Having justification for belief, even if one does not believe, or at least not on that basis.

(Propositional / situational justification.)

Having justification for belief, and believing on that basis. (Doxastic / belief justification.)

Having justification for belief, and believing on that basis, and having internal access (knowledge?)
of what is the basis of that belief. (Weak internalist doxastic justification.)

Recall the content must also be justified. The event P may cause me to believe that P, but not in the
right way. Here is a silly example: an alien is found, this causes an extremely unreliable news
source to report this, and this report causes me to believe that an alien has been found. he same goes
wih memory, and I've got a realistic example for this (just in case realism is a form of
methodological caution): I am poisoned, which causes me to vomit, which causes me to believe that
I have been poisioned (in the past). This is not the same as remembering I have been poisoned.
(Remembering is similar to knowledge. Both are factive and their content must have appropriate
connections with their referents, even if those are not causal. Perception is similar!)

Having justification for belief, and believing on that basis, having internal access of what is the
basis of that belief, and also having internal access (knowledge?) to its being justificatory. (Strong
internalist doxastic justification.)

How much does internal accessibility require epistemic justification, or relates to knowledge? Do
regress problems threaten?

Quando olho para um campo esverdado, decerto tenho justificação epistêmica para acreditar que há
mais do que dez folhas de grama no campo — mas devemos dizer que eu acredito, ou ainda que eu
sei, que há mais do que dez folhas de grama ali? Este pensamento parece jamais passar por minha
mente. Com base nisso, sou inclinado a dizer que não, nem sei nem acredito que há mais do que dez
folhas de grama em minha frente. Precisa, no entanto, algo passar por minha mente para que seja
uma crença? Preciso entreter a ideia que zebras não usam pijamas para crer, ou saber, que elas não o
fazem? Não sei.

Pensamento curioso: suponha que sim, é preciso entreter algo conscientemente para crê-lo. Esta
tese parece implicar que, se alguém não for capaz de pensar especificamente sobre o número 20,¹
então este ser não acreditará, nem saberá, que há mais do que vinte gotas de água no mundo. —
Disso, não podemos retirar nenhum absurdo, provido que haja uma explicação alternativa sobre o
fato que tais seres de algum modo pressupõem haver muito mais água do que isso.

¹Seres humanos dotados de plenas capacidades linguísticas podem não conseguir pensar sobre
números grandes específicos, como o sete ou o vinte. Se não aprenderam um sistema de contagem,
então suas noções quantativas serão meramente estimativas; "20" e "25" são essencialmente
indistinguíveis. É preciso não só linguagem em geral, como uma linguagem especial à matemática,
que nomeie cada número, e torne o contínuo das quantidades em uma sequência digital de
quantidades. (Um sistema de contagem no corpo, como contagem nos dedos, também serve.) Sendo
assim, seres humanos de certas tribos, ou crianças de um ano e meio, ou animais não-humanos, não
acreditarão em nada acerca de números específicos.

Nem todo contato causal é uma instância de percepção. Se vejo um campo através de óculos tão
escuros que sou incapaz de discriminar se é um campo recheado de grama ou um campo de terra
batida, então não se pode dizer que percebo a grama do campo. Percebo apenas o campo. (É
possível perceber algo apenas em algumas de suas propriedades. São apenas estas propriedades que
conhecerei.)

Não percebo a propriedade dos objetos à minha volta de emitirem elétrons. Como colocar este fato?

Preciso da percepção tanto para aprender algo por mim mesmo quanto por meio de testemunho, e
ainda preciso de minha memória para reter o que foi aprendido.

Quatro tipos básicos de fundamentação para crenças: percepção, introspecção, memória, e a priori
(intellectual seemings). Há também testemunho, indução, abdução, que não são básicas: o
testemunho do outro se conectou com a realidade por meio de uma das quatro formas (apesar de
memória ser um produto das outras três...), e as inferências usam premissas conhecidas por meio
dessas quatro formas também. (“Abdução” é ampla o suficiente para englobar os padrões
inferenciais das ciências empíricas.)

Três tipos de fundamentação para crença (again): causal (o que te fez acreditar?), justificacional (o
que te dá justificação?), e epistêmica (o que te dá conhecimento?).

Termos alternativos para intro-specção: autodirigido (self-directed), autoconhecimento, … .

Virtue reliabilism may be the position that encapsulates thoughts I've had for the past year about it
being proper for a rational agent to have certain prima facie (defeasible)* suppositions: (i) that it is
not crazy, i.e., that its intellectual seemings are reliable, that it's reasoning faculties are in order, that
what is distinct and clear is likely to be true; (ii) that things are as they (memorially, introspectively,
perceptually) appear; (iii) and that that knowledge is a natural state for it. Here's J. C. Watson's IEP
article detailing Linda Zagzebski's thoughts on this:

«It may be that “only 5 per cent of a creative thinker’s original ideas turn out to be true,”
Zagzebski explains. “Clearly, their truth conduciveness in the sense of producing a high proportion
of true beliefs is much lower than that of the ordinary virtues of careful and sober inquiry, but they
are truth conducive in that they are necessary for the advancement of knowledge [for humans as a
group].” (2000: 465)»

*They may be overridden, by justification to an incompatible belief. They may be undermined

(undercut), by removing justification for the belief (without justifying an incompatible belief). (All
overridings undercut, of course.)

