate change and the need to be more
energy secure, an examination of energy security through the lenses of vari-
ous existing elements/dimensions of the world today (social/cultural, trade,
finance, policy) may provide a better understanding of energy security from
these perspectives.
Additionally, given that no “regime” or “architecture” currently exists
to govern energy at an international level, it is therefore crucial to under-
stand the governance structures within states at regional and national levels.
This, combined with the dimensional analysis of energy security, will pro-
vide a useful platform to understand the energy environment within which
countries operate. This can perhaps enable individual states to design policies
which will move them closer towards being more energy secure. Notwith-
standing this, it is evident that no clear consensus yet exists on what it means
to be energy secure.
Going forward, in the current environment of climate change and
the ongoing energy transition from non-renewable to renewable sources of
energy, the varied approach to the concept of energy security is likely to con-
213
tinue. This transition will continue to bear various risks for government and
non-government actors, multilateral involvement and market structures that
will continue to illustrate the varied approach to energy security.
214
Diaspora Engagement Strategies in the
Era of the Covid-19 Pandemic: The Case of
Trinidad and Tobago
Michele Reis
Introduction and definition
S ince Diaspora and other non-state entities have gained prominence

in the area of international relations during the 1990s, there has
been a growing body of literature focussing on the potential contributions of
overseas nationals to their homeland.1 Beyond this period, decision-makers
the world over have been engaging their Diaspora as part of national develop-
ment strategies to fully harness their potential. In fact, numerous countries
have developed national diaspora policies and either have full ministries or
other arrangements to ensure their operationalisation. It has become stan-
dard practice that a country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry
with responsibility for Planning and Development are usually the lead minis-
tries to oversee the execution of Diaspora policies.2
Diaspora-led engagement from an economic standpoint has served
countries of origin creditably in mobilising resources to stimulate trade and
investment, assist in diversifying markets and foster entrepreneurship through
the creation of new businesses in a wide variety of contexts. In social terms,
Diaspora engagement has improved the livelihoods of native communities
by direct involvement in social and infrastructural development, as well as
1 Jorge Duany, Blurred Borders: Transnational Migration Between the Hispanic Caribbean and the
United States, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).
2 The government of Haiti created the Ministère des Haïtiens Vivant à l’Etranger since 8 November 1994.
enhancing the quality and delivery of health and education and led to the
overall betterment of people’s standard of living in the homeland.
In the current climate, the Covid-19 pandemic has brought into sharp
focus, the relevance of Diaspora as non-state actors to homeland govern-
ments, civil society, regional and international organisations and the private
sector, particularly for countries in the Global South, as they have been dispro-
portionately affected by the unprecedented challenges caused by the ongoing
health crisis. This has given rise to increasing studies on the role of Diaspora
as transnational actors in crisis management and relief specifically related
to the pandemic. This new subset of work builds on the role of Diaspora in
crisis containment and recovery, complementing the efforts of governments
and NGOs in their native communities which to a large extent focussed heav-
ily on the implications of the Diaspora in rebuilding efforts of conflict-ridden
and war-torn nations and in relief efforts post-natural disasters.
As nations across the globe struggle to redress their economies, Dias-
pora contributions have renewed significance in order to assist decision-mak-
ers in their growth and development plans. Diaspora engagement strategies
therefore represent an invaluable opportunity for resilience and socio-eco-
nomic recovery in the immediate and post-pandemic era. Diaspora can pro-
vide invaluable relief assistance and respond to the needs of vulnerable com-
munities in an efficient and transparent manner and need not be perceived as
a threat. In fact, “partnering and empowering Diasporas can be an efficient
policy approach for governments, especially in times of crises, and not only
at the local level in countries of settlement, but also at the transnational level
in the countries of origin.”3
Even prior to the pandemic, the economic outlook for many countries
of the region was less than favourable. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago,
disruptions in the energy sector, such as cuts in production and price shocks
were responsible for significant losses for the country, which were only fur-
ther compounded by the global health crisis. This notwithstanding, the Trini-
dad and Tobago government came in for high praise by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for the manner in which the country has managed
to contain the negative impact of the pandemic on the economy through
prudent fiscal management. Nonetheless, the current economic climate in
3 Veysi Dag, ‘The Role of Diasporic Structures in Crisis Governance During the Covid-19 Global
Pandemic,’ Jadaliyya, The Arab Studies Institute, May 28, 2020.
216
both the energy and non-energy sectors continues to be severely impacted
by Covid-19. Significant decline in energy production, substantially lowered
energy exports and revenue and a sharp decline in GDP (which fell by 7.4%
in 2020)4 are all factors that will undoubtedly further hinder recovery efforts.
Because of the highly transmissible nature of Covid-19, relatively low vac-
cine coverage rates in many parts of the world and multiple mutations of
the virus, the decisive actions that need to be adopted by governments will
require frequent adjustments in order to keep pace with the rapidly evolving
scenarios around Covid-19. Pandemic public expenditure will therefore prove
to be an even greater challenge as state resources will no doubt be deflected
away from other spheres of socio-economic, technological and ecological ac-
tivity (provision of social services, allocations for research and development,
climate change mitigation, infrastructural development and upgrades, etc).
The impact of the pandemic is likely to engage the attention and energy
of governments for a considerable period of time, given its extremely deleteri-
ous effects on the areas of health and education, the economy, social inter-
action and people’s livelihoods in addition to the psycho-social repercussions
that are felt harder in emerging economies such as Trinidad and Tobago.
Whilst Diaspora engagement is not new, the context of the global pandemic
will increase pressure on homeland governments and other players to have an
accelerated approach to transnational engagement to alleviate problems asso-
ciated with Covid-19, which continues to ravage economies internationally.
As countries in the Caribbean region are at varying levels of mobilisa-
tion of their Diaspora populations, it stands to reason, that nations with a
longer history of Diaspora involvement in homeland development plans will
have a greater capacity for mitigating some of the socio-economic fallout
from the pandemic. This is in direct contrast with countries that have little
precedent for engaging the Diaspora like Trinidad and Tobago, and in the
absence of a suitable framework for interfacing with their overseas nationals,
responses risk being ad-hoc and reactionary on the part of states.
A key feature of mobilisation efforts hinges on technological advan-
ces in ICTs, which have revolutionised the transfer of information, fuelled
increased global networking and knowledge-sharing as well as facilitated
4 World Bank Group, Investing Back Home: The Potential Economic Role of the Caribbean Diaspora,
(Washington D.C., World Bank, 2016), (accessed on 29 November 2021), available from https://
documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/990601467315599193/pdf/105761-REVISED-CDI-Report
FinalLatest-PUBLIC.pdf.
217
instantaneous communication despite geographical distance. This has given
rise to the phenomenon of iDiaspora, who have the capability of enhancing
Covid-19 response through the engagement of Diaspora and alumni associ-
ations, Diaspora associations and individuals themselves, partnering on on-
going projects with groups in homeland communities.
iDiaspora
iDiaspora recognises the salience of Diaspora to nation-building in the

