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Cmte. Rocky
Grupo TAM - Flight Safety Officer
Capt. Rocky
TAM Group - Flight Safety Officer
Member of:
Safety
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Índice
Safety
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Editorial Convidado - Günther Matschnigg
Vice-presidente de Operações e Infra-estrutura da
International Air Transport Association - IATA 04
Guest Editorial - Güenther Matschnigg, Expediente
Vice President Operations and Infrastructure International Air
Transport Association - IATA 05 Cmte. Rolim Adolfo Amaro
Presidente da TAM
Traduções
Tomada de Decisão vs. Julgamento do Piloto Side by Side
Decision-Making vs. Pilot Judgement 25 - 27
Curt Lewis, PE, CSP, Manager Flight Safety - American Airlines Impressão
Gráfica TAM
Hilário G. Vieira - Gerente
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Editorial convidado
A
s a wise old philosopher whose name I can’t the senior managements of the of the safety stakeholders: by
recall once said: “a journey begins with the first ICAO, IATA, AITAL, IFALPA, IFATCA, IBAC, Flight Safety Güenther
step”. I believe the journey has begun with a Foundation (FSF), US Commercial Aviation Safety Team Matschnigg,
giant step…the destination is to place practical and (CAST), Airbus, Boeing, and Embraer. These Vice President
useful products in the hands of pilots, controllers, civil organizations pledge resources and active participation Operations and
aviation authorities, and airline managements. Products in the Team activities. PAAST is co-chaired by Captain Infrastructure
that can produce immediate results in the improvement M. Rocha - Rocky/TAM and Captain L. Garcia, International
of the flight safety environment which we all share; representing IFALPA. The Team will operate with small Air Transport
products that can help solve problems. Action Teams composed of volunteer pilots, controllers Association - IATA
Dateline August 2000, Rio de Janeiro. The first piece and other individuals who are willing to deliver safety
of good news comes as a result of the ICAO Grepecas products and assistance wherever it is needed.
meeting…Grepecas is the air navigation planning and Look at PAAST as a flight-safety-store: it will identify
implementation group for the Caribbean and South the priorities, search for good, readily available tools to
American Regions; it is made up of the States, ICAO, address the problems, and rapidly set the Action Teams
IFALPA and IFATCA, with IATA representing the airlines. in motion to spread information, knowledge, and
At this meeting a resolution was made to change the assistance to the aviation community in the regions. We
structure of the Grepecas organization and establish an hope some of you will help us along in these tasks.
Aviation Safety Board. This Board will provide a forum
where deficiencies in the air navigation plan, And more good news…
characterized as safety impairments, can be identified As PAAST was being launched, the Flight Safety
for immediate State resolution. The Aviation Safety Foundation selected it to be the first FSF Regional Team
Board is a relatively small group where pilots and airlines Leader to distribute its new CFIT/ALAR Education Tool
will be represented by IFALPA and IATA. In particular, package in the Latin America and Caribbean regions.
our regional office has been promoting such forum, The package is complete and will be available to PAAST
where real life and immediate safety needs can be in late November. It consists of training tools, videos,
directly handled under the ICAO auspices…prior to this CD ROM, presentations, Safety Alert Bulletins, Risk
event we did not have an official safety forum to seek Awareness Tool and Checklist, Risk Reduction Planning
solution to safety problems. By the way, yours is the Guide, and more… PAAST then immediately sets off to
first region in the world to take such innovative step fulfill its mission.
and we at IATA hope it will be a model for other regions. CFIT and ALAR are two priorities heading up the
PAAST regional safety program. There are others that
But wait, there is more… will be addressed in the months to come. Items such as
Again, Dateline August 2000, Rio de Janeiro. training aids for stabilized approaches, runway
Immediately after the ICAO Grepecas meeting we held incursion, rejected take-off, ATC phraseology, simplified
the IATA Safety Advisory Committee meeting and a engine-out procedures, EGPWS, and MSAWS.
Human Factors Seminar; concurrently, the Third
Regional Flight Safety Conference also took place. All In summary…
these events were graciously hosted by TAM. Big steps have been taken to address regional flight
The good news for your region came out of the safety needs: An ICAO Aviation Safety Board that
Regional Flight Safety Conference where the official provides a direct link to the States to deal with safety
launching of the Pan American Aviation Team (PAAST) deficiencies….A regional Aviation Safety Team, PAAST,
materialized. This event, in my opinion, is a major as a non-political and non-commercial regional group
milestone for regional flight safety development. It to provide leadership and assistance to the civil aviation
represents the commitment of all the organizations that community….And a new CFIT/ALAR product from FSF
have a stake in flight safety to pool the resources and on its way to you.
consolidate the safety programs into a single, coherent, I wish to congratulate TAM for its commitment to
and efficient thrust to bring practical and tangible safety safety. We at IATA also pledge continued partnership
products to the aviation community. with you to achieve the flight safety objectives that will
PAAST unanimously received the firm support from make the skies even safer throughout the world. Safety
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Conversando sobre
Segurança de Vôo
Safety
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Talking About
Flight Safety
M
Capt. (A330) Rocky any things have been done toward percentage in the accidents/incidents statistics.
TAM Group Flight Safety around the world, from However, it is very important to observe that in
Flight Safety Officer observation of the specific several situations the problem “was created” in
characteristics of each area, cultures, other “area”, but in the interaction between man
organizations already established and available and the subject, the best action was not taken.
means. However, air traffic growth and accidents, The article DECISION-MAKING X PILOT
that continue to happen, strongly show that, there JUDGEMENT supplies important insights for a
is still a lot to be done, and soon. better performance of the pilots when they need
Several initiatives have been taken in many to choose “the best available action”.
extents – companies and governments – which In the long and difficult task of increasing
result in a diversity of actions and organizations, Flight Safety, a constant evolution of methods
that lead to efforts dispersion and loss of “focus” and techniques is a reality. However, the FOQA,
in the most critical points. POSSIBLY, THE BEST SAFETY TOOL OF THE
In short: it is necessary to have a Prevention 21 ST CENTURY, is certainly the current
strategy based on the accidents-incidents’ Prevention “state of the art”.
“contributing factors” that results in an Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) in its “Icarus
objective and effective Safety agenda. Committee” bulletin explains, in a simple and
The need to create a Safety “common forum” direct way, the philosophy of this Flight
by regions of the world was well identified and Operations Quality Control Program, under
conceived by real “experts” in the area. The Safety point of view.
