1. Schupbach 2017 (p. 42) dá a teoria da abdução de C. S. Peirce.

Uma maneira melhor de colocá-la

seria, como pensei agora [mas Schupbach antecipa no próximo parágrafo]: uma teoria H explica
E, quando a presença de H tem E MENOS surpreendente, e quando a ausência de H (não
preenchida por outra teoria H*) tem MAIS E surpreendente. (O problema descritivo central é:
como pensar esta remoção de H sem adição de H* — e.g. e se tivermos H1 e H2 explicando E
juntas? Outra: o que considerar como parte do conhecimento de fundo k? P(e|k) < P(e|h & k).) (O
problema normativo central é: por que um fato ser “surpreendente” ou não sob uma teoria é
epistemicamente relevante? Talvez colocar em termos da conversa, “mais esperado = menos
surpreendente,” ajude.) (Não importa se H+E ainda é surpreendente, ou se E-H ainda não é
surpreendente. O que importa é a diferneça, o /\.)
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2. Peter Lipton (2004) commited what seems to be a big sleight-of-hand in his derivation of the No
Miracles argument's circularity. Not all conditions for being a 'scientific realist' (which he defined
on page 184) were shown to need to be believed by one who accepts the NM argument (as
expounded on page 186).
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3. Como caracterizar a noção de circularidade sem usar noções dedutivas, ou noções como “boa
razão” (que já pressupõem que sabemos discriminar boas regras de inferências de más em alguma
medida)? Ver Lipton página 187. [Possível resposta à objeção de circularidade à dedução.]
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4. Há hipóteses menos explicativas e com menos virtude explanatória. São coisas distintas. Ou não?
Não pode ser. “H1 e H2 explicam igualmente bem os fenômenos, mas H1 é mais simples, e portanto
tem mais virtude explanatória.” Será?s
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5. On the Justification of Deduction:
- "Certain forms of thought can't be intelligibly doubted because they force themselves into every
attempt to think about anything." (The Last Word, 1997, p. 61.)
- How are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible? (P. Boghossian, 2001)
- On Basic Logical Knowledge: Reflections on Boghossian's "How are Objective Epistemic
Reasons Possible?" (Crispin Wright, 2001)
- Rule-Circularity and the Justification of Deduction (Neil Tennant, 2005)
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6. Suponha que eu sei uma série de coisas An, e faço a seguinte inferência abdutiva condizente com
minha prática abdutiva: {An} |- ABDUÇÃO não é confiável. ||| Que conclusão devo tirar disso?
Minha conclusão derruba minha confiança na inferência, o que derruba minha confiança na
conclusão, o que levanta minha confiança na inferência novamente, fechando o ciclo. Uma ideia é:
posso fazer um raciocínio dedutivo em cima do fato que a inferência I conclui pela
inconfiabilidade de I. Por exemplo: [P1] Se uma inferência é confiável, então ela não concluirá por
sua própria inconfiabilidade. [P2] A abdução concluir por sua própria inconfiabilidade. [C1] Logo, a
abdução não é confiável.

O problema aqui é P1, é claro. Ela parece falsa na forma geral: “Se uma inferência é confiável,
então ela não concluirá por uma falsidade.” Ela será verdadeira apenas se dizer: ela não concluirá
em geral por uma falsidade. Uma inferência confiável não precisa ser infalível. Agora, não podemos
dizer que “ela não conlcuirá em geral pelo valor de verdade errado para um P em específico.” Isto é
pois, para um P específico, é perfeitamente possível que nossa inferência confiável conclua
falsamente sobre seu valor de verdade. Agora, será que “regra de inferência é inconfiável” é um P
específico? Considere que uma regra de inferência tem subsumida sobre seu status de
“(in)confiabilidade” milhões de inferências. Não é nada específico. Dizer de algo confiável que
não é confiável é dizer de uma taxa de 85% de acerto dentre 100.000 inferências que a taxa de
acerto é só 35%. Isto são 50.000 erros, não apenas um.
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7. Golden. Studies of the logical structure of deduction aim at object-neutrality and context-
insensitivity. (Psillos 2007, Fine Structure.) Abduction and induction are not likewise object-neutral
and context-insensitive. We will argue now that enumerative induction is not object-neutral. Nelson
Goodman has argued in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1955) that not every predicate which regularly
manifested itself in observed cases can be “projected” to unobserved cases, wherever in the timeline
they may be. An example is “grue,” which for the purposes of this argument we assume emeralds in
2018 really do have. Therefore, good inductive practice is not insensitive to what property is being
projected. Therefore, a specification of the inferential structure of induction (what is concluded
from what) will not ignore the property at hand. We take this statement to imply that induction is
not object-neutral. We accompany no proof that induction is not context-insensitive.