homeland through a digital interface. Formally launched on October 8th 2018,
the iDiaspora Platform came into existence during the International Migra-
tion Dialogue in Geneva, Switzerland. With the advent of the Covid-19 pan-
demic, the platform gained currency as a critical tool for sharing global en-
gagement best practice, as well as a knowledge transfer reference point for
Diaspora communities across the world.
iDiaspora positions Diasporic actors as a central agent for transforma-
tion in homeland communities through collaboration and networking with a
wide range of stakeholders, including governments in the country of origin
and receiving countries, civil society and NGOs, Diaspora leaders and other
practitioners, academia and the private sector. Such a forum could not be
more opportune, given the upheaval and disorder that have resulted from the
pandemic, making it imperative to use remote technology to continue mo-
bilising virtually.
Despite the myriad challenges, the directly congruous relationship
between contemporary Diaspora engagement and digitisation provides
opportunities for cross-cultural collaboration with other Caribbean Diaspora
groups, as well as those external to the region. Where the pandemic has lim-
ited human interaction spatially, it presents under-utilised mechanisms for
unification, mobilisation and collaboration virtually.
Ultimately Diaspora are being viewed as one vital component in a
transnational response to the crisis through their potential involvement in na-
tional development projects in the homeland, either through finance, sharing
of technical expertise or serving in an advisory capacity. An accelerated trans-
national response is required, as border closures, restrictions on non-essen-
tial international travel, disruptions in supply of food and other commodity
distribution chains, fluctuations in the import-export environment and new
218
professional and educational paradigms underscore the salience of Diaspora,
possibly more than ever in contemporary times.
Diaspora Engagement in the Era of Covid-19
Since the official declaration of the Coronavirus pandemic by the
World Health Organisation (WHO) on March 11th 2020, iDiaspora in collab-
oration with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) sprang into
action almost immediately by organising a series of Global Diaspora Virtual
Exchanges. The two principal aims were:
“(1) to create a space for collaboration where diaspora groups from
around the world could share their best practices responding to the Covid-19
crisis and (2) to showcase the work already done by diasporic groups and
enhance the cooperation between policymakers, practitioners and stakehold-
ers involved in mainstreaming of migrant communities into the Coronavirus
crisis.”5
These Virtual Exchanges provided a crucial platform for dialogue
bringing together 300 stakeholders from four continents sharing ideas and
interventions that could assist or were already assisting communities at home
and abroad in navigating the global health crisis. It is a useful framework for
discussing possible initiatives that could be replicated in Trinidad and To-
bago, in addition to exposing the gaps in Covid-19 responses by the Dias-
pora and identifying opportunities for rebooting the economy and alleviating
stresses and shocks experienced by the resource-strapped state.
Whilst the novel forum was undoubtedly a beneficial tool, there are
limitations that should not be overlooked. For example, Diaspora commun-
ities should not be seen as a panacea for solving all problems associated with
the pandemic nor as a compensation for systemic developmental shortcom-
ings that were hitherto unaddressed prior to the health emergency. Moreover,
it is vital to acknowledge that appropriate transnational interventions by Di-
aspora must be analysed in the context of the understanding that they them-
selves have been equally affected by the pandemic in their host countries,
either by being furloughed or having family members who were breadwinners
succumb to Covid-19, resulting in either reliance on state assistance or having
to return to their countries of origin. More studies will therefore be required
5 International Organization for Migration, ‘Global Diasporas Reacting to the Covid-19 Crisis: Best
Practices From the Field,’ (Geneva, Switzerland, 2020), (accessed on 29 November 2021), available from
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/idiaspora-global-diaspora.pdf
219
in the near future to measure the capacity of Diaspora to contribute to their
homeland. This applies to both financial and social remittances.
The major lessons derived from the exchanges among the interaction
between Diaspora groups and policymakers, researchers, civil society and
other stakeholders highlighted the importance of a comprehensive, inclu-
sive approach to transnationalism in dealing with the crisis. If transnational
interventions by the Diaspora are to be cohesive, proactive, coordinated and
effective, the Virtual Exchanges outlined key areas to be addressed, includ-
ing humanitarian initiatives, health and psychological assistance, as well as
administrative support related to repatriation. Additionally, significant em-
phasis was placed on the need for greater synergies among local, regional
and international players in order to devise targeted responses to the health
crisis, particularly in jurisdictions where the perception of corruption is high,
gross deficiencies and inequalities exist in the provision of social services and
bureaucratic systems are inefficient. Thirdly, the use of ICTs was identified as
being central to strategies to the crisis given the limited mobility and in-per-
son contact that have been characteristics of the pandemic due to high trans-
missibility of the novel Coronavirus in a world that is highly interconnected.
The Diaspora either formed new networks dedicated to responding to
the plight and vulnerability of communities, due to the negative impact of
Covid in their countries of settlement and countries of origin or adapted their
mandates to include crisis relief strategies. Diaspora skills were deployed in a
wide range of areas, based on the sharing of best practice over several coun-
tries with recommendations for further action in the future.
In order to bring the aforementioned initiatives to fruition, three main
sets of best practices were identified by the expert panellists at the Virtual
Exchanges Forum. These included:
1. Connection: ensuring the adequate flow of information and ideas as
well as access to goods, services and opportunities;
2. Partnership: enhancing cooperation and coordination among trad-
itional and non-traditional actors to ensure responses are complement-
ary and follow humanitarian principles; and
3. Self-empowerment: empowering transnational communities by recog-
nizing that they have their own voice and capacity to fight for their
own rights.6
6 International Organization for Migration, ‘Global Diasporas Reacting to the Covid-19 Crisis: Best
Practices From the Field,’ (Geneva, Switzerland, 2020), (accessed on 29 November 2021), available from
220
These criteria can be utilised to evaluate the effectiveness of the meas-
ures adopted by Diasporic actors in mitigating the adverse effects of Covid
in their source and destination countries. In the absence of such criteria any
gaps can be closed by ensuring that these principles are systematically ap-
plied. Emerging from the Virtual Exchanges, were three critical elements that
form an integral part of the action required to engage effectively with other
actors in the homeland: communication, capacity-building and cooperation.
In the next section measures by various individual Caribbean countries’ Dias-
pora can be examined in relation to these three important elements.
Regional Responses to Diaspora Engagement
The Caribbean region is no stranger to migration and over the past few
decades it continued to be a net exporter of its population, with one of the
highest out-migration rates worldwide with an estimated 22% of the region’s
people residing overseas.7 With such a substantial proportion of its residents
living abroad, the Caribbean Diaspora has been the focus of many studies
by regional and international organisations, with particular emphasis on its
potential role as a catalyst for change and development in the homeland.
The transformational role of workers’ remittances is important, as they keep
many regional economies relatively buoyant.
The region has been severely impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic as
disruptions in international travel and border closures affected the tourism
sector and energy commodity prices plummeted dramatically in the first quar-
ter of 2020, compounding economic performance in the monocrop countries
of the Caribbean, most of whom were already in recession in the pre-pan-
demic period. Caribbean nations required a swift response to the health crisis
and its attendant repercussions and therefore embarked on initiatives in order
to accelerate the involvement of their Diaspora in recovery efforts in specific
areas.
Because the Caribbean is not a homogenous zone, it is difficult to speak
of a collective approach to engaging their Diasporas in relief and recovery
methods. In this sense, it is more appropriate to examine the initiatives under-
taken on a state-by-state basis and evaluate the ability of the interventions
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/idiaspora-global-diaspora.pdf
7 Aymeric Faure, ‘Migratory Patterns in the Caribbean: Impacts and Perspectives for Caribbean Countries,
(L’Institut Open Diplomacy, July 2018), (accessed on 29 November 2021), available from https://www.
open-diplomacy.eu/blog/migratory-patterns-in-the-caribbean-impacts-and-perspectives-for-caribbean
221
to contribute to resilience and sustainability in the long-term. The principal
reason for the lack of greater collaboration among regional organisations
is largely due to varying levels of mobilisation among Caribbean Diaspora
groups. For instance, Grenada with a population of 108,339 inhabitants and
an estimated Diaspora of 67,200 formulated a Grenada National Diaspora
Engagement Policy in November 2020.8 Several months after the outbreak of
Covid-19, the formalisation of the draft version of the policy was timely as
it took into account the pandemic and how the Diaspora could be effectively
engaged moving forward. The much larger island of Jamaica has a draft na-
tional diaspora policy in circulation. The disparities in mobilisation of Dias-
pora communities in the region do not permit therefore, the application of a
blanket, common approach to an engagement strategy that can benefit all the
individual Caribbean countries.
Because of the widespread effect of Covid-19 on Small Island Devel-
oping States (SIDS), plans to buffer the economy and contain the spread of
the virus targeted many areas. Key among them are the economy, education,
digitisation and enhanced delivery of public services, social protection focus-
sing on vulnerable populations and food security.
Given the similar challenges facing regional governments, cooperation
frameworks offer an effective model. Regional organisations such as the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organisation of Eastern Carib-
bean States (OECS) have been seeking to mitigate the impact of the global
pandemic primarily in education, given the widespread dislocation in school-
ing and the shift to online learning. In this regard, a collaborative approach
has been taken to stem the repercussions of learning loss with coordination
of a validation workshop and funding from the Caribbean Development
Bank (CDB) in tandem with CARICOM, the OECS, the Education Network
of Planning Officers and other partners in education. There was precedent
from an OECS model piloted by the Education Development Management
Unit (EDMU) of the OECS to respond to the impact of the pandemic on
education, which resulted in the creation of the Education Response and
Recovery Strategy.
8 Neville Ying, Grenada National Diaspora Engagement Policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International
Business and CARICOM Affairs, 2020 (accessed on 29 November 2021), available from https://www.
grenadiandiaspora.gd/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/IOM_Booklet_GNDE_Policy_32_V6_11Aug2021.
pdf
222
Schools in the Caribbean were faced with numerous challenges pri-
or to the pandemic, such as outdated curricula, emphasis on exam-oriented
schooling as opposed to critical thinking approaches, so it was imperative to
have a two to three-year roadmap to guide the process for learning recovery
beyond the pandemic and enhance the compromised learning outcomes of
Caribbean students. This is the primary objective of the CDB/CARICOM/
OECS Model Learning Recovery and Improvement Strategy for Caribbean
Schools.
Another initiative in the area of education was the certification of early
childhood practitioners in e-learning pedagogy by the UWI Open Campus, to
accommodate changes in the delivery of education. In some territories in the
Caribbean children under the age of five have not attended physical school
since the beginning of the pandemic.
Although these initiatives at the regional level do not incorporate the
Diaspora, they provide avenues for collaboration with education specialists
overseas. In fact, the pandemic is an invaluable opportunity to reengineer
the manner in which Caribbean countries have traditionally engaged their
Diaspora communities, giving priority to digitisation. In this regard, the
Grenada National Diaspora Engagement Policy acknowledges the nexus be-
tween “rapid changes in new emerging technologies” in the context of the
pandemic and “the need for Grenada to re-examine its diaspora engagement
strategies.”9
Previously, states in the Caribbean organised large Diaspora conferen-
ces in a more traditional face-to-face setting, bringing together key stakehold-
ers from the government, the private sector and civil society with members of
the Diaspora through their organisations and associations in the homeland.
The pandemic has emphasised the importance of digital networks during this
period of reduced mobility, disruptions in air and maritime travel and chan-
ges in human interaction to limit transmission of the disease.
Some of the specific areas that require a targeted response include sup-
port to ensure remittance flows are not unduly disrupted, Diaspora philan-
thropy to provide PPE to frontline workers and to assist in providing med-
ical supplies and relief in the area health, as well as human capital transfer
9 Neville Ying, Grenada National Diaspora Engagement Policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International
Business and CARICOM Affairs, 2020 (accessed on 29 November 2021), available from https://www.
grenadiandiaspora.gd/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/IOM_Booklet_GNDE_Policy_32_V6_11Aug2021.
pdf
223
through the sharing of expertise to assist teachers who lack training in the
online delivery of schooling, the provision of laptops and learning devices
and upgrading of infrastructure to support virtual classes.
Without the possibility of a joint approach harnessing the technical,
economic and advisory capabilities of the large Caribbean Diaspora, individ-
ual countries have been using the platforms available to engage their overseas
nationals in bringing relief and providing support in the areas in which com-
munities were most affected. Two countries provide useful examples: Bar-
bados and Jamaica.
Barbados was unable to organise a flagship homecoming event, “We
Gathering,” for its Diaspora originally planned for 2020. Instead, it instituted
the Barbados Welcome Stamp encouraging people, inclusive of the Diaspora
to work remotely from Barbados, in order to compensate for shortfalls in
regular tourist arrivals and the significant decline in revenue earnings from
the sector. Billionaire Barbadian celebrity, Rihanna, donated thousands of
tablets to the Ministry of Education to ensure that children on the island
could attend school online.
Four months after the pandemic was officially declared, CARICOM
organised a Lunch Time Chat Webinar on July 15th, 2020, under the auspices
of the Sir Shridath Ramphal Centre bringing together Diaspora profession-
als with diverse backgrounds in trade, finance, diplomacy, export promotion,
development and management consulting. Panellists lamented insufficient
initiatives to encourage investment. It should be noted however, that an as-
sessment is needed to ascertain if there has been a significant decline in in-
vestment capability of the Diaspora, as they themselves have been impacted
by the pandemic in their host countries.
Against the gloomy outlook predicted by the World Bank in terms of
decline in economic growth for most CARICOM countries, remittance flows
showed an increase of 6.5% for Latin America and the Caribbean, under-
scoring the importance of the Diaspora in post-pandemic recovery efforts. In