Commercial Aviation Safety Team – CAAST in Some breakdowns caused by combined and
North America was created and now, in August certain situations do not allow much time for
of 2000, by the time of Worldwide Meeting taking action. The “surprise element” counts a
IATA/ICAO in Rio de Janeiro, the Pan American lot and it was what happened in that dark night
Aviation Safety Team-PAAST, came to life, of May 26, 1991, over Thailand with Lauda Air -
intending to improve the area Safety level. Flight 004 - REVERSER DEPLOYED IN-FLIGHT -
Our guest editorial focuses the “PAAST” BOEING 767.
very well. It is Spring in Southern Hemisphere. The
“Free Take-Off” – “Take-Off ”. Increasing famous Spring storms have begun. Do not
speed, runway getting more and more neglect meteorology!
backward; total expectation of flying! But, not Last, but not least, see how it is the
always it happens as expected ... REJECTED “ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES MARCH” and
TAKEOFFS brings up important factors to the BARRIERS-DEFENSES, that once “spanned”,
consider, some of them, very little considered result in accidents-incidents.
or reminded. There is a lot of information to always help
The Human Factor always appears in high you; “Fly Safe”.
Safety
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Decolagens Abortadas
Rejected Takeoffs Flight Safety Foundation
• Os comentários feitos pelo comandante e • Comments by the captain and the first officer
pelo primeiro-oficial de um Douglas MD-88 foram of a McDonnell Douglas MD-88 were included
incluídos em um relatório de uma RTO, iniciada in a report of an RTO initiated when the master-
quando a luz de advertência acendeu no painel. warning light illuminated. The captain said that
O comandante disse que o primeiro oficial há pou- the first officer had just called “V1”.
co havia informado “V1”. “My hand was just leaving the throttles
“Minha mão tinha acabado de largar as when I saw a red master-warning light and a
manetes (throttles), quando vi uma luz “master- lot of dry pavement remaining in front of me,”
warning” acender, ainda com muita pista à frente”, said the captain. The warning was caused by a
disse o comandante. A advertência foi causada high-temperature condition in the aeroplane’s
por alta temperatura no compartimento da cauda tail compartment. The warning light
do avião. A “warning-light” apagou-se durante a extinguished during the RTO.
RTO. “The aircraft stopped easily, with runway
“A aeronave parou tranqüilamente, com sobra to spare,” said the captain. “We followed up
de pista”, disse o comandante. “Nós with the applicable procedure, and the light
prosseguimos com o procedimento aplicável e a remained extinguished.
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luz permaneceu apagada”. “The aircraft was taxied clear of the runway
“A aeronave foi taxiada da pista para uma onto a parallel taxiway and kept away from
taxiway paralela e mantida longe das áreas congested areas while we ascertained brake
congestionadas, enquanto averiguávamos o freio and tire status. We observed brake temperatures
e o estado dos pneus. Observamos as temperaturas and eventually had the fuse plugs melt on two
do freio e por fim verificamos que os plugues- of the four main tires [causing the tires to
fusíveis derreteram em dois dos quatro pneus prin- deflate]. Passengers were bussed to the terminal
cipais (o que fez com que os pneus se esvazias- building… after the brakes had cooled.
sem). Os passageiros foram levados de ônibus ao “I plan to incorporate a personal ‘buffer’
terminal… depois que os freios esfriaram.” relative to V1 speed for reaction time and go/
“Planejo incorporar uma “proteção” pessoal no-go decision making, even for long runways,”
com relação à velocidade V1, em termos de tempo said the captain.
de reação e tomada de decisão go/no-go, inclusive “It just might save tires, brakes, passenger
para pistas longas”, disse o comandante. inconvenience or more in the future.”
“Isto pelo menos poderá economizar pneus, The first officer’s report of the incident was
freios, inconveniência para os passageiros ou algo different from the captain’s report. Noting that
mais, no futuro.” V1 was 133 knots, VR [rotation speed] was 138
O relatório do primeiro-oficial sobre o inci- knots and V2 [takeoff safety speed] was 142
dente foi diferente do relatório do comandante. knots, the first officer said:
Notando que V1 era 133 nós, VR (velocidade de “We were at 140 knots to 145 knots with
rotação) 138 nós e V2 (velocidade de segurança the nose wheel off the ground; the main wheels
de decolagem) 142 nós, o primeiro-oficial disse: had not lifted off yet. A “tail compartment temp
“Nós estávamos entre 140 e 145 nós com a high” light illuminated with associated master
roda do nariz fora do chão. As rodas principais warning. The captain elected to reject the
ainda não haviam decolado. Uma luz de ‘alta takeoff.
temperatura no compartimento da cauda’ acendeu “Spoilers deployed and autobrakes
juntamente com a “master-warning”. O coman- activated. The nose wheel came back down
dante decidiu abortar a decolagem.” firmly when the autobrakes activated. The
“Os spoilers foram estendidos e os freios aircraft stopped with approximately 2,000 feet
automáticos ativados. A roda do nariz voltou (of runway] remaining.
firmemente para baixo quando os freios “The captain’s decision to abort is
automáticos foram acionados. A aeronave parou debatable, but with the advantage of hindsight,
com aproximadamente 2.000 pés (de pista) I believe it was a mistake,” said the first officer.
remanescente.” “He reacted to the red master warning [light]
“A decisão do comandante de abortar é without knowing its source… the captain did
discutível, mas com a vantagem da observação an excellente job of controlling the aircraft, but
posterior do que se passou, acredito eu, foi um we were very lucky the main gear had not lifted
erro”, disse o primeiro oficial. “Ele reagiu à “red off, or we would not have been able to stop
master warning light” sem saber sua fonte… o within the remaining runway.”
comandante realizou um excelente trabalho de
controle da aeronave, mas tivemos muita sorte, • The captain of a Learjet 60 rejected the
pois o trem principal não havia descolado ou nós takeoff after the aeroplane suddenly
não teríamos conseguido parar na pista restante”. decelerated and began to drift from the runway
centreline at rotation speed. The aeroplane was
• O comandante de um Learjet 60 abortou a taking off with a 20-knot crosswind on a
decolagem após o avião repentinamente runway that was 8,500 feet (2,576 metres) long
desacelerar e começar a derivar da linha central and 150 feet (46 meters) wide.
da pista na velocidade de rotação. O avião estava The captain said that the airport had another
decolando com um vento cruzado de 20 nós, em runway that was longer and better oriented with
uma pista de 8.500 pés (2.576 metros) de the surface wind direction, but the longer
comprimento e 150 pés (46 metros) de largura. runway was being cleared of snow and was
O comandante disse que o aeroporto tinha not available for takeoff. The captain said that
uma outra pista mais longa e melhor orientada a McDonnell Douglas DC-9 had departed
com relação à direção do vento de superfície, mas minutes earlier from the open [shorter] runway
a pista mais longa estava sendo desbloqueada da
neve e não estava disponível para decolagem. O
comandante disse que um Douglas DC-9 havia
partido minutos atrás da pista que estava aberta
(mais curta), sem dificuldade. A pista aberta
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aparentemente tinha alguma neve acumulada without difficulty. The open runway
em sua superfície. apparently had some packed snow and drifted
“Nós havíamos avaliado o estado de uma pe- snow on its surface.
quena parte da pista, julgando-a favorável para “We had back-taxied down a portion of [the
uso, pois eu já havia decolado antes em pistas runway] and felt it was OK to use, because I
com as mesmas condições, sem problema”, disse had taken off before on runways with the same
o comandante. conditions with no problem,” said the captain.
