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Resumo
Lançando mão de diferentes linhas de análise – da violência e subjetividade,
da antropologia legal e das práticas de parentesco –, proponho nesse
artigo considerar a entrega de uma criança em adoção como uma forma de
sofrimento social. Em vez de enfocar o fenômeno espetaculr de “trafico” ou
o “rapto” de crianças, examino a “violência cotidiana” na prática rotineira de
adoção legal. Em particular, viso demonstrar como a adoção plena emerge
como uma forma de violência burocrática estatal que arrisca aumentar o
sofrimento que pesa sobre a experiência. Conforme essa linha de raciocínio,
investigo o “de-kinning” de mães de nascimento, i.é., o esforço institucional
investido em desfazer a categoria naturalizada da maternidade biológica.
Contudo, minha questão principal, elaborada na segunda parte desse texto, é
como esse processo é experimentado pelas pessoas mais envolvidas. Ao todo,
meu propósito é olhar de perto situações nas quais a análise de discursos
e práticas revela as ambivalências da experiência social, introduzindo
assim novos elementos nos debates sobre políticas sociais, e ampliando as
possibilidades criativas da “plasticidade” do parentesco.
Palavras-chave: violênciae subjetividade, antropologia legal, práticas de
parentesco, sofrimento social
Abstract
Bringing together different strands of social analysis – the work on violence
and subjectivity, legal anthropology and studies on kinship practices –, I
propose in this article to treat a woman’s giving away her child as a form of
social suffering. Rather than focusing on the more spectacular phenomenon
of “traffic” and “abduction” of children, I approach the “everyday violence” in
adoption practices. In particular, I propose to demonstrate how legal plenary
adoption emerges as a form of state-organized bureaucratic violence that
“further burdens experience”. Following this line of reasoning, I investigate
the “de-kinning” of birthmothers, i.e., the institutionalized effort that goes
2 See Yngvesson (2002) on the distinction between «giving» and «giving away» in the adoption process.
3 The “voice” we refer to here (according to the work of S. Cavell, paraphrased by Das) is not “that
of speech or utterance [but rather] that which might animate words, give them life, so to say…[…]…
Words, when they lead lives outside the ordinary, become emptied of experience, lose touch with life—in
Wittgenstein, it is the scene of language having gone on a holiday.” (Das 2007: 6) This remark was aimed
particularly at the register of the philosophical, but we might say that it applies with equal relevance to
the spheres of law and politics.
Policies and programs participate in the very violence they seek to respond to
and control. Bureaucratic indifference, for example, can deepen and intensify
human misery by applying legal, medical, and other technical categories that
further burden social and individual experience (Kleinman 2000: 239).
4 See the work of Modell (1994), Motta (2005), Kendall (2005), Mariano (2008), and Högbacka (2010) for
studies in different parts of the world that attempt to restitute the narratives of birthmothers.
5 In contrast to the medieval “wheel” – a sort of gyratory infant-sized mail box on the outside wall of
the maternity ward –, accouchement sous-x allows for a woman to check into the hospital and give birth
without leaving any record of her name.
6 Mères dans l’Ombre translates as “Mothers in the shadows”, and Les X en Colère as “The angry Xs”.
Brazilian birthmothers
What Brazilian birthmothers want and feel is rather more nebulous, con-
sidering that, although Brazil has witnessed in past decades an impressive
proliferation of support groups for adoptive parents, the country holds to
date no collective movement uniting birth families. However, by looking at
Article 166 of the country’s 1990 Children`s Code allows for what is known as
“direct adoption” – the possibility of birth parents handing over their child to
a family they themselves have selected, on the condition that the courts ex-
amine and approve the transaction. In Brazil today, estimates are that between
50 and 75% of legal adoptions take place in this fashion, restricting court in-
terference to the final step of accepting or rejecting the arrangement agreed
upon by the birth and adoptive families (Ayres 2008). Yet, despite the techni-
cal legality of the process, one finds in the daily press repeated mention of
authorities from hospitals, youth councils and the state attorney`s office bent
on denouncing just this kind of “direct adoption” as though it were illegal9.
7 The as yet tenuous penetration at the time of state bureaucracy into everyday affairs facilitated
“clandestine” adoption (in which the office of public registry would issue the child’s birth certificate as
though it had been born to its adoptive parents) as well as intercountry adoption (Fonseca 2007).
8 In Portuguese, Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente, known as ECA.
9 The ambivalence Brazilians experience in relation to adoption procedures can be seen in Brazil’s
most recent amendment to the Children’s Code, known as the “Adoption Law” (n. 12.010) passed on
August 3, 2009. A clause that criminalized direct adoption, making out-of-court arrangements liable
to a punishment of prison and fine, was removed from the bill a few weeks before it was approved in
Congress (Couto 2009). Interestingly enough, instead of criminalizing direct adoption, the law’s final
version attempts to better regulate the process, adding six new sub-paragraphs to the existing article
(166) of the Children’s Code.