keeping with this fact, Jamaican Prime Minister, Andrew Holness, lauded the
Diaspora as a “critical lifeline” during the Covid-19 pandemic. According to
the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) remittance bulletin for March 2021, the country
224
reported a 70% increase in net remittance inflows in comparison with the
same period in 2020 and a 36% increase for fiscal year 2021 relative to 2020.10
During a virtual town hall meeting entitled the “Jamaica Diaspora Sus-
tainability Symposium” which took place on June 16th, 2021, the Diaspora
was again recognised and commended for their continued commitment to the
homeland, despite the challenges they face in the host countries. The contri-
butions of the Diaspora are not limited to the volume of remittance inflows.
Trade promotion and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), foster entrepreneur-
ship, led to job creation and knowledge and skills transfer at a time when
job losses have been acute, especially in the informal sector and for small
and medium-sized business enterprises. Additionally, many business owners
have sustained significant loss of earnings due to temporary closures during
lockdowns and reduced operating hours owing to curfews. In the absence
of foreign exchange inflows from the tourism sector, remittances from the
Diaspora have assisted Jamaica in maintaining its balance of payments, in
addition to its net international reserves.
Apart from remittances, the Jamaican Diaspora has contributed to al-
leviating problems in the education sector during the pandemic. Through a
not-for-profit Diasporic organisation, Chicago Concerned Jamaicans (CCJ),
the Diaspora provided laptops, tablets and other hardware necessary to assist
children, particularly in rural schools to adjust to the new remote-learning
environment. Additional support has come from at least ten other Diaspora
associations based in both Canada and the U.S. However, the opportunities
for assistance from the Diaspora transcend the need for provision of hard-
ware and infrastructural support. There are opportunities in the long-term for
partnering with stakeholders in education to ensure that the challenges that
existed prior to the pandemic can be addressed through modernisation of the
current learning environment.
What comes to the surface is that the three axes of action mentioned
during the Virtual Exchanges Diaspora Symposium - connection, partnership
and self-empowerment are not always present throughout the planning and
implementation process of Covid-19 responses, resulting in more unilateral,
emergency-type, ad-hoc approaches to engaging each country’s Diaspora in
10 licia Smith, ‘Support from Diaspora Critical Lifeline During Pandemic-PM,’ Jamaica Information
Service, June 17, 2021, (accessed on 29 November 2021), available from https://jis.gov.jm/support-from-
diaspora-critical-lifeline-during-pandemic-pm/
225
the region. Neither does the communication strategy sufficiently embrace
digitisation which would allow not only for greater participation but trans-
parency, trust building and efficiency.
Trinidad and Tobago: Opportunities for Engaging the Diaspora
The models for engaging the Diaspora in Covid-19 management and
response provided by other Caribbean countries are ones in which the home-
land already has well-established links with its overseas community. Trinidad
and Tobago on the other hand, has not had much precedent traditionally in
integrating its Diaspora in homeland development. Nonetheless, there have
been two critical developments in providing a platform for engaging the Di-
aspora going forward.
The first is the draft National Diaspora Policy (NDP), which, though it
predates the pandemic, has been adapted to take into account the new social
and economic circumstances that prevail. The second, is the Roadmap to
Recovery Report emanating from the work of the committee convened by
the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago to identify risks associated with
the pandemic and to provide a framework to adequately respond in the short
to long-term. These two reports allow for possible transnational approaches
to mitigating the physical, financial and psycho-social fallout from the pan-
demic.
According to 2017 statistics of the IOM11, there are approximately
374,492 members of the Trinidad and Tobago Diaspora, primarily located in
the United States, Canada and the U.K., with smaller numbers geographically
spread over many countries in different continents. In 2019, the Government
of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (GoRTT) undertook steps to begin
work on a NDP, the first of its kind for the country under the Ministry of
Foreign and CARICOM Affairs. Whilst there was no formal structure previ-
ously for engaging the Diaspora, a number of mechanisms acknowledged the
need for strengthening linkages with the Diaspora, such as the Official Policy
Framework (OFP) in 2015 and the National Development Strategy 2016-
2030, more commonly referred to as Vision 2030. The latter makes specific
reference to the Diaspora’s potential contribution to economic growth such
11 International Organization for Migration, ‘Migration in the Caribbean: Current Trends, Opportunities
and Challenges,’ Working Papers on Migration 1. 2017 (accessed on 29 November 2021), available from
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/flies/resources/Working%20papers_%20en_baja_20.06.17.pdf
226
as through increased trade via access to new markets and Foreign Direct In-
vestment (FDI).
If the intention of the GoRTT is to strengthen Diaspora participation
and improve engagement in investment, trade and tourism, to promote cul-
tural values and image-building, drive the development of philanthropic and
development associations, enhance knowledge and technology transfer as
well as further encourage remittances, the NDP could not be more timely
in providing the framework that would facilitate the homeland in resilience
strategies in the immediate and in the aftermath of the pandemic.
The rapid propagation of Covid-19 has demonstrated the need for re-
silience, innovative thinking and sound decision-making to face the negative
impact of dealing with the pandemic. As such, the NDP’s axis on socio-eco-
nomic development, looks specifically at the areas of trade and investment, re-
mittances and banking, education, health, climate change, renewable energy
and the environment, tourism, agriculture, culture, science, technology and
innovation, brain circulation, knowledge and skills transfer, Diaspora philan-
thropy and volunteering, crime and violence and improved delivery of public
services. This multi-sectoral approach is useful, as these are all areas impact-
ed by the health crisis.
Even in the absence of a formal mechanism to engage the Diaspora,
the Ministry of Education in Trinidad and Tobago partnered with educa-
tion specialists in the Diaspora to assist in preparing teachers and students at
home for the new educational paradigm. The initiative entitled “21st Century
Teaching and Learning in Trinidad and Tobago” brought together education
consultants based in Washington, D.C. with those in the home country on
August 4th and 5th 2020 to share best practices in the field through a free webi-
nar. It was presented by the Trinidad and Tobago Diaspora Association Net-
work (TTDAN), in collaboration with the Embassy of Trinidad and Tobago,
Washington, D.C. The target audience comprised teachers, school adminis-
trators and parents.
Another major area of obvious concern is that of health. A database
of skilled overseas nationals would have been beneficial in assisting the Min-
istry of Health in its Covid-19 containment and management strategies. This
includes the treatment of ill patients, procuring medication and other pro-
phylactics, the provision of PPE, test kits, ventilators, design and delivery of
227
awareness campaigns, community outreach, sourcing additional and special-
ist health care professionals, particularly intensive care nurses and doctors, ur-
gent care technicians, mental health services, as well as professional market-
ing agents to boost the vaccination rollout. The implementation of the NDP
would facilitate the allocation of the right type of specialist medical profes-
sionals for deployment in the health care institutions where they are needed
most. A mapping exercise to match resources and skillsets in the Diaspora
with special needs in the homeland is critical to improve the management
of Covid-19, and raise the overall level of health care beyond the pandemic.
In the domain of health, the NDP acknowledged several actions which
the Diaspora could undertake with counterparts in the homeland. These in-
cluded the digitisation of medical records that would greatly enhance ad-
ministration and management systems across the nation’s health facilities by
lessening bureaucracy. The NDP recommended the establishment of joint
technical councils similar to those in the education sector to improve health
care by sharing experience, knowledge and technical skillsets employing
modern and innovative measures and systems.
Regarding mental health, Diaspora groups such as the Trinidad and
Tobago Healthcare UK Forum (TTHUF) have an invaluable role to play in
transforming mental health care in the country and to provide outreach dur-
ing the pandemic, given the psychological stress and trauma experienced by
nationals in the Diaspora and at home.
Similar to the Adopt-a-School Initiative in the education field in Trini-
dad and Tobago, an Adopt-a-Clinic measure such as the one that already
exists in Jamaica could be implemented to allow for the private sector and the
Diaspora to get involved in providing equipment and additional resources to
medical institutions.
In the era of digitisation, Jamaicans have managed to effectively use
virtual town meetings to put the Diaspora directly in contact with nationals
on the island. The “Let’s Connect” initiative with ambassadors “offers mem-
bers of the Diaspora an opportunity to speak directly with the Ambassador
about issues that are of interest to them, as well as to be updated on the
Government’s policies and programmes and the Embassy’s activities”.12 It
12 Derrick Scott, ‘Adopt A-Clinic Programme Gaining Traction in Diaspora,’ Jamaica Information
Service, October 5, 2021, (accessed on 29 November 2021), available from https://jis.gov.jm/adopt-a-
clinic-programme-gaining-traction-in-diaspora
228
has been recommended that Trinidad and Tobago can benefit from similar
initiatives.
In the field of health, TTDAN has been active in advocacy to encour-
age vaccine uptake in collaboration with other Diaspora partners. On June
17th 2021, it led two insightful panel discussions designed to address myths
about and misinformation about Covid-19 through educational presentations
in preparation for the donation of Pfizer vaccines to Trinidad and Tobago
from the U.S. The committee selected a team of knowledgeable health pro-
fessionals in both Trinidad and Tobago and across the Diaspora. These and
other health experts possess the professional technical skills that could be
used by Trinidad and Tobago to treat patients successfully, curb infectious
spread and minimise the loss of life.
The pandemic has tested the public health care system even in de-
veloped countries. A study of health care delivery in the U.S. lamented sys-
temic issues such as “longstanding inefficiencies and deficiencies in chronic
disease management and treatment,” including “a fragmented healthcare
experience and system, narrowly focused services, limited resources beyond
office visits, expensive yet low quality care, and poor access to comprehen-
sive prevention and non-pharmacological resources.”13 Many aspects of this
account are no less applicable to Trinidad and Tobago. These problems are
further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic and while the institution of a
parallel health care system in the islands has stemmed the collapse of overall
health care in the country in the early phases of the health crisis, the arriv-
al of additional variants, community spread, vaccine hesitancy and a large
cross-section of the population having comorbidities has not been sufficient
to halt the propagation of the virus and prevent widespread death.
A solution to many of the health challenges is to utilise digital health
and telemedicine measures. However, much of that infrastructure is lacking,
including the legal framework, resulting in missed opportunities to imple-
ment such solutions, although it is provided for in the NDP with assistance
from the Diaspora, working in tandem with stakeholders in healthcare in
Trinidad and Tobago. This can be achieved within the ambit of the “Digital
13 Azizi A. Seixas, Iredia M. Olaye, S. P. Wall and P. Dunn, ‘Optimizing Healthcare Through Digital
Health and Wellness Solutions to Meet the Needs of Patients with Chronic Disease During the COVID-19
Era,’ Frontiers in Public Health, Vol. 9 (July 2021), (accessed on 29 November 2021), available from
https://planning.gov.tt/sites/default/files/Report%20of%20the%Roadmap%20to%20Recovery%20
Committee_1st_.pdf
229
First Government” Initiative in the Roadmap to Recovery Report using an
accelerated approach. In order to ensure that there are minimal disruptions
in the provision of state services, the report mentions the fast-tracking of
the creation of an e-identity for each Trinidad and Tobago citizen and its
permanent residents. The primary features will be mandatory access to gov-
ernment services, managed by government in a state-run or approved private
data centre, superseding all existing identifiers, in alignment with the existing
electronic processing of all government services and e-commerce activities.
The Ministry of Public Administration and Digital Transformation should
play a key role in this initiative.
Not unlike the NDP, the Roadmap to Recovery Report utilises a
multi-sectoral approach to promoting both short and long-term development
in confronting Covid-19 by engaging the private sector, civil society and aca-
demia. Three priority areas were identified:
i. Addressing and mitigating the hardship inflicted by Covid-19;
ii. Restarting the economy; and
iii. Laying the foundation for sustained economic recovery.14
Given the acute challenges facing the country brought on by the pan-
demic, the Diaspora is mentioned in the report as one of the important play-
ers that can contribute to improving the social and economic well-being of
nationals in the homeland in an ‘all hands on deck’ approach to jump-starting
the economy and ensuring that the measures are sustained post-pandemic.
While there is provision for including the Diaspora in the report, the visibly
absent mechanisms in place to engage overseas nationals in the development
strategy means that it is more difficult, though not impossible to incorporate
these important players.
The report focuses on four short-term objectives:
i. Social Protection, in which no one is left behind
ii. Retention and creation of jobs
iii. Boosting aggregate demand
iv. Minimising and remediating supply disruptions.15
14 Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, n.d., ‘Roadmap for Trinidad and Tobago Post
Covid-19 Pandemic,’ (accessed on 29 November 2021), available from https://planning.gov.tt/sites/
default/files/Report%20of%20%the%20Roadmap%20to%20Recovery%20Committee_1st_.pdf
230
Recommendations and Conclusion
The three main sets of best practices identified in the Global Diaspora
Virtual Exchanges Forum: Connection, Partnership and Self-empowerment
must be embedded in the initiatives adopted by decision makers when mov-
ing forward. Actions outlined in the Roadmap to Recovery Report must in-
clude the following if the Diaspora is to have an enhanced role in achieving
the objectives specified by the government:
• The creation of long-term sustainable networks with local actors, such
as local authorities, FBOs and civil society, private sector groups and
academia to facilitate an adequate and targeted response to the needs
on the ground. This will also work as a complement to local efforts in
order to avoid the perception of an imposition of ideas from overseas.
• The incorporation of social networks and webinar platforms will im-
prove communication, in the local and transnational contexts, without
requiring a physical presence in the country. This would also allow for
continuity of efforts so that for example initiatives undertaken last year
with the MoE and education specialists in Washington and local ones
would not be one-off.
• The inclusion of the vulnerable through their participation and contri-
butions could shape initiatives by employing more effective communi-
cation strategies.
• The bridging of the digital divide in administrative processes must be
accelerated with input of the Diaspora who know the local context and
through knowledge transfer can assist in selecting the most appropriate
platforms.
Measures outlined in the roadmap should also incorporate the three