“Durante a corrida de decolagem, estávamos “During the takeoff roll, we were
tendo leves desacelerações, o que já era esperado, experiencing slight decelerations, which I fully
devido às condições”, disse o comandante. “Po- expected, given the conditions,” said the
rém, na VR, sentimos uma rápida desaceleração captain. “However, at VR, a sudden rapid
que nos pareceu anormal. Tentei continuar e re- deceleration was felt, which seemed very
cuperar a velocidade de rotação, mas a aeronave abnormal. I attempted to continue and try to
começou a derivar fora da linha central da pista.” regain rotation speed, but the aircraft started
“Executei uma abortagem de alta velocidade to drift off the centre of the runway.
devido a rápida desaceleração em VR e a impos- “I performed a high-speed abort due to the
sibilidade de nos manter no centro da pista, quan- sudden rapid deceleration at VR and the
do a rotação foi iniciada. Decidi abortar porque inability to maintain the centre of the runway
senti que esta era a opção mais segura, devido ao when rotation was initiated. I elected to abort
comprimento da pista restante e a largura dispo- because I felt this was the safest option, due to
nível. A abortagem teve êxito e o controle da ae- the remaining runway length and width
ronave foi mantido ao longo de toda a RTO.” available. The abort was successful, as control
“Acredito que a razão para a desaceleração e of the aircraft was maintained throughout [the
a subseqüente derivação da linha central, foi RTO].”
devido a uma combinação de vento cruzado com “I feel the reason for the deceleration and
um possível acúmulo de neve na pista”, disse o subsequent drift from centerline was due to a
comandante. combination of the [crosswind] and a possible
“Com relação ao ocorrido, sinto que deveria large snowdrift on the runway,” said the
ter esperado a abertura da pista mais longa. Sinto captain.
que houve um pouco de complacência, devido “In retrospect, I feel I should have… waited
as minhas experiências anteriores e decolagens for [the longer runway] to open. I feel there
de sucesso nestas condições e, também, ao fato was a bit of complacency involved due to my
de que outras aeronaves estavam decolando com past experiences and successful takeoffs in
sucesso.” these conditions, and also the fact that [other]
jet aircraft were successfully departing.”
• Vento cruzado também foi mencionado
como fator de um incidente de RTO informado • A crosswind was also mentioned as a
pelo comandante de um vôo cargueiro de um factor in an RTO incident reported by the
CASA 212. captain of a CASA 212 cargo flight.
“Durante a aceleração, a aproximadamente 60 “During the acceleration, at about 60 knots,
nós, a aeronave derivou à esquerda, o que atribuí the aircraft drifted to the left, which I attributed
ao vento transversal”, disse o comandante. “Corrigi to the crosswind,” said the captain. “I corrected
o desvio quando o primeiro-oficial anunciou ‘V1’ the drift, and, soon after, the first officer called
e ‘rotate’. Ergui o nariz e um segundo depois as ‘V1’ and ‘rotate’. I rotated the nose, and, a
rodas principais decolaram.” second later, the main wheels lifted off.
“A aeronave parecia reagir de modo anormal, “The aircraft seemed to handle abnormally
mais especificamente, os controles de vôo pareciam more specifically, the flight controls felt mushy.
frouxos. Nós estávamos a aproximadamente de 5 We were at approximately five to 10 feet AGL
a 10 pés AGL quando falei para o primeiro-oficial: [above ground level] when I told the first officer
‘o avião não está bem. Vou recolocá-lo de volta na that ‘the plane doesn’t feel right, and I’m going
pista’.” to put it back on the runway’.”
O comandante disse que acreditava que o The captain said that he believed the
avião estava completamente “sobrecarregado”. O aeroplane was grossly overloaded.
avião começou a virar para a esquerda após tocar The aeroplane began to turn left after
o solo. touchdown. “I attempted to correct this
“Tentei corrigir a situação acionando os freios e situation by applying brakes and nose-wheel
guiando a roda do nariz”, disse o comandante. steering,” said the captain. “However, I was
“Porém, não consegui recuperar o controle. O avião unable to regain control. The plane skidded off
deslizou para o lado esquerdo da pista”, completou. to the left side of the runway.
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Segundo o relatório, o sistema de direção da The report said that the nose-wheel-steering
roda do nariz aparentemente havia falhado. “A system apparently had failed. “The nose wheel
roda do nariz havia virado até aproximadamente had turned to approximately its limits, and the
seu limite e o pneu deixou uma grande marca de tire left a large skid mark that started along the
derrapagem, que começou ao longo da linha cen- centre of the runway and ended at the point
tral e terminou no ponto onde a aeronave saiu da where the aircraft departed the runway,” said
pista”. the report.
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de um quarto de milha (0,4 quilômetro) em névoa. taxi on runway 26L.
Nós não estávamos executando nenhuma “I made a left turn down runway 26L”, said
atividade naquele momento e meu foco completo the captain. “We did not hear (the other B-737)
estava na observação visual da pista”. get cleared for takeoff. The reported visibility
“Observei duas luzes foscas no final da pista, was a quarter mile (0.4 kilometers) in fog. We
seguidas rapidamente pelo formato de uma were not performing any duties at that point,
aeronave. Ela parecia estar no final e imóvel. Fui and my whole focus was on visually clearing
para uma taxiway. Achei que a aeronave havia se the runway”.
movido. A meio caminho da minha vez, a “I noticed two dim lights (at the end of the
aeronave ainda estava a pelo menos 3.000 pés runway), followed quickly by an aircraft shape.
(909 metros) de distância e percebi que eu poderia The aircraft appeared to be at the end and
estar fora do caminho. Desimpedi a pista e disse stationary. I went for a taxiway. I could tell the
à torre que tinha visto o outro B-737 e que estava aircraft had rolled.
fora da pista”, disse o comandante. Halfway through my turn, the aircraft was
“Assisti o outro avião terminar a abortagem e still at least 3,000 feet (909 meters) away, and
então desimpedir a pista. Nós não cruzamos os I knew I could be out of the way.
caminhos e ficamos separados por aproxima- “I cleared (the runway) and told tower I saw
damente 2.000 pés (606 metros) de pista. A (the other B-737) and was clear of the runway”,
tripulação do outro avião fez um bom trabalho”. said the captain. “I watched (the other airplane)
O comandante disse que incidentes finish the abort and then clear the runway. We
semelhantes poderiam ser evitados se a torre de did not cross paths and had approximately
controle não emitisse instruções para taxiamento 2,000 feet (606 meters) separation of unused
de volta em pistas, quando taxiways podem ser runway between us. (The crew of the other
usadas, durante condições de baixa visibilidade. airplane) did a good job”.