We will argue now that inference to the best explanation is context-sensitive. First, that some
hypothesis H may be the best explanation is context-sensitive, as the same hypothesis can be or not
be the best depending on which other hypotheses have been considered. 1 That may have been a very
weak argument, as the footnote reveals. Granted that H is the best explanation (for E), then this
follows from that (from E).

A better argument for abduction being context-sensitive may be this. Judging whether H is the best
explanation requires background knowledge, or at least unconscious heuristics calibrated by
background experience (even if such heuristics are not GOFAI-like inferences on propositions).
This falls prey to the very same problem. Background knowledge may also be involved in judging
whether A → B. (Does “Rain → Wet floor”? Not in Trantor, where every floor is underground.)
Context-sensitivity in evaluation of premises is not context-sensitivity in inferential structure.

A better argument for abduction being context-sensitive may, then, be this. It makes no sense to
even speak about H being the best explanation unless a reference class is specified. Therefore,
abduction would only be meaningful when taken in a certain context where the {H1, …, Hn} to
which H is compared is contextually given. However, there is a counter-argument to be made here:
one may just add a template for contextual specification in the inferential structure of abduction
(like A → B can be contextually specified). So we say: “Given the available hypotheses {H1, …,
Hn} for E, H is the best explanation.”

Like we have made abduction context-insensitive above, we can make enumerative induction
object-neutral. Consider the following form for a strong numerative induction (i.e. begins from
'all'): “All observed Fs are Gs. G is a projectible property. Therefore, all unobserved Fs are Gs.” (A
possible problem arises from 'being projectible' to just meaning 'being proper for induction.' Any
inference may be valid thus. Consider schminduction: “P is proper for schminduction. P.” No
illumination or application-procedure has been provided.)

(See Psillos (2007), pp. 441-442, on context-sensitivity.)