main axes of action put forward by the participants in the Global Diaspora
Virtual Exchanges: communication, capacity-building and coordination.
Joint technical councils or working groups that bring together professionals
in the Diaspora and the homeland need to be implemented using digitisation
to advance work through virtual sessions. The sharing of best practices on
both sides can improve initiatives and lead to greater progress in the areas
of cooperation, health, education, enterprise, crowdfunding, advocacy and
the additional areas identified in the NDP. In the immediate response to the
health crisis emphasis must be placed on emergency relief, health care and
sourcing of donor funding.
Sustainability of initiatives is a key feature that needs to be ensured so
that long-term measures can continue to be operationalised and adapted to
231
meet changing needs and any rapidly evolving situations. Beyond networking,
synergies need to be created and nurtured among the major stakeholders in
the national and transnational Covid-19 response.
Diaspora engagement during the pandemic would be impossible with-
out the use of digital platforms to connect with the communities most affect-
ed, to identify needs in the home country and coordinate strategies informed
by best practice in their adopted countries to alleviate the problems and pro-
vide relief during the health crisis. During the Global Diaspora Virtual Ex-
changes in the early stages of the pandemic, Diaspora organisations used
social media and webinars “to create informative campaigns and material
tailored to their own communities to avoid the spread of the virus and to
protect the most vulnerable people within their diasporas.” 16
Groups like the TTDAN also used webinars to promote vaccine up-
take and dispel false information about the disease prior to the donation of
vaccines by the government of the United States to the GoRTT. More virtual
town hall meetings to combat vaccine hesitancy are planned in the jurisdic-
tion of Washington, in light of the rising numbers of Covid-19 cases, the high
death rate and plummeting vaccine rates in Trinidad and Tobago.
Digital platforms also assisted in collecting donations. Mobilised Di-
asporas have been able to successfully use technology to track the impact
of their donations and relief efforts back in their countries of origin. Un-
fortunately, this is not possible for Trinidad and Tobago at this time. There is
insufficient organisation and cohesion at the level of the Diaspora as a col-
lective as well as on the ground to assess the impact of any initiatives, which
largely remain sporadic.
The unprecedented challenges caused by the pandemic require that all
policy documents going forward need to be updated to reflect the disruptions
as a result of Covid-19 and incorporate Diaspora as part of the national strat-
egy. Even with the NDP in draft format, the manner in which development
is approached must allow for the input of Diasporas who have the capacity
to engage in transnational initiatives to respond to the pandemic and future
challenges ahead, using the vast resources they possess.
16 International Organization for Migration. 2020. ‘Global Diasporas Reacting to the Covid-19 Crisis:
Best Practices From the Field.’ (Geneva, Switzerland, 2020), (accessed on 29 November 2021), available
from https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/idiaspora-global-diaspora.pdf
232
The initiatives above highlight the need for an accelerated approach to
transnational engagement efforts targeting the sizable Diaspora, working in
tandem with the public and private sector, supporting the work of civil society
groups and building on those initiatives in the homeland. The NDP under-
scores the importance of engaging the Diaspora in all spheres of activity as
opposed to their utilisation only in crisis management and recovery efforts in
a health emergency such as the countries are currently experiencing. The end
result of Diaspora-led engagement is to contribute to creating “a reimagined
society and economy post Covid-19,”17 as radical changes in people’s person-
al, community, national and professional lives will remain altered for some
time in the foreseeable future.
233
Biographies
Dr. Marlon Anatol has taught at the Institute of International Rela-