Um Douglas MD-80 estava se dirigindo The captain said that similar incidents might
para a decolagem, quando um Beech 1900 be avoided if tower controlled refrained from
inadver-tidamente taxiou sobre a pista à frente. issuing instructions to back-taxi on runways
A tripulação do Beech 1900 havia obedecido when taxiways can be used during low-
a uma liberação para taxiar na pista e guardar visibility conditions.
posição, emitida para um outro Beech 1900, A McDonnel Douglas MD-80 was rolling
com um sinal de chamada semelhante. O outro for takeoff when a Beech 1900 inadvertently
Beech 1900 estava em uma taxiway perto do taxied onto the runway ahead. The crew of the
final da pista. Beech 1900 had responded to a clearence - to
O comandante do MD-80 disse: “Eu tinha taxi onto the runway and hold position - issued
acabado de realizar o ‘call-out’ de 80 nós, to another Beech 1900 with a similar call sign.
quando o co-piloto notou uma aeronave The other Beech 1900 was on a taxiway near
taxiando na nossa frente, da direita para a the approach end of the runway.
esquerda”. The captain of the MD-80 said: “I had just
O primeiro oficial disse: “Até onde posso re- made the 80-knot call-out when the co-pilot
cordar, a aeronave não havia falado com a torre, noticed an aircraft taxiing in front of us, front
não olhou em qualquer direção e apenas right to left”.
lentamente taxiou pela pista ativa. Ao vê-lo cruzar The first officer said: “As far as I can recall,
a linha ‘hold-short’ percebi que ele não ia parar e the aircraft had never talked to the tower, did
imediatamente abortei minha decolagem”. not look in either direction and just slowly
O relatório também incluiu os comentários taxied across the active runway. Upon seeing
de um controlador da torre. “Eu estava him cross the hold-short line, I realised that he
trabalhando como assistente de controle de was not going to stop and immediately aborted
posição local. Durante um período de grande my takeoff”.
movimento de chegada e partida, nós estávamos The report also included comments by a
liberando as aeronaves para partir na pista em tower controller. “I was working the local
seu comprimento total e também de uma control assistant position”, said the controller.
interseção.” “During a heavy arrival and departure rush, we
“O controlador local liberou o MD-80 para were (clearing aircraft to depart on the runway)
decolagem e o Beech 1900 (Aeronave Z) para full length and from an intersection.
taxiar para a posição e aguardar no final da pista. “The local controller cleared the MD-80 for
O outro Beech 1900 (Aeronave Y) informou: ‘em takeoff and the Beech 1900 (Aircraft Z) to taxi
posição e aguardando’ e foi para a pista em into position and hold (at the approach end of
frente ao MD-80.” the runway). The other Beech 1900 (Aircraft Y)
“O MD-80 abortou sua decolagem e parou read back “into position and hold”, and went
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entre 500 e 1.000 pés (152 a 303 metros) da onto the runway in front of the MD-80”.
Aeronave Y. Sinais de chamada semelhantes, “The MD-80 aborted his takeoff and was
Aeronave Y e Aeronave Z.” stopped by 500 to 1,000 feet (152 to 303
meters) from Aircraft Y. Similar call signs,
Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z”.
RTOs foram iniciadas quando janelas do
cockpit se abriram.
RTOs were initiated when cockpit windows
• O comandante de um Boeing 767 disse que opened.
o cockpit se tornou extremamente ruidoso a 100
nós. “A aproximadamente 130 nós, a janela do • The captain of a Boeing 767 said that the
comandante se abriu e a decolagem foi rejeitada cockpit became unusually noisy at 100 knots.
sem incidente”, disse o comandante. “At approximately 130 knots, the captain’s
“A janela do comandante parecia estar fechada window flew open, and the takeoff was rejected
e travada durante o pré-vôo e foi verificada como without incident”, said the captain.
fechada e travada, quando realizado o checklist “The captain’s window appeared to be
antes do início”, disse o comandante. closed and locked during pre-flight, and was
“A trava da janela do comandante nunca verified closed and locked (when conducting
foi fisicamente empurrada para assegurar que the) before-start checklist”, said the captain.
estava completamente travada. Não está listado “The captain’s window lock was never
em nossos procedimentos empurrar este physically pushed to ensure that it was
punho, assegurando que está completamente completely locked. It is not listed in our
trancada. procedures to physically push this handle to
“No futuro, eu planejo fazê-lo”. ensure that it is in the completely latched
position.
• O comandante de outro B-767 disse que a “In the future, I plan to physically push this
RTO iniciou-se quando a janela se abriu a handle to ensure that it is fully latched”.
aproximadamente 100 nós.
“Este comandante pegou no punho e olhou • The captain of another B-767 said that
para a janela, durante o pré-vôo e anunciou the RTO initiated when the window opened at
‘fechada e travada’”, disse o comandante. “No giro about 100 knots.
de decolagem, a aproximadamente 80 nós, eu “This captain had grabbed the handle and
olhei para a janela porque uma corrente de ar looked at the window during pre-flight, and
estava se formando e vi que o punho estava para called ‘closed and latched’”, said the captain.
trás ao invés de para frente.” “On the takeoff roll, at about 80 knots, I looked
“Quando agarrei o punho, a janela abriu de at the window because an air leak was
repente e fui forçado a fazer a abortagem. Nós developing and saw that the handle was back
cronometramos o resfriamento do freio, fizemos instead of forward.
uma inspeção visual e então fomos para nosso “As I grabbed for the handle, the window
destino, envergonhados… popped in, and I was forced to do the abort.
“Não consigo me lembrar da abertura da ja- We timed the brake cooling and had a visual
nela depois de completar o checklist de pré-vôo e inspection done on the brakes, then took of for
só posso supor que, quando eu forcei o punho (our destination) with egg on the face.
durante o checklist, ela já estava aberta.” “I cannot remember opening the window
after completing the pre-flight checklist and can
only assume that when I grabbed the handle
Anomalias de velocidade foram citadas como during the checklist, it was already open”.
causas para RTOs.