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8. Just like we need to use in abduction the property of “explanation” to assess hypotheses, which is
a composite property that compresses multiple properties into one, we also need the composite
property of “complexity” to assess data sets. The best explanation for a data set including only
information about copper when heated in vacuum up to 100ºC and analysed with a milimeter ruler
is not very promising. Not much epistemic warrant can be extracted from this information. The best
1 We should say we are not sure that this is a proper understanding of context-sensitivy. If we could construct a
parallel or similar argument for deduction being context-sensitive, our understanding would clearly be improper. Let
us try. Modus ponendo ponens is context-sensitive because even when we have no information regarding the truth of
B, whether A implies B depends on the context. This seems dumb, of course. The point is that granted that A → B,
then this followsfrom that (from A).
explanation for a data set including information about all metals when heated to any temperature
com 0.1K to 10²³K in all environments known to us is promising indeed! (“Extremity” of the data
included is also interesting. Better to explain the behavior of copper near black holes, or in 0.1K and
10²³K, than to explan its behavior under what we take to be normal conditions. Assessing
“extremity” will depend on what seems surprising, limiting, or extreme given background
understanding of reality.)
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9. Perhaps Tim Williamson is right that abduction is the only type of inference that can introduce
theoretical terms at a higher level of abstraction than the data we used in our abductive inference.
This is because we can understand how such theoretical terms would explain what has been
observed if the theory were true. Deduction and enumerative induction are structured so as to assure
no introduction of new terms (even if the latter is ampliative, and thus introduces new content).
Psillos (2007) has a bit to say on this (p. 441-442).
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10. One explanation is enough. If you only have one explanation, and it is a good explanation, of
course you are epistemically justified to adopt it. Some remarks on this: (1) IBE mentions “best”
explanations not because one can accept good explanations only if there are worse alternatives, but
because if there are two good alternatives explanations (for total evidence, let's say) then there's
obviously no epistemic justification to be had by accepting the lesser one. This does not imply that
in the case of a single available explanation (or a single available good explanation, for one can
make zero-explanatory hypotheses at will) you do not have reason to accept it. (2) I think that if
there have been attempts to come up with other good explanations but failed, then there is more
reason o accept the singularly available good explanation than there would be if attempts at crafting
other hypotheses had never been made.
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11. Subjectless epistemology. Sabe... acho que devemos fazer sentido de questões epistêmicas tanto
em termos de sujeitos quanto em termpos de não sujeitos. Permita-me explicar esta frase críptica e
patética: creio que em cérebros de animais não humanos não existem sujeitos. Não há 'sujeito da
experiência,' não há um Eu, há apenas um sistema distribuído, multiplamente competente, e
acoplado ao seu ambiente de várias maneiras (e.g. rastreando ou discriminando objetos e
propriedades, ou tendo rotinas de comportamento especificamente talhadas para as contingências de
seu ambiente, sem raciocínio ou modelamento envolvido). Questões sobre percepção e
conhecimento já parecem surgir nestas criaturas sem sujeito (subjectless epistemic machines).

Em seres humanos (a partir de um certo grau de desenvolvimento ontogênico, e.g. lá pelos 2 anos
de idade), há tanto parte da cognição que acontece sem sujeito (i.e. subpersonal cognition) quanto
que acontece em, ou para, um sujeito (i.e. personal cognition). É possível que haja uma
epistemologia para cada parte de nós. Eu, como sujeito, obtenho conhecimento refletindo por meio
de razões e evidências internamente acessíveis. Mas mesmo assim, eu, como sistema completo,
também tenho conhecimento do tipo externista: um mero contato causal com o mundo já me
fornece evidência do mundo, mesmo que eu não saiba responder aos paradoxos céticos.
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12. Realism about understanding: when it occurs, we can solve problems. Anyone who describes
understanding and explanation as the mere satisfaction of a “cognitive itch,” a mere feeling, is
forgetting important epistemic facts about understanding. When we feel we have understood a
problem, most commonly we can actually solve the problem. Of course understanding can be
illusory, specially when one isn't too familiar with a subject (think of how many times each of us
has felt we understood what's the proper analysis of “knowledge”), but consider how often a feeling
of understanding of... the solution to a mathematical problem... what has gone wrong in a machine...
who has done what to whom... how we lost our car keys... and so on — how often they are
accompanied by being able to solve a problem. This is evidence that we reach understanding when
we reach the truth. (The Subject of Experience, by Galen Strawson, doubts that at p. 2. He also says
we only feel we understand x relative to some y that makes x understandable. Likewise, we need a y
to make x feel like a mystery. Some supposition. For nothing is intrinsically mysterious.)
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13. Varieties of knowing. “Know that” designates a static conceptual understanding.
“Know why” designates a dynamic conceptual understanding. (One understands a process, a
connection/relation/grounding, a mechanism, a causal history, something like it.)
“Know how” designates a dynamic non-conceptual “understanding.”
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14. Quacking like a duck. What's the best explanation for an object looking like a duck, walking like
a duck, and quacking like a duck? That it is a duck. There are alternative theories: it is a robot duck,
a camouflaged swain, a hallucination, a 3D animation projection, or the tip of the tail of a huge
underground creature who attracts prey via its duck-like surface tailtip. These are all worse
explanations than taking the duck at face value. Likewise, what's the best explanation for a gas
behaving exactly as if it was composed of numerous tiny molecules? Not the intrumentalist
interpretation, I'm sure.