tions at the University of the West Indies for many years. He is the Direc-
tor of Research at TAIRASS, a research consultancy, and holds an Honours
Degree in Applied Sociology and a Ph.D. in International Relations, spe-
cialising in Research, with expertise in the areas of Trafficking in Persons,
Security, Migration, Trade and Development. He was the Director of Project
R.E.A.S.O.N., the most successful crime-prevention initiative undertaken in
Trinidad and Tobago, which led to a 45% reduction in shootings and wound-
ings between 2015 and 2017 in the East Port of Spain areas of Laventille,
Morvant, Sea Lots, and Beetham Gardens. He conducts monitoring and
evaluation services; social, economic and market intelligence as well as pol-
itical surveys and related research throughout the Caribbean region. He has
published numerous journal articles and book chapters on Migration, Crime
and Security, Economic Development, Trafficking in Persons and Youth. He
has co-edited two book to date, entitled “Selected Essays on Contemporary
Caribbean Issues” and “Contemporary Issues in Caribbean and Latin Amer-
ican Relations, both with Raymond Mark Kirton. He is currently a senior
fellow at the Cipriani College of Labour and Co-operative Studies.
Affiliations: Senior fellow, Cipriani College of Labour and Cooperative Studies
Mailing address: Apt3 Block C1, La Reine Court, Flagstaff, St. James, Trinidad
Email: marlonanatol2000@yahoo.com
Amanda Anatol has focused on the delivery of Life Skills to students
of the University of Trinidad and Tobago for over a decade, and before re-
turning to Trinidad and Tobago she taught in the UK and in the Middle East
for several years respectively. In each of these countries she has participated
in community outreach programmes, and she has held a variety of positions
during all of the aforementioned posts, ranging from Curriculum Leader, to
Head of Key Stage, to Vice Principal, and has wide ranging experience of
dealing with all members of a wide variety of communities.
Affiliations: The Anatol Institute of Research and Social Sciences
Mailing address: Apt3 Block C1, La Reine Court, Flagstaff, St. James, Trinidad
Email Address: amandanatol@gmail.com
Dr. Paulo Gustavo Pellegrino Correa holds a PhD in Political Science.