Safety
Digest
19
simultaneamente com a potência de “The brakes were held at the end of the
decolagem. A 80 nós, os motores foram checados runway, and the engines were stabilised at 1.4
e todas as indicações eram normais.” EPR”, said the captain. “The brakes were
“A 100 nós, os indicadores de velocidade fo- released simultaneously with setting takeoff
ram comparados. A 110 nós a velocidade estag- thrust. At 80 knots, the engines were checked,
nou. Todas as indicações de motor foram and all indications were normal.
conferidas como normais, mas a velocidade V1 “At 100 knots, the airspeed indicators were
não foi alcançada. Anunciei ‘estagnação de velo- crosschecked. At 110 knots, the airspeed
cidade’ e ‘rejeitei a decolagem’.” stagnated. All engine indications checked
“A aeronave permaneceu em controle positivo normal, but V1 speed was not achivied. I called
ao longo de toda a decolagem rejeitada”, disse o ‘airspeed stagnation’ and ‘rejected takeoff’.
comandante. “The aircraft remained in positive control
“A velocidade da aeronave foi reduzida abaixo throughout the rejected takeoff”, said the
da velocidade de taxiamento normal ao final da captain.
pista.” “The aircraft was slowed to below normal
A tripulação dirigiu-se para uma taxiway e taxi speed by the end of the runway”.
parou para permitir o resfriamento dos freios. The crew turned onto a taxiway and stopped
Quando verificaram que um dos pneus do trem to allow brakes to cool. When they learned that
de aterrissagem principal havia esvaziado, fizeram one of the tires on a main landing gear had
com que os passageiros fossem encaminhados para deflated, they arranged to have the passengers
o terminal. “Concluindo: os cálculos de peso e bussed to the terminal. “In conclusion, the
balanço estavam corretos, a carga de combustível weight and balance computations were correct,
estava correta, os cálculos de desempenho estavam the fuel load was correct, the performance
corretos e os flaps, ‘bleeds’, ajustes de EPR, NI computations were correct and the flaps,
previsto e velocidade aerodinâmica estavam bleeds, EPR settings, target NI (low-pressure
adequadamente fixadas e corretas”, disse o shaft speed) and airspeed were properly set and
comandante. “A causa da estagnação de correct”, said the captain. “The cause of the
velocidade é desconhecida.” airspeed stagnation is unknown”.
Safety
Digest
21
“Eles informaram que não viram nada; porém, were certainly glad that the aircraft has a
o compartimento foi inundado com um agente cargo fire extinguishing system”.
extintor. Falsa advertência ou não, nós certamente
estávamos felizes pela aeronave ter um sistema • Failures of both integrated drive
de extinção de fogo em carga”. generators (IDGs) prompted an RTO on a
Boeing 757-200.
• Falhas de ambos os geradores (IDGs - “At about 120 knots, we had an alectrical
Integrated Drive Generators) resultaram em uma failure, and everything except the standby
RTO num Boeing 757-200. instruments went blank”, said the first officer.
“A aproximadamente 120 nós, tivemos uma “The captain immediately closed the throttles
pane elétrica e tudo, exceto os instrumentos and applied the brakes. Deceleration felt
auxiliares, ficou apagado”, disse o primeiro-oficial. normal”.
“O comandante imediatamente reduziu The report said that the airplane reverted
totalmente as manetes e acionou os freios. A the stanby electrical system, which does not
desaceleração foi normal”. provide power to the anti-skid systems for the
Segundo o relatório, o avião reverteu para o outboard main-landing gear brakes. “This
sistema elétrico auxiliar, o qual não fornece força caused these tires to skid under the heavy
aos sistemas anti-derrapantes para os freios do trem braking, and the left-outboard tires overheated
de pouso externo. “Isto fez com que estes pneus and blew”, said the report.
travassem na freada brusca, com os pneus externos Maintenance personnel found that both
da esquerda superaquecendo e estourando”. IDGs were low on oil. A bearing in the nº2
O pessoal de manutenção descobriu que IDG had failed. “When the nº2 generator failed,
ambos IDGs estavam com óleo baixo. Um suporte the already stressed nº1 generator failed also”,
no IDG nº2 falhou. “Quando o gerador nº2 falhou, said the report.
o nº1, que já estava sob pressão, também falhou”.
• The crew of a Beech 1900D used the
• A tripulação de um Beech 1900D usou o parking brake to hold position on the runway
freio de estacionamento para manter posição na and then did not fully release the parking brake
pista e depois não o soltou completamente quando when takeoff clearance was issued.
a liberação de decolagem foi informada. “The aircraft handled and accelerated
“A aeronave acelerou normalmente até normally until reaching approximately V1
alcançar aproximadamente V1, onde uma speed, where a hesitation to rotate was
hesitação para rodar foi notada”, disse o primeiro- noticed”, said the first officer. “Both members
oficial. “Ambos os tripulantes simultaneamente simultaneously called for an abort, which was
optaram pela abortagem, que foi realizada sem accomplished without further incident”.
incidentes adicionais”. “Shortly thereafter, we discovered the
“Logo após o ocorrido, nós descobrimos que parking brake was partially set. After fully
o freio de estacionamento estava parcialmente releasing the brake, we departed”.
ativado. Após liberar o freio completamente, nós The first officer said that after landing, a post
decolamos”. flight inspection revealed that the outboard tire
O primeiro-oficial disse que depois de pousar, on the right main landing gear was flat-spotted
uma inspeção pós-vôo revelou que o pneu externo and deflated.
no trem de aterrissagem principal direito estava “We had not followed our company’s
parcialmente liso e desinflado. general operations-manual procedures on
“Nós não havíamos seguido o manual de obtaining an amended release after a
procedimentos gerais de operações (MGO) de ‘mechanical irregularity’”, said the first officer.
nossa companhia ao obter uma liberação após “The captain and I were removed from active
uma ‘irregularidade mecânica’“, disse o primeiro- flight status and have receives additional
oficial. “O comandante e eu fomos afastados dos training on the subject.
vôos e tivemos treinamento adicional no assunto”. “The situation could have been avoided by
“A situação poderia ter sido evitada, assegu- ensuring that the parking brake was fully
rando-se que o freio de estacionamento estava released, as required by the takeoff checklist,
completamente liberado, como requerido pelo or perhaps not setting it on an active runway”.
checklist de decolagem, ou talvez o seu não
acionamento já na pista”. • A switch that was not placed in the proper
position by a newly hired second officer (flight
• Um “switch” que não foi colocado na posição engineer) during a rushed departure resulted
correta, por um recém-contratado segundo-oficial in a Boeing 727-200’s RTO.