10 See Pedro (2003) and Rohden (2003) for historical data on the rather erratic judicial condemnation
of women who have thus “exposed” their children.
11 Agência Estado: “Polícia encontra bebê de 5 dias vendido pela mãe no RS”, March 4, 2010.
12 In May of 2010, newspapers reported that the Central Registry contained a list of 5000 adoptable
children , and a waiting list of 27.000 candidates to adoptive parenthood (see Folha de São Paulo 9/5/2010).
Adoption specialists generally add that many of the available children (being older, darker or in fragile
health) do not correspond to the profile most adopters are looking for.
13 Piscitelli (2009), in her study of professional prostitutes, makes a similar provocation about sex
workers who are prevented by “protective” legislation against traffic of persons from freely exercising
their prerogative to cross national borders.
A second, perhaps more pervasive, motive for isolating birth families from
participation in the adoption process may be found in moral attitudes, unop-
posed in Brazil by any birthmothers’ social movement, that condemn the lack
of humanity of any woman who voluntarily gives her child away. Just as in
other Western (and non-Western) countries, in Brazil as well there has been
much discussion of late about “safe haven” laws (Fonseca 2009c). Seizing
upon a few spectacular episodes of newborn children found (sometimes
dead, sometimes alive) in a “dump heap”, legislators have moved to offer “an
alternative” to desperate women, “decriminalizing abandonment” in safe cir-
cumstances, and allowing reluctant mothers to give up their babies in com-
plete anonymity. The mood has given rise to public campaigns, such as that
in Rio de Janeiro (2011), in which pamphlets, stamped with the cartoon image
of a baby dropping into a trash can (framed by a red traffic sign symbolizing
an imperative “no”), were to be distributed whole-sale in public maternity
wards. The idea announced in the title of the pamphlet and explained in the
text that follows is to persuade women, rather than to carelessly abandon an
unwanted child (exposing it to harm or death), to give it up in adoption. One
may well wonder at the efficacy of this message. (The studies of women and
girls who actually do somehow put an end to their newborn child’s life depict
them as so isolated in their disorientation that they are not likely to seek or
take in information on alternatives – O’Donavan 2002). But what really stands
14 This expression has been documented in ethnographies in other parts of Brazil (Mariano 2008) and
Latin America (Drouilleau 2011).
To lend weight to arguments that might “animate words”, “giving them life”,
and thereby counteract the violence of bureaucratic categories, we propose
now a “descent into the ordinary”, through fragments drawn from the lived
experience of different Brazilian subjects involved in the adoption process.
A birthmother’s narrative
The high probability that their behavior will be the object of public com-
mentary has an inevitable effect on the way women narrate their story. It is
thus not surprising to hear birthmothers resorting to stereotypes, either to
refute them (“I never abandoned my child”), or to endorse them (with tales of
maternal “sacrifice” made to ensure their child’s welfare). However, differing
somewhat from third party observations, the birthmother’s tale of sacrifice
tends to dwell more on the details of socioeconomic differences: “There [with
the adoptive family], he has everything; I don’t have even half as much”; “She
was well brought up – good education, comfortable house [..] Was I going to
take her back just to leave her knocking about this slum?” 16 At the same time,
by emphasizing the adoptive parents’ great attachment to the child, the nar-
rators convey the idea that not only have they rendered a service to the new
parents, they have also guaranteed fulfillment of the child’s emotional needs:
16 In this sub-section, I deal with birthmothers interviewed in their homes during fieldwork in working
class neighborhoods of Porto Alegre, 1993-1994.
[She went to my house] and asked, “Did you decide?” I said, “Yes I did. You’re
going to get him.” “Are you sure?” she asked. “Yes, take her right now before
I change my mind”. So she took the baby and I stayed behind. I didn’t last an
hour. I went running to get the baby back. And she said, “Look, Eliane. You
have to be sure about this. We don’t want to pressure you”. She gave me a week
to make up my mind… One week later, I went to her house. We just sat there
crying – the baby there in the crib and the two of us crying. Finally I said, “No,
you keep him”.
By emphasizing the respect her child’s adoptive mother showed her, Eliane
appears to highlight the virtue of her own reasoned consent. The other wom-
an’s delicate patience is offered as proof that this birthmother has been recog-
nized as worthy partner in the decisions that will affect her child’s future.