He was a Visiting Researcher at the University of Waikato, New Zealand
(2012) and Guest Lecturer at the University of West Indies, Trinidad and To-
bago (2017). Full Professor at the Postgraduate Program in Borders Studies
(PPGEF) at the Federal University of Amapá (UNIFAP) in Brazil. He was
part of the Board of the Brazilian Association for Defense Studies (ABED)
and former Deputy Vice-Chancellor of Cooperation and International Rela-
tions at UNIFAP.
Mailing address: Rua Eurico dos santos Barbosa 1136, Macapá -ap -brazil 68901026
Email: paulogustavo1978@gmail.com
Julianna Vanessa Davis MSc, BSc (Hons). Ms. Julianna Davis is cur-
rently an M.Phil./Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate Institute of International
Relations at the University of the West Indies (UWI) in Trinidad and Tobago.
Julianna’s research interests include energy policy, energy security, energy
governance, renewable energy policy, climate change finance and sustainable
development with a focus on Small Island Developing States in the Carib-
bean. Julianna is a strong advocate for volunteerism which underpins her
involvement in the UWI Alumni Association Mentorship Programme over
the past 7 years. She is also proficient in information visualization and visual
design which she pursues in her spare time.
Mailing Address: 77 Mountain View Drive, Maracas Valley, St Joseph. Trinidad
Email address: jvdavistt@gmail.com
Dr. Ashaki L. Dore, is a Corporal in the Trinidad and Tobago Regi-