(engenheiro de vôo) durante uma partida apressada, “During the takeoff roll, the auto-pack-trip
Safety
Digest
22
resultou na RTO de um Boeing 727-200. system did not arm (as indicated by a green
“Durante o giro de partida, o sistema auto- light) and the takeoff was discontinued at 100
pack-trip não armou (como indicado por uma knots”, said the captain. “It turns out that the
luz verde) e a decolagem foi abortada a 100 arming switch was not moved to the armed
nós”, disse o comandante. “Isso mostra que o position”.
‘switch’ armador não foi movido para a posição The auto-pack-trip system was required for
correta”. takeoff, due to runway length and aeroplane
De acordo com o relatório, o sistema auto- weight, said the report. The system
pack-trip foi requerido para a decolagem, automatically disconnects the engine driven
devido ao comprimento da pista e ao peso do pack (which supplies conditioned air to the
avião. O sistema desconecta automaticamente cabin) if the engine loses power.
o “ engine driven pack ” (que fornece ar “The cause of the forgetting of the switch
condicionado para a cabine) se o motor perde was my allowing things to get rushed just prior
força. to takeoff and not allowing enough time for an
“A causa do esquecimento do ‘switch’ inexperienced flight engineer to catch up,” said
permitiu que as coisas fossem feitas the captain. “All checklists were accomplished,
apressadamente, momentos antes da decolagem but not in the smooth controlled fashion one
e não proporcionou tempo suficiente para um would like.”
engenheiro-de-vôo inexperiente se adaptar”, disse The second officer said that takeoff
o comandante. “Todos os checklists foram clearance was obtained sooner than expected,
realizados, mas não da maneira tranqüila e and the crew rushed to complete the before-
controlada que gostaríamos”. takeoff checklist and did not complete the
O segundo-oficial disse que a autorização checklist until the aeroplane had accelerated
de decolagem foi obtida mais cedo do que o to about 60 knots.
esperado e a tripulação se apressou para “In retrospect, we should have stopped the
completar o checklist de pré-decolagem, o qual operation instead of rushing during a critical
não foi completado até que o avião houvesse phase of flight,” said the second officer. “I
acelerado a aproximadamente 60 nós. should have voiced that I was being rushed and
“Considerando o retrospecto do incidente, did not feel comfortable.”
nós deveríamos ter interrompido a operação ao
invés de nos apressarmos durante uma fase • Not informed by his first officer of the
crítica de vôo”, disse o segundo-oficial. “Eu actual reason the aeroplane was veering toward
deveria ter dito que estava sendo pressionado the side of the runway, the captain initiated an
e não me sentia confortável.” RTO, believing that there was a flight-control
problem. The report indentified the aeroplane
• Não informado por seu primeiro-oficial only as a “medium-large transport” (with a gross
da real razão pela qual o avião estava mudando weight between 60,000 and 150,000 pounds
de direção para o lado da pista, o comandante [27,000 and 67,500 kilograms).
iniciou uma RTO, acreditando que havia um “I lined the aircraft on the centreline and
problema de controle de vôo. O relatório só turned the controls over to the first officer,” said
identificou o avião como um “transporte de the captain. “He applied the power and
médio a grande” (com peso bruto entre 60.000 commenced the take off roll. I fine-tuned the
e 150.000 libras - 27.000 e 67.500 quilos). power settings and monitored the takeoff and
“Direcionei a aeronave na linha central e the engine instruments.
passei os controles para o primeiro-oficial”, “At 104 knots, I made the 100-knot call and
disse o comandante. “Ele aplicou a força e then checked the engine instruments again. By
começou a corrida de decolagem. Ajustei os now, we were passing 115 knots, and I noticed
dados de força e monitorei a decolagem e os that the aircraft was drifting left. I thought that
instrumentos dos motores.” the first officer was a little slow in correcting
“A 104 nós, fiz o ‘call-out’ de 100 nós e depois for a wind gust.
conferi os instrumentos dos motores novamente. “When we reached about 120 knots, the
Àquela altura, nós estávamos passando 115 nós aircraft continued to drift left. I’m guessing that
e notei que a aeronave estava virando para a es-
querda. Achei que o primeiro-oficial estava um
pouco lento para corrigir uma rajada de vento.”
Safety
Digest
23
“Quando atingimos aproximadamente 120 the right main gear was about to cross the
nós, a aeronave continuou saindo para a centreline. Suspecting a possible problem at
esquerda. Acredito que o trem principal direito this time, I was just about to say something to
estava a ponto de cruzar a linha central. the first officer when he said something to the
Suspeitando um possível problema neste effect of ‘you need to take the aircraft’.
momento, eu estava quase para dizer algo ao “We are now at approximately 125 knots
primeiro-oficial quando ele disse algo como with approximately 3,700 feet of runway
‘o senhor precisa assumir a aeronave’.” remaining [V1 was 155 knots]. I immediately
“A essa altura, nós estávamos a aproxima- took control of the aircraft. I checked the engine
damente 125 nós com 3.700 pés de pista instruments; they were normal. The aircraft was
remanescente (V1 era 155 nós). Imediatamente wings-level, so I didn’t think we blew a tire.
tomei o controle da aeronave. Conferi os “I ultimately came to the conclusion that
instrumentos dos motores, que estavam normais. we had a possible flight-control [rudder]
A aeronave estava com as asas niveladas, assim problem. In light of this consideration, I elected
achei que não tínhamos um pneu furado.” to abort the takeoff.
“No final das contas cheguei à conclusão de “I’m not willing to take an aircraft airborne
que tínhamos um possível problema de controle if I suspect flight-control problems.”
de vôo (leme). Levando em conta esta The captain later discovered that the first
consideração, decidi abortar a decolagem. Não officer’s seat-latching mechanism had failed.
estou disposto a levar uma aeronave ao ar se The seat had moved back during the takeoff,
suspeito de problemas de controle de vôo”. and the first officer could not reach the rudder
O comandante descobriu mais tarde que o pedals.
mecanismo de travamento do assento do primeiro I could say that the first officer could have
oficial havia se soltado. O assento havia se movido given me more information,” said the captain.
para trás durante a decolagem e o primeiro oficial “[Neverthless], I’m quite sure the seat rolling
não conseguia alcançar os pedais do leme. back startled the first officer and the most
Eu diria que o primeiro-oficial poderia ter me important thing on his mind, rightly so, was
fornecido mais informações” disse o comandante. that someone take control of the aircraft.”
“Não obstante, estou bastante certo de que o The report said that the RTO resulted in the
deslocamento do assento para trás assustou o replacement of the aeroplane’s tires and brakes,
primeiro-oficial e a coisa mais importante em sua and the requirement for the captain to take a
mente, agindo corretamente, era de que alguém few hours of simulator training on RTO
tomasse o controle da aeronave”. procedures and a line check.