Coming back to her present-day circumstances, Eliane lets us know that,
despite all, she has no ambivalence about her motherhood. She claims to
have carefully guarded the child’s umbilical cord as a remembrance. And, to
this day, she keeps up on her child’s well-being, making episodic visits to his
“I always say, even if I won at the lottery and could pay them back, I wouldn’t
do that. Sure I could if I wanted to. After all, he’s my son. Just think of it!
Imagine if I could reunite all my children! But I wouldn’t want to hurt them
[the adopted parents]. It would be an awful thing. Just think! After six years
caring for him. Of course they love the child. And him? All he wants is to be
with his parents.”
In her telling of the story, it would appear that the issue is not so much
Eliane’s personal relation with her son. It is, rather, the relationship she has
established with the adoptive parents – one that has preserved her dignity as
a caring mother.
The fact that the overwhelming majority of adopted children throughout the
world come from situations of war or poverty points to the structural vio-
lence that underwrites the social suffering involved in “relinquishing” a child
for adoption. I suggest that this suffering has been understated in hegemonic
representations because of a political economy in which the “negotiation” of
meanings between the different partners in dialogue is marked by extreme
inequality (see, for example, Marre and Briggs 2009). Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that the “clear contractual terms” of adoption provided by court-conduct-
ed procedures appear more in keeping with adoptive parents’ sensitivities
than with those of birthparents.
Mediators I interviewed consistently assured me that potential adopt-
ers are after “a child of their own”, unburdened by other family connections.
In most situations, they have no particular desire to establish a relationship
with their adopted child’s mother – most likely a person of different origin
and class. They are (understandably) reluctant to deal with the birthparents’
ambivalences. And they are leery about entering into a transaction of great
Much of what goes into adoption law and policy – whether on the local, na-
tional or international level – is governed by the principle of a “child’s best
interest”. Yet, the exact content of this principle – what exactly constitutes a
child’s best interest – is far from self-evident. During the first decades of the
Post-World-War-II era, adoptees were often rebuffed as neurotics or the result
of a “bad adoption” if they went in search of their origins. Today most pro-
fessionals working in the area consider it normal, if not imperative, for ad-
opted youngsters to seek information on or contact with their birthfamilies.
Of course not all adoptees are interested in having a second set of parents
(Howell 2006, Yngvesson 2010), and some reject outright the idea of meet-
ing their birthparents. However, among those adoptees I have interviewed or
17 On the other hand, in many American states, legal measures approved to permit the “unsealing” of
adoption records were accompanied by clauses designed to ensure against any spill-over effect that might
amplify the rights of birthparents (Carp 2004). In other words, the adoptee and only the adoptee was to
have free access to information. In Argentina, an amendment to the law regulating the centrally-run
adoption registry was recently introduced to strike any mention of concluded adoptions, thus avoiding
the possibility of birthparents tracing down the whereabouts of their offspring (Tarducci 2011).
It is evident that all the different actors in the adoption triad are subject to
suffering. And, certainly, there is a “social” dimension to this suffering on all
sides. Prevalent attitudes on the ´tragedy” of infertility, the “childless family”,
and the second-rate nature of adoptive parenthood weigh heavy on adoptive
parents (see Nascimento, this volume). Similarly, the adoptee must deal with
the pity or suspicion of others for being a “rejected” child, deprived of his
“real parents”, and, for that reason, perhaps even liable to personality disor-
ders. Such social representations are the motor force of violence in everyday
life. Yet, one might argue, the birthparents’ suffering is compounded by a
number of factors. First, in most situations, they have been subject to severe
structural violence in the form of poverty and discrimination. It is significant
that the parents (often steeped in poverty, illness and drug dependency) who
have been unilaterally stripped of their parental authority seldom present
any formal opposition19. One might suppose they are used to being treated
as non-persons, and may even see themselves in that way. Birth parents who
have “voluntarily” relinquished a child to a family they have chosen may be
slightly better off, but the stigma of having thus “abandoned” a child makes
it difficult for them to form associations or otherwise bring their experience
– attitudes, interests, demands – to public debate.
It is precisely the complex relationship between recognition of suffer-
ing in the public sphere and suffering experienced in people’s everyday lives
that concerns us. The episode that opened this article is symptomatic of how
a birthmother, caught in the bureaucratic machinery of the legal system, is
coerced into forgoing the publically-mediated recognition of her maternal
status. Here, one might well consider how state intervention is designed to
operate, playing on the partisan plasticity of norms that alleviate “the human
misery” of some sufferers while ignoring or even intensifying that of others.
There is an interesting parallel to be drawn with the contribution
Margaret Lock (2000, 2002) brings to the discussion of violence in everyday
life. In her studies on donors and receivers of transplanted organs, she con-
centrates on the variegated mediation of specialists who decide crucial is-
sues such as the moment of death that renders a person’s organs available
for transplants and the criteria for ordering the list of patients waiting for