ment (TTR) and has 17 years of military service. She holds a PhD in Inter-
235
national Relations from the University of the West Indies and her doctoral
research explored citizen participation in the citizen security framework of
countries facing high levels of crime and violence. Her publications include:
Human Security: A New Regionalism for the Caribbean. Caribbean Dialogues
Journal 15, no ¾; Incentivizing Crime Prevention in Trinidad and Tobago.
In Caribbean Perspectives on Criminology and Criminal Justice, Westphalia Press
(2019); Leveraging the Asylum System to Overcome Immigration Barriers
in Small Island States (2021). In Contemporary Caribbean Issues in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, Lexington Books, Venezuelans in Pursuit of the Gol-
dilocks Policy Environment in Trinidad and Tobago. In Exodus: The Outward
Movement of Venezuelans to the Americas and the Caribbean in the 21st Century
(Co-authored) (Forthcoming).
Affiliation: Cipriani College of Labour and Co-operative Studies
Mailing address: Corner Esperanza drive and Mt D’or road. Champ Fleur.
Email address: leidiadore@yahoo.com
Dr. André Vincent Henry is the Director of the Cipriani College of

Labour and Co-operatives and serves as Adviser to the Ministry of Public
Administration of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago. He is a former
member of the diplomatic service of Trinidad and Tobago and staff member
of the International Labour Organization. Dr. Henry has taught at the Uni-
versity of the West Indies and was a Vice President for Trade and Industry at
the Tourism and Industrial Development Company of Trinidad and Tobago.
His primary research interests are in the areas of social justice equity particu-
larly in the work place and in public policy.
Affiliations: Cipriani College of Labour and Co-operative Studies
Mailing Address: Cipriani College of Labour and Co-operative Studies, Valsayne, Trinidad.
Email: henrya@cclcs.edu.tt
Dr. Clement Henry is a policy research consultant. His recent em-

ployment included Manager of the Government of Guyana/Inter-American
Development Bank’s Citizen Security Strengthening Programme, Chairman of
the Guyana National Data Management Authority, and Head of the Policy
Research Unit in the Ministry of Home Affairs. Dr Henry is a graduate of
the University of the West Indies, St Augustine -Doctor of Philosophy; the
University of Guyana, Turkeyen- Master of Social Science; and Andrews
University, Michigan - Bachelor of Arts. His publications include Poverty and
236
Human Security in Guyana and An Analysis of the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid
Flows to Guyana. His research interests include citizen and human security,
international regimes, inclusive growth, and business cycle analysis.
Affiliations: Nations University
Mailing address: 1943 Lincoln Road, Providence Gardens, East Bank Demerara, Guyana
Email Address: cshenry7@gmail.com
Dr. Raymond Mark Kirton is a citizen of Guyana who is the holder of

the Bachelor of Arts (Distinction) from the University of Guyana, Master of
Science (M.SC) from Georgetown University, Washington DC and a Ph.D.
from the University of Texas at Austin. His professional career includes, Sen-
ior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Government and International
Affairs as well as Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at University of
Guyana. Most recently he served as the Director of the Institute of Inter-
national Relations at the University of the West Indies, St. Agustine Trinidad
from where he retired. He also served as the Special Political Advisor to the
President of Guyana until August 2020. He has published numerous articles
in journals, and chapters in books and has coedited three books – “Govern-
ance, Conflict Analysis and Conflict Resolution” with the late Cedric Grant,
– “Selected Essays on Contemporary Caribbean Issues: An International Re-
lations Perspective” with Marlon Anatol; and Contemporary Issues in Carib-
bean and Latin American Relations with Marlon Anatol and he has also
co-authored ‘A History of the Institute of International Relations: 50 Years
and Beyond’ with Khellon Roach.
Affiliations; RMK Consulting Enterprise
Mailing address: 185 Durban Backlands, Georgetown, Guyana.
Email Address: rmkirton@gmail.com
Dr. Jacqueline Laguardia Martinez PhD, is Lecturer at the Institute of

International Relations at The University of the West Indies. Previously, she
has worked as Associate Professor at the University of Havana and Research-
er Associate at the Cuban Institute for Cultural Research ‘Juan Marinello’.
She has participated in academic events, delivered lecturers and undertaken
teaching responsibilities in several countries in North America, Latin Amer-
ica and Europe. She is member of the Cátedra de Estudios del Caribe ‘Nor-
man Girvan’ at the University of Havana and the Coordinator of the CLAC-
237
SO Working Group on “Crisis, respuestas y alternativas en el Gran Caribe”.
She is a member of LASA and the Caribbean Studies Association.
Affiliations: Institute of International Relations at The University of the West Indies (The UWI)
Mailing address: Institute of International Relations, UWI. St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago
Email Address: jacqueline.laguardia-martinez@sta.uwi.edu
Dr. Sacha Joseph-Mathews is an Associate Professor of Marketing