Segundo o relatório, a RTO resultou na “I guess it’s easier to attach some sort of
substituição dos pneus e freios do avião e a exi- blame to the pilot, rather then a defective part
gência para que o comandante tivesse algumas or possible lax maintenance procedures,” said
horas de treinamento simulado em procedimentos the captain. “I hope that in the future, my
de RTO e check de linha. decisions will continue to be based on what’s
“Acredito que é mais fácil atribuir algum tipo right and safe, and not on what’s expedient.”
de culpa ao piloto, do que a uma peça defeituosa
ou a possíveis procedimentos de manutenção
negligentes”, disse o comandante. “Espero que no Courtesy of the October 1998 edition of Flight Safety
futuro, minhas decisões continuem a ser baseadas Digest, compiled by the US Flight Safety Foundation
no que é certo e seguro e não no que é rápido”.
Safety
Digest
24
Tomada de Decisão X Decision-Making vs.
Julgamento do Piloto Pilot Judgement
By Curt Lewis, PE, CSP, Manager Flight Safety - American Airlines
Safety
Digest
26
O uso do processo DECIDE exige que o pilo- Using the DECIDE process requires the pilot
to pondere o resultado da ação realizada. Um to contemplate the outcome of the action taken.
resultado de sucesso deveria ser a ação que não A successful outcome should be the action that
cause nenhum dano à aeronave e aos passageiros. causes no damage to the aircraft or injury to
passengers.
Cadeia de Julgamento
Judgement Chain
O fenômeno de cadeia de julgamento
acontece quando uma decisão não adequada The judgement chain phenomenon occurs
aumenta a probabilidade de outra ocorrer. À when one poor decision increases the
medida que a cadeia cresce, a probabilidade de probability of another. As the chain grows, the
realização de um vôo seguro diminui. Para probability of a safe flight decreases. To break
quebrar a cadeia, o piloto deve identificar a the chain, the pilot must identify the
combinação de eventos que possa resultar em combination of events that may result in an
um acidente e lidar adequadamente com a accident and properly deal with the situation
situação, a tempo de impedir que o acidente in time to prevent the accident from occurring.
ocorra. Essencialmente, um piloto tem que prever Essentially, a pilot must forecast which events
quais eventos devem ser omitidos ou must be omitted or committed to avoid the
comprometidos para evitar a situação. situation.
Pesquisa: Amanda Maresh Recursos Consultados: Krouse, Research: Amanda Maresh Sources Consulted: Krouse,
Shari Stamford. (1996) Aircraft Safety. New York, NY, Shari Stamford. (1996) Aircraft Safety. New York, NY,
McGraw Hill Companies, Inc. Flight Performance: Human McGraw Hill Companies, Inc. Flight Performance:
Factors Section 6, http://www.allstar.fiu.edu/aero/ Human Factors Section 6, http://www.allstar.fiu.edu/
HumFac06.htm. 21 Jul 99. aero/HumFac06.htm. 21 Jul 99.
Cortesia Flight Deck American Airlines Courtesy Flight Deck American Airlines
Safety
Digest
27
FOQA - Possivelmente a Melhor
Ferramenta de Safety do Século 21
FOQA - Possibly the Best Safety Tool of the 21st Century
30
Reverso aberto em vôo - Boeing 767
Ban Nong Waeng, Tailândia
Reverser deployed in-flight - Boeing 767
Ban Nong Waeng, Thailand By Capt. (A330) Rocky - TAM Group Flight Safety Officer
Viena
Hong
Kong
Bancoc
ilâ
an
2320m
nd
ma
Phitsanulok
ia
Moulmein
Mt Du Ngae
1805m
Local do
acidente
Lop Buri
M 58
tK m
12
Mar de Andaman
am
ph
ae
ng
Bancoc
Golfo da
Tailândia
sofrido grande esforço no sentido vertical para suffered great effort down in the vertical axis,
baixo, seguido de forças anormais de “roll-yaw”. followed by abnormal “roll-yaw” forces.
Então veio a surpresa maior: o motor esquerdo Then came the biggest surprise: the left
foi encontrado com seus atuadores hidráulicos engine was found with its reverse hydraulic
de seu reverso em posição totalmente deslocada, activators in a totally dislocated position,
mostrando conclusivamente que o reversor do showing with no doubt, that the left engine
motor esquerdo se abriu totalmente antes da reverser opened completely before the
queda da aeronave. aircraft fall.
O Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) foi The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR)
encontrado, mas devido sua excessiva exposição was found, but due to its excessive exposure to
ao fogo intenso durante muito tempo, sua fita de the intense fire for a long time, its recording
gravação ficou totalmente derretida e nada pôde tape was totally melted and nothing could be
ser recuperado. recovered.
Felizmente foi possível recuperar dados do Luckily it was possible to recover data from
Electronic Engine Control (EEC), que forneceram the Electronic Engine Control (EEC), that
informações vitais para se analisar o supplied vital information to analyze the engine
comportamento do motor – não ficou então behavior – No doubt remained about the
nenhuma dúvida sobre a abertura do reverso. reverser opening.
O Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) foi The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) was
recuperado em melhores condições que o DFDR recovered in better conditions than the DFDR and
permitindo assim ouvir a gravação dos sons no it was possible to listen to the recording of the
cockpit e a comunicação dos últimos 30 minutos sounds in the cockpit and the communication of
da operação do NG 004. the last 30 minutes NG 004 operation.
A seguir, está a transcrição do CVR, logo após Following, the CVR transcription, right after
a decolagem até o acidente. As informações the takeoff up to the accident. The information
obtidas pelo CVR eliminaram as últimas eventuais obtained by the CVR eliminated the last
dúvidas e bem mostraram como foram os últimos eventual doubts and showed how last moments
Safety
momentos naquele cockpit. were in that cockpit.
Digest
32
Abertura do reverso
Reverser deployment
w
Ya
ll
Ro
1 2
“Janela” de recuperação
Recovery “window”
As setas enfatizam os movimentos e forças críticas.
Arrows emphasise critical movements & forces
A asa direita movendo-se mais rapidamente em ‘giro’ externo aumentou o rolling 28º+/seg
Stbd wing moving faster on outside ‘turn’ incr. lift. rolling 28º +/sec
Distúrbio do reversor
estourado para trás sobre
a asa esquerda, causando
Vertical
estol parcial
Reverser ‘plume’ blown back over port wing, causing partial stall
cal
Verti
8 seg.: Corte de combustível – Nº 1 pára, reduzindo a perda de sustentação est. para 13%
8 sec.: Fuel cutoff - Nº 1 spools down to idle, reducing est. lift loss to 13%
11.05:40: F/O [para Com.]: O senhor quer que 11.05:40: F/O [to Capt]: Do you want me
eu tire esta restrição de velocidade? to delete this speed restriction?