Existem percepções e existem perceptíveis. Crenças sobre perceptíveis nem sempre são crenças
perceptuais.

Ordinariamente, talvez se diria que existem quatro elementos na percepção: (i) o objeto percebido,
(ii) a representação do objeto, (iii) a relação causal entre o objeto e sua representação, e (iv) o
sujeito ao qual a representação é apresentada. (É possível que a representação seja uma
_modificação_ do estado do sujeito. Seria uma representação entendida fenomenicamente.) Uma
epistemologia sem sujeito rejeitaria iv, e entenderia a representação funcionalmente. (A relação
causal deve ser apropriada. Beware of devian causal chains.) Cara, eu gosto de escrever bem
rápido, é uma atividade prazerosa. Eu tenho treinado errar menos enquanto eu escrevo rápido.

Note: "Perception" varies continuously in degrees (and perhaps along more than one dimension),
and the epistemology of each kind of perception differs a bit. (Asking at WHAT POINT does
perceptual knowledge begin is foolishness.)

Look at this merrily important, yet subtle distinction. There are three degress of perception.
1. Simple, non-conceptualized perception. I may perceive an orange without perceiving it to have
any particular attribute. “There is something here.” (What is this something? I don't know, but I do
perceive it.)

2. Middle, semi-conceptualized, attributive, “objectual” perception. De re. This is attributing a

property to an object, but without we taking into account any proposition we may believe. In
perceiving a lemon to be yellow I may be lead to believe the proposition “this orange is yellow,” yet
my middle-type perception is perceiving the lemon to be yellow. Room for error exists, but at
attributing properties to objects: I may mistake a horse to be a winged horse. (Property mistake. I
believe only half-wrongly, given that a horse does exist. The object is selected.) Objectual
perception seems to entail simple perception, perhaps because its being factive require its
having a reference, and simple perception always fixes reference. See fn 1 below.

3. Complex, conceptualized, propositional perception. De dicto. Maximal room for error: I might
believe “there is a boat” while there is none. The belief has no reference. I'm not wrong about an
object. (Can't I be propositionally wrong about an object?) (Object mistake. Notice that I do
perceive a cow to be a boat, but the complex perception is perceiving there to be a boat at all.) Here
is an interesting example. Oedipus perceives and believes his mom to be sexy, but he neither
perceives neither believes that his mom is sexy. (Notice that inside “that” we have “his mom,”
whereas “his mom” is outside “to be.” This grammatical feature, as it turns out (for it could have
turned out otherwise, contrary to linguistic philosophers), reflects an independent fact about reality
whose thinking about is not, of course, conditioned by this grammatical feature.) A child perceives a
tachistochope to be noisy, but not that it is noisy. The associated name or description matters to
propositional attitudes and perception. (Sorry. I am unsure whether I have even given an example
which is not of propositional belief.)

[Idea: Propositional perception does not require simple or attributive perception. The evidence
comes from a class of counter-examples. These are “mental seemings” (for lack of a more precise
term) which are propositional, which have been generated by ordinary processes 1 inside perceptual
systems, which may or may not be believed, which are existential or attributive (and I think the
latter entail the former), and which refer to nothing.]

On factivity: maybe we can reject that propositional perception can be (or is) non-factive. Cases of
misperception, such as hallucination, are not cases of perception. Likewise, we can reject that
propositional remembrance can be (or is) non-factive. Misremembering that P is not a kind of
remembering that P, or any kind of remembering.

The above account may be fumbled by identifying propositions with things in the world. The de re /
de dicto distinction can still be preserved by talking about sentential guises, of course.

1 That is, processes which produce, or normally produce, our most frequent propositional perceptions. Note: these
seem to be linked to both simple and objectual perception. The most common variety of propositional perceptions
may acquire reference via simple perception.
Propositional perception can be true or false, like propositional belief can. For instance, the
perception an eye doctor or an elementary 1970s teacher has of a tachitoscope. Objectual
perception, like objectual belief, cannot — it can only be accurate or inaccurate. Maybe we don't
want to call it 'belief,' by rather 'property attribution.' (A child may have an accurate belief about a
tachitoscope, e.g. she believes the tachitoscope to be noisy. But is there any proposition she believes
in (regarding tachitoscopes or noisiness)? If not, then it cannot be a true or false belief. (But perhaps
she believes that “there is something noisy here.”) (Also see that believes of approval or admiration,
let's say, are said to be appropriate or not, but not true or false.)

As it happens, both perceiving to be and perceiving that are factive. If a straight stick is bent,
perhaps we may say that “I perceive it as if it were bent,” or some variation thereof, but not that “I
perceive it to be bent,” and even more clearly not that “I perceive that it is bent.” What do you
think?

(Visual images are percepts; so are phenomenal smells and whatnot. Why not call them qualia?
Because they are a specific kind of qualia: the ones appropriately generated by sensory perception.)