in the Eberhardt School of Business at the University of the Pacific. She ob-
tained both her Masters in Tourism and Hospitality Management and her
PhD in Business Administration degrees from Florida State University. Pro-
fessor Joseph-Mathews has been working and teaching in marketing, cus-
tomer service and international business for almost 20 years. In addition to
teaching, Dr. Joseph Mathews is an avid researcher, consultant and advisor.
Affiliations: Eberhardt School of Business, University of the Pacific
Mailing address: 10173 Charles Morris Way, Elk Grove, California, 95757
Email Address: sacha.joseph@gmail.com
Dr. Ruben Martoredjo holds a PhD in International Relations from

the Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies (2018).
He also holds a Master of Science degree in International Relations from the
University of the West Indies (St. Augustine Campus) (2009, graduated as
top of class with distinction), and a Doctorandus degree (candidate to doctor-
ate’s degree) in Commercial economics, from the Anton de Kom University
of Suriname (1992). His research interests include the areas of Globalization,
Regionalism, Regional Integration, Latin America and the Caribbean, Suri-
name, SIDS, Social Development, and Social and Economic dimension of
Climate Change.
Mailing Address: Javaweg Br.261, Paramaribo, Suriname
Contact email: rsmarto@gmail.com
Dr. Michele Reis completed a doctoral degree in International Rela-

tions at the Institute of International Relations, St. Augustine Campus, Uni-
versity of the West Indies, Trinidad and Tobago in 2005. Dr. Reis’ principal
area of research is diaspora and migration issues with a particular empha-
sis on Caribbean and Latin American diasporic communities in the United
States and South American migrants in her native Trinidad and Tobago. She
has published on various aspects of regional and international migration, as
well as diasporic communities in International Migration Journal and other
238
journals and contributed chapters to various books in both English and Span-
ish. She is an independent Consultant/Researcher on Migration and Dias-
pora issues. She has worked on projects for the ACP/IOM, UWI, UNICEF,
OAS/CCST, CARICOM/EU, NIHERST and the OECS. She is currently
working on a National Diaspora Policy for Trinidad and Tobago under the
Ministry of Foreign and CARICOM Affairs.
Affiliation: Manager - Trini Diaspora Connection Ltd.
Mailing Address - 1 Savary Street, St. Joseph, Trinidad and Tobago
E-mail address - same as current one- diaspora.issues@gmail.com
Dr. Wendell C. Wallace is an English trained Barrister, Certified

Mediator with the Mediation Board of Trinidad and Tobago and a Crimin-
ologist who lectures on the Criminology and Criminal Justice programme at
The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago. Dr.
Wallace is the Chair of both The University of the West Indies, St. Augus-
tine Crime Committee and The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine
Police Research Group (UWISA-PRG) as well as the Deputy Dean for Dis-
tance Education and Outreach in the Faculty of Social Sciences. To date Dr.
Wallace has published six books (edited and sole author) and over twenty-five
peer-reviewed journal articles. His research interests include: policing, gangs,
violence (domestic and school), and education-related issues.
Mailing address: No. 18 First Street West, Montague Avenue, Trincity. Trinidad and Tobago. 868.
Email Address: wendell.wallace@sta.uwi.edu
239
Título: The changing Political and Socio-Economic Environment in the
Caribbean and Latin America: Prospects and Challenges.
Organização: Paulo Gustavo Pellegrino Correa, Raymond Mark Kirton,
Marlon Anatol.
Financiamento: Projeto multidisciplinar ESFRON/SANTANA.
Projeto gráfico: Nepan Editora
Capa e arte final: Julianna Vanessa Davis
Diagramação: Marcelo Alves Ishii
Revisão de texto: Marlon Anatol and R. Mark Kirton
Tipologia: Calisto MT 11/16
Número de páginas: 239

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The Changing Political and Socio-Economic Environment in The Caribbean and Latin America - Prospects and Challenges Ebook

Enviado por

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Formatos disponíveis

The changing Political and Socio-Economic Environment in the Caribbean

and Latin America: Prospects and Challenges

Diretor administrativo: Marcelo Alves Ishii

The changing political and socio-economic environment in the Caribbean

The Venezuela – Guyana Border Controversy:

A decade of the Community of Latin American and

New Perspectives on Policing in Trinidad and

The Challenge of Talking and Practicing Citizen Security .............. 72

Human Trafficking, Transnational Organized Crime

Transnational Crimes and Citizen Security in the Caribbean..........111

The economic implications of COVID-19: Critical

Fair and Just Governance in the Caribbean: The

Energy Security in the Caribbean: An analysis of

Diaspora Engagement Strategies in the Era of the

A s the third decade of the twenty-first century unfolds, the chang-

The contemporary state of regional

As a result of the lack of success of the Mixed Commission, the second

It was envisaged that for a period of twelve years, efforts would be

In February 2021, following a ‘case management meeting’ convened by

8 Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation,1978, Brazil

Jacqueline Laguardia Martinez

Latin American and Caribbean regionalism in the 21st century

B efore analyzing the Community of Latin American and Carib-

1 Comunidad de Estados de América Latina y el Caribe in Spanish.

22 “La CELAC está conformada por los siguientes órganos:

To make such an ambition a reality, CELAC members engaged in dis-

Contemporary challenges to regional

Introduction and definition

Another consideration is normative sponsorship theory — a theory

Publication). (Edinburgh, Scottish Government Social Research, 2009).

available from http://www.lectlaw.com/files/cjs07.htm

T he citizen security approach emerged as a direct reaction to na-

in Latin America advanced national security paradigms which emphasized

Citizen Security Actors

33 William Easterly, “The Cartel of Good Intentions,” 44.

The Socio-economic dimension –

D espite regional and global efforts to combat and eradicate trans-

(2021): 173-80. DOI: 10.1080/21632324.2020.1809276

Measuring the impact of any social phenomenon is difficult55, and this

56 John, ‘A critical approach to understanding human trafficking in the Caribbean’.

71 May, ‘Transnational Crime and the Developing World’.

The citizen security approach sees transnational criminal actors as non-

While the data on rates of illicit/unregistered firearms to population is

51 Randy Seepersad. 2013. Crime in the Caribbean.

Bahamas 225700 2019 UNODC

Barbados 4513 2018 UNODC

Belize 421 2019 UNODC

Grenada 3371 2020 GRENDIN

Guyana 1076 2019 GUYDIN

Haiti 1322 2019 UNODC

Jamaica 24000 2019 UNODC

Suriname 6463 2017 UNODC

Trinidad & Tobago 2890 2019 UNODC

In so far as production is concerned, only marijuana is produced in

Bahamas 8439 2018 UNODC

Barbados 3487 2018 UNODC

Dominica Alcohol & Drug Information

Grenada 3657 2020 GRENDIN

Drug Information Network Trinidad &

Country Quantity of drugs in Kg Year Data Source

Bahamas 1,000 2019 UNODC

Belize 1369 2019 UNODC

Jamaica 1630 2019 UNODC