11.05:43: CMT: Sim. 11.05:43: CAPT: Yeah.
11.06:19: CMT: E o check pós-decolagem? 11.06:19: CAPT: And the after takeoff
11.06:20: F/O: Landing gear’s off - flaps up - check?
Check pós-decolagem está completo. 11.06:20: F/O: Landing gear’s off – flaps up
11.06:23: CMT: OK- altímetros em treze. – after takeoff check’s complete.
11.06:52: F/O [na freqüência da companhia, 11.06:23: CAPT: OK – and we got altimeters
depois de calcular em voz alta, em alemão, at thirteen.
para si mesmo]: Solo Bangkok - Lauda Quatro? 11.06:52: F/O [on company frequency after
11.06:57: LAUDA: Manutenção Lauda - calculating aloud in German to himself]:
Bangkok. Prossiga. Bangkok ground – Lauda Four?
Safety
Digest
34
Sobrecargas na empenagem
Empennage overloads
15.000 pés de descida
‘Fin’ (barbatana) 15.000Ft descent
overstressed – ‘tip’(ponta)
flexiona e falha Aeronave provavelmente caindo
Fin overstressed - tip • Parte rolando, parte curvando-descendo
flexes & fails • Velocidade “off clock” – M0.99
Aircraft prob. tumbling
• Part rolling, part diving turn
• Speed “off clock” - MO.99
Possível separação do
Nº 1 do seu pylon
Poss. Nº 1 separation
from pivot/thrust
stresses
Safety
Digest
37
Imediatamente após o acidente, diversos Immediately after the accident, a number
operadores de B-767 tentaram reconstituir o of airlines operating Boeing 767 aircraft
ocorrido com o NG 004, em seus simuladores. attempted to replay the circumstances of the
Esses esforços não chegaram aos resultados accident in their flight simulators. But these
pretendidos, pois esses simuladores não foram efforts yielded erroneous results because the
projetados para tal tipo de pesquisa e não simulators, not designed to cover such use, did
chegaram aos parâmetros necessários. not contain the performance parameters
A comissão de investigação e os fabricantes required to duplicate all the conditions of the
desenvolveram simulações mais próximas da flight.
realidade do acidente, mas sem contudo The inquiry commission and manufacturers
reproduzí-lo completamente. developed other simulations to reproduce the
A aeronave estava sendo acompanhada pela accident conditions, but without however
manutenção da empresa devido a algumas completely reproducing it.
ocorrências de alertas no sistema de reverso The company’s maintenance was following
daquele motor, porém, dentro das condições de the aircraft due to some alert occurrences in
despacho da aeronave, conforme o Minimum that engine reverse system. However, within
Equipment List (MEL). the aircraft clearance conditions, according to
A investigação finalmente concluiu que houve Minimum Equipment List (MEL).
abertura do reverso do Motor 1, precedida de Investigation finally concluded that there
aviso de “L REV ISLN VAL” (Left Reversor Isolation was opening of the Engine 1 reverse preceded
Valve), quando o sistema de “auto restore” atuou, by “L REV ISLN VAL” (Left Reverser Isolation
ciclando a luz de aviso correspondente que foi Valve) warning, when the “auto restore” system
interpretado como “Nuisance Alert”. A abertura acted flashing the corresponding warning light,
efetiva do reverso se seguiu e, pela característica that it was interpreted as “Nuisance Alert”. The
da aerodinâmica da aeronave, reduziu cerca de reverse opened and because of the aircraft
25% da sustentação da sua asa esquerda com aerodynamic characteristics, that reduced
seu decorrente abaixamento e consequente about 25% of its left wing sustentation,
elevação da asa direita. A aeronave girou para a lowering it and consequently elevating the right
esquerda derrapando e mergulhou atingindo wing. The aircraft rotated and skidded to left
rapidamente alta e excessiva velocidade, o que and dived quickly reaching high and excessive
resultou em demasiados esforços sobre a sua speed, what resulted in excessive efforts on its
cauda, resultando na ruptura do leme direcional tail, resulting in the directional-rudder rupture,
e deriva, seguida da separação do Motor 1 da followed by the Engine 1 separation from the
asa esquerda, iniciando então a seqüência de left wing, beginning then the aircraft structural
falha estrutural da aeronave. flaw sequence.
As investigações do acidente não definiram The accident investigation didn’t define
nenhuma falha específica de nenhum specific fails of any component that had
componente que tenha comandado a abertura commanded the reverse opening in that
do reverso, naquela faixa de potência e fase de potency range and phase of flight.
vôo. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) emitted Airworthiness Directives-AD and
emitiu Airworthiness Directives - AD e a Boeing Boeing also emitted Services bulletins (SB).
também emitiu Services Bulletins (SB). In most aircraft Reverser Deployment in
A questão de Reverser Deployment em vôo flight is catastrophic and so should be
na maioria das aeronaves é catastrófica e, como considered in the training programs and day
tal, deve ser bem analisada nos programas de by day operations.
treinamento e operações do dia-a-dia. Certification requirements are always
Os requisitos de homologação são sempre complied but the situation continue to be
atendidos mas continuam a tratar tal situação treated as “abnormal”.
como “Abnormal”. However, the surprise of the occasion and
Contudo, a surpresa da ocasião e o pouco the short reaction time available dictates a
tempo disponível para reação, ditam um cuidado larger care with this breakdown/situation.
maior com essa pane/situação. In other occasions with other equipment it
Em outras ocasiões com outros equipamentos, was verified that the time to identify the
viu-se que a margem de tempo para se identificar breakdown, its adverse effect on that moment
a pane, seu efeito adverso naquele momento e a and the respective action taken is very small.
tomada de ação respectiva é muito pequena. For the “Wolfgang Mozart” “crew”, in that
Para a “crew” do “Wolfgang Mozart”, naquela dark night, over Thailand, was, for sure!…
noite escura, sobre a Tailândia, certamente foi!…
Safety
Digest
38
PRIMAVERA/SPRING
PRIMAVERA/SPRING
Para os aviadores, “nem tudo For aviators, “not everything is
são flores” na “estação das flowers” in the “season of the
flores”… flowers”…
PRIMAVERA Safety
Digest
39
Razão de Acidentes
Accident ratio
1 Maior
Major
10 Menor
Minor
30 Ferimentos/danos limitados
Limited injury/damage
Atividades
Productive Activities Produtivas
Unsafe acts Atos perigosos
Tomadores
de decisão
Decisões Falhas ativas e
falíveis latentes
Active and
Decision-makers latent failures
Fallible decisions
Falhas ativas Active failures
Falhas latentes Latent failures
Falhas latentes Latent failures
Falhas latentes Latent failures
Fonte/Source: James Reason. 1990. Human Error. Cambridge